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Abstract
This study arose from the intersection of a number of concerns, chiefly: the need for
informed decision making by the public, including scientists, in issues involving science
and technology; the inadequacy of school science in preparing students for this task; the
inadequacy of curriculum development processes in effectively using the combined
expertise of curriculum stakeholders; and the strong interest of curriculum stakeholders in
just what school science should be. Accordingly, the study set out to inform debates about
each of these issues by addressing underlying causes. T h e particular underlying cause
studied was the nature of school Science and h o w it could and should characterise that
broader entity, science.
School science is traditionally characterised in one or two dimensions: as knowledge
or processes or both. This has been the situation for so long the correspondence between
the school subject Science and science itself tends not to be questioned. A relatively small
number of authors in the education literatures have been critical of this situation, and so the
present study sought to re-examine the characterisation of science for the school
curriculum. However, an obvious rejoinder to the question, W h a t is the nature of science?
is another question, W h o s e view of science should be used? Given the disparity of views
a m o n g science curriculum stakeholders, the present thesis sought not to add yet another
view to the debate, but to 'map' the various views with the aim of providing a framework
within which all stakeholders could add to informed discussion and decision making. The
present thesis identified the metascientific literature as such a suitable basis, whose
authority is recognised by stakeholders as a group. It comprises the publicly available,
refereed scholarly body of research into the nature of science. Thus the present thesis
interprets this as the central research question, H o w does the metascientific literature
characterise science?
Through a semantic analysis of summary statements, such as definitions of science,
the present thesis identified characterisations of science in the literature as being
multidimensional, not uni- or bi-dimensional as traditionally used. In particular, the present
thesis suggests knowledge, activity, purpose, structure, belief system and context as six
interactive dimensions that account for characterisations of science in the metascientific
literature. It further suggests that these dimensions provide a m o r e robust basis for
characterising science in the school curriculum.
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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

This is a thesis about the nature of school Science. Specifically, it seeks to inform
debate about what the nature of school Science could and should be. It interprets this debate
as a question of w h y and h o w the general school curriculum can robustly represent,
portray, or characterise science and h o w this characterisation can be improved. O f central
concern to the present thesis is the argument that, to the extent that the subject called school
Science corresponds to the field or discipline called science, the decisions by curriculum
developers and curriculum stakeholders about that correspondence should be well
informed. This thesis seeks to inform those decisions.
T h e nature of school Science is significant because of at least two debates. O n e arises
from broad public concern about science education and education generally, and another
because different groups of curriculum stakeholders in contemporary, pluralistic
democracies have different views about what school Science should be. In response the
present thesis seeks to inform these debates, and provide a framework that accommodates
these diverse views by grounding discussion in the metascientific literature, that is, the
published, peer-reviewed, publicly available body of scholarly analysis of science.
T h e present thesis pays only peripheral attention to factors other than the nature of
science that can and do influence the nature of school Science, such as student readiness
and interest, current issues, matters of learning, matters of teaching, or matters of
curriculum implementation. These factors are important and legitimate issues for curriculum
developers to consider, and will affect the present thesis and be affected by it. However,
they are not the central issue here.
These introductory remarks introduce several terms that are important in the present
thesis, such as characterise, robust and the general school curriculum Their meanings here

should be clarified. The term characterise is used to mean represent or portray Xhe peculiar,
typical, distinctive or distinguishing features or qualities of science (The

Macquari
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Dictionary). The term robust is used here to m e a n strongly built (The

2
Macquarie

Dictionary), in the sense of beingrigorous,soundly constructed and thoroughly grounded
in scholarly analysis of science.
The term general is used to mean the school curriculum provided for all students. The
school curriculum addressed by the present thesis is the curriculum for years K-12, that is,
from kindergarten to the end of secondary schooling. It is possible for a school system to
devise special curricula, such as for preparing particularly able students for tertiary science
and technology studies, for students with learning difficulties, for a vocational program,
and so forth. For such curricula, and even for K-12 generally, it m a y be argued that only
some aspects or dimensions of science need be addressed at the school level. The present
thesis will argue against this, but in any event the very possibility of specialised curricula is
a distraction from the present purpose, which is h o w to differentiate the characteristics of
science for various curriculum purposes w h e n those purposes pre-suppose the nature of
school Science. Therefore natures of differentiated school Sciences will not be addressed
except to show that the present thesis applies to all school science curricula.
While this thesis claims to inform curriculum development generally, its focus is on
curricula in contemporary pluralistic democracies, using the Australian context, and
particularly N e w South Wales ( N S W ) , to provide a related set of examples.

Overview of the thesis
In brief, this thesis argues that a suitable, indeed necessary, authority for deciding the
nature of science in the school curriculum is the metascientific literature. T w o of its
premises are that, first, school Science needs to represent or characterise science more
authentically or robustly, and secondly that this cannot be done unless the decision-making
processes involving science curriculum stakeholders are improved. A sound grounding in
the metascientific literature addresses both.
A semantic analysis of s u m m a r y statements of science (ch. 4) shows that the
metascientific literature characterises science in multiple dimensions, not just in the one or
two (knowledge and/or processes) traditionally used in curriculum documents. T h e present
analysis suggests six interdependent dimensions of characterisation: knowledge, activity,
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structure, context, purpose and belief system. T h e six are developed in six dedicated
chapters, one for each, by analysing the use of various elements used in the literature to
characterise science. T h e findings of this analysis and theorising then lead to
recommendations for the rationale and nature of science in the school curriculum. The
scope of these recommendations is limited to the nature of school Science, and does not
include questions of learning,teachingor curriculum implementation except as implications
of the analysis.
The present thesis refers to the literature throughout, but it does so in several ways.
Hence, the literature review (ch. 2), methodology discussion (ch. 3) and bibliography are
linked. Their respective roles are to:
•

direct the reader to the basis for the aim, method and data source;
explain h o w the literature was analysed and the findings from this analysis
were interpreted; and

•

list the references used.

The term, the literature, is used here as a shorthand for the literatures of several
research fields: science education, general education, curriculum, education policy, the
sciences, history of science, philosophy of science, sociology of science, science policy,
and fields within fields such as learning theory and the public understanding of science.
T h e semantic analysis of summary statements takes its data from the metascientific
literature, and educational argument takes its aim and context from the educational and
metascientific literatures. The majority of sources used were scholarly sources, including
books and journals on education, science and metascience. Other sources were articles in
reference books, fiction, and curriculum and policy documents. The term metascientific

literature is used here to mean literature about science: the statements and arguments abou
the nature of science. It includes the passages and chapters in the scientific literature that
discuss the nature of science. M o r e often, it means the texts, journals and indeed whole
scholarly fields of study devoted to the nature of science, notably the history, philosophy,
sociology and policy of science. Because the present thesis ultimately seeks a 'mainstream'
view of science for the curriculum, it interprets the literature more broadly than would be
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necessary for particular metascientific arguments. The criteria and procedures used in
selecting from and reviewing the literature are discussed in the methodology chapter.
Some concerns and premises that preface the thesis

The purpose and approach of this thesis can be better introduced and understood by
setting d o w n some of the author's motivating concerns and some presumptions or premises
about the science curriculum. Broadly, these were concerns about science, society and the
science curriculum. A s issues they can all be found in the science education, curriculum and
metascientific literatures, but the reasons w h y these and not some other valid issues arose
are found in the prior experiences and orientations of the researcher:
T o begin with, any researcher, no matter h o w unstructured or inductive, comes to
fieldwork with some orienting ideas, foci, and tools ... At the outset... w e usually
have at least a rudimentary conceptual framework, a set of general research
questions, some notions about sampling, and some initial data gathering devices.
(Miles & Huberman 1984, pp. 27-28)
These matters are mentioned below in no particular order. While some sort of logical order
could be reconstructed, they emerged as issues to m e more or less concurrently and
gradually converged as several clusters of questions that led to the present study.
1) There are strong but disparate views of science and its significance

One stimulus for the present thesis was the strong and increasing societal interest i
science, often together with technology, and in education, specifically science education.
M a n y authors have characterised science in the twentieth century as a dominant influence in
western societies, and an emerging force in non-western cultures. Scientific thought has
been a significant theme in the history of Western European culture (Tarnas 1991) but the
latter half of the twentieth century has seen great changes in science and in speculation
about the nature of science and its role in society. Just one area of this interest has been the
inextricable links between science and technological and economic developments, which
have brought its influence to the attention of m a n y sectors of contemporary industrialised
societies (Ravetz 1971; Toffler 1981; Ziman 1984).
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Ironically, increasing public interest in science is accompanied by popular perceptions

that are inadequate and obsolete. The public hold powerful, although mixed, images of

science that are well documented in the literature (Edge 1995; Lewenstein 1995; Wynne
1995; Cozzens & Woodhouse 1995). Some images characterise science as essentially
benevolent, other as malevolent, and some as neutral. Two Australian examples will

suffice. Robyn Williams, presenter of The Science Show, broadcast nationally on radio

the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), sees science as powerful because it is
enabling, and therefore a source of pride:

Both Sir Karl Popper and his admirer Sir Peter Medawar have celebrated the Open
Society as one of the greatest ornaments of m o d e m democracy. They put science
at the very centre of this ornament: 'Mankind's [sic] greatest achievement', says
Medawar. The reason they do so is because of the splendid scientific tradition of
free discussion, scepticism, the pursuit of truth and a truly international network of
communication. (Williams 1987, p. 48)
The biologist Charles Birch has also characterised science and technology as powerfu
this power is somewhat foreboding:
The most powerful and disruptive forces of the twentieth century are science and
technology. The world's most pressing political, social and economic problems
have their origin in science and technology. The population explosion, economic
growth, pollution and environmental deterioration, the means of war, the limits to
growth, disparities of wealth and urbanisation. (Birch 1976,1980 p. 324)

Despite the differences between these views, they share a widely held belief that sc

become a significant force in society. This belief underlies much of the rationale f
education in the school curriculum. For example, it formed part of the rhetoric for

future scientists and technologists, particularly dominant since the 1950s and 1960s,

for public science literacy that became popular in the 1970s and 1980s. Various curr
stakeholders still articulate these rhetorics today.
Such powerful but mixed images of science are significant for school science
education. First, these images imply that science is worthwhile learning. Secondly,
different views of science imply different curriculum experiences, as we will see.
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The increasingly utilitarian views of science and science education

In the closing decades of the twentieth century, the value of both science and
education have if anything been judged more instrumentally, especially by governments and
industry. In the 1980s and 1990s, Australia, Great Britain, the U S A and s o m e other
countries pursued public policies that were strongly influenced by instrumentalist economic
considerations that gave market forces greater prominence in determining a range of policies
concerning both the private and public sectors. There has been increasing pressure on
public and service sectors to be more efficient and accountable, for example as determined
by education and science policies.
Thus school Science is one of several curriculum areas that has c o m e under scrutiny
for its capacity to serve national economic interests and, explicitly in some countries,
security interests. Rhetorics such as science literacy became less central than rhetorics of

competitiveness, efficiency and accountability. Interest in quantifying the behaviour and
productivity of systems has led to a trend of management by objectives. There has been a
correspondingrisein pressure on the curriculum to become more vocational and pragmatic
(Ruby 1991). Skilbeck (1987) has argued that these changes challenge the values of a
classic liberal education, the imputation being that such an education is somehow a 'luxury'
that is out of place and perhaps not particularly relevant to a modern, enterprising and
productive culture.
The people and institutions that comprise the science communities have also been
subject to similar pressures. For example, 1989 saw both the Australian Government begin
establishing a series of science research centres, and the Australian Minister for Science,
Barry Jones, call for scientists to be more active in seeking sponsorships and funding
grants. Research funds are decreasingly characterised by relatively independent control by
universities and regular growth, and increasingly characterised by the goals of projects with
fairly short projections and identifiable economic benefit. T h e value of so-called pure
science is increasingly measured in terms of short- to medium-term economic return. The
links between the rise of utilitarian values, an economic imperative and science and
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technology are illustrated well by the then Minister for Education, Employment and
Training urging Australians to m a k e Australia 'the clever country' (Dawkins 1990), a theme
since used widely.
Science education in these circumstances is under increasing scrutiny and pressure,
and increasing changes in the direction and rate of change of policy. These pressures and
policy changes have been linked expressly to technological development and economic
prosperity. This presents both opportunities andrisks.T h e present thesis seeks to inform
decisions concerning these opportunities and risks.
3) Effects of rapid change in science and society

The accelerating rate of change, both recent and projected, in Western (and other)
societies is well documented. It has widespread effects on, among other things, science and
science education. O f particular concern in the present thesis is that these changes place
pressure on cultural structures, traditions and individuals, and the increasing need for
informed decision making. S o m e commentators have also commented on the effect of rapid
change, especially rapid changes in technology and science, on the public perception of and
attitudes towards science and technology. These perceptions and attitudes affect the ability
of citizens to participate in contemporary, pluralistic, participative democracies, a theme
pursued in the present thesis.
4) Curriculum development in a contemporary pluralistic democracy

The increasing pressure on curriculum development in contemporary pluralistic
democracies like Australia is one of increasing pressure on several grounds, as w e have
mentioned. It is not just that there is increasing interest in education and science, but that
this happens along with changes in values, economic conditions and the orientation to and
provision of schooling. This complex of factors influenced the direction of this thesis.
First is the trend towards a more managerialist approach to education across Australia
and in other western societies (Sharpe 1991). Thus, as w e will discuss later, themes such
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as equity in education lost their primacy to themes such as efficiency, accountability,

diversity, choice and excellence. Curriculum policy, for example, focused increasingly o
managerial issues rather than content, resourcing or pedagogy, except in the periodic
debates on literacy and numeracy. Thus the late 1980s saw several changes to managing the
process of curriculum development in N S W : the replacement of (notionally) school-based
curriculum development with centrally-developed curriculum and school-based curriculum
implementation; the replacement of sometimes protracted, widely consultative curriculum
development with centralised, 'fast track' curriculum development; and the shift of
education policy decisions from the state Department of Education to the government
(through the Minister) and the statutory education board (Board of Studies). A n Australian
example is the mapping of the curriculum, including science, in each education system in
Australia with a view to determining commonahties and later exploring national curriculum
guidelines. This commenced in 1988 under the aegis of the Australian Education Council
(AEC), a council of federal, state and territorial ministers of education (Fensham 1995). A s
mentioned above, these trends were not confined to Australia: a relevant example is the
introduction of the National Curriculum under the conservative government in Great Britain
during the 1980s which served as a model for change fee curriculum development in N S W .
The A E C and British examples are instances of top-down approaches to curriculum
development, which in both cases resulted from narrow consultative bases and in the latter
became legislated.
Second is the changing perception of the curriculum and its role in a pluralistic
democracy. This applies particularly to the views of policy makers and their use of the
curriculum and other means of achieving changes in education. Again, the rhetoric involves
less attention to curriculum content, and more to strategies like directing resources,
restructuring management and mass testing. However, measures such as these can affect
the nature of the curriculum, including the science curriculum, as w e shall see in the
concluding chapter.
Third is the legitimacy of the school curriculum. The combined effect of the changes,
above, has been to greatly reduce open and public discussion of curricula as they are
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developed. This can affect the legitimacy of a curriculum in a pluralist democracy, not just
in the sense of being lawful, but being authorised or justified by following established
practices and standards (The Macquarie Dictionary); that is, that legitimate interests are
served. This is important: if a sufficiently influential fraction of curriculum stakeholders
dismiss a curriculum as misdirected, perhaps because of inappropriate political or
ideological pressures, then the community at large will c o m e to distrust the curriculum too.
Recent concerns by the Australian public over literacy and numeracy standards exemplify
this point. Walker (1991) has argued that rapid social change necessitates devising
processes to ensure that interests regarded by the society as legitimate have a voice in
education policy:
[IJt is not possible in practice to separate questions of aims and procedures, of
content and methods (and therefore) w e have before us, in a time of rapid and
extensive social change, a task of devising procedures which will ensure that
legitimate interests are duly represented in education policy-making. (Walker
1991, p. 107)
The question of the legitimacy of the curriculum is central to the concerns of the present
thesis. Questions concerning the education of the mass of school children, the mass of the
future citizenry, are fundamentallytiedup with the nature of society and preferred states of
society. M y o w n value preference is that the curriculum reflect broad and enduring value
preferences: broadly based both in content and in community support, and enduring so that
the m a x i m u m benefit of school education is felt by citizens in an increasingly changing
society. A direct implication is that ideological or political enthusiasms must be measured
against criteria of being well-argued and strongly substantiated. That is, the content of the
science curriculum must be strongly substantiated and reflect the legitimate interests of as
m a n y curriculum stakeholders as possible.
Fourth is the changing role of curriculum stakeholders, where stakeholders are
defined as 'any group or individual w h o is affected by or w h o can affect the future of the
organisation' (Bryson 1988, as quoted and adopted by Fasano 1991, p. 122). The
education policy literature speaks increasingly about curriculum stakeholders, meaning
groups and individuals in society w h o m a k e s o m e claim to having a say in the curriculum.
Moreover, political shifts in m a n y western democracies in the 1980s saw more stakeholder

Chapter 1: Introduction

10

groups and shifts in their relative influence (Fasano and Winder 1991). For the science
curriculum and the present thesis, a significant issue is that these stakeholder groups often
have differing views about the nature of science and what the nature of school Science
should be.
Fifth is the responsibility for the specification of the science curriculum. In N S W this
responsibility has long been held by statutory boards, currendy a single Board of Studies,
for the Minister in the Government. Syllabuses are developed by curriculum committees or
writing teams of the Board. Thus in N S W there is statutory responsibility for setting the
curriculum: that courses are to be taught 'in accordance with any relevant guidelines
developed by the Board and approved by the Minister' (for primary) and 'in accordance
with a syllabus developed or endorsed by the Board and approved by the Minister' (for
secondary) ( N S W Education Reform Act 1990, Part 3). In N S W at the time of writing,
school education has been covered by, essentially, only four main pieces of legislation in
just over one hundred years: the Pubhc Instruction Act of 1880 with a number of
amendments over the years; the Education Act of 1961; the Education and Public
Instruction Act of 1987; and the Education Reform Act of 1990. There are three important
points to be m a d e here about this legislative history: none sets out the content of the
curriculum, or h o w that content is to be determined apart from the Board(s); they become
progressively more detailed and explicit; and they have been revised and repealed in shorter
and shorter periods of time. T h e second and third reflect the increasingly political and
managerialist nature of the N S W school curriculum in recent years. The first reflects a
history of syllabuses being developed by committees of the respective boards, where the
committee membership, like the board memberships, were both representative and expert
It is this type of curriculum development process the present thesis seeks to inform.

5) Personal experiences of science curriculum development

I have been fortunate to have had experience in science curriculum development at
school, regional, state ( N S W ) and national (Australian) levels. However, I found the
quality of decision making disappointing because the writing of curriculum did not always
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reflect the optimum synthesis of several fields of knowledge and expertise. Curriculum
writing and advisory committees depend on a blending or diffusion of ideas as the
discussions lead to a consensus of some sort. Diffusion between such fields as science,
curriculum, policy and pedagogy is a complex process and the extent to which it can be
described as an entirely rational process is questionable. Such a process requires not only
the specific expertise of the participants but knowledge of other possibilities, other ways of
doing things.
Four aspects of this process are noteworthy here. First, in practice the optimum
expertise was lacking: stakeholder representation typically arose from expressions of
interest rather than securing the best person for the job. Secondly, the collected expertise
did not necessarily equate with a coherent expertise: little and often no time was given to
sharing the detail of various points of view. Thirdly, long-standing processes of widely
consultative curriculum development gave w a y to 'fast track' curriculum development, as
part of the rhetoric for increased efficiency and accountability. The accelerated development
process placed additional strain on informed decision making. Fourthly, there is a case to
be m a d e that curriculum writers operate, if not in a theoretical vacuum, then in a theoretical
hinterland. Certainly there did not seem to be a structured view of h o w various scientific,
metascientific and science education research can be synthesised, which to continue the
metaphor m a y be a meta-theoretical vacuum. A heartening exception at the time of writing is
the revision of the N S W Science 7-10 syllabus, for which the Board of Studies hosted a
symposium of curriculum stakeholders and at which various theoretical positions were put.
Even here, though, the subsequent development process has been carried out by a syllabus
writing group whose efforts have been disseminated infrequently and to limited audiences
with short times for feedback. Fifthly, these problems are compounded w h e n the product
of such committee work is finally submitted for executive approval, in the case of N S W to
the Board of Studies, and sometimes to the Minister. It is even less clear h o w those vested
with the power of approving syllabuses, such as governmental minsters or senior
bureaucrats, will possess the multifaceted expertise that syllabus writing committees should
have.
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Informed decision making can be promoted by research and theorising that draws
upon all relevant fields. This thesis aims to contribute to such theorising and so inform
curriculum development in this context.
6) Personal experiences of science in public forums

A second set of relevant personal experiences were public meetings I attended that
involved scientific matters, such as siting a rubbish tip in a residential area, protests over
the clear felling of native forests for woodchips, and closing a local hospital. Concerns
about these meetings included lack of concern for verifiable information and the justification
of claims; poor procedures for clarifying and analysing issues, and harnessing available
expertise; and several well educated and knowledgeable people speaking beyond their
authority and/or falsely. Further, I found that relevant scientific arguments and public
policy were frequendy difficult to check.
These raise several issues. O n e is the juxtaposition of the right in a pluralistic
democracy for personal expression of a point of view, with the need in such a society for
informed decision making. Another is that various points of view are not necessarily
equivalent: some m a y claim scientific support while others do not; sometimes conflicting
views both claim scientific support; sometimes scientifically supported claims have to be
balanced with other, legitimate matters such as cost and employment implications. There are
considerable literatures that deal with the public understanding of science, science
controversies and public disputes (Wynne 1995; Nelkin 1995; Martin and Richards 1995),
some aspects of which w e will pursue later in the thesis.
These were personally compelling reasons to argue for changes in school Science to
prepare people to take a meaningful part in decision making in personal and social
situations. School Science could be useful in at least two ways here: useful in providing
familiarity with and access to relevant knowledge, and useful in developing general,
transferable skills in thinking and problem solving. However, there are significant
questions about school Science. W h y does school Science not prepare people to contribute
to issues in more meaningful and constructive ways? It would seem that school Science is
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s o m e h o w deficient because it does not enable most school students in this way: is this so?
Are there other ways to conceptualise science for school education? If so, what might
belike?
7) Personal experiences of science teaching

The third set of relevant personal experiences was m y contribution as a science

teacher to my students' ability to deal with such issues. Consistent with research fin

(Matthews 1994), only a portion of the most able students continued their school Scienc
studies at a level that supported further study beyond the time when Science ceased to

compulsory (Year 10 in NSW), and most other students, including many able students, did

not continue. Very few students of any ability showed a capacity or propensity to apply

science to real contexts, which was unsurprising as the curriculum did not encourage th

These impressions were reinforced in visits to many schools during a stint as a science

consultant. Thus my personal view was that school Science education made little lasting

impact on the lives of students. This is a travesty in an increasingly scientific socie
8) Research interest

Another stimulus to the present thesis was the relatively small but growing degree of
research interest in the nature of school science. This is discussed in some detail in
literature review chapter, but it needs mentioning here because of its formative role
present thesis:
Roberts' emphases, Aikenhead's categories and other dissections of purpose and
content demonstrate therichnessof science as a h u m a n activity, and hence of its
potential to provide meaningful content for all students to learn at school and,
indeed, for the enrichment of the lives of all citizens. A classification of curriculum
content like the commonly used knowledge, skills and attitudes is both too simple
and too abstract to do justice to this richness in science. The simplicity of mis
classification pushes into its three categories aspects of the h u m a n exploration of
nature that are epistemologically different. Its abstractness divorces science content
from the dynamic and h u m a n situations of its origins and its learning. It is n o w
time to replace, in curriculum thinking and planning for science, this unhelpful and
oversimplified trilogy for the content worth learning. N e w typologies for
describing science content are needed, and those that are emerging need to be
encouraged in the debates about science for the school curriculum. Because of the
complexity of science ... no typology will be ideal or even pragmatically the
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neatest. Rather, some will be more helpful and useful than others, depending on
the context or the stage of debate that theteachersand curriculum decision makers
are in. (Fensham, Gunstone & White 1994, p. 3)
It would be difficult to argue that personal experiences or social developments alone
would have led to the present thesis, because from the outset the metascientific, science
education and curriculum literatures influenced the direction of m y thinking and stimulated
particular clusters of questions. These literatures report research that suggests links between
the nature of science presented in the curriculum and several factors: poor student
engagement with science, the public understanding of science, the resolution of sciencebased controversies in the community, and the education of scientists and technologists
w h o are able to address the expanding and changing nature of science and technology and
w h o are able to articulate their findings in debates that include economic, political, social
and ethical dimensions. It greatly concerned m e , and still does, that there are significant
mismatches between these different literatures, and between the literatures and the enacted
science curriculum. For example, there is a burgeoning literature on children's construction
of knowledge in science, and fields of literature that deal with the public understanding of
science, and with philosophical, sociological and historical dimensions and understandings
of science. However, I found little of any of this implemented as I visited and corresponded
with schools, and little mention in the curriculum and education policy literatures. These
impressions were confirmed repeatedly as I researched the present thesis and, with a few
encouraging exceptions, remain.
9) Assumptions about the science curriculum

Finally there are some assumptions, usually implicit, about the school science
curriculum that this thesis seeks to address:
a)

school Science should be (mandatory) in the curriculum;

b)

school Science should cover broadly the same content and be presented in
the ways that it has done traditionally;

c)

school Science should reflect or characterise science; and

d)

school Science has traditionally reflected or characterised science.
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W e will take these in order.

a) The premise that school Science should be (mandatory) in the curriculum
This thesis will argue strongly that science should be part of the general school
curriculum, and that it should be mandatory for most school years at least. T h e concern is,
however, that what is usually mandatory is a poor characterisation of science that ill suits
the personal enrichment of students, the necessary science education for future citizens and
the grounding for future scientists and technology. The argument pursued by this thesis is
therefore that being mandatory is insufficient, and a robustly grounded school Science is
part of the solution.

b) The premise that school Science should cover broadly the same content and be
presented in the ways that it has done traditionally
This premise is flawed. First, it is uncritical of traditional school science education
despite criticisms on m a n y grounds, as discussed in later chapters. The presumption that
science deserves a mandatory place in the school curriculum seems to engender or at least
reinforce other assumptions about the preferred content and delivery of the Science
curriculum. This m a y , of course, arise simply through familiarity. Fensham has noted that
m a n y teachers
are more hesitant and comfortable with the traditional types of elitist curricula for
which their o w n socialisation in science has equipped them. (Fensham 1992, p.
798)
Hacker (1984) m a d e a similar point about the relative failure of the Australian Science
Education Project (ASEP) materials, which are integrated, student centred and organised
around topics of student interest rather than subject tradition. Hacker found that the teaching
styles required by the A S E P materials did not match the preferred teaching styles of most
science teachers, and, further, that the teachers could not or would not change to meet the
requirements of the curriculum materials. Teacher comfort or familiarity w a s a factor in
revising N S W syllabuses also, where the very open-ended, student-centred approaches in
the 1980 Investigating Science K-6 policy and the 1972 Science 7-10 syllabus were not
widely endorsed by teachers. The subsequent 1990 Science and Technology K-6 syllabus
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and 1985 Science 7-10 syllabus gave more structure and suggestions of explicitly science
content, a trend continued in the 7-10 syllabus being developed at the time of writing.
Secondly, this premise ignores changes that have taken place in society, in education
and science education in particular, and in understandings of science - metascientific
understandings. Just one example is that n e w groups of learners are a significant element in
the context of science curricula. Science curricula had, almost traditionally, been written for
the minority of students w h o are most academically able. The trend in western-style
democracies, from the 1970s and into the 1990s, has been for secondary education to
become more widely available and accessible:
The presence of these m u c h greater and more socially representative numbers of
students in the final years of secondary schooling, w h e n science education has had
its clearest definition and purpose, has meant that very n e w curriculum questions
are being asked of science. Curricula that were designed for the preparation of
future professionals have not proven attractive or appropriate for students w h o are
not likely to enter such professions. O n the other hand, that the majority of
students should cease to study the sciences in their last two or three years at school
is also an inadequate response to the importance n o w claimed for science.
(Fensham 1992, p. 795)
T h e nature and purpose of a curriculum for the mass of school students is a significant, if
not central, motivating concern of the present thesis. W h a t are the needs of these students?
This thesis will argue that a more robust and multidimensional characterisation of science
can help to address this issue. M o r e central, however, is the matter of changing
metascientific views: this thesis will argue that this alone is sufficient to reject the premise
that the content of the science curriculum should remain primarily as it was, and is.
Thirdly, this premise does not seek alternatives to traditional science curricula. The
syllabus revisions mentioned above were in part a reaction to a perception that 1970s and
1980s curriculum development gave m o r e emphasis to processes than to knowledge
content. That is, that the process versus content debate swung too far away from requiring
that students 'know' their subject. B y implication there is a criticism that students should
'know' m o r e science - 'know' their subject - rather than merely 'do' activities. This raises
several issues: the extent to which policy pressures for accountability and efficiency drive
the actual curriculum content through large-scale testing of students; whether knowing
versus doing is a false dichotomy, and if so what a better analytical structure might be; and
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just what it is that students should know or do - what does a close examination of the
metascientific literature suggest that school children should learn? This thesis therefore
seeks to delineate what the metascientific literature has to say that is useful to the school
Science curriculum, and in so doing, to clarify debates about science learning outcomes,
and by implication, what tests should test, and so forth.
c) The premise that school Science should reflect or characterise science
The present thesis will argue, as others have done, that, to the extent school Science
reflects science, it should do so as authentically as possible. Further, it will s h o w h o w this
can be done. W e have already alluded to the scant attention paid to specifying or clarifying
the nature of science in the school curriculum: this situation undermines the justification of
science in the school curriculum. This lack of specification m a y indicate assumptions on the
part of legislators, at least, and possibly those w h o prepare the legislation and m a k e advice
on policy, as to the benefits and preferred views of science in the curriculum. T h e lack of
specification m a y also contribute to difficulties experienced by the planners, designers,
implementers and evaluators of science curriculum in refining their field, since it is then that
the details have to be clarified and agreed upon.
Calls for the school science curriculum to better reflect the nature of science arise in
both the education and metascientific literatures (see chapter 2). This reflects something of
the variety of curriculum stakeholders w h o share this view, even if they do not agree on
precisely what should be done about it, or h o w this should be done. It does not, of course,
reflect the views of all stakeholders equally: schoolteachers,students, parents and the mass
media, for example, do not as a rule publish in scholarly journals, but their views are partly
represented in s o m e of the scholarly studies and analyses. Early thinking towards the
present thesis led to a pilot study of the views of school science teachers. However, the
results, though only tentative, added nothing beyond confirming studies of teacher views
already published. Consequently, the research question w a s changed and the pilot study
omitted from the present study. W h a t the pilot did show was the need for s o m e theoretical
framework into which the views of disparate stakeholders could be accommodated and
analysed, and about which there was very little in the literature. H e n c e the decision to
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ground the analysis in the published, scholarly literature as an authoritative and ap
source of views about the nature of science. This decision was informed by readings of
both the education and metascientific literatures.

d) The premise that school Science has traditionally reflected or characterised scienc
It is useful to highlight the fact that science does exist in all school curricula addressed
here and, as in the context of N S W and elsewhere, it is included in a particular form. This
point is important because there can be a temptation to presume that a subject that has been
there for a long time and seems always to be included in any 'core' of the curriculum has its
place in the curriculum established a priori. A s noted above, m a n y authors have argued that
traditional approaches to school Science characterise science inadequately. The present
thesis provides an analysis that shows not only h o w this is so, but h o w this can be
remedied.
The presumed correspondence between school Science and the field or discipline of
science is a fundamental assumption about their natures, but one that, considering its
significance, is rarely scrutinised. In presenting a subject called school Science, a school
curriculum is conventionally presumed to characterise or portray what is widely recognised
as the field of study, science. The rationale for the very inclusion of the subject, and for its
content and approach, relies strongly on this assumption. The present thesis tests this
assumption and finds that in m a n y significant respects it is not warranted. Li a technical
sense this is not a necessary cause for concern, because education systems can, in this
sense, simply decree what subjects will comprise the curriculum and what the nature of
those subjects will be. After all, school systems must m a k e m a n y decisions about what
should and should not be in the curriculum, taking account of factors that go well beyond
the presumed nature of disciplines such as science. In that case there is a responsibility, in a
pluralistic democracy, for the education system to m a k e clear what the distinctions and
correspondences between the discipline and the school subject are, and w h y they have been
made:
Finally ... [we look] towards a w a y forward for science education which is more
securely grounded in our current understandings both of the nature of scientific
inquiry and of h u m a n knowledge acquisition. (Millar & Driver 1987, pp. 36-7)
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W h e r e the correspondence - the grounding - is not clear, the rationale for the form and
scope of the subject is weakened. The present thesis extends this critique to argue that a
robust characterisation of science is more meaningful and more empowering than traditional
characterisations of science for the school curriculum.
The present thesis as a response to these issues
In brief, the present thesis seeks to address the above issues, and some others, by:
1)

analysing contemporary thinking about science in a way that assists informed
decision making in the development of the science curriculum;

2)

making suggestions as to what could and should be done in representing this in
the curriculum; and

3)

proposing guidelines for curriculum development based on this study, and
suggesting further research.

T h e notional audience for this thesis is science curriculum stakeholders: syllabus writing
groups, academics, teacher and school system representatives, other interested groups and
those in government departments and in government w h o will influence the development of
science curriculum through their executive decisions.
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Questions arising from these concerns

Out of the issues discussed above arise various questions, of which the present thesis
is mainly concerned with one:
How can the school science curriculum better characterise the nature of science?
The cluster of questions contributing to this central question is summarised below in Figure
1.1. The present thesis addresses this question by first addressing the research question:
How does the metascientific literature characterise science?
The cluster of questions contributing to this central research question is summarised below
in Figure 1.2.
Briefly, the rationale for these questions is as follows. The concerns discussed above
lead to m a n y possible questions, of which the contribution or worth of science education to
students and to society chiefly occupied m y mind. Again, there are several possible notions
of this worth, such as its contribution to a liberal education, to scientific literacy, and to
further studies and careers in science and technology. This thesis is not concerned with
singling out for attention any particular rationale for science education, and accordingly
accepts all such curriculum arguments. However, w h e n it comes to identifying the factors
of science education that contribute to this worth, such asteaching,learning, the nature of
the subject, the curriculum design, and so forth, w e select for attention mainly one of these:
the nature of the subject Thus, when it comes to addressing the question,
What is the worth of science education for all students?,
the present thesis interprets this as,

What is it about the nature of science that makes science worthwhile for students to
study?
The rejoining question is,
How can the school Science curriculum better reflect the nature of school science?
This question is interpreted in two ways. O n e concerns the clarification of science
curriculum content:
What is the nature of science?
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T h e other, which also arises from the concerns discussed above, concerns part of the
curriculum process that is linked to the nature of the subject:
How

can curriculum decisions about the nature of school Science be better

informed?
This complex question suggests several possible answers, of which the present thesis
addresses the development of a more robust characterisation of science itself. This reflects
the concern of the present thesis with solutions that, while complex in their argument,
address the curriculum reality that curriculum stakeholders will need convincing arguments
to contemplate suggestions for science curriculum reform. The solution to both of these
questions that the present thesis addresses is to clarify the views given in the metascientific
literature, being the literature containing the scholarly, refereed, publicly available analyses
of science. This is framed by the central research question,
How does the metascientific literature characterise science?
T h e answer to this question is framed in the methodology discussion in chapter 3,
presented in chapter 4, and developed in the six companion chapters and their introduction
(chs 5 to 11), and in Appendix B. T h e curriculum implications of this analysis are pursued
in the final chapter, chapter 12.
Questions about the contribution of this research

Finally, another cluster of questions concerns the contribution of the present thesis a
a piece of research. It places this thesis within a field of research, discusses the
methodologies employed and offers some comment about the contribution of this thesis to
the field.
Pedagogical factors are not discussed because, although important for effective
science education, they introduce another set of considerations that arise secondarily from
the central question.
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A s c h e m a of questions
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leading to the central research question,

' H o w c a n the school science curriculum better characterise
the nature of science?'

What is the worth of science
education for all students?
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EMPOWERMENT:
Science education
is preparation for
scientific literacy

LIBERAL EDUCATION:
Science education has
intrinsic worth as part of
a general education
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Grey arrows represent possible pathways; black arrows represent pathways addressed by the present
thesis.
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Figure 1.2:
A schema of questions leading to the central research question,
' H o w does the metascientific literature characterise science?'

H o w can the school science
curriculum better reflect the
nature of science?

How
c a n curriculun
decisions about the nature
of school science be better
informed?

What is the nature
of science?

What do curriculum
stakeholders think the
nature of school
science should be?
H o w does the
metascientific literature
characterise science?

I

' What are the implications
for the school science
curriculum?
The questions in Figures 1.1 and 1.2 are consistent, and overlap significantly, with

questions such as those identified by a group of US science curriculum stakeholder
reported by Shymansky and Kyle (1992). They included:

Why has the broader cultural significance of science virtually been ignored? ..
How have the natural sciences changed us?
How can we understand and assess these changes? ...

What will students need to know to be scientifically literate?
What are the values, images, customs, beliefs, and practices associated with th
teaching and learning of a reformed science curriculum?...
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How can the nature of science be used to inform instruction? ...
How do we prepare all of today's youth for tomorrow's world? ...
What ought a reformed science education offer learners and society?...
Which fundamental concepts ought to be integrated into the curriculum?...

Should science education ensure a scientifically and technologically oriented wor
force versus a scientific and technological literacy for all? ...
What (whose knowledge) counts as a legitimate science education? (Shymansky
and Kyle 1992, pp. 750-4)
The present thesis has something to say about each of these, and other, questions about the
nature of school science identified by various groups of curriculum stakeholders.
Comments about reading this thesis
The size of the thesis
The research and thesis turned out to be considerably larger than first expected, but
there are strong reasons for this. The central reason is that characterising science for the
school curriculum, robustly and in a w a y that is compelling for curriculum stakeholders,
proved to be far more difficult than first thought There are three main contributing reasons
for this. First, it was difficult to establish some interpretative order in views of science,
which are diverse, complex and frequently contradictory. Second was the growing
realisation, as the thesis progressed, that the multiple dimensions of characterisation it
proposes are found in the representations of science encountered daily by school students
and citizens: not just in scholarly literature (which they do not encounter daily), but in texts,
media reports, documentaries, advertisements, cartoons and so forth. Third were the
repeated experiences of presenting drafts of the thesis to seminars and meetings, and
finding that its central task was taken very seriously and perceived omissions and biases
were keenly contested. Striking a balance between depth and breadth, always a difficult
task in a thesis such as this, had to be adjusted many times as curriculum stakeholders from
m a n y groups seized upon some point or other and argued strongly a particular point of
view. This was compounded w h e n considering one dimension at a time, which emphasises
the need to consider the dimensions as an interactive set w h e n characterising science. Thus
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to some extent, the length and scope of the thesis, and the relative depth given to topics
covered are products of the concerns of m a n y dozens of curriculum stakeholders. There are
other elements of science that could also have been discussed, but which in striking the
balance of length and scope received passing or no mention.
A s a final c o m m e n t on the size of the thesis, the extended analysis of metascientific
arguments is given in Appendix B: summaries only are given in the six companion chapters
(6 to 11). It is hoped that this presentation makes clearer the application of the metascientific
literature to the curriculum focus of the thesis, but that the reader will nonetheless use
discussion in Appendix B to gain a more detailed understanding of the ways in which a
multidimensional analysis assists in understanding arguments about the nature of science.
Experience in presenting drafts of this thesis showed the strong interest and uneven
familiarity mentioned above, a situation best redressed using an analytical framework as
suggested here. Further, the very length emphasises the complexity, magnitude and
significance of the task, and therefore the significance of the arguments presented in
Appendix B.
Some stylistic notes

The nature of the analysis made certain stylistic demands, for reasons concerning the
nature of the analysis and discussion, and for clarity.
First, there is a large number of quotations included in the text, and of a greater
length, than is the case in m a n y theses. This arises directly from the aim of showing h o w
the analysis is well grounded in the literature.
Secondly, there is a mix of primary and secondary sources. This is because the
present thesis is an example of curriculum theorising, whose notional audience will not be
exclusively interested in the direct translation or quotation of, for example, Plato, Bacon or
Einstein, but also in h o w particular arguments are deployed by subsequent writers.
Third is the matter of gendered language: while every attempt has been made to avoid
it, the one exception must be in the m a n y quotations. M a n y of these quotations contain
gendered language, which is unsurprising given that they were written before any general
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awareness of its deleterious effects. Avoiding gendered language proved difficult. T o
merely report on or paraphrase an author would in m a n y cases weaken the thesis, which
makes extensive use of direct quotations to strengthen its argument. After all, its central
purpose is to ground a particular area of curriculum theorising in its literature. T o m a k e
editorial changes to quotations at best reduces the authenticity of the quotes, and at worst
makes the text, with its editorial insertions in square brackets, convoluted and hard to
follow. T h e best solution was to note the first use in any quotation of a gendered
expression as verbatim by the conventional insertion of the term sic in square brackets.
T h e fourth matter of style concerns marking quotations. This thesis makes
considerable use of quotations because of its task. In a thesis of this type, the excessive use
of quotation marks and, for quotes within quotes, double quotation marks, clutters the page
and hinders reading. T o avoid excessive use of quotation marks, this thesis adopts other
conventions where possible: extended quotations are all set in different typeface and
indented; terms being discussed, and emphasised terms, are set in italic typeface; and
quotations in the text are set within single quotation marks.
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Chapter 2
A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

The purpose and structure of this chapter

This chapter reviews the literature on which the present thesis is based. The
relationship between the thesis and the literature is complex. Firstly, the present thesis, like
any piece of research, must show that it is well grounded in its literature and advances the
field as measured by that literature. Secondly, the data for both the semantic analysis of
summary statements and the extended analysis of metascientific argument were collected
from the literature. T h e thesis makes three types of argument: an argument that the nature of
school Science should and can be better characterised; an argument that the metascientific
literature characterises science in multiple dimensions; and an argument that the present
thesis is a sound piece of curriculum theorising that advances its field. Therefore this review
of the literature must include several literatures: educational, metascientific and research.
T o do this, the present chapter is organised as follows:
1.

educational issues from the literature;

2.

metascientific issues from the literature; and

3.

methodological issues from the literature.

1. Educational issues emerging from the literature

Calls for the school science curriculum to better reflect the nature of science arise in
variety of literatures, mainly in education and metascience. This is not a dominant theme in
either field, but it is a long standing concern, found in a variety of forums, and is growing
as measured by volume of publication.
1.1 The nature of school Science is a longstanding, small but growing part of science
education research
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The nature of school Science is a relatively small area of research interest compared
with other areas in science education. For example, research into learning probably
comprises the greatest interest, and especially in recent years, research into students'
alternative frameworks: Pfundt and Duit have reported a growth from 2000, in the third
(1991) edition of their bibliography, to around 3500 in the fourth (1994) edition (Pfundt &
Duit 1994, p. vi). T o put the present thesis in context further, a review of science and
technology education by Fensham (1992) identified thirteen influences on the current state
of science curriculum development, of which the nature of school science is central in only
one. While not equally the subjects of research, the thirteen nonetheless indicate the scope
of scholarly interest, and place the present discussion in a broader context of issues
currently applying to science curriculum development:
1.

historical and sociological analyses of the curriculum

2.

evaluations of the 1950/1960s curricula

3.

n e w groups of learners

4.

measurement of educational achievement

5.

international comparisons

6.

political and economic comparisons

7.

concerned science teachers

8.

science educators and their research

9.

academic scientists

10.

theories of teaching and learning

11.

philosophical and sociological views of classroom science

12.

major social changes and international movements

13.

technologies for learning

Fensham's instructive review is recommended to the reader requiring the extra detail
and fuller discussion on this list, and particularly the references to key papers and the
extensive bibliography. His analysis, particularly of point 11, above, is included in the
review below.
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Although research interest in the nature of school Science is relatively small, there are
nonetheless several indicators that a range of science curriculum stakeholders view it as
significant. For convenience, w e will consider these indicators as three main groups.
First, there have been calls over m a n y years for improved understandings of the
nature of science (Jenkins 1996), 'and in fact the nature of each individual science', in both
school curriculum and wider contexts (Finley, Lawrenz & Heller 1992, p. 268). Calls for
improving students' understandings of the nature of science, and their facility with it, are
made on a number of grounds, which are discussed in section 2.2 below.
Secondly, the amount of interest is growing. Reviews of science education research
point to recent growth in studies into the nature of science as part of science education
(Finley, Lawrenz & Heller 1992; Feldman & Atkin 1993; Lederman, Gess-Newsome &
Zeidler 1993; Fensham, Corrigan & Malcolm 1989; Matthews 1994). For example, the
nature of school Science has become an identifiable strand of interest in science education
research. In the intermittent series of reviews of science education literature given in the
journal Science Education, the review of 1990 research established a category, The Nature
of Science, and noted an apparent 'emerging interest in the history and philosophy of
science and its applications to issues in science education' (Finley, Lawrenz & Heller 1992,
p. 239). Matthews (1992, p. 9) has reported that a special issue of the journal Synthese,
advertised in 1987, and other journal special issues, devoted to metascience and science
education, gave rise to the First International Conference on History, Philosophy and
Science Teaching at Florida State University in 1989. In turn, this gave rise in to the
journal, Science and Education (full title, Science and Education: Contributions from
History, Philosophy and Sociology of Science and Mathematics) in 1992, and the
International History, Philosophy and Science Teaching Group, which has held subsequent
international conferences.
Thirdly, a variety of stakeholders have called for further research into the nature of
school Science (Finley, Lawrenz & Heller 1992; Feldman & Atkin 1993). That is, calls
have been m a d e across the spectrum of curriculum stakeholders, including: the science
education, education, scientific and metascientific communities; academics from other
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fields; education policy elites such as governments and school systems; politicians and
governments; media commentators; and others such as parent, industry, trade union and
teacher groups. This is reflected partially in the spread of scholarly literature used by the
present thesis: in addition to the dedicated journal Science & Education and dedicated
books, the present thesis has drawn on articles in international science education journals
(Science Education, The Journal ofResearch in Science Teaching, The International Journal
of Science Education), national science education journals (in Australia, The Australian
Science Teachers Journal, Research in Science Education), other education journals
(Journal of Curriculum Studies, Educational Leadership), journals from other fields (Public
Understanding

of Science), and in general educational and metascientific books. It is

perhaps a sad reflection on the (declining) political 'clout' of education academics as
curriculum stakeholders that the state of science education is held to be in an especially
parlous state w h e n concern is expressed by non-academics:
T h e crisis [in the state of science education] has led to recent calls from business
leaders, politicians, and educators, for the reform of science education. (Gruender & Tobin
1991, p. 2)
T h e present thesis is a response to each of these indicators. Its analysis seeks to:
•

contribute to the science curriculum debate through a better informed
characterisation of science for the school curriculum;

•

extend the scholarly understanding of the nature of school Science, both as
presendy and potentially enacted;

•

provide a means of bringing together the diverse views of science curriculum
stakeholders; and

•

provide both a substantial piece of research on the nature of school Science,
and a stimulus and signpost to further research and curriculum development

/ .2

Educational issues in the literature

As indicated above, a variety of sources identify a variety of educational issues that
relate to the nature of science. A list of these issue is given below to s h o w this variety,

Chapter 2: Literature Review

31

together with suggestions for further research. It should be clear to the reader that these
issues are overlapping and not discrete; they represent different perspectives and are not
intended to be logically discrete. However, they do represent the different foci of arguments
given in the literature concerning science education.
1.2.1 Pressure for science curriculum reform

First are arguments that the science curriculum needs reforming, where a more robust
characterisation of science is part of the solution. This overlaps with several categories of
argument being addressed in the present section. The school curriculum comes under attack
periodically; this is nothing new, and by the very nature of the school curriculum will no
doubt continue to be the case in the future. However, the 1980s and 1990s saw substantial
public disquiet over curricula in the school systems of most western countries, and in
particular over the science and mathematics curricula (Bybee et al. 1991; Matthews 1994).
These criticisms have come from across the spectrum of stakeholders - governments,
parents, industry, trade unions, academics - with a corresponding range of responses, both
suggested and enacted (Ruby 1991; Winder 1991). Calls for a more robust grounding of
school Science represent only one among m a n y of these responses prompted by curriculum
criticisms, but it is a significant response made by some of the reports established for the
express purpose of addressing these criticisms. Matthews (1994, chapters 2 and 3) lists a
large number of reports that call for an understanding of the nature of science as part of
science curriculum reform. They include: Education for All American Youth (National
Educational Association 1944); The Place of Science in the Education of the Consumer
(US, National Science Teachers Association ( N S T A ) 1945); Training of Graduate Science
Teachers (British Association for Science Education ( A S E ) 1963); School Science
Education for the 1970s ( N S T A 1971); Alternatives for Science Education ( A S E 1979); A
Nation at Risk (US, National Commission on Excellence in Education 1983) and the more
than three hundred reports and twenty bills before Congress that resulted from it; Science in
the National Curriculum (UK, National Curriculum Council 1988, revised in 1991); Project
2061: Science for All Americans (American Association for the Advancement of Science
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( A A A S ) 1989); Unifying the Goals of Science Education (Canada, Alberta departmental
guide to STS education 1990); Project 2061: Benchmarks for Scientific Literacy (AAAS
1993); and The Science, Technology, Society Movement (US, NSTA 1993).

There have been some parallels in the Australian context, although on a smaller scale

and perhaps with less success. For example, the Dirks Report (1984), sponsored by the
Australian Science Teachers Association (ASTA), made wideranging recommendations for
the aims and design of the science curriculum K-12, including understandings of the

of science and the ability to apply scientific knowledge and skills in real contexts
the national discussion paper, Science for Everybody? Towards a National Science

Statement (Curriculum Development Centre 1988), set widely ranging goals for the scie

curriculum that were based on some broad notions of the nature of science. However, t

paper proved to be greater in scope than the National Science Profile that eventuate

the more conservative political climate in the late 1980s and 1990s has meant that t
curriculum, likewise, has become more conservative. While conservatism is inherently

neither a good nor a bad thing, for Fensham it meant defining the curriculum by terms

accountability rather than by student interest and science for all, which he sees as
and counter-productive:
In terms of the statements of intended curricula for science in Australia's schools,
the progress that was being steadily made towards science for all would appear to
have been severely arrested, and even reversed.
W e have gone backwards. Having been well ahead of the U K in our
conceptualisation of school science for 30 years, w e have been returned to the
past, at least in the official curriculum...
W e can only hope that, on the ground, the influence of the n e w [national
curriculum] framework will be minimal. (Fensham 1995, p. 203)
The present thesis will argue that pressures for a more inclusive school Science
curriculum are consistent with more comprehensive characterisations of science, and

the concern of traditional science curricula with limited conceptions of knowledge an
activity established a distortion of science that needs to be redressed.

1.2.2 An appreciation of the nature of science is necessary for a robust understandi
science
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Second are arguments that an appreciation of the nature of science is necessary for a
robust understanding of science. This has been argued by m a n y science educators over the
years (Finley, Lawrence & Heller 1992, p. 268). It has also been argued from
metascientists. For example, Matthews (1994) cites a variety of claims to show that
historical and philosophical understandings of science are a great help, and indeed
necessary, to develop a sound grasp of scientific knowledge and activities. Similarly, there
have been many calls for science education to study science in its broader contexts (Newton
1988; Edge 1995). C. P. Snow's famous Two

Cultures lecture, that dealt with the

communication gulf between the sciences and the arts, is cited often as an example of h o w a
narrow, intellectual approach to science leaves scientists unaware of, and unable to deal
with, broader issues of science. Further, many n o w argue that without these philosophical,
historical, sociological and technological understandings, students are m u c h less able to
develop robust understandings of science knowledge and its interplay with scientific
activities and other characteristics (Jenkins 1996). This argument is m a d e often in
conjunction with calls for improved scientific literacy.
1.2 3 School Science should be authentic

Third are claims about the nature of science: that (traditionally a single,
undifferentiated) authentic science has particular, essential characteristics that should be
reflected in school Science. For example, Martin, Kass and Brouwer (1990) have observed
that there have been m a n y calls for school Science to be authentic science, but argued that
the diversity of views about what authentic science would be makes this a very difficult
task:
Science teachers are being challenged to present science as it 'really is' rather than
promote a mythic, textbook science. The call for developing scientific literacy or
teaching real or authentic science appears in an increasing number of documents
such as A Nation at Risk (National Commission of Excellence in Education 1983)
along with the N S T A position statement Science-Technology-Society: Science
Education for the 1980s (1982). (Martin, Kass & Brouwer 1990, p. 541)
Martin, Kass and Brouwer summarise several views of the nature of science, and
conclude from this that the notion of authenticity is difficult to determine, being better used
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as a goal to which the curriculum should aim, rather than as a criterion that is necessarily
arbitrary:

In attempting to give meaning to the term 'authentic', science educators should deal
with therichdiversity of meanings of the term authentic ... Rather than attempting
to establish an authentic portrayal of science at a specific point in the student's
education it m a y be more useful to see authenticity as an asymptotic state toward
which the curriculum is pointing.
While it is difficult to identify an 'authentic' view of science, therichdiversity
of meaning inherent in the term authentic science could be used to identify those
cases where a portrayal of science is unauthentic. A science education that is
tending towards authenticity would be one that draws in as m a n y relevant aspects
of science as are appropriate at a given point in the student's life. For the young
student this m a y mean no more than allowing him or her the opportunity to explore
the personal dimension of science and m a y imply that greater emphasis be placed
on the development of an experiential basis rather than in the formal development
of 'scientific facts and ideas'. (Martin, Kass & Brouwer 1990, p. 552)
This much is entirely consistent with the present thesis, which can be taken as a respo
to, and extension of, it. Further, Martin, Kass and Brouwer proposed a number of aspect
or dimensions of authentic science: methodology; epistemology; the distinction between
what science ought to be and how it is; the personal character of science, like the

motivations of scientists, and the arduousness and exhilaration of authentic scientific
the public character of science, meaning the science statements in articles and texts;

historical contexts of science; the social contexts of science; science and technology;

aims of science. This is encouraging as far as it goes, but it seems to leave more ques

than it does answers. The discussion is not altogether clear: the discussion of the dif

aspects is too brief to explain them clearly and defend them against existing metascie

positions, and the above summary of the aspects differs slighdy from other summaries su

as by Finley, Lawrenz and Heller. What, therefore, are the aspects of authentic science

how were they identified? What of other aspects also discussed, like the tacit knowledg

belief and commitment of scientists, and the criterion or principle of falsifiability?

other metascientific issues? Are there other aspects? Can some of these aspects be gro

and the number reduced? It is clear that Martin, Kass and Brouwer set a large task, whi
was their aim, and it is one that cannot be done justice in a single journal article,

did not claim to do. However, the present thesis does set out to make this sort of anal

As we will see, its method and characterisation differ, but the characterisation is con
with, and can accommodate, Martin, Kass and Brouwer's analysis.
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Finley, Lawrenz and Heller, noting the difficulty in determining authentic science,
point to other attempts that also seek this goal:
While the difficulties associated with determining what counts as authentic science
are substantial, there are attempts to at least find the features of the nature of
science about which most researchers would agree. For example, Cleminson
[1990] has carefully examined the writing of several key historians and
philosophers of science and concluded that there are five features upon which there
is substantial agreement. In a modified form, these key features are: (a) Scientific
knowledge is tentative and should never be equated with truth; (b) Observation
alone cannot give cannot giveriseto scientific knowledge in a simple inductivist
manner because our observations are greatly influenced by our theories; (c) N e w
knowledge in science is produced by creative acts of the imagination allied with the
methods of scientific inquiry; (d) The acquisition of n e w scientific knowledge is
problematic and previously held ideas are not given up easily; and (e) Scientists
study a world of which they are a part, not a world from which they are separate
(pp. 437-438). While these statements do not address all of the aspects of science
provided by Martin, Kass and Brouwer, they illustrate the type of research that is
needed to develop an acceptable characterisation of the nature of science. A s
Cleminson indicates, these analyses are necessary to establish an epistemological
base for curriculum reform and encouraging because the ways in which the nature
of science is n o w being described is consistent with our emerging views of h o w
the knowledge of an individual student changes over time. (Finley, Lawrenz &
Heller 1992, p. 269)
As before, Cleminson's purpose and suggested characterisation is consistent with the

purpose of the present thesis, but it is inadequate: it addresses only a few characteri

discussed in the literature, and it is more a list of agreed differences from the tradi

positivist view of science than a characterisation of science. Again, this is due partl

limitations of the single journal article; the present thesis makes a far more thorough
attempt.
More recently, Roth (1995) has produced a book, Authentic Science, whose length

does allow for this detailed treatment. However, it is a report on his attempt as a tea
researcher to ground an open-inquiry classroom in authentic practices, where that

grounding is in a particular view of science. It does not attempt to give a broadly gro

characterisation of science for the Science curriculum, as Martin, Kass and Brouwer, an

Cleminson, sought to show and the present thesis seeks to show. These are sound reasons
for arguing that Roth's claim of authenticity is weakly supported.
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1.2.4 An appreciation of the nature of science is necessary for a liberal education

Fourth are arguments that an appreciation of the nature of science is necessary for its

intrinsic worth, rather than for narrowly instrumentalist reasons. This is the argumen
liberal, or general, education:
The best preparation for an uncertain future is a sound, general education that
engages the present interest of learners. (Skilbeck 1984, p. 127)

The liberal education tradition opposes narrow, technocratic, and vocational conceptio
curriculum, a point made by Skilbeck in opposing the technocratic, instrumentalist
curriculum models that were emerging as he wrote and that became very influential in

western education systems into the 1990s. We will return to this theme in the concludi

chapter, in the discussion of national political and economic goals and their pressure

school Science curriculum. For the present, the liberal education argument has been us
a justification not only for the study of science, but for learning about science:

The present rapprochement between HPS and science education represents in part
a renaissance of the long-marginalised liberal, or contextual, tradition of science
education, a tradition contributed to in the last hundred years by scientists and
educators such as Ernst M a c h , Pierre D u h e m , Alfred North Whitehead, Percy
Nunn, James Conant, Joseph Schwab, Martin Wagenschein and Gerald Holton.
At its most general level the liberal tradition in education embraces Aristotle's
delineation of truth, goodness, and beauty as the ideals that people ought to
cultivate in their appropriate spheres of endeavour ... For a liberal, education is
more than the preparation for work.
T h e liberal tradition is characterised by a number of educational commitments.
O n e is that education entails the introduction of children to the best traditions of
their culture, including the academic disciplines, in such a w a y that they both
understand the subject discipline, and k n o w something about the discipline - its
methodology, assumptions, limitation, history and so forth. A second feature is
that, as far as is possible and appropriate, the relations of particular subjects to
each other, and their relation to the broader canvas of ethics, religion, culture,
economics and politics should be acknowledged and investigated. T h e liberal
tradition seeks to overcome fragmentation. Contributors to the liberal tradition
believe that science taught from such a perspective, and informed by the history
and philosophy of the subject, can engender understanding of nature, the
appreciation of beauty in both nature and science, and the awareness of ethical
issues unveiled by scientific knowledge and created by scientific practice.
(Matthews 1994, pp. 1-2)
The same general argument is put by Edge (1995) and others in calling for school Scien
to embody the studies of the inter-relationships between science, technology and socie

science and technology studies (STS). In calling for understandings about science, the
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arguments do not support narrow, traditional characterisations of science, calling instead for

comprehensive and rigorous characterisations, which the present thesis terms robust. T
present thesis also proposes such a characterisation for the school curriculum.
1.2.5 An appreciation of the nature of science is necessary for personal and social reasons

Fifth are arguments that an appreciation of the nature of science is necessary for

personal and social reasons: personal knowledge; better public science literacy and th

empowerment of citizens; more capable scientists and technologists; and national econo
and security benefits.
Arguments for personal knowledge of the nature of science are similar to those for a
liberal education, above, but they are made also in terms of the learning individual
(Fensham 1995):
HPS can contribute to the fuller understanding of scientific subject matter - it can
help to overcome the 'sea of meaninglessness', as Joseph Novak once said, where
formulae and equations are recited without knowledge of what they m e a n of to
what they refer. (Matthews 1994, p. 7)

This is similar to the argument for a robust or rigorous understanding of science, abo

is included here to highlight that some arguments emphasise the benefit to the individ

(personal knowledge) rather than the soundness of the knowledge (robust understanding)
Arguments for improved public science literacy also appeal to the notion of

empowering citizens in the increasingly scientific and technological nature of western

societies. Both of these goals have been used to argue for broader characterisations o
science than provided by traditional school Science:
While educators agree that understanding issues in history and the nature of
science and technology is critical to development of scientifically literate citizens,
little, if any, instructional material is available for teacher use in this area.
Moreover, most curriculum guides do not require teaching of the history and
nature of science and technology, and teachers are not well prepared in this area. In
the classroom, a laboratory or hands-on approach is often used to represent the
nature of science and vignettes of scientists to represent the history of science.
Nowhere is the student likely to encounter a cohesive view of the ways in which
the intellectual development of the sciences and resolution of problems by
technology shaped history and were in turn shaped by it. N o conceptual
framework that describes teaching and learning strategies that would more
accurately reflect key themes in the history and nature of science and technology is
available to guide improvements.
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A place to begin is with the clarification of scientific and technological literacy.
W e propose the following major categories of understanding:
1. T h e scientifically literate person understands the nature of m o d e m science,
the nature of scientific explanation, and the limits and possibilities of science.
2.
T h e technologically literate person understands the nature of technology, the
nature of technological solutions to h u m a n problems and the limitations and
possibilities of technology.
3. T h e scientifically and technologically literate person understands that the
natures of science and technology as well as their interrelationships have changed
over time.
4. The scientifically and technologically literate person understands that science
and technology are products of the cultures within which they develop.
5. T h e scientifically and technologically literate person understands that the
roles and effects of science and technology have differed in different cultures and
in different groups within these cultures.
6. T h e scientifically and technologically literate person understands that
technology and science are h u m a n activities that have creative, affective, and
ethical dimensions.
7.
T h e scientifically and technologically literate person bases decisions on
scientific and technological knowledge and processes. (Bybee et al 1991, p. 150)
These issues and scientific literacy are addressed specifically by the present thesis in
concluding chapter.
Arguments for more capable scientists and technologists, and those for national
economic and security benefits, are linked often but not always; both sets of argument
appeal to a variety of factors, depending on who is making the argument Thus some argue
simply for making the existing science curriculum more rigorous (eg, Gross & Levitt

1994), although the nature of this rigour is often not specified, while others (eg, Fensha
1992; Matthews 1994) argue for making clear the historical and philosophical
underpinnings of science:
The second response [to preparing future scientists and technologists] I will call
the 'critical' or 'self-awareness' approach. This starts from the assumption that
what young scientists most need (as, indeed, do w e all, desperately) is ... some
critical understanding of the nature of the situation into which they are being
propelled, so that they can work out what is happening to them before it is too late
and so allow them (at least in principle) to retain some control over their fate. Y o u
cannot 'resist temptation' unless you are able to recognise it for what it is. Y o u
cannot m a k e rational choices of your course of future action without an
understanding of this kind, and also a reflexive self-awareness of your o w n
strengths and weaknesses, skills and aptitudes, inclinations and preferences,
values and feelings, and so on. Y o u cannot 'exert willpower' without such
preconditions.
Applying this principle to science education, the 'critical' approach implies
teaching material about science, its institutionalisation and social structure, its
values and practices, so as to stress ideas about its social nature and its relationship
with other social institutions... (Edge 1995, p. 14; emphasis in original)
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Despite the range of suggested solutions, there seems to be a shared assumption across

some curriculum stakeholders that the effectiveness of the science curriculum is link
these national failings and, therefore, to their desired improvements:
In our age of technological application and advancement, when business and
industry have difficulty recruiting employees with the necessary knowledge of
science and mathematics, few can doubt that the crisis in science education is a real
one.
T h e crisis has led to recent calls from business leaders, politicians, and
educators, for the reform of science education. In the U S , such calls for reform
have been fuelled by a decline in the economic viability of the country, and its
failure to compete economically with countries such as Japan has been linked by
some to a decline in the scientific literacy of high school graduates. (Gruender and
Tobin 1991, p. 2)

This issue, and the appeals to rigour, noted above, are taken up in the concluding cha
1.2.6 An appreciation of the nature of science is necessary to engage students

Sixth are arguments that an appreciation of the nature of science is necessary as a
solution to the declining interest, achievement and participation in science courses.

detailing this low level of student engagement are a matter for widespread concern in
science education literature, as in this review:
[Disturbingly, students and teachers are deserting science.
This flight from the science classroom by both teachers and students has been
depressingly well documented. In the U S in the mid-1980s it was estimated that
each year 600 science graduates entered the teaching profession whilst 8,000 left it
(Mayer 1987). In 1986, 7,100 U S high schools had no course in physics, and
4,200 had no course in chemistry (Mayer 1987). In 1990 only four states required
the three years of basic science recommended by the sobering 1983 report A
Nation at Risk, the rest allowed high school graduation with only two years
science (Beardsley 1992, p. 80). Irrespective of years required, seventy percent of
all school students drop science at the first available opportunity - which is one
reason w h y in 1986 less than one in five high school graduates had studied any
physics. In 1991 the Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology and
Government warned that the failings of science education were so great that they
posed a 'chronic and serious threat to our nation's future' (Beardsley 1992, p. 79).
In the U K , recent reports of the National Commission on Education and the Royal
Society have both documented similar trends. O n e commentator has said that
'wherever you look, students are turning away from science. Those that go to
university are often of a frighteningly low calibre' ( B o w n 1993, p. 12). In
Australia in 1989 science education programs had the lowest entrance requirement
of all university degrees. (Matthews 1994, p. xiv).

A greater appreciation of the nature of science seems one of the few positive prospect
suggested for this problem:
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H P S can humanise the science and connect them to personal, ethical, cultural and
political concerns. There is evidence that this makes science and engineering
programs more attractive to m a n y students, and particularly girls, w h o currently
reject them. (Matthews 1994, p. 7)
1.2.7 A solution must be found for the difficulty in characterising the nature of science

Seventh are arguments that a solution must be found for the difficulty in

characterising the nature of science for the school curriculum and, derivatively, for l
and teaching strategies and teacher education:

Several problems exist relative to teaching the history and nature of science and
technology. First, there are no specific descriptions of scientific and technological
literacy as these pertain to the history and nature of science and technology.
Second, no conceptual framework exists that describes the teaching and learning
strategies for the history and nature of science and technology. Third, teacher
understanding of content and pedagogy is weak. Several authors (Russell 1981;
W a g n e r 1983; Duschl 1985, 1988, 1989) have delineated these needs and
problems. (Bybee et al 1991, p. 151)
The present thesis seeks to provide such a framework for teaching, learning and teacher
understanding.
1.2.8 Present characterisations of science for the school curriculum are inadequate

Eighth are arguments that, although understanding the nature of science is included
already in the goals and content of some school Science curricula, it is inadequate: it
characterised implicitly and incompletely, and in any case such good intentions in the
formal, published curriculum are lost in the implementation. This is discussed at some
length in the concluding chapter, but some indication of argument in the literature is
necessary here. Thus a common view among science education researchers is that school

Science is an inadequate and counter-productive characterisation of science. An example

the editorial to the 1991 special edition of Science Education that addressed the histo
philosophy of science and science teaching:
Traditional approaches to science teaching and learning have focussed on students
memorising facts about science and using algorithms to solve formulaic problems
(Stake & Easley 1987; Tobin & Gallagher 1987). T h e teacher and the textbook
have assumed the roles of the principal sources of knowledge, the paper and pencil
tests have exerted a major driving force on the curriculum. Science is perceived to
be a catalogue of truths about the universe: truths to be learned for later recall on a
test. Evidence for these claims in the U S is the number of reports and studies
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which have identified serious shortcomings in elementary and secondary education
(for example, those of the Carnegie Foundation, 1983; National Commission on
Excellence in Education, 1983; Murnane & Raizen 1988; Weiss, 1987). The
problems, however, are world-wide. (Gruender & Tobin 1991, p. 2)

Similar criticisms have been made of school Science in other education systems. Martin,
Kass and Brouwer (1990, p. 541), for example, cite the 1975 Symonds Report of the

Commission on Canadian Studies, that characterised school Science as 'being taught as a

body of knowledge and technique without any mention of its personal, social, or nationa

relevance'. The characterisation proposed in the present thesis meets these criticisms
being thoroughly grounded in the metascientific literature.
1.2.9 The nature of school science arises from the curriculumfocus or model, and
changes as curriculum emphases change

Ninthly are arguments that the nature of science as presented in the school curriculum
changes as the curriculum focus changes (Meyer 1977; Roberts 1982; McKenzie 1987).

Developments in Australian science curricula roughly followed those in the US and the U

with emphases shifting in the post-war years from unrelated facts, to unifying concept
processes, and then to values:
In the decade following that war, science courses were concerned primarily with
the teaching of factual information illustrating the technological applications of
scientific principles. The facts taught were often trivial and were rarely linked
together by any criteria. Meyer (1977, p. 94) calls this the 'grab bag era' of science
education.
Around 1955 this loose collection of facts began to be replaced by the 'big
ideas' of science. Concepts and other content of science courses tended to be
selected for their ability to contribute to the development of these 'big ideas'.
M e y e r refers to this as breaking through the 'content barrier' and calls this the
beginning of the 'big ideas era'.
During this period there developed a curriculum reform movement characterised
by an emphasis on the nature and structure of science and by the use of teaching
strategies that involved students actively in learning - 'inquiry approaches' and
'discovery learning'. Content continued to be selected for its capacity to contribute
to 'big ideas'. But it was n o w organised and used in such a w a y that it illustrated
the processes of science. Meyer calls this breaking the 'process barrier' into the
'inquiry era'. H e dates this at 1965. The PSSC, Chemstudy and B S C S courses are
exemplars of this from the United States, as are A S E P and JSSP in Australia.
M e y e r postulated the existence of a 'values barrier' that began to be dented
around 1975. The 'era of the value judgement' that lay beyond this barrier was
characterised as emphasising the contribution of scientific knowledge and the
processes of science to the amelioration of h u m a n and social problems. Meyer
argued that the breakthrough of this barrier would effect a synthesis of content,
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process and values to bring about a 'confluence of understandings, attitudes, skills
and insights to resolve conflicts between values'. (McKenzie 1987, pp. 160-2)
The present thesis will argue that curriculum emphases such as these in fact emphasise
certain characteristics or dimensions of science at the expense of others. In passing it should
be noted that there is evidence that shifts like these are complex and not at all clearly made at
the classroom level: questions of content, process and values are still current and
unresolved in the 1990s despite there having been major shifts in curriculum materials. This
difference between the formal, published curriculum and the enacted curriculum is an
ongoing issue in the curriculum literature. The more important point here, though, is that
these particular shifts direct the attention of curriculum developers, teachers and students to
different dimensions of the character of science. Thus the rise of process-oriented science
curricula in the 1950s and 1960s was influenced by a view that science is a process of
investigation. A n example is Schwab's argument that science is a process of inquiry or
search for cause and effect, and therefore has curriculum implications, influenced the B S C S
project (Fensham 1992, p. 792). Roberts' (1982) argument that there are different science
curriculum emphases means that there can be different emphases at different stages
(Fensham 1994). T h e present thesis interprets this to m e a n different dimensions of science
m a y be emphasised at different stages.

2. Metascientific sources and issues
2.1 Metascientific sources

The aim of the present thesis, to show that school Science can and should reflect
better the nature of science, is addressed by theorising h o w the metascientific literature
characterises science and h o w this could be better understood by science curriculum
stakeholders. That is, the present thesis seeks to show h o w the school science curriculum
can be grounded more robusdy in the scholarly literature about science. Thus this review of
the literature needs to clarify the metascientific literature as it applies to the present thesis.
In choosing the metascientific literature as the central source of metascientific views
for the school curriculum, and in seeking mainstream views of science for the curriculum,
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the present thesis m a d e an a priori, if somewhat implicit, choice about initial literature
sources. T h e metascientific literature is immense and growing, and no attempt could be
m a d e even to pretend that a comprehensive review is even possible. This is readily
conceded by m a n y authors (Martin, Kass & Brouwer 1990; B y n u m , Browne & Porter
(eds) 1983, Introduction; Jasanoff et al. (eds) 1995, pp. xi-xv; Oldroyd 1989, p. 1). In any
event it would be a distraction from the purpose of the present thesis, which is not to tally
the m a n y views and their variants (an impossible and meaningless task) but to represent this
variety. A n attempt to review the field (a) is beyond the scope of this thesis, (b) is already
provided in other texts, (c) would embody an analytical perspective that would itself be the
subject of the present analysis, and (d) would not make explicit the characterisations
proposed in the present thesis. In making use of the accounts in the literature, the present
thesis selects accounts considered representative of widely, and some less widely, held
views. T h e intention is to include sufficient detail from the literature to demonstrate the
ways in which science is characterised, and show different stakeholders that the range of
metascientific views can be discussed and compared within a c o m m o n framework. It seeks
neither to reproduce accounts already familiar to the reader acquainted with the literature nor
advocate a partisan or pre-committed stand.
In this w a y it can place some significant and current views in some sort of context,
and in turn develop a c o m m o n conceptual framework within which this diversity can be
placed. The main sources used for each field are given in chapter 3.
2.2 Metascientific issues

Discussion of metascientific issues takes up the greatest part of the present thesis, b
some of the significant issues for the present thesis can be listed here:
a)

Views about the nature of science are many, and establishing a particular
view of science is a complex and difficult matter that can never be
definitively concluded.

b)

O n e source of difference is whether accounts of science should be normative
(what science should be ideally), or descriptive (how science actually is
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the comparison of statements and identification of key text units within
them;

5.

coding the key terms into semantic categories; and

6.

links to further analysis and theorising.
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B a c k g r o u n d a n d contextual influences

Parameters arising from the practical pretensions of this thesis
W e noted in chapter 1 that the present thesis seeks to inform educational practice,
specifically the development of a general, school science curriculum. This aim is a
necessary restriction on the methodology and the range and type of outcomes to be
considered. There are a large number of possible strategies and outcomes from analysing
and theorising about the nature of science. M a n y of these are complex and require
thorough familiarity with metascientific arguments usually removed from school science
education. Therefore one criterion to be applied is that the solution be plausible in the
context of curriculum issues. The curriculum and science education literatures contain
m a n y examples of curriculum initiatives that have failed or made little difference for
various reasons (Fensham 1992). The metascientific literature contains m a n y theories of
science that m a y or m a y not be acceptable to a broad selection of curriculum stakeholders
and, even if acceptable, have not been analysed for their curriculum implications in the
manner presented in the present thesis. Scientists and metascientists as a group are
familiar as stakeholders in the science curriculum, but their role and involvement have
become clouded in recent years. Ongoing curriculum debates point to a need for their
expertise to be shared more widely, and suggest that their role has been less than
effective; and other stakeholders have become more influential, notably government and
industry groups (Ruby 1991; Sharpe 1991).
In seeking to inform the development of science curriculum, then, the present
thesis seeks to provide a framework (1) within which curriculum developers can place,
compare and m a k e informed judgements about the large and often disparate range of
views about the nature of science, and (2) that is meaningful and plausible to all groups
of stakeholders in curriculum development, and not just particular groups of stakeholders
such as scientists and metascientists. The general aim istoproduce a comprehensive and
widely acceptable framework for the characterisation of science, which could encompass
diverse views, which is appropriate in complexity to a mainstream school science
curriculum.
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The compatibility of such a framework with educational policy
The position taken in the introduction and rationale of this thesis w a s that
curriculum debate in a pluralistic democracy should be informed and open. Given the
discussion above, the question naturally arises whether an analysis such as proposed
here meets this criterion. Also, the influence of government and education policy on the
curriculum has been increasing and changing markedly in western countries from the
mid-1980's (see, for example, contributions in Fasano & Winder (eds) 1991 and Collins
(ed.) 1995). This has seen a shift in the power to make curriculum decisions, away from
some traditional curriculum stakeholders such as teacher and professional educator
groups, and towards other groups such as government, industry and unions. It has
accompanied a shift of policy imperatives, for different curriculum emphases and faster
curriculum development, that have restricted the contribution of public debate to the
curriculum. Fensham has commented that, in applying diverse interests to education, it
becomes likely, even probable, that the accommodation of one or more of these interests
will lead to the exclusion of one or more others:
Recognition of this probability, unfortunately, is still quite rare in the reports
and policies of the 1940s, as it was in the 1960s. Without it, some critical
implications for science curriculum are likely to be missed in decision making
for the current reforms in science education, just as they largely were in the
development and implementations of the 1960s reforms. Hodgson (1987) has
suggested that each proposal should be subjected to a scrutiny that reveals the
underlying sociopolitical motivation of the interest groups. W h o s e views of
science, whose interests, and whose views of society are being advanced?
(Fensham 1992, p. 793)
M u c h of the science education literature from the 1980s has concerned, quite
properly, student learning in science, notably the burgeoning literature on constructivism
(Fensham 1992; Pfundt & Duit 1994; Wandersee, Mintzes & N o v a k 1994). Yet the
radical interventions of conservative government policies on the curriculum m a k e no
mention of this. Debate at governmental level, and including the more recently influential
stakeholders, appears far less concerned with the implications of learning theories than
with the curriculum meeting broader needs such as micro economic reforms. A central
concern of education debates at political and policy levels is the function of education,
n o w widely interpreted as efficiency, accountability and curriculum content. W e have
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mentioned in the introduction, and will expand in the concluding chapter, that the drive
for more responsive curriculum development meets political and administrative policy
needs: short terms of political office, the costs of large scale curriculum projects, and
changing political, economic and industrial goals have all been identified. The very long
lead times of m a n y earlier curriculum development projects at least partly legitimise the
press for shorter development times. These are not the central concerns of m u c h recent
and current research in science education. T h e question that arises from this situation is
whether an analysis designed to inform the nature of school Science would be useful in
such a climate.
The answer to this question must be yes. First, the proposal of a framework that is
grounded broadly in the scholarly literature provides a c o m m o n setting for debating the
diverse views of science in the curriculum. This would contribute positively to informed
and open curriculum debate. Secondly, a framework grounded in the literature explicitly
addresses the content of the curriculum, a concern that partly drives current changes in
education policy. T h e present thesis is concerned also with the rationale for curriculum
content, but its scope is broader and includes a strategic rationale for political debate in a
pluralistic democracy. In a pointedly political exercise, of course, any piece of research
can be excluded arbitrarily from consideration, as could the present thesis. Other than
this, however, the present thesis will claim to be of use in detennining the nature of
science in the school curriculum regardless of h o w consultative are the development
strategies. A characterisation grounded in the metascientific literature can be useful
whether an education system seeks open debate over the school curriculum, or whether
debate is closed by investing the change in government administrators or committees w h o
report only to the government. Since the characterisation developed in this thesis is
intended as a framework for (informed) debate, its credibility and usefulness are
increased by accounting for a broader spectrum of views brought to the debate. T h e
present analysis must therefore draw broadly on the metascientific literature to strengthen
its credibility in an increasingly political and accountable process.
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This concern with the effects of changes in government and education policy is an
instance of the pragmatic criterion mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. It should
not, of course, limit the scope of the thesis in the sense of focussing concern on a
particular political or policy context. T o the contrary, given the topic of the nature of
science, the present thesis will argue that a plausible set of dimensions of characterisation
can be discerned in the literature, and that accounting for a wide range of
characterisations is likely to apply to characterisations of science to be m a d e in the future.
The need to seek mainstream views
Arising from the rationale of this thesis, and its argument for students to be
empowered as citizens in an increasingly scientific culture, is the question of h o w science
is conceptualised in mainstream

Australian culture. There will be at lesat some

similarities, as w e shall see, with the mainstream educational systems in other western
cultures such as in Britain, western Europe and North America, and education systems in
other countries similarly addressing science in the curriculum. O f course, the notion of a
mainstream culture is problematic in m a n y contexts, notably here the difficulties in
meaningfully discussing notions like mainstream and a single, undifferentiated culture.
However, the pragmatic criterion identified for the present analysis shifts the focus
somewhat. A s a piece of curriculum writing, the scope of the present thesis is restricted,
arbitrarily and perhaps fluidly, to apply to the general curriculum in the mass school
system, where there is an immediate need for utility and widespread acceptance. Thus it
must at the same time acknowledge the cultural pluralism n o w widely recognised in these
countries, which must be addressed by such a curriculum, and also that at some point in
each school system a decision is m a d e to adopt a particular science curriculum and it is
this decision that the present thesis seeks to inform.
Sources of mainstream views
In this sense a mainstream view of science is taken here as that found in a diverse
set of sources, mainly the scholarly 'metascientific' literature such as the history,
philosophy, sociology and policy of science, but including the mass media, science
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books and journals, general non-fiction including reference books, fiction, and
curriculum documents. Use of such a diverse set as this could be problematic for the
present thesis because it would expose the study to the criticism of having based some of
the analysis on sources that were not credible to a scholarly critique, meaning a critique
by those w h o have m a d e an in-depth study of the issues, even if they argue from diverse
perspectives. Clearly, a curriculum should be academically robust, at least sufficiendy so
to withstand such a critique. Accordingly, this study is based upon texts that would be
acceptable to such a critique, with the aim of producing a framework within which any
conceptions of science, mainstream or not, could be compared, analysed and debated. In
this w a y debate about the science curriculum would be better informed concerning the
nature of science. The present thesis argues that there are implications for the design and
content of science curricula, curriculum and teaching resources, the framing of teachers,
and so on.
Criteria for this study
Given all the above, an account of science appropriate for a school science
curriculum, as proposed in this thesis, must meet at least the following three criteria.
(1) It must be broadly based, and include a wide range of, and perspectives from,
literature acceptable to a scholarly audience as defined above. Therefore it should base the
discussion of the nature of school science on a well-grounded understanding of the ways
in which science is characterised in the metascientific literature. It should accommodate
the nature of science knowledge, which is large, expanding and subject to revision, and
our understanding of the nature of knowledge itself. It should be appropriate for citizens
in a multicultural and pluralistic society.
(2) It must be acceptable to the range of science curriculum stakeholders, but
specifically curriculum writers and ultimately to teachers and students. This relates to
parameters such as the overall complexity of the framework, the labels it uses for
concepts and its appeal as a plausible and useful framework. Implicit in such a position is
the claim that a theoretical framework is more likely to be adopted and used if it is more
widely acceptable, especially to key stakeholders. T h e complexity of any framework
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proposed is not central to the focus of the present thesis, since it introduces other factors
such as the curriculum implementation strategies adopted by education systems.
Nonetheless, it serves as a reminder to temper the complexities and subdeties that might
arise from academic thoroughness with a consideration for what will be pragmatic and
feasible, and meaningful to lay stakeholders.
(3) It must itself be open to further debate and development. It should not be
restricted to present conceptions or to a particular conception that is disputed at a
metascientific level, but instead be inclusive of the range of characterisations found in the
literature and attempt to be so for future characterisations. T h e strategy of starting with
the conventional, albeit diverse, views of established academic scholarship is not
intended to restrict the findingstothat set of views. Rather, it is to characterise science in
a w a y acceptable to science curriculum stakeholders with expertise and scholarship in
various characteristics of science. This is one step, but a significant one, in legitimising
the science curriculum. It does not preclude other views from the curriculum, because
ultimately such a decision is beyond the power of such stakeholders and lies with the
formal education system and the government If the results of the analysis are suitable, as
it will be argued they are, they can also be applied to other, alternative views and the
relative merits of different approaches can be discussed from within a c o m m o n
framework.
The relationship to existing characterisations of science in the curriculum
W e have noted debate a m o n g science curriculum stakeholders about what sort of
science should and could be in the school curriculum. T h e present thesis interprets this
debate as concerning what the characterisation of science should be for the school
curriculum, which does not a priori preclude present characterisations of science in the
curriculum. W e have noted also two tendencies in the ways science education writings
characterise science: (1) to characterise science as knowledge, or processes or both, and
(2) to take this as given or unquestioned. These two tendencies have been contested by
Millar and Driver (1987), w h o argued that the so-called processes or activities of science
are not characteristic of science particularly, but of clear thinking generally. They argued
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instead that science is characterised by the purposes of this activity and the ends to which
the knowledge is put; that is, science is characterised instead by its knowledge and
purpose.
It is significant that in their theorising, Millar and Driver do not present a totally
n e w construct, but instead theorise from the existing categories or dimensions of
characterisation. A s a matter of speculation, any number of alternative characterisations
could have been proposed, although most of these would be novel to the science
curriculum. For example it would be possible to propose a framework that used quite
different organising concepts: familiar examples include the set who, what, where, why,
when and how, and the set presage, process and product. A different kind of alternative
would be to propose an extreme relativism that denied any privileged status for currendy
accepted frameworks, and thereby dispensed with any reductionist strategy resulting in
categories of characterisation. Instead, Millar and Driver acknowledged the validity and
usefulness of one of the traditional categories of characterisation (knowledge), and
proposed that purpose replace the other (processes). Their proposal is therefore a
development of the existing schema, familiar to science educators and science curriculum
stakeholders. This would be more appealing to practitioners than replacing the familiar
with a completely novel scheme, and its chances of successful implementation would
accordingly be improved. T h e present thesis seeks to advance the field in a similar
fashion, by developing existing schemas if possible.
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T h e research questions a n d methodological overview

The central research question
T h e central goal identified in the discussion above is addressed in the present thesis
by beginning with the research question,
What are the similarities and differences between the characterisations, or
representations, of science in the summary statements in Figure A.l?
T h e proposed strategy is to categorise the data according to meaning and compare the
categories. F r o m the answers to this research question some judgements can then be
m a d e about the ways in which science is characterised in the scientific and metascientific
literature, with a view to theorising about the characterisations found.
The general strategy
It would seem, therefore, that a strategy that began by allowing for the validity of
the existing categories to be ascertained and the possibility of other categories to emerge
would be m o r e useful than starting completely afresh. The procedure adopted for the
present study should allow for this possibility among other, more novel, possibilities.
T h e grounded approach adopted in the present analysis is well suited to this criterion. It
addresses the second criterion, above, concerning its acceptability to practitioners, but
makes a radical reappraisal less likely.
Overview of the method of analysis adopted in this thesis
Given all the foregoing, the present thesis seeks to discern ways in which science
is characterised in the metascientific literature and to propose a means by which these
findings can be applied to the general school science curriculum. The strategy comprises
three parts, as previewed on page 44.
1.

T h e semantic analysis is an analysis of passages of text selected from the
metascientific literature. The analysis constructs categories of meaning used to
characterise science. T h e data for this analysis is given in Appendix A.1, the
discussion is given below, as the remainder of this section, and the application
of the analysis and generation of results are given in chapter 4.
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The extended discussion and meta-analysis explicates the proposed categories
and develops the argument that they are an interactive set of dimensions of
characterisation. This is introduced in chapter 5 and developed in the set of
companion chapters (chapters 6 to 11), using arguments from the metascientific
literature analysed in Appendix B.
Finally is an argument applying the proposed characterisation of science to the

3.

curriculum, and its place as a piece of curriculum research. This is given in
chapter 12.
The second and third parts are discussed later in section 6 of this chapter, w e will confine
our attention here to the first, which is the subject of the present chapter.
The semantic analysis
The first part, the semantic analysis, comprises three stages.
1.1

A broad range of text units, called summary statements, were selected from the
literature: definitions of science, and statements that, while not necessarily
written as comprehensive definitions, summarise all or part of an author's
conception of science. These are given in Figure A.1 (in Appendix A ) .

1.2 These summary statements were arranged into a c o m m o n format, to facilitate
comparison and the identification of key terms in them. This is given in Table
A.l (in Appendix A).
1.3

These key terms were coded into semantic categories following a grounded
theory approach. This is given in Tables A.2 to A. 11 of Appendix A . The
results of this analysis, the indications of h o w science is characterised in the
metascientific literature, then form the basis for the argument presented in the
body of the thesis.

The remainder of this chapter comprises these three stages of textual analysis.
The purposes of textual analysis
In describing categories of textual content, the present study seeks to discern
different meanings rather than compare the frequencies of text units. It is therefore

Chapter 3: Methodology

56

concerned with recording themes rather than word units. This represents one of three
main purposes of analyses of textual content identified by Holsti (1969, pp. 42-3, with
reference to Kerlinger 1964): (1) describing its characteristics (the purpose of this
analysis), (2) making inferences about its causes, and (3) making inferences about its
effects. T h e present analysis is more judgemental and subjective than a mechanical
recording of word units to determine their frequency. This is both a strength and a
weakness (Carney, 1972, pp. 46-7).
Methods of textual analysis
There are various ways of analysing text that suit various purposes and contexts
(see Holsti 1969, Table 2-1). T h e present analysis concerns the meanings discerned
within the summary statements in Figure A.l, i.e. it is a semantic analysis. Semantic
analyses can be undertaken by methods from different fields, including logic,
psychology, anthropology, literary criticism, communications science and linguistics.
Within linguistics there are alternative approaches also, including logical relations,
substitution, compatibility (collocation), distribution, synonymy, antonymy, hyponymy
and others (Nida 1975, pp. 194-5). Considering the various methods available it is
prudent not to be too doctrinaire in the present analysis, because different methods will
yield different insights. It is therefore important to acknowledge that a particular
approach, adopted for particular purposes, will produce particular results, as in the
present thesis.

3. Compilation of summary statements
The collection of data
T h e data collected for analysis comprise passages of text, ranging from a single
sentence to several paragraphs, from the metascientific literature. The metascientific
literature is taken here to be the massive and growing corpus of work in reference books,
texts and journals especially from fields such as science and the history, philosophy and
sociology of science, and more generally from fields such as history, sociology and
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linguistics. These units of text are identified as suitable for the present analysis because
they summarise the authors' view of science or some aspect of science. For the purposes
of the present thesis, the text units are called summary

statements. S o m e are explicit

definitions of science, such as dictionary entries, while others are judged by their form
and contexttobe equivalent to such a definition. The latter type are those judged to imply
a definition or partial definition, such that they can be slighdy reworded to m a k e their
definition more explicit without loss or alteration of meaning. Having established a
collection of such summary statements it is then possible to draw a comparison to discern
differences and similarities.
It m a y be objected at this point that a sentence or paragraph extracted from a
monograph of several hundred pages invites taking quotations out of context and a
specious interpretation. In answer to this concern, first, the sources of the data in Figure
A.1 include m a n y expected to be k n o w n to the reader with at least a passing familiarity
with the metascientific literature: even if the actual quotation is not k n o w n , the reader
would be able to form a judgement astoits veracity. The range and number of sources of
the summary statements m a k e it likely that any such reader will c o m e across authors
whose work is familiar. Most of the sources in Figure A.1 should be recognisably
authoritative to such a reader. Secondly, the textual analysis is not the complete
argument, but merely the means by which categories of characterisation are discerned.
The arguments for the proposed categories, and their interpretation as dimensions, are
made separately in Appendix B and summarised in the respective companion chapters.
Sources of summary statements
The first stage was locating and collecting the summary statements. Clearly, there
is a great variety of theoretical positions, contexts and intended audiences in interpreting
science in the metascientific literature, hence the need to meld various viewpoints as part
of the rationale of the study. Theorists within of each of these fields exhibit a range of
responses towards other viewpoints, which m a y be: accepted but not preferred; credible
and have significance in other contexts; accepted as legitimately held by others but
rejected in favour of another view; or directly opposed or rejected. This diversity of
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view, both about science and about other metascientific views, m a y be surprising to the
lay reader, but unsurprising to the reader with some familiarity of the field. In any case,
this is the very issue that the present thesis seeks to address: it is all gristtothe mill.
Similarly, in the context of developing science curriculum, the various stakeholders
need not be expected to find other viewpoints credible or perhaps significant. For
example, academic or industrially based scientists appear less likely to be concerned with
the diversity of metascientific arguments that philosophers and sociologists of science
would have appraised. Figure A.1 therefore includes entries diverse enough that each of
these groups of stakeholders would find something plausible: general dictionaries and
encyclopaedias; dictionaries and encyclopaedias of science, philosophy, philosophy of
science and sociology of science; general, undergraduate-level texts in science, history of
science, philosophy of science and sociology of science; and texts and articles identified
through library searches of key words and prominent thinkers. In turn, m a n y of these
sources suggested texts and authors for further study that yielded summary statements.
Further, having found certain texts well recommended in the literature, other texts by the
same and other authors were canvassed for summary statements.
Selection of summary statements: credibility
Having found a sample of text potentially worth including, the second stage
concerned the judgement of whether the example could be claimed to be frivolous or
unacceptable to stakeholders with metascientific expertise. This implies criteria of
academic credibility,rigourand depth, and raises questions of what standards and whose
standards. Again, the types of sources listed above would satisfy most critics o n these
criteria. T h e metascientific literature comprises the published findings of established and
recognised fields of scholarly research and theorising that is available for public scrutiny
and, being peer-reviewed, has been subjecttoacademic scrutiny as part of the publication
process. Views about science expressed in the tabloid press, for example, would be of
interest in shaping a science curriculum, but they should be the subject of the present
analysis and not form part of the data from which the thesis was constructed. The sort of
authority to which the tabloid press would appeal in making a thoroughly argued
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characterisation of science, as distinct from a populist characterisation, is the sort of
authority that the present thesis seeks to scrutinise. O f course, even within the
metascientific literature, some views are broadly accepted as legitimate (even if not
universally agreed with) and others only marginally accepted. Given the purpose in this
study of addressing the mainstream school curriculum, it is legitimate to seek mainstream
views of science.
This raises the question of what constitutes a mainstream view. There is no
expectation that any one reader will find all the statements equally acceptable. Rather, the
argument is that the summary statements (1) comprise an acceptable representation from
the metascientific literature, (2) have each been subjected to a similar analysis, and (3)
have been subjected to an acceptable analysis. T h e framework developed from this
analysis could then be applied to characterisations that m a y not be acceptable to the
metascientific community and would be a means of clarifying w h y such characterisations
are judged as unacceptable. T h e intention is to clarify the ways in which science is
characterised in the metascientific literature.
Accordingly, consideration w a s given to ensuring that the entries in Figure A.l
were acceptable as legitimate metascientific statements, even though it is recognised that
for any one reader the diversity of views included will no doubt present a mixture of the
academically acceptable, the disagreeable and the curious. It is important that the
distinction is understood between the deliberate sampling of a wide range of views from
the metascientific literature and the analysis of those views. It is hoped that the reader will
agree that the analysis of his or her preferred statements is valid, even though he or she
might not agree with all the other statements. B y extrapolation, it should be clear that the
analyses of these other statements are similarly valid, and that therefore the analysis
proposed in this thesis applies broadly to the characterisation of science.
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Selection of summary statements: form
A s the collection of summary statements grew, it became apparent that they were all
either explicit definitions of science, or approximated the form of defining or elaborating
terms:
The grammar embodies a range of ways of defining or elaborating terms. The
most familiar and probably the most frequendy used is to define technical terms
through an identifying relational clause. (Halliday & Martin 1993, p. 149)
Thus sentences were judged to be suitable as summary statements if, in a general sense,
they defined or elaborated the term science. If the surrounding text was judged to be
useful in providing additional meaning, then it w a s included also. M o r e detail on
grammatical considerations is given below.
Representativeness of the data
The third comment o n selection concerns representativeness and the number of
texts sampled. The sample is not a representative sample. It would be difficult enough to
guarantee a representative sample of metascientific texts, but the interpretative nature of
selecting text units as summary statements precludes any such notion. A s a general
statement, all quotes found by means of the search described above were included in
Figure A.l. The present study seeks to discern categories of meaning and therefore not
the relative numbers of particular viewpoints: it is concerned with the qualitative
differences between different characterisations. Thus, while there would be no reason in
principle to include two statements that are worded identically, w e are not concerned with
h o w m a n y times a statement is found. For example, in the case of two dictionary entries
the same statement w a s given twice, but was recorded only once for analysis. This is
consistent with the analysis below, which creates categories of meaning by putting
together terms with similar meanings. There is no significance in the order of the entries
in Figure A.l, except for statements 95 and 96, which are included consecutively
because they illustrate a shift in thinking between books with the same editor but
separated in publication by over two decades.
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T h e initial coding: comparison of statements a n d identification of
key text within them

Options for coding or categorisation of terms
Since the research question seeks trends or patterns in the use of meanings, the
next stage was to construct categories of similar meanings. Several options are available
in the coding or categorisation of the terms collected (Miles & Huberman 1984, pp. 5472). The first istobegin using a list of codes developed before the collection and analysis
of data, in the manner of interview or observation schedules or checklists. T h e advantage
of this option is that it can be set up to embody the conceptual framework, research
questions, hypotheses, identified problems and variables identified by the researcher
(Miles & H u b e r m a n 1984, p. 57). This approach is interpreted as a rigidly predetermined schedule of categories and is not suited to the general grounded approach as
in the present analysis.
A second option is to wait until the data are collected to see what categories can be
identified. The advantage of this inductive approach, as discussed earlier, is that the data
are less likely to be 'moulded', as it m a y be into pre-existing codes such as the first
option uses, and the researcher isfreerto seek alternative explanations. The problematic
nature of induction in philosophy should be noted, in that there is disagreement about
whether and h o w induction works. However, it is not problematic in the pragmatic sense
proposed in the literature on grounded theorising, and certainly not as interpreted here, in
which provisional speculations and revisions of interpretations are not only
acknowledged but encouraged. (See the discussion below of theoretical sensitivity.) A
third option represents a mid-point between the first two, which is to use categories or
codes that are not specific to content and general enough to handle a variety of data and
suggest further categorisation. This is more receptive to modification than using preexisting codes but provides sufficient structure to help avoid the inconsistencies and
retrospective adjustments that can result from an empirical, grounded approach.
T h e analysis presented here represents a combination of the second and third
approaches. The initial coding used three general categories of grammar/syntax, as in the
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third approach above. This coding w a s used simply as a technique for structuring the text
units so that the key terms could be identified m o r e clearly and consistently. T h e
subsequent codings were used to create semantic categories. They began with the
tentative identification of the traditional categories of characterisation (knowledge and
processes), and continued to establish further categories (chapter 4). These codings draw
on the techniques of grounded theory, as in the second approach, above.
Beginning with 'core' meanings
The initial stage of analysis was to identify 'essential' or 'core' meanings in the text
units without distorting the data. It does not suit the purpose of this analysis to alter data,
or use data selectively, to m a k e the text units conform to pre-determined coding
categories.
Lay's procedure for analysis of formal definitions
The basis of the present analysis w a s that of Lay (1982, pp. 45ff), w h o provided
an analysis of formal definitions using a method of coding that meets the specifications
given above. In Lay's method of analysis the subject of each statement is set against its
predicate, and from the predicate the class of categorisation can be deterrnined. F r o m
Lay's account, the subject of the sentence is identified as belonging to a class, and then
distinguished from all other subjects. This is done by describing the term to be defined in
terms of the class and the differentiae:

The term to be defined

= the class

(the subject to be defined)

(the class, group or
category to which the
subject belongs)

e.g.

science

is the investigation and
analysis

e.g.

biology

is the study or science

the differentiae
(the characteristics that
distinguish the subject from
all others in the class and
exclude all other subjects
except the one being
defined)
of natural phenomena
of living organisms and
vital processes
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Within this analysis, a formal definition must meet two criteria: (1) 'the subject does
belong to the class and (2) the differentiae exclude all members of that class except the
one being defined' (Lay 1982, p. 48). B y the first criterion, the differentiae must not
repeat terms from the class or subject being defined: science is what is done in science
labs does not define, but merely repeats. B y the second criterion, science, for example,
would have to be distinguishedfromtechnology.
Subjecting the summary statements to Lay's analysis
The initial analysis of the summary statements found in Figure A.l, using Lay's
framework, is given in Table A.l. Most entries fitted this framework because the subject
is science. In other cases the original was reworked to m a k e the subject science, so
making the analysis clearer and more consistent:
•

where the standard definition format is implied;

•

where more than one definition is made or implied in the extract (in which
case there is more than one subject, and the definitions of each of the extra
subjects are included); and

•

where the original text is a sentence with several relevant clauses.

Care was taken not to alter the original meaning. The original text is in any case available
to allow the reader to check the interpretation. Simply dismembering thetextcan diminish
the clarity of the original meaning and integrity of the text. In these cases, wording in
square brackets [ ] w a s added to clarify the meaning. In cases where the original was
reworked, as in summary statements 5, 6, 8, 9, 11 and 14, for example, a reworked
version is indicated by the conjunction or. The version corresponding mosttothe original
is given first
Whether as originally worded or reworded, the word science is the subject in all
examples as analysed. It is m o s d y used to denote a concept, but in a few examples it
denotes a word or term (Science is the term used to . . . ) , as in, for example, summary
statements 1, 5, 14 and 80. This does not seem to make any difference, however. T h e
examples of science as a term were interpreted in terms of science as the subject, and add
nothing further.
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In a few cases, science is described in terms of what it is not: it is distinct from
either tradition or authority (summary statement 14), not just a collection of laws [orj a
catalogue offacts (summary statement 15) and is not a technique; it is not a form of
power; it is not even simply an accumulation of knowledge (summary statement 16).
These appear to be intended to reflect a concern to counter some popular notions of
science, and indeed is the substance of the article from which Feynman's quote
(summary statement 6) is taken: that the terminology, for example, is just the labels and
tools of science - necessary for, but not actually science itself. T h e classes set out in
terms of not being something in fact are worded in two ways. Bronowski (summary
statement 16) claims science is neither a technique nor a form of power. But a different
wording is used by Bronowski for knowledge and by Einstein and Infeld for laws and
facts: not just and not simply. Science is actually being described in terms of those
qualities.
Determining the classes: establishing subject, class and differentiae
Where the structure of the text entry matched Lay's format or was easily reworked
to be so, establishing the class and differentiae w a s unproblematic: the subject is
explicidy part of the class. For example:
A 1.9 Modern science is a search for understanding expressed in laws or
principles of greatest generality and which are capable of experimental test

Subject Class Differentiae
M o d e m science
is a search

• for understanding
• expressed in laws or
principles
• of greatest generality
• and which are capable of
experimental test.

Determining the classes: reworded examples
Where possible the subject was taken to be the noun only, in order to reduce the
text unit of the class to its essential meaning. A n y qualifications of the noun, such as by a
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clause or adjective, were taken to be qualifications of the class and therefore one of the
differentiae. Using the same example:

Subject
[S]cience

Class
is a search

Differentiae
• for understanding
• expressed in laws or
principles
• of greatest generality
• and which are capable of
experimental test
• [as practised in modern
times]

In some cases judgements were not so easily made, and determining the subject
depended on the particular wording adopted for the text unit. In these cases the

differentiae served not only as qualifications of the subject but also to 'mop -up' or

the remaining ideas in the original text. That is, the original data are preserved. Su

statement 4 is an example in which the core characterisation is made by several words:
Al .4 Science is a developing body of knowledge ...

At face value there are several possible interpretations:

or, science

Class
is a developing
body of knowledge
is a ... body of
knowledge
is ...knowledge

or, science

is a... body

Subject
Science
or, science

Differentiae
• [which is] developing
•
•
•
•

body
[which is] developing
of knowledge
[which is] developing

In this case, and in several others, the essential characterisation is body of knowledge.

Following the principle, above, of trying to reduce the Class to its essential term, th

characteristic developing can be put aside into the differentiae, but the remainder co
interpreted as body of knowledge, or body (of knowledge), or (body of) knowledge.
This example was not clear, and so was entered twice, as body and as knowledge.
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Determining the differentiae
The differentiae are dealt with later. See below.
Setting out the subject, class and differentiae
For clarity, the first line of differentiae in Table A . 1 (column three) are marked with
a bullet (•) and subsequent lines are indented. The fourth (right-hand) column contains
the key words from the analysis of each entry: the class in upper case letters and the key
words from the differentiae in lower case. Using the same example:
Subject
Science

Class
is a search

Differentiae
! K e y words
• for understanding
SEARCH
• expressed in laws or ! • for understanding
principles of greatest • laws or principles
generality
• greatest generality
• which are capable of • capable of experimental
experimental test
test
• [as practised in modern • m o d e m [times]
times]

See Table A.l: A n analysis of the summary statements of science given in Fig. A.l,
which follows Lay's (1982) method for analysing definitions.

5. The second coding: coding the key terms into semantic categories

The next stage of analysis was to seek regularities or patterns in the use of key
words of classes in summary statements of science. This entailed a second process of
establishing categories, this time on the basis of meaning. Judgements had to be m a d e in
establishing the categories into which the data are distributed. T h e greater subjectivity
introduced in establishing these categories therefore had to be carefully identified and
monitored. A c o m m o n means of compensating for this subjectivity is by proliferating the
number of categories, but this presents its o w n problems, including ending up with an
unwieldy system (Holsti 1969, p. 98).
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Grounded theorising
The overall methodology is an example of grounded theorising (Glaser & Strauss
1967; Glaser 1978; Strauss 1987; Strauss & Corbin 1990):
A grounded theory is one that is inductively derived from the study of the
p h e n o m e n o n it represents. That is, it is discovered, developed, and
provisionally verified through systematic data collection and analysis of data
pertaining to that phenomenon. Therefore, data collection, analysis, and theory
stand in reciprocal relationship with each other. O n e does not begin with a
theory, then prove it Rather, one begins with an area of study and what is
relevant to that area is allowed to emerge. (Strauss & Corbin 1990, p. 23)
That is, the present analysis is an attempt to derive some sort of construct or theory
inductively from the data, where the data are the summary statements of science from the
metascientific literature. T h e proposed analysis represents grounded theorising as
proposed by Strauss and Corbin in the following respects. The summary statements
given in Figure A.l were subjected to a process of coding, beginning in Table A.l. Each
w a s subjected to a semantic analysis, initially following the method proposed by Lay
(1982) and described below, in which the subject is set against the predicate (Table A.1).
Collection and coding of the data entailed developing the theoretical sensitivity necessary
for grounded theorising, where theoretical sensitivity is
an awareness of the subtleties of meaning of data ... the attribute of having
insight, the ability to give meaning to data, the capacity to understand, and
capability to separate the pertinent from that which isn't (Strauss & Corbin
1990, pp. 41-2).
The data are coded in Appendix A. They were coded into key words of subjects and
predicates in Table A.l, are then coded and placed into categories, and the categories
n a m e d (Tables A.2 to A. 10). The six proposed categories of characterisation resulting
from this analysis form the basis for, and are developed respectively, in Appendix B and
the six companion chapters.
Minimal structure to this point
Lay's approach, which had been used up to this point imposes minimal structure
on the coding of the data and is therefore a general coding system as described in the
third option described by Miles and Huberman, above. The simplicity of the categories subject, class and differentiae - and the fact that they address grammar and syntax in the
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most general way, not the meaning content, means that they d o not constrain the
categorisation of meaning and a degree of 'grounded' theorising is possible.
Possibilities for the categorisation of meaning
Having collected data in the categories of class and differentiae, the question then
arose as to the categorisation of meanings. The use of a complete and pre-determined set
of categories has been discounted above as unsuitable to the present analysis. T h e use of
general categories is possible, at least in principle, and two approaches are examined
here.
Lay's categorisation of cause
The first is the continuation of Lay's method of analysis. L a y proposes further
general categories to be used in the coding of the differentiae, which 'can include four
characteristics or "causes" [following Aristode's doctrine of four causes]:
•

the efficient cause (what created the object or term),

•

the material cause (what the object is made of),

•

the formal cause (what the structure of the object is), and

•

thefinalcause (what the function of the object is).' (Lay 1982, p. 48)

O n e or more of the causes m a y be used as appropriate. Admittedly, these are intended to
apply to the differentiae and not the classes, but the method had been useful to this point
in systematically segmenting sentences, and its full use would potentially have been
useful.
Halliday's categories of circumstance
The second is a functional grammar approach (Halliday & Martin 1993; Halliday
1994). A s with Lay's approach, this approach is based on the language structure rather
than the semantic content. However, a functional g r a m m a r approach enables the
categorisation of text units based on 'how the language is used' (Halliday 1994, p. xiii).
The particular interest in the present thesis is in the text units that have a basic purpose of
defining or elaborating terms, especially those using an identifying relational clause, as
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mentioned above. Thus, to use the example from the discussion of Lay's method on page
62:

The term to be defined = identifying relational clause
the token, which specifies the value, which specifies the function (or meaning,
the form (or sign, name,
referent, function, status or role) of that being
holder or occupant) of that
identified
being identified
e.g., science the investigation and analysis ofnatural phenomena
e.g., biology the study or science of living organisms and vital
processes

Defining or elaborating terms can be accomplished through a number of grammatical

constructions that can be interpreted in terms of the token/value relationship. The

not concern us here. However, a significant exception to the token/value construct i
when a term is defined in terms of a list of attributes:
... where something becomes identifiable by having a particular set of attributes.
Each of the attributes is a necessary condition ... but only the whole set is
sufficient to define the term. This kind of definition tends to be used when the
major classes in taxonomies are being established. Geographers [for example]
look first for partial likenesses to establish principle groupings; sub
classification then proceeds on the basis of partial difference. (Halliday & Martin
1993, p. 152)
Our example would look something like the following:
science [is or has or entails] • investigation
• analysis
• concern with natural phenomena
• etc, etc

Before evaluating this schema, the nature of the relational clause needs to be clar
Relational clauses can be of three types (Halliday & Martin 1993, pp. 42-3):
(1) intensive (the term science denotes...)
(2) possessive (science includes all the...)
(3) circumstantial (science is about the... or science concerns the...).
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The notion of circumstantiation is set out by Halliday (1994, pp. 149-61) in some detail.
In particular is the set of possible circumstantial elements he proposed (p. 151):
Type of circumstantial element Specific categories (subtypes^
extent
distance, duration
location
place, time
manner
means, quality, comparison
cause
reason, purpose, behalf
contingency
condition, concession, default
accompaniment
comitation, addition
role
guise, product
matter
angle
It appears that at least some of the circumstantial elements m a y be relevant categories for
the present analysis; they could conceivably apply to definitions or summary statements
of science. S o m e judgement is needed.
Criteria for plausible categories
Categories must meet certain criteria in order to be plausible. In seeking to show
that there are plausible categories of the ways by which science is characterised in the
literature, the present analysis soughttoembody generally accepted principles of category
construction, in particular to meet criteria, such as described by Holsti (1969, pp. 94ff):
1)

The categories must reflect the purposes of the research. This is done by
making explicit both the variables and the indicators used for
categorisation. It results in a valid representation of concepts being
discussed, and reliably guides the categorisation. For example, this study
is not concerned with any relationship between the categorisation of
meaning and the authors' genders and nationalities.

2)

T h e categories must be exhaustive, meaning all entries must fit into a
category. This is demonstrated in the analysis of Tables A . 2 to A . 10,
below. In fact, the sequential construction of these tables is m a d e to
accommodate all entries explicidy.

3)

T h e categories must be mutually exclusive, meaning that n o entry should
fit into more than one category. In general, this was demonstrated easily in
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the present analysis. S o m e classes, however, required greater
consideration before placement. This seems to arise where the term
includes a number of associations of meaning - no doubt the reason for its
use - that require judgement as to the essential or core meaning. See the
discussion of enterprise, below, as an example where a judgement was
m a d e to identify the core meaning as the basis for the classification.
4)

The categories must be independent, meaning that the placement of one
entry to a category should not affect the categorisation of any other entries.
This is often difficult to satisfy, such as where the categories are rank
orders or values along a scale: ranking an item third, for example,
displaces all items already ranked lower than three. The categories
proposed in the present study are not of this type and so satisfy the
criterion of independence.

5)

Each category should be derived from a single principle of classification,
meaning they use similar levels of conceptual analysis. This is easily met
in the present study, which is a semantic analysis: all categories are
categories of meaning. There is no mixing with numbers of respondents,
for example, which employs a different principle of classification.

Difficulties with these pre-determined sets of categories
Lay's categorisation of causes and Halliday's categorisation of circumstantial
elements are unsatisfactory for the present thesis, on the basis of thefirstof Holsti's
criteria, above. First, their contribution to the search for patterns in the classes is unclear,
addressing as they do the differentiae and not the classes themselves. It would be better
to defer the question of categories of differentiae until any categories of classes could be
determined. Secondly, neither Lay's categorisation of causes nor Halliday's
categorisation of circumstantial elements appears to relate particularly well to the set of
data w e have as the list of classes, and as categories do not clearly relate to the purposes
of the study. Thirdly, Halliday's categorisation of circumstantial elements (types and
subtypes) introduces a set of terms that is large and introduces complexities of grammar
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likely to be unsuited to the purpose of this thesis. Fourthly, while s o m e of the
circumstantial elements appear relevant, this analysis uses a restricted range of
circumstances. M o r e than this, the very nature of the text units means that this study is
concerned with a limited range of grammatical resources, not just in terms of
circumstance.
Fifthly, it is possible to reword m a n y of the summary statements so that the
intended meaning is preserved quite clearly, but in doing so changing the category of
functional grammar. M o r e particularly is the interest in this study in sentences which
involve the clarification of a noun. The basic structure by which w e refer to nouns, and
modify nouns, is by a noun group, such as the study of humanity, that contains the
nouns study and humanity. This is not a circumstance. Furthermore, it is possible to blur
the distinction between the two: some phrases beginning with in or at could be either a
circumstance or a noun group, depending on the context. While this illustrates the
analytical power of a functional grammar approach for interpreting text, it introduces
complexities that are unnecessary for the purposes of the present analysis. Sixthly, w e
have noted earlier that there exists a tradition of categorisation in terms of knowledge
and/or processes, that Millar and Driver (1987) recognised in suggesting that purposes
replace processes. W e have noted already that it would seem useful to start by
considering the categories already in use. Seventhly, one of the features of the grounded
approach is that it provides opportunity for categories to 'emerge' from the data, a
potential that m a y be wasted by imposing pre-existing categories.
Given the foregoing argument, examination of the differentiae was deferred until
after the examination of the classes. The terms used as classes in Table A.l are listed
alphabetically in Table A.2. The application of and results of this semantic analysis are
described in chapter 4.
6. Links to further analysis and theorising

We turn finally, from the semantic analysis and construction of categories of
meaning, to the second and third parts of the present study: the extended discussion and
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meta-analysis of the proposed categories as multiple dimensions of characterisation, (in
Appendix B and chapters 6 to 11), and their application to the curriculum (in parts 4 of
chapters 6 to 11 and in chapter 12).
T h e six companion chapters (chapters 6 to 11) summarise the selection,
comparison and analysis of various metascientific arguments from the literature. Actual
metascientific characterisations are given in sufficient detail in Appendix B to illustrate
various arguments, for two reasons. T h e first is to show that a wide selection of
metascientific argument and points of view can be adequately represented in the six
proposed dimensions, which the present thesis interprets to m e a n that this literature
characterises science in these six dimensions. T h e second is to indicate to science
curriculum stakeholders the breadth and nature of characterisation of science in this
literature.
O n a number of occasions during the writing of this thesis it was tempting to
structure this meta-analysis as a review of representative viewpoints followed by
advocacy of a preferred view or characterisation. In other words, to provide more
guidance to curriculum stakeholders. This approach was rejected as making assumptions
about the desired nature of school Science on behalf of stakeholders. The approach
adopted w a s to indicate something of the scope to be found, with an emphasis more on
mainstream metascientific views, as judged more suitable to mainstream curriculum
development. In this sense, the author's views have influenced the argument, in the
selection of sources and authors and in the manner they are presented, but it is hoped that
beyond the stated concern for mainstream views this influence has not been too
obtrusive.
While no direct precedence for the present thesis has been found, there is some
experience in the educational research literature to be drawn on, that serves as a guide to a
meta-analysis such as attempted here. For example, Dunkin (1996) has described nine
types of errors occurring in three stages of the process of synthesising research. W e will
use this review of errors as a benchmark for discussing the analysis of the metascientific
literature.
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In thefirststage, or what Dunkin called the primary stage,
the synthesiser searches the literature and selects from it the items judged
relevant to the topic of the review. Errors m a d e at this stage result in bias mat
might lead to conclusions that represent the findings of only part of the research
and omit thefindingsof the rest or that give equal status to the findings of good
and poor research. (Dunkin 1996, p. 88)
Thus the first type of error is unexplained selectivity, where the reviewer does not
explain or justify w h y research is excluded that falls within the stated scope of the
review. The result of this error is that the conclusions of the research cannot be claimed
to apply to the wholefieldof concern. The present thesis, while claiming that a strictly
accurate representation of the field (science and metascience) is an unreasonable
expectation, has addressed this type of error in its procedure for identifying arguments.
That is, it began its exploration of metascientific fields using authoritative, current and
representative texts, such as The Philosophy of Science (Boyd, Gasper & Trout (eds)
1991), The History of Science (Bynum, Browne & Porter (eds) 1983), Companion to
the History of Modern

Science (Olby, Cantor, Christie & H o d g e (eds) 1990), and

Handbook of Science and Technology Studies (Jasanoff, Markle, Petersen & Pinch (eds)
1995). Aside from argument and explanation, these texts included extensive
bibliographies and references that the present thesis used as further sources.
The second type of error is lack of discrimination, in which the reviewer fails to
discriminate between the uneven quality of research on a topic. Dunkin's main concern
here w a s the lesser quality of non- refereed conference papers and reports, w h e n
compared to journal articles and texts that have undergone peer review. The present
thesis has relied overwhelmingly on the latter, reviewed, category, and so avoids this
criticism.
In the second stage, what Dunkin called the secondary stage,
the reviewer analyses the literature selected in order to identify context,
methods, and the findings of each study included. This is the stage at which the
variety of errors m a d e is greatest... (E)rror in identifying facts about contexts
and methods leads to the misclassification of studies, and errors in identifying
and reporting findings introduce error into the next stage of the synthesis.
(Dunkin 1996, p. 88)
Thus the third type of error is erroneous detailing, where the reviewer makes wrong
statements about the details of research. The present thesis has attempted to avoid this
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problem by careful adherence to its source materials and extensive use of quotations to
accurately represent the varied and often complex arguments in metascience. The fourth
type of error is double counting of multiple reports from the one project which does not
apply to the present study and its concern with the variation and substance of argument,
not its representativeness.
Potentially more damaging are the fifth and seventh types of error, respectively
nonrecognition of faulty author conclusions, and suppression of contraryfindings.In the
former, the original authors do not represent their findings fully and reviewers accept
these uncritically; in the latter,findingscontrary to the reviewer's generalisations are
ignored. It is the nature of metascience that original authors put particular lines of
argument and typically it is other authors w h o argue the faults in those arguments. The
present thesis has attempted throughout to show that metascience is a complex field
almost defined by opposing arguments and that for m a n y , even m o s t characteristic
issues, such as the role and defence of induction, there is no agreed solution. Thus in the
majority of cases, the complexity and diversity of the field is best represented by
presenting several views. For the sixth type of error, unwarranted

attributions, the

reviewer makes false claims about the results of studies; again, the close adherence to the
original texts and extensive use of quotations should convince the reader of the veracity
of the present thesis here.
In thetertiarystage, which applies particularly to the present thesis,
the reviewer seeks to assemble the evidence of the individual studies according
to the main topics or issues investigated, in order to see whether meaningful and
justifiable generalisations (syntheses) can be stated about them. T h e questions
asked are, D o they add up?, and, IF so, to what? Errors at this stage can lead to
the statement of invalid generalisations and to the failuretorecognise valid ones.
O f course, errors m a d e at the primary and secondary stages seriously threaten
the validity of generalisations at the tertiary stage, but it is also possible that
errors can emerge at this stage for the firsttime.(Dunkin 1996, p. 94)
Dunkin identified two types at this stage. Thus the eighth type of error is a consequential
error arising from errors at earlier stages. Since the earlier errors were rebutted, above,
this type should not apply. The ninth type is failure to marshal all evidence relevant to a
generalisation, where the present thesis interprets generalisations as the six dimensions of
characterisation. The extensive size of the present thesis has resulted from addressing just
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this question - marshalling sufficient evidence for the dimensions. This thesis argues that
marshalling all evidence is an improbable feat, given the nature of the field and the task,
and in any event unnecessary. Instead it claims to have marshalled sufficient evidence
relevant to the generalisations, and leaves it to the reader to make this judgement
In conclusion, the six companion chapters, together with the extended analysis in
Appendix B , marshal a considerable amount of metascientific argument to make, support
and illustrate the case for science being characterised in the proposed multiple
dimensions. In doing so, it is recognised that m u c h more argument could have been
included but that, in the judgement of the author and the readers of various drafts, what
has been finally included is sufficient to make the case. Indeed, there were several
instances in the writing of the thesis of discarding sections in an effort to contain the
overall length, because they added no further to the overall argument even though they
were consistent with it.
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Chapter 4
Application and results of the semantic analysis:
constructing dimensions of characterisation
The semantic analysis of a collection of summary statements about
science given in the metascientific literature as a basis for identifying
dimensions of characterisation

Introduction to the chapter
This chapter reports the application and results of the semantic analysis described in
chapter 3. It interprets the resulting categories of meaning as dimensions of
characterisation, to be applied in the extended discourse. It is structured as follows:
1.

categorising the classes:
a)

classes meaning knowledge

b)

classes meaning activity

c)

classes meaning purpose

d)

classes meaning context

e)

classes meaning structure

f)

classes meaning some unstated mind-set

2.

classes with complex meanings;

3.

characterisation as versus characterisation by;

4.

the possibility of more, or fewer, categories of characterisation;

5.

categories of meaning as dimensions of characterisation;

6.

the relegation of terms to the differentiae;

7.

the 'content' of dimensions;

8.

the interdependent nature of the dimensions; and

9.

conclusions and application of the results for further analysis and
theorising.
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Semantic analysis of the classes
The categorisation of the classes is a combination of the second and third types of
categorisation, as described above. That is, it proposes the two traditional categories of
knowledge and processes (or activities) as tentative constructs, to see what remains after
they are extracted.
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Categorising the classes

a) Classes meaning knowledge
T h e list in Table A.2 of classes identified in the s u m m a r y statements clearly
includes a large number of words used to characterise science in terms of knowledge or
concepts. These are collected in Table A.3. This category is consistent with the traditional
characterisation of science by its knowledge. However, the majority of classes remain
uncategorised, which indicates that in m a n y metascientific accounts knowledge alone is
not sufficient to characterise science.
b) Classes meaning activity
F r o m among the classes n o w remaining in Table A.2, a second set w a s extracted
that were used to characterise science by activity of s o m e sort, meaning that it is
characterised by some sort of process, method, dynamic, development or change. This is
consistent with the second traditional dimension of science, often called process.
However, there appear to be several difficulties with labelling this set of terms as
processes. First, the set appears to have a broader meaning than what are commonly
regarded as 'scientific processes' such as predicting and experimenting. For example, the
terms activity, behaviour and procedures are more general than this. Contention and
developing statements appear to refer to different activitiestowhat are commonly thought
of as scientific processes. Secondly, there is also a collective imprecision in the ways
these terms are used in the summary statements1. Thirdly, terms such as enterprise (see
discussion below) appear to have been employed explicitly because they e m b o d y a
collection of meanings, in this case to associate purpose, large scale and context with
activity. Fourthly, the term processes is subject to s o m e debate within the science
education literature, and it would be prudent to avoid any confusion with that debate.
Accordingly, the present thesis labels this set of terms as activity, a term m o r e likely to

1

This is taken up in more detail in the dedicated companion chapter, chapter 10, and in
Appendix B.5.
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avoid any existing debates over related terms, yet which labels all the terms in the set
T h e set is collected in Table A.4.

c) Classes meaning purpose
Finding that science is often characterised by its knowledge and activities is not
unexpected, of course. W h a t m a y have been less expected, given the dominance of these
two dimensions in the literature, is that a large number of terms for classes still remain
after knowledge and activity have been accounted for. That is, for the majority of
summary statements, knowledge and activity are not sufficient to characterise science.
Consistent with the characterisation suggested by Millar and Driver (1987) of purpose
instead of processes, it is worthwhile noting that, from the classes remaining in Table
A.2, a third set w a s extracted in which science is characterised by its purpose, intentions,
goals or aims. These terms are set out in Table A.5.
d) Classes meaning context
F r o m the classes n o w remaining in Table A.2, a fourth set was extracted in which
science is characterised by its context, such as community,

contextual, culture,

entrenched, occupation/vocation, politics, society and tradition. These are collected in
Table A.6. Note that the term tradition can be taken as meaning an intellectual tradition,
meaning it is referenced to ideas, or a tradition within a social or sub-cultural group,
meaning it is referenced to cultural or social norms. These interpretations correspond to
positions found in the literature, being characteristic especially of internalist and
externalist positions respectively. This is a significant distinction in the characterisation of
science, and is discussed in s o m e detail in chapter 6. A number of the s u m m a r y
statements do not mention context, and a view of science is implied through this
omission that science is acontextual; this corresponds to an extreme internalist position,
in which only the intellectual context is considered2.

2

Again, this is taken up more fully, in the companion chapter on context and in Appendix
B.1.

Chapter 4: The semantic analysis

81

e) Classes meaning structure
F r o m the classes n o w remaining in Table A.2, a fifth set w a s extracted that
indicates a structural, relational or syntactical characteristic of science, such as body,

disciplines, institutions, laws, set, structure, systems, and theories. These terms are se
out in Table A.7. Terms such as laws and theories are c o m m o n l y associated with their
knowledge content, but this misses a significant element of characterisation. Scientific
knowledge is not set out in any old fashion. It has characteristic forms or structures as
well as purposes. M u c h of science is set out mathematically, in which the order or
structure is highly significant and scientific language derives its meaning and precision
from its characteristic structures. According to some conceptions, a scientific theory is
very highly structured and according to some others it is not but in any case structure or
form is a metascientific issue. Note that s o m e terms m a y be considered to arise from an
internalist approach, being concerned only with the intellectual context: laws, theories
and propositions are commonly given as examples. Others correspond to an externalist
position: industries, enterprise and institution are obvious examples. This apparent
dichotomy might indicate that structural or relational aspects should be considered as two
categories. However, a number of relational terms are ambiguous o n this question, and
could refer to either, especially w h e n read in context: tradition, discipline, system, fields
of science are examples. This indicates a mutual influence that the intellectual and
organisational structures have on each other, and that their distinctiveness can be blurred.
T h e term structure incorporates all these variations. This also is discussed later in the
thesis.
f)

Classes meaning some, often implicit, mind-set
F r o m the classes n o w remaining from Table A.2, a sixth set w a s extracted which

indicates ^foundational or dispositional aspect of science, which is usually unstated or
implicit, such as attitudes, belief, belief system, commitment, criteria of judgement,
fundamental conceptions and value posture. These terms are set out in Table A.8. They
indicate that science is at least partly characterised by some set of assumptions, attitudes,
beliefs and values. Again, discussion of this proposed dimension is given m o r e fully in a
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dedicated chapter, chapter 7, where the case is m a d e that these terms all comprise
elements of a belief system.
2.

Classes with complex meanings

Some terms had a number of associated meanings, from which a core or central
meaning was interpreted, as mentioned above. This required some consideration of the
meaning in the context of the surrounding text and the broader set of meanings as given
by a dictionary. For example, the term enterprise means:
1.

a project undertaken or to be undertaken, especially one that is of some
importance, or that requires boldness or energy
2. engagement in such projects
3. boldness or readiness in undertaking, adventurous spirit or energy
4. a company organised for commercial purposes (The Macquarie
Dictionary).
In turn, the term project means:
1.

something that is contemplated, devised, or planned; a plan; a scheme; an
undertaking (The Macquarie Dictionary).

F r o m this the term enterprise, as used in several of the summary statements, is
interpreted as meaning a planned activity of some importance that requires some spirit of
boldness. The possibility of such an extended explication reflects, no doubt the authors'
purpose in using the term enterprise. It is reasonable to suggest here, however, that the
core meaning is activity or a synonym of it. It is also reasonable to suggest that the
remainder of the explication can be analysed using the categories of characterisation
proposed here: the characterisation of science as enterprise is reasonably interpreted as an
activity that is planned (it has purpose), of significance (it has context) and is undertaken
with particular attitudes (particular elements of a belief system).
3. Characterisation as versus characterisation by

Somewhat similarly, a small number of classes from Table A.l remains after the
six categories proposed above are noted. The remaining terms differ from those already
accounted for in terms of their meaning: unlike those included in the six categories, the
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remainder refer to science as a whole. They characterise science in its entirety as
something. Characterised by does not have the same meaning as characterised as. For
example, while a kangaroo m a y be characterised as a marsupial, it is characterised by
more than just a pouch (or fur, or w a r m bloodedness, etc.) In this sense, w e could be
confident in claiming that science can be partly characterised by a body of knowledge,
but very clearly from the analysis above, it is more contentious to attempt to characterise
science as a body of knowledge. In considering these preliminary findings it is
reasonable to suggest that the disagreements that arise in discussing whether science is a
body of knowledge or a set of processes often arise because of this confusion of usage.
In this w a y w e can interpret characterisations of science as a world view/picture
(summary statements 16, 73, 74), a vision (61) and as Natural and Physical Science
(80), as representing a different use of language, because at face value they represent
complete characterisations of science. However, they can be 'unpacked' to m a k e explicit
the meanings tied up in the terms, which, in all cases encountered in the present study,
can be understood in terms of the six proposed dimensions. Read in context, science as a
world view and science as a vision can be understood as a set of beliefs, assumptions
and criteria, as discussed in the companion chapter on belief system and Appendix B.2.
Science as natural and physical science refers to a particular context of the notion of
science, as discussed in the chapter on context Several of the classes already categorised
could be 'unpacked' in this w a y also: enterprise (statements 19,27, 36,85, 87) has been
mentioned, but research (statements 41, 48, 50, 58, 69, 71) implies particular, goaldirected activities (purpose and activity), and knowledge or intellectual activity (statement
80) explicidy refers to knowledge and activity.
A second reason for not considering this use of the language is that the study
would then be left open to accept every characterisation of science in terms of a metaphor:
science as a discourse, science as a tree, and so on. While these m a y have their o w n
insights, they represent a different set of data which would have to be dealt with
separately and would include more idiosyncratic approaches and attendant difficulties in
interpretation. There are two responses to this. O n e is to accept the rmnimal interpretation
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of accepting characterisation by, and leave aside characterisation as because it is an
unnecessary complication in the present study. Borhek and Curtis (1975), for example,
discuss science as a belief system as part of their book on beliefs; they m a y or m a y not
have views about science as a process, etc. All w e can say is that at the least they
characterise science partly in terms of beliefs. That is sufficient for inclusion in one of the
six proposed categories of characterisation.
The other response is to 'unpack' the term, as discussed above. So, for example,
the claim that science is language can be approached by examining the term language, as
given in this summary statement:
Language (like other social semiotic systems) is a dynamic open system that
achieves metastability through these statistical processes. (Halliday & Martin
1993, p. 110)
Thus in turn, language can be understood in terms of the dimensions already proposed:
context (like other social semiotic systems), activity (dynamic, metastability, processes),
structure (systems, open system, statistical), and rules as elements of a belief system
(statistical). Within this summary statement the term semiotic can be 'unpacked' in turn.
Understood as pertaining to the 'theory and study of signs and symbols' (The Macquarie
Dictionary), the term semiotic can be analysed in terms of these same proposed
dimensions: activity (study), and structure (theory, signs, symbols). In turn, signs and
symbols as part of a communication, can be explicated in terms of activity, purpose and
context. T h e point is that language is not a seventh dimension, but rather another
construct which can be understood in terms of the six dimensions already proposed. In
other words, it is suggested here that the w a y to include such entries in the present
exercise is to subject them to an additional stage of analysis that deconstructs their
figurative meaning: to examine what characteristics of trees orrivers,for example, are
analogous to science. The branch-like structure and dynamic growth of the tree, for
example, are characterisations respectively in terms of structure and processes, which
again are categories identified above.
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T h e possibility of m o r e , or fewer, categories

Of course, it will always remain a possibility that a term or terms will be found that
will not fit any of the proposed categories of characterisation, requiring the addition of a
seventh, eighth or greater number of categories. T o this there are two responses. First,
no terms of this type were found; the categories proposed were constructed as set out in
this chapter in order to account progressively for all terms called Classes. Secondly, it
was acknowledged in chapter 3 that such categories are created, not discovered, and it
remains an option of the writer to propose as few or as many as the writer can justify.
Given the parameters discussed earlier, the data collected and the analysis adopted,
the traditional characterisation only in terms of knowledge and processes is judged to be
inadequate, for m a n y reasons. Alternatively, an extensive collection of categories of
finely distinguished meanings is judged to be unsuited to the purposes of the analysis
because it introduces a complexity unsuited to the school curriculum. In acknowledging
that these categories are constructed and not discovered, it is acknowledged that another
analyst could construct a set of categories that is completely different, or partly different
by sharing only some categories, or partly different by adding categories. The present
analysis can claim no more than any other analysis in developing a system that suits its
purpose, applying it systematically so as not to distort the data, and constructing a
plausible and useful account. It will additionally claim, however, that it presents a more
plausible and comprehensive attempt to characterise science for the purposes of
curriculum development than has been available hitherto.
5. Interpreting the categories of meaning as dimensions of
characterisation

It should be made clear that the semantic categories identified in this study are
categories of meaning and not in themselves proposed as categories of science itself,
however that might be construed. That is, they are categories of the ways in which
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scholars characterise science; w e can attach n o more significance than that. However, a
potential problem with the term categories is that it might encourage the reader to interpret
them as discrete entities or even, in a nominalist approach, vesting them with independent
existences. This would be misleading and a misrepresentation of the findings of this
thesis. Therefore the thesis uses the term dimensions rather than categories, meaning that
scholars interpret different dimensions or viewpoints on the same topic of analysis, that
is, science. It is possible to have multiple dimensions of interpretation of the one subject,
and that is precisely what is proposed here: that scholars characterise science in multiple
dimensions, where the characterisation involves a set of mutually interactive, multiple
dimensions.
6. The relegation of terms to the category Differentiae

At this point the reader may object that there was a degree of arbitrariness in
classifying some units of text in Table A.1 as either belonging to classes or differentiae.
S o m e examples could have been reworded in more than one w a y such that the meaning
of the original text w a s maintained, yet the class in one version could almost as easily
have been relegated to the differentiae in another. The criticism is not that the meanings in
the raw data - the original text unit - are lost, because a careful comparison of Figure A.l
(the s u m m a r y statements) and Table A.l (the content analysis of the summary
statements) should convince the reader that the meanings are retained. Rather, the
criticism could be that some of the text units m a y have been arbitrarily assigned to being
differentiae and so excluded from the semantic analysis to which w e have just subjected
the classes. If this were the case, it m a y be possible that some of the differentiae are not
adequately categorised by the six categories proposed.
A s a check against such a potential criticism, the text units identified in Table A.l
as differentiae are set out in Table A.9 according to the six categories of characterisation
proposed in the analysistothis point There are two conclusions to be made:
(1)

Table A.9 makes clear that, with the exception of the factor identified in

(2) below, the text units assigned to the differentiae can be categorised in the same six
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ways as the classes, meaning that w e only need to be concerned with the six proposed
categories, and not with the status of classes versus differentiae. Classes and differentiae
thus represent analytical tools by means of which the proposed categories of
characterisation were identified, and need not be the concern of the end-users of this
theorising. Lay's approach to the differentiae appears clearly unsuited to the present
exercise, and can n o w be disregarded.
(2)

A smaller number of differentiae remain as not clearly belonging to any of

the six semantic categories. These text units have the form of nature, or of the
environment, or of humanity and the universe. Their form means that they could not have
been the subject of a sentence, and so could not have been a class. They represent what is
often called the content of the knowledge. They are included in Table A.9 in italics in the
column of the categorytowhich they direcdy refer in the original text, not in the category
of the class of the original text. F r o m this w e see that they also serve to indicate the
content of at least some differentiae, namely knowledge, activities and foundational. The
question immediately arises, D o these text units constitute a seventh dimension? The
answer is no, not in terms of the w a y the present set of dimensions is being proposed.
First none of the summary statements fundamentally characterised science in terms of,
for example, science is of Nature, rather, it is always knowledge

of Nature, or

investigation of Nature, or beliefs about Nature. Second, it makes no sense to talk of
knowledge, for example, without the content of that knowledge. Knowledge, activity,
structure, purpose, context and belief system do not in themselves characterise science,
for it m a y be that as they stand those dimensions could applytoother endeavours such as
history. That possibility is explored tentatively at the close of the thesis. But if their
content is wholly or partly of humanity and the universe, then w e have a thorough
concept of science. Table A. 11 contains a detailed analysis of a small number of
s u m m a r y statements in terms of the proposed dimensions. The content of humanity and
the universe, or some variant with similar meaning, is shown to apply either direcdy or
indirecdy to all dimensions.
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T h e 'content' of the dimensions or categories

We therefore turn to the question of the 'content' of each dimension. Where it is
given, the summary statements generally share a c o m m o n focus, that is, the knowledge,
activities and beliefs are of or about Nature, the universe and/or the environment:
•

•

•

natural world

(summary statement 3),

man and his environment

(summary statement 1),

the world around us

(summary statement 4),

some aspect of reality

(summary statement 8),

our sense experience

(summary statement 10),

the many particulars of empirical evidence

(summary statement 11),

•

the physical and biological world

(summary statement 13)

•

the world and our place in it, the world, the nature of reality, reality
(summary statement 14)

•

reality, the wide world of sense impressions
la view of} the world

(summary statement 15)
(summary statement 16).

The qualifier generally was included above for two reasons. Firsdy, not all the quotes
state their focus, and those that do vary from broadly to narrowly focused, as can be seen
in the extracts above. Table 4.1 below shows h o w a summary statement from Figure A.1
can be 'unpacked' into segments corresponding to dimensions. Thus, statement 3
'unpacks' as follows:
[Science is] all exploratory activities of which the purpose is to come to a better
understanding of die natural world.

This can be reworded to clarify activities as the class:
[Science is]... activities [that are] exploratory [and] of which the purpose is to
come to a better understanding of the natural world.
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The reworded version can then be 'unpacked' and interpreted in terms of the proposed
dimensions and their linkages:
Table 4.1
Analysis of a s u m m a r y statement into dimensions
Original!reworded

text

Analysis by categories of
characterisation (given in
bold type)

Linkages of
categories of
characterisation

[Science is] activities

[Science is] A C T I V I T Y

AcnvrTY

[which are] exploratory

[which are] a subset of activities

ACTIVITY: activity

[Science is also] A C T I V I T Y

ACTIVITY

which has as a purpose

A C T I V I T Y : purpose

[and] of which the purpose

1

is to
come to a better

the activity of coming to

purpose: activity

understanding

knowledge

activity: knowledge

of the natural world.

of the natural world.

knowledge: natural world

Thus statement 3 can be interpreted as follows:
i.

Science is an activity.

ii.

This particular type of activity is exploring.

iii.

This activity is purposeful.

iv.

T h e purpose is to 'come to' (an imprecise word indicating change or
development which is another sense of activity).

v.

W h a t is 'come to' is knowledge.

vi.

The knowledge is of the natural world.

Thus of the natural world is the content, stricdy speaking, of the knowledge. It is extra
information about the knowledge. In turn, the knowledge is the 'content' or extra
information of the activity 'coming to', which in turn is the content of the purpose, which
in turn is the content of activity. This represents a series of links:
ACnVTTY: purpose: activity: knowledge: of the natural world.
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Each of the dimensions activity (twice), purpose and knowledge relates either direcdy or
indirecdy to the content of the natural world, and the dimensions activity (twice) and
purpose relate direcdy to other dimensions. T h e notion of the content of dimensions
sometimes being other dimensions is consistent with the commonsense notion of science
partly involving knowledge of activities, of structures, etc. That is, science not only
involves doing activities, for example, but knowing about them and understanding them.
Thus the content of the dimensions is humanity and the natural world, or something
equivalent and the other dimensions.
8.

T h e interdependent nature of the categories or dimensions

Finally, and related to the matter of interconnectedness raised in the preceding
paragraph, the complexity of m a n y of the summary statements in Figure A.l is not fully
identified in the analysis to this point. The concern addressed above, whether the
assignation of a piece of text as the class or in the differentiae makes a difference, arises
because two or more categories are linked in m a n y of the examples. Table A. 10 sets out
the entries in Figure A.l (where the numbers indicates the entry number in Figure A.1) in
terms of the categories of categorisation of the classes against those of the differentiae. It
shows that, for some cases, the meaning of the class (say, knowledge) is explicated in
terms of the same category of meaning in the differentiae (i.e. knowledge), but for others
the class (say, knowledge again) is explicated in terms of other categories (such as
processes). In the example above, the class activity was explicated by differentiae of
activity, purpose and knowledge. Table A. 10 indicates that although individual authors
in the metascientific literature typically claim to characterise science in one or two
dimensions, up to six dimensions are employed typically in their overall characterisation.
That this is not obvious is due to these extra semantic resources being embedded within
the text
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Conclusions

It is reasonable to conclude from the analysis of data in Tables A. 1 to A. 10 that
(1)

a characterisation of science in terms of only its knowledge content, or
processes, or both, is not comprehensive;

(2)

it is not sufficient to conclude simply that science can be adequately
characterised in just one dimension;

(3)

a comprehensive categorisation of science is more adequately made by
accounting for a set or cluster of six dimensions derived from a semantic
analysis of summary statements: knowledge or conceptual framework(s),
process(es), purpose(s), belief system(s), structure(s) and context(s);

(4)

the six dimensions are interdependent and should be considered in
combination; and

(5)

the content of these dimensions is humanity and the universe, and the
dimensions themselves.

The conclusions of the foregoing semantic analysis of summary statements of
science from the metascientific literature are that in the examples studied:
(1)

science is characterised in the metascientific literature in terms of one or
more of six dimensions: knowledge, process, purpose, structure, context
and belief system;

(2)

these dimensions of characterisation are typically used in combination;

(3)

the content of these dimensions is humanity and the universe, and the
dimensions themselves; and

(4)

a comprehensive characterisation of science m a y be constructed utilising
all six of these dimensions.

Further points, which are more tentative at this stage of analysis, will be explored more
fully in the six companion chapters and Appendix B , that set out a case for each of these
six dimensions:
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different views or characterisations of science in the metascientific
literature, curriculum documents and elsewhere can be analysed and
compared in terms of this six-dimensional framework;

(6)

the six dimensions or categories of characterisation are 'interactive' in the
sense that they influence each other. A position taken in one dimension
will affect the options available in the rerriaining five. It also indicates that,
if science is considered to be multifaceted in some way, the integrity of the
whole m a y be lost by considering the facets out of context and
disconnected from other meanings. This lends support to Bronowski's
claim (see summary statement 16) that science is a 'highly integrated form
of knowledge which makes a world view'; and

(7)

this six-dimensional framework for the characterisation of science is more
suitable than existing frameworks for the characterisation of science for
inclusion in the school curriculum.

Conclusion of this analysis
The question remains, what is it that meaningfully or appropriately characterises
science for inclusion in the curriculum? In part, the answer is that it depends on what
criteria w e are using to frame the curriculum. The philosopher of education Paul Hirst
(1974), for example, was concerned mainly with the knowledge. It will be argued in
chapters 6 to 12 and in Appendix B that the six dimensions are each necessary but not
sufficient to characterise science, and that science results from the interactions of these
dimensions. T h e application of the proposed theoretical framework will be addressed
following the six chapters explicating the proposed dimensions of characterisation of
science.
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Chapter 5
I N T R O D U C T I O N T O T H E SIX C O M P A N I O N C H A P T E R S

Science is characterised in the metascientific literature by a set of six
interdependent dimensions, being knowledge, activity, structure, purpose,
context and belief system in combination, the content of which is Nature,
including humanity, and the dimensions themselves.

Having constructed six categories of meaning from a semantic analysis of su
statements of science from the metascientific literature, there now follow six companion
chapters, one dedicatedtoeach dimension, which examine some of the ways in which these
meanings are made in that literature. The argument to be made is that each dimension is a
necessary, but not sufficient, characteristic of science. Each is necessary in that the
meanings of characterisation in the metascientific literature are incomplete without it and it
does not reduce to any of the other dimensions. None is a sufficient characteristic of science
in that none alone completely characterises science. Each of these six companion chapters
follows a common format of four parts:
1)

evidence from the analysis of the summary statements in Figure Al, from
which the six proposed dimensions were constructed;

2)

a summary only of evidence from argument in the metascientific literature, to
direct the reader to some issues of recurrent interest concerning the
dimension, and explore some of the subdeties entailed, given in Appendix B;

3)

the relationships between the dimension and the other dimensions;

4)

conclusions for theorising about the science curriculum.

1. Evidence from the summary statements

Each companion chapter begins with this section, to draw attention to relev
meanings from the summary statements. The six dimensions constructed in the analysis of
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the summary statements are semantic categories, i.e. categories of meaning, that are th
basis for suggesting six dimensions of characterisation. This is a means of ensuring the
argument for characterisation is grounded in the semantic analysis of the metascientific
literature. Each of these sections also includes a list of appropriate text units from just the
first twenty summary statements. T o provide the complete list from the summary statements
would merely reproduce the data given in the tables in the appendix. These examples are
given simply to illustrate, first, that even within the first twenty summary statements the
general notion of the dimension applies in various ways, and secondly, that there is a sound
base of data on which to construct a more thoroughgoing argument for a category or
dimension of characterisation.
2. Evidence from argument in the metascientific literature

This section is included to show something of the breadth of scope of
characterisations in the literature. A s already stated, this thesis does not seek to provide
simply a metascientific discussion, but to inform the use of metascientific discussion in the
development of the science curriculum. Each of the six suggested dimensions is a broad
category of meaning, probably much broader than most readers would have expected
initially. The summary statements are by definition extracts from the metascientific literature
selected because they summarise or encapsulate an author's view of science. Their purpose
w a s to provide data for collecting and categorising such succinct expressions of view.
However, they d o not express the extended arguments usually given in making and
justifying these views; this is the purpose of section 2 and the related metascientific
discussion in Appendix B.
W e have mentioned both the immense quantity and scope of the metascientific
literature, and the intention of this thesis to provide a c o m m o n framework of this literature
for all science curriculum stakeholders. S o m e stakeholders are very familiar with this
literature, others have scant familiarity with it, and yet others have deep knowledge of, and
commitment to, only particular views or fields. With this in mind, this section seeks to
select and present sufficient arguments, and in sufficient detail, to show h o w the literature
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uses various issues to characterise science in a particular dimension of meaning. The detail
is intended to be sufficient in both the number and range of examples, and discussions of
the examples themselves. The reader familiar with that area should be satisfied that some
characteristics have been included and their contribution demonstrated, while not
belabouring the point with detail available elsewhere. The reader less familiar with a field
should be satisfied that the discussion provides sufficient detail to indicate h o w a range of
arguments contributes to characterisations of science.
A s to the metascientific literature itself, an attempt is m a d e to include a range of
analyses of metascientific views. In some places, historical examples are given to illustrate
the contribution of particular views, but the general concern is with the views that are
considered to be current in the latter half of the twentieth century, and their immediate
antecedents.
2.1 Comparison of metascientific views

Each of the six companion chapters presents an overview of metascientific analyses,
to enable a comparison not just of views, such as inductivism or realism, but of analyses or
categorisations of views. These overviews are given in Appendix B: Table B.l.l for
Context, Table B.2.1 for Belief System, Table B.3.1 for Purpose, Table B.4.1 for
Structure, Table B.5.1 for Activity, and Table B.6.1 for Knowledge. Each of these tables
compares the same authors and follows the same format, in order to show h o w each
dimension applies to our understanding of various metascientific views.
The six tables draw on standard references and authoritative summaries of the current
state of central metascientific fields:
The Philosophy of Science (eds Boyd, Gasper & Trout 1991, typology
given by Boyd, Gasper and Trout) for philosophy of science;
•

The Macmillan Dictionary of the History of Science (eds B y n u m , Browne &
Porter 1983, typology given by Bhaskar) for history of science;

Chapter 5: Introduction to the companion chapters

•

Handbook

96

of Science and Technology Studies (Jasanoff, Markle, Petersen

& Pinch (eds) 1995, typology given by Callon) for science and technology
studies (henceforth STS); and
•

The Structure of Scientific Theories (ed. Suppe 1979) as a statement of
history and philosophy of science (henceforth H P S ) m a d e at the time of the
decline of the positivist Received View.

Classroom

conceptual change: philosophical perspectives (Nussbaum 1989) and

From

science as knowledge to science as practice (Pickering 1992) are included from texts with
H P S and S T S approaches, respectively.
In the post-positivist era of H P S , three positions dominate and indeed are interpreted
as comprising a n e w but complex consensus (Boyd Gasper & Trout 1991). T h e central
tenets of the H P S traditions that apply more clearly to this current consensus are that
science turns on sense experience (in empiricism), on the personal or social construction of
beliefs and knowledge (in constructivism), or on the existence of an independent reality or
assumptions about Nature (in scientific realism)1. Note that there is a variety also of views
from within notionally S T S perspectives (as given by Callon 1995), and furthermore that
there are significant overlaps between various views.
T h u s each of the six companion chapters includes (in Appendix B ) a table for its
dedicated dimension (Tables B.l.l, B.2.1, B.3.1, B.4.1, B.5.1 and B.6.1). These set out

1

The glossary in Boyd, Gasper and Trout (1991) defines these terms as:
Empiricism: The view that all knowledge is based on or exhausted by what is known by sensory
experience.
Scientific realism: The view that the subject matter of scientific research and scientific theories
exists independently of our knowledge of it, and that the goal of science is the description and
explanation of both the observable and unobservable aspects of an independently existing
world.
Constructivism: The view that the subject matter of scientific research is wholly or partly
constructed by the background theoretical assumptions of the scientific community and thus is
not, as realists claim, largely independent of our thoughts and theoretical commitments. (Cf.
Neo-Kantianism.)
Neo-Kantianism: Another n a m e for constructivism, the view that the reality described by our
scientific theories is a social and intellectual construct and thus is not, as realists claim, largely
independent of our thoughts and theoretical commitments. The n a m e suggests an association
with the views of the eighteenth-century philosopher Immanual Kant, but this association is
exegetically controversial.
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six metascientific analyses as an indication of the variety of metascientific approaches in the
literature. The tables each have the following structure:
Table [Dimension] 1
Examples of characterisation of key metascientific viewpoints
by [Dimension, eg, activity, knowledge, etc.]
Author

Viewpoint

Examples of reference
i to [dimension]

Identified in the w o r k
of ...

Various thinkers whose
Authors) and Categorisatio Examples of h o w the
work has been associated
particular metascientific
nof
date of
publication
view employs this particular with this viewpoint
viewpoints
according to dimension (activity,
providing
categorisation author(s), eg, purpose, etc)
of

empiricism,

viewpoints.

science as

Other authors rational
knowledge,
m a y also
refer to these \ constructivis
categories of m. The
viewpoints. categories of
M a n y authors views are not
discrete.
can be
represented
by more than
one label.

Each table presents the six authors in the same order, which is chronological by publication
date.
Thus Suppe (1979) focused on the philosophy of science in roughly the first half of
the twentieth century. Writing in 1973, Suppe provided (1) a comprehensive account of the
Received V i e w of scientific theories, the positivist viewpoint that w a s the dominant
metascientific view for m u c h of the first half of the twentieth century, and the viewpoints in
philosophy of science that appeared to be competing to replace it: (2) sceptical descriptive
analyses, (3) Weltanschauungen (world-view) analyses, and (4) semantic approaches. In
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the Afterword of the 1979 second edition, Suppe notes the decline of the extreme
Weltanschauungen analyses as favoured views and the emergence of (5) scientific realism
as a strong contender. Suppe's view is that historical realism is concerned to represent
actual practices of science, 'both historical and contemporary':
Contemporary philosophy of science rapidly is becoming philosophy of science - a
discipline concerned with science as actually practiced yet at the same time doing
philosophy ... Contemporary philosophy of science increasingly is coming to
realise that there are 'patterns of reasoning in the construction or discovery (as well
as the ultimate acceptance or rejection) of scientific hypotheses and theories and
that a great deal of illumination of the scientific enterprise can be attained by
examining them' (Shapere 1974) and that the philosophical examination of them is
central to a viable philosophy of science. (Suppe 1979, p. 650)
Bhaskar (1983k) identified three main views that have been historically significant.

Two of these are based mainly on activities: observation as the basis for empiricism, and
mental construction, involving reasoning in various ways, as the basis for idealism. The

third alternative, realism, is based on beliefs about Nature, but the variants of realism

distinguished in part by the investigative activities of Nature: (1) reasoning to ascerta

abstract reality (in Platonic realism), (2) observation to ascertain a material reality (
Aristotelian realism), (3) perception of a material reality which is independent of

perceptions (in perceptual realism), or (4) perceptions and other activities (including s

activities) of scientists, concerning the objects of scientific inquiry (in scientific re
Nussbaum (1989) identified three main traditions or viewpoints in his discussion of

alternative philosophical frameworks for studying the history of science. The historicall

significant viewpoints are characterised in terms of (1) reasoning (in rationalism) and (
observation (in empiricism and positivism). For Nussbaum the current viewpoint is
characterised by (3) construction of the best available knowledge (in constructivism).
Boyd, Gasper and Trout (1991) categorised views somewhat similarly to Bhaskar.
However, they tended to emphasise more the late-twentieth century consensus in the
philosophy of science. They proposed observation in scientific realism, construction in

neo-Kantian constructivism and observation in post-positivist empiricism as the three mai
alternatives in the complex consensus following the demise of the traditional positivist
empiricism that dominated the field for much of the twentieth century.
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Pickering (1992, p. 7) took the 'stock appreciations of scientific knowledge' to be
'objective (logical empiricism), as relativetoculture (Kuhn, Feyerabend), [or] as relative to
interests (SSK)'. These three correspond broadly to philosophy of science, sociology of
science and sociology of scientific knowledge (henceforth S S K ) . The present thesis
interprets the foci of these approaches as belief system (criteria for judging objectivity),
context (culture) and purpose (interests).
Callon (1995) has proposed four models of scientific development as a framework
for reviewing S T S approaches. There does not appear to be the consensus (if loose) within
S T S that Boyd, Gasper and Trout claimed for H P S , but Callon's (1995) four models of
scientific development provide an authoritative review of the field. Callon's models are in
themselves characterisations chiefly in terms of activity. These are, (1) science as rational

knowledge; (2) science as a competitive enterprise; (3) science as sociocultural practice; and
(4) science as extended translation. In terms of the categories already sketched above, at
least models 2, 3 and 4 assume the construction of knowledge as central, and m a y be
considered as variants of constructivism.
A comment on using and classifying metascientific views
The present thesis takes a cautionary approach to discussing and clarifying
metascientific views, including notional fields of metascience like H P S , S T S , S S K and so
forth. Although some argue that there is a post-positivist consensus in H P S (see Boyd,
Gaspar & Trout 1991), there is no similar consensus in S T S (Edge 1995) except perhaps
that S T S has supplanted H P S (Shapin 1992), although this is contested by others (for
example, Matthews 1994). In any event, such comparisons draw too simplistic a distinction
between S T S and H P S for the purposes of the present thesis, because they diminish the
very diversity and overlapping characterisations it seekstom a p (Shapin 1992). The present
thesis interprets each viewpoint (such as empiricism, constructivism, etc.) in multiple
dimensions, or as a complex of characteristics. T h e method used to explicate these
metascientific views is to focus initially on one dimension at a time, dedicating a chapter to
each.
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There is considerable debate in the literature over competing metascientific theories,
the more significant being included in this section of the companion chapters and in more
detail in Appendix B . Emphasis is given to contributions to this debate from the
philosophy, history and sociology of science; references are made less commonly to
analyses from other fields such as science policy, psychology and linguistics. For example
in recent years there have been challenges m a d e against the adequacy of the philosophy of
science itself (a largely Anglo-American tradition) from theorising within a largely FrenchGerman tradition of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (known sometimes as continental
epistemology). Alcoff (1992, pp. 77-81) has described five main approaches from the
tradition of continental epistemology: phenomenology, critical theory, hermeneutics, poststructuralism and feminism. The impact each of these traditions has m a d e on thinking
within the scientific community varies, but their cumulative effect has been more significant
from within the sociology of science, which in recent years has succeeded in broadening
the scope of theorising about science. There are attempts to account for science within each
of these traditions, and accounts within particular traditions necessarily deny accounts from
some of the other traditions. Even attempts to characterise science in terms of a rejection of
metaphysics employ discussions of metaphysics. Thus positivism is a tradition within the
philosophy of science that denies metaphysics, but the point remains that in that
characterisation the concept of metaphysics is still employed, albeit negatively. (See, for
example, Schlick 1979). The relative merits of different claims from the sociology of
science, and their challenges to the philosophy of science, are therefore included in this
section. Theories from within these traditions draw upon scholarship in psychology and
history, and mention will be m a d e of these where necessary.
It is to some extent arbitrary in choosing where to begin such an overview, since
m u c h of the discussion in the literature draws upon more than one of these fields in its
theorising. In particular, it is clear that discussion of h o w our knowledge of the cosmos can
be justified will draw upon h o w w e claim to have such knowledge and will imply particular
views about what there is w e can claim to have knowledge of. Conversely, claims as to the
nature of the cosmos will imply particular theories of h o w w e can claim to have knowledge
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of such a cosmos. That is, a useful understanding of the relative merits of various theo
of metaphysics, both in its general sense and as epistemology and ontology, is possible
only if there is some understanding of several theories of each, and particularly those under
current debate. Claims from the sociology of science are no easier, for these are mosdy
theorised by beginning with the inadequacies of the philosophy of science, against which
sociological accounts are proposed as better alternatives. (I do not take this to mean that
sociological accounts cannot be established without recourse to the philosophy of science.
It is clearly in the interest of making a convincing case for an alternative that account be
taken of the shortcomings of that which one seeks to replace). Following this precedent,
sociological accounts are often considered after other accounts.
It must be emphasised that metascientific positions such as described above are
merely labels for different interpretations or characterisations of science. The present thesis
therefore rejects dogmatic characterisations of science, and is cautious about the use of
broadly encompassing labels such as H P S and STS. W e have mentioned that each of the
positions above assumes a role in science for certain activities such as observation and
experimentation. Further, there are some broad, if partial, similarities. M o s t generally,
empiricists, constructivists and realists 'largely agree' that science knowledge is useful or
instrumental (Boyd 1983, p. 211); what they disagree on is w h y science knowledge seems
to work, and under what conditions it succeeds or fails. Nor do the differences correspond
to alternatives between H P S and S T S traditions: there are similarities and differences both
within and between these traditions. For example, within the H P S views mentioned, mental
constructions are rejected in some views but central to others such as constructivism and
scientific realism. Within the S T S views mentioned, most but not all of Callon's models
assumes the construction of knowledge as central, and m a y be considered as variants of
constructivism.
M a n y current characterisations of science are not as distinct as the labels and their
historically antecedent exemplars would suggest. For example, all assume experimentation
and laboratory work, and most are n o w concerned to describe actual rather than idealised
scientific activity. Thus although various S T S approaches emphasise different
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characteristics, each of Callon's four models provides different insights by focusing on
other scientific activities. Likewise, Bhaskar's scientific realism acknowledges activities of
social or cultural context:
Three main positions characterise the history of philosophical reflection on the
natural sciences. For empiricism, the natural order is given in experience: for
idealism it is what w e m a k e or construct; for realism, it is given as a
presupposition of our causal investigations of Nature, but our knowledge of it is
socially produced, and it is the nature of objects which determine their cognitive
possibilities for us. (Bhaskar 1983k, p. 363; emphases added).
Within the context of the history and philosophy of science (HPS), Bhaskar and Boyd,
Gasper and Trout have identified the contemporary metascientific position as being covered
by post-positivist empiricism, constructivism and scientific realism, within which
individual authors accept variously insights from competing positions. The consensus
position in post-positivist H P S admits socio-cultural or psychological activities (such as
constructivism generally and scientific realism). This is broadly consistent with positions in
S T S , of which Callon identifies four. For curriculum theorising, then, doctrinaire
approaches to particular metascientific fields seem unwise, and in any case for the present
thesis they represent only some of the m a n y views it seeks to map.
M u c h of the metascientific literature, especially philosophy of science, is or has been
concerned with determining what science should be, rather than what it is. A general
science education must address what science is. The present thesis argues that curriculum
developers should begin answering that question by comprehensively reviewing the
literature about science - the metascientific literature - rather than arguing from a particular
position within the literature, such as a normative view of science.
2.2 The impact of the Received View of science in the metascientific literature
There are m a n y references in this thesis to the positivist Received View which, to
avoid repetition, should be explained here. In developing an overview of metascientific
views in the twentieth century, one cannot but be struck by the impact of one particular
view or cluster of views, sometimes referred to as the Received View (Suppe 1979) or less
precisely as the 'standard view'. T h e Received V i e w (henceforth R V ) , which dominated
metascientific interpretation from roughly the 1920s to 1960s, was a version of logical
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positivism or logical empiricism. The differences between logical positivism and logical
empiricism are not usually significant in the present thesis, and so the term R V is used in
this general sense.
Part of the influence of the R V was that it is a normative account of science, i.e. it
purported to set out what science should be - what methods should be used, what
assumptions should be made, what criteria should be applied, and so on. A normative
account is not subject to the pressure of corresponding with what is the case, as is applied
to descriptive accounts. Quite the opposite is the case when the dominant view is normative:
it creates a pressure on other accounts to match the interpretation it has prescribed.
The R V was rejected progressively in the philosophy of science in the 1960s (Brown
1977; Suppe 1979) and in the sociology of science. The metascientific literature since that
timetendsto characterise itself as post-positivist, a term which the present thesis adopts. A
good deal of the metascientific literature that is critical of the philosophy of science, such as
m u c h in STS, refers to variants of the R V in making its criticisms, that most post-positivist
philosophy also rejects. However, the R V , or at least elements of it, remains influential and
a resource in some fields, including a m o n g philosophically inclined scientists and in
popular (lay) characterisations of science:
Although 'dead' in philosophy, positivism lives in the sciences: as a tendency of
thought, in the natural sciences; and as very m u c h more than that, in m a n y of the
human sciences. (Bhaskar 1983i, p. 335)
The R V still influences m a n y w h o have or are studying for science qualifications, such as
science undergraduates and science teachers (Gallagher 1991; Lederman 1992). M a n y
school and undergraduate sciencetextstypically present a view of science knowledge that is
strongly influenced by positivism. The decline of the dominance of the positivist R V is
therefore variable: strong within m u c h post-positivist metascientific literature (HPS and
STS), but patchy in broader contexts.
T h e point of this discussion is to emphasise the influence on thinking about science
from a particular normative account that provided a prescription of science that in m a n y
respects w a s quite narrow, i.e. a particular belief system, particular activities, structures,
contexts and purposes resulting in particular knowledge. This is not to argue that normative
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accounts are obsolete strategies in current conceptions of science: some current

metascientific approaches are explicitly normative (see, for example, Fuller 1991) but

complex of viewpoints that oppose the RV, the normative/descriptive distinction is reg

as no longer relevant Indeed, in some views this distinction was never significant, be
it arose out of the RV itself and does not arise from the viewpoints currendy debated
(Brown 1977). On balance it would be misleading to characterise metascience simply as

having moved from positivism to post-positivism. A more defensible interpretation woul

be to argue that positivism no longer enjoys the dominance it once had, and that vario

post-positivist views have presented strong critiques of it and alternatives to it tha
probably not widely appreciated beyond the metascientific academic community. The

present lack of a single, dominant received view of science is an argument for the pre
thesis to clarify a complex field for curriculum developers.
2.3 Current metascientific views

Given this discussion, post-positivist metascience is characterised not so much by the
(uneven) demise of positivism, but by the emergence of different views of science and
vigorous debate between them. At the close of the twentieth century, none of the

alternatives to the RV commands a similar consensus. Nor is such a consensus likely in

the foreseeable future, because of vigorous debates between and within different field
metascience. This was the case in HPS from about the 1970s (Suppe 1977), although a
complex consensus of several viewpoints could be discerned by the 1990s (Boyd, Gasper
& Trout 1991, pp. xii-xiii). Part of the trend in recent philosophy has been towards
interpreting and accounting for the insights of different perspectives:
In the modem period ... philosophy turned from its previous preoccupation with
metaphysical questions to a primary concern with the possibility and nature of
knowledge. This 'epistemological turn' w a s to dominate philosophy for two
centuries, only to be replaced in the early part of this century, at least for AngloAmerican philosophy, by a 'linguistic turn'. B y analysing language, it sought to
achieve m a n y of the same goals that epistemology seeks in analysing the mind.
The linguistic turn has been characterised by preoccupations with the structure of
language, word-world relationships, and the analysis of meaning. Recently,
however, the views about the foundations of knowledge and the knowing subject
that were the basis for the epistemological turn have been called into question, and
it has seemed to m a n y philosophers that language and meaning cannot bear the
kind of weight the linguistic turn required.
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These challenges have been joined by developments in the philosophy of
sciences and the hermeneutic tradition, pointing toward a n e w direction in
philosophy characterised by an interest in interpretive activities. This 'interpretive
turn' has benefited from the interpretive practices of such disciplines as literary
criticism, cultural anthropology, jurisprudence, historiography, and feminist
theory. With philosophy's redirection of attention to the interpretive disciplines,
however, the concept of interpretation itself has become the source for
controversy. The more philosophy and the interpretive disciplines proclaim the
importance of interpretation in all of inquiry, the less there is agreement about what
it is, what interpretive practices presuppose, and h o w to judge interpretive
successes and failures. (Bohman, Hiley & Shusterman 1991, p. 1)
The demise of positivism was marked not only by changes in philosophy, but also by

shifts in other disciplines, like sociology, and the growth of new disciplines. Signific
among these is the recognition of social and cultural characteristics in understanding

science, generally in the field of the sociology of science (henceforth SS) and a numbe

emergent and inter-related fields, principally STS and the sociology of scientific knowl

(SSK) (Callon 1995). Perhaps even more than in philosophy, a trend towards intersections
of approaches has been noted in sociological studies of science and technology (Bowden
1995; Edge 1995):
Cross-cultural comparisons of knowledge and technology systems were a
significant feature of S T S studies during the 1960s and 1970s (Finnegan &
Horton 1973; Goody 1977; Hollis & Lukes 1982; Horton 1967; Wilson 1977) but
ceased to be an active site of STS work during the 1980s. This retreat from crosscultural studies is currendy being reversed asfreshinsights are gained from the
intersections of the social study of science with anthropology, postmodernism,
feminism, postcolonialism, literary theory, geography, and environmentalism.
(Watson- Verran & Turnbull 1995, p. 115)
There are viewpoints also from other fields, such as linguistics, policy studies,
anthropology and psychology, and there are similarities and differences both within and
between each of these fields such that it is possible to discern the emergence of some

general characterisations of science that can derive from more than one intellectual tr
or field.
Acknowledging the contribution of multiple viewpoints may be interpreted as a
reflection of a postmodern sensibility. Certainly the lack of a single received view in

metascience, or even within either HPS or STS, is consistent with this notion. Following

this line of argument, the present thesis may be considered to represent some sort of po
postmodern sensibility, that recognises the insights of multiple perspectives, but also
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recognises a pragmatic reality of having to make decisions about devising a science
curriculum and satisfying curriculum stakeholders.
3. The relationships between the dimension and the other dimensions

Section 3 of each companion chapter addresses the interactions of the dimensions. A
significant part of the argument proposed in this thesis is that the six dimensions are
interactive, that is, science is invariably characterised by several or all of the dimensions in
combination. The dedication of a chapter to each dimension is simply an analytical device to
explicate each of the proposed dimensions, but in so doing artificially isolates them.
Therefore each dedicated companion chapter includes this section to give some examples of
these interrelationships. Section 3 in each of the six companion chapters does not deal with
all possible combinations and relationships, which is an impossible task. It merely
mentions examples where some characterisation of science is made using more than one
dimension.
4. Conclusions for use in curriculum theorising

Section 4 of each companion chapter addresses the implications of the analysis for the
science curriculum. The present thesis is not a thesis in the history, philosophy and
sociology of science, although m u c h of it deals with those literatures and in Appendix B
provides considerable metascientific argument to illustrate the scope and cogency of the
dimensions. It seeks to m a p the fields of metascience in order to better inform the
characterisation of science in the school curriculum. Therefore each of the companion
chapters on the dimensions closes with this section, which draws from the preceding
discussion issues for the school curriculum. These issues are taken up in the concluding
chapter to synthesise a position for the curriculum
5. The order of the six companion chapters
Finally, something must be said about the order chosen to present the six companion
chapters, bearing in mind that each presents a dimension of characterising science, together
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with discussion of its implication for the curriculum. To some extent the choice of order
arbitrary: it does not imply a necessary and logical priority or sequence, and could have
been varied in order to m a k e different emphases. This applies both to the characterisation of
science and its implications for the curriculum.
T o address first the characterisation of science, it was tempting to present the chapters
on knowledge and activity first. These, after all, are the traditional and c o m m o n categories
of characterisation, and are what most readers would expect Because of this, they were the
first categories identified in the semantic analysis. However, the present thesis argues that
other categories of meaning are also used in characterisations of science, sometimes
explicidy, but frequendy implicidy and embedded in the text. T o show h o w they are used to
add meaning to knowledge and activity would mean that the argument would have to be
diverted to explain these additional arguments. This strategy was rejected because (1) it
m a d e the argument unnecessarily complex and hardtofollow, and (2) this complexity did
not m a k e clear the role of each category or dimension. The chapter on belief system argues
that elements of a belief system, such as assumptions, criteria for judgement, perspective
and values, are logically prior to substantive beliefs (mosdy the knowledge content) and
appropriate activities. This is the reason for knowledge and activity being the most familiar
dimensions - they are the explicit elements of the belief system, but they cannot be
understood fully without the implicit elements. Thus it will ultimately help to read about
belief systems early on.
The chapter on context is also addressed early because questions of context address
s o m e fundamental issues of characterising science, which is the central concern of the
present thesis. First, the question of internalist and externalist views, although seen as
declining in importance in some metascientific views, remains a significant issue for the
development of the science curriculum. Secondly, the question of essentialist versus
constructivist characterisations of science is significant for the science curriculum, because
curriculum stakeholders frequendy adopt some particular essentialist position apparently
unaware of the implications of taking such a position. Thirdly, boundary work - studies of
the boundaries between what is accepted as science or not - also suggest that curriculum
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stakeholders engage in boundary work without realising the implications of taking
particular stands. These are important issues to raise early on in the thesis, not just because
they highlight arguments used in characterising science but because they raise issues that
affect the interpretation of the metascientific literature generally. For these reasons, the
chapter on context is presented first, and belief system second. Conversely, activity and
knowledge, being the most familiar dimensions for most readers, are presented last so that
they can be informed by the arguments in the preceding chapters.
A s for the curriculum implications, the argument is constructed slightly differendy.
Section 4 of each companion chapter presents the curriculum implications arising from the
particular dimension, but some curriculum arguments apply to all dimensions. For
example, a central theme that is developed and progressively reinforced is that a general
science education should m a k e students, and hence our future scientists, technicians, and
citizens generally, aware of the strengths and limitations of science in the increasingly
scientific nature of western societies. T o fail to understand h o w and w h y science works,
and to appreciate different insights from various views of science, is to limit both the
rationale for the very inclusion of science in the school curriculum, and reduce the
justification for scientific belief by scientists working in their field and citizens alike (who,
of course, include scientists). T o avoid repetition of general arguments such as these in
every companion chapter, therefore, the discussion of curriculum implications develops
across the six and some general issues are addressed in the concluding chapter. This is not
done to imply some significance in the order of dimensions for the curriculum; it simply
follows the decisions about ordering the chapters, discussed above, but develops a
curriculum argument in successive chapters. Thus, while the dimensions of science
characterisation are presented so that in principle they could be read in any order, the
theorising about the curriculum builds progressively in successive chapters.
Finally, it must be remembered that the separation of the dimensions into six separate
chapters is only an analytical device to m a k e explicit various arguments m a d e about the
nature of science, and to reduce the complexity of these arguments. A s mentioned above,
section 3 of each of the companion chapters, and the concluding chapter, are intended to
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show that the literature uses combinations of these dimensions - that is, makes

multidimensional characterisations - and that the complexities of characterisations can b
simplified by identifying the dimensions or categories used.
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Chapter 6
CONTEXT
Context, as in the circumstances surrounding a situation or event, or the
parts of a discourse connected with units of text, is a necessary, but not
sufficient, dimension of science.

Introduction
This chapter comprises an argument that context is a necessary, but not sufficient,
dimension of science. Context is defined broadly, as the circumstances of, or the
influence of one or more elements on, any particular element of science:
1. the parts of a discourse or writing that precede or follow, and are direcdy
connected with, a given passage or word, [and]
2. the circumstances or facts that surround a particular situation, event, etc. (The
Macquarie Dictionary).
It is the second meaning that is used in the present discussion, although as will be shown,
it is interpreted broadly here. The first meaning m a y be taken to apply in the more
restricted sense of a linguistic understanding of scientific and metascientific discourse.
The argument is that context is a necessary dimension of science in that
characterisations in the metascientific literature are incomplete without it, and it does not
reduce to any of the other dimensions, i.e. its omission is not covered by any of the other
dimensions. It is not a sufficient dimension of science in that it does not completely
characterise science. Where science is characterised in the literature by context, usually it
is characterised also by one or more of the other dimensions of science: knowledge,
purpose, activity, structure and belief system. These other dimensions m a y be used in
explicating scientific context, and scientific context m a y be used in explicating the other
dimensions.
O n e of the lingering influences of the positivist Received V i e w (see discussion in
chapter 5) is a widespread belief that science is acontextual: that scientific results are
independent of where, w h e n and by w h o m the science is done. A consequence of this
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view is that the term context simply means the context in which science takes place, as
represented in this V e n n diagram:

In this sense, context might be taken to be an industry or government funding body, or
legislation controlling the use of animals in laboratories, or society as a whole: that is,
context means the organisations or structures that affect science, but are not actually
science itself. This chapter will argue that such a view is only one of m a n y views about
context and science. Even to argue that context does not refer to science itself - that
science is acontextual - is still to characterise science partly by context, a view that
nevertheless relies on science being characterised by particular notions of context, like an
intellectual tradition, specially trained personnel and specially equipped facilities.
However, as just noted, m a n y views argue that context characterises science just as
strongly as other dimensions like activity or knowledge: that science is fundamentally
shaped and its outcomes determined by funding arrangements, interpersonal networks,
the state of equipment development, the available ideas, the motivations of scientists, the
targeting of funding, and so forth. This is not represented neatiy by a V e n n diagram like
the one above. Better would be some sort of representation of multiple dimensions along
these lines:
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This is quite a different idea of context and science, although it subsumes the earlier one,
as this chapter will discuss at some length.
There is in particular considerable metascientific debate about whether science
comprises only concepts and the methods by which w e develop them, or whether science
is more than this. The former view, which approximates the internalist view in the
literature, essentially acknowledges an intellectual or cognitive context only: the context of
ideas that gives meaning to other ideas. This view is strongly held. For example, the
positivist R V acknowledged as scientific only that which could be rationally
reconstructed. Thus the texts typically used in secondary or tertiary level courses of
chemistry, physics or biology, are concerned only with a framework of concepts,
propositions, laws and theories, i.e. the cognitive content. Ideas and propositions are
generated,testedempirically and debated in terms of their cognitive merit In this view, if
science is done 'properly', a scientific claim can and should be examined regardless of its
social, personal or other non-cognitive contexts. Thus the strength of science is that it is
characterised by only its intellectual context and is in other respects acontextual. Against
this is the latter view, which approximates externalist views in the literature. It holds that
science cannot be understood by its conceptual framework and logical arguments alone:
that a range of other contexts also characterise science, such as personal, social,
economic, political and other factors. That is, science cannot be understood without
considering the broader range of contexts. M u c h of this chapter is devoted to addressing
this issue, firsdy because it represents significant and vigorous debates in the literature
which should be covered in this review, and secondly because it represents fundamental
disagreements about the nature of science.
A s with each of the companion chapters, the present chapter will m a k e selective use
of these accounts only. In so doing it will attempt to strike a balance between including
sufficient detail to construct the argument and not repeating the detail available in the
literature.
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The argument in this chapter comprises four parts, as set out in the introduction to
the six companion chapters:
1)

evidence from the analysis of the summary statements;

2)

evidence from argument in the metascientific literature;

3)

the relationships between the dimension context and the other dimensions;

4)

conclusions for use in theorising about the science curriculum.
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Evidence from the s u m m a r y statements

Context as a partial characteristic of science is indicated in the summary statements fr
the metascientific literature collected in Figure A.1
The collection of classes (in Table A.6) and text units from the differentiae (column
five of Table A.9, headed Context), collectively indicate that any particular aspect or
circumstance of science is characterised partly by surrounding factors. A s with the other
dimensions, mis category of characterisation was constructed from a semantic analysis of
m a n y metascientific sources. Thus it includes a wider range of viewpoints than do many
individual positions in the literature. In particular, w e have noted in chapter 4 that some
summary statements use tradition to m e a n ideas, as in an intellectual tradition, while
others use it to mean to cultural or social norms, as in a tradition within a social or subcultural group. These interpretations correspond to internalist and externalist positions,
respectively. The very identification of different views of what constitutes legitimate
contexts for science, a debate discussed below in Appendix B.1.3 below, uses and
therefore legitimises context as a dimension of characterisation.
Chapter 4 also mentions the lack of reference, in m a n y of the summary statements,
to any sort of context. Even though the summary statements are extracts from larger
arguments, the surrounding arguments of m a n y statements do not mention context and
other statements dismiss it. These writings, therefore, put a view that science is
acontextual, either explicitiy, or implicidy by omitting reference to context This is a
significant issue in characterising science and is addressed below in the discussion of
intemalism and externalism. T o emphasise the point, the very omission of reference to
when, where or by w h o m science occurs implies that the science described is the same no
matter whether done, for example, in Europe or south east Asia, under capitalist or
socialist governments, or in times of war or peace. S u m m a r y statements characterising
science as acontextual include entries from general dictionaries (1 and 80) and 2,3,7, 8,
9,10,11,16,17 and 19 from thefirsttwenty.

Chapter 6: Context

115

However, m a n y other summary statements do refer to context of various sorts and
to varying degrees. Notions of context include the following from just the first twenty
statements, to indicate that the notion of context is used in various ways:
(a)

There is a notion of an historical context meaning that w e can identify a tradition
of science over time, and that the science of today has not formed from
disconnected contemporary events, but from antecedents which can be traced
back through time. Thus there are text units which indicate, explicitiy or
implicidy, a temporal or historical context:

(b)

•

traditionally studied

•

that has evolved

•

which takes place in a particular sort of tradition

There is a notion of science being associated with people - it has a

(4)
(13)
(20)
human

context. It is not part of the non-living environment, like the wind or rain, nor
does it arise from the actions of non-human living things, and nor does it exist
independently of humans. It is done by, and done for, humans, as the following
text units state or imply:

(c)

[as] a domain of human [knowledge]

(5)

[as done by] scientists

(5)

[as one among] otherfieldsof human endeavour

(5)

[as a] human activity

(13)

[as concerning] our place [in] the world

(14)

[as] a creation of the human mind

(15)

[as comprising] the producers (researchers)

(18)

Science is sometimes characterised or portrayed in the context of other tasks,
uses and purposes, which can be termed a utilitarian context:
•

[that] can in fact be used in a variety of ways

(14)

[as] designedfor educating or accrediting scientists

(14)

•

[as] protecting the interests of the scientific estate

•

[as serving] to maintain and to perpetuate structures and

(14)
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(14)

[as comprising] the products... and interesses of these products

(18)

Science is sometimes characterised or portrayed in the context of a tradition or
accepted practices, beliefs, purposes, structures or knowledges. This can be
termed a traditional context:
•

•

[as one among] otherfieldsof human endeavour
distinctfromeither tradition or authority

(14)

[as] essentially centred in a paradigm

(20)

which takes place in a particular sort of tradition
(e)

(5)

(20)

Science is sometimes characterised or portrayed in terms of groups of people,
which m a y be small research teams, larger groups such as sub-cultures within
society, or the general society as a whole. This can be termed a social context:
•

which itself forms part of a larger system: science in society (18)

These examples are given simply to illustrate that even within the first twenty summary
statements the general notion of context applies in various ways. Note that the five loose
clusters (a) to (e) above are not discrete categories, because some statements fit in more
than one. S u m m a r y statement 21 itself describes h o w views of science in different
contexts have different conceptions of what is legitimate scientific context. Thus, in
Anglo-American parlance, science is characterised as non-societal, non-cultural, whereas
in many countries including France, Germany, Italy, Russia and Japan science refers to
general scholarship that m a y therefore include societal and cultural factors. Even these
five loose clusters are sufficient to show s o m e uses of context in characterising science,
and to argue for a broad interpretation of context as a category or dimension of
characterisation.
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A r g u m e n t from the metascientific literature

Debates in the metascientific literature address many aspects of context in science,
which again supports a broad interpretation of scientific context Appendix B.l outlines
the variations, implications and subdeties of several of these debates to indicate the scope
of the ways in which science is characterised partly by context. The arguments presented
in Appendix B.l are briefly as follows.
B.l.l Current metascientific views with respect to context
Different metascientific views characterise science differently by intellectual
(cognitive), psychological, social and ontological contexts.
B.1.2 Boundary concerns
A central issue in m u c h characterisation of science is h o w and where one constructs
the 'boundaries' between what is regarded as science and non-science.
B.l. 3 Context as being 'Internal' and 'External'
Another central issue in characterising science, arising from the enduring influence
of the positivist Received V i e w (RV), is whether science is characterised only by its
intellectual or cognitive context (intemalism) - the ideas of science and received
knowledge - or whether also or instead it is characterised by other contexts such as social
and psychological contexts.
B.l.4 Historical contexts of science
Science is sometimes represented by its characteristic history.
B.l.5 Intellectual contexts of science
Science is sometimes represented by its characteristic ideas and knowledge.
B.l.6 Socio-cultural contexts of science
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Science is sometimes represented by its characteristic social and cultural contexts,
both in the sense of science being part of a larger socio-cultural context, and of subcultures of sciences.
B.l.7 Human contexts of science
Science is sometimes represented by its characteristic h u m a n contexts, such as
characteristic traits of scientists, psychological factors, h u m a n elements in scientific
activities, and personality.
B.l .8 Organisational contexts
Science is sometimes represented by its characteristic social organisations, like
research units and university faculties, which correspond and interact in various ways
with knowledge structures.
B.l.9 Physical contexts of science
Science is sometimes represented by its characteristic physical contexts, like
artefacts and locations, notably laboratories.
This is not intended as an exhaustive list, but merely one which addresses significant
themes in characterisations of science in the literature.

Context as a necessary dimension of science

The argument to this point of the chapter, including Appendix B.l, has shown a
variety of ways that the metascientific literature characterises or portrays science in terms
of context That is, science is characterised by, or can be identified by, for example: its
history; its ideas and concepts as they stand relativetoother ideas and concepts; particular
groups of people and organisations and h o w they stand in relation to other groups;
particular individuals with particular skills and dispositions; particular locations and
artefacts; and by the efforts of individuals and groups to define the boundaries between
science and other h u m a n enterprises. The argument that context is a necessary dimension
does not rest on such a list in itself, but on the arguments summarised by the list: not only
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do metascientific arguments typically appeal to notions of context, but m a n y accounts
hold that contextual factors actually constitute science. In either case the argument fails if
context is removed. Further, the literature provides a variety of accounts of, and disputes
over, these contextual aspects. T o understand this variety one must be familiar with at
least s o m e of the major positions. T o recognise only a single position, w h e n there exists a
substantial academic literature of debate, is to fail to understand that there m a y be
plausible alternatives, to miss insights provided by alternatives, and especially to be
unable to defend a particular view from the attack of other views. O n e cannot appreciate
the certainty or strength of a particular view without appreciating the strength of
alternative arguments. It follows that to understand science, one must: first, understand
the contribution of contextual factors to the nature of science; secondly, appreciate that
accounts of this contribution differ, and thirdly, appreciate the insights of some alternative
characterisations.
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T h e relationships between the dimension of context a n d the other

dimensions

While context is a necessary dimension of characterisation, as argued in section 2

above, it is not sufficient to characterise science. This is because context is typicall
in combination with other dimensions of characterisation, namely knowledge, activity,
structure, purpose and belief system. We have referred to these other dimensions

throughout this chapter, but rarely explicitiy and at best only hinting at relationships
between combinations of the dimension. This is because the present chapter seeks to

draw the reader's attention to context as a dimension of characterisation. This will ins
show how context is used as a dimension in combination, by analysing some multidimensional characterisations of science that include context
Context and structure
In formulating the dimension context, considerable thought was given to whether it

included or subsumed the dimension structure. Support for conflating the two is given by
The New Webster Encyclopedic Dictionary of the English Language (1971) which
includes the following meanings for these terms:
Context:

The manner of interweaving several parts into one body; the disposition and
union of the constituent parts of a thing with respecttoeach other, constitution;
Structure:
The arrangement of the parts in a whole (the structure of a sentence, rock of a
columnar structure); manner or m o d e of organisation; m o d e in which different
organs or parts are arranged.
This does not make a clear difference between the two. A clear distinction is made by the
equivalent entires in the Macquarie Dictionary.
Context:
2. the circumstances of facts that surround a particular situation, event, etc.
Structure:
1. The m o d e of building, construction or organisation; arrangement of parts,
elements or constituents.
2. Something built or constructed ...
3. A complex system considered from the point of view of the whole rather than
of any single part: the structure of m o d e m science.
4. Anything composed of parts arranged together in some way; an organisation.
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Thus in some sense of these terms, the component parts of a structure form a context for
each other. O n this basis the notion of structure could be subsumed under context: it
could be meaningful to speak of the structural or organisational context
However, there are several arguments opposing this view, and it remains up to the
author to m a k e the case for as m a n y or as few categories as are plausible: the categories of
characterisation proposed in this thesis are, after all, constructions or inventions. These
arguments include the following. (1) The categories of meaning identified in Appendix
A.1, upon which the proposed categories of characterisation are based, are meaningfully
distinguished and derived from the data. (2) M a n y terms in Appendix A.l are used to
indicate a context but not a structure, or structure without recourse to the concept of
context (3) While there is a sense that structure can be considered part of the context so
too can the belief system, concepts and activities be considered part of the context That
is, just about anything can be considered to be part of the context of something else, in
which sense context is not a useful category. S o m e views in the literature do interpret
science primarily in terms of context, but even so (and the present thesis has disallowed
recourse to a single viewpoint from the literature) it results in a single category of
characterisation which would then have to be further categorised to be useful. Equally,
some views of science see it as essentially a belief system or essentially knowledge. (4) A
close relationship between these two categories of characterisation simply demonstrates
again the nature of the proposed dimensions: they are not proposed as separate entities
like six slices of a pie, but six dimensions of meaning. That is, they label six ways in
which scholars view science or six points of focus for analysis of science. (5) Having the
two categories ensures that all elements of characterisation are categorised, whereas
conflating the two m a y create too coarse an analysis. The judgement in the present thesis
is that the justification for separate categories of context and structure is better m a d e than
for conflating them, in terms of the purpose of the thesis. That is, they are more useful if
considered distinctly, for the purpose of the present thesis.
The juxtaposition of context and structure is nicely illustrated by Abbott's (1988)
study, The System of Professions, given by Gieryn as background to his discussion of
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boundary-work (Gieryn 1995, pp. 409-11). The notion of a profession is clearly one of
structure, system or organisation, which Abbott characterises in terms of a range of
contexts:

Abbott rejects the idea that the development of a profession is independent of the
practices and claims of other professions or differendy organised occupations.
Instead, the history of one profession is best understood through its contests
with other professions for jurisdictional control over tasks - the professions
together constitute a system that is the proper unit of analysis for sociological
theorising. Abbott focuses on interprofessional competitions created w h e n more
than one occupational group lays claim to the legitimate provision of three tasks diagnosis, inferential interpretation, and treatment of problems. The book offers
a structural model (tempered by sensitivitytohistorical contingencies and actors'
initiative) to explain the causes of jurisdictional contests a m o n g professions, the
mechanisms through which one or another side gains advantage, and the variety
of settlement patterns that restore the system to equilibrium. T h e boundary
problem is ubiquitous: H o w do tasks and competencies m a p onto the ecology or
geography of professions and their abutting occupations? (Gieryn 1995, p. 409)
Abbott identifies a set of contextual factors that determine the nature and outcomes of
these jurisdictional contests: the arenas in which they are found, what brings the contests
to a head, how the contests are settled, the strategies used to make the arguments, and

patterns of settlement. Briefly, jurisdictional contests are fought in three arenas: the le
arena of courts and legislature, the public arena of public opinion and media

representation, and the work site of professional activity. These contests do not come to a
head randomly or from the greed of expanding professions, but through individual and
corporate intentions which the present thesis interprets as purposes. These intentions are
influenced by structural and cultural factors, notably changes in technology or
organisation, co-opting of professions by external groups, changing values used to
legitimate boundary claims, and the growth of modern universities, which bestow
professional credentials. Demarcation contests are argued using particular rhetorical
strategies: reduction of a task to one already within the boundary, using metaphor to

argue the similarity of a task to one within the boundary, and creating a gradient to argue

that a complex problem translates into milder, solvable problems. Lasdy, there are distinct

patterns of settling boundary disputes: one profession wins full jurisdiction (which entail
the other(s) winning no jurisdiction), subordination (meaning the delegation of minor
tasks to other professions or non-professions, as in the delegation by physicians of
bedside care to nurses), division of labour between professions (as with engineers and
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architects), intellectual control (meaning splitting the abstract from the practical), advisory
control (where one profession advises within the boundary of another, as in science-law),
and clientele differentiation, where different professions do the same work but for
different clients or markets. Considering the case studies given by Gieryn as examples of
boundary work, Abbott's focus on jurisdictional competition between professions is
useful in interpreting demarcation issues of science. Gieryn uses examples of all three
arenas, catalysts for contests, settlement of contests, rhetorical strategies and patterns of
settlement
Furthermore, in terms of the present thesis, w e can identify in Abbott's account
appeals to all six dimensions - context, structure, belief system, activity, purpose and
knowledge - in characterising professions. T h e interrelationship of dimensions, of
course, tends to be masked by the discussion of metascientific views in Appendix B.l,
because the argument here is presented in order to highlight the use of a particular
dimension, namely context. It is worthwhile reinforcing in this section that the six
dimensions are identified and proposed as an interactive set of six. That is, embedded in
the language of a wide range of metascientific discussions are several of, or all six,
dimensions in combination.
Context and belief system
Context and belief system are inter-related in m a n y ways. The emergence of an
historicist characterisation of science in the Enlightenment, mentioned above, entailed
assumptions that science exhibited certain uniformities that persisted historically:
[The Enlightenment] laid d o w n a series of assumptions concerning science and
its historical existence which have been so influential that all Western historians
of science have been formed within them. This holds equally whether historians
have been persuaded of the Enhghtenment's commitments, or whether they have
attempted to modify them. (Christie 1990, p. 7)
Indeed, it is the 'universal assumption that modern science has some simply graspable
defining feature' which Schuster (1990, p. 221) holds to be responsible for the lack of
resolution of extemalism/internalism (e/i) and revolution/continuity debates, which have
attempted to identify and interpret such universal features.
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Specific instances of claimed interaction of context and belief system abound. For
example, the notion of scientific laws in western European science has been interpreted as
arising from the Christian belief that the cosmos is controlled by a law-giving God. In
China, this belief was not shared by the Mohists or the Logicians, but Ronan (1982) has
interpreted it as similar to the belief system of the group k n o w n as the Legalists, as
discussed in Appendix B.2. Ronan characterises the (post-Legalist) Chinese and
European approaches as differing based on the belief systems arising in different cultural
contexts. T h e structure of laws of Nature in Western European science is explained in
terms of Western European beliefs that everything - humans and their environment operated because they were guided by 'divinely ordained laws' given by powerful,
'personal guiding deities'. However, he characterises Chinese natural philosophy by a
belief that the cosmos was an organism, and behaved as it did, not because it obeyed
laws, but because of its nature as an organism.
Another example of interaction between elements of a belief system and context is
the notion of science as a subculture characterised by shared norms, where norms are
argued in the present thesis as elements of a belief system. The best k n o w n example is
Robert Merton's (1942,1967), that characterises science as a social activity arising from
four institutional norms or imperatives:
The ethos of science is that affectively toned complex of values and norms
which is held to be binding on the m a n [sic] of science. T h e norms are
expressed in the form of prescriptions, prescriptions, preferences and
permissions. They are legitimatised in terms of institutional values. These
imperatives, transmitted by precept and example and reinforced by sanctions are
in varying degrees internalised by the scientist, thus fashioning his[/her]
scientific conscious ... (Merton 1942, in Barnes 1972, pp. 66-7)
Merton argued that, historically, the institutionalisation of Western European science is
characterised partly by its wider social context. Prior to becoming a widely accepted
social institution, science was not accepted as valuable in its o w nright,as it was later. In
seventeenth century England, though not necessarily in other societies, the values to
which science protagonists appealed were the values and practices of 'ascetic
Protestantism':
In his most recent defence of the Merton thesis, Merton (1984) examines the
thesis at three levels of theoretical abstraction. The sociohistorical version is that
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ascetic Protestantism helped to 'motivate and canalise the activities of m e n in the
direction of experimental science.' The middle-range hypothesis is that the
development of science, like the development of any institution, had to be
supported by group values. A t the most general and abstract level, the
hypothesis is that the interests, motivations, and behaviours in any given
institutional sphere - such as religion or economy - are interdependent with the
interests, motivations, and behaviour in other institutional spheres - such as
science. N o matter h o w distinct and autonomous institutional spheres seem to
be, they are linked through the multiple statuses and roles of given individuals.
(Restivo 1995, pp. 97-8)
Restivo notes that there was debate, following the original formulation of Merton's
thesis, as to whether Puritanism followed science or science followed Puritanism. More
recent analyses suggest the parallel development of Puritanism, science and capitalism,
each reflecting, in the terminology of the present thesis, purpose (roles and purposes),
belief system (values), and context (roles, and institutional, ecological and organisational
contexts).
A n interesting example of interplay between context and other dimensions of
characterisation is Watson-Verran and TurnbuU's analysis of the overlap between two
knowledge systems, using the example of Watson's work with the Yolngu Aboriginal
Australian community (Watson-Verran and Turnbull 1995, pp. 131-6). This is 'work
within the historically layered contestation between white Australia and Aboriginal
Australia' (p. 131). Both these traditions contest the notion of a dual system of
knowledge production, although contemporary Aboriginal cultures are more likely to
accept that there is a 'critical and interpretive core of all knowledge'. Significandy, this is
explained by their status as 'subjugated knowledges', and not because of the inherent
rationality of Western European science. Yolngu knowledge is characterised by a
fundamentally different language and conceptual structure to that of Western science: the
former entails entities and designates relations between them - a formalised recursion of
relationships - whereas the latter designates relations between spatiotemporal entities - a
formalised recursion of tallying or number. Western knowledge sees Nature, society and
knowledge as distinct: for example, knowledge is a representation of reality. Yolngu
knowledge does not m a k e this distinction, and is therefore antirepresentationalist, and
m a y be characterised as idealist (p. 134). In exploring ways to merge the two, the project
sought characteristics that could be assimilated by each side:
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In this process Yolngu look for and emphasise metaphor in Western knowledge.
Science looks for and emphasises codification and develops a grid in which two
systems can be seen inratio.(Watson-Verran & Turnbull 1995, p. 124)

The researchers in this process sought to be sensitive to both traditions of knowledge,
which entail both implicit and explicit characterisations:

Having learned how to see these analogies and understand things in new ways,
w e are answerable for what w e do next. If w e are to hope for transformations of
systems of knowledge, for the reconstruction of worlds less organised by axes
of domination, w e cannot present our claims to n e w knowledge as universal
claims. Nor can w e treat their mobilisation in the dual knowledge production
systems within which w e work as unproblematic, using stabilised assemblages
as though they were transparent technologies. In working through the dual sets
of devices and strategies whereby claims are mobilised from Yirrkala, the site of
our work, w e must 'focus up' the forms of association, the values, and the
politics embodied in the products and the processes of our work. (WatsonVerran & Turnbull 1995, p. 136)
If we now seek to identify the complete characterisation, rather than highlight the use

particular dimension, we find in the passage above all six elements of characterisation
used together. Thus Watson-Verran and Turnbull characterise science by structure
(system, assemblages , sets and forms of association); by knowledge (systems of
knowledge, new knowledge and knowledge production systems); by context in the
senses of one among many (systems and not system), socio-cultural (implicitly the
Yolngu and European Australians) and physical-spatial (Yirrkala, the site of our work);

by activity (production, working through... devices and strategies, claims are mobilise
and the processes of our work); by purpose (strategies); and by belief system (implicit
the whole passage, explicit in values and politics embodied in ...).
Redner's characterisation of twentieth century science
Redner's (1987) interpretive history of science makes strong use of multiple
dimensions in combination in its characterisation of science. Redner characterised the

history of (western) science by three major epochs, where the third, which he calls Wor
science, emerged only during the twentieth century:
In the West there have already been two major scientific epochs: the ancientmediaeval and the post-Renaissance. The first might be called AristotelianPtolemaic science in honour of its outstanding theorists; along similar lines the
second might be referred to as Newtonian-Einsteinian science, and I have called
it Classical science for short. Each of these long-lasting epochs had its o w n
relatively distinct internal phases and divisions, which might be listed in the
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following stages. Aristotelian-Ptolemaic science began with a Greek phase
which culminated in the achievements of the M u s e u m of Alexandria, followed
by a more pedestrian R o m a n phase; subsequent to the fall of the ancient classical
world, it went through at lest three successive revivals and transformations,
which might be called Arab-mediaeval, Christian-mediaeval and Renaissance,
but basically it remained the same kind of speculative science throughout The
first epochal transition took place only with the Scientific Revolution of the
seventeenth century, which established Newtonian science in total opposition to
the previous Aristotelian-Ptolemaic science. This epoch might in turn be divided
into two major phases: the first from the formation of the scientific academies of
the Royal Societytillthe French Revolution and the second from the n e w French
Grandes Ecoles and the German universitiestillthe onset of the Second World
War. (Redner 1987, pp. 19-20)
Drawing on a wide range of sources, Redner characterised the differences between these
epochs not just by different knowledge content, as in descriptive histories, but by
different criteria of what constitutes knowledge and what the knowledge means. The
present thesis interprets this as characterising science mainly by context (history),
knowledge, and belief system (such as criteria for judgements).
Thus, in what Redner called Ancient-Mediaeval science, knowledge was largely
conceptual or 'essentialist'. It was set securely and metaphysically ordered within a

philosophical system. This is exemplified in the Ptolemaic cosmology of a closed, finite
ordered and hierarchically structured world with the Earth at its centre, nested in a
hierarchy of concentric spheres:
By this world view every piece of knowledge had its assigned place in the
overall scheme, and anything that could not be fitted in was not considered true
or was not even counted as knowledge (theoria) as distinct from mere opinion
(doxa). Knowledge was essential, necessary, certain, perfect, eternal and divine;
opinion w a s accidental, contingent, corrupt historical and worldly. (Redner
1987, p. 20)
The Classical science epoch began with the rejection of the earlier world view, in

the Scientific Revolution. Redner characterises Classical science as producing knowledge
of how things related and were bound by laws, rather than with what the essential nature

of things was, as in ancient science. The present thesis interprets this as resulting fr

change in purpose or aim, and belief system. Classical science assumed the universe to b
infinite and the same everywhere, with no centre, no boundary and no hierarchy of
rankings. Laws, therefore, applied equally everywhere:
The overall intellectual quest of Classical science can be characterised as a search
for fundamental simplicity, universality and total determinism. (Redner 1987, p.
23)
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The relationships sought were mathematical, deduced rationally from first principles and
experimentally tested (activity). The quest for fundamental simplicity expressed in general
laws (structure), marks Classical science as tending to be reductionist With an infinite
universe, in principle the search for knowledge was infinite also because an unlimited
Nature implied an unlimited knowledge of it. In turn, this fostered a particular and
enduring view of science itself:
This conceptualisation made possible the idea of an endless progress of science an idea that is itself historically relative ... (Redner 1987, p. 20).
M a n y histories interpret Einstein's general relativity theory as the beginning of a n e w
epoch, but Redner marks it as part of the culmination of Classical science, that m a d e
possible the third epoch, contemporary World science. General relativity presented a
different cosmology to Newton's, in which space is curved and bounded and therefore
endless but finite; what Newton had proposed as gravity or action at a distance could n o w
be reinterpreted as a function of Einsteinian space. However, Einstein was wedded to the
Classical epistemology of deterministic cause and effect hence his often-cited remark that
'God does not play dice'. For Redner, citing Prigogine and others, this characterises a
difference between epochs: Bohr's principle of complementarity and Heisenberg's
principle of uncertainty entailed discontinuities, such as quantum jumps, and
indeterminacy at micro levels that were fundamentally incompatible with Classical
science. Thus Classical science is characterised by simplicity, reversibility and
determinism, in its presuppositions about Nature and its approach to this Nature (Redner
p. 28). These are beliefs, assumptions and criteria, which the present thesis interprets as
elements of a belief system.
O n the other hand, Redner characterises World science by technification,
formalisation, abstraction, problem-solving andfinalisation (pp. 60ff). The elements of
these characteristics were present in the nineteenth century, but they did not coalesce into
'a dominant system of sciences' until well into the twentieth century (p. 63). Briefly,
technification is a process by which techniques tend to replace traditional practices of
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abstraction

and problem-solving

often a c c o m p a n y

technification, although they can arise without it, and are associated with a tendency to
introduce mathematical techniques. Formalisation is the tendency to draw together
quantified data into relations, laws and eventually a systematic and formal theory.
Abstraction results from the selection of ideal or abstract subjects from the more complex
reality so that they suit mathematical description. Problem-solving arises because
mathematical, axiomatic science couches its questions as problems for which there are
particular solutions. Finalisation arises as the natural and only outcome for such axiomatic
problems, since the research does not provide any direction from within itself.
Redner argues that these characteristics reinforce both the authority structures of
World science, and its suitability for technical application. That is, external contextual
factors fundamentally characterise World science, regardless of any internal, intellectual
context Thus Redner argues that the change from Classical to World science is not
marked by particular and outstanding intellectual revolutions, but by changes in structure,
organisation and ways of working which nonetheless have resulted in logical
contributions of individuals that are rarely distinct. In themselves, these changes could be
dismissed as contextual changes to Classical science, but Redner argues that they result in
a different kind of knowledge to that of Classical science, possibly analogous to the
difference between Classical and Aristotelian knowledge. The different forms of
knowledge - Ancient, Classical and World - are different but not incommensurable, since
the later forms grew out of the earlier forms. This constitutes a scientific tradition. The
difference between World science and Classical science is characterised by more than the
instrumental and organisational changes. The reductionist character of Classical science,
most notably in the logical positivists, meant that it failed to deal with the organised
complexity of Nature: the properties of water, for example, cannot be reduced to

1

Redner characterises technified science as science in which the role of technology is change
extending the human faculties, as with the microscope and telescope, to actually generating the
data being investigated, as with the cyclotron and computer. With the cyclotron, for example, we
do not 'see' sub-atomic particles in the same sense as w e 'see' with a microscope, because for the
most part, he argues, the cyclotron generates the very particles it is being used to investigate. Part
of the theory of the particles is the theory of how the machine works, and without such a theory
the data are meaningless (Redner 1987, p. 68).
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properties of oxygen and hydrogen within Classical science. World sciences, on the other
hand, are complex and address complexities, although not all contemporary sciences are
Big science:
Contemporary World sciences, by contrast, have tended to be applied to
precisely such complexities. Complexity is a feature of the objects they deal
with, the methods with which they work and the w a y they are organised to
utilise such methods. Thus cognitively, instrumentally and organisationally the
World sciences are complex and deal with complexity. This aspect is broadly
understood for these science are commonly referredtoas practising Big Science
- though this formulation is not very accurate because not all contemporary
sciences are Big Science. T h e term 'Big Science' is meant to reflect their
organisational complexity; it tells us about their other dimensions. These might
be indicated colloquially by saying that these sciences deal with Big Objects.
(Redner 1987, p. 25)
To conclude the metascientific analysis in this chapter, characterisations of science
often appeal to various notions of context, and typically in combination with other

dimensions, as in the preceding examples. This has implications for science in the scho
curriculum, to which w e n o w turn.
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Conclusions for theorising about the science curriculum

This section will extend the argument, given above, that scientific context is an
integral part of metascientific characterisations of science, to claim also that it should form
part of school Science. This argument is based on several premises. First the preceding
argument in this chapter has shown that context is a necessary but not sufficient
dimension of science in the metascientific literature. Second, the scope of scientific
context is m u c h broader than most individual characterisations of science address: to
understand science it is necessary to understand, firstiy, that science arises from a variety
of contextual factors, and secondly, h o w these contexts shape science and different
perceptions of it. Third, the traditional academic school science curriculum is
overwhelmingly concerned with science knowledge content and certain activities - i.e. it
is strongly internalist this is well documented (see Matthews 1994). This characterisation
of science is both incomplete and strongly contested in the literature. Such an incomplete
characterisation renders improbable a general appreciation of h o w science works such as
the educated citizen increasingly requires. Moreover, to fail to understand that a broader
notion of context than simply the cognitive actually constitutes science, is to limit a
rationale for the study of science, and reduces the justification of scientific belief. Also, it
makes m o r e difficult an appreciation of the special sense in which the scientific
community understands scientific knowledge to betentativeyet authoritative. This section
will argue that these claims apply both to the general science curriculum for all students,
and to specialised curricula intended to cater for students with special needs, including
those intending a career in science. Most of this argument is structured as a series of
numbered paragraphs, which firstiy summarise Appendix B.l, and secondly highlight the
significance of context for the science curriculum.
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Findings about the nature of science contexts from the review of the
metascientific literature.

To the extent that there is a current (albeit complex) metascientific consensus, it is
the agreement that there is no longer a single received view of science, and particularly
here, that there is no single agreed view of scientific context. With the decline in
metascientific influence of positivism, there is widespread but not universal metascientific
agreement that the positivists' rejection of all but intellectual context was mistaken.
Accounts within the contemporary loose consensus recognise multiple notions of context
variously including psychological, socio-cultural and ontological contexts, for example.
However, w e have seen that positivism remains influential as a tendency of thought in the
natural sciences generally, and is particularly influential in certain fields, such as
behavioural psychology. For example, in their day to day work m a n y scientists primarily
address the cognitive context - the manipulation of scientific concepts and propositions
that is the bread and butter of their work. Yet studies from a variety of perspectives show
that this alone is inadequate to understand h o w and w h y decisions are made about science
knowledge. This points to a general need to provide arichernotion of context in school
science: clearly there is a need for students to become familiar with the cognitive context
of science, but also to develop a broader understanding of its contexts, as will be
developed below. These ideas can be summarised as follows.
There is a range of currently accepted views of science that characterise science by various
notions of context.
a)

For m u c h of the twentieth century only the cognitive or intellectual context was
subjected to any significant analysis and remains prominent in scientific practice,
but as the sole context it does not withstand contemporary philosophical or
sociological analysis.
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The restriction of scientific contexttoonly cognitive or intellectual characteristics
remains a tendency of thought in the natural sciences generally, and an influential
characterisation of science in certain fields, such as behavioural psychology.

c)

The range of relative emphases on internal (cognitive or intellectual) and external
(socio-cultural, political, economic, psychological and other) contexts is
represented in extemahst/intemalist (e/i) debates.

d)

Internalism characterises science knowledge as unique, rational and autonomous;
externalism accommodates a wider context of factors that characterise and affect
science that, except in extreme externalism, includes cognitive factors; each
provides particular insights into science.

e)

E/i debates are considered by s o m e metascientists n o w to be passe and
unproductive, but by others to have yet to be resolved; however, beyond this
specialised field of expertise, such as a m o n g the majority of curriculum
stakeholders, e/i issues remain contentious.

f)

The present thesis accepts the position of some accounts (such as Morrell) that
extreme e/i positions should be avoided except as examples of tendencies of
thought or analysis.

g)

Extreme internalism, concerning only the abstract logical and cognitive
characteristics of scientific ideas, explains neither the working of science as a
whole nor the development of m a n y scientific ideas.

h)

Extreme externalism, concerning sociocultural, political, technical, economic and
military contexts of science, does not explain the cognitive criteria by which
scientific ideas are formed and scrutinised.

Determining the context of the scientific and the non-scientific is described in the liter
as boundary work
i)

All fields, including science, are characterised by exercises in establishing the
boundary between what is agreed as the field (in this case science) and what is
not; this is called boundary work.
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Boundary w o r k has been characterised by Foucault as making the truth and
power of the field, which in science can be interpreted as seeking to explain the
cognitive authority of science.

k)

This so-called boundary work either seeks to identify the essential characteristics
by which science is uniquely and necessarily distinguished from non-science
(essentialism), or to identify the ways in which people contend for, legitimate or
challenge scientific authority (constructivism).

1)

Essentialism assumes that there are characteristics that uniquely establish or
demarcate science, and seeks to identify them: the major essentialist position in
philosophy is given in Popper's criterion of falsifiability; the major essentialist
position in history is given in Kuhn's paradigmatic consensus and problemsolving; in sociology, the major essentialist position is given in Merton's four
social norms of science, namely universalism, communism, disinterestedness
and organised scepticism.

m)

Essentialist approaches to boundary work are flawed because each is subject to
telling criticisms: for each of them, examples in actual scientific practices show
that they do not, and sometimes cannot apply, except as ideals (aims or
purposes) of science; in practice each seems to reduce to social negotiation of
scientists and, sometimes, others.

n)

Constructivism

m a k e s n o essentialist assumptions, and instead seeks to

understand the boundaries of science by describing boundary work in action:
constructivist approaches have identified a range of boundary episodes in
political, technological, social and other contexts.
o)

T h e present thesis is an example of constructivist boundary work to the extent
that it attempts to theorise about h o w the metascientific literature characterises
science.

Science can be characterised by its intellectual context
p)

The available ideas, beliefs and concepts constitute an intellectual context within
which scientists, and others, work and think.
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T h e intellectual context can be interpreted from several perspectives: as the
currendy accepted conceptual framework that partly characterises the normal
science with a Kuhnian paradigm; as the long-standing divide between the
science and arts communities of scholars (Snow's 'two cultures'); and as the
auxiliary theories from which technical concepts such as auxiliary statements are
drawn to support any particular theory (a notion that supports the influence of
theory on observations).

r)

T h e intellectual context - the available framework of concepts and
understandings - is massive, and in m a n y fields is rapidly increasing and
changing; it is well beyond the total comprehension of any individual.

s)

Because the intellectual context is subject to testing and revision, it is
authoritative while at the same time dynamic and tentative.

Science can be characterised by its historical contexts
t)

M o d e r n science can be traced mainly through a western European tradition,
which shows not only historical antecedents to present day science, but
examples of the testing and rejection of ideas by which w e characterise science.

u)

Historians tend to emphasise either the continuity of the scientific tradition, or
the discontinuity w h e n significant ideas are superseded (hence terms like the
Scientific Revolution); like most historical categories, each approach provides its
o w n insights.

v)

While m a n y ideas and beliefs can be dated to the early Greeks, the roots of
present day science date more clearly from the Scientific Revolution; m a n y of its
present characteristics date from the twentieth century, reflecting an increasing
rate of change.

w)

Traditional science histories have tended to be accounts of the individuals and
ideas that were clear antecedents of current scientific knowledge and practice;
they tend to ratify the successful revolutions and individuals and, because the
characterise science as a progressive march, are called W h i g histories.
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Recent developments in historical analysis have criticised W h i g histories as
distorting the history of science, and point to the need to interpret historical
events in their o w n terms; in this way, w e can construct an understanding of
w h y certain ideas rose and fell from favour.

y)

Science histories show that not only has accepted knowledge changed over time,
but also notions of what is accepted as truth and rationality.

Science can be characterised in various ways by socio-cultural contexts
z)

Science can be characterised as a subculture that affects and is affected by society
at large and other sub-cultures within society, such as religious, economic,
political and military interests; distinctions, such as between science and
technology, have become increasingly blurred, or, such as with the social,
political and religious, increasingly contested.

aa)

Science can be characterised by subcultures within it which includes the notion
of paradigms of thought and approach; subcultures within science are becoming
increasingly differentiated by specialisation.

bb)

The meanings of scientific phenomena are interpreted through a world-view or
Weltanschauungen,

which m a y arise from particular scientific and broader

cultural contexts; it is the world-view or Weltanschauungen

within which

individuals and groups interpret or m a k e meaning of phenomena.
cc)

Feminist critiques characterise science by a masculine Weltanschauungen, in the
sense that the metaphors used in making scientific explanations m a y arise from
broader cultural contexts, such as masculine imagery.

dd)

In recent decades, developments in fields such as history, sociology and
anthropology have become increasingly critical ofttaditionalmethods of crosscultural comparisons because these methods tend to leave unexamined the effect
of western cultural beliefs and practices on both western and non-western natural
philosophies; they question the meaningfulness of interpreting traditions from
other, non-western, contexts from within a western context
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In recent decades there has been increasing interest in the natural philosophies of
other cultural traditions, both because of their intrinsic insights, and because of
the insights they afford into western European science by w a y of comparison.

ff)

U s e of the term science in non-Western contexts is difficult because of these
problems in cross-cultural comparisons; the present thesis uses a c o m m o n
alternative, the term natural philosophies.

gg)

T h e western literature on the natural philosophies of non-western European
cultures is relatively small, and often negligible, in comparison to the literature
on western European science, so our relative understanding of different
traditions is disproportionate.

Science can be characterised by human contexts
hh)

Scientific progress can be characterised partly by the characteristics of individual
scientists rather than groups; this has been recognised more in post-positivist
accounts of science that seek to describe actual practices rather than reconstruct
ideal practice in terms of logic and rationality.

ii)

Popular characterisations of scientists tend to be stereotypic, notably in the mass
media.

jj)

T h e effect of such stereotypes on children's perception of science and career
choices is well documented and generally thought to work against the interests of
science.

kk)

Individual characteristics of scientists include psychological attributes such as
learning, cognition, personality, competition, ambition, incentive, motivation,
interest and confidence.

11)

T h e individual characteristics of scientists provide more complete accounts of
m u c h of science as it is practiced than do abstract notions such as logic and
rationality.

mm)

Studies that focus o n the individual cognition of scientists often provide
psychological explanations of scientific discovery, such as a type of learning, a
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gestalt shift, the interplay of psychological and social factors, or as a novel
synthesis of concepts.
nn)

S o m e studies of individual scientists address the roles of competition, ambition,
incentive, motivation, interest confidence, and the personality of the scientist
particularly as it contributes to the relative success of different scientists.

oo)

S o m e studies of individual scientists address the contribution of individual
judgement in the design and implementation of experiments and the interpretation
their results.

Science can be characterised by organisational contexts
pp)

Science is characterised by the ways people and resources are organised: it takes
place in characteristic organisational contexts.

qq)

Characteristic scientific organisational contexts include university faculties,
departments, disciplines, and research teams comprising units within
universities, companies, government instrumentalities and community-based
groups.

rr)

Scientific paradigms reflect some of these organisations.

ss)

T h e rapid expansion and diversification of science in the twentieth century has
generated both n e w scientific fields, and hence organisations, and n e w
combinations of existing fields.

Science can be characterised by physical contexts
tt)

Science is characterised by physical contexts such as locations and artefacts;
locations include laboratories and field sites; artefacts include experimental
apparatus and clothing.

uu)

Traditional accounts tended to provide descriptions of artefacts and locations,
and interpret their role as relatively incidental to the rational reconstruction of
experimental activity.

vv)

M o r e recently, laboratory studies have focussed on the role of locations and
artefacts in constituting scientific knowledge, arguing that the interaction of
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people, apparatus and phenomena is more fundamental and complex than
traditionally understood.
ww)

In particular, laboratory studies have argued that laboratories can be interpreted
usefully as the locus for complex sets of interactions between people, apparatus
and phenomena that provide better characterisations of science than both
traditional philosophical accounts of methodology and traditional sociological
accounts of social interactions.

xx)

S o m e post-positivist accounts argue that during the twentieth century, science
became increasingly characterised by shifts in the interactions between
technology (as in apparatus) and science, where the apparatus provides both the
phenomena and the means of observing those phenomena

II. Implications for a school science that is grounded in the
metascientific literature

Given the conclusions in part I of the present section, above, there is a clear need to
reconcile the traditionally internalist characterisation of science in the school curriculum
with the farricherappeal to context in metascientific discussions. T o do this w e must
examine the rationale for the internalist curriculum, which arises from several
assumptions of particular interest to the present curriculum.
1)

A n assumption about the nature of science, that knowledge and certain processes
characterise science, where knowledge comprises the framework of concepts
and propositions currentiy accepted by the scientific community.

2)

A n assumption about the purpose of the science curriculum, that it should
prepare futures scientists and technicians by giving them a thorough grounding
in the accepted knowledge of science, that is, an internalist curriculum.

3)

A n assumption about potential scientists and technologists, that they are to be
found a m o n g those school students with above average ability and interest in
science; that is, with above average ability and interest in an internalist
curriculum.
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4) Another assumption about the purpose of the science curriculum, that it should
prepare future citizens, w h o will include scientists and technologists, for life in
an increasingly scientific and technological society.
5)

A n assumption about the nature of the learner, that students can develop a
personal knowledge that is consistent with the accepted scientific concepts and
propositions, and apply them in unfamiliar contexts, whether as scientists or as
citizens.

The present thesis argues against each of these assumptions.
1) Arguments against traditional, narrow, characterisations of science
T h e present thesis presents a critique of the traditional view that science is
characterised by knowledge and certain processes of reasoning and experiment. This
critique is grounded robusdy in the metascientific literature, and given in the semantic
analysis of s u m m a r y statements and the analyses in the six companion chapters and
Appendix B. W e have seen in the present chapter that characterisations of science only by
its abstract logical and cognitive features is called internalism, and that extreme or
exclusively internalist views are n o w widely thought by the scholarly communities that
analyse science to inadequately characterise science. A s the discussion on e/i debates
showed, a strict internalism at best distorts the characterisation of science, and at worst
provides a characterisation that cannot be sustained in the face of a very substantial
academic literature. Likewise, extreme externalist characterisations, which seek to
reconceptualise our understanding of the interactions between science and society by
creating n e w concepts and terms, are contested in the literature partly because of this
radical reconceptualisation, and partly because they fail to explain the cognitive criteria
used by scientists to the satisfaction of the scientific community. In their extreme forms,
internalism and externalism are unsuitable as a basis for a general school science
curriculum. The fadings of extreme internalism w e have mentioned. Extreme externalism
is also unlikely to be useful in a school curriculum because it does not characterise the
cognitive character of science knowledge adequately, and in m a n y cases n o longer
conceptualise sciences and society in the ways most people use those terms. Thus to
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characterise science as equivalent to any other enterprise in society is to invoke a level of
relativism that is not only contested strongly in the literature, but is at odds with the
construction of a mainstream school curriculum. T o suggest a school curriculum that
relativises traditional subjects and entails a radically different notion of
compartmentalising the curriculum is beyond the stated scope of the present thesis, which
accepts the general structure of the curriculum and schools broadly as they are. However,
both internalism and externalism are useful in that they offer different insights into the
workings of science. A moderate externalism is considered to include insights from both
perspectives, and is a suitable characterisation for school science ( A A A S 1989, in
Matthews 1994, p. 39).
Despite all this, the extensive e/i debates in the literature provide not only a range of
perspectives o n science, but some middle-ground positions in both H P S and S T S that
combine both internalist and externalist insights. A s found in curriculum debates in m a n y
countries, including the debates accompanying the national curriculum framework project
in Australia, e/i issues are central to arguments about what the nature of school science
should be. T h e choice seems to be charicatured from both sides: one as a rigorous
coverage of the intellectual tradition of science versus spurious social studies of science;
the other as an empowering and socially-responsible education versus an intellectually
sterile, technical approach to science.
Given the argument in the present chapter, school science should present a range of
e/i characterisations and their insights, for two reasons. T h e first is simply to demonstrate
the range of views of science. T h e second is that they represent, in various ways,
fundamental characteristics of science that should be included if students are to develop a
robust understanding of science. Science knowledge, for example, is a central concern in
internalist characterisations and in all science curricula2. Equally, w e have shown in the
present chapter that this is inadequate to explain h o w science works, and that various
external contextual factors play a part in constituting science. The main disagreement is
h o w these factors work, and to what extent. Thus an historical perspective not only

2

Knowledge is addressed at length in Chapter 11 and Appendix B.6
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provides an understanding of h o w current ideas c a m e to be, but indicates their strengths
by showing h o w they prevailed over competing ideas and their limitations by showing
h o w they are accepted as tentative and depending on experimental tests. E v e n the milder
interpretation of socio-cultural, human, organisational and physical contexts - that they
influence science - is necessary to understand the strengths and limitations of science
from the perspective of the citizen in a democracy. T h e stronger argument that various
contextual factors contribute essentially to scientific outcomes, should also be put. Thus
the present thesis presents the following recommendations for the general school science
curriculum.
a)

School science should present arichernotion of scientific context than merely
the intellectual, in such a w a y as to provide a coherent rather than anecdotal
understanding.

b)

There are plausible, even compelling, arguments that a broader notion of context
than simply the cognitive actually constitute science, and that to fail to account
for this is to fail to understand h o w science actually works.

c)

Extreme internalism and externalism are strongly contested in the literature and
unsuited as the basis for school science, except as indications of approach.

d)

Plausible middle ground views, also found in the literature and well suited to the
school curriculum, characterise scientific knowledge as appealing to empirical
test and being socially constructed, i.e. as being subject to a range of contextual
factors, including the cognitive, socio-cultural (in its broadest sense), and
ontological.

e)

School students need to understand something of the breadth of scope of
scientific knowledge, to develop understandings about s o m e concepts, and to
understand that scientific knowledge derives its authority from its capacity for
testing and revision; this understanding is best given by addressing a broader
range of context than merely the cognitive.
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Arguments against the assumption that internalist views are most adequate for

preparing future scientists
The second the assumption is that a purpose of the science curriculum is that it
should provide a thorough grounding in the accepted knowledge of science, that is, an

internalist curriculum, to prepare future scientists and technicians. This assumption ha
two parts: suitability of the internalist curriculum, and the preparation of aspiring
scientists and technologists. An internalist school science is inadequate on several

grounds. We have already shown that an exclusively, and even just a strongly, internalis
view of science is flawed and inadequate. Therefore a school curriculum cannot base its
rationale on a discredited view of the nature of science. While science is clearly
characterised by knowledge, the companion chapter on knowledge and Appendix B.6
will show further that science knowledge is more complex than many traditional views

address. There is a clear link in the literature between metascientific views and scienc

education. The discussion of the notion of two cultures, earlier in the present chapter,
mentioned its contribution to calls for 'liberalising' and 'contextualising' science

education. Edge (1995, pp. 8-9) cites several reports in the UK that advocate such a shi
and indicates some of the debate that arose in response, debate which the present paper
explicidy seeks to inform. He notes that the two cultures debate found expression not
only in the growth of critical fields such as STS and SSK, but in the nature of science
education, quoting Clive Morphet as an eloquent summation of this argument
The justification for the inclusion of these non-vocational elements has
... always involved at its core the notion that courses in science and
technology are essentially illiberal, being concerned with facts,
objectivity, abstraction, specialisation, manipulation, etc., and that
such a diet is unwholesome and should be 'balanced' or
'complemented' with a course or courses which expose students to
more subjective ways of knowing and doing ... A cruder expression
of the same sentiments will describe science and technology students
(and, presumably, their teachers) as uncultured. (Morphet,
unpublished conference paper, quoted in Edge 1988)
Even where all parties share an essentially positivist view of science, this claim
could engender not only opposition but active hostility. Those of us w h o have
experienced it k n o w that this is one feature that has not changed overtime!But it
must be said that, rereading these pleas from the 1960s, I a m struck again by
h o w relevant their challenge still is ... Indeed, sharpened by subsequent debates
about the need to recruit more w o m e n to science and technology, and their status
within those professions, and by feminist critiques of science, the message has
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been amplified. The positivist terms in which the 'two cultures' debate was set
tended to separate science from the humane domain. Ironically, out of a
(misguided) attempt to m a k e science social and 'civilised' (as if it were part of
neither society nor civilisation) has arisen a richer S T S criticism. A n d yet the
earlier rhetoric is constantiy reemerging. (Edge 1995, pp. 9-10)
Thus characterisations of science in terms of the 'two cultures' have been debated, and
continue to be debated, both in terms of (academic) metascientific argument and science
education. This is self-evidendy a concern of the present thesis.
If w e consider for the m o m e n t only the needs of those students w h o m a y go cm to a
scientific career then there are several persuasive arguments for considering a wider
context of science. First the present thesis argues that a school Science that seeks to
authentically represent science must show that broader notions of context help constitute
science. This is part of the argument for increasing the rigour of school Science. The
matter ofrigouris addressed in the concluding chapter of this thesis because it draws on a
robust multidimensional characterisation of science, such as the present thesis proposes,
and is not restricted mainly to context
Secondly, the knowledge content of science is more intelligible if studied in
historical, socio-cultural and personal contexts:
Solomon (1987) reviewed the scattered literature on a n u m b e r of social
influences that make the teaching of arigidlyinsulated science, which has no
contact with everyday contexts, nonsense for any group of students and a quite
untenable option if the curriculum's intentions are widespread learning
(Fensham 1992, p. 803).
This is an argument from the perspective of improving learning practice, which is a
derivative concern only of this paper, but nevertheless it holds. Thirdly, our future
scientists should have a better understanding of science in the 'real world'. This argument
has two bases: increasing the rigour of the subject and increasing the effectiveness of
science as part of society. The matter of the effectiveness of science as part of society has
been addressed in the discussion given earlier in the present chapter. For example, w e
have seen that m u c h of scientific inquiry can no longer be characterised as arising from
the intellectual curiosity of individual scientists, and instead arises from the interests of
governments, industry and citizen groups. This also extends to detemnning questions of
scientific authority: in only some cases is this determined as an internal matter for expert
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scientific communities. In an increasing number of cases it is determined by government
policies and funded by contracted projects set by industries, governments and citizen
groups. In m a n y of these cases the authority of claims to science knowledge is unclear
because opposing groups use qualified scientists to support their o w n claims and dispute
those of others; it is easier to characterise such disputes as being resolved by complex
social negotiations involving competing cognitive claims rather than by straightforward
appeals to cognitive arguments. A number of recent historical and other studies have
shown that even a number of developments within the scientific community are better
characterises as complex contests between authorities rather than simple tests of
falsification or verification.

3) Arguments against the assumption that high achievement in an internalist curriculum
selects our bestfuture scientists
T h e third assumption is that potential scientists and technologists are to be found
a m o n g those school students with above average ability and interest in science; that is,
with above average ability and interest in an internalist curriculum. In part, this is
reasonable and expected: it is natural that w e should want bright and motivated students to
choose to do further studies in science and technology. However, there is a circular
argument if w e claim that a bright and motivated student is one w h o excels at mastering
decontextualised science knowledge, where such knowledge is used to define the bright
and motivated student^. A w a y out of this circularity is to look for indicators of interest
and ability beyond achievement in an internalist science curriculum, and there are sound
reasons for doing this based on both educational and metascientific arguments. A n
example from metascience is the effect of gendered metaphors and other constructions in
science on the involvement of w o m e n in science, as noted earlier in this chapter. In the
science education literature there are m a n y accounts of the deleterious effect of masculine
imagery and decontextualised knowledge on the participation of particularly girls in
school science; here, success or otherwise in school science is direcdy related to the

3

This is an example of the problem of the criterion in epistemology, where the criteria and
justified belief are confused; see Steup 1992, p. 378.
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characterisation of context in school science, not on s o m e notion of absolute ability.
Likewise from metascience, Ravetz (1971) has characterised science partly by craft-like
activities4. In science education, the use of relatively open-ended inquiry projects is
designed partly to encourage the learning of skills and concept development through
activity, as in the learning of a craft. However, in the N S W science curriculum, the
strong emphasis in the Science and Technology K-6 syllabus receives progressively less
emphasis in the secondary curricula, and project work in the senior secondary years (11
and 12) tends to be restricted to the science courses regarded as non-academic; the most
able and interested senior science students are encouraged to take distinct-discipline
courses, particularly physics and chemistry.
4) Arguments against the assumption that the traditional, internalist curriculum best
prepares future citizens for life in a scientific society
Fourth is the assumption that another purpose of the science curriculum is that it
should prepare future citizens, w h o will include scientists and technologists, for life in an
increasingly scientific and technological society. Clearly, such a curriculum goal appeals
to a wider notion of scientific context than a narrow interpretation of cognitive context as
argued in the present chapter. However, it is weakened in two respects. O n the one hand
its presence in the N S W science curriculum diminishes as children proceed from primary
to junior secondary to senior secondary levels. Thus, a broad scientific and technological
context is clearly present at the K-6 level; at the junior secondary (7-10) level it is
moderately argued but at the time of writing its future is unclear, at the senior secondary
(11-12) level, it is largely absent in the science courses regarded as 'academic', and its
substantial presence only in the 'non-academic' alternatives (the General Science and
Science for Life syllabuses) reduces the status of broad notions of science context. O n the
other hand, although the goal of educating citizens lessens the requirement for a strongly
internalist curriculum, curriculum flexibility is necessary to allow educational decisions to
be m a d e about m o v e m e n t of students between academic and general strands in the

4

See the companion chapter on activity and Appendix B.5.
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curriculum. Thus often there is pressure to ensure that sufficient knowledge of scientific
concepts is covered in general strands should students wish to 'step up' to pre-university
courses, which is interpreted c o m m o n l y as changing the relative emphasis on the
intellectual content versus the social utility of science. This is most evident at the junior
secondary level, where the Science 7-10 syllabus allows schools considerable flexibility
in principle for selecting the detail of content and presentation, but in practice schools are
concerned to ensure that the more able students are well grounded in the knowledge that
will prepare them for the senior science-discipline courses (particularly physics and
chemistry), should they elect to do them. In this w a y the entry requirements into tertiary
science-based courses influence senior science subject choices, which in turn apply
pressure to retain an essentially internalist perspective on the junior secondary science
curriculum at the school level.
T o the extent that school science represents science, it should encourage students to
appreciate that there are diverse views about science, including, here, scientific contexts:
students should be aware that people construct and use different characterisations of
science, and for different reasons. It is only by appreciating a broad notion of scientific
contexts that various scientistic arguments in public life can be understood, and with it the
ability to m a k e informed contributions to public debates that draw on science. There are
several implications for school science. Most obviously there is a need for school science
to assist students to deconstruct public images of science, particularly stereotypic ones.
There is also a need for students to develop some appreciation of the tension between
ideals of science, such as goals of objectivity andrationality,and the actual practice of
science. There is a need to 'humanise' science by considering more of the h u m a n
contexts, such as individual personality, interest and motivation: w e have noted that the
science education literature shows that far too m a n y students, notably girls, lose interest
in science through their school science course. Patendy, this is the exact reverse of the
desired outcomes of a science education, both for an educated citizenry and future
scientists and technologists. Science students need to understand that contemporary
science is as it is because of historical antecedents, and, as with historical examples of
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science, capable of revision. Thus an appreciation of science history engenders an
understanding not just of h o w contemporary science came to be as it is, but also of the
special sense in which scientific knowledge is regarded as both authoritative and tentative,
and of w h y s o m e ideas that were once regarded as plausible (even true) are n o w no
longer thought to be so. Yet historical contexts are usually not addressed by m u c h more
than incidental or background biographical notes; that is, there is little planned attempt to
develop a systematic understanding of science from its history. Likewise, a powerful
technique for characterising western European science in the literature istocompare and
contrast (western) science with natural philosophies in other cultures, yet in N S W at least
this receives little planned attention except where individual schools choose to do so. That
it m a y receive some attention in social studies classes would more likely serve to
emphasise the internalist character of school science, and results in a piecemeal
characterisation of science. There are some examples internationally where the scope of
science curricula has been broadened to include traditions from other cultures, a direction
that the present thesis can inform. While the science curriculum typically addresses the
traditional disciplinary organisation of science, as physics, chemistry, biology and so
forth, as found in universities, it should also address the considerable scientific activity in
government agencies, industry and community-based groups such as consumer and
environmental groups.
T h e physical contexts of school science bears a moderate resemblance to
contemporary science: school laboratories are equipped with some artefacts that are
recognisably scientific such as workbenches with water, gas and electricity oudets, and
are stocked with glassware, balances and other artefacts that characterise scientific
laboratories. However, some artefacts in school laboratories are n o longer used in
contemporary science, or largely so, such as cathoderaytubes, simple microscopes and
even bunsen burners. Conversely, m a n y artefacts used in contemporary science are
absent from schools, such as complex optical microscopes, electron and ion microscopes,
various electronic imaging and spectroscopic analysis machines, and sophisticated
computer software. T h e reasons for this discrepancy include cost, physical and
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conceptual simplicity suited to school students, and dated coverage in the curriculum.
Thus, the cost of purchasing and maintaining sophisticated apparatus is frequendy
beyond the resources of universities, let alone schools, the more so w h e n purchasing
items of even moderate expense such as electronic balances involves foregoing the
purchase of other useful artefacts. O f course, sophisticated equipment invariably requires
extensive training in its correct and safe use, as provided in undergraduate and sometimes
postgraduate science courses, and this is regarded traditionally as beyond the ability of
most school students. Conversely, a justification for using simpler equipment is that they
are simpler to use and to understand: for example the mechanisms themselves of beam
balances, spring balances and simple optical microscopes help to demonstrate basic
concepts whereas the electronic circuitry in electronic balances and electron or ion
microscopes does not. The third reason, that the curriculum as formally embodied in
printed documents and implemented by teachers whose science knowledge is dated, is
challenged by the present thesis. T o the extent that science is characterised by its physical
contexts, school science needs to ensure it characterises not just historical science but its
ongoing developments.
The present thesis does not advocate a radical shift of the school science curriculum
from one essentially grounded in the western European science tradition into crosscultural studies of comparative natural philosophies, although it allows for such a
possibility should the curriculum developers of an education system choose to do so.
(Hopefully, the present thesis would m a k e such a choice, were it made, better informed.)
Rather, it seeks to inform decisions about the broad subject called Science in Australian
and similar school systems, that is, where school Science is based on the western
European science tradition. A s mentioned earlier, the focus of the present thesis on the
western European scientific tradition arises from its concern to address adequately the
tradition of science embodied in these science curricula, as a device for informing the
deliberations of curriculum stakeholders. O n c e established, the proposed framework of
categorisation can be appliedtoother traditions of science and for any curriculum.
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Arguments against the assumption that students will modify their own belief system
in the light of experience with a traditional internalist science curriculum.
Fifth is the assumption that the learner can develop a personal knowledge that is

consistent with the accepted scientific concepts and propositions, and apply them in
unfamiliar contexts, whether as scientists or as citizens. The complexities of research
concerning learning science are largely beyond the scope of the present thesis, but some
comments should be made. Briefly, the present thesis rejects the assumption that
acontextual, propositional knowledge, as commonly given in science textbooks and
embodied in science curriculum documents, can be learned as personal knowledge and
applied in novel contexts, by the majority of school students.
This is the thrust taken by the report, Science for All Americans ( A A A S 1989). It
presents a number of conclusions and advocates a number of approaches, some of which
match, and some of which conflict with Science For All approaches (Fensham 1992, pp.
800-801). The report advocates reversing the trend of adding more and more to school
science curricula. (In preparation of the report, educational criteria of 'utility, social
responsibility, intrinsic value of knowledge, philosophical value and childhood
enrichment' were used to reduce some of the more extensive lists of topics proposed by
panels). The report employs content that is very conceptual 'and largely confined to the
concepts science uses to describe the various scientific phenomena of importance'.
Fensham is doubtful of the effectiveness of the argument for experiment and activity: 'an
experiential emphasis is recommended but underplayed as a goal'. Science for All
Americans also recommends an historical perspective, although again Fensham queries its
translation into school practice. This is advocated for two reasons: to gain appreciation for
the w a y ideas are 'products of their historicaltimeand place', and to gain appreciation for
the 'cultural salience of some of the great episodes of scientific endeavour'. Fensham is
sceptical of the success of the implementation of the latter, given the tertiary socialisation
of teachers. T h e report recommends that the contribution and potential of w o m e n and
minority groups should be illustrated, but it should be m a d e clear 'to girls and minority
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students that they are expected to study the same subjects, at the same level, as everyone
else and to perform as well'.
Context in NSW science syllabuses
The N S W science curriculum, as an example of a mainstream science curriculum,
indicates some ambivalence towards scientific context on the part of its curriculum
developers and stakeholders. At the Primary level, the Science and Technology K-6
syllabus makes a fairly consistent argument for learning science and technology in
plausible contexts for primary children, rather than presenting decontextualised
knowledge organised around traditional science disciplines. This m a y be regarded as a
moderately externalist approach, although it is far more prescriptive about the knowledge
to be covered than the process-oriented Investigating Science K-6 policy (1980) it
replaced. The change towards increasing specification of content reflected broader policy
changes toward developing curricula that specified knowledge content more explicidy. A n
internal evaluation ( N S W Department of Education, unpublished, 1989) of the 1980
policy by the then N S W Department of Education, in which the present author
participated, showed a low rate (less than 1 0 % ) of implementation in schools, largely
because teachers felt that policy provided little support in selecting, prograrrjming and
teaching knowledge.
The junior secondary level is covered by a single syllabus, the Science 7-10
syllabus (1985, amended 1989, and under redevelopment at the time of writing). This
syllabus is aims-based, meaning that is provides a framework of concepts from which
schools and teachers are to select knowledge content detail. A formal review of this
syllabus was begun in 1996, but as of the end of 1997 the outcome of this review is not
finalised. Certainly, a syllabus review Symposium held in M a y 1996 reflected a concern
to address the knowledge of science disciplines, and m u c h of the discussion at that
symposium concerned whether or not traditional (internalist) science knowledge should
be promoted more strongly or not in any syllabus revision ( N S W Board of Studies,
1996).
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At the senior secondary level, science studies are optional for students for the first
time, and a small but increasing minority of students are electing to take no further science
studies. A t this level there were basically two types of courses available: discipline-based
courses (Physics, Chemistry, Biology and Geology, of which students m a y elect one or
two, and a multidisciplinary course); and interdisciplinary courses, Science for Life and
General Science). A t the time of writing, these interdisciplinary science subjects, among
others, are being discontinued following the recommendations of The 1996 M c G a w
Report for the N S W Higher School Certificate. The discipline-based courses are strongly
internalist; the interdisciplinary courses presented a moderately externalist view of
knowledge, and led students to acquire knowledge through the study of issues and
themes of social and personal relevance. In general, it is the discipline-based subjects that
are regarded as the best pre-requisites for further science studies at tertiary level, and
students intending further science or technological studies are encouraged to take these,
particularly physics and chemistry. At the time of writing the statutory Board of Studies
has recendy undertaken a general review of the secondary curriculum and the prospects
for secondary syllabuses, including science syllabuses, is for more discipline-based
approaches. T h e situation is compounded further because in Australia there w a s an
attempt in the early 1990s to provide national, c o m m o n , curriculum profilestoreduce the
variation between the curricula in each state. However, in N S W , the largest education
system in Australia, the Eltis Report (1995) reviewed the curriculum and recommended
that the national curriculum profiles should be taken into account but not over-ridden by
the state curricula set by the Board of Studies; this recommendation was accepted by the
government. T h e national Science Profile is, from the point of view of the present thesis,
largely internalist: four of the six content strands correspond strongly with traditional
science knowledge disciplines. However, it still has some critics w h o see it as
downgrading therigourof traditional science disciplines.
Some specific recommendations corresponding to the summary of findings in part I
above:
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Throughout the following, students should develop an appreciation of science
context as part of developing a multidimensional characterisation.
Science is characterised by context in a variety of ways
a-c)

Students should develop an appreciation that science is characterised by a variety
of notions of context

d-h)

School Science should present insights from both internalist and externalist
positions, and avoid extreme positions of either. For example:
•

Students should develop an appreciation of the cognitive criteria by which
scientific knowledge is formed and scrutinised.

•

Students should develop an appreciation of h o w social, political,
industrial, military and other contexts characterise science.

Determining the context of the scientific and the non-scientific is described in the lite
as boundary work
i-o)

Students should develop an appreciation of the ways in which different groups
and individuals distinguish science from non-science, and the criteria and
purposes used in doing this. For example:
•

Students should develop an appreciation of and apply s o m e of the central
means by which scientists and metascientists characterise science, such as
Popper's criterion of falsifiability, Kuhn's notions of paradigms, problemsolving and consensus views, and Merton's four social norms of science,
namely universalism, communism,

disinterestedness and organised

scepticism.
•

Students should appreciate that essentialist approaches to boundary work,
like those of Popper, K u h n and Merton, are flawed, although they are
used as ideals to which science aims, and that constructivist approaches are
also useful. For example:
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Students should analyse case studies of boundary work for strengths,
weaknesses and purposes of attempts to distinguish science from nonscience, using a multi-dimensional characterisation of science to do this.

•

Students should develop an appreciation of both the insights of a moderate
relativism, and the pitfalls of an absolute or strong relativism.

Science can be characterised by its intellectual context
p-s)

Students should develop an appreciation of the intellectual or cognitive contexts
of science, and their importance in characterisations of science. For example:
•

Students should have opportunities to develop an appreciation of the
available ideas, beliefs and concepts as the intellectual context within
which scientists, and others, w o r k and think, in particular the nature and
scope of science knowledge (see chapter 11).

•

Students should develop an appreciation of different notions of intellectual
context: as science knowledge; as the paradigms within which
communities of scientists do normal science; as communities of scholars;
and as interdependent theories and auxiliary theories.

•

Students should develop an appreciation that because the intellectual
context is subject to testing and revision, it is authoritative while at the
same time dynamic and tentative.

•

School Science should foster in students a love of learning and applying
knowledge.

Science can be characterised by its historical contexts
t-v)

School science should provide students with opportunities to develop an
appreciation of the historical contexts of science. For example:
•

Students should develop an appreciation of the western European tradition
of science, and that current science knowledge and practices derive largely
from that tradition.
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Students should develop an appreciation of h o w some ideas have been
enduring in science, while others have changed.

•

Students should use historical case studies to show h o w various ideas
were developed or rejected.

•

School Science should not confine itself to a W h i g history approach, and
should include ideas that are not necessarily antecedent to present
understandings, in order to understand better h o w ideas can rise and fall
from favour.

Science can be characterised in various ways by socio-cultural contexts
z-gg)

School science should provide students with opportunities to develop an
appreciation of the socio-cultural contexts of science. For example:
•

Students should develop an appreciation of the ways in which science is
affected by, and affects, other subcultures within society, such as
religious, economic, citizen, political and military interests.

•

Students should develop an appreciation of the interactions between
science, technology and society.

•

Students should develop an appreciation of h o w phenomena are interpreted
through a world view or Weltanschauungen,

which m a y arise from

particular scientific and broader cultural contexts, including non-masculine
and non-European perspectives.
•

Students should develop an appreciation of non-western European natural
philosophies, and use a multi-dimensional characterisation of science to
develop insights into the strengths and weaknesses of different traditions
(including western European science), and the difficulties in making crosscultural comparisons.

•

School Science should avoid making simplistic characterisations for or
against either western European science or other natural philosophies, and
instead use multi-dimensional characterisations.
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Science can be characterised by human contexts
hh-oo) School science should provide students with opportunities to develop an
appreciation of the h u m a n contexts of science. For example:
•

Students should develop an appreciation of the actual, and not just
idealised, activities of scientists.
Students should identify their o w n preconceptions of scientists, and
develop an appreciation of widely used stereotypes and their implications.

•

Students should have opportunities to learn about the roles of competition,
ambition, incentive, motivation, interest confidence, and the personality
of past and present scientists, such as through biographies and visits to
and by practising scientists.

Science is characterised by organisational contexts
pp-ss) School science should provide students with opportunities to develop an
appreciation of the organisational contexts of science. For example:
•

Students should develop an appreciation of the ways people and resources
are characteristically organised in science, such as university faculties,
departments, disciplines, and research teams comprising units within
universities, companies, government instrumentalities and communitybased groups.
Students should develop an appreciation of the ways in which the
organisational contexts of science are changing with changes in
knowledge, changes in society and so forth.

Science is characterised by physical contexts
tt-xx)

School science should provide students with opportunities to develop an
appreciation of the physical contexts of science. For example:
•

Students should develop an appreciation of the ways in which locations,
such as laboratories and field sites, and artefacts, such as experimental
apparatus and clothing, characterise science.

Chapter 6: Context

•

157

Students should develop an appreciation of the ways in which people,
apparatus and phenomena interact in the production of scientific
knowledge.

•

Students should develop an appreciation of the effects of scientific
developments on technology, and of technological developments on
science.

Conclusions on context
The very considerable body of constructivist science education hterature shows that
the prior understandings of learners, which the present thesis interprets also as prior
beliefs, has powerful effects on what they construct as knowledge that are resistant to
knowledge-transmission modes of teaching. This literature also shows that children do
not transfer concepts well to novel situations, at least not without planned and effective
intervention by teachers. The present thesis therefore argues that, whether w e are
considering science education for the preparation of scientists or for the scientific literacy
of citizens, the science curriculum should specifically address the transfer of concepts to
novel situations, and not simply assume that students will do this of their o w n accord.
Thus, an internalist curriculum is further inadequate in this respect: famiHarity alone with
the acontextual propositions and concepts that comprise an internalist curriculum is not a
good preparation for applying knowledge in novel contexts, a result w e would expect
from a science education, and if combined with traditional, transmission-based modes of
teaching is an ineffective curriculum for acqiiiring science knowledge in the first place.
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Chapter 7
BELIEF SYSTEM
A belief system, as in a systematic set of beliefs about the nature of
reality and the proper orientation to this reality, is a necessary, but not
sufficient, characteristic of science.

Introduction
This chapter comprises an argument that a belief system is a necessary, but not
sufficient characteristic or dimension of science. A belief system is defined generally, as a
set of related beliefs, attitudes, values, assumptions, and criteria for decisions, that is often
unstated or implicit:
A belief system is a set of related ideas (learned and shared), which has some
permanence, and to which individuals and/or groups exhibit some commitment.
(Borhek & Curtis 1975, p. 5)

This thesis takes the meanings of terms such as belief, attitude, value and assumption to be
the non-technical meanings in general usage, as found in general dictionaries such as The
Macquarie Dictionary (1985). Thus belief is taken to be an assent or agreement to, or
conviction of, the truth of some proposition, but not with the certainty of knowledge, at
least as it is commonly used. Attitude is interpreted as the adoption of a position or
disposition toward something. Value is taken as ideals, customs and the like, towards
which people have an emotional regard. Assumption is taken as that which is taken for
granted, and priority to be a precedence in order. The companion chapter on knowledge and
Appendix B.6 discuss more technical meanings of belief and knowledge, and the
relationship between the two, as used by philosophers and others. A belief system is the
notion that these beliefs, attitudes and so forth are interrelated; although interpreted
generally, a particular model is discussed and adopted in this chapter.
This chapter will argue that a belief system is a necessary dimension of science in that
the meanings of characterisation in the metascientific literature are incomplete without it,
and that the meanings of the other proposed dimensions do not substitute for its omission.
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It is not a sufficient dimension of science in that it does not completely characterise sc
W h e r e science is characterised by a belief system this thesis argues that it is usually
characterised in combination with one or more other dimensions of science: knowledge,
purpose, context structure and activity. These other dimensions are used in explicating the
belief system, and the belief system is used in explicating the other dimensions. A scientific
belief system is not simply any set of beliefs, but a systematic set characterised by its
association with particular knowledge, purposes, contexts, structures and activities.
M a n y popular characterisations of science do not mention belief system. This is partly
because of the influence of the positivist Received V i e w of science for m u c h of the
twentieth century, according to which science is neutral, free of values, and provides
certain knowledge, not mere beliefs or opinions. O f course, this view itself represents a
belief about the nature of science, and implies further beliefs about the nature of the
cosmos. It is one of various views explored in this chapter. Belief systems tend to be
inexplicit also partly because the very unstatedness of beliefs, assumptions and the like
means that their use is implicit and unrecognised. Nonetheless, this chapter will show h o w
elements of belief systems form part of characterisations in the metascientific literature.
The argument in this chapter is made in four parts:
1)

evidence from the analysis of the summary statements;

2)

evidence from argument in the metascientific literature;

3)

the relationships between the dimension of belief system and the other
dimensions;

4)

conclusions for use in theorising about the school science curriculum.
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Evidence from the analysis of the s u m m a r y statements

The collection of classes (in Table A.8) andtextunits from the differentiae (in column

6 of Table A.9, headed Foundational) collectively indicate that science is characterised
partly by a related set of (usually unstated) beliefs, attitudes, values, criteria and

assumptions. The present thesis interprets this set as a belief system, as mentioned bel

section 2.1 and discussed in Appendix B.2. As with the other dimensions, this category of

characterisation was constructed from a semantic analysis of many metascientific sources
Thus it includes a wider range of viewpoints than do many individual accounts in the
literature. The following examples from the summary statements are characterisations of
science by belief system.
Belief system
Some summary statements refer explicidy to belief system, for example:
Belief systems ... are structures of norms which bear some relationship to each
other and vary greatly in the degree to which they are systematic. W h a t is
systematic about belief systems is the interrelatedness of the various substantive
beliefs. S o m e systems are more tighdy interrelated than others.
At one end of the continuum are belief systems that consist of a few tighdy
linked general statements from which a fairly large number of specific propositions
can be derived. Confronted by a n e w situation, the believer m a y refer to the
general rule to determine the stance he should take. Science is an example of such
a belief system. The principle of the experiment remains the same regardless of the
differences in empirical problems to which it is applied ... the rules of scientific
method, being systematic, m a y be applied to all kinds of data without regard to
their location. Thus, a high degree of system is in one sense an aid to diffusion of
belief... (Borhek & Curtis, in summary statement 75)
Some statements imply a belief system:
[The term science is used sometimes to refer to] a myth, that is, a systematic set of
beliefs about the nature of reality, about the appropriate way to relate to reality and
about the 'discipline of the self ... necessary to achieve an appropriate relationship
to reality. (Kenny, in summary statement 14)
Myth
Kenny (above) interprets myth not as a fantastic or unreal story, as the term is
sometimes used, but as a widely held set of beliefs that is meaningful for a group in
society. Bernal uses mythology in the same way, adding that it is rationalised, meaning
a science belief system follows certain rules and criteria:
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Science, in one aspect, is ordered technique; in another, it is rationalised
mythology. (Bernal, in summary statement 23)
Thought
In summary statement 10, Einstein also uses the notion of thought - a logically
uniform system of thought. This might ordinarily be thought to mean system of
knowledge, but this is just as meaningful if interpreted as a system of beliefs:
Science is the attempt to make the chaotic diversity of our sense experience
correspond to a logically uniform system of thought. (Einstein, in summary
statement 10)
That is, the chaotic diversity of our sense experience can be made meaningful when

interpreted using our belief system. The dimension of system is taken up in the compan
chapter on structure and Appendix B.4.

World view
The same applies to the notion of a world picture or world view, which can be

interpreted as a set of beliefs about the world that is meaningful because partly beca
cohesive:

Science is a world picture. It is not a technique; it is not a form of power, it is not
even simply an accumulation of knowledge. But it is a highly integrated form of
knowledge which makes a world view. (Bronowski, in summary statement 16)
[S]cience is not an independent, value-free dissociated activity ... [TJhere is no
distinction between scientific strategies and human strategies in guiding ... h o w to
look at the world. Science is a world view based on the notion that w e can plan by
understanding ... [S]cience is distinguished from magical views by the fact that it
refuses to acknowledge a division between two kinds of logic. There is only one
kind of logic; it works the same w a y in all forms of conduct and it is not carried
out by any kind of formula but by an active view of h o w you apply the logic of
long-term planning strategiestothe conduct of the whole of your life. Finally, and
most crucially, science is distinguished from earlier forms of trying to achieve a
unitary view of the world by the fact that there is only one form of truth in it.
There is no distinction between m a n [sic] and nature, there is no distinction
between the logic of magic and other logics, and there is no distinction between
means and ends. (Bronowski, in summary statement 73)
Elements of belief systems
Some statements refer to elements of a belief system, such as beliefs, attitudes,
criteria and rules:
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Science m a y be taken ... as one of the most powerful influences moulding beliefs
and attitudes to the universe and m a n [sic]. (Bernal, in summary statement 24;
emphasis added)

A common interpretation of belief and science is something like, In the past people belie
things but now we (say we) know. As we will examine in this chapter and the companion
chapter on knowledge and Appendix B.6, this connection between knowledge and belief

commonly centres on the extra certainty we have of knowledge, such as justified true bel

or consensus within a scientific community. Since current post-positivist metascientific

thinking acknowledges the capacity of science knowledge for revision, there has been a r
examination of the role of belief in science. An example is Been
I. A. Richards attempted a less metaphysical answer to the ... linguistic problem of
what styles of belief are demanded by literary and scientific texts from the reader.
H e contrasts, without preference, the 'statements' of science and the 'pseudostatements' of literature ... Statement (which w e might n o w call propositional
discourse) demands belief; pseudo-statement does not. (Beer, in summary
statement 100, emphases added)
Attitudes, motivations and belief
[There has arisen] a standard view [of science], largely shared by reflective
scientists, technical philosophers, and the educated public alike, and laying great
emphasis upon the objective features of scientific thought... T h e current attacks
thus challenge not only a firm set of habitual attitudes, but... the underlying moral
motivation of these philosophies, their upholding of the ideal of responsibility in
the sphere of belief as against wilfulness, authoritarianism, and inertia. (Scheffler,
in summary statement 25; emphases added)
While Scheffler explicitly mentions belief and attitudes, characteristics like objective

features and moral motivation are also elements of a belief system, in that they represent
beliefs about criteria about how science should be done, and what is scientific or not
Curiosity, desire and emotions
Similarly, while Baker does not explicidy use the term attitudes, he characterises
science by several attitudes, such as curiosity, desire and pleasure:
Although curiosity and the desire to generalise are the mainsprings of the scientific
mind, yet clearly they cannot alone create a scientist: originality and intelligence
and perseverance are necessities, and the finding of pleasure in the use of the
hands in delicate manipulations is very nearly necessary. (Baker, in summary
statement 64)
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Objectivity and criteria
Scheffler, again, characterises objectivity, which is a set of ideals and criteria for
making judgements about what is scientific, as leading to an ontological vision, meaning a
cohesive set of beliefs about the nature of reality:
Objectivity [culminates in an] ontological vision ... (Scheffler, in summary
statement 26)

Grunfeld characterises science by a set of rules for science (logic and rationality), that

elements of the belief system, by criteria and attitudes (commitment) that are also elemen
of the belief system:
What science gives us is criteria of judgement... and a commitment to logic and
rationality. (Griinfeld, in summary statement 29)

Harre likewise characterises science by a set of rules (ideals of scientific reasoning) th
apply to an attitude (confidence) and, by implication, are criteria for judgment:
Actual science [entails] ideals of scientific reasoning ... by which the effect of new
evidence on our confidence in the truth of laws is assessed. (Harre, in summary
statement 39)

Similarly, Rapoport refers to rules (principles) that entail values and criteria (ethical,
objective) and attitudes (conviction):
These ... are the ethical principles inherent in scientific practice: the conviction that
there exists objective truth; that there exist rules of evidence for discovering it that,
on the basis of this objective truth, unanimity is possible and desirable; and that
unanimity must be achieved by independent arrivals at convictions - that is, by
examination of evidence, not through coercion, personal argument or appeal to
authority ... (Rapoport, in summary statement 53)
Values
Other elements of a belief system are values:
Science is a deceptively inclusive word which ... is commonly used to denote ... a
set of cultural values and mores governing the activities termed scientific ...
(Merton, in summary statement 30, emphases added)
Science is a problem-solving sub-culture whose main value is truth. (Boulding, in
summary statement 59; emphasis added)
[T]he value posture hospitable to scientific endeavour is rationalistic in the choice
of alternatives, relativistic in judgement and expectation, and anticipatory of
change ... [The scientist] can bring differing value judgements into play ... The
values of science, to become effective, must be supported by more general societal
values ... (Silvert, in summary statement 31)
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Silvert characterises values as interacting with rules for judgments (rationalistic and
relativistic) and attitudes (anticipatory).
Beliefs about the cosmos, or Nature, or the material world

Boas refers to what the present thesis interprets as belief system (a conception of a ...

material world) in terms of rules, but which we might interpret as assumptions or beliefs

[Philosophy] has taken over from physics a conception of a permanent and
indestructible material world and inferred religious conclusions from the existence
of that world. It has given to science certain rules, such as, "Nothing is m a d e from
nothing"; "Nature always follows the simplest course"; "Nature does nothing in
vain"; and these and similar rules have determined the kind of scientific
conclusions that would be acceptable ... Each of them is based on some
metaphysical dogma, some d o g m a that is usually unexamined. It is unexamined
because it had been part and parcel of collective dunking and seems self-evident
(Boas, in summary statement 63)
These rules can be interpreted as criteria for judgement which, as will be argued presen

can be interpreted as elements of a belief system. Some statements refer to beliefs abou
cosmos, and about how we can have knowledge of it:

By natural science we mean then a specific vision ... at once of knowledge and of
the object of that knowledge, at once of natural science and of nature. W e m a y
trace the characteristically Western tradition of rational science and philosophy to
the commitment of the Greeks ... to the decision of questions by argument and
evidence, as distinct from custom, edict revelation, authority or whatever else ...
It was the Greek style of rationality to m a k e this explicit by analysis of the
reasoning involved, in the manner of Socrates. The Greeks developed thereby the
conceptions of a problem as distinct from a doctrine. At the same time by deciding
that, among the m a n y possible worlds as envisaged in other cultures, the one
existing world was a world of exclusively self-consistent and discoverable rational
causality, they committed their scientific successors exclusively to this effective
direction of thinking, and closed to them visions of things still open elsewhere.
They introduced in this w a y the conception of nature, comprising a rational
scientific system, in which formal reasoning matched natural causation, so that
natural events and reasoned conclusions must equally follow exacdy from true
principles. Hence the two fundamental conceptions from which the characteristic
style of all Western rational thinking has followed: causal demonstration and
formal proof. (Crombie, in summary statement 61)
Some refer, either explicidy or implicidy, to the content of scientific belief as concer
nature of reality. The literature refers to these as ontological beliefs, sometimes as
metaphysical beliefs, that is, beliefs about the ultimate nature of being:
Science ... must necessarily have a philosophy [because its] disagreements are
philosophical conflicts - conflicts, among other things, in regard to ultimate kinds
of explanatory ideas ... (Gale, in summary statement 33, emphasis in original)
[Science is or involves setting] knowledge within a more comprehensive
metaphysics. (Harre\ in summary statement 38)
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The sciences are regional ontologies and ontology is general science. After all,
every substantive scientific problem is a subproblem of the problem of ontology,
to wit What is the world like? (Bunge, in summary statement 45)
[A]s a result of the evolution of scientific thought there has emerged a broad and
coherent picture of the universe and of life in it... I will argue that this process of
unification has not been restricted to the integration of beliefs about the world, but
that there has also been a progressive tendency toward unification of those beliefs
with the methods employed to attain well-grounded beliefs. That is, I will argue,
the methods w e consider appropriate for arriving at well-grounded beliefs about
the world have c o m e more and more to be shaped by those very beliefs, and have
evolved with the evolution of knowledge. (Shapere, in summary statement 105)
Scientific theories are ways of looking at the world; and their adoption affects our
general beliefs and expectations, and thereby also our experiences and our
conceptions of reality. W e m a y even say that what is regarded as 'nature' at a
particular time is our own product in the sense that all the features ascribed to it
have first been invented by us and then used for bringing order into our
surroundings. (Feyerabend, in summary statement 113)
The final examples are taken from the remaining references in just the first twenty
summary statements, to show further the wide, if usually implicit, reference to belief
system:

• commitment to thetestingof proposed explanations

(5)

• belief in the ignorance of experts [interpreted as scepticism of the dependence on(6)
authority for knowledge claims, or recognition of the limitations of science]

• commitment to accuracy in observation and merciless treatment of fallacy in logic (17)
• a naturalistic metaphysics and an empirical epistemology (20)
• to predict and control phenomena revealed by the metaphysics and epistemology (20)

T w o comments should be m a d e about these extracts. Firstiy, not all these extracts

agree with one another. This result supports an important contention of this thesis, whic

to argue that characterisations of science appeal, first, to a range of beliefs, attitude

values, assumptions and priorities, and second, that different accounts make these appeal
in different ways, not just one way.
Secondly, while some statements explicidy refer to belief systems or elements of
them, such as beliefs, attitudes and values, considerably more statements use terms that
entail belief systems. For example, some terms label categories of beliefs, such as
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metaphysics, ontology and epistemology, in philosophy: they represent beliefs about the
cosmos and our knowledge of it. These terms are discussed in Appendix B.2. S o m e
statements imply or entail beliefs, values or attitudes, and some statements d o not discuss
them singly or discretely. Statements using commitment, conviction, ideal, recognition and
scepticism infer some unspecified blend of belief, assumption, attitude, and so forth. This
seems to indicate that some authors consider these terms collectively. That is, collectively
the terms attitude, belief, value, assumption and similar are used describe a cognitive state
to partly characterise science. This collective use of terms and lack of individual specificity
reflects the unstated nature of the cognitive state, and their inter-relatedness and collective
meaning. T o identify and delineate a particular belief that underpins an assumption or value
requires a deliberate analysis of the sort attempted here. Only in this w a y can the unstated
and assumed be m a d e explicit. It is acknowledged here by describing the cognitive state
indicated by the collective set of terms as a belief system.
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2) Evidence from argument in the metascientific literature

Debates in the metascientific literature characterise science variously by belief system,
which again supports a broad interpretation of science. Appendix B.2 indicates aspects of
belief system as it used in characterising science, as summarised here. This list addresses
some recurring themes, and is not definitive; it is intended as an indication of scope.
B.2.1 The notion of a belief system
Science is also characterised by an interrelated set of beliefs, values and assumptions,
or by one element from such a set, that is, 'an interrelated cognitive system' (Rokeach
1972, p. ix). The present thesis adopts a model of belief systems proposed by Borhek and
Curtis (1975) as a suitable account. In this model, belief systems comprise a number of
elements, namely values, criteria of validity, logic (that includes language), a perspective or
cognitive m a p , substantive beliefs (the content of the belief system), prescriptions and
proscriptions (that include norms for behaviour), and beliefs 'concerning means to attain
valued goals' (Borhek and Curtis 1975, p. 13, or technology beliefs.
Applying the concept of belief system in the present thesis
Several questions arise from this discussion of belief systems. W h a t is the application
of a model such Borhek and Curtis' to the claim of this thesis that belief systems partly
characterise science? In particular, what is the relationship of the elements of belief systems
to the proposed characteristics of science? W h a t is to be m a d e of the observation that
elements of belief systems appear to apply to the other five proposed dimensions: context,
purpose, structure, knowledge and activity? If this is so, h o w can a separate dimension
based on belief systems be justified? Whether or not a separate category of belief systems is
established, what is the role of the elements of belief systems in the otherfivedimensions?
The answers to these questions, which comprise the following few pages, will establish a
basis for the claim that a belief system is an identifiable dimension of science. The argument
for the claim will comprise the remainder of this chapter.

Chapter 7: Belief system

166

T o begin with, Borhek and Curtis's analysis is a plausible and useful argument that
science is an example of a belief system. Their argument is m a d e quite properly as part of
an explication of belief systems and society; it is not extended to argue that science is
completely and exclusively a belief system. T h e present thesis argues that while science
might be characterised by a belief system, it cannot be characterised as a belief system, i.e.
thought of alternatively as a belief system. For example, consideration of the context of
science draws attention to artefacts of science - scientific disciplines as organisations,
institutions, infrastructures, and equipment. These things exist materially. A s discussed in
the companion chapter on context and Appendix B. 1, it makes sense to claim that science is
characterised partly by the buildings, laboratories, faculties, departments and equipment
that contribute to its context They are more than just beliefs, although belief systems play a
strong role in their design, construction and use.
The relationship of belief system to the other dimensions in the present thesis
The central issue at this point is the relationship of belief systemtothe other proposed
categories or dimensions: is belief system restricted to one dimension of characterisation?
O n the one hand, claims about context purpose, structure, knowledge and activity each
entail some sort of belief: one option is, therefore, to address the elements of belief systems
only as they apply in the other five companion chapters. In this sense each s u m m a r y
statement entails a belief or beliefs to which some appeal could be m a d e to justify the
statement: any definition of science entails a belief that the statement is so, that the statement
is true and can be justified. Each entails beliefs, such as what is regarded as 'legitimate'
scientific study. B y extrapolation of this argument, beliefs are entailed in the justification
and formulation of the otherfivedimensions. There is a sense that just about anything to do
with science will entail s o m e sort of belief, and if this is so, it begs the question as to h o w
there could be a separate chapter concerned with a belief system
Thus one option is to address belief system in each of thosefivechapters, and not as
a separate chapter, because beliefs are associated with context purpose, activity, structure
and knowledge. T h e discussion of each dimension would comprise descriptions of what it
entails, including the underlying beliefs, attitudes, and so forth. In this approach, the
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criterion for establishing each dimension is the subject of the belief. For example, the
chapter on activities would include not only a description of the processes that characterise
science, but also the beliefs, values and assumptions entailed by, or which underpin, those
processes. W h e r e a proposition represents a belief about one of the other five dimensions it
is included there. This option is rejected because there are elements of belief system that do
not uniquely apply to any of the other dimensions, such as ontological and epistemological
beliefs - beliefs about the nature of being and knowledge. Moreover, the approach does not
make the concept of the belief system explicit.
Another option is to address belief system wholly or partly in a separate, dedicated
chapter. This approach would a c c o m m o d a t e the beliefs (and attitudes, values and
assumptions) that do not apply uniquely to any of the other five dimensions. In particular,
there are beliefs about the nature of the cosmos - the concern of science - and about h o w w e
can claim to have knowledge of this cosmos. These are ontological and epistemological
beliefs, which, in Borhek and Curtis's account, would largely be included as beliefs about
perspective.
T h e present chapter is organised according to the second option. It addresses any
proposition that constitutes a belief, attitude, or similar, of any sort; the role of belief
systems in determining other dimensions of science will be mentioned also from time to
time elsewhere in showing the interrelatedness of the six dimensions. The present thesis
interprets belief system simply as a category of meaning in characterisations of science that
the present thesis identifies along with five other dimensions of characterisation. The
function of the present chapter, therefore, is to m a k e clear h o w metascientific argument
characterises science by belief system. This is the same rationale that applies to each of the
six companion chapters: belief system one dimension of characterisation of science in its
o w n right and should be presented as a whole in one chapter.

Implications of adopting particular beliefs
O n Borhek and Curtis's account the values, criteria of validity, language or logic and
perspective of a belief system form a logically prior set. It is this set which is likely to be
unstated and assumed, comprising the elements likely to be of least interest to scientists in
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their day-by-day work. This prior set, together with prescriptions and proscriptions, app
to apply to the substantive and technology (enabling) beliefs that comprise and underpin the
substantive beliefs in purpose, context, structure, processes and knowledge. Substantive
beliefs by definition comprise m u c h of the character of knowledge as a characteristic, and
technological beliefs would apply substantially to the chapter on activity as a characteristic.
Importantly, Borhek and Curtis' nomination of technology beliefs as 'often the meeting
ground for fundamentally different belief systems' (p. 14) recognises that in the actual
practice of science beliefs are formed and changed in a complex fashion that strictiy
intellectual analyses by 'purists' cannot explain. Prescriptions and proscriptions would
appear to apply across the board.
Adoption of, or commitment to, particular underlying beliefs, attitudes, values, etc.,
has two related effects. It entails a particular belief system while denying others, and it
entails certain alternatives in the other dimensions while denying others. Conversely,
evidence of this particular purpose or that particular set of processes implies a particular
underlying belief system, and denies others. W e have seen that m a n y of the summary
statements refer to fundamental beliefs about the nature of reality, about h o w science can
claim to increase our understanding of this reality and about h o w w e can claim to have such
knowledge. These do not relate uniquely to any of structure, purpose, concepts, processes
or context T h e y will entail, or logically compel, values and attitudes about the sorts of
behaviours and approaches that are necessary to carry out science successfully. They will
entail prerogatives adopted in making scientific decisions. Therefore the claim to be m a d e in
the remainder of this chapter is that science involves not only beliefs about purpose,
context, concepts, processes and structure (and which are found as part of these
dimensions), but other elements of a system of beliefs, particularly concerned with the
nature of the cosmos (ontological beliefs) and h o w w e can have knowledge of that cosmos
(epistemological beliefs).
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A belief system provides the basis for choosing, prioritising, orienting, deciding what
counts.
Given the foregoing discussion, some elements of belief system identified in the
summary statements will be found in all six proposed dimensions of science. In the most
general sense they indicate the beliefs and attitudes claimed to be held when involved in
scientific activity - w h e n thinking or acting to some scientific end. They are foundational,
assumed, taken for granted. They provide criteria forjudging what is important, valuable
and worthwhile. They m a y be considered to include the set of priorities assumed when
making fundamental decisions in science: the basis for choosing methods of investigation,
what to accept, what to reject, what to look for, h o w to describe, what is worthwhile
pursuing, what is not worthwhile pursuing, what is significant or is not what is scientific
or is not what counts as evidence or does not count as evidence.
The present thesis therefore addresses belief system in a general sense to mean beliefs
about what is to count in science, about what science is capable of, about what is within the
proper domain of science, and the proper activity of people doing science. In a more
particular sense, these beliefs include those about the nature of reality - the nature of the
ordered universe or cosmos - and the orientation to this cosmos that will yield scientific
understandings of it. B y their very nature they are most often not even noticed by the
individual. In a society in which scientific ideas are very m u c h a part of the general pool of
ideas of that society, the individual m a y not have considered even the very existence of
assumptions, values and beliefs upon which those ideas depend. These beliefs will yield a
view of what science is capable of, which would therefore guide the activities, thinking and
decision-making of those w h o are involved in science. A belief about the capability of
science also implies a view of what constitutes a fair appraisal or criticism of science and a
view of what is a reasonable use of scientific knowledge/expertise in domains beyond
science itself; this is more than a view of the limits of science.
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Because beliefs are often implicit in thinking, they may only become evident when
comparing systems of thought
Beliefs about the nature of the cosmos and how we have knowledge of it are

embedded in everyday thinking, and therefore may not be readily apparent. It is difficul
appreciate the extent to which basic beliefs about the world underpin so much of the
thinking in a culture, particularly one's own. The basic beliefs of Western European

cultures about the cosmos are difficult to identify readily because they underpin so muc
the conceptual framework of Western European science, and scientific thinking is widely
promulgated in Western cultures. The philosopher Rom Harre made this clear by pointing
to the assumptions or beliefs in watching something as commonplace as a horse-race:
There has to be a relatively permanent material frame of reference constituted by
the course. There are moving material objects, the horses, which must continue to
exist from the start of the race to the finish. Just think of the assumptions involved
in believing that the horse which has just gone out of sight behind a large person
w h o is blocking the view of the course is the same horse that is still leading after
the horses emerge into view again. W h a t would you say to a bookmaker w h o
persisted in doubting that the horse which finished first was the one upon which
one had bet at the start of the race because it had not been under continuous
observation all the time? W h a t would you say to a physicist w h o insisted that
electrons existed only at such times as they were interacting with instruments?
(Harre 1985, p.20)
The example of the horse race serves to show that there are beliefs and attitudes which

pervade our thinking and are usually unnoticed. These are beliefs and attitudes about th
cosmos and about how we claim to know about it. They may only become evident through
comparison and analysis of the beliefs held in different cultures and different schools
scholarly theorising. As will be shown shortly, different philosophical accounts of

phenomena such as Harre's horse race entail different basic beliefs, and as indicated ab
such beliefs are the subject of theorising within the philosophy of science, especially

metaphysics and epistemology, but also in the sociology of science and other traditions.
Accounts of these beliefs are made in metaphysics, epistemology, logic, sociology,
history, linguistics and psychology
Probably the most fundamental beliefs are those concerning what science is claimed
to produce knowledge about - the nature of the cosmos - and beliefs concerning how we
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claim to have and justify this knowledge. They are the subject of much of philosophy:
beliefs about the ultimate nature of the cosmos constitute the field of metaphysics; beliefs
about what is to count as real rather than spurious knowledge are found in theories of
epistemology; and beliefs about what is correct reasoning comprise the domain of logic.
Metaphysics, epistemology and logic are interrelated, and comprise fundamental branches
of the philosophy of science.
Rather unhelpfully, the term metaphysics is defined and used variously. Bhaskar
(1983g) has noted a general meaning of metaphysics as a general world-view or
philosophy, and a narrower interpretation as the nature of and relationship between theories
of being, or ontology, and of knowledge, or epistemology. Harre" (1985, p. 30) has
characterised metaphysics as 'the study of the most general concepts used in science and
ordinary life, through the study of the internal structure of the language used in different
fields', and 'the study of the most general categories within which w e think' (p. 100).
Examples of such categories include space, time, thing and cause. Because there is more
than one category, and more than one concept within each category, metaphysical systems
of concepts have been proposed; these are cosmologies. A metaphysical system or
cosmology serves to provide 'an adequate and a self-consistent system of concepts with
which to understand the world as revealed in the results of experiments' (Harre 1985, p.
13).
Working definition of a belief system used in this thesis
In summation, the present thesis interprets the collection of terms, found in the
summary statements and meaning beliefs, attitudes, values and the like, to m e a n belief
system. For our purposes, then, a belief system is a set of interrelated beliefs, attitudes,
values, criteria for judgements, and rules for h o w these beliefs are expressed in logic,
language and behaviour, that are reasonably enduring and held by an individual or group.
This is broadly based on the model of Borhek and Curtis (1975), although neither their nor
any other one particular model is necessary to postulate here the usefulness of belief system
as a dimension of characterisation.
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B .2.2 Some current metascientific positions
The differences between various metascientific views - interpretations of science - rest
partly on their different accounts of belief systems in science, whether implicit or explicit
These are summarised in Table B.2.1.

B.2.3 The role of belief system in characterising a western European scientific tradition
The notion of a Western European scientific tradition can be characterised partly by
the historical changes in belief systems. Central are beliefs about the nature of the cosmos
and of h o w to develop reliable knowledge of it.
B.2.4 Causality
Notions of cause and effect are central to science, and a scientific world view is
commonly characterised as having beliefs of cause and effect that are distinct from other
world views or belief systems (see, for example, Johnston 1986). Scientific beliefs about
cause contribute to beliefs about Nature, G o d and magic, among other things; these are
mentioned below and are also taken up in Appendix B.2.
B.2.5 Attitudes to Nature
Beliefs about the material world, or cosmos, are characterised commonly as beliefs
about Nature. Central to the successes of the western European scientific tradition is that the
cosmos is uniform and predictable, and therefore knowable; other influential beliefs have
been that Nature behaves like a mechanism (and therefore can be understood as one) and
that Nature behaves like an organism, a belief that is enjoying something of a revival in
some circles. Beliefs such as these engender attitudes such as curiosity, whereas beliefs that
Nature is capricious or wilful, as held in some other cultures, have engendered attitudes
such as a w e and fear that did not lead to inquiries of Nature.
B.2.6 Nature and magic
Science is sometimes characterised by its contrast with magic. However, like
scientific belief systems, magical belief systems are characterised by beliefs about, and
attitudes towards, Nature and h o w it works; the two can often be difficult to distinguish
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unequivocally. Views that magic is pre-science or failed applied science are difficult to
support historically. However, versions of magical beliefs in which Nature is ensouled,
and beliefs in sympathies and antipathies, do differ from contemporary scientific beliefs.
Also, Bronowski (1978) has argued that science, unlike magic, relies on a single logic of
h o w the world works: that in science there is no 'other world' that works according to a
different logic to everyday life.
B.2.7 Nature and God
The relation of G o d to Nature, and hence also the relation of G o d to science, has long
been debated and continues to be so d o w n to the present. It is highly significant that these
conflicts are characterised less by particular knowledge claims or activities, the traditional
categories of characterisation, than by fundamental concerns with belief systems.
B.2.8 Nature and mathematics
Science is characterised commonly as mathematical, and of particular interest here that
the role of mathematics in science is predicated on a belief that the cosmos can be
represented mathematically.
B.2.9 Metaphysical beliefs
Science is also characterised by beliefs about the ultimate nature of being, or
ontological beliefs. This has included a belief that the material world ultimately comprises
interacting particles, and more recendy has included once again a belief in physics and
metaphysics that Natureritimatelycomprises fields rather than entities or things.
B.2.10 Experimentation
Science is also commonly characterised by a belief that experimentation is an
appropriate w a y to gain knowledge of the material world. This entails a belief that Nature
can be manipulated into independendy variable factors in such a w a y as to show h o w these
factors behave in their non-manipulated, that is non-experimental, state (Bhaskar 1983c, p.
136).
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Models and metaphors

Science is characterised often by models and metaphors that are used to represent
elements of belief systems: fundamental beliefs, assumptions, values and attitudes. A n
example is the mechanistic model, which represents a complex and often implicit set of
factors elegandy with a single model or metaphor.
B.2.12 Other belief systems
T h e western European tradition of science is also characterised sometimes by
contrasting its fundamental assumptions, attitudes and beliefs with those of other cultures,
both historical and extant. Examples covered in Appendix B.2.12 include animistic beliefs,
different beliefs about time, predestination, reincarnation and cause and effect, and noninquisitive attitudes arising from beliefs that Nature is capricious and unknowable.
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Belief system as a necessary characteristic of science

The argument to this point of the chapter establishes belief system as a (semantic)
category of characterisation in the literature. It does thisfirstiyby arguing that a number of
terms in the summary statements, such as belief system, beliefs, attitudes, assumptions,
values, criteria of judgement and priorities, can be meaningfully interpreted as belief
systems or elements of belief systems. Secondly, it argues that science is characterised in
the literature by a range of views about the nature of belief systems. Central a m o n g these
are different beliefs about the nature of the cosmos (ontological beliefs) and of our
knowledge of it (epistemological beliefs), but they also include different assumptions that
scientists make, values they hold, and so forth. Various theoretical interpretations of
science can be characterised partly by h o w they characterise science by belief systems:
central to empiricism is the belief that knowledge of the cosmos is perceptual, to
constructivism that knowledge arises from mental states, and from realism that the subject
of scientific study is an external reality.
Belief system is a necessary characteristic not because of any particular arguments
addressed in the present chapter, but because the variety of accounts reviewed here
characterise science partly by appealing to belief systems and would fail without doing so.
That is, science necessarily concerns belief systems: systems of related beliefs, attitudes,
values, assumptions and so forth. The fact that characterisations of science do not always
explicidy mention belief system arises because these elements of belief systems are typically
implicit, or unspoken, not because belief systems are unnecessary. T o adopt a particular
belief system is to adopt criteria forjudging what is to be scientific or not what activities to
use, what criteria to apply and what assumptions to make. Characterisations of science fail
if w e remove these referencestobelief systems.
T o understand the nature of science, one must at least be aware that the literature
characterises science by belief system, construes belief systems in various ways, and,
ideally, understand at least some of the insights of the major positions. A s with the other
dimensions of characterisation, to recognise only a single position from the literature is to
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fail to understand that there m a y be plausible alternatives, and hence possible alternative
insights, and especially to be unable to defend a particular view from the attack of other
views. O n e cannot appreciate the strength of a claim to be scientific without appreciating the
strength of alternative arguments. It follows that to understand science, one must: first,
understand the central role of belief system in characterising science; second, appreciate the
diversity of accounts of belief systems; and third, appreciate the insights of some alternative
characterisations.

Chapter 7: Belief system

3)

179

T h e relationships between the dimension of belief system and the other
dimensions

Following the discussion in Appendix B.2.1, elements of belief systems apply
fundamentally to each of the other dimensions: knowledge, activity, purpose, structure and
context W e will illustrate this interrelationship using two examples. O n e is some historical
beliefs about experimentation as beliefs central to an enduring, characteristic activity of
science. The other is the Gaia hypothesis as an example of a belief about Nature that derives
some of its meaning only by considering a wide and recent context of science.
Some historical beliefs that underpinned and justified experiment
T w o influential writings on scientific activity in the history of science have been those
of Isaac Newton and John Stuart Mill, mentioned earlier. Both gave some principles or
rules for scientific activity, but although these are well known in histories of science, it is
rarely recognised that they are not recipes or descriptions of activities, but instead are
beliefs, assumptions and criteria about gaining knowledge of the material world. That is,
they are elements of belief systems. Thus Newton's four Rules of Reasoning

in

Philosophy, in the 1687 third edition of the Principia, comprise criteria that arise clearly
from beliefs about the cosmos:
1.

W e are to admit no more causes of natural things than such as are both true and
sufficient to explain their appearances.
2.
Therefore to the same natural effects w e must, as far as possible, assign the
same causes.
3. The qualities of bodies, which admit neither the intensification nor remission of
degrees and which are found to belong to all bodies within the reach of our
experiments, are to be esteemed the universal qualities of all bodies whatsoever.
4. In experimental philosophy w e are to look upon propositions inferred by
general induction from phenomena as accurately or very nearly true,
notwithstanding any contrary hypotheses that m a y be imagined,tillsuch time as
other phenomena occur, by which they m a y either be m a d e more accurate, or
liable to exceptions. (Newton 1713/1934, pp. 398-400).
It is interesting to note a post-modem flavour to Newton's fourth point particularly, that
knowledge is revisable and relative. This is not always m a d e explicit in positivist
characterisations of science.
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Similarly, Mill's Canons of induction, well k n o w n in histories of science, are not so

much descriptions of activities but principles for conducting inductive inquiry. That i
also are elements of a belief system:

[Mill's Canons] concern the isolation of those circumstances which are related to
the phenomena studied by causal laws. They comprise
(1) The Method of Agreement: if two instances of a phenomenon share only one
circumstance, it is either their cause, or effect
(2) The Method of Difference: if an instance in which a phenomenon occurs and
one in which it does not differ in only one circumstance, it is the cause, or
effect or an indispensable part of the cause, of the phenomenon.
(3) The Joint Method of Agreement and Difference: combining the previous
two, putting together knowledge of what is c o m m o n to all cases of the
phenomenon and what alone differs when it is absent.
(4) The Method of Residues: subtract from a phenomenon what is known
already to be the effect of certain antecedents, and the residue is effect of the
remaining antecedents.
(5) The Method of Concomitant Variation: phenomena which vary together are
connected through some fact of causation. (Blackburn 1983a, p. 269)
It is significant that neither Newton's nor Mill's lists are recipes of component activ
they express beliefs, about the nature of the cosmos and appropriate ways to get knowle
of it, criteria for judgements and assumptions.
The Gaia hypothesis as a belief system about Nature
We have discussed already that in the last decades of the twentieth century - described

by some writers as the post-positivist era of science and by others as the post-modern e
thought - science has become characterised much more diversely than in previous times.
The companion chapter on context and Appendix B.l note some of these influences as
post-modernism, ecology and feminism. As an example, in 1979 James Lovelock proposed

that the Earth be considered wholistically, as a superorganism, and not reductionistical
(western European) science has treated it traditionally. The scientific status of this
hypothesis at that time was contentious (Lovelock 1995; Kelly 1988), but in his revised

preface Lovelock reasserts that the concept of Gaia is more meaningful in the late twent

century than the beliefs about Nature embodied in traditional characterisations of scien
On 4 July 1994 the United States of America awarded the Liberty Medal to the
Czech president Vaclav Havel. In his speech of acceptance he took the theme,
' W e are not alone nor for ourselves alone.' H e recognised that the m o d e m age has
ended, the artificial world order of past decades has collapsed and a n e w more just
order has not yet emerged. H e went on to say that w e are n o w where classically
modern solutions do not give a satisfactory response. W e need to anchor the idea
of h u m a n rights and freedoms in a different place and in a different w a y than has
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been done so far. Paradoxically, he said, inspiration for the renewal of this lost
integrity can again be found in science. In a science that is n e w - post-modem - a
science producing ideas that in a certain sense allow it to transcend its o w n limits.
H e gave two examples: first the anthropic cosmological principle where science
finds itself on the border with myth which returns us to an ancient idea, namely,
that w e are not just an accidental anomaly. Second, the Gaia theory in which all
life and all the material parts of the Earth's surface make up a single system, a kind
of mega-organism, a living planet. In Havel's words:
According to the Gaia Hypothesis, w e are parts of a greater whole. Our
destiny is not dependent merely on what w e do for ourselves but also on
what w e do for Gaia as a whole. If w e endanger her, she will dispense
with us in the interests of a higher value - life itself.
The statesman Havel's acceptance that humanrightsare not enough is timely. Not
only for ourselves but for Gaia. (Lovelock 1995, p. viii)
Thus Lovelock argues three things. First, he argues for an alternative belief system for
science: belief in Gaia and the attitudes, values and so forth that it entails. Secondly,

argues that such a scientific belief system derives its meaning partly from the context o

time: of ecological, political and social disorder that affect Nature/Gaia as a whole and

just people. Thirdly, he argues that social, political, technological, individual and othe
contexts can be positively influenced by such a belief system in science.
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Conclusions for theorising about the science curriculum

This section extends the argument developed in the present chapter, that a science
belief system is a necessary part of metascientific characterisations of science, to claim also
that it should form part of school Science. T h e implicit character of belief systems means
that they are not only unrecognised commonly in science, but that other belief systems held
by an individual or group are also commonly unrecognised. This has important implications
for a general school science curriculum, particularly w h e n scientific belief systems conflict
with other belief systems held by school students. There is a massive science education
literature that addresses the persistence of student 'misconceptions' of science after science
education courses. The present section will argue that this arises because the curriculum
fails to m a k e explicit the beliefs, assumptions, and so forth, that characterise science, and to
address conflicts between scientific belief systems and other beliefs held by students.
I. Findings about the nature of science belief systems from the review of
the metascientific literature.
There is a range of currently accepted views of science in contemporary scientific,
philosophical, sociological, historical and linguistic analysis, that characterise science by
various belief systems or elements of belief systems. There is no simple, clear and
universally agreed explanation of a science belief system. Examples given in this chapter
can be summarised as:
There is a range of views of science that entail different belief systems
a)

Different accounts of science either mention or entail various beliefs, assumptions,
criteria for judgements, values, and so forth, that can be meaningfully interpreted
as elements of a belief system.

b)

Different metascientific perspectives entail different belief systems in science:
•

where knowledge arises from perception, as in empiricism, science m a y
have nothing to say about a material world beyond these perceptions;
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where knowledge is a mental construction, as in constructivism, science m a y
only generate knowledge that is agreed within its social or mental contexts;

•

where an external reality is presumed, as in scientific realism, scientific
knowledge of it is socially and psychologically constructed.

c)

T h e present thesis suggests that Borhek and Curtis have proposed a useful theory
of belief system that comprises several elements:
•

values that define what is good or valuable;

•

criteria by which statements made within the belief system are validated;

•

a set of rules by which beliefs within the system are related to each other,
called logic and including language;

•

a perspective, or cognitive m a p or mythology, which defines the individual
believers, the group of believers, and the environment external to the
believers;

•

substantive beliefs, which are the actual content of the belief system, and can
only be understood in terms of the values, criteria, rules and perspective of
the system;

•

prescriptions and proscriptions of behaviours, including norms for
behaviour, and

•
d)

beliefs about the ways to achieve goals, called technology.

Beliefs and other elements of the science belief system are entailed by each of the
dimensions of science: knowledge, activity, purpose, context and structure; that is,
the dimensions of science each entail beliefs, assumptions, and so forth.

e)

Various scientific belief systems have been adopted throughout the history of
science, and at any stage, including the present several systems of belief have
been in contention.

f)

A n y particular characterisation of science chosen, whether adopted consciously or
not, entail particular beliefs, assumptions, values and attitudes which will differ
from those entailed by other standpoints which have been rejected, whether
consciously or not
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Science is characterised by beliefs about cause and effect
g)

A scientific world view is characterised c o m m o n l y as differing from other world
views by particular beliefs about cause and effect.

h)

Beliefs about cause and effect are not self-evidendy true as commonly supposed in
either scientific or general contexts, and are disputed in philosophy.

i)

Beliefs about cause that are widely held include
causes and effects are events that have naturalistic, not supernatural,
explanations;
•

causes and effects are events that are connected by causal paths;
causes reside in particular entities, not classes, and so particulars are the
appropriate subjects of scientific study.

j)

Beliefs about cause and effect are c o m m o n l y underpinned by a belief that the
points of space and time are continuous (known as the L a w of Continuity), but
quantum mechanics describes phenomena that are not continuous in time and
space, and thus cannot be explained by beliefs that underpin classical physics and
everyday events.

Science is characterised by particular beliefs about, and attitudestoward,the material world
k)

A scientific world view is characterised also by beliefs about and attitudes toward,
the cosmos.

1)

Characterisations of science use the term nature in t w o senses, sometimes
distinguished, as in the present thesis, by the use of upper case and lower case:
Nature as the material world, and nature as the essence of things in the material
world; the latter is no longer used widely, and the former is interpreted variously.

m)

A significant characteristic of the classical science that emerged in the Scientific
Revolution w a s the demise of beliefs about Nature, notably that
•

Nature was like an organism,

•

Nature had a soul,

•

Nature could be understood and manipulated by magic, and

•

that humans had a special place in, or were separate from, Nature.
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Conversely, other beliefs arose about Nature, notably that
•

Nature w a s like a mechanism that could be understood by understanding its
parts,

•

Nature had no soul,

•

Nature could be investigated rationally according to a single, naturalistic
logic that applied universally, and

•
n)

H u m a n s were part of Nature.

A n influential characteristic of science is that it can only provide explanations of
the phenomena w e observe and not inferences about a material world; therefore it
rejects metaphysical beliefs about the existence of Nature; this view, the positivist
Received View, w a s dominant for at least the first half of the twentieth century and
is still influential as a tendency of thought among m a n y scientists and the public.

o)

A perspective in post-positivist metascience is scientific realism, that presupposes
an external reality, even if our knowledge of it is socially constructed; it argues that
the success of science is meaningful only if w e presuppose, or believe in, an
external reality.

p)

Another perspective in post-positivist metascience is constructivism; weak
versions emphasise the social construction of knowledge; strong versions argue
that science knowledge is beliefs that are entirely negotiated or constructed within
the context of particular beliefs; Knorr-Cetina has argued that this does not deny a
material reality, simply that such a reality is continually renegotiated, and the key
to understanding science is understanding this negotiation.

q)

Another perspective in post-positivist metascience is to challenge beliefs about
Nature that arise from the reductionist approaches that have traditionally
characterised science; these include some ecological challenges (this chapter
mentions the Gaia hypothesis) and feminist critiques (discussed in Appendix B.l).

Scientific and magical beliefs
r)

Science is popularly distinguished from magic by differences in characteristic
beliefs about Nature, but this is relatively recent in the history of western European
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science; it relates to beliefs already discussed, such as beliefs about Nature, and
cause and effect and, in turn, about appropriate w a y s to gain knowledge of the
material world.
s)

Magical beliefs are interpreted here as beliefs that there is m o r e than one logic of
the material world, and that ordinary science knowledge accesses only one logic;
other logics m a y be accessed and interpreted by significant terms, numbers or
signs.

t)

A s the twentieth century progressed, the public faith in scientific rationality, truth
and neutrality (beliefs associated with the positivist characterisation of science) lost
its dominance; some scientists and science commentators n o w express alarm that
scientific beliefs in effect 'compete' for public acceptance with other beliefs, such
as superstitions, that are antitheticaltobelief systems that characterise science.

Science, Nature and God
u)

Science is partly characterised by the interface of sets of beliefs about science,
Nature and God; this has been the case throughout the history of science and
remains the case today.

v)

Several examples of this interface are:
•

G o d constructed an orderly and rational world that shows evidence of design
and that can be studied by science;

•

God, as the powerful creator of the world, can disrupt its order and cause
activity that is beyond human comprehension;
there is no God, and h u m a n life has no meaning for Nature beyond what w e
construct science simply gives us knowledge of Nature;

•

the existence of h u m a n rationality in the universe is not accidental, and
means that the universe is self-aware; s o m e sciences seem to indicate
purpose in the universe;
the scientific belief system concerns naturalistic explanations of the material
world and has nothing to say about the existence or not or not of any G o d ,
which involves super-natural explanations;
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the authority of religious beliefs, as revealed in texts or revelations, is
supreme and at best science beliefs are subordinate to revealed, religious
truths.
w)

Studies of public controversies concerning science, including those about science
and religion, animalrights,ecological debates, U F O s , and so forth, show the
science community is only one of a number of groups in society that negotiate the
legitimacy of their belief system as part of these disputes.

Nature and mathematics
x)

Mathematics has been part of science history from antiquity d o w n to the present,
although different scientific belief systems interpret the role of mathematics, and its
relationship to the material world, differently.

y)

In general, the use of mathematics in science 'is predicated upon the belief that the
Universe is algorithmically compressible' (Davies, in summary statement 85), that
is, a belief that Nature can be described using mathematics.

z)

In the twentieth century the mathematics in science has become significandy more
complex, helped by the massive increases in computing power, m u c h of this
mathematics describes and predicts phenomena that do not arise from the belief
systems of classical science and everyday understandings.

Other metaphysical beliefs
aa)

Classical science interprets the ultimate character of phenomena as particles; m u c h
of twentieth century physics has explored progressively more fundamental
particles within the atom.

bb)

Historically, particles were believed to be knowable by primary qualities, such as
shape, position, number, spatial relation and motion, that inhere within the bodies
themselves; so-called secondary qualities, such as taste and feel, were believed to
arise from the observer and so were not the subject of inquiry; this distinction is
difficult and is not resolved.
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S o m e recent physics interprets the ultimate objects of science knowledge in the
material universe asfieldsratherthan things.

dd)

S o m e recent, albeit often not mainstream views, such as the Gaia hypothesis,
characterise the material universe as systems rather thanfieldsor things.

ee)

Recent developments in physics, for example, challenge our conventional beliefs
about being (ontological beliefs): quantum cosmology, imaginary time, chaos
theory, self-organising systems, superstring theory, and advanced theories of
complexity and computation.

Beliefs about experimentation
ff)

While experimentation is not the only scientific activity, experiments are
characteristic of science and are justified by a general belief that designed
interventions in Nature generate knowledge of it.

gg)

Further, science experiments rely on the belief that 'the conditions for producing a
given effect can be separated into independendy variable factors, in such a w a y as
to demonstrate h o w the factors studied - and represented in experimental design
and dependent and independent variables - retain their identities (and dispositional
properties)' (Bhaskar 1983c, p. 136)

Models and metaphors
hh)

Science is characterised by the use of models and/or metaphors to interpret or
represent natural phenomena; the use of models and metaphors rests on a belief
that they characterise the phenomena being investigated.

ii)

Organisms, mechanisms, particles, fields and systems have all been used as
models or metaphors to explain the ultimate character of Nature.

Other belief systems
jj)

Western European science is characterised sometimes by contrasting its belief
system - its fundamental assumptions, beliefs, and so forth - with belief systems
in other cultures.
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kk) There are fundamental problems in making comparisons between belief systems
that need to be recognised, mentioned generally in the companion chapter on
context and discussed in Appendix B.l.
11)

In addition to the general difficulties of cross-cultural comparisons, recent studies
from several fields argue that comparisons between belief systems are more
difficult than traditionally recognised: there can be a tendency to assume the
efficacy of the elements of one's o w n belief system, while at the same time failing
to identify the elements of other belief systems.

mm)

S o m e beliefs that have been used to distinguish modern western European science
from other natural philosophies are
•

belief that the universe is a god or deity, or a manifestation of one

•

belief that events in the universe are cyclic, or recur, such as reincarnation

•

belief that the universe is an organism or animal

•

belief that the universe is capricious, non-uniform, unpredictable and
therefore unknowable by humans.

nn)

These accounts characterise the attitude or orientation that arises from such beliefs
as one of bewilderment or complacency, and not the attitude of inquisitiveness that
characterises western European science.

oo)

S o m e beliefs in other cultures have been the same as those that characterise
western European science, for example the Mohists and Legalists in ancient China,
but they did not endure; one of the reasons suggested is the different social
contexts in which competing belief systems were negotiated. S o m e attitudes, such
as a w e or bewilderment, are also found in accounts of various natural
philosophies. However, where Davies (1992), for example, described a sense of
awe as a stimulus to further inquiry, others such as Jaki (1974) described awe in
non-western contexts as stifling inquiry.

Belief system is a necessary dimension of science
pp)

A belief system, as discussed in this chapter, is a necessary dimension of science
because discussions in the literature about science characterise science partly by
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appealing to belief systems or their elements, and those arguments would fail
without doing so.
Belief system is interrelated with the other dimensions
qq)

The belief system is interrelated with the other dimensions - knowledge, activity,
purpose, structure and context - meaning that it is not an entity that can stand
alone, but one of six foci or perspectives which are used in combination to
characterise science.

rr)

T h e belief system is interrelated with the other dimensions in the sense that beliefs
and other elements of a belief system are entailed by statements about knowledge,
activity, purpose, and so forth.

ss)

Aside from beliefs concerned with these other statements, however, science is
characterised by beliefs about the material world that it studies (ontological
beliefs), the character of our knowledge of that world (epistemological beliefs),
and about the w a y in which science develops such knowledge (methodological
beliefs).

II.

Implications for a school science that is grounded in the metascientific
literature.

Any characterisation of science entails a system of belief s, as the present chapter has
argued at s o m e length, and this dimension of science is significant for the general school
science curriculum in two broad senses. First belief system is a necessary dimension in
characterising science, and secondly that the identification of belief systems in science
provides a significant insight into the belief systems of school students (and others) as they
attempt to learn science.
The implication of scientific belief systems on the school curriculum
The present chapter has argued that when w e examine the scientific and metascientific
literature w e find that science is characterised partly by a belief system. Further, these
characterisations fail if they do not entail a belief system, whether or not any particular
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account makes it explicit. Therefore the present thesis argues that a robust characterisation
of science in the school curriculum should m a k e explicit various beliefs, assumptions,
values, and so forth - the elements of the belief system - that characterise science. T o
present science as neutral, value free and objective, for example, whether intentionally or
simply by omission, is to present a highly contentious characterisation of science that will
fail s o m e future citizens as they seek to evaluate some future claim m a d e in the n a m e of
science. For one thing, disinterestedness and objectivity are elements of a particular belief
system that should be identified. For another, the present thesis includes elsewhere
metascientific argument that in any case pure, disinterested scientific research is in the
minority at best, and a spurious notion at worst. While m a n y would characterise pure (as
distinct from applied) science as aiming to be objective and neutral, this is better
characterised as a goal, purpose or intention and rather than a description of actual practice.
Equally, m a n y would argue that objectivity, while a goal, is negotiated and relative, and
that this goal is best met by identifying the assumptions, beliefs, values and criteria made
by scientists and others.
There is both individual and community benefit from the school science curriculum
addressing scientific and non-scientific belief systems. Theoretical disputes within the
scientific and metascientific communities have traditionally been judged to be of little or no
interest to m a n y lay citizens. It is especially the case in public disputes that involve citizens,
industries and government instrumentalities, and where scientific claims are made. Here the
assumptions, values and criteria for judgement can clearly affect the outcomes - knowledge
claims - and are evident if w e k n o w to look for them. T o be unaware that science entails a
belief system is to fail to understand the basis for scientists making the judgements and
assumptions that they do; moreover, it is to fail to defend or justify certain beliefs, values,
and so forth, when confronted with competing claims. T h e Creationist-evolution debate in
science education is an example where the basis for the difference between these two,
opposing views of science for schools is two belief systems that are mutually incompatible
in significant respects. For example, Strahan (1987, pp. 5-9) characterises science partly by
a set of criteria and beliefs, such as the uniformity of Nature, naturalistic cause and effect,
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falsifiability, tentative or revisable claims to knowledge and truth, testability, limited
for authority. H e rejects 'Creation science' partly because, from his review of creationist
literature, he identifies beliefs and criteria that are incompatible with those he used to
characterise science: the creation of Earth and some extraordinary phenomena had non
-natural causes (direct action by G o d ) , meaning that Nature w a s not uniform and not all
causes were naturalistic; and the authority of a particular Scriptural interpretation is
unquestionable and incorrigible, therefore its truth claims are absolute and not falsifiable or
revisable. Thus while these opposing views share some characteristics, such as particular
concepts and a limited interpretation of scientific activity, the fundamental and significant
differences are characterised well by their different belief systems.
Given the extensive discussion in the present chapter, a full debate on scientific belief
systems would be m u c h longer. That would not serve our purpose. Rather, a few points
should be m a d e clear in summary.
W e can engage in debate about beliefs, but the full argument is best made using the
concept of the belief system, rather than seizing on individual beliefs in isolation.
•

Systems of belief used in science need to be understood in reference to other
dimensions of characterisation, such as activity, context, purpose and knowledge.
The notion of scientific belief systems can be difficult to identify because (a)
beliefs, assumptions and the like are, almost by definition, typically unstated and
part of our unconscious thought, and (b) it goes against the familiar, positivist
characterisation of science as beingrational(and therefore conscious) and objective
(and thereforefreeof assumptions, emotions, and so forth).

Belief system as a dimension both of science and students of science
T h e second argument for addressing scientific belief systems arises from the first,
and it is a learning issue: the influence and resilience of each student's o w n personal
beliefs. W e have noted in the literature review that probably the largest body of recent and
current science education research concerns students' construction of meaning, showing
that children's prior conceptions are often at odds with accepted scientific explanations and
beliefs, and can be resistant to change. The present thesis argues that this is not adequately
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explained simply in terms of knowledge, such as conceptual change. Rather, children, and
for that matter all people, hold beliefs about h o w the world works, and their belief system
makes sense to them. In pointing to what he calls the unnatural nature of science, Wolpert
(1992) highlights the fact that m a n y scientific beliefs and explanations are counter-intuitive;
that is, they run counter to c o m m o n sense. ( W e might argue that m a n y scientific beliefs and
explanations are commonsensical, but Wolpert makes a plausible case that m a n y are not,
particularly for those without a science education). Thus w e can find in the literature
examples where students have an Aristotelian view of motion - that objects m o v e only
while a force acts on them - or a belief that G o d can cause unexpected and unnatural events,
and that such beliefs can be highly resistant to traditional science teaching. T h e present
thesis argues that it is the student's personal belief system that is resistant, and it is so
because it is meaningful to the student: it comprises their personal world view. Thus simply
being told that science has found otherwise, or doing s o m e sample activities designed to
show otherwise, does not address the student's unidentified and implicit beliefs, values,
assumptions and so forth. T o cite the Creationist-evolution controversy again, the literature
shows that a significant proportion of science students, both at school and university, will
maintain a belief in literal creationism and a disbelief in evolutionary theory despite their
science studies (Matthews 1994, p.30).
This second argument raises an ethical question of whether or not a science education
should work towards forming particular beliefs in children. For example, w e have noted in
the present chapter Nelkin's (1995) observation that the individualistic culture in the U S has
fostered a view of individualrightsto belief, and that if parents wish their children to have
particular religious beliefs, the education system has n o right to indoctrinate students (as
they would see it) in some other belief system
The present thesis argues that there is a distinction between education and
indoctrination, on the basis that an educated person should be better able to discern different
points of view and m a k e considered judgements between them, whereas an indoctrinated
person will be aware of only one view, or have charicatured impressions of alternative
views, so that indoctrination is likely to lead to a particular and uncritical view. O n this
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basis, the present thesis accepts the criticism, put by some Creationists and others, that
traditional school science puts only a particular view of science that characterises science
knowledge as uncontested, even uncontestable, and as given. Such an approach entails an
uncontested, given belief system. This is at odds with a commonly given rationale for
science education, that it promotes critical and rational thinking. T h e solution, given the
discussion in the present chapter, is to m a k e explicit the assumptions, beliefs, criteria for
judgement and so forth, that scientists use; that is, the belief systems used. This will mean
addressing examples where scientists use different belief systems, as w h e n they m a k e
different assumptions or m a k e different judgements. It could be illustrated also by historical
belief systems, such as by contrasting Aristotelian and Newtonian mechanics. It will also
m e a n addressing examples where a belief system is not accepted as scientific by the
scientific community: as w e have seen in the foregoing discussion, science belief systems
are sometimes m a d e clear by examining differences from other belief systems.
It is in this w a y that students can understand the special sense that science knowledge
is considered tentative yet authoritative. There seems to be a fear on the part of some in the
science community that the lay public cannot understand this, and presumably will interpret
tentativeness as simple relativism: that any viewpoint is as good as any other, as argued in
extreme externalist or constructivist views. Such views fail to account for the undoubted
successes of science: scientists are able to m a k e impressively accurate predictions, and
sometimes control, of natural phenomena, as when they put satellites and space probes into
predetermined orbits, or synthesise completely n e w chemicals with predicted properties,
and so forth. Clearly these involve successful assumptions, judgements and so on. That
they are tentative is a belief itself, and there are many examples from science history where
a successful belief system is replaced by a more successful one: the replacement of classical
Newtonian mechanics by relativity and quantum mechanics is a c o m m o n example, but one
which is rarely m a d e clear at less than undergraduate levels of study. T h e present thesis
argues that this approach is not indoctrination, because it explicidy addresses what
scientists and others m e a n to think critically, and makes clear the role of a belief system in
making judgements, in revising their beliefs, and in mamtaining their beliefs. It also is a
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means of making clear w h y some other belief systems, that are not accepted by the
scientific community as scientific, m a y nevertheless be legitimate belief systems in other
contexts. Indeed, the general curriculum is predicated on this notion: children study science
along with literature, history, art, and so forth, each of which entails particular but different
beliefs.
The solution proposed for issues like these - characterising science more robusdy,
addressing students' o w n beliefs, justifying scientific beliefs in the face of competing belief
systems in the community, and answering allegations of indoctrination - is to embrace
scientific belief systems in the science curriculum. Students should, over the course of their
science education, become aware of the nature and diversity of belief systems. Only in this
w a y will they, as future citizens in a scientific and technological society and, for an
increasing proportion, as future scientists and technologists, be able to identify and make
informed decisions about scientific belief systems and their interaction with other belief
systems.
Some specific recommendations corresponding to the summary of findings in part I above:
Throughout the following, students should develop an appreciation of science belief
system as part of developing a multidimensional characterisation.
Science is characterised by belief systems in a variety of ways
a-b)

School Science should m a k e explicit h o w science is characterised by belief
systems. For example:
•

Students should develop an appreciation of the various ways in which belief
systems, and elements of belief systems, characterise science.

•

Students should develop an appreciation of scientific beliefs and
assumptions about the material world and h o w to gain reliable knowledge of
it, such as the role of perceptions, mental constructions, and assumptions
about the existence or not and nature of an external reality.

c-d)

Students should gain an appreciation of the notion of a belief system, such as an
interactive set of: values the define what is worthwhile; criteria used in making
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judgements; rules that govern beliefs, including logic and language; a perspective
or mythology that sets apart the believers from the non-believers; the substantive
(content) beliefs of the belief system; norms (prescriptions and proscriptions) of
behaviours; and beliefs about the ways to achieve goals.
e-f)

Students should gain an appreciation of different past and present belief systems
and h o w they differ.

Science is characterised by beliefs about cause and effect
g-j)

School Science should provide students with opportunities to develop an
appreciation of scientific beliefs about cause and effect. For example:
•

Students should develop understandings about naturalistic, supernatural and
preternatural accounts of cause and effect, and that science accepts
naturalistic explanations only.

Science is characterised by particular beliefs about, and attitudes toward, the material world
k-q)

School science should provide students with opportunities to develop an
appreciation of past and present beliefs about the cosmos, or Nature, or the
material world, including: Nature can be explained by a single, universal, uniform
logic; and humans are part of Nature.

Scientific and magical beliefs
r-t)

School Science should provide students with opportunities to compare the
characteristics of science and magical, paranormal and other beliefs, and to
appreciate that sometimes there are difficulties in making these distinctions.

Science, Nature and God
u-w)

School Science should provide students with opportunities to characterise
interfaces between scientific beliefs and religious beliefs. For example:
•

Students should develop an appreciation of the nature of scientific beliefs
about the material world, the use of naturalistic explanations, and the
interaction of scientific beliefs with other dimensions such as purpose.
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Students should have opportunities to contrast a multidimensional
characterisation of science with religious and other belief systems; this
should be done sensitively, like any comparison of beliefs, so as not to set
science in opposition to the beliefs of the students or their families, but to
clarify the strengths and limitations of science and of other belief systems.

Nature and mathematics
x-z)

School science should present students with opportunities to develop an
appreciation of the beliefs that underpin the use of mathematics in science, that is,
beliefs about the mathematical characteristics of the material world. It should not
presume a mathematical approach to school Science, butratherdevelop it.

Other metaphysical beliefs
aa-ee)

School science should provide students with opportunities to develop an
appreciation about other metaphysical beliefs that are part of, or characterise,
scientific belief systems, such as: beliefs about the ultimate character of
phenomena, such as particles, fields and systems; qualities, such as primary,
secondary and occult qualities; and some recent notions such as chaos and selforganising systems.

Beliefs about experimentation
ff-gg)

School science should provide students with opportunities to develop an
appreciation of beliefs that underpin the use of experimentation in science, notably
that the nature of the material world is such that in m a n y situations variables can be
isolated and studied because they retain their identities or properties.

Models and metaphors
hh-ii)

School science should provide students with opportunities to develop an
appreciation of the roles of models and metaphors in science to interpret,
characterise or represent natural phenomena. For example:
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Students should have opportunities to identify, experience - first hand or
through case studies as appropriate - and discuss a variety of models and
metaphors used in science, such as mechanisms, organisms, particles, fields
and systems.

Other belief systems
ij-oo)

School science should provide students with opportunities to develop an
appreciation of other belief systems, meaning both the belief systems of nonwestern European natural philosophies, and non-science belief systems within
western cultures; it should use a multi-dimensional characterisation of science to
do this. For example:
•

Students should gain an appreciation of the role of belief systems in
contrasting western European science with other natural philosophies, such
as the rejection of supernatural, cyclic and organistic beliefs, and the belief
that Nature is uniform, predictable and merefore knowable.

•

Students should gain an appreciation of the role of belief systems in
contrasting western European science with other belief systems, such
religious, 'new age', superstitious and social belief systems.

•

Students should gain an appreciation of the difficulties in comparing belief
systems; that one presumes the soundness of one's o w n beliefs and
discounts other beliefs.

Belief system is a necessary dimension of science, and is interrelated with other dimensions
pp-ss) School science should provide students with opportunities to develop an
appreciation that belief system is a necessary dimension of science, and that is also
necessarily just part of the multi-dimensional character of science.
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Chapter 8
PURPOSE
Purpose, as in directedness according to aim, goal or intention, is a
necessary, but not sufficient, dimension of science.

Introduction
This chapter comprises an argument that purpose is a necessary, but not sufficient
dimension of science. Purpose is defined generally, as plan, aim, goal or intention:
Purpose
(1) the object for which anything exists or is done, made, used, etc.;
(2) an intended or desired result end or aim;
(3) intention or determination. (The Macquarie Dictionary).
The argument that purpose is a necessary dimension of science, is that characterisations
in the metascientific literature are incomplete without it and it does not reduce to any of
the other dimensions, i.e. its omission is not covered by any of the other dimensions. It is
not a sufficient dimension of science in that it does not completely characterise science.
Where science is characterised in the literature by purpose, usually it is characterised also
by one or more of the other dimensions of science: knowledge, context, activity, structure
and belief system. These other dimensions m a y be used in explicating scientific purpose,
and scientific purpose m a y be used in explicating the other dimensions.
T h e introduction to the present thesis acknowledged the stimulus of Millar and
Driver's argument for purpose as a dimension or characteristic of science:
For science, w e would argue, is characterised by its concepts and purposes, not
by its methods. (Millar & Driver 1987, p. 56).
Unfortunately, Millar and Driver did not provide an argument for this claim beyond this
assertion. Instead they argued that science teaching is characterised by knowledge and
purpose, and that emphases on process science in education are misplaced. T h e present
chapter argues that the metascientific literature does indeed characterise science by
purposes, but as part of a multidimensional characterisation. T h e other part of Millar and
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Driver's claim, that processes do not characterise science because they are not unique to
it is addressed in the companion chapter on activity.
As with each of the companion chapters addressing the dimensions, this chapter
and Appendix B.3 will use arguments from the literature selectively. In so doing it will

attempt to strike a balance between including sufficient detail to demonstrate the argume
and not repeating all the detail given in the literature.
The argument in this chapter comprises four parts, as set out in the introduction to
the six companion chapters:
1) evidence from the analysis of the summary statements;
2) evidence from argument in the metascientific literature;
3) the relationships between the dimension purpose and the other dimensions;
4) conclusions for use in theorising about the science curriculum.
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Evidence f r o m the s u m m a r y statements

The collection of classes (in Table A.5) and text units from the differentiae (column
four of Table A.9, headed Purpose), collectively indicate that science is characterised
partly by intentions, ends, aims, goals or purposes. As with the other dimensions, this
category of characterisation was constructed from a semantic analysis of many
metascientific sources. Thus it includes a wider range of viewpoints than do many
individual accounts in the literature.
Purpose is not usually the central dimension in the summary statements, but
nonetheless is embedded commonly in them. Thus even in accounts that are not framed

around an explicit notion of purpose, there is an implicit recognition that scientific a

is not aimless or (usually) serendipitous, and is guided by short term objectives or lon
term aims. This was recognised by the philosopher Karl Popper:
To speak of 'the aim' of scientific activity may perhaps sound a little naive; for
clearly, different scientists have different aims, and science itself (whatever that
m a y m e a n ) has no aims. I admit all this. Yet w h e n w e speak of science, w e do
seem to feel, more or less clearly, that there is something characteristic of
scientific activity; and since scientific activity looks pretty m u c h like a rational
activity, and since arationalactivity must have some aim, the attempt to describe
the aim of science m a y not be entirely futile. (Popper 1956,1983, p. 132)

Note that Popper presents a twofold characterisation by purpose. The first is speculatio

about an aim of science, where he initially rejects a scientific aim, but seems to concl

that aim or purpose is implicit in the claim that science is rational. The second is a c
identification of the aim-directed activity of individual scientists.
Despite Popper's somewhat tentative tone, some summary statements explicidy
mention purpose, goal or aim, as given in Table A.5. The following quotations from
summary statements are examples of explicit characterisations by purpose:
[Science is] all exploratory activities of which the purpose is to come to a better
understanding of the natural world. (Medawar, in s u m m a r y statement 3;
emphasis added)
Among the characteristics that distinguish science from other fields of human
endeavour are the goal of explaining, with ever increasing precision, the nature
of the universe in terms of uniform natural processes and relationships, and the
commitment to the testing of proposed explanations by means of empirical
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observation and experimentation. (National Academy of Sciences of U S A , in
summary statement 5; emphasis added)
The goals and objectives of the tradition are twofold, namely, to predict and
control phenomena revealed by the metaphysics and epistemology of the
paradigm, and to explain and understand these same phenomena. (Gale, in
summary statement 20; emphasis added)
The aim of science is to attempt to comprehend the world rationally, as we all
agree (including the positivists w h o should disagree). (Agassi, in summary
statement 43; emphasis added)

These goal states concern themselves with certain interesting epistemic and
pragmatic attributes. Consider a typical list of some of these aims:
a) to acquire predictive control over those parts of one's experience of the world
which seem especially chaotic and disordered;
b] to acquire manipulative control over portions of one's experience so as to be
able to intervene in the usual order of events so as to modify that order in
particular respects;
c] to increase the precision of the parameters which feature as initial and
boundary conditions in our explanations of natural phenomena;
d] to integrate and simplify the various components of our picture of the world,
reducing where possible to a c o m m o n set of explanatory principles. (Riggs,
quoting Agassi, in summary statement 58; some emphases added)
Those theories which we come to call 'scientific' are efficient at advancing our
cognitive aims and, in general, they do so better than theories w e denote as
'non-scientific'. (Riggs, in summary statement 58; emphasis added)
Other statements indicate purpose in the wording, although they do not use explicit te
such as purpose or one of its synonyms. Purpose is commonly indicated by the

prepositions to, expressing 'aim, purpose or intention' and less frequendy for, meanin
'with the object or purpose of (The Macquarie Dictionary).
What is relevant to a. scientific problem and what has meaning in science
depends on what w e are looking for and what w e are trying to accomplish.
(Griinfeld, in summary statement 29)
[R]esearch ... is very often conducted toward the finding and the testing of
metaphysically relevant hypotheses. (Agassi, in summary statement 41)
Below is a sample arbitrarily selected from the first twenty summary statements,
roughly grouped to indicate some variety of purpose:

to perceive, describe, comprehend the cosmos
• to come to a better understanding of the natural world (3)
• to increase understanding (8)
• to form a picture of reality (15)
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• to establish [the] connections between [this picture] and the wide world of sense (15)
impressions
•

to form conceptual generalisations about the m a n y particulars of empirical (11)
evidence

• to m a k e the chaotic diversity of our sense experience correspondtoa logically (10)
uniform system of thought
to understand, explain
• to explain

(5)

• to explain the world around us

(4)

• to produce a satisfying explanation of reality

(8)

to have greater understanding than that of one's own experience
• to extend experience

(2)

to seek patterns, regularities, causes
• to reduce experience to order

(2)

• to acquire and organise knowledge (about the universe and its parts)

(5)

•

to explain the interaction and interrelationship of those parts (through the (5)
formulation of laws and theories describing natural processes)

• to generate understandings codified in statements of high generality (laws and (8)
principles) and accessible to experimental tests
• to verify or falsify claims about the world

(14)

• to produce and distribute knowledge

(18,9)

Note that the loose clusters above are not intended as discrete categories, but simply to
indicate something of the scope of purpose as used in the literature. Variations in the
notion of purpose are the subject of the remainder of this chapter.
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A r g u m e n t from the metascientific literature

Debates in the metascientific literature address many aspects of purpose in science,
which again support a broad interpretation of scientific purpose. This scope is indicated
by the review of the following metascientific arguments in Appendix B.3.
B.3.1 Current metascientific views with respect to purpose
Metascientific interpretations differ partly in the purposes they ascribe to science.
These are summarised in Table B.3.1.
B .3.2 The role of purpose in characterising a western European scientific tradition
Historical accounts of science partly characterise the western European scientific
tradition by scientific purposes. These have included seeking naturalistic explanations,
control over Nature and other goals discussed in Appendix B.3.
B.3.3 Purpose as seeking solutions to problems, reliable knowledge, regularities, causes
and other ends.
Most accounts of science appeal to more than one notion of purpose, including
seeking solutions to problems, reliable knowledge, regularities and causes. Each of these
is complex, and appeals are typically m a d e to more than one of these, and other, goals at
the onetime.S o m e particularly enduring and influential goals are dealt with separately in
later sections.
B.3.4 Control ofNature as a purpose of science
A pervasive theme in the literature is that science is the means by which humanity
gains control of Nature: that through accumulating reliable knowledge of Nature w e are
better able to explain, manipulate and m a k e ever more reliable predictions about it. Thus
knowledge, explanation, manipulation and prediction can be characterised as intermediary
goals by which w e can achieve the higher goal of control.
B.3.5 The strengthening of utilitarian purposes in the twentieth century
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During the twentieth century science became increasingly characterised by utilitarian
purposes that reflected its increasing association with government industrial, economic
and military goals.
B.3.6 Critical perspectives on scientific purposes
T h e increased sharing of scientific, economic, industrial and other goals, mentioned
in the section above, point to the inadequacy of purely cognitive goals in accounting for
the nature and direction of scientific goals and the nature of science knowledge itself. This
is reflected in critical perspectives to science. It also has strong implications for the
interaction of the public with science communities and institutions, particularly in
contemporary pluralistic democracies.
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Purpose as a necessary dimension of science

The argument to this point of the chapter shows not only that the metascientific
literature characterises science by purpose, but it does so in a variety of ways: it identifies
various purposes, usually together. Thus natural science is characterised as an enterprise
which is directed to one or more of the goals of seeking knowledge of Nature, solutions
to problems, regularities in natural phenomena, causes of phenomena in Nature, various
intermediary goals by which other goals can be achieved, controlling Nature and
usefulness to people. Simply identifying purposes does not, of course, m a k e purpose a
necessary dimension of science. Instead, the argument for the necessity of purpose arises
from the roles it plays in characterisations in the literature.
First the accounts presented in this chapter characterise science as being carried out
to some end in an absolute sense. Science is not serendipitous, at least not in a strategic
(long term) sense. (The literature does record instances of apparent tactical, or short term,
serendipity, but these are always set within a longer term context that is clearly aimdirected. Hence the maxim, Chance favours the prepared mind.) Thus it is inconceivable
that an experiment could be set up in the complete absence of any purpose: even just the
preparatory selection, setting up and calibration of equipment, for example, is nonsensical
unless particular outcomes are sought.
Secondly, the accounts presented in this chapter characterise science as being
carried out to ends in a relative sense: to certain ends and not others. This is not as clear
cut as w a s once thought, but the very tension in arguments about what are scientific
purposes (vis a vis purposes of the non-scientific) are central to understanding disputes
involving science, notably those in the public arena. It is relatively unproblematic where
the goals of science are identified as arising from thefield.Thus for cognitive/knowledge
goals, as in internalist views, the scientist pursues goals identified from the cognitive field
- predominantly through the specialist literature. They are not for example, personal
ones, as identified in some critiques of the work of Sir Cyril Burt Burt's work has been
characterised as unscientific because it did not seek (aim) to meet accepted scientific
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criteria and, in s o m e critiques, because the falsification of data pointed to personal aims
concerning status, and so forth (Gieryn 1995, pp. 432-3).
It is unproblematic to use goals in this w a y to characterise science as different from
some other fields of h u m a n endeavour: science does not work towards rhyming or
cadence as does poetry, for example. It is still relatively unproblematic in Kuhn's
characterisation of normal science, comprising problem-solving within an existing
paradigm: goals are identified from the paradigm. Revolutionary science, in which a
paradigm is overthrown, also draws its aims from thefield:the c o m m o n example of
Einsteinian mechanics overthrowing the Newtonian paradigm can be characterised as
changing the attempt to address the same (explanatory) goal.
Tension arises, however, w h e n there is dispute or confusion as to whether the
goals are characterised as emerging internally, from the scientific community, or not.
Judgements about this status are no longer thought to be as clear cut as they were once
characterised, and a good deal of the S T S literature addresses issues related to this
(Gieryn 1995). For example, the goal of democratic participation - universal franchise - is
readily identified as arising within the field of politics. In traditional characterisations,
science proceeds by consensual arguments of various sorts, but does not require - indeed
it rejects - a goal such as universal franchise.
The exclusion of democratic participation results because the principle of persuasion
in science works by appealingtoevidence and argument: scientists aimtocollect evidence
and construct arguments that are based on it and meet certain criteria. Thus the resolution
of a scientific matter is not m a d e by a show of hands at a public meeting (although a
socio-political matter m a y well be): unlike a political democracy, one is not entitledtovote
in establishing a scientific consensus by virtue of birthright or age. O f course, it is the
acceptance of evidence that, in principle, ultimately wins the day, and this is taken often
as some demonstrated capacity for relevant expertise. It is following this line of thinking
that most people seem to be confident in identifying science: the complex of goals
characterising science underpin the general autonomy of science and contrasts strongly
with most of what is agreed to be non-science (Porter 1990). Yet w e have seen from the
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selection of critiques in section 3.6, above, that the nexus between government, industry
and m u c h of science (the scientific community) c o m m o n l y devalues the scientific
authority of community groups w h o oppose various pronouncements that the established
scientific community labels as scientific. Clearly, to win the scientific argument (putting
aside the political argument), successful community groups have been able to demonstrate
the validity of their alternative knowledge claims in part by demonstrating scientific
purposes.
Further, the present thesis suggests that at least some debate in the public arena that
draws on science can be characterised by goals that are incompatible because they
represent different but not widely accepted 'scientific' purposes. For example, the present
author has observed a number of public debates that purported to concern scientific
matters but the show of hands by the voting audience at each meeting resolved nothing
concerning science. O n e meeting involved the geologist Ian Plimer and the 'creation
scientist' Duane Gish, and another involved an ecologist and a pro-logging contractor. In
a stricdy scientific sense both meetings were futile exercises. First, the show of hands at a
public meeting says nothing about experimental support or otherwise for some claim.
Secondly, each speaker argued towards different ends. For the geologist the purpose was
to show that geological phenomena conformed to existing scientific understandings and
experimental test but the ultimate purpose of his opponent was to show conformity to an
interpretation of biblical texts. For the ecologist the purpose was to show conformity to
ecological research over the long term, but for his opponent it was to show the economic
impact on the local community over a shorter term. The proponents at both meetings, and
arguably m u c h of the audience, went h o m e at the end no closer to resolving the
(intemlaist) scientific nature of the disputes. The research on scientific knowledge,
controversy and public decision making, reviewed by Martin and Richards (1995),
shows that such outcomes should be no surprise. T h e present thesis argues that an
understanding of the various purposes of the different actors is necessary both to
understand these issues, and therefore to develop resolution strategies.
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T h e arguments above entail that purpose is a necessary dimension of science:
science is characterised by purposes and is inconceivable without them, and these
purposes differ in at least s o m e respects from the purposes of other h u m a n endeavours.
Both of these notions of purpose are found widely in the metascientific literature, and to
omit referencetopurpose from these accounts would eliminate a category of meaning that
does not reduce to belief system, knowledge, activity, structure, or context. Further,
different views of science propose different purposes, or different variants of a purpose.
A n understanding of these differences is significant in developing the capacity to critique
different views of science. T o recognise only a single position, w h e n there exists a
substantial academic literature of debate, is to fail to understand that there m a y be
plausible alternatives, to miss insights provided by alternatives, and especially to be
unable to defend a particular view from the attack of other views. O n e cannot appreciate
the certainty or strength of a particular view without appreciating the strength of
alternative arguments 1 . It follows that to understand science, one must: first, understand
the nature of scientific purposes; second, appreciate that accounts of scientific purposes
differ, and third, appreciate the insights of some alternative characterisations.

1

Note J. S. Mill's classic statement of this position in his On Liberty (1848).
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Relationships between the dimension of purpose a n d other dimensions

Purpose, belief system and context as ideology
While section 3.5, above, relates purpose to the context of the twentieth century,

the critical perspectives given in section 3.6 imply that this relationship involves mo

than simply utilitarian purposes. Critical perspectives arise from the interplay of sev
dimensions: the system of beliefs, the purposes of science, and the social-politicalindustrial-military contexts, particularly as emerged in the twentieth century. For
example, in his discussion of science, alienation and oppression, Young (1990) related

scientific developments to scientific and social purposes, and these in turn to individ

and social consequences. He argued a critical perspective in which a variety of fields phenomenology, existentialism, the sociology of work, the histories of colonialism,

racism, imperialism, patriarchy and feminism - are united by their intersection with th
scientific world view that dissociates the knowing subject and the known object:

The close interrelations between the development of scientific instruments and
theories in astronomy, navigation, ballistics and mining, as well as between
medicine, agriculture and the study of living phenomena; the development of
world trade, mercantile capitalism and urbanisation; and the development of a
view of the relations between God, the individual and the redemptive value of
work are all so intertwined and mutually constitutive that the scientific, capitalist
and Protestant revolutions of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries are a single
reconstitution of the world, the world-view and the structure of relations among
people and peoples. They have in c o m m o n a splitting-off of moral value, mind
and responsibility - concerning purpose or final causes - from the labour process
itself. This occurs in science, in manufacturing and in moral relations. A
mechanical world-view comes to replace an organismic one. Fact and value,
thing and purpose and body and mind become sharply dichotomised, just as
labour power gets separated off from the worker.
In this way, abstraction from science and from nature becomes the rule, so
that what matters is not the sensuous particularity of persons, processes and
things but the value of labour power and of commodities. The same alienation
occurs in the scientific world-view. W h a t matters to science is that which is
amenable to mathematical handling - matter and motion. These preoccupy the
thinkers w h o are developing the m o d e m world-view. The commodity exchange
abstraction, like the abstractions of science, treats objects as shorn of their
secondary qualities and the social relations embedded in them and in which they
have their being. Both are forms of misplaced concreteness. (Young 1990, p.
890)
Young argues that in the industrial revolution the link between the scientific world-vi
and the daily lives of people was made when scientific and technological rationality wa

Chapter 8: Purpose

211

applied to manufacturing processes. Drawing on argument from Marx, Marcuse and
others, the argument is extended to show how this union displaced craft work with
control by quotas, which were in turn displaced by control by machines. Thus science
was linked to oppression through ideology, a linkage that persists:

Which example should one choose? Here are some candidates: the role of
military research through 'research and development' from nuclear physics to
higher mathematics, optics, chemical and biological warfare, containerisation
and high resolution photography; the management-based research and
development policies pioneered by the Rockefeller Foundation including the
international organisation of hygiene and tropical medicine, the Green
Revolution, primatology, the social sciences and molecular biology; behavioural
control in drugs (an industry providing a topic in its o w nright),conditioning,
cerebral implants and psychosurgery; management sciences and operational
research; the n e w technologies and property relations of genetic engineering,
fertilisation and childbearing; and, finally, Social Darwinism in international
relations, in business and in social theory. I trust that the large domain of the
concepts of alienation and oppression vis-d-vis science will begin to become
apparent (Young 1990, p. 895)
Of course, many would retort that this scathing critique characterises the ideological
application of science, and not science itself, which comprises only the 'technical' (n
social or other) concepts and knowledge-developing activities. This reply supports

Young's argument exactly. Young is arguing that a characterisation of science that allo
only goals from the cognitive context is too narrow to explain why certain fields of
scientific knowledge are pursued, and not others. However, we can explain the direction
and social consequences of scientific activity when we identify certain purposes and
beliefs being used, which we may summarise as ideology.
Purpose and structure
The companion chapter on structure and Appendix B.4 discuss disciplines and

faculties as characteristic scientific structures. In the present discussion of purpose

should be noted that these structures serve identified, traditional purposes of seeking

knowledge. Thus scholars with related expertise work together on related cognitive goal

in biology, organic chemistry, inorganic chemistry, and so forth. Recent studies, mainl
in STS, have identified other purposes for these structures. For example, heads of

departments and research centres seek funding and other support on behalf of their unit
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partly for knowledge goals but also for strategic and resourcing goals (Cozzens and
Woodehouse 1995; Etzkowitz & Webster 1995; ELringa & Jamison 1995).
Interplays between characteristics, such as the example above involving purpose,
belief system and context, or purpose and structure, show that while purpose is a
necessary dimension of science, it is not sufficient alone to characterise science. Again,
the separate discussions of purpose and the other dimensions are to m a k e the analysis
clear, the complete characterisation emphasises the interrelatedness of the she dimensions
of characterisation.
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Conclusions for theorising about the science curriculum

This section extends the argument given in the present chapter, that scientific
purpose is an integral part of metascientific characterisations of science, to claim also that
it should form part of school science. This argument is based on several premises. First,
the preceding argument in this chapter has shown that purpose is a necessary but not
sufficient dimension of science in the metascientific literature. Second, although the
literature explicidy mentions scientific purpose relatively rarely, it frequently refers to
purposes or aims in the wording of arguments; that is, notions of purpose are embedded
in the text or implicidy worded. Nonetheless, despite occasional examples of serendipity
or chance contributing to some breakthrough, all characterisations argue that scientific
activity is, overall, purposive or goal-directed: all outcomes arise from goal-directed or
purposive activities and structures.
Scientific purposes are more diverse than some individual characterisations of
science address. For example, most accounts acknowledge publication of articles in
scientific journals and texts as a goal associated with the production of knowledge, but
they vary in the significance and role of this as a goal. Also, changes in goals lead to
changes in outcomes, and the increasing complexity of contemporary science means that
m a n y of the world's scientists do their work to meet a broader range of goals than the
narrow cognitive objectives given in traditional accounts of science such as positivism.
Because the present thesis concerns not just the science education of potential scientists
but of all students as future citizens, it concerns also the public understanding of science.
T h e public understanding of and interaction with science rests largely on an
understanding of contemporary goal complexes, and access to the determination of goals.
T o understand science it is necessary to understand (a) that science arises from, and
develops towards, a variety of purposes, and (b) h o w these purposes shape science and
different perceptions of it.
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Findings about the nature of science purposes f r o m the review of the
metascientific literature.

There is a range of currently accepted views of science in contemporary
metascientific analysis, that characterise science by various purposes. There is no simple,
clear and universally agreed account of scientific purpose, but most accounts identify as a
central goal the creation of knowledge that meets internalist criteria, such as agreement
with experimental test; with the decline of positivism, the goal of certain knowledge is no
longer current. T h e present chapter has argued that current metascientific views can be
distinguished by their characterisation of scientific purpose, although there are some
similarities between certain views. M a n y accounts identify s o m e externalist as well as
internalist goals, characterised either as the application of internalist knowledge, or as the
outcomes of the partly externalist character of science. Examples given in this chapter can
be summarised as:

A range of currently views of science, accepted by various groups of scholars and others,
characterises science by various notions ofpurpose.
a)

Purpose is often implicit, or at least understated, in the wording of metascientific
arguments.

b)

T h e influence of the positivist R V meant that for m u c h of the twentieth century
the purpose of science was characterised narrowly as cognitive goals concerning
certain knowledge of phenomena; the cognitive goal of generating knowledge
with as high a degree of certainty as possible remains a goal of science identified
by most post-positivist accounts.

c)

T h e goal of generating knowledge is characterised differently in different
metascientific accounts: as conforming to observations in empiricism; as arising
from mental activity or constructs in constructivism; in scientific realism it is
given in an external reality, but constrained by social, psychological and other
factors.
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While acknowledging the goal of acquiring knowledge, various accounts
emphasising related or other goals: to generate statements of codified knowledge;
to test or scrutinise scientific statements against competing statements; to achieve
a variety of cognitive and sociocultural ends; or to establish coherence between
humans, statements and technical devices.

e)

T h e goal of acquiring knowledge is characterised c o m m o n l y as part of
complexes of goals, including variously
•

solving problems

•

identifying regularities in Nature, often expressed as laws

•

identifying the causes of phenomena

•

control of Nature, arising from the ability to predict, explain and
manipulate

•

formulating theories, as descriptions or explanations of phenomena

•

as a means of acquiring economic, social, political, military or other
power.

f)

The history of the western European scientific tradition can be characterised
partly by continuity of purposes, particularly gaining reliable knowledge of the
cosmos, and partly by changes in purpose, such as changes in notions of laws
and theories.

g)

The purpose of science is characterised sometimes as its capacitytobe useful to
individuals, community groups, cognitive science disciplines, industry or
governments and nation states.

h)

The very utility of science means that most contemporary science serves multiple
goals, some of which m a y conflict with each other, and with traditional notions
of science as truth- or knowledge-seeking.

i)

The conflict of goals means that the general public frequendy finds it difficult to
access scientific knowledge and decision making; this has significant
implications for the roles of science, scientists and citizens in pluralistic
democracies.
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II.

Implications

for

a

school

science

that

is g r o u n d e d

in

the

metascientific literature.

School science should articulate a rich notion of scientific purpose, that is more
robust that a narrow cognitive goal of learning: it should develop an appreciation of h o w
science knowledge arises from characteristic purposes, such as developing naturalistic
explanations that meet the criteria of agreed scientific belief systems. This provides a
coherent rather than anecdotal understanding of natural phenomena and scientific
explanations of them. Thus a science education would enable students to develop an
ability to critique alternative claims to knowledge, andtojustify scientific beliefs.
W e have noted in earlier chapters that the school science curriculum traditionally
characterises science as knowledge and activity, an essentially internalist characterisation
that is incomplete and strongly contested in the literature. (The companion chapters on
knowledge and activity also argue that the literature characterises scientific knowledge and
activity as more varied and complex than m a n y views of science address). T h e present
chapter extends this critique, by arguing that because purpose is an essential dimension of
characterisation in the literature, school science should address scientific purposes if it
claims to be grounded in the literature of its field. The knowledge and other outcomes of
science arise because of complex, characteristic purposes and aims. A n incomplete
characterisation makes it improbable that citizens could develop a general appreciation of
h o w and w h y science works, as they increasingly require. T o fail to understand that
simple, cognitive goals do not account for a great deal of scientific activity, nor account
for differences in the views of scientists working towards different ends, is to limit a
rationale for the study of science, and reduces the justification of scientific belief. It
makes m o r e difficult an appreciation of strengths and limitations of science in comparison
with other h u m a n endeavours. That is, tensions between different views in society are
unlikely to be understood without a robust understanding of scientific purposes.
Examples from the present chapter include tensions between the institutional authority
arising from purely cognitive goals of science, the needs and goals of individual citizens,
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and the ideological and power goals of science, industry, government and community
groups. M a n y of these tensions arise from a tension between the remarkable successes of
science in achieving certain goals on the one hand, and changes in goals that are not
understood widely; shared goals with industries and governments exist in both
categories. It is clear that such issues cannot be understood by glib overviews or mere
labels; instead they will require each issue to be analysed, and preferably by more than
one approach to analysis, as argued by Martin and Richards (1995).
Claims such as these presume particular views about the role of a school science
education in a pluralist democracy, such as exists in Australia, the U K , most western
European countries, the U S A , Canada and so forth. A t the core of this issue is an
assumption that the goals or purposes of curriculum areas, in this case science, align
more or less with the goals or purposes that a society adopts for its school curriculum.
Popper in his The Open Society and Its Enemies is an example where science is
characterised as contributing positively to a pluralistic, democratic, open society.
These claims apply both to the general science curriculum, and to alternative
structures to such a curriculum intended to cater for students possibly intending a career
in science. W e have seen that citizens require a robust understanding of scientific
purpose. Scientists also require this understanding: first, they are also citizens, and
second, the example of the napalm research discusssed in Appendix B.3 raises significant
questions about personal and scientific ethics at least N o w , while it is true that science is
partly characterised by attitudes and values as components of a belief system2, there are
different views about the existence and nature of scientific ethics. Thus w e are unlikely to
gain agreement from all curriculum stakeholders that scientists should do no research for
military goals such as producing napalm. However, w e are more likely to secure
agreement for conclusions such as by Edwards (op. cit), that science and technology
create possibilities and pressures for meeting social ends, notably industrial, military and
commercial purposes. T h e notion possibilities implies the ability to discern the

2

See Appendix B.2.
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implications of goals and complex situations, and pressures implies the ability to
construct robust arguments and goals.
Also, science education is measured increasingly by its ability to serve utilitarian
purposes, such as the economic well-being of society, through its role as providing
exposure to and training in science. Education policy in Australia and other western
democracies from the mid-1980s experienced a shift in the influence of curriculum
stakeholders resulting in increased pressure on the school curriculum to meet national
needs, especially economic goals (McKinnon 1991; Sharpe 1991). That is, there is
increasing pressure on the goals of the school curriculum to match broad national policy
goals, particularly the goals of science, mathematics and technology in the curriculum.
This corresponds with the increasingly utilitarian goals set for science and technology by
government policy.
Specific recommendations corresponding to the summary of findings in part I above:

a) The curriculum, at system and class level, should make explicit the often implicit
purposes or goals of science. This should include:
•

making clear the purpose of experimental activities in class:

•

making clear the intentions of historical and current scientists; and

•

examining scientific debates and controversies for the research goals and
other goals.

b)

Students should appreciate the ways in which the science community seeks to
generate knowledge with as high a degree of certainty as possible, and w h y w e
no longer view this knowledge as certain and immutable Truth. This should
include students understanding:
•

that in the histories of science, religions and other social movements
knowledge claims were regarded by their believerstobe absolute truths;

•

examples of accepted scientific knowledge being supplanted by different
understandings, and the grounds for making such claims; and

•

ways in which scientists seek to increase the certainty of their results.
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c) Students should appreciate the central insights of the ways in which different
scholars seek this certainty: by conforming to observations; by constructing
knowledge mentally; and by socially and psychologically seeking to k n o w an
external reality. For example, students should become familiar with:
•

a variety of techniques by which scientists m a k e and refine observations;

•

examples in which different scientists have m a d e , and are making,
different conclusions from the same data, or collect different data
accordingtodifferent goals; and

•

examples in which our view of the cosmos has changed w h e n the goals of
scientific activity have changed.

d)

Students should be familiar with other goals related to the development of
knowledge: to generate statements;totest competing statements;toachieve other
ends; and to make coherent links between actants. For example, students should
become familiar with:
•

the language of science;

•

examples of scientists and others testing competing scientific claims;

•

examples showing differences and similarities of goals of scientists and
others; and

•

h o w the links between scientists (and others), statements and technical
devices are used to make meaning.

e)

Students should become familiar with sub-sets of goals that contribute to the
goal of developing reliable knowledge, such as solving problems, identifying
regularities, identifying causes, controlling Nature (partly expressed by the goals
of predicting, explaining and manipulating), constructing theories, and as a
means of acquiring power. For example, students should become familiar with:
•

the orientation of m u c h scientific activity to solving problems, and the
sorts of problems that scientists seek to solve;
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• examples of problems that scientists do not set out to solve, problems in
which the role of science is contentious, and problems that science has yet
to solve;
•

the ways in which regularities are identified, confirmed or disputed, and
expressed as laws;

•

accepted causal explanations of phenomena, and some c o m m o n notions of
cause;

•

the nature of predictions and explanations, and h o w experiments are
designed to produce them;

•

the notion of manipulating and controlhng Nature;

•

some c o m m o n l y used justifications for and critques of the goal of
contolling Nature;

•

the nature and examples of scientific theories; and

•

the ways in which scientific research contributes to other goals, notably for
economic, social, political and military goals.

Students should appreciate that the history of Western science is partly
characterised by goals. For example, students should appreciate that:
some goals, such as developing reliable knowledge, have been enduring in
the history of science although their sub-goals, concerning the means,
have changed; and
some goals haverisenand fallen from favour in the history of science, like
developing naturalistic explanations, mastering Nature, and justifying and
repudiating the role of G o d in causing phenomena.
Students should appreciate that the purpose of science is often given as its
usefulness. For example, students should appreciate that scientific activity is
carried out to serve the purposes of
•

individuals, both for enrichment as in fulfilment curiosity and personal
satisfaction, and for empowerment, as in the ability to m a k e informed
decisions;
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community groups, w h o are able to effect changes to communities and
others through being informed and skilled;
•

cognitive science disciplines, being the organisations of professional
scientists that generate the majority of scientific knowledge;
industry, which increasingly relies on scientific activity to solve problems
and facilitate the development of n e w technologies; and
governments and nation states, w h o use scientific knowledge and skills to
inform policy, ensure security, and, with industry, are the largest users
and supporters of professional scientific activity.

h)

Students should appreciate that science, especially because it is useful to so
m a n y groups in society, serves multiple goals that m a y well conflict with each
other, and with the goals of traditional, internalist notions of science. For
example, students should have opportunities to:
•

contrast and evaluate the goals that lead to conflicting claims in the n a m e of
science; and
contrast and evaluate the goals given in traditional characterisations of

•

science, and in studies of science in practice.
i)

Students should appreciate the difficulties that citizens, including scientists acting
outside the expertise of their professional specialism, have in accessing and
interpreting scientific information w h e n community or citizen groups have
different goals to those of the science community. For example, students should
have opportunities to analyse case studies of citizen action, including action by
individual or small groups of scientists:
•

against the scientific work of scientists in government or industry bodies;

•

to access and interpret scientific information;

•

to

develop their o w n scientific knowledge and have it accepted as credible;

and
to stimulate research for a particular purpose, that is subsequentiy pursued
by the relevant professional field, government instrumentality or industry.
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In summary, there is a need for school science to address scientific purpose, both
as it applies internally to knowledge, and externally to science in society. T h e rationale for
this claim arises both from a comprehensive characterisation of science itself - that is, a
robustratherthan merely technical understanding of science - and from arguments for the
scientific literacy of citizens.
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Chapter 9
STRUCTURE
Structure, as in an arrangement of constituent parts, is a necessary, but
not sufficient, dimension of science.

Introduction
This chapter comprises an argument that structure is a necessary, but not sufficient,
dimension of science. Structure is defined generally, as an arrangement of constituent
parts:

(1) mode of building, construction, or organisation; arrangement of parts,
elements or constituents;
(2) something built or constructed; a building, bridge, dam,framework,etc.;
(3) a complex system considered from the point of view of the whole rather
than of* any single part: the structure of modern science;
(4) anything composed of parts arranged together in s o m e w a y ; an
organisation. (The Macquarie Dictionary).
That is, the notion of structure is not specific about what is being structured, but inst
is a notion of mode, arrangement, construction, complexity, system, composition or

organisation. Thus whether the topic of discussion is cognitive structures, organisationa
structures or language structures, we recognise - characterise - these structures as
scientific because they are assembled, arranged, or structured, in ways that are
characteristic of science.
Structure is a necessary dimension of science in that it categorises essential
meanings of characterisations in the metascientific literature, and that the meanings of
other proposed dimensions will not substitute for its omission. It is not a sufficient

dimension of science in that it does not completely characterise science. Where science i
characterised by structure it is usually characterised in combination with one or more
other dimensions of science: knowledge, purpose, context, activity and belief system.

These other dimensions are used in explicating scientific structure, and scientific struc
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is used in explicating the other dimensions. T h e notion of structure pertinent to
characterising science varies between different metascientific accounts. T h e present
chapter will m a k e selective use of these accounts only, to suit its purpose. In so doing it
will attempt to strike a balance between including sufficient detail to construct the
argument and not repeating the detail of general accounts already familiar to the reader
acquainted with the literature.

The argument in this chapter is made in four parts:
1)

evidence from the analysis of the summary statements;

2)

evidence from argument in the metascientific hterature;

3)

the relationships between the dimension of structure and the other
dimensions;

4)

conclusions for theorising about the science curriculum.
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Evidence from the s u m m a r y statements

The collection of classes (in Table A.7) and text units from the differentiae (column
three of Table A.9, headed Structural), collectively indicate that science is characterised
partly by order, relation, structure, syntax or system. A s with the other dimensions, this
category of characterisation was constructed from a semantic analysis of m a n y
metascientific sources. Thus it includes a wider range of viewpoints than do m a n y
individual accounts in the literature.
N o w , it could be argued that this is a false distinction: that on the one hand
structure is a characteristic of scientific knowledge, and not science itself, and therefore
should therefore be included as a descriptor of scientific knowledge; and on the other
hand the organisational structure of science is part of the context of science, and should
be included there rather than separately. The present thesis argues the contrary position
based on the semantic analysis of the summary statements and the categories of
meanings: that characterisations of science are argued partly in terms of structure, and that
having drawn attention to the structured character of science one cannot m a k e a clear
distinction in every case between cognitive and organisational structures. A reasonable
analysis of both the knowledge and context of science will address both intellectual and
organisational structures; as with the other dimensions proposed in this thesis, structure
is not an independent entity, but a dimension, focus or category of meaning used to
characterise science. Thus in one sense it would not matter where the present thesis
addresses structure, but in another sense to subsume structure under the other dimensions
is to fail to m a k e clear h o w the literature uses the notion of structure. T o emphasise a
point m a d e elsewhere, the six proposed categories or dimensions of characteristics of
science are not intended to be discrete categories; quite the opposite, they are intended to
be considered as a notional set, with overlaps between them. However, to omit one
category fails to identify that category of meaning.
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S o m e terms interpreted here as characterising structure can be interpreted otherwise:
for example, (scientific) law can be interpreted as an expression of reality, or belief
system as a psychological entity, or theory as a given of scientific knowledge. However,
this interpretation misses a fundamental insight of language used in metascientific
discussion, as given here in the summary statements: that laws and theories, among other
things, are structures, devised and used by scientists for particular ends. Thus science is
characterised in the summary statements not just by knowledge, or processes, and so
forth, but with terms such as body of knowledge, or set of processes, which indicate
s o m e notion of structure, composition and cohesion, and not randomness or
happenstance in their co-existence:
The term 'science' is usually assumed to have a very precise and well-defined
meaning. But it can in fact be used in a variety of waystoindicate:
(a) a set of procedures ...
(b) a set of conclusions or a body of knowledge ...
(c) an institution or set of organisational arrangements ...
(d) a myth, that is, a systematic set of beliefs ...
(e) an ideology, that is, an organised way of thinking ...
(Kenny, in summary statement 14; emphases added)
Thus, the present thesis interprets such wording as characterising science both by
knowledge and the structure or body of its knowledge, by processes and the set of such
processes, and so forth. It is not only possible but meaningful to interpret the wording
both ways, and the analysis of the summary statements in Appendix A.l was careful to
identify and retain all such noun combinations as a means of retaining the multiple
possible meanings.
In some summary statements the primary characterisation is a broad notion
structure, as in system:
[The standard] view [of science] ... understands science to be a systematic
public enterprise ... The truth primarily sought is general, expressed in laws of
nature, which tell us what is always and everywhere the case ...
(Scheffler, in summary statement 27; emphases added)
S o m e summary statements identify particular notions of structure, as in the totality of
science being structured as disciplines or fields:
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T h e natural sciences and engineering are defined as the majorfieldsof science
(physical, chemical, biological, earth, engineering and applied, and agriculture)
excluding the social sciences and humanities (which are concerned with the
extension of knowledge about m a n [sic], culture and society).
( A S T E C report to the Prime Minister of Australia, in summary statement 70;
emphases added)
Other summary statements argue structure as the interrelatedness of the component parts
giving meaning to the whole, as in a system of sub-systems:
We may conceive 'science' ... as a system essentially relating to the
development of knowledge. Component parts of this system are: the producers
(researchers), the process of research, the products, the interesses for these
products, the reporting sub-system, etc... This system forms itself part of a
larger system: science in society. There are m a n y ways of looking at science - at
the knowledge-producing and knowledge-distributing industries.
(Radnitsky, in summary statement 18)
or as a system of interrelated components:

Belief systems are not simply collections of norms ... They are structures of
norms which bear some relationship to each other and vary gready in the degree
to which they are systematic. W h a t is systematic about belief systems is the
interrelatedness of the various substantive beliefs. S o m e systems are more
tightly interrelated than others.
At one end of the continuum are belief systems that consist of a few tightly
linked general statements from which a fairly large number of specific
propositions can be derived. Confronted by a n e w situation, the believer m a y
refer to the general rule to determine the stance he [sic] should take. Science is
an example of such a belief system. The principle of the experiment remains the
same regardless of the differences in empirical problems to which it is applied ...
the rules of scientific method, being systematic, m a y be applied to all kinds of
data without regard to their location. Thus, a high degree of system is in one
sense an aid to diffusion of belief...
... T o the degree that a system of beliefs is highly systematic, social control
m a y be affected on the basis of informal sanctions and m a y be easily taught and
learned. Belief systems with a relatively high degree of system seem to rely on
rather general internalised standards to maintain social control - standards such
as generalised codes of ethics (science)... T o learn part istolearn all.
... In any kind of belief system that has a high degree of system - a scientific
theory, for instance - a change in one proposition requires adjustments in all
others.
(Borhek & Curtis, in summary statement 75; emphases added)
There are also more idiosyncratic notions of structure, that explicate a particular notio
structure. Thus Needham uses the term structure to characterise science as comprising the
meaningful conjunction of otherwise disparate characteristics, in much the same way as
the present thesis constructs its argument:

Chapter 9: Structure

228

W h e n w e say that modern science developed only in Western Europe at the time
of Galileo in the late Renaissance, w e mean surely that there and then alone there
developed the fundamental bases of the structure of the natural sciences as w e
have them today, namely the application of mathematical hypotheses to Nature,
the full understanding and use of the experimental method, the distinction
between primary and secondary qualities, the geometrication of space, and the
acceptance of the mechanical model of reality. Hypotheses of primitive or
medieval type distinguish themselves quite clearly from those of the m o d e m
type. Their mtrinsic and essential vagueness always m a d e them incapable of
proof or disproof, and they were prone to combine in fanciful systems of
gnostic correlation. In so far as numericalfiguresentered into them, numbers
were manipulated in forms of "numerology" or number mysticism constructed a
priori, not employed as the stuff of qualitative measurements compared a
posteriori.
(Needham, in summary statement 72; emphases added)
Some statements construct their argument by pointing out explicidy that science is not
characterised by mere collections or accumulations of laws, facts or knowledge, for

example; that is, it is not just the content of these things, but their structure that ma
them characteristically and usefully scientific:
Science is not just a collection of laws, a catalogue of facts, it is a creation of the
human mind with its freely invented ideas and concepts. Physical theories try to
form a picture of reality and to establish its connections with the wide world of
sense impressions.
(Einstein and Infield, in summary statement 15; emphases added)
Science is built up with facts, as a house is with stones. But a collection of facts
is no more science than a heap of stones is a house.
(Poincare, in summary statement 7; emphases added)
Science is a world picture. It is not a technique; it is not a form of power, it is
not even simply an accumulation of knowledge. But it is a highly integrated
form of knowledge which makes a world view.
(Bronowski, in summary statement 16; emphases added)
In some statements the notion of structure is implicit in, or entailed by, the argument
in the arrangement of complex sense data according to the structures of logic:
Science is the attempt to make the chaotic diversity of our sense experience
correspond to a logically uniform system of thought
(Einstein, in summary statement 10; emphasis added)
Sometimes these structures are called laws and theories, which by their construction
represent natural patterns and structures:
Science is a collection of well-attested theories which explain the patterns and
regularities and irregularities among carefully studied phenomena.
(Harre\ in summary statement 40; emphases added)
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The present chapter argues that the summary statements, and other passages from
the literature, use the term structure in more than one w a y to describe science, as for
example:
(a)

a cognitive or essentially internalist notion, as in organised (or structured)
collections of facts, laws (7,15);

(b)

as organisation that combines or ignores e/i distinctions, depending on the
particular viewpoint, as in an institution or set of organisational arrangements
(14),
or system (18),
or enterprise (19);

(c)

or as indistinct in this respect, as in disciplines (4).

Each of these refers to some notion of structure: (a) describes a significant characteristic
of science knowledge, that its components are arranged as an ordered framework; (b)
takes sciencetobe (at least) a social organisation, or corporate entity; (c) m a y be taken to
relate to (a) or (b) or both. For example, the philosopher Stephen Toulmin has argued
that disciplines are characterised by concepts, methods and fundamental aims (which the
present thesis interprets respectively as knowledge, activity and purpose):
Thus 'the nature of an intellectual discipline always involves both its concepts
and also the m e n [sic] w h o conceived diem, both its subject matter or domain
and also the over-arching intellectual ambitions uniting the m e n w h o work
within it' (Toulmin 1972). S o a discipline is a continuing historical entity whose
continuity is part intellectual and part professional - a discipline being
characterised intellectually by a geneology ofproblems and professionally by a
geneology of institutional authority. (Suppe 1979, pp. 675-6)
Thus for Toulmin at least, scientific knowledge has been structured traditionally as the
disciplines, but the disciplines also reflect or contribute to the organisation of the
scientific enterprise: different departments within university faculties of science, different
laboratories, courses of study, journals, professional associations, and so on, reflect the
structures of different scientific disciplines. This is discussed in Appendix B.4.3 here and
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Appendix B.l. Note that these loose clusters are not discrete categories, but merely
indicate something of the scope of structure as used in the literature.
Notions of structure are embedded in the text of a good m a n y of the summary
statements, even where the subject of the statement is not structure or one of its
synonyms. Below are text units indicating various notions of structure from just the first
twenty statements. Note that some of the quotes above have been drawn already from the
first twenty statements:

systematic study

(1)

general laws

(1)

systematised knowledge in general

(D

a particular branch of knowledge

(1)

reduce it to order

(2)

body of knowledge

(4)

a set of processes

(4)

domain of human knowledge and activity

(5)

systematic organisation of knowledge

(5)

Scientists attempttoacquire and organise knowledge

(5)

formulation of laws and theories

(5)

codified in statements of high generality (laws and principles)

(8)

expressed in laws or principles of greatest generality

(9)

conceptual generalisations

(H)

a w a y of ordering its many facets and checking the validity of this order

(13)

a paradigm, or conceptual structure

(20)

These examples are given simply to illustrate that even within the first twenty summary
statements the general notion of structure applies in various ways. This is sufficient to
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base a more thoroughgoing argument for a general interpretation of structure as a
category of characterisation; that argument comprises sections 2 and 3, below.
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Evidence from argument in the metascientific literature

Debates in the metascientific literature address many aspects of structure in science,
which again supports a broad interpretation of structure as a dimension of
characterisation. Appendix B.4 addresses this scope as follows.
B.4.1 Current metascientific views with respect to structure
Various metascientific views differ in the w a y they interpret characteristic scientific
structures. These are summarised in Table B.4.1.
B .4.2 The unity of science
It is c o m m o n for the metascientific and other literatures, including public contexts,
to refer to science rather than sciences, which is based on a view that there is s o m e
underlying, unitary structure of science. This has been interpreted both as a unity of
method and of scientific results such as theories. S o m e recent, post-positivist accounts of
science refer instead to sciences, emphasising the variation of characteristic methods,
theoretical and other structures.
B .4.3 The role of structure in characterising a western European scientific tradition
T h e history of western European science is characterised partly by changes in
characteristic structures, including knowledge structures and organisational structures.
B .4.4 Structures of knowledge (cognitive structures)
a)

laws

b)

theories

c)

disciplines

d)

other cognitive structures

Science is c o m m o n l y characterised, although often imprecisely so, by structures of
knowledge such as laws, theories and disciplines. Appendix B.4.4 discusses each of
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these, and some other, ways in which knowledge is characteristically structured in
science.
B.4.5 Organisational structures
Science is often characterised by a various organisational structures, such as
university faculties and academies.
B.4.6 Language structures
Science is also characterised by its particulr language structures, such as its
vocabulary, grammar and syntax, notably a highly nominalised form and use of passive
voice and third person. S o m e views extend this characterisation to argue that the language
is not merely necessary to express the concepts, relationships and precision of science
(expressing meaning), but that w e can only k n o w what is shaped or structured by
language (making meaning).
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Structure as a necessary dimension of science

The argument to this point, given in detail in Appendix B.4, establishes structure as
a (semantic) category of characterisation in the literature: there are a variety of ways in
which structure is used to characterise science. Thus science is not characterised simply
by ideas, scientists, resources or language but as structures or arrangements of ideas
(laws and theories), people and resources (organisations) or language (technical terms
and wordings). However, these examples are not explicit reasons for structure being
essential. The argument that structure is a necessary dimension does not rest on these
examples, but on the arguments they represent: not only do metascientific arguments
typically appeal to notions of structure, but m a n y accounts hold that structural factors
actually constitute science. That is, laws and theories do not have the meanings claimed
of them without their characteristic structures; scientific organisations cannot be
understood, whether in their intellectual contexts as disciplines or in relation to broader
social contexts, without reference to their structural characteristics; and the meaning and
authority of scientific language cannot be understood without understanding its
characteristic structural features. These arguments fail if reference to structure is
removed. Also, as with the other categories of characterisation, the literature provides
detailed accounts of these structural aspects, and indeed a variety of approaches and,
often, disputes over them. T o understand both the depth and the variety one must be
familiar with at least some of the major positions. T o recognise only a single position,
w h e n there exists a substantial academic literature of explication and debate, is to fail to
understand that there m a y be plausible alternatives, to miss insights provided by
alternatives, and especially to be unable to defend the particular view from the attack of
other views. O n e cannot appreciate the strength of a particular view without appreciating
the strength of alternative arguments. It follows that to understand science, one must:
first, understand the contribution of structural factors to the nature of science; second,
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appreciate that accounts of this contribution differ, and third, appreciate the insights of
some other characterisations.
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T h e relationships between the dimension of structure and other
dimensions

a) Structure and knowledge
The combined use of structure and knowledge in the c o m m o n expression body of
knowledge was noted at the beginning of this chapter and section 4.4 above. Given that a
separate chapter is dedicated to knowledge w e will do no more than acknowledge this
relationship here.
b) Structure, knowledge, belief system and purpose
Laws
In section 4.3, above, passing reference was made to beliefs givingrisetodifferent
notions of scientific law, but scientific laws, as structures, are a manifestation of both
belief system and purpose. In the passage from Loewer, quoted above in section 4.4,
argues that laws are discovered, when many contemporary accounts would substitute or
include constructed, but the point here is that Loewer identifies the law as a primary aim
(or purpose) of science, that arises from the belief of scientists and philosophers that our
universe is governed by scientific laws, and around which laws particular scientific
subjects are often organised (that is, structured). Thus Loewer characterises this aspect of
science in terms of structure, belief system, and purpose, not in isolation, but in
combination.
Scientific laws raise interesting and fundamental questions about characterisations
of science, because they demonstrably relatetobeliefs about what science actually does,
and these beliefs relate in turn to beliefs about the nature of the cosmos. There have been
at least three main uses of the term law, as used in science. First is the notion of a
scientific law as a prescription of the God-given regularities in Nature. Thus some
accounts argue that the notion of a scientific law arose in the western European scientific
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tradition, and not in other cultures, on the basis of a belief in a law-giving God. For
example, Needham (1972), Graham (1973) and Ronan (1982) have all noted that the

argument that the belief in a personal, powerful deity, held by the Europeans, but not b
the Chinese, predisposed the former to look for lawlike regularities:

In the very interesting paper Human Law and the Laws of Nature (1951),
Needham suggests that the concept of a divine legislator, absent in China, m a y
have been necessary for the genesis of the idea of 'laws of nature,' and also for
Western confidence that the secrets of a cosmos ordered by a rational being will
be intelligible to rational beings. W e no longer think of the phrase 'laws of
nature' as anything but a metaphor, but 'the problem is whether the recognition
of such statistical regularities and their mathematical expression could have been
reached by any other road than that which Western science actually travelled'
(Needham 1969). Here, of course, w e are at the crux of the matter. A s with
most if not all answers to the negative question w e can think of alternative
routes; and the trouble is not that they are plausible but that w e can neither
estimate their plausibility nor set limits to their proliferation. (Graham 1973, p.
55)
Graham, continuing, expressed reservations about the significance of the belief or nonbelief in a divine legislator, even though in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century scienc
the notion of God the clockmaker is significant in a conception of the cosmos as a
mechanism, like a clock. From Needham's research we know that the term law was not

generally used until after Galileo, and in any event the neo-Confucians used the term li

for principles, moral, political and natural, which may have been adequate. In any event,
there are examples of Chinese discussion of the cosmos in terms of 'workmanship',
'authorship' and so on, despite the underlying cause being conceptualised as an
impersonal spirit The point here is that, for Francis Bacon and his successors, but

apparendy not in other cultures of the time, there was a strong belief in the regular an
precise character of Nature, which could be discovered and expressed in law-like
statements:
If there is a personal Creator, the universe is not simply there (as for Aristode)
and has not simply grown (as for the Chinese) but has been designed and
constructed, so that the way to understand it is to take it to pieces like a manm a d e instrument and see h o w it works. This implies that nature is
comprehensible in a special way ... (Graham 1973, p. 56)
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Although the assumption of natural regularity has remained central in western European

science, this view of law as God-given declined as the new empirical science increasingl
provided naturalistic explanations and appealed less to the authority of God as
explanations of natural phenomena
However, the term law is still used in two senses, and to many more kinds of
statements:
Not till the 17th century, did the modern concept of law become dissociated
from its theological and prescriptive connotations. Law is itself used
ambiguously to refer to both statements and what such statements designate
(e.g. Ohm's Law refers to a proposition and what the proposition describes, viz.
a relation between certain variables).
M a n y different kinds of statements, or phenomena, are called laws. They
include constitutive, dispositional, developmental, quasi-teleological, abstract
and idealised properties, processes and relations, ranging from observed
patterns through experimentally established invariances to the fundamental
theoretical principles (or ... axioms) of whole branches of sciences; lawstatements m a y express numerical constants or qualitative attributes,
developmental sequences, identities or functional relations, statistical
correlations or universal features of types of thing. Though all these entities
cannot be subsumed under a unitary analysis there are central unifying strands.
(Bhaskar 1983e, pp. 229-239)
Some historical examples of laws given as aims of science are given in Appendix B.3 in
the present thesis.
In contemporary HPS, there is general agreement that a law is an expression of a

natural regularity, as in these definitions given in the glossary of Boyd, Gasper and Tr
(1991, p. 776):
Law:
A causal or statistical relation between at least two factors, or the statement used
to express such a relation. Examples are the ideal gas law, PV=NkT, and
Newton's second law, F-ma. Normally, laws tell us something about
counterfactual situations.
Counterfactuals:
Types of conditional (if ... then) statements whose antecedents or if-clauses
express circumstances that are contrary-to-fact such as 'If it were raining ...' or
'If it had rained...'. Scientific laws are saidtosupport counterfactuals.
The classical empiricist account of laws is based on Hume's analysis of causation
(Bhaskar 1983e), and the main distinction between accounts of laws is between Humean
and non-Humean accounts (Loewer 1995, p. 265). A potted version of the argument is
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as follows. Our concern with laws arises because one of the aims of science is to identify
the necessary, law-like sequences of events, from among accidental sequences1. A
necessary sequence of events is usually taken to imply a necessary connection between
events, but the empiricist John Locke (1632-1704) argued that necessary connections in
Nature were unknowable. David H u m e (1711-76) extended this critique by arguing that
there are no empirical grounds even for the assumption of natural necessity. Instead, he
argued that our notion of cause is a psychological habit arising from our experiences of
natural regularities:
H u m e contended the idea of necessary connections could not be drawn from our
observations of the external world, but is a projection onto it derived from our
experience of repeated conjunctions of events. Thus H u m e analysed the notion
of necessary connection as empirical invariance plus subjective habit of mind.
(Bhaskar 1983e, p. 230)
Hume's position entails two assumptions which are critical to understanding the
differences between accounts of laws: epistemologically, all (non-analytic) knowledge
must arise from sense-experience, and ontologically, the objects experienced by our
senses must be invariant patterns of events (events conjoined constantly and
deterministically). Thus the first approach to laws, that of empiricists and positivists,
accepts this notion of cause and its assumptions: it is basically H u m e a n , with various
refinements.
Non-Humean accounts reject one or both of these assumptions. The second group,
the constructivist or neo-Kantian position, follows Immanual Kant (1724-1804). It
rejects H u m e ' s epistemological assumption, and argues instead that what w e see as
natural necessity arises from the a priori principles by which w e structure our sense data.
In this view, laws are constructed, not discovered; constant conjunctions are necessary
but insufficient. Kant argued that H u m e failed to show h o w laws are necessary: in
principle a finite number of conjunctions can support an infinite number of statements; in
principle any well-established law can be m a d e to appear suspect because of
1 See the companion chapter on purpose and Appendix B.3.
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philosophical difficulties, such as the problems of induction and several paradoxes (see
the companion chapter on activity for a discussion of induction); and finally, H u m e does
not account for changes in the w a y w e construct explanations of phenomena:
Finally, the H u m e a n theory furnishes no rationale for scientific development,
whereas scientific accounts appear to be stratified around a reapplied distinction
between identified phenomena and their structural explanations. (Bhaskar
1983e, p. 231)
A third group, the version of scientific realism Bhaskar calls transcendental realism,
denies both H u m e ' s ontological and epistemological premises. Briefly, Bhaskar points
out that invariant patterns of events are rare outside of the closed conditions of
experiments. Scientists are causal agents of these experimentally controlled invariant
patterns of events. If w e identify those invariant patterns of events with laws, w e arrive at
the absurd conclusion that the experimental activity of scientists changes the laws of
Nature. Thus both experiments and applied scientific activity are intelligible only if w e
recognise that patterns of events and laws are ontologically different. 'Further, if laws are
identified with constant conjunctions, then w e must ask what governs phenomena in
open systems (where no such conjunctions are available)' (Bhaskar 1983e, p. 231) The
empiricist is faced with there being either no laws, or (as argued by both Mill and
Lakatos) that science has yet discovered no laws. For example, w e saw in the companion
chapter on purpose that John Mill (1806-73) sought both those sequences that were
invariable and those that held only in certain circumstances: empirical laws stated patterns
that held in limited contexts, whereas basic laws of Nature are absolutely invariant
patterns. Basic laws can only be deduced from empirical laws. Thus the position of
transcendental realism is that laws (natural regularities or patterns) exist but our
knowledge of them is constructed: laws are the tendencies of natural mechanisms that
exist without being manifest in particular outcomes.
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Theories
As with laws, theories also are more completely characterised by the combination
of knowledge, structure, belief system and purpose. Rappoport's classification (itself a
structuring) of theories is an interesting combination of these categories, and Suppe's
thorough summary of it is given to illustrate this characterisation:
A stronger argument can be given against the possibility of there being a general
deep structural analysis of theories. In an article which has attracted insufficient
attention by philosophers, Anatol Rappoport (1958) presents an interesting
taxonomy of theories. The following sorts of theories can be distinguished: (i)
theories which are intrinsically mathematical... and describe a state-transition
mechanism ('equations of motion'); examples include classical and quantum
mechanics, quantitative analysis in chemistry, and the general theory of natural
selection; (ii) the class of theories like the first except that they contain n o statetransition mechanism; examples include most theories of equilibrium, classical
thermodynamics, crystallography and classical optics; (iii) stochastic theories,
which are mathematical and quantised but the basis for quantising is counting
rather than measuring ...; characteristic problems are sampling strategies and
statistical validation; paradigm examples include theories in genetics,
demography, epidemiology, and ecology; (iv) qualitative theories, which
concern themselves with such problems as recognition and meaningful
classification ...; the success of the theory depends in large part on whether it so
organises our observations as to gain a heuristic and predictive advantage;
paradigm examples include qualitative analysis in chemistry, and m u c h of
biology, and m a n y portions of the behavioural sciences; (v) taxonomic theories,
which, while often falling under other classifications given here, have as their
central problems recognition and meaningful classification ...; paradigm
examples include kinship systems, classifications of natural languages, and
biological classification; (vi) historical theories which are concerned to describe
the occurrence of single events, rather than classes of events ...; paradigm
examples include the continental-drift hypothesis in geology, migratory theories
about the origin of the American Indian, and m a n y anthropological and
archaeological theories; (vii) theories in the social sciences which have as their
primary emphasis the imparting of an intuitive understanding of social
behaviour, institutions, political systems, cultures, and the likely paradigm
examples include theories in depth psychology such as Freud's. That the entities
c o m m o n l y called scientific theories evidence such diversity does lend credence
to the suggestion that there will not be any particularly deep or revealing
characteristics c o m m o n to all scientific theories other than what Achinstein
incorporates into his analysis. (Suppe 1979, pp. 123-4)
This is the sort of philosophical basis that many recent commentaries draw on when they
refer to sciences rather than science: the lack of any uniform structure does not support a
uniform characterisation of science. It is consistent with multidimensional
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characterisations such as the present thesis proposes: not only do structures vary, but
characteristic purposes, belief systems and so forth.
Another complex characterisation of theories is the critical approach to theories,
found in continental philosophy. It expressly combines structure, belief system, context
and purpose:
[TJhe 'traditional' concept of scientific theory [was] as an entirely disinterested,
value-neutral account of the world, a conception that denies from the beginning
any intrinsic connection between scientific knowledge and the practical interests
in h u m a n life. Like all major Western thinkers from Plato to Hegel, Husserl
accepted this traditional conception of theory and so, for all his sensitivity to the
crisis of Western science, still acquiesced in the split between knowledge and
action that sustained the crisis. According to Horkheimer, the solution was to
reject the traditional notion of theory in favour of a n e w concept of critical theory
i.e. of theory as deriving from the fundamental practical interests of human life
and hence essentially and intrinsically directed towards the improvement of
human existence.
The work of Jurgen Habermas represents a systematic and sustained effort to
develop and ground this conception of critical theory. Habermas's fundamental
project is to provide a contemporary counterparttothe classical ideal of building
h u m a n society on the basis of a body of practical knowledge (i.e. a knowledge
of basic h u m a n values). (Gutting 1990, p. 129)
This critical approach expressly claims that, contrary to the positivist RV, scientific
theories have practical or interested purposes that are sometimes characterised as
ideologies.
Structure and context
In section 4.4, above, mention was made of the development of scientific
institutions, notably the scientific academies, in early modern Europe. Emerson (1990)
characterises this organisation development largely in terms of historical and
sociopolitical contexts, but also by changes in purpose, knowledge and activity:
All of these institutions had a profound effect upon the pursuit of science. They
gave it prestige, social legitimation, recognition and an important place outside
the schools and church but within the state a m o n g the complex of institutions
promoting secular novelties. Defining n e w roles, they created for the first time
scientific careers and a n e w if small class of professional scientists w h o served
as their permanent and full time functionaries. Because they were recognised,
approved and increasingly successful and useful, they promoted the pursuit of
science a m o n g the classes for w h o m approval, success and utility were most
important - professional m e n , gentiemen w h o had to m a k e their w a y in the
world and those w h o sought to be regarded as polite and useful members of
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society. T h e academies and societies were all committed to the use of
experimental methods which they saw as not only providing m e n with n e w
knowledge but also as eliminating old errors, superstitions and ignorance ... The
academies' attitudes toward knowledge supported and helped to drive the
European Enlightenment which they did m u c h to define. Societies everywhere
became exemplars of good science not only for their respective kingdom but for
the European Republic of Letters. Indeed, this Republic and the cosmopolitan
ideals it expressed reflected the institutionalisation of science in these n e w
bodies. Their transactions, memoirs, journals and other published works created
a n e w m e d i u m for the exchange of information and speeded the dissemination
and criticism of n e w ideas. Even though m a n y of these institutions were also
committed to chauvinistic ends, their publications, research programs, prize
competitions and work as state agencies gave a direction to national and
international scientific activities which had formerly been lacking in Europe.
This can be seen not only in the c o m m o n European pursuit of problems ... but
also in the co-operative undertakings such as the observations of the Transit of
Venus in 1761 and 1769.
A s the academies pursued their projects, they also tended to m a k e science
more clearly a distinctive activity requiring rigorous training and specialised
expertise. Their o w n standards and the work of their professional members had
encouraged specialisation and had raised the expected levels of performance so
that by 1800 few amateurs and virtuosi were to be found a m o n g those making
significant contributions to natural knowledge. A s servants of their respective
states the academies increasingly showed h o w useful specialised bodies
possessing scientific knowledge could be to the governments which chartered or
supported them. (Emerson 1990, pp. 972-3)
Thus the primary characterisation in this passage is by structure, in that Emerson is
discussing structure: institutions such as the Societies as and other bodies, summarised
the institutionalisation of science. However, this characterisation is made largely in te

of context: prestige, social legitimation, recognition and an important place outside the
schools and church but within the state among the complex of institutions, among the
classes, and European. Other categories of characterisation are knowledge (scientific

knowledge), purpose (gave a direction to national and international scientific activities
and the common European pursuit of problems) and activity (experimental methods,
research programs).
The final example is a view that science is a structure characterised partly by rules,
especially linguistic rules, but the characterisation draws on all six dimensions:
Hagendijk (1990) has recently criticised a version of constructivism that he
attributes to Latour. His criticism is based on a view of science as part of a
culturally created w a y of establishing facts that he believes constructivism
undermines. H e draws on Anthony Giddens's structuration theory as an
alternative to constructivism. Here, science is considered to be generated by
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rules (especially linguistic rules). Hagendijk, like Giddens, fails to clearly locate
rules and cultural conceptions in time and space. This is a critical problem
because rules and resources are conceptualised in this theory to be the basic
dimension of social structure (see item 4 below). T h e basic theory can be
summarised as follows:
1. Social structures are simultaneously produced and changed by humans,
and used as resources; structural properties are the m e d i u m and outcome of
the practices they recursively organise.
2. Structure is a virtual order of rules and resources; the observable patterns
of social interaction are conceptualised as systems.
3. H u m a n agents are assumed to be knowledgeable.
4. The modalities of structuration are rules (normative and interpretive) and
resources (pohtical-authoritative, economic-allocative).
Science as an institutional order is theorised to be dependent for its reproduction
on configurations of various types of rules and resources. M o d e m science, then,
is supposed to have emerged out of the confluence of material, literary and social
technologies (following Shapin and Schaffer 1985). Experimental science is
viewed as a n e w 'form of life' with material, cognitive, and moral aspects. The
dynamics of boundary maintenance and collaboration are conceived in terms of
discourse coalitions and discourse structuration. A n d national subfields of
science are supposed to be created out of the intertwining of cognitive and social
arrangements. (Restivo 1995, p. 108)
The present thesis interprets this passage as characterising science using all six
dimensions: structure (social structures, structuration, structure is a virtual order of r
and resources, systems and institutional order); activity (generated, produced and
changed ... and used, recursively organise, experimental science, and dynamics);
knowledge (conceptions, knowledgeable and cognitive); context (cultural, social, humans

, resources (political-authoritative, economic-allocative), and national subfields); belief
system (rules (normative and interpretive), and moral aspects); and purpose (implicit in,
for example, used as resources, and emerged out of the confluence...).
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Conclusions for theorising about the science curriculum

This section extends the argument, given above, that scientific structure is an
integral part of metascientific characterisations of science,toclaim also that it should form
part of school science. This argument is based on several premises. First the preceding
argument in this chapter has shown that structure is a necessary but not sufficient
dimension of science in the metascientific literature. Secondly, the scope of scientific
structure is broader than m a n y individual characterisations of science address: to
understand science it is necessary to understand, firstiy, that whichever characteristic w e
are concerned with derives its scientific significance in part from its particular
arrangement or construction. The present chapter sought to show in some detail h o w this
applies particularly to arrangements of knowledge, organisations and language. Thirdly,
these structures shape science and different perceptions of it; this also has to be
appreciated to m a k e a more complete characterisation of science. Fourthly, the traditional
academic school science curriculum is overwhelmingly concerned with science
knowledge content and certain activities, as set out particularly in the companion chapters
on knowledge and activity; this characterisation of science is both incomplete and
strongly contested in the literature. Part 4 of the companion chapter on context rejects
such incomplete characterisations for the science education of both the citizen and the
science-trained professional, as limiting the understanding and justification of science.
This section summarises the discussion in Appendix B.4, and highlights its significance
for the curriculum.
A s mentioned already, the present, post-positivist understanding of science as
given in the metascientific literature is that there is n o longer a single received view.
Indeed, the unity of science that is usually implicit in such a normative account is
challenged by post-positivist accounts, and it m a y be more instructive to consider the
term sciences rather than science. T h e current (complex) consensus is that there is a
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variety of views, and these views provide different accounts of structure: they m a y vary
in their accounts of particular structures, as in traditional versus critical perspectives of
scientific theories, and, more strikingly, explicate structures of different entities. For
example, w e have discussed in this chapter of science Machlup's historical treatment of
knowledge

structures, Rappoport's s u m m a r y of theory

structures, scientific

organisations as given in Redner, and Cozzens and Woodhouse, and language structures
as analysed by Martin and Halliday. N o w , it is clear that each of these topics is different,
but to argue that w e have lumped together dissimilar entities, like apples and oranges, is
to miss the point: each of these w a s characterised by particular arrangements or
structures, and it is this appeal to structure that w e have identified as a significant indeed, essential - category of characterisation. This points to a general need to provide a
richer notion of structure in school science: clearly there is a need for students to become
familiar with at least some of these structures, which are summarised here.
I. Findings about the nature of science from the review of the
metascientific literature.

There is a range of currendy accepted views of science, which characterise science
by various notions of structure as given in contemporary philosophical, sociological,
historical and linguistic analysis. Examples given in this chapter can be summarised as:

There is a tradition of referring to science, that may be less informative than referring t
sciences
a)

There is a strong tradition in the literature, and in general use, orreferringto
science; this emphasises similarities, and is reinforced by the notion of unity of
science.

b)

There is a tendency in post-positivist metascientific literature to examine actual,
rather than idealised or normative, characteristics of science: this concerns
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differences as well as similarities, and therefore speaks of sciences rather than
science. This is most evident where analyses have turned their attention from
physics as the paradigm of science, to biology, chemistry and other fields.
c)

T h e present thesis uses the term science, partly because of the c o m m o n usage,
and partly because it concerns the school subject called science. However, in
doing so, it recognises that m a n y recent analyses n o w refer to sciences, and that
this term serves to alert us to the diversity of structures, belief systems,
activities, purposes, contexts and knowledges that can be masked by the generic
term science.

Scientific knowledge is traditionally structured as disciplines, such as physics and
geology.
d)

Science disciplines as currendy recognised are in m a n y cases historically recent
constructions, and historical analysis shows that science knowledge has been
arranged in a variety of ways.

e)

The twentieth century has seen considerable pressure on disciplines as cognitive
structures, with n e w fields emerging and existing disciplines merging, such as
geophysics.

f)

Disciplines can also be characterised as organisational structures, and m u c h
contemporary analysis argues that the social and political organisation of science
better explains the nature of post-war disciplines than d o purely cognitive issues.

g)

There are also other attempts to provide a cognitive basis for structuring science,
as in Shapere's notion of scientific domains, which are different from
conceptions of disciplines or fields.

h)

T h e Scientific Revolution is often characterised by changes in both cognitive and
organisational structures: n e w fields or disciplines emerged, theories were
structured differendy (notably using mathematical structures), and scientific
organisations emerged.
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Other notions of cognitive structure characteristic of science are laws, theories and
hypotheses; different metascientific approaches give different views of their structures
and significance.
i)

L a w s are taken usually as statements of regularity or pattern in Nature,
specifically the relation between at least two factors: empiricism holds that they
are straightforward statements of phenomena, and therefore laws are discovered;
constructivism holds that w e can only k n o w as a result of the mind (accounting
for changes in laws in the light of n e w evidence), hence laws are constructed;
scientific realism (in the account discussed here) holds that laws are statements
of natural (real) mechanisms, knowledge of which is constructed using
experimental manipulations.

j)

Theories are taken usually as systematic accounts, such as descriptions or
explanations, of a subject; in science they account for observational (empirical)
data, but a strong (but not universal) current view is that they influence
observations. Despite their obviously structured character and earlier
understandings of theory, no universal structure of theories has been
determined. Despite philosophical objections to the imprecision of the notion
paradigm, a scientific paradigm as a general theoretical context or as a
disciplinary matrix is a structural characteristic that is widely understood in both
scientific and lay circles.

k)

Hypotheses are taken usually as tentative expressions of theories that require
further evidence and testing.

1)

T h e view that theory influences observation (the theory-laden-ness of
observations) rejects the popular characterisation of science as an objective,
value-free enterprise.
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T h e rejection of science as objective has been extended to the argument that
theories, not being neutral accounts of Nature, are directed towards improving
h u m a n existence.

Science is also characterised by organisational structures: disciplines as organisations,
university faculties and departments, scientific bodies and academies, and the general
organisational character of science in relation to other organisations in society, such as
government, industry and citizen organisations.
n)

Cognitive structures account for little of science as an organisational structure,
and thus provide little understanding of the development and workings of
science in society.

Science is identified and constructed also by characteristic structures of language.
o)

Scientific language has complex and characteristic structures; the w e a k
interpretation is that these structures are the means by which w e express the
complexities of scientific knowledge; the strong interpretation is that these
structures are the means by which w e make these complex understandings.

Structure is a necessary category of meaning in characterisations of science, and is used
typical in combination with other dimensions (categories of characterisation).
p)

T h e meanings of laws, theories and scientific language depend partly but
essentially on their characteristic structures, as do the rationale and effectiveness
of scientific organisations; these fail if w e d o not account for their structure or
composition.
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Implications for a school science that reflects the metascientific
literature.

School science should present a robust notion of scientific structure, in such a way
as to provide a coherent rather than anecdotal understanding.
(i)

School science needs to address not just the existence of disciplines, laws and
theories but an understanding of their status and meaning.
The notion of natural regularity or pattern embodied in laws - and indeed the
underlying belief in such regularity - is fundamental to the western European
tradition of science, yet is poorly acknowledged in public understandings of
science (Wynne 1995). A similar argument applies to theories, but more
strongly. Theories are explanatory structures, and the special sense in which the
scientific community understands scientific explanations to betentativeis poorly
understood by the wider community (and sometimes in public controversies by
scientists also; see Martin & Richards 1995). The present thesis argues that the
appropriate response is not to argue that the public simply 'misunderstand'
science (Wynne 1995) or to reject tentativeness: the view of science as absolute
truths is long discredited. Rather, the response should be to understand h o w
theories and laws in science are constructed, and h o w they derive their meaning
from particular belief systems, activities, contextual issues, and so forth.

(ii)

Similarly with organisational structures: an understanding only of cognitive
structures does not provide an understanding of h o w science works as an
institution and in relation to other interests in society. The present thesis argues,
again, that the appropriate response is not to reject or ignore this characteristic;
the more than thirty years of S T S and other research, such as given in Jasanoff
et al (1995) and elsewhere, makes a compelling argument for an understanding
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based on a m o r e robust characterisation of science, such as the present thesis
proposes.
(iii)

Likewise, the linguistic structures of science need to be understood, not just
because it is their characteristic structures that give them their meaning, but
because they present special requirements for students of science. Halliday and
Martin (1993) argue in detail that scientific language deters students from
learning science: it alienates them and, w e might add, alienates non-sciencetrained adults. They provide compelling evidence that science is understood
more easily by addressing direcdy the linguistic structures of scientific language.
Moreover, addressing the scientific language is a means of coming to understand
other scientific structures, such as theories, that are constructed in scientific
discourse.

Some recommendations corresponding to the summary of findings in part I above:

a) Whether or not school Science retains the name Science, or changes its
designation to The Sciences or some othertide,it should m a k e clear both some
features believed to apply widely, such as patterns of reasoning, assumptions
and experimental design, and other features believed to apply more in some
sciences than in others. This should include developing an appreciation of:
•

patterns of reasoning used widely in the sciences, such as induction and
deduction;

•

basic factors in experimental design, such as controls, variables, placebos,
and so forth;

•

the influence of different experimental designs on knowledge outcomes;
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language elements that tend to characterise science generally, such as
nominalisation, jargon2 and passive voice;
language elements that characterise different sciences, particularly technical
vocabularies; and
non-structural dimensions that are relative to the unity or otherwise of
science, such as assumptions (belief systems), purposes, activities and
contexts.

b), c)

Students should develop an appreciation of both idealised, or normative,
characterisations of science, and of descriptive characterisations of science as
practised. T h e former are useful because they are unencumbered by the
complexities of real life, and hence typically more straightforward, and because
idealised accounts provide the norms to which the scientific communities aspire
and by which they are judged. T h e latter are useful because they bring
understanding of science in practice, and hence understandings of w h y certain
tasks are studied and not others, of h o w scientific disputes arise and are dealt
with, of h o w scientists actually w o r k and communicate, and so forth. This will
lead easily into studies of the sciences. This could be achieved using the
examples above.

d)

Students should develop an appreciation of:
•

the various current science disciplines; and

•

the history and historical contingency of science disciplines and
knowledge structures.

e)

Students should develop an appreciation of current changes in science
disciplines, both the emergence of n e w disciplines and the merging of existing

2

The term jargon is used here in its technical sense meaning technical terms that partly characterise
a discourse, not in the pejorative sense meaning cluttered and obfuscatory language. Thus jargon
includes the technical terms that characterise science.
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disciplines. Not only is this useful knowledge to have in a science education, but
it is motivating. It has the currency and immediacy that for m a n y school students
signals relevance, the interests in emerging disciplines reflect current interests in
the community such as environmental management the chemistries of polymers,
drugs, fuels and biological processes, advances in surgery, reproductive
technologies and so forth, micro-electronics and communications and
information technologies, and space travel, to n a m e some c o m m o n examples.
This is not to say that long-standing disciplines are of little use in the school
curriculum, because m a n y concepts fundamental to science education arose in
those disciplines, and a historical approach is a useful way of developing greater
understanding of them (Matthews 1994). H o w e v e r , the school Science
curriculum is typically based on traditional notions of the physics, chemistry and
biology disciplines: typically without their historical insights, as Matthews
argues, and just as typically without even recognising the immense amount of
work being done n o w in recent and emerging disciplines.
f)

Students should develop an appreciation of the organisational characteristics of
science disciplines, including that their post-war characteristics have arisen not
just because of their cognitive structures, but also their socio-political structures.

g)

W h e r e students are making comparative studies of disciplines, they should be
aware that there are other cognitive bases for structuring science knowledge
besides disciplines, such as domains (Shapere 1979).

h)

Students should develop an understanding that the Scientific Revolution is
characterised as a period of great and significant change in part because of
changes in both cognitive and organisational stnictures: n e w fields or disciplines
emerged, theories were structured differendy (notably using mathematical
structures), and scientific organisations emerged.
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Students should develop a knowledge of s o m e basic current and historical
scientific laws, and an appreciation of the nature of laws:
•

that laws are statements of natural regularities or patterns;

•

that laws were traditionally interpreted as being discoveries and statements
of truths; and

•

that laws are interpreted more recendy by s o m e as constructions and
statements of our best experimental understanding of natural regularities.

j)

Students should develop a knowledge of s o m e basic current and historical
scientific theories, and an appreciation of the nature of theories:
•

that theories are usually interpreted as descriptions CM- explanations;

•

that theories were traditionally interpreted as arising from observations,
where observations are independent of theories;

•

that theories are interpreted more recendy as influencing observations; and

•

that theories arise and are meaningful within paradigms, and typically
change with changes in paradigms.

k)

Students should develop a knowledge of s o m e current and historical
hypotheses, and an appreciation of the nature of hypotheses:
•

that hypotheses are interpreted usually as tentative expressions of theories
that require further evidence and testing.

Students should have experience at devising their o w n hypotheses, and at
devisingtestsfor their o w n and others' hypotheses.
1)

Students should develop an appreciation of the role of theory in observation,
together with the R V notion of objectivity, and the goal or purpose of being as
objective as possible. (See companion chapters on purpose and activity.) For
example, students should gain an appreciation of:
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the role of the brain in mediating sensory inputs (observations), as in the
effect of optical illusions, and in seeking patterns within unfamiliar sense
data;

•

notions of objectivity, subjectivity, evidence, deduction; and

•

the criteria used in different contexts to m a k e judgements about these
notions.

m)

Students should develop an appreciation of the multiple purposes and uses of
scientific theories. For example, students should develop an appreciation of:
•

different notions of Nature, both in non-western natural philosophies and
in the history of western European science; and

•

the effect of these beliefs about Nature on the purposes and activities of
science.

n)

Students should develop an appreciation of the relationships, and their limits,
between the cognitive and organisational structures of science. For example,
students should develop an appreciation of:
•

the cognitive disciplines of science and the bases for their structures;

•

organisational structures of science and the bases for their structures; and
the limitations of cognitive structures in accounting for the organisational
structures of science in society.

o)

Students should develop an appreciation of the characteristic elements and
structures of scientific language. For example, students should develop an
appreciation of:
•

technical vocabularies and the notion of jargon;

•

the highly nominalised structure of scientific language;

•

the use of passive voice;

•

the structures and purposes of characteristic science genres such as
explanations, reports and recounts; and
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the ways in which the characteristic structures and elements of scientific
language shape our view of Nature.

p)

Students should develop an appreciation that the meanings of scientific theories,
laws and language depends in part on their characteristic structures. This
appreciation would arise out of the experiences suggested in the paragraphs
above.

School science, at least as given in syllabus documents and external examinations,
pays relatively little regard to notions of structure, being concerned primarily with the
non-structural characteristics of scientific knowledge and certain activities (see Halliday &
Martin 1993; Matthews 1994). The present thesis provides both a rationale and a
theoretical framework as a means of including structure in a robust characterisation of
science in the school curriculum.
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Chapter 10
ACTIVITY
Activity, as in process, change or development, is a necessary, but not
sufficient, dimension of science.

Introduction
This chapter comprises an argument that activity, defined generally as process,
praxis, change or development, is a necessary but not sufficient characteristic or
dimension of science. Activity is a necessary dimension of science in that the meanings of
characterisation in the metascientific literature are incomplete without it, and it does not
reducetoany of the other dimensions. Activity is not a sufficient dimension of science in
that it does not completely characterise science. Where science is characterised in the
metascientific literature by activity, usually it is characterised also by one or more other
dimensions of science: knowledge, purpose, context, structure and belief system. These
other dimensions are used in explicating scientific activity, and scientific activity is used
in explicating the other dimensions. Scientific activity is not simply any activity, but
certain types of activity, and activity characterised by its association with particular
knowledge, purposes, contexts, structures and belief systems. W e have noted earlier that
activity or process is one of the two commonly used dimensions for characterising
science, and the metascientific literature is replete with detailed discussion and debate
about the nature and significance of the way science works. A s indicated in chapter 5, the
present chapter, and Appendix B.5, will use representative examples from these accounts
to show some of the ways science is characterised in the literature by activity. As with all
the companion chapters, it will not attempt to reproduce or even to systematically
summarise the literature, these tasks being beyond the scope of this thesis.

The argument in this chapter is made in four parts:
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evidence from the analysis of the summary statements in Figure A l , from
which the six proposed dimensions were constructed;

2)

evidence from argument in the metascientific literature, which will present
some issues of recurrent interest arising from characterisations of science by
activity, and explore some of the subdeties they entail;

3)

the relationships between the dimension of activity and the other dimensions;

4)

conclusions for use in theorising about the science curriculum.
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Evidence from the analysis of the s u m m a r y statements

Activity as a partial characteristic of science is indicated in the summary statements fr
the metascientific literature collected in Figure A.l
The collection of classes in Table A.4, and text units from the differentiae in Table
A.9 (column two, headed Activity), collectively indicate that science is characterised
partly by something being done or something happening, although this is interpreted very
differently across the literature. For example, m a n y traditional characterisations of science
address experimental activity, but as this chapter will show, experimental activity is
interpreted variously and in m a n y characterisations experimental activity is insufficient to
account for all activity. T h e term process is familiar in the science and education
literature, including science education, but its meaning is narrow and its use is debated.
T o label the proposed characteristic by that n a m e would be to invite its interpretation as
equating or closely resembling existing uses of process. For example, Millar and Driver
(1987) have identified three different meanings for the term processes as used in science
and science education:
These w e have identified as: the processes scientists use in investigating the
natural world, the cognitive processes involved in learning science and the
pedagogical processes taking place in classrooms. W e suggest that these are
essentially different... (Millar & Driver 1987, p. 39)
T h e present paper is concerned primarily with the first of these meanings, and, as
indicated above, has found that the literature has wider concerns than merely investigative
activity; it is concerned with the second and third meanings only as they are implied by
the first. O n these grounds the term process is too narrow a term to label the semantic
category of characterisations in the literature. Similarly, dynamic is used ambiguously in
the business literature. The term activity is proposed as an appropriate label for this
category of meanings from the metascientific literature: its meaning is sufficiendy broad
to encompass the broad range of meanings in the s u m m a r y statements, and it is not
identified already with a particular genre of related literature.
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The terms in Tables A.4 and A.9 indicate a great range of activities, processes and
changes, supporting a broad interpretation of scientific activity. S o m e authors
characterise science by limited types of activities only, though not always the same
activities, while others consider a wide range. For some authors, only experimental
activities are of interest while for others they are part of a larger set of activities. All these
characterisations are disputed, as argued in summary statements 25-27 (Scheffler). A
point of discrepancy also arises within some statements as well as between them. For
example, summary statements 4 and 14 specifically address the characteristic of activity
(processes and procedures respectively) among other characteristics. They also mention
other activities that are not inquiry activities, although they do not label them necessarily
as activities. S u m m a r y statements 4 and 14 alone also include explaining, studying,

organising, educating, accrediting, approving, discrediting, protecting, relating, thinkin
maintaining, and perpetuating.
Thus the terms indicating activity do not have clear, distinct uniformly agreed,
single meanings. The meaning for any one term can vary between statements, with some
terms being used differendy by different authors. Conversely, different terms sometimes
appear to be used synonymously and are used almost interchangeably. In m a n y cases the
clear and distinct meaning for a term can be inferred only from the context of the
surrounding text. T h e meaning is often imprecisely defined. For example, in summary
statements 4 and 14 processes and procedures are interpreted to m e a n processes or
procedures of inquiry, including experimental processes or procedures (although they are
not explicidy identified with experiments).
T w o points of discrepancy arise from the meanings of text units in different
statements. First, different terms, processes and procedures, are used to label essentially
the same concept of inquiring activities. Secondly, w e see from some other summary
statements that there is disagreement as to what inquiry processes are. Statements 78,
120, 95 and 96 (the latter two both edited by Messell) m a k e contradictory claims about
scientific method, reflecting a particular debate over the existence and nature of such a
method. In statements 81-84 Schuster seeks to dispense with conventional notions of a
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scientific method by establishing a more comprehensive framework. Several statements
set out a standard view of science, which approximates the positivist R V . This view
proposed a fairly fixed notion of scientific activity (statements 25, 30, 33, 47). Others
promote some of the more open and variable views of scientific activity that post-date the
'standard view' (statements 36, 38, 39, 81-84).
The variety of terms and their uses leads to a collective imprecision of meaning.
Thus, despite the considerable precision of argument presented by m a n y of the authors,
the field of metascientific literature is not characterised by agreed, clear and precise use of
these terms, nor on which terms are significant. The set of terms indicating activity is not
suited, therefore, to further analysis into distinct sub-categories, for to do so is likely to
require the acceptance of some of the summary statements and the rejection of others.
This would defeat the purpose of the present thesis, which is to construct a broadly
acceptable framework for understanding the field.
The variation in use is represented or interpreted in the summary statements by both
the variation in the terms used, and by the possible (semantic) interpretation of any one
term in one or more of three ways:
(a)

as processes, methods, activities or change generally (such as activities,
clarification of problems, methods, combination of methods ..., developing,
search, skill, study, technique); and/or

(b) as processes manifest in the psychology of individuals, or in the behaviour of
individuals or the behaviour of groups (such as behaviour, observing,
experimenting, describing, classifying, analysing, explain, approving or
discrediting scientific conclusions, protecting the interests of the scientific
estate, maintain and perpetuate, making plans, the ability to ... relate
propositions); and/or
(c)

as abstracted logical, psychological or linguistic processes (such as
deductions and inferences, classifying, describing, explain, discover,
intuition, ordinary perception, m e m o r y and understanding).
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These three general interpretations are simply general semantic approaches: they are
attempts to represent different meanings of activity in science. Quite clearly, m a n y terms
will fit more than one of these interpretations. They are not suggested as classes of
categorisation: (1) they d o not meet the criterion of each termfittingonly one category;
(2) attempting to represent them as categories or sub-groups of processes would involve
a degree of interpretation not suited to the attempt in this paper to ground the analysis in
the literature; (3) this collective imprecision implies a lack of uniformity in the
interpretation and use of the terms which renders an analysis based on individual terms
difficult to justify; (4) some of the general terms in (a) fit in (b) or (c) depending on h o w
they are used; and (5) the present thesis does not seek to establish a finely constructed
hierarchy of classification categories. Again, a broad interpretation of the characteristic of
activity will avoid such a difficulty.
Examples from just the first twenty summary statements show some of this diverse
meaning:

study

(1)

based on the deductions and inferences which can be m a d e

(1)

formulated, from reproducible observations and measurements

(1)

skill; proficiency
extend the range of experience and to reduce it to order
all exploratory activities

(1)
(2)
(3)

to come to a better understanding

(3)

developing

(4)

to explain

(4)

a set of processes for observing, experimenting with, describing, classifying

(4)

and analysing
traditionally studied

(4)

domain of h u m a n knowledge and activity within which scientists seek

(5)

systematic organisation of knowledge

(5)
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Scientists attempt to acquire and organise knowledge

(5)

formulation of laws and theories describing natural processes

(5)

explaining

(5)

testing of proposed explanations by means of empirical observation and

(5)

experimentation
built

(7)

an activity characterised by the search for understanding

(8)

accessible to experimental tests

(8)

a search for understanding

(9)

experimental test

(9)

attempt to make the chaotic diversity of our sense experience correspond

(10)

activity

(11)

form conceptual generalisations about the m a n y particulars of empirical evidence (11)
a way of knowing

(12)

a h u m a n activity that has evolved

(13)

a way of looking ... and a way of ordering ... and checking

(13)

procedures for verifying or falsifying

(14)

highly technical measures often requiring mastery of mathematics

(14)

educating and accrediting ..., approving or discrediting ..., and... protecting... (14)
appropriate way to relate to reality

(14)

way of thinking ... to maintain and perpetuate ... social domination and

(14)

subordination
creation of the h u m a n mind with itsfreelyinvented ideas

(15)

form a picture of reality and to establish its connections

(15)

observation

(17)

respond to challenge and questions
the development of knowledge

(18)
(18)

the producers (researchers), the process of research... the reporting sub-system
the knowledge-producing and knowledge-distributing industries

(18)
(18)

Chapter 10: Activity

264

• a knowledge producing and knowledge improving enterprise

(19)

• activity

(20)

• predict and control... and to explain and understand

(20)

Many of the terms are used in wider contexts than just the scientific and
metascientific literature, and so are open to a wider interpretation than terms that have
only technical or jargon use. In these cases the reader m a y associate particular meanings
to them in the present discussion. T h e examples of process and dynamic have been
mentioned above in this context S o m e of these subdeties of use will be mentioned in the
analysis later in this chapter and in Appendix B.5.
Given the discussion above, a definitive treatment of the characteristic of activity is
implausible; it is certainly beyond the scope of this paper. W e have noted already a
variety of activities named, variation in the terminology used in describing them, and
different accounts of particular activities, sometimes in stark contradiction with each
other. O n these grounds alone, agreement on a single definitive statement would be an
improbable outcome. M o r e significantiy, the very notion of a definitive explication is at
odds with some of the views included in the summary statements. In any event a
definitive explication is not necessary to serve the purpose of this chapter, which is to
m a k e the case that activity is a necessary but not sufficient characteristic of science.
Instead, in establishing that science is partly characterised by some developmental,
dynamic or active aspect, the remainder of this chapter and Appendix B.5 will address a
range of issues found in the literature which, taken collectively, indicate (a) some of the
ways in which such activities are understood, and (b) some of the issues by which this
understanding is argued and contested. A n account of the nature of science must say
something about activity if it is to be adequate but it is not possible to say everything
about the nature of that activity.
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Evidence f r o m argument in the metascientific literature

Debates in the metascientific literature address many aspects of scientific activity,
again supporting a broad interpretation of scientific activity. It is clear that the literature
draws upon a broader notion of activity than m a n y individual thinkers have proposed.
This breadth is interpreted both as a wider range of activities than m a n y individual
accounts recognise, and as different interpretations of the same activities. The variations,
implications and subtieties of the views in several of these debates are outlined below, but
discussed in detail in Appendix B.5.
B.5.1 Activity as observable and non-observable
Science is characterised most obviously by - and indeed is manifest in - observable
activities, but it is also characterised by mental or non-observable activities.
B.5.2 Activity as method and methodology
Science is c o m m o n l y characterised, at least in the metascientific literature, by
particular methodologies rather than methods, where methodology is our understanding
of the principles and logic that underpin scientific inquiry.
B.5.3 The characterisation of a Western European scientific tradition by activity
Histories of the western European scientific tradition routinely characterise science
by activity, both technical and reasoning activities, and both the developments of
characteristic methods and methodologies. For example, the development of a tradition of
hypothetico-deductivism characterises much of science history (Oldroyd 1989).
B.5.4 The problem of induction
Induction is a long-standing methodological tradition in western European science,
and remains a plausible w a y to build a commonsense view of the world. However, there
are severe philosophical flaws with induction, for which there are no clear solutions.
A m o n g the responses have been to propose methodologies that do not require induction,
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as in falsificationism, and to require only that inductions be probably true given large
enough samples.
B.5.5 The characterisation of key metascientific viewpoints by activity
Various metascientific views characterise science by different activities. While all
acknowledge empirical activities as central, the views differ in their emphasis and
interpretation and in their account of other activities. These views are summarised in
Table B.5.1.
B.5.6 The notion of a uniform method of science
M a n y characterisations of science have traditionally referred to a single, uniform
scientific method, but this is rejected in post-positivist accounts of science.

B.5.7 Interpretations of some characteristic scientific activities: experiment, observati
explanation and prediction
Experiment, observation, explanation and prediction are central activities in most
views of science. The relationship between theory and experiment and in particular
theory and observation is of particular interest. In m a n y popular and traditional accounts
of science, scientific observation (and perhaps experiment) is 'objective', meaning
independent of theory and preceding it. However, at least in m a n y examples, postpositivist accounts identify a role of theory as influencing, however implicitly,
observations. This is the 'theory-laden-ness' of observation. The recendy emerged genre
of laboratory studies have shifted from considering only idealised reconstructions of
experiments to explicating all activities in laboratories, with the result that scientific
knowledge is argued to arise from a m u c h broader range of activities. Part of the theoryladen-ness of observations is the link between observation and language, in which
language is interpreted as not merely being the means of representing reality, but also of
constructing our knowledge of it.
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B.5.8 Mathematical activities in science
Science is characterised partly by mathematical activities, notably the development
of graphing and calculus to represent variation, of algebra to represent all existing
magnitudes, and in the twentieth century of massive increases in computational power.
B.5.9

Debate over discovery and verification

The positivist R V rejected discovery as a characteristic scientific activity because it
w a s not subject to rational interpretation or reconstruction, and relegating ittopsychology
and history. T h u s there w a s no account of the formation of hypotheses, only their
rational justification. In post-positivist accounts of science this is a distortion of scientific
activity, and their are various accounts of the activities by which hypotheses are formed.
B.5.10 Activity as more than method and methodology: internalist and externalist
perspectives on scientific activity
Post-positivist accounts characterise science by m o r e than just experimental
activities, for several reasons. Experiment is n o w believed to be less distinct as an activity
than once thought The role of experiment is n o w characterised as m u c h more complex,
and a wider range of activities are n o w believed, in most accounts, to contribute to the
intelligibility of science. For example, the philosopher R o y Bhaskar (1975) has argued
that the role of scientists' work in creating meaning from experiments is not recognised
by traditional philosophies of science. Similarly, the sociologist Jerome Ravetz (1971)
has argued that the activities of scientists have craft-like characteristics that are critical to
the success of science, and again are not represented in traditional characterisations of
science. Furthermore, expressions of scientific activity in science policy, such as by
governments, m a y not even argue the differences from traditional views and simply
presume a broader scope of scientific activity in planning and measuring the outcomes of
science.
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Activity as a necessary dimension of science
The argument above and in Appendix B.5 has s h o w n a variety of w a y s in which
the metascientific literature characterises science by activity. A s a list it is not an argument
that activity is a necessary dimension of science. Rather, it is the arguments, summarised
in such a list that metascientific arguments claim that there are characteristic activities of
science and that characterisations would fail without them. Further, the variety of
accounts and interpretations means that understanding of scientific activity entails some
familiarity with at least some of the major views and their differences. T o recognise only
a single position, w h e n there exists a substantial academic literature of debate, is to fail to
appreciate that there m a y be plausible alternatives, to miss insights provided by
alternatives, and especially to be unable to defend a particular view from the attack of
other views. O n e cannot appreciate the certainty or strength of a particular view without
appreciating the strength of alternative arguments. It follows that to understand science,
one must: first, understand the contribution of activities to the nature of science;
secondly, appreciate that accounts of this contribution differ; and thirdly, appreciate the
insights of some alternative characterisations.
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T h e relationships between the dimension of activity a n d the other

dimensions

T h e discussion in Appendix 5, of activity as characterised in the metascientific
literature, made occasional and passing references to other dimensions of
characterisation. As in each of the companion chapters, this section will provide a few
examples of characterisations employing activity in combination with other dimensions.
Activity, belief system and knowledge
There are many examples of the general interaction of activity, knowledge and
belief system. Notably, science is commonly characterised by beliefs about the
appropriate activities for interacting with the cosmos, that are logically expressed in
very activities and result in knowledge of the cosmos:
... I [have] argued that, as a result of the evolution of scientific thought, there
has emerged a broad and coherent picture of the universe and of life in it a view
which, while incomplete and in some aspects open to serious question, is at
present the best picture available. In the present section I will argue that this
process of unification has not been restricted to the integration of beliefs about
the world, but that there has also been a progressive tendency toward unification
of those beliefs with the methods employed to attain well-grounded beliefs. That
is, I will argue, the methods w e consider appropriate for arriving at wellgrounded beliefs about the world have c o m e more and more to be shaped by
those very beliefs, and have evolved with the evolution of knowledge.
Such a view of the intimate relation between knowledge and the methods of
gaining knowledge flies in the face of the traditional sharp bifurcation of the
two. For it is, and has long been, commonly assumed that there exists a unique
method, the 'scientific' or 'empirical' or 'experimental' method, allegedly
discovered or at least first systematically applied in the seventeenth century,
which can be formulated wholly independendy of, and is wholly unaffected by,
the knowledge which is arrived at by its means. It is as though scientific method
is a set of abstract and immutable rules, like the rules of chess, independent of
the strategies of the game but governing what strategies are possible.
Yet the most strenuous efforts of scientists and philosophers have failed to
produce agreement as to precisely what that method is. Indeed, general
philosophical theories about science according to which there is an eternal
scientific method which, once discovered, needs only to be applied to generate
knowledge, but which itself will not alter in the light of that knowledge, have
proved either empty or false. (Shapere 1984, p. 178)
Thus the significance of Galileo's and Kepler's mathematical developments is not simply
changes in methods or methodologies, but shifts in beliefs as to what the mathematics
represents: new ontological and epistemological possibilities. The ontological and

epistemological implications are significant in the literature. The precedence of activi
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vis-a-vis belief system is not fixed, either. Hacking's (1983) analysis of the relationship
between theory (a structure that if well established is interpreted here as an expression of
belief system) or experiment, gave examples of prior theory, of experimental activity
prior to an explanatory theory and of concurrent development of the two. O f course,
dissemblance of theory into various reasoning activities (as theorising) blurs this
distinction, but is not m a d e here because the reduction of all to activity obscures the role
of the theory as product.
The following passage is a good example of this interplay and its dissociation from
what would be regarded typically as a 'common-sense' view of the world. The context of
the passage is that Davies (1988) has introduced the notion, arising from quantum
physics, that 'the world of our experience - the universe that w e actually perceive - is not
the only universe', that there are 'countiess billions' of 'parallel' universes alongside ours
(Davies 1988, pp. 11-12). The concern here is the role of mathematical activity and
beliefs about this mathematics activity and the nature of the cosmos:
In the mid-1960s a remarkable mathematical formula w a s discovered by the
physicist John Bell. A n y logical theory based on the independent reality of subatomic particles which adherestothe well-established principle that faster-thanlight signalling is impossible obeys this formula. Q u a n t u m theory on the other
hand does not. Recent experiments in which pairs of photons (particles of light)
are sent simultaneously through two pieces of polarised material set obliquely to
one another confirm that Bell's formula is indeed violated.
These studies show that reality, inasmuch as it has any meaning at all, is not
a property of the external world on its o w n but is intimately bound up with our
perceptions of the world - our presence as conscious observers. (Davies 1988,
p. 12)
That is, Davies appeals to the interplay between activity (observing and mathematical) and
belief system (beliefs about reality) in characterising science.
Criteria for activity, arising from the belief system
O n the present analysis, some well-known historical developments in scientific
activity are more accurately and usefully identified as associated with changes in die belief
system. For example, two influential developments in inquiry activity have concerned
expositions of beliefs, criteria or rules (all elements of the belief system) about activities.
O n e is Newton's four 'Rules of Reasoning in Philosophy' in the third edition of the
Principia in 1687 (Newton 1713/1934), which constitute criteria relating beliefs about the
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cosmos to developing knowledge of it. M o r e widely known are Mill's Canons, which are
not descriptions of activities but principles for conducting inductive inquiry; they are
mentioned in Appendix B.2.
Another development frequently noted in the literature is a change in the
interpretation of the significance of the mathematical procedures. The Aristotelian and
Ptolemaic approaches of the Middle Ages had been interpreted as functional descriptions
but not representing reality. This was called saving the phenomena, as discussed in
Appendix B.2 on belief system. The shift from mediaeval to classical science is usually
characterised partly by a shift in beliefs about the significance of mathematical activities,
from functional descriptions (instrumentalism) to representing reality. A s w e have seen,
instrumentalism and realism remain current, although competing, views of science today.
T h e interplay between mathematics and science was strengthened by Rene
Descartes, whose Cartesian system was very influential for several generations (Singer
1959, p. 264; Dijksterhuis 1986, p. 408). Descartes m a d e strong ontological claims
about the relationship of mathematics to the cosmos, that Nature corresponded
fundamentally with numbers (Singer, p. 226) but not in the ways claimed by
numerology. T h e Cartesian belief justified the mathematical activity that is identified
d o w n to the present day, which in constructivist interpretations (such as Descartes and
Kant) identifies the products of mathematics and science with mental activity.
F r o m Newton's work the fundamental belief that Nature could be represented
mathematically led to a mathematical physics that enabled quantitative and more reliable
explanations of Nature. This fundamentally shaped what became known as Classical
science: a coherent and plausible synthesis of ontological, epistemological and
methodological beliefs, including notions of experimentation, the use of mathematics,
and the relation of this mathematics to metaphysical entities. The role of the belief system
is examined in Chapter 7 of this thesis.
Activity and knowledge
Elements of the interdependence of activity and knowledge have been addressed in
the discussion in Appendix B.5 on experiment and theory, to the extent that theories are
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constructs of knowledge. Historically, the success of the n e w experimental techniques
contributed to the decline of the older belief systems, such as Aristotelian and magical
beliefs, and the activities that characterised them. Further, the sheer scope of activity
brought about the possibility of a far more integrated and comprehensive understanding
of the cosmos. The mathematical techniques that enabled relativity and quantum theories
in the twentieth century are clear examples of this in physics; microscopic techniques,
including staining and electron and ion microscopytechniques,are examples in biology.
Activity, structure and purpose
The comparison of deduction, induction and abduction in Appendix B.5.9 is a
straightforward example of the interrelationship between activity and structure. These
activities derive their distinctiveness from their characteristic structures: alterations to
these structures either create errors, as in erroneous deductions, or convert them to other
syllogisms with different meanings. Further, each of these activities has a different
purpose that arises from its characteristic structure, as given by the passage quoted in
Appendix B.5.9, from H o o k w a y (1992a).
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Conclusions for use in theorising about the science curriculum

This section extends the argument, given above, that activity is integral to
characterisations of science in the literature, to claim also that it should form part of
school science. First the present chapter has argued that activity is a necessary, but not
sufficient, characteristic of science in the literature. Secondly, the scope of scientific

activity is broader than many individual characterisations address, in particular tradition

internalist characterisations common in school curricula. Thus to understand science, it is
necessary to have a robust understanding of scientific activity, which includes an

appreciation that there is a variety of views of science that provide a variety of insights.
The introduction to the present thesis referred to Millar and Driver (1987) as
challenging the traditional characterisation of science by/as knowledge and/or processes.
Specifically, Millar and Driver claim the authority of 'current philosophy of science':
[Tjhere is no empirical evidence to support the view that a clearly describable
method of science, consisting of a set of identifiable 'processes', exists. W e
argue that the c o m m o n l y listed processes are aspects of our general cognitive
functioning from infancy and that science can lay no special claim to them.
(Millar & Driver 1987, p. 36)
And again on page 45:
Firstiy we suggest that to characterise the contribution that science makes to the
curriculum in terms of teaching its method is a proposition which is based on the
shakiest of foundations. There is little support for the view that an algorithm for
gaining and validating scientific knowledge can be identified and communicated
to others. Secondly, w e argue that the idea of separate 'science processes' as
being uniquely characteristic of the w a y scientists work also fails to stand up to
scrutiny; the 'processes' which are commonly identified as 'scientific' are in fact
characteristic of m a n y h u m a n endeavours. W e will argue in the final section of
the paper that it is not the 'process' or, indeed, the 'processes' which
characterise science. It is to the 'constructs' and purposes that w e must look for
the particular characteristics of science, and for a rationale for its curricular
position. (Millar & Driver 1987, p.45) 1
While endorsing the strategy of Millar and Driver in seeking to ground school science
more accurately in current metascientific understandings of science, the present thesis

1

Note that Millar and Driver mention 'constructs' and purposes... for the particular characteristics
of science, which the present thesis identifies as structure and purpose, but which Millar and
Driver failed to explore.
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draws partly different conclusions from its more explicit and systematic analysis of the
literature.
First, it is generally agreed by scholars that no clearly describable method of
science exists, but it is disingenuous to conflate the notion of a single scientific method,
c o m m o n in school science, popular images of science, and perhaps undergraduate
science, with a generalised philosophy of science that has long abandoned such a notion.
Further, the position taken in the present thesis is to reject claims to the authority of
stylised fields such as the philosophy of science or the sociology of science, or even just
science.
Secondly, it is also true that m a n y activities undertaken in science are indeed
'characteristic of m a n y h u m a n endeavours', but this misses the point in several respects:
•

These activities are characteristic of science in particular when in combination
with a belief system, structures, conceptual framework, purpose and context
identified with science.

•

T h e converse is not so necessarily: activities of m a n y h u m a n endeavours are
not characteristic of science. Rhyming, for example, is characteristic of
poetry but not of science. It would be misleading to imply that, because
activities traditionally thought to be characteristic of science are found
elsewhere that they do not characterise science.

•

M a n y activities n o w in more general use arose in a scientific context While
the notion of controlling variables or predicting, for example, have a wider
use than the technical, scientific sense, they were developed and refined in
scientific contexts.

Thirdly, detailed semantic analysis of the metascientific literature, as undertaken in
the present thesis, indicates very clearly that a m u c h broader conception of activity than
the traditionally identified observing, predicting, and so forth, is e m b e d d e d in
explications of science. Broader notions of activity are part of the conceptual resources
used in the metascientific literature in such discussions, and ignorance of them will limit
and distort an understanding of science and facility with it.
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Thus the present thesis supports Millar and Driver, in that the methods usually
thought to characterise science are characteristic of sound thinking generally and not
science uniquely. However, it also argues that methods do characterise science when in
combination with the other five dimensions of characterisation, and that experimental
methods are only part of a broader range of activities that characterise science.
I. Summary of findings about the nature of science from the review of
the metascientific literature.
There is a range of views of science activity
a)

Science is characterised by both observable (technical) and non-observable (mental
or logical) activities.

b)

Scientific methods are understood andrationalisedby methodologies.

c)

The popular notion of a unitary scientific method is contentious, and rejected by
recent metascientific scholarship.

d)

T h e western European scientific tradition can be characterised partly by
developments of methods and methodologies.

There is a variety of activities that characterise science.
e)

Variants of hypothetico-deductivism - forming hypotheses and making deductions
from them - have been an enduring characterisation of scientific activity in H P S .

f)

The formation of hypotheses in science is contentious in the literature: various
accounts have characterised it as induction, discovery, conjecture and social
negotiation.

g)

Induction is a plausible account of making generalisations and hypotheses from
empirical data, although philosophy shows that naive versions, at least, are flawed.

h)

Discovery is contentious in the metascientific literature, largely because the
positivist R V rejected it as a psychological and historical issue that cannot be
rationally justified; m a n y accounts in the post-positivist literature seek to redress
this imbalance in order to understand knowledge acquisition in science.
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i) Accounts of discovery include the psychological (focussing on the fresh
conceptualisation) and the sociological (focussing on the scientific status of
discovery rather than accounts of mere learning).
j)

S o m e accounts, such as Popper's falsificationism, allow simple, bold conjecture as
a means of generating a hypothesis.

k)

M a n y post-positivist accounts, notably critical accounts in S T S , reject
rationalisations of forming hypotheses because they tend to be normative rather
than describing actual practices; instead they seek to elucidate actual instances of
scientists interacting with each other, phenomena and instruments, in actual rather
than idealised contexts.

1)

Experiment is 'a designed practical intervention in Nature' (Bhaskar 1983c, p. 136)
in which observations are m a d e in socially contrived, purposeful, controlled and
reproducible conditions; experimentation is widely accepted as a characteristic
science activity, even in accounts where it is not emphasised.

m)

Traditionally, experiments were considered to produce the observational data from
which hypotheses and, ultimately, theories were constructed; that is, observations
were held to be prior to, or independent of, theory, meaning objective.

n)

Post-positivist accounts typically regard observations as influenced by theory, or
theory-laden; m a n y accounts interpret observations as being influenced by a
Weltanschauungen, or world view, which the present thesis interprets as part of the
belief system of the observer, other accounts characterise observations and theories
as being determined by language (the linguistic resources of the observer).

o)

Another activity that s o m e accounts claim characterises science is explanation;
positivists hold that science can only provide descriptions of phenomena, not
explanations of them, but this is contentious.

p)

Another activity that characterises science is prediction; it is the predictive successes
of science that confer on it authority.

q)

Mathematical activities have long been associated with science, and increasingly
characterise scientific activity; these include the use of algebra the mathematics of
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variation (calculus), and massive increases in computational p o w e r that have caused
the flourishing of m a n y fields and the growth of completely n e w fields, such as
artificial intelligence, cosmology, sub-atomic physics, and mathematical modelling.
r)

Post-positivist accounts of science have been concerned not just to revisit
characterisations of experiment but to clarify the role of non-experimental activities
in science; these arise from critiques of experiment and assumptions that the social
role of science needs explanation.

s)

Extra-experimental characterisations of scientific activity include the craft-like
character of scientists' skills, science as work, and the measurement of activity by
outcomes such as economic value and publications output

II. Implications for a school science that reflects the metascientific
literature

School science should present a robust notion of scientific activity, in such a way
as to provide a coherentratherthan anecdotal, understanding2. W e have noted that Millar
and Driver distinguish three meanings of the term processes in science education,
respectively processes of investigation, learning and pedagogy, and that the present thesis
is concerned with the second and third meanings only as they are influenced by the
present analysis of the first
Given the centrally empirical character of science, students should investigate
phenomena. However, there should be s o m e caveats on this statement. First critiques of
process-based science education (such as Millar &

Driver 1987) question the

effectiveness of open-ended inquiry-based learning as the sole, or even the dominant,
m o d e of instruction and learning. Secondly, the present thesis identifies a range of

The traditional characterisation of science as knowledge and/or processes is consistent with the
education tradition of categorising objectives as knowledge/skills/attitudes - that we know, we do,
and w e have particular dispositions towards things. This is to confuse a concept about people (that
we know, do, feel) with a concept about science. To have scientific knowledge, for example, is not
just to have the currenUy accepted knowledge of the cosmos, but to have knowledge of science
itself - knowledge of skills, of resources, of authorities in the field, etc. But this alone does not
address the purposeful nature of science, and other dimensions proposed by the present thesis.
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investigative methods, and in particular a rejection of the notion of a single, c o m m o n ,
scientific method. Therefore the present thesis advocates that students experience, and be
m a d e aware of, a variety of strategies, both in their o w n investigations, and case studies
of actual investigations.
Thirdly, the present thesis also identified a strong theme in post-positivist accounts
that experimental activity alone does not account for the generation and use of science
knowledge. Therefore, students should also experience, first hand and through case
studies, examples of the broader range of activities by which the literature characterises
science.
A note about practical work in school Science
O n e influence of philosophical and sociological views of classroom science
featured in the 1950/1960s curriculum projects, was the emphasis on the importance of
practical work in science. This came from two sources. First it c a m e from educational
theorists: Armstrong's ideas of heuristic tasks and Dewey's ideas of learning by doing,
though both dating from earlier in the century, influenced science curriculum projects in
the 1950/1960s in the U K and the U S A respectively (Fensham 1992, p. 792). Secondly,
it c a m e from the philosophy of science. Schwab, for instance, argued in the B S C S
project that science is a process of inquiry, and therefore has implications for the
curriculum:
T o teach science as inquiry, he suggested that two changes were needed in the
role of the laboratory. First, a substantial part of the laboratory work should be
m a d e to lead rather than to lag the classroom phase of scienceteaching.Second,
the demonstration function of the laboratory should be subordinated to two other
functions, namely, to provide a tangible experience of some of the problems of
acquiring data dealt with in science and to provide occasions for an invitation to
conduct miniature but exemplary programs of inquiry (Fensham, 1992, p. 792).
A second influence, also from the philosophy of science, w a s the advocacy of the
use of models, as in the P S S C project. A third influence w a s the so-called process
approach in which the processes of science themselves became the things to be learned,
the learning objectives, in the curriculum. This led to two outcomes that will be taken up
later in this thesis. O n e was that the processes tended to be treated separately, producing
what Fensham (1992, p. 792) called 'atomised components of the investigative methods
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scientists employ'. The other was that the processes tended to separate from the content,
that is, the knowledge:
Initially ... (processes) had been advocated as essential components of the
content of science to complement and to give a dynamic to the otherwise
potentially sterile body of facts and conceptual knowledge that was n o w being
seen as appropriate for school learners.
... In the struggle, however, to apportion the n e w ideas about what the
content of school science might be in its traditional place in secondary education,
and the pressure for it also to be part of the curriculum of the earlier years, a
quite unphilosophical dissection occurred. Stated a little crudely but without
much exaggeration, the elementary or primary curriculum got the processes, and
the secondary curriculum retained the content of science, which was n o w much
more conceptual and less factual and descriptive (Fensham 1992, p. 792)
Historical, philosophical and sociological influences were much greater by the 1980s,
both on the scope and number of ideas, and the creation and implementation of curricula.
This is of central interest to this paper.
In Fensham's view, the philosophical viewpoint has changed chiefly with respect
to some revision of the claims made for practical work:
For example, Hodson (1988) has refined Schwab's earlier work on Science as
Enquiry by pointing out differences a m o n g the inquiries in science. Each one
arises in relation to specific subject matter, and the essence lies in the sorts of
concepts, data, and questions that are employed. It is this interweaving of
phenomena, concept and process that Millar and Driver (1987) express in their
concerns about the predominant place m a n y junior science curricula have given
to science processes over science content. Lybeck (1981), in his study of the
teaching and learning of the Archimedes principle, has provided a splendid
example of the point Hodson is making. Earlier Hodson (1985) used a
philosophical basis to identify a number of distinct learnings in science
education. If these distinctions are not to be blurred or lost, he argues, each
needs a definite 'space' in the curriculum so that students recognise it for what it
is and have enough practice with it. (Fensham 1992, p. 802)
Suggestions as to how this can be achieved have been made by other writers and in some
curriculum materials.
Finally, note that the traditional characterisation of science as knowledge and/or
processes is consistent with the education tradition of categorising objectives as
knowledge/skills/attitudes - that we know, we do, we have particular dispositions

towards things. This is to confuse a concept about people (that we know, do, feel) with a

concept about science. To have scientific knowledge, for example, is not just to have th
currendy accepted knowledge of the cosmos, but to have knowledge of science itself,
such as knowledge of skills, resources or authorities in the field. But even this alone
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not address the dimensions of nature of science that are purposeful, are structured, and
forth.
Following are some specific examples in response to the summary in part I, above.
There is a range of views of science activity
a)

Students should develop an appreciation of, have some experience of, and develop
some competence in a variety of observable (technical) and non-observable (mental)
activities. S o m e examples could be:
•

Students should be able use a variety of instruments and apparatus used to
extend the senses and manipulate the environment. These should include both
simple, traditional school laboratory apparatus, and examples of electronic,
information and communication technologies.

•

Students should have opportunities to develop mental skills, such as
comparing, predicting, analysing and evaluating arguments, and making
judgements.

•
b)

Students should develop metacognitive skills.

Students should develop an appreciation of some methodologies, such as
induction, hypothetico-deductivism, verificationism and falsificationism. For
example:
•

Students should have opportunities to evaluate and compare the effects of
different methodologies, such as the effects on an investigation of
verificationist and falsificationist strategies. Opportunities should include
investigations carried out by the students/class, and case studies of actual
scientific work.

c)

Students should understand that investigative activity in science is not formuladriven and instead proceeds by various methods, although some activities, like
observation and prediction, are typical. For example:
•

Students should have the opportunity to analyse investigations, both their
o w n and case studies of others, to identify component activities and their
purposes.
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Students should develop an appreciation of h o w methods and methodologies partly
characterise the western European scientific tradition. For example:
•

Students should study and where feasible replicate historical examples of
simple experiments in order both to develop their o w n scientific
understandings and to appreciate h o w these understandings represented
historical developments.

There is a variety of activities that characterise science.
e)

Students should gain an appreciation of the significance of hypothetico-deductivism
in western European science. For example:
•

Students should have experiences in forming hypotheses and making
deductions from them

f, j) Students should develop an appreciation of the range of views of generating
hypotheses, such as induction, discovery, conjecture and negotiation.
•

Students should analyse a variety of examples of hypothesising, both from
their o w n efforts and from case studies of historical and contemporary
examples.

g)

Students should gain an appreciation of the nature and role of induction, and of
some of its flaws.
•

Students should analyse a variety of examples of induction, both from their
o w n efforts and from case studies of historical and contemporary examples.

h, i) Students should gain an appreciation of the nature and role of discovery as an
activity of knowledge acquisition, and of critiques of discovery.
•

Students should analyse a variety of examples of scientific discoveries from
case studies of historical and contemporary examples.

k)

Students should gain an appreciation of actual examples of scientists hypothesising,
and not just idealised examples. For example:
Students should analyse a variety of examples of actual hypothesising from
case studies of historical and contemporary examples.
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Students should have opportunities to compare examples of actual
hypothesising with their rational reconstructions.

1)

Students should gain an appreciation of the nature and role of experiment in
science, including experimental purposes, structures, controls, reproducibility and
social contrivance. For example:
•

Students should develop skills in designing experiments, controlling
variables, replicating, and comparing the results of different experimental
designs.

•

Students should analyse case studies of historical and contemporary
experiments.

m , n) Students should gain an appreciation of the interplay between observation and
theory, such as the ideal (once the prescription) of theory-independent observation,
and the role of theory and language in observations.
•

Students should analyse examples where experimental (observational) data
are or have been interpreted in more than one way, and the criteria used to
m a k e these judgements.

o)

Students should gain an appreciation of the nature and role of explanation in
science, and that there are different views of explanation.
•

Students should analyse, using more than one account of explanation,
examples of explanations given by scientists and others.

p)

Students should gain an appreciation of the nature and role of prediction in science.
•

Students should develop skills in making predictions and testing them.

•

Students should analyse case studies of historical and contemporary
predictions.

q)

Students should gain an appreciation of the role of mathematics in science,
including experience themselves in mathematical activity.
•

Students should have opportunities to develop non-mathematical, nonquantitative understandings of science concepts.
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• Students should develop an appreciation of the role of mathematics in refining
understandings, refining measurements, and in enabling fresh
understandings.
•

Students should develop mathematical skills and knowledge and have
opportunities to apply them in scientific contexts.

r, s) Students should gain an appreciation of the natures and roles of non-experimental
activities in science. In particular, students should gain s o m e proficiency in the
craft-like character of scientific skills, gain an appreciation of science as work, and
the ways in which scientific work is measured.
•

Students should develop craft skills of science, such as observation,
manipulation, calibration, assembly, fabrication and the care of living
organisms; they should develop an appreciation of the role and value of these
skills.

•

Students should have opportunities to see scientists at work, both in person
and through audio-visual or multimedia resources, and where possible to
interact with scientists.

•

Students could have opportunities to do work-study with scientists.

•

Students should develop a familiarity with scientific journals and other
examples of scientists' work, and develop an appreciation of their worth.
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Chapter 11
KNOWLEDGE

K n o w l e d g e , as in the state of k n o w i n g a n d a body of truths, facts or
wisdom, is a necessary, but not sufficient, dimension of science.

Introduction
This chapter comprises an argument that knowledge is a necessary, but not
sufficient, dimension of science. Knowledge is defined generally, for example:
[Knowledge is] anything that is known by somebody and as 'production of
knowledge' any activity by which someone learns of something he or she has
not k n o w n before, even if others have. (Machlup 1980, p. 7)

It is interpreted both as the state of knowing and the body of collected truths, facts
wisdom:

Knowledge
1. acquaintance with the facts, truths, or principles, as from study of
investigation; general erudition.
2. familiarity or conversance, as with a particular subject, branch of learning,
etc.
3. acquaintance; familiarity gained by sight experience, or report: a knowledge
of human nature.
4. the fact of state of knowing; perception of fact or truth; clear and certain
mental apprehension.
5. the state of being cognisant CM- aware, as of a fact or circumstance.
6. that which is k n o w n or m a y be known.
7. the body of truths or facts accumulated by mankind in the course of time.
8. the sum of what is known.
9. cognisance of facts, or range of cognisance: this has happened twice in my
knowledge.
(The Macquarie Dictionary, emphases in original)
Thus knowledge applies to both a state of the knower (definitions 1, 2, 3, 4,5, 9 above

and that which is known (6, 7), but this distinction is not always made clearly (8). T
chapter will address all three possibilities, namely what it means to have scientific
knowledge, the body of scientific knowledge, and discussions about knowledge that do

not distinguish clearly between the two. The claim that having scientific knowledge is
state of the knowing individual and not of science is included in the present thesis,
along with views that oppose it. The objection itself arises from particular views of
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science and epistemology, and is opposed by other views; the present thesis explicidy
seeks to establish a framework that will enable comparison of all views, and so includes
this objection as one view. Secondly, the collection of summary statements, and other
arguments in the literature, do not restrict the notion of knowledge in this w a y : in the
literature, science is characterised by knowledge as a particular state of knowing, by
knowledge

as a body of knowledge, and sometimes by knowledge

as an indistinct

notion. Therefore this thesis addresses each possibility.
This chapter will argue that knowledge is a necessary dimension of science in that
the meanings of characterisation in the metascientific literature are incomplete without it
and that the meanings of the other proposed dimensions will not substitute for its
omission. It is not a sufficient dimension of science in that it does not completely
characterise science. W h e r e science is characterised by knowledge, usually it is
characterised in combination with one or more other dimensions of science: activity,
purpose, context structure and belief system.
These other dimensions are used in explicating scientific knowledge, and scientific
knowledge is used in explicating the other dimensions. Thus scientific knowledge is not
simply any knowledge, but knowledge characterised by its association with particular
activities, purposes, contexts, structures and belief systems. W e have noted earlier that
knowledge is one of the two commonly used dimensions for characterising science, and
the metascientific literature is replete with detailed discussion and debate about the nature
and significance of scientific knowledge. T h e present chapter, together with Appendix
B.6, will m a k e selective use of these accounts only, to suit its purpose. In so doing it will
attempt to strike a balance between including sufficient detail to construct the argument
and not repeating detail available in the literature.
T h e argument in this chapter comprises four parts:
1)

evidence from the analysis of the summary statements;

2)

evidence from argument in the metascientific literature;

3)

the relationships between the dimension of knowledge and the other dimensions;

4)

conclusions for use in theorising about the science curriculum.
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Evidence from the s u m m a r y statements

Knowledge as a partial dimension of science is indicated in the summary statements
from the metascientific literature collected in Figure A.l. T h e collection of classes (in
Table A.3) and text units from the differentiae (column one of Table A.9, headed
Knowledge), collectively indicate that science is characterised partly by knowledge,
concepts, conclusions, facts, informative content, notions, common

sense or

understanding. A s with the other dimensions, this category of characterisation was
constructed from a semantic analysis of m a n y metascientific sources. Thus it includes a
wider range of viewpoints than do m a n y individual accounts in the literature.
Providing examples of text units meaning knowledge is straightforward: w e have
noted earlier that knowledge is one of the two c o m m o n dimensions of characterisation.
Thus, as w e have mentioned, knowledge in science is taken to mean the body of received
knowledge:
For nearly any body of knowledge that is sufficiendy organised to exhibit
appropriate evidential relationships among its constituent claims has at least some
call to be seen as scientific. W h a t makes for science is system, whatever the
subject (Quine 1978, in summary statement 37)
or of personal knowledge:
The creation of scientific knowledge 'begins with the plain and unembroidered
evidence of the senses, with innocent, unprejudiced observation ... and builds
upon it a great mansion of natural law' (Medawar). (Mulkay 1979, in summary
statement 47)
or is indistinct:
Scientific knowledge is experimental knowledge. It is characteristic of scientific
research that observational evidence plays a crucial role in the resolution of the
issue between contending hypotheses, and whatever sort of objectivity scientific
inquiry has depends crucially on this feature of the scientific method. (Boyd
1991, in summary statement 50)
Here is a selection of text units from just the first twenty summary statements,
showing the use of knowledge in characterising science:

• knowledge so obtained [from] systematic study (1)
• systematised knowledge in general

(1)
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(1)

a better understanding of the natural world

(3)

a developing body of knowledge - observations, concepts, laws and theories

(4)

a domain of human knowledge

(5)

systematic organisation of knowledge

(5)

knowledge about the universe and its parts

(5)

facts

(7)

search for understanding

(8)

this understanding being codified in statements

(8)

search for understanding expressed in laws or principles

(9)

conceptual generalisations

(11)

a w a y of knowing

(12)

a set of conclusions or a body of knowledge

(14)

scientific conclusions

(14)

facts

(15)

not even simply an accumulation of knowledge

(16)

a highly integrated form of knowledge which makes a world view

(16)

common sense

(17)

general understanding

(18)

knowledge

(18)

a knowledge producing and knowledge improving enterprise

(19)

a paradigm, or conceptual structure

(20)

empirical epistemology

(20)

explain and understand

(20)

Note the inclusion of laws and theories from statement 4. The present thesis
interprets laws and theories as cognitive structures, or structures of knowledge, as in
body of knowledge. Other statements within these first twenty also mentioned laws and
theories, but w e have not included them in this list, preferring to discuss these terms
separately, here. W e have discussed in chapter 4 phrases, commonly used, such as body
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of knowledge or set of conclusions, that could be interpreted either as structures (body
set) or knowledge (knowledge, conclusions), or both. T h e present thesis, in seeking to
address all characterisations, accepts both interpretations. Explications of law and theory
in the literature clearly characterise them as both knowledge and structure (and often other
dimensions, notably beliefs, purposes and activities). This does not imply that the
proposed categories of characterisation are insufficient to neady house law and theory in
just one category; rather, it shows that the categories are useful in explicating different
characteristics of complex notions such as law and theory. This is the function the present
thesis seeks to serve. Thus w e acknowledge the use of law and theory as knowledge
terms.
However, law and theory are addressed in the companion chapter on structure (with
the associated metascientific argument in Appendix B.4), for several reasons. The
principle reason is that the present thesis argues that law and theory, tike all the
characteristic terms it analyses, have a multidimensional character. However, it would be
repetitious to treat these terms, like law and theory, in each of the four, five or six
chapters that apply most strongly. Instead, the strategy has been twofold: to treat most
terms in one, or sometimes two chapters to show h o w they are characterised in those
dimensions; and to show in part 3 of the companion chapters h o w the dimensions actually
work in combination. L a w s and theories are clearly characterised by knowledge, but the
present thesis treats them mainly in the discussion on structure to draw the reader's
attention to their structural dimension. L a w s and theories also arise within, and derive
part of their character from, their contexts, especially their intellectual contexts. However,
to explore every element of characterisation for every scientific term and characteristic is
well beyond the scope of the present thesis, and in any case would belabour the point
Although knowledge is used c o m m o n l y to characterise science, its meaning is not
c o m m o n l y m a d e clear. There is a considerable literature devoted to arguing variations,
subtleties, complexities and a broader scope of what knowledge is, and h o w it
characterises science. The following section, and Appendix B.6, highlights some of these
arguments most relevant to the present thesis.
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Evidence from argument in the metascientific literature

This section mentions some of the argument in the literature that characterises
science by knowledge, reviewed in Appendix B.6. Although knowledge is one of the two
dimensions traditionally used to characterise science, this association did not m a k e the
present analysis necessarily easier: tradition is not sufficient reason to substantiate an
analysis of this type, and exacdy what w e mean by knowledge is rarely explained in
general science texts, other than to address fields or disciplines of knowledge. W h e n w e
turn to the metascientific literatures, there are strong and diverse views about the nature of
scientific knowledge, whose complexity is compounded by views in other literatures,
such as psychology. In informal discussions with a number of scientists and science
educators during the writing of this thesis, most viewed scientific knowledge primarily as
a list or m a p of knowledge content but this characterisation alone is unsatisfactory. With
some prompting, most agreed that science knowledge was more problematic than this, as
discussed in the metascientific literature, and in any event attempting to provide a
comprehensive m a p of such content could never be definitive. Related to its often
unspecified use, the term knowledge is used commonly in conjunction with one or
another of several other terms, for example belief, understanding and information, whose
meaning and relationship to knowledge are likewise often imprecise and interpreted
variously. Appendix B.6 delineates some of these uses and relationships in
characterisations of science, and is set out as follows.
B.6.1 Current metascientific views of knowledge
The variety of metascientific views characterise science knowledge and its role
differendy. These are summarised in Table B.6.1.
B .6.2 Illustrating an historical tradition of science by knowledge
The history of western European science is characterised partly by the development
of knowledge. Traditional histories tend to trace the successful ideas, meaning those
interpreted as precursors of later ideas. Thus these histories characterise the development

Chapter 11: Knowledge

290

of scientific knowledge as the progressive march of history. Developments in historical
scholarship have meant that contemporary approaches tend instead to evaluate historical
episodes from within their o w n contexts, rather than judging with hindsight.
B .6.3 Knowledge and belief; standard definitions of knowledge
Science is often characterised by knowledge in association with belief, where
knowledge is taken as a more secure form of belief. The standard definition of knowledge
in epistemology is that knowledge is justified true belief, although this has more recendy
been subject to philosophical attack for which there is no agreed answer.
B.6.4 Kinds of knowledge
a)

knowledge how and knowledge that

b)

internalist and externalist theories of knowledge

Science is characterised sometimes by particular kinds of knowledge. While there is
no philosophically or sociologically distinct kind called science, m u c h of philosophical
analysis has centred on propositional knowledge, or knowledge-that; this is commonly
taken to be the 'knowledge content' of science. Propositional knowledge-that comprises
empirical knowledge, derived by induction from observation statements, and a priori
knowledge, derived by deduction from axioms or assumptions. Practical knowledge-how
also characterises science, as argued in post-positivist philosophy and sociology of
science. The content of science knowledge is characterised in some views as arising only
from the mind of the individual (internalism), but in other views as also arising from
factors like the physical and social environments (externalism).
B.6.5 Knowledge and information
Science is also characterised sometimes by knowledge in the sense of data, facts
and information, both as a state of knowing and as that which is known. These terms
usually refer to the elemental contents of science knowledge and so m e a n a state of
knowing that is less certain than understanding. Data and information are particularly
interesting because of their astonishing increase in recent decades, k n o w n by terms such
as the information revolution or knowledge explosion.
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B.6.6 Knowledge and understanding
Science is characterised sometimes by knowledge in the sense of understanding,
meaning knowledge that is reasoned. Understanding usually means knowledge of the
underlying argument or of the implications, and is therefore more complex than simple
recall of data. The sheer volume of science knowledge in the sense of data or information
means that a personal understanding of it all is impossible. The public understanding of
science is the subject of a substantial literature itself, and is interpreted variously.
B.6.7 Knowledge as concepts and propositions
Science is also characterised by knowledge in the sense of concepts and
propositions. Propositional knowledge-that comprises statements that affirm or deny a
claim. A concept is a generalised term for a number of entities that are similar in some
way. Concepts and propositions typically comprise the knowledge content in science and
elsewhere.
B.6.8 Knowledge and power
Science is also characterised by knowledge as it applied to power and usefulness,
usually as its ability to predict

B.6.9 Knowledge as a map of scientific content or topics; current scientific conception
Science is also characterised by knowledge in the sense of a m a p of scientific
content. This is n o w often a reference to the information explosion, where any attempt at
a complete m a p is nonsensical, but it also applies to lists and categorisations, as for
example as the list of contents in science texts, in maps of sciencefieldsand disciplines,
in published sources like journals and in dissertation abstracts.

Knowledge as a necessary dimension

The argument to this point of the chapter and in Appendix B.6 establishes
knowledge as a (semantic) category of characterisation in the literature: knowledge is used
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in a number of senses, and from a number of theoretical positions. Thus at the broadest
level, knowledge is used in the sense of a knowing (or cognitive) state, as a body of
statements, or in a sense that does not distinguish clearly between the two. Theoretical
differences centre on a tension between the view that science knowledge arises direcdy
from sense experiences (a strong empiricism or positivism) and the view that it is a mental
construction (constructivism). There are a number of plausible middle-ground positions
that acknowledge both the central role of observations in forming science knowledge, and
mental and social activities in the actual construction of knowledge.
These arguments do not in themselves establish knowledge as a necessary
dimension, but their contribution to metascientific discussions does: metascientific
discussions commonly appeal to knowledge in characterising science as a central element
of science. That is, science is centrally concerned with knowledge: as the knowledge
content (of the cosmos); as knowledge structures like theories, propositions, and some
senses of disciplines,fieldsand domains; as knowledge-how and knowledge-that as
justified or reasoned beliefs (understanding); as elemental units of facts and information;
and as networks of generalised ideas (concepts). Characterisations of science fail if w e
remove these references to knowledge. There is an immense literature addressing these
elements, that includes different interpretations of them. T o understand the nature of
science knowledge, one must at least be aware that the literature construes science
knowledge in these various ways and, ideally, understand at least some of the insights of
the major positions. A s with the other categories of characterisation, to recognise only a
single position from the literature is to fail to understand that there m a y be plausible
alternatives, and hence possible alternative insights, and especially to be unable to defend
a particular view from the attack of other views. O n e cannot appreciate the strength of a
claim to science knowledge without appreciating the strength of alternative arguments. It
follows that to understand science, one must: first, understand the central role of
knowledge in characterising science; secondly, appreciate the diversity of accounts of this
knowledge; and thirdly, appreciate the insights of some alternative characterisations.
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Relationships between the dimension of knowledge a n d the other
dimensions

Knowledge is used pervasively to characterise science, and many examples show
the interrelationship between knowledge and the other dimensions. W e will review some
examples here.
Science knowledge in the twentieth century and scientism
A suitable illustration of the interrelationship between knowledge and other
dimensions is the nature and place of science knowledge in the twentieth century. It is
commonly accepted that scientific understandings change withtime;Table B.6.2 gives
some examples. Indeed, science histories typically emphasise the historical development
of science knowledge,ratherthan, say, scientific activities or institutions. The history of
both science and metascience give a m u c h more robust appreciation of the nature of
contemporary science (Matthews 1994). Metascientific analysis shows that science
knowledge has changed and will to continue to change; further, our understanding of it is
also likely to change. These are powerful insights. They challenge the traditional
characterisation of science knowledge as a body of eternal, that is, unchanging, truths.
However, the characterisation of science knowledge as authoritative is supported by its
utility, making it a valuable resource to both scientific and general cultures.
A second characteristic of science knowledge in the context of the twentieth century
is the increasing links between science, technology and policy, notably through industry
and government, as mentioned already. T h e knowledge, activities and purposes of
science are increasingly obscuretothe lay observer, who, through increasingly disparate
specialisations, m a y be a scientist whose expertise is in some otherfield.For example,
the equipment that characterises m u c h current scientific activity is often electronic and its
functions result from the action of silicon chips on circuit boards and other apparatus
concealed inside a sealed box. This contrasts with the equipment familiar to citizens from
their school Science, whose workings can be deduced mostiy from external examination
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and resemble instead the equipment of J. J. Thompson's physics laboratory barely a
century ago.
A third characteristic is that, inevitably, science knowledge develops sometimes
before ethical, cultural, political, legal and other factors, as with, for example, in

fertilisation, and the cloning of mammals. When science is embroiled in these ethical a

other disputes its image - its popular characterisation - as neutral, value-free, objec

knowledge is questioned in the public arena and, increasingly since the 1960s, rejected
Also, as science has increasingly served industrial and military ends, its expense,

purposes and underlying beliefs and values - and hence its knowledge claims - have been

disputed in the public arena. Certainly it presents choices to the community, but as we
discussed in the companion chapter on context and Appendix B.l, citizens' abilities to
make informed decisions about the choices is a contentious issue, and interpreted

variously. The resulting inaccessibility of science to democratic processes has fuelled
sentiments of alienation, mistrust and criticism of science:
Today's controversies reflect a long history of public ambivalence toward
science in American society (Mazur 1981). The acceptance of the authority of
scientific judgement has long coexisted with mistrust and fear, revealed, for
example, in the early opposition to innovations such as vaccination ortoresearch
methods such as vivisection. The romantic view of the scientist as a 'modern
magician', a 'miracle m a n [sic] w h o can do incredible things,' has been
parallelled by the negative images of m a d scientists: the D r Frankensteins and D r
Strangeloves that pervade popular culture (Rozak 1974, p. 31).
In part, public ambivalence has been a response to the obscurity and
complexity of science that appears to threaten the power of the citizen. T h e
growing importance of expertise in policy decisions seems to limit the
democratic process (Goggin 1986). Activists demand greater involvement in
decisions about science and technology, seeking participation in review boards
and decision-making groups. However, only about 5 % of American adults are
both attentive to science policy issues and sufficiendy literate scientifically to
understand and assess the arguments underlying the disputes (Miller 1990).
Thus disputes often have less to do with specific technical details than with
broad political issues: They represent the growing polarisation between those
w h o see scientific and technological developments as essential to social progress
and those w h o see these developments as driven by political or economic
interests (Richards 1988); between those with programmatic agendas seeking to
implement specific goals and those with moral lenses concerned about
accountability, responsibility, andrights.S o m e controversies (eg., over the
superconducting supercollider) remain mainly at a policy level where issues are
debated by experts, ethicists, and policy elites. Other (eg., over the use of
animals in research) are public protests engaging social movements and citizens
groups. Sometimes concerns have less to do with the implications of science and
technology than with the power relationships associated with them ... (Nelkin
1995, pp. 446-7)
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T h e present thesis interprets Nelkin's critique as arguing that late-twentieth century
science knowledge is characterised partly by its use in public disputes, whose resolution
involves understandings not just by scientists but in m a n y cases also by other interested
parties. This also involves scientific activity: by implication, the design, execution and
interpretation of experiments are contested as parts of the disputes.
The present thesis argues that knowledge (concepts) and (experimental) processes
alone account for neither disputes over the intellectual content nor socio-political issues:
they are understood m u c h better using the multi-dimensional characterisation proposed
here. Thus the supercollider example is characterised also by: a restricted context
(participants are those with demonstrated and accepted expertise - experts, ethicists, and
policy elites); activity (involvement in decisions, debate of the intellectual content or
knowledge); structure (of groups vying for expert status, and funding and approval
bodies); purpose (programmatic agendas seeking to implement specific goals); and belief
system (the assumptions and priorities of experts, ethicists, and policy elites). O n the
other hand, the example of animals in research is characterised also by: a broader context
(social movements and citizens groups, w h o by implication involve expert groups or
individuals where necessary as resources); activity (public protests); structure (there is a
contrast between organisations like review boards and decision-making groups, and
social movements and citizens' groups); purpose (citizen concern with science being
driven by political or economic interests); and belief system (moral lenses concerned
about accountability, responsibility, and rights). Both examples entail an obscure and
complex structure of science, which either precludes citizen participation, as with the
superconductor, or provokes it, as with vivisection.
Another characteristic c o m m o n to both types of examples is that they make complex
appeals to the character of science knowledge. Where the context is restricted to 'experts',
the involvement of policy elites signals questions of competition for funding, as with the
supercollider debates, or broader political issues. So even in these contexts, decisions are
not m a d e solely on the grounds of the intellectual content of science knowledge. Thus
B i m b e r and Guston (1995) characterise the U S debate over superconducting
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supercolliders as an example of characterising science as exceptional because of its unique
contribution to the economy:

The fourth category of argument [that science is exceptional] involves economic
exceptionalism. It relies on the claim that science is a uniquely productive
investment of current resources for future gain. In the United States, supporters
of a federal role in scientific research have been advancing such a claim since the
nation's founding, privileging science by protecting intellectual monopolies
under the U S . Constitution ...
Recent calls for a redoubling of the U S . academic research effort (Lederman
1991) have cited at least one analyst w h o claims to have documented
extraordinary rates of return for investments in scientific research (Mansfield
1991). O n e need look no further than the justifications that scientists offered for
enormous expenditures on the superconducting supercollider, for example - in
the presence of a crippling budget deficit -tosee the conviction with which m a n y
are willing to argue for the economic specialness of science. (Bimber and
Guston 1995, pp. 558-9)
That is, even in this example of so-called 'pure' science research, the question of wheth
or not to proceed with the research does not rely solely on its intellectual merit, but o

broader context of arguments such as the level of government funds allocated to scientif
research instead of some other policy area. Gieryn (1995, p. 436) has argued that the
relationship between science and government is very complex, where both government
and the science community try to keep the boundary between the two close 'but not too
close':
The dilemma for policy makers (in the broadest sense) is clear: Bring science
near enough so that political choices are legitimated by their perceived grounding
in authoritative and objective understandings of the facts as only science
provides, but not so close that choices and futures b e c o m e exclusively
'technical' and beyond the grasp and thus control of non-scientists. Scientists
also need to keep the fence on their 'politics'frontierwell mended. After all,
what makes scientific knowledge useful for politics is not just its content but its
putative objectivity or neutrality. Science can legitimate policy only if scientists
are not treated as just another interest group and their technical input is not
defined as just another opinion. Spillover in the other direction - from politics
into science- is just as dangerous for scientists' autonomy: W h e n politicians
themselves m a k e facts, the professional monopoly of scientists over this task is
threatened. A n even more likely threat is the capture of science by policy-making
powers - a loss of scientists' control over their research agendas and, in the
limiting case, over what is represented as 'scientific' knowledge. (Gieryn 1995,
p. 436)
Appendix B.l on context discusses this at greater length, including examples from US
and Australian government science policy. Thus scientific knowledge, even in pure
science, has a complex characterisation partly by context
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W h e r e the dispute involves public (lay) participants, such as the debates over
vivisection or fluoridation, the role of context in characterising science knowledge is

clearer. The authoritative, objective and neutral status of science knowledge is central,
and used as a resource by all sides in such debates. For example, Yearly (1995) has
argued that research into environmental issues continues to be dominated by 'top down'
projects from 'funding agencies and their political controllers'; there have been
surprisingly few 'radical research initiatives to appear in a bottom-up way from the
scientific community' (p. 476). Despite this, however, 'academic and institutionally
independent scientists still play a central role in analysing environmental issues' (pp.
7).
Thus both sides value the independence of the science knowledge: they contest the
debate by valuing the authority of the science knowledge that suits their purposes, and

question scientific authority that suits their opponents' purposes. Yearly provides a nic

example of Greenpeace questioning the neutrality of science faculties that rely on exter
funding, and the counter claim of the UK Atomic Energy Authority questioning the
independence of the University of London because it hosts the Greenpeace International
Science Unit This is common in public disputes involving science:
The authority of scientific enterprise has rested on assumptions about scientific
neutrality (Proctor 1991). T h e interpretations and predictions of scientists are
judged to berationaland i m m u n e from political manipulation because they are
enlisted by all sides of disputes. Just as industrial advocates use technical
expertise to support their projects, so too do the protest groups w h o challenge
them...
Though political values or moral issues m a y motivate disputes, the actual
debates often focus on technical questions. Quality of life issues are discussed in
terms of the physical requirements for a disputed facility or the accuracy of risk
calculations rather than the needs or concerns of a community. Concerns about
the morality of foetal research are reduced to debates about the precise point at
which life begins. This displacement of issues can be tactically effective, for in
all disputes broad areas of uncertainty are open to conflicting scientific
interpretation. W h e n decisions must be m a d e in a context of limited knowledge,
and mere is seldom conclusive evidence to dictate definitive resolution, power
m a y hinge on the ability to manipulate knowledge and to challenge the evidence
presented to support particular policies. But as technical expertise becomes a
resource, exploited by all parties to justify competing moral and political claims,
it becomes difficult to distinguish scientific facts from political values. Debates
a m o n g scientists reveal the value premises that shape the data considered
important, the alternatives weighed, and the issues regarded as appropriate
(Hilgartner 1992). (Nelkin 1995, p. 452-3)
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The present thesis interprets this passage as characterising science knowledge not just b
context, but also by belief system and purpose. The belief system includes assumptions
about scientific neutrality, judged to be rational, value premises and the assumption that
political values and moral issues characterise the non-scientific aspects of disputes are all
elements of the science belief system used. Purpose is more impticit, but is given as the
focus on technical questions, the notion of effective tactics, evidence presented to support
particular policies, and political values. The arguments in the companion chapters on
belief system, purpose and context and their respective appendices show that the
interpretation of Nelkin and Yearly, above, will depend on h o w one characterises science
and the interpretive perspective used.
A moderate internalist argument is that, although funding and policy issues affect
science, and the ultimate application of science knowledge, the work of scientists is
essentially buffered from these factors, and purely cognitive criteria and beliefs are
applied in (ideally) rational and objective ways. The evidence is weighed by scientists, as
in publication in refereed journals within a shared belief system. Competing knowledge
claims from different research efforts thus still need to be evaluated using scientific
criteria, that is, the criteria agreed to and used by the particular community of scientists.
This can be better understood by addressing the belief systems underpinning the
competing knowledge claims. It is this evaluated knowledge that is then used m o r e
widely by society. In partial contrast, another moderate externalist argument is that the
funding and poticy priorities and decisions determine what problems are identified and
investigated, and science knowledge cannot be divorced from these constraints.
Argument presented earlier, such as from Bhaskar, Ravetz and Longino, m a k e a plausible
claim that scientific knowledge has an inherendy social character and cannot be reduced to
a stricdy internalist (cognitive) structure, without requiring a strong externalism. A s with
other examples across the companion chapters, a moderate externalism seems most
defensible.
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Conclusions for later use in theorising about the science curriculum

This section extends the argument, developed above and in Appendix B.6, that
science knowledge is a necessary dimension of metascientific characterisations of science,
to claim also that it should form part of school Science. This is not the same as arguing
simply that school Science should include science knowledge and concepts: w e have
noted that science is commonly characterised by knowledge already, and that school
Science traditionally emphasises knowledge. The present section argues a stronger case,
that school Science should embody a richer, or more complex, notion of science
knowledge as it is characterised in the literature of its field.

I. Findings about the nature of science knowledge from the review of
the metascientific literature.
There is a range of currendy accepted views of science in contemporary scientific,
philosophical, sociological, historical and linguistic analysis, that characterise science by
various notions of knowledge. There is no simple, clear and universally agreed
explanation of science knowledge. Examples given in this chapter can be summarised as:
There is a range of views of science knowledge.
a)

Different metascientific perspectives offer different notions of knowledge in
science, as given in statements arising from: perception, in empiricism; mental
construction, in constructivism; or given in an external reality, but socially and
psychologically constructed, in scientific realism.

b)

There are different kinds of knowledge proposed, of which the kinds that mostiy
concern the present thesis are practical knowledge-how, and propositional
knowledge-that; there are two kinds of knowledge typically regarded as
knowledge-that.
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O n e kind of knowledge-that is a priori knowledge, which 'is derived from its
self-evident axiomatic bases by deduction ... [and] is said to come from reason.'
(Quinton, 1988, p. 279)

d)

T h e other kind of knowledge-that is empirical knowledge, which is derived from
'uninferred observation statements by deduction ... [and is usually said to derive
from] sense perception and introspection.' (Quinton, 1988, p. 279)

e)

Traditional accounts of science knowledge, that derive from positivism, have
emphasised the rational reconstruction of knowledge-that, and have paid scant
attention to, or have rejected, knowledge-how because it cannot be rationally
reconstructed.

f)

Post-positivist metascience has sought to explain the role of knowledge-how in
science, notably the knowledge that is entailed by the craft-like character of
scientific activity (Ravetz), and tacit knowledge (Polyani).

g)

T h e literature discusses knowledge in science in several senses: as a body of
knowledge, as in a published body of concepts and propositions; as a state of
knowing; and in senses that do not clearly distinguish between the two.

Knowledge is related to belief.
h)

T h e association between knowledge and belief has a long history (notably from
Plato) and is found in popular uses of the terms: knowledge entails belief, but is
more secure because it is reasoned.

i)

T h e standard definition of knowledge in epistemology is that propositional
knowledge is justified true belief: that is, it must satisfy the three conditions,
justification, truth and belief. While this definition once c o m m a n d e d almost
universal agreement in epistemology, it is no longer agreed to define certain
knowledge. Most responses in epistemology seek a fourth condition, although
none is agreed yet m a n y responses in sociology and some in philosophy hold
that criteria like justification, truth and belief are not absolutes, and instead are
relative or contingent.
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j) There is debate about what determines knowledge and beliefs: there are two
broad positions, internalism and externalism, although these terms are used in
two senses.
k)

O n e sense of internalism and externalism is a restricted one in epistemology:
either beliefs can be justified only by the internal states of the believer
(internalism) or by more than the believer's internal states.

1)

The other sense of internalism and externalism is broader, as used in history and
sociology of science: either the content of knowledge and beliefs is determined
by intellectual or cognitive factors (internalism), or it is detenmned by social,
political and other factors as well as, or instead of, internal factors (externalism).
This is the sense discussed in the companion chapter on context and Appendix
B.l; internalism and externalism are only categories to help analysis, and
extremes of either should be avoided (Morrell 1983a, 1983b), and debates
between the two camps have been marked by charicature and have not yet
resolved m a n y issues (Shapin 1992).

Science is characterised by knowledge as information, facts and data
m)

Science knowledge is characterised by elements of knowledge-that in the sense
of information, facts or data. In the sense of a knowing state of the individual,
possession of the relevant information, facts or data is interpreted usually as
necessary for having science knowledge, but not sufficient because they do not
require reasoning or understanding.

n)

Information, facts and data are also elements of science knowledge in the sense
of the body of knowledge that is external to the knowing individual: that is, the
body that is available but not necessarily k n o w n by the individual. This is the
knowledge available intextbooks, journals, on the Internet in databases, and so
on.

o)

The amount of information, facts and data that is produced by scientific activity
has always been increasing, but is n o w so large and increasing at so great a rate
that it is difficult for any individual to keep track of it, and impossible to k n o w it
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personally. This has been described by various terms such as the information
explosion.
p)

T h e effects of the information explosion on society and science have been
interpreted variously as beneficent malevolent or neutral.

q)

Each of these interpretations is arguable and simplistic: the present thesis argues
that it is more sustainabletocharacterise science by a combination of knowledge,
context purpose, structure, activity and belief system, where they arise often
from more than one perspective.

Science knowledge is characterised by being reasoned and having understanding.
r)

Science knowledge is characterised by understanding: in the sense of a state of
the knowing person, it means to comprehend the significance of, and reasoning
behind, a proposition of knowledge.

s)

In the sense of a body of knowledge, an understanding usually means a
statement that is a proposition thatp, where p is a predicate that affirms or denies
a claim.

t)

Knowledge-that is expressed typically as propositions.

u)

Propositions are statements that typically express an understanding about
concepts, where concepts are generalised terms that label a group of similar
ideas, like planet and animal.

v)

Concepts are important in understanding science knowledge, because they
enable the individual to respond to classes or groups of entities - objects,
relations or properties - rather than a multitude of individual instances.

w)

Science knowledge is conceptually complex, and has become increasingly so in
the twentieth century.

x)

Furthermore, science concepts often differ from concepts in a 'commonsense'
view of the world; this has implications both for the science education of both
scientists and citizens generally.

y)

T h e public understanding of science and science issues w a s characterised
traditionally as a 'deficit' on the part of the public: that given the right
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information and/or training they too would understand the 'correctness' of the
science knowledge. Typically, this assumed a particular, uncontested,
authoritative view of science knowledge. It is a view of public understanding
and science thatremainswidely accepted despite strong criticisms.
z)

M o r e recent studies of the public understanding of science have also examined
the ways in which competing public science disputes construct and exploit
alternative meanings of science knowledge: the w a y s in which science
knowledge is revisable and contested within the science community, and the
ways in which 'folk' knowledge is useful for citizens regardless of its formal
endorsement by the scientific community.

Science knowledge is characterised by power and authority
aa)

A s discussed in the companion chapter on context and Appendix B.l, science
knowledge has traditionally been equated with power, because of its predictive
and explanatory success; this association dates at least from Francis Bacon.

bb)

T h e correlation between the power of western societies and the practice of
western European science was held traditionally to demonstrate the intrinsic
rationality and power of western European science: science w a s thus the
paradigm of rationality.

cc)

Following analyses that showed both predictive power in non-western systems
of knowledge, and flaws in traditional, positivist accounts of western science,
some accounts n o w seek to explain the success of western European science
without denying the power and usefulness of other knowledge systems such as
indigenous knowledges.

dd)

The authority of (western European) science knowledge has meant that the image
of science is frequendy used either to convey or deny authority to arguments or
knowledge systems. The present thesis interprets this as associating knowledge
claims with other dimensions of science, namely scientific structures (such as
scientific language), activities (such as experiment), beliefs, context, or purpose.
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Knowledge as a map of scientific content
ee) The content of science knowledge is commonly taken as a 'map' of scientific
content, although the present thesis argues that other dimensions, such as the
belief system, activities and purpose, have the same content.
ff) Histories of science are typically histories of science knowledge, and show
clearly that the content of science knowledge changes.
gg) Given its constandy changing and expanding character, it is not plausible to try
to give a detailed map of current science knowledge.
hh) Knowledge as a map of science content can be interpreted in several ways, each
of which being limited but offering useful insights: as concerning the material
world; as the disciplines, fields or domains of science, where they are taken as
cognitive, not organisational, structures; and as the body of refereed, scientific
publications.
II.

Implications for a school Science that reflects the metascientific

literature.

Although current school Science curricula, in Australia and elsewhere, are centred
moderately or strongly on knowledge, they do not present a comprehensive
characterisation of science knowledge as found in the metascientific literature. One
example is that they do not address the present and future volume of science knowledge.
Stonier made this point in a critique of physics teaching in Great Britain:
Micro-electronics in its various shapes and forms is propelling society into a new
era as different from the industrial era as that era was from the Middle Ages.
Imagine m y astonishment at finding h o w little is taught about solid state
physics, transistors, h o w micros work, what is the historical development of
this technology, what are some of the likely future developments. It is true that
there exists options to learn about electronics and micro-electronics - but they
appear to be limited. The teachers frequendy appear to have little idea of what is
shaping up in the future (e.g. cryogenic micro-electronics), or other ideas of
related technology, (e.g. photovoltaics) and certainly little about the history of
the technology, which could be one of the most fruitful ways of introducing
physical concepts. Needless to say, I did not expect that students might have
discussed the implications of these developments on employment patterns, the
home, changing lifestyle, or warfare. Heavens forbid! (Stonier 1987, p. 106)
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To be fair, there are some fairly obvious rejoinders to Stonier we should mention before
pursuing his critique. First, w e have noted that the sheer volume and scope of science
knowledge are immense and expanding rapidly, so the science curriculum can always be
open to the charge that some particular area of knowledge has been left out Secondly,
school practical work in electronics is expensive, far more so than for the equipment that
would suffice for teaching basic concepts of electricity and electrical circuits. Thirdly, the
concepts of electricity and circuits are regarded usually as more fundamental than for
electronics, and given the pressure for curriculum time from the volume of potential
science knowledge content to go beyond basic electrical concepts means denying time for
some other area of content.
Fensham (1992, p. 800) has made a similar point about school Science knowledge
not representing the massive advances in science knowledge. Other calls for revision of
school physics and chemistry aside, he is critical on two counts. First, school Science,
particularly chemistry, is still concerned with general concepts and abstract principles,
rather than an understanding offieldand laboratory experiences of chemical reactions.
Secondly, it is concerned with basic chemicals long used in school laboratories rather
than 'in terms of newer substances with quite novel properties'.
The comments on Stonier's analysis aside, his and Fensham's basic criticism
stands: the school Science curriculum does not reflect well the character of science
knowledge, as the analysis of the literature by the present thesis shows.
There are responses to each of the three objections to Stonier given above. First
while a school Science curriculum cannot address the quantity of science knowledge, it
should indicate the scope and areas ofrapiddevelopment. Secondly, while m u c h of the
more recent science requires more sophisticated and expensive equipment providing
resources for practical equipment is only one of the issues that arise. T o the extent that the
scope for practical activities 'drives' the inclusion of electronics or other fields in the
curriculum, there is a general resourcing response that will arise from the commitment of
the community to provide the resources, and other, particular solutions: some schools use
commercial electronics kits, and universities, for example, use software that enables
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students to design, 'construct' andtestcircuits on screen. But Stonier is urging schools to
address more than circuitry activities: he argues that the past present and potential social
impacts are important for citizens and scientists alike to understand, and students can
learn about them by doing other activities. Thirdly, the notion that the more fundamental
concepts, suitable for school students, are those in the more established areas of science,
is an assumption only. S T S and H P S approaches to science education, for example,
suggestrichareas of interest and utility that are largely untapped by traditional science
curricula and that offer fresh approaches toteachingscience content
Also, the considerable literature on constructivism in science education shows that
teaching science concepts is not straightforward, and that children form various
understandings of concepts, often at odds with the intention of the teacher and
curriculum. While there are examples of recommendations for teaching concepts more
effectively, there has been relatively little for designing a science curriculum. Thus at least
some of the difficulty with learning science concepts has to do with learning and teaching
activities, and does not arise solely from some characteristic inherent in science concepts.
While science learning and teaching issues are beyond the scope of the present thesis, the
constructed character of science knowledge advocated in m a n y contemporary views
should feature in school Science knowledge.
A second example of a fundamental flaw in typical school Science is the emphasis
on proto-university knowledge content. This has strong implications at least for science
literacy and the public understanding of science, which Shamos has argued should focus
more on knowledge-as-understanding, including metascientific understandings:
Contrary to what most science educators contend, knowing science in the formal
academic sense m a y not be a necessary condition to attaining scientific literacy in
the social sense. However, knowing what science is about is prerequisite to such
literacy. T h e distinction m a y seem subde at this point, but it is nonetheless
important W e will never get the mass of our population to understand science in
detail, but w e m a y be able to instil some understanding of h o w the enterprise
works and h o w scientists practice their discipline - enough, one hopes, to serve
the societal purpose of scientific literacy. (Shamos 1995, p. 45)
T o the extent that the school Science curriculum reflects the literature, and the
present thesis argues that a curriculum must in order to demonstrate its rigour, then the
curriculum must present a more robust and coherent characterisation of science
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knowledge than simply a selection of science concepts as content. Such a characterisation
will show that there are different views of what constitutes science knowledge, and in
particular that it includes practical knowledge-how as well as propositional knowledgethat. That is, the curriculum should not be content for students merely to experience
science activities, but to develop a practical knowledge-how - some of what Ravetz called
the craft skills of scientists - as stated outcomes or objectives. Students should develop an
appreciation of h o w and w h y knowledge is distinguished from benef, and should be
encouraged to develop reasoned understandings rather than memorisation for recall of
simple collections of data. That is, a robust characterisation of science knowledge will
entail covering less content but more thoroughly so as to develop understandings.
Students should develop an appreciation of the status and source of information, facts and
data, and their rapid expansion. This will entail developing skills for accessing,
evaluating and using data and information. Students should develop an appreciation of the
power and authority of science knowledge, which includes appreciating its limits. This
will entail students learning to identify and evaluate appeals to scientific knowledge in
both the science literature and public forums. Finally, students should develop an
appreciation of the scope of science knowledge, which includesfieldsthat are developing
rapidly. This will entail students learning h o w to locate and evaluate updated information
and claims of science knowledge. The current increase in the use of microprocessor
technologies is a suitable range of strategies for these propositions. A s transmitters of
information, schools are already battling to compete with information from T V , satellite
transmissions, domestic video recorders and existing computers that are better-researched
and more appealingly presented. N e w microprocessor technology is more flexible,
'controllable, interactive, up-to-date and client-oriented' (Meighan & Reid 1982, p. 375).
A m o r e robust and coherent characterisation will also characterise science by
knowledge in combination with activity, context, structure, purpose and belief system.
Thus the science curriculum should not be strongly reductionist, although that strategy
might suit sometimes: it should demonstrate the holistic character of science knowledge,
rather than a fragmented conceptual framework. Numerous studies in science education
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show that learning science is enhanced w h e n the knowledge is presented in some
meaningful context, and that student disaffection with science is related strongly to the
acontextual character of the knowledge presented; this is an argument from pedagogy and
learning theory. T h e present thesis supports this argument from the scientific and
metascientific literature: science knowledge is only partly, and unclearly, characterised by
its content; it is also characterised by particular activities, contexts, structures, purposes
and belief systems.
Finally, the earlier review of the science education literature, particularly that of the
constructivists such as Driver, show that different learners can develop or construct
different, individual understandings from apparently identical learning stimuli. This
demonstrates an inequality between public knowledge with private understandings. This
inequality is partly discussed by the present thesis in addressing the public understanding
of science. However the constructivist science education literature is beyond the scope of
the present thesis and except for acknowledgment of the significance of children's
individual understandings and beliefs, is not addressed.
Some specific recommendations corresponding to the summary of findings in part I
above:
Throughout the following, students should develop an appreciation of science
knowledge as part of developing a multidimensional characterisation.

There is a range of views of science knowledge.
a)

Students should develop an appreciation of different views of h o w w e develop
knowledge of the material world, specifically through perception and mental
activity. For example:
•

Students should have opportunities to identify the basis for knowledge
claims, and in particular to identify the influence of prior understandings.

•
b-d)

Students should have opportunities to develop meta-cognitive skills.

Students should develop an appreciation of different kinds of knowledge. For
example:
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Students should have opportunities identify and practise developing
practical knowledge-how and propositional knowledge-that

•

Students should develop skills in making valid deductions, both from
axioms and from observation statements.

e)

Students should develop an appreciation of the differences between rational
reconstructions of knowledge and descriptions of actual knowledge
development

f)

Students should gain an appreciation of the role and significance of craftknowledge and tacit knowledge in science. For example:
•

Students should have opportunities to develop craft and tacit science
knowledge.

g)

Students should develop an awareness that science knowledge is characterised as
both the body of published knowledge and a state of knowing. For example:
•

Students should develop an appreciation of the size and scope of published
science knowledge.

•

Students should develop metacognitive skills, as a means of developing an
awareness of, and a capacity to foster, their o w n state of knowledge.

Knowledge is related to belief.
h)

Students should develop an understanding of the interrelatedness of knowledge
and belief. For example:
•

Students should have opportunities to identify beliefs about the material
world, and challenge (test) them.

i)

Students should develop an appreciation of some of the ways in which
knowledge is justified. For example:
•

Students should have opportunities to analyse justifications of knowledge,
such as in contemporary and historical case studies.

j-1)

Students should develop an appreciation of internalist and externalist views of
knowledge, and the difficulties of extreme versions of either. For example:
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Students should have opportunities to analyse knowledge claims, such as
in contemporary and historical case studies, for internalist and externalist
elements.

Science is characterised by knowledge as information, facts and data
m-n)

Students should develop an appreciation of the nature and role of information,
facts or data in science. For example:
•

Students should develop skills in collecting and manipulating facts,
information and data.

•

Students should develop an awareness of, and skills in accessing and
using, information, facts and data in a variety of media, such as text
books, journals, electronic and print data bases, the Internet and so forth.

•

Students' science knowledge should not be restricted to information, facts
and data, but should include reasoned understandings.

o-q)

Students should develop an appreciation of the nature and scope of the
information explosion, and attitudes and skills for addressing it. For example:
•

Students should develop and awareness of the scope and rapidrateof
growth in science knowledge.
Students should develop an awareness and some knowledge of cutting
edge science knowledge.

•

Students should develop an awareness of characterisations of the
information explosion as variously beneficent, malevolent and neutral for
society, and that each of these characterisations is flawed.

•

Students should develop skills in applying multidimensional
characterisations of science to critique and analyse the effects of rapid
science knowledge growth on society.

Science knowledge is characterised by being reasoned and having understanding.
r-t)

Students should develop an appreciation that science knowledge is partly
characterised as a reasoned understanding. For example:

Chapter 11: Knowledge

•

311

Students should have opportunities to analyse the reasoning behind a range
of fundamental science concepts.

•
u-v)

Students should develop skills in expressing propositional knowledge.

School Science should provide students with opportunities for students to
develop understandings of a range of fundamental science concepts, and their
significance. For example:
•

Students should develop an appreciation of the nature and purpose of
concepts.

•

Students should develop understandings for a range of fundamental
science concepts.

•

Students should develop an appreciation of the often complex character of
science concepts and the difficulties this presents those without a science
education.

x)

Students should develop an appreciation of the ways in which science
knowledge could be characterised as 'commonsense', and as noncommonsensical. For example:
•

Students should examine commonsense understandings of the material
world and test them, either direcdy or through case studies, for their
scientific merits.

y-z)

School Science should provide students with opportunities to develop an
appreciation of the public understanding of science, the ways in which it is
interpreted, and its roles. For example:
•

Students should develop an appreciation of 'folk' knowledges, their uses
and limitations, including their o w n prior understandings.

•

Students should examine case studies of studies of the public
understanding of science and its role in disputes and public education
campaigns.

Science knowledge is characterised by power and authority
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aa-bb) Students should develop an appreciation of the long-standing association
between (science) knowledge and power. For example:
•

Students should develop an appreciation of h o w (science) knowledge is
commonly associated with power, through its role in 'controlling' Nature;
this could be achieved through study of contemporary and historical case
studies.

•

Students should develop an appreciation of h o w this association with
power lent support historically to claims that western European knowledge
is the paradigm for rationality.

cc-dd) School Science should provide students with opportunities to develop an
appreciation of the relative merits of (western) science and the natural
philosophies of non-western cultures. For example:
•

Students should develop a sensitivity to the difficulties in accounting for
the successes (power and usefulness) of western science while
acknowledging the power and usefulness of other knowledge systems
such as indigenous knowledges.

•

Students should likewise develop an appreciation of the limits of western
science and other knowledge systems.

•

Students should develop an appreciation of the effects of using western
science as the standard for judging other knowledge systems.

<

Knowledge as a map of scientific content
ee)

School science should provide students with opportunities to develop a
knowledge of the content of science.

ff)

School Science should provide students with opportunities to develop an
appreciation of the historical changes in science knowledge.

gg)

School Science should provide students with opportunities to develop an
appreciation of the immense scope of science knowledge, and that particular
strategies are needed to be able to manage it (See the information explosion,
above, in (o), (p) and (q).)
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hh) Students should develop an appreciation that science content can be 'mapped' in
various ways. For example:
• Students should develop a familiarity with science knowledge as given in
the cognitive disciplines or domains of science, and in the body of
refereed, scientific publications.
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Chapter 12
CONCLUSION
The multidimensional character of science, as interpreted from the literature
by the present thesis, is a robust basis for characterising science in the
school curriculum.

Introduction

This chapter extends the argument developed in the preceding chapters and Appe
B, that school Science can and should be grounded in the characterisations of science given
in the metascientific literature. This argument is that the rationale for school Science - the
justification for its inclusion, nature and scope - is set out in curriculum goals, especially
science curriculum goals, and that these goals are legitimated to the extent they reflect the
nature of science. True, curriculum goals typically refer to more than just characteristics of
individual curriculum subjects: they quite properly concern the education of individual
learners and reflect broad social and political goals. However, the inclusion of a particular
subject in this case Science, is justified partly because, among other curriculum goals, it
characterises afieldcalled science that is judged to be worthwhile learning. The present
thesis argues that this sense of justification increases when w e can show that the school
subject robusdy represents or characterises the field.
To show that it accurately characterises itsfield,a syllabus must show both that it
addresses the variety of views that comprise the field, and that it does so rigorously. The
present thesis has shown that there are a variety of scholarly views of science, and argues
that its multidimensional analysis is bothrigorousand a suitable framework for science
curriculum developers. Addressing the variety within the field is best done by seeking the
views of practitioners and academic analysts in thatfield:in this case, scientists, like
chemists and biologists, and metascientists, including many scientists but also
philosophers, historians and sociologists of science. However, the present thesis has
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argued that, while the direct involvement of these groups of stakeholders is necessary,
either as curriculum developers or advisers to them, use of the metascientific literature as a
resource is also necessary, perhaps more so. It is the literature that gives the current,
received state of the field, comprises the considered views of its practitioners and
academics, argues the character of science more fully, is open to scholarly critique, and
strives to be removed from the anecdotal and situational. T o embody diverse views while at
the same time claiming to berigorous,a syllabus must show that it represents the more
complex and robust characterisations in the literature rather than the views of particular
individuals. Thus the literature can help curriculum developers ensure an appropriate
representation offieldspecialists. Other curriculum stakeholder groups, although not the
central concern of the present thesis, m a k e contributions representing broader interests
within pluralist societies, and these are mentioned where appropriate.
The present thesis has argued that a robust characterisation must show that school
Science is thoroughly grounded in the metascientific literature, and therefore reflects the
diversity and rigour of that literature. It argues that this is achieved by a set of six
interrelated dimensions of characterisation: knowledge, activity, context structure, purpose
and belief system. In particular, the present chapter draws on section 4 of each of the six
companion chapters, that summarise arguments concerning each dimension in the literature
and suggest some curriculum implications. The present chapter will not repeat that detail,
but instead draws cm those arguments to show h o w the proposed multidimensional
characterisation of science applies to some curriculum arguments. It also suggests that its
analysis could apply to other, related issues, such as other areas of the curriculum, the
curriculum as a whole, selection of an appropriate curriculum model, selection of
resources, teacherttaining,and school organisation; these are speculations and suggestions
for further research based on the present analysis.
This chapter is organised as follows.
1)

School Science should reflect the nature of science, both in the formally set
out curriculum goals that reflect the nature of science and in what is enacted
in schools.
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School Science does not reflect the nature of science as characterised in the

2)

metascientific hterature, either in its formal goals or as enacted in schools.
T h e multidimensional characterisation developed in the present thesis can

3)

inform issues concerning the science curriculum and the nature of science in
it
4)

The present thesis has implications for the selection of curriculum models
and resources,teachertraining and school organisation.

5)

The present thesis suggests several areas suitable for further research, and
possible tests of its claims.

Sections 1 and 2 consolidate the argument, developed in the thesistothis point that school
Science must ultimately reflect the nature of science, and that a robust characterisation of the
nature of school Science must be grounded clearly in the literature that analyses the nature
of science. Section 3 shows h o w the present thesis informs s o m e typical issues that apply
to school Science, and the nature of science it promotes. Sections 4 and 5 are m o r e
speculative, and suggest some possible implications and areas for further research of the
present thesis.
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School Science should reflect the nature of science, both as formally
set out in curriculum goals that reflect the nature of science, a n d as
enacted in schools.

Simply to say that school Science should reflect the nature of science appears to be a
truism, yet this leaves important decisions unclarified. W h a t is the nature of science? T o
what extent should the goals of school Science reflect the nature of science? W h o decides
these questions? Not only are there a variety of views about the nature of science, there are
also a variety of curriculum goals. This section will review some enduring goals of the
science curriculum, but will do so by placing them within the context of general curriculum
goals that affect the science curriculum but are not always identified in the narrower scope
of the science education literature. It will then theorise about some implications of the
analysis of the metascientific literature made in the present thesis. W e will use as examples
analyses of some curricula from pluralist, western democracies, such as the U S A , U K and
Europe, but with particular emphasis cm N e w South Wales ( N S W ) , Australia, as identified
in Chapter 1.
T o show that school Science reflects the nature of science, one must show that both
the formal, published curriculum goals and the enacted curriculum reflect the nature of
science. T h e former is a statement of intention only, and not of actual practice in schools.
The latter alone cannot show that a particular practice is more than happenstance or
tradition, rather than a planned curriculum event Accordingly, this section is structured as
follows:
1.1

The metascientific literature characterises the nature of science in multiple,
interdependent dimensions;

1.2 The goals of science education should reflect the nature of science;
1.3

The implementation of school Science should reflect the goals of science
education; and

1.4 The implementation of school Science should reflect the nature of science.
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1.1 The nature of science is characterised in multiple dimensions

The present thesis has argued that the metascientific hterature characterises the nature
of science in multiple dimensions. Further, the present thesis has suggested six dimensions
that together account for a selection of s u m m a r y statements about science, and
metascientific arguments: knowledge, activity, structure, purpose, context and belief
system. These dimensions are mutually interacting, or interdependent: typically they are
used together in the literature and derive the richness of their meaning through these
interactions. They were constructed from a semantic analysis of the literature, and
consolidated by extensive analysis of it. The six dimensions were constructed in chapters 3
and 4 (the discussions of the methodology and the semantic analysis); consolidated in
sections 1 to 3 of the six companion chapters and Appendix B; and summarised in section 4
of the companion chapters.
Discussion in earlier chapters acknowledged that these dimensions are constructed,
not absolute, and so m a y differ from the results of similar attempts by other researchers. It
also acknowledged that the metascientific Hterature is not the only source of views about the
nature of science, but used that literature as the source of data because it represents the
publicly available, scholarly statements about science. This is consistent with the aim of the
present thesis, namely to use current, publicly available, scholarly data to theorise about
characterising science for the school curriculum.
/ .2 Science curriculum goals should reflect the nature of science

It is important that the goals of science education reflect the nature of science because
these goals are the formal curriculum statements that provide the rationale for including
science in the school curriculum and the formal expression of what school Science should
be and include. There have been m a n y arguments put, in a variety of forums since the 18th
century, that the field of science should be represented in the school curriculum (DeBoer
1991; Matthews 1994). This is usually interpreted as meaning that there should be study at
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school that embodies or characterises what is widely recognised as science. That is, the
inclusion of Science in the school curriculum is justified precisely because it characterises a
field regarded by society as worthwhile studying. T h e study of school Science is justified
c o m m o n l y because it also serves as a vehicle for other curriculum goals, such as the
personal and social development of the child; while these are important they are not central
to the present thesis and receive passing mention only.
Science curriculum goals relevant to the present task are found in the science
education, general curriculum, and metascientific literatures. Claims that science curriculum
goals should reflect the nature of science are m a d e in two ways in these literatures: in the
content of science curriculum goals, although this is often implicit, and in explicit calls for
school Sciencetoreflect science. S o m e examples of these claims follow.
1.2.1 The content of science education goals as rationales for science in the school
curriculum
Science curriculum goals
In their review of research into science curriculum goals, Bybee and DeBoer (1994)
discerned three main, enduring goals for the science curriculum:
Three major goals have shaped the curriculum and instructional practices in science
education. These three goals have been repeated, with continuing variation,
through the 200-year history of science education in the United States. Broadly
defined, these goals are understanding of scientific knowledge, understanding and
using scientific methods, and promoting personal-social development. (Bybee &
DeBoer 1994, p. 380; emphases added).
Though identified in the context of the U S education system(s), these goals are general and
can be identified in the science curricula of other, similar, pluralist western democracies, as
w e shall see. Bybee and DeBoer also identified some recent initiatives in science curriculum
that interest U S and other science curriculum developers; w e will turn to these shortly.
Bybee and DeBoer interpret these three main goals in clusters of goals found in expressions
of what is to be learned, and, alternatively, in the ends or purposes of science education.
First are goals that set out what is to be learned:
Three such student outcome goals are (1) to acquire scientific knowledge, (2) to
learn the processes or methodologies of the sciences, and (3) to understand the
applications of science, especially the relationships between science and society
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and science-technology-society. Under this organisation, the students should have
some knowledge of the products of science, should have experience with and
understand the methods of science, and should understand h o w science is a force
in their world. (Bybee & DeBoer 1994, p. 357)
That is, the familiar goals of knowledge, method and applications are expressed as

propositional knowledge and investigative activities. The present thesis interprets thi
characterising science mainly by knowledge, activity (processes or methodologies,
methods) and context (science and society, in their world).
The alternative source of the three traditional goals arises from the expression of
curriculum goals as the ends or purposes of science education:

Another way to view the goals of science teaching is to look at the ends to which
the knowledge, method, and applications applies. The goals of science teaching
then become (1) personal development, which includes aesthetic appreciation,
intellectual development, and career awareness; (2) social efficiency and
effectiveness, including the maintenance of a stable social order, economic
productivity, and the preparation of citizens w h o feel comfortable in a technical
world and understand issues such as environmental conservation, disease
prevention, birth control, industrial development, and computer literacy; (3) the
development of science itself, which involves the cultural transmission of scientific
knowledge from one generation to the next so that each subsequent generation has
a base from which n e w scientific discoveries can be made; and (4) national
security, which includes the development of a strong, technically able military, an
internationally competitive workforce, and a citizenry that is sympathetic to the
importance of science as a competitive force in this world. (Bybee & D e B o e r
1994, p. 358)
This set also can be interpreted in terms of the six dimensions proposed by the present
thesis: scientific knowledge, both as the body of science knowledge and the knowledge of

the individual; scientific activity, that includes a wider notion of activity than just

work; scientific purposes, as cognitive purposes of science itself, utilitarian purpose

society including government and industry, and personal goals; scientific structures, s

as scientific institutions and knowledge structures; context, including social, militar
citizen applications, career development; and belief system, which is largely implied,

attitudes such as feel comfortable with, aesthetic appreciation and sympathetic suggest
alignment between the belief systems of students and science.
As an example of such a goal set, the Canadian report, Science for Every Citizen,

includes these traditional goals in a statement that also indicates the shifts in prior
education from the 1980s:
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Develop citizens abletoparticipate fully in political and social choices facing
a technological society.
ii. Train those with special interest in science and technology education for
further study.
iii. Provide an appropriate preparation for m o d e m fields of work.
iv. Stimulate intellectual and moral growth of students.
(Fensham 1992, p. 797)
Fensham notes that the two target groups - 'a scientifically based work force and a
scientifically literate citizenry' - are covered in goals 1 and 2, the third accommodates the
impact of technological development on the structure of work and the economy, and the
fourth links individual qualities to the 'corporate actions referred to in the first objective'
(1992, p. 797). W e will return to each of these throughout this chapter.
General curriculum goals
General curriculum goals are also a source of rationales for including science in the
school curriculum. There is a range of general curriculum goals identified in the curriculum
literature that influence the deliberations of science curriculum developers, although they
m a y be inexplicit to some stakeholders. This range reflects both the multiple purposes of
the school curriculum and different theoretical and ideological perspectives. For example,
the 1992 Handbook

of Research on Curriculum (Jackson (ed.) 1992), a project of the

American Educational Research Association, included chapters on Conceptions of
Curriculum and Curriculum Specialists (Jackson), Curriculum Policy (Elmore & Sykes),
The Relationship between Culture and Curriculum (Peshkin), Conceptions of Knowledge
(Schrag), Curriculum Ideologies (Eisner), Organisation of the Curriculum (Goodlad & Su),
besides sections on the Curriculum as a Shaping Force and Topics and Issues Within
Curricular Categories (the latter including a chapter on Science and Technology by
Fensham). Each of these implies or states goals for the curriculum, showing h o w different
visions and models of curriculum arise from different analytical perspectives, and even
further variation arising from different theoretical positions within an analytical perspective.
T o varying extents and in different ways, these goals influence the nature of school
Science. A n example is the cluster of goals for acquiring knowledge, a central goal in most
curriculum writings, and probably the most enduring:
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T h e oldest, mainstream tradition regards curriculum as worthwhile knowledge and
focuses on what knowledge is of most worth within a society, in order to set the
criteria and grounds for developing a curriculum. The touchstones m a y be an
intellectual heritage, or the characteristics of learners, or scientifically validated
knowledge, or a conception of a good society, and the policy-related aim is to
provide authoritative prescriptions for curriculum content that express the
underlying orientation. (Elmore & Sykes 1992, p. 195)
Thus the term worthwhile knowledge is an umbrella for different notions of what is valued
as worthy of study, found, for example, in the literatures on curriculum policy, ideology
and organisation.
Reviews of these curriculum fields, from Elmore and Sykes, Eisner, and Goodlad
and Su, above, show that different curriculum views judge knowledge to be worthwhile
acquiring w h e n it:
•

is part of being an educated person, resulting from study of the liberal arts,
including the discipline science;

•

characterises the discipline science;

•

is appropriate to the cognitive development of students;

•

empowers studentstobe participatory citizens in a pluralistic democracy;

•

helps students realise their individual potentials;

•

comprises the multiple dimensions of intelligence, and so enables students to
m a k e meaning of the various systems of symbols used in society;

•

improves the efficiency of instruction;

•

contributes to the economic and social prosperity and security of the society;

•

engenders beliefs in a religious orthodoxy;

•

contributestothe ability to think rationally; and

•

is useful in understanding, shaping and resolving social issues.

A s a set, these interpretations are m u c h more consistent with the multidimensional character
of science identified in the present thesis, than with the essentially internalist and positivist
character of most traditional school Science. This is so even where some knowledge judged
to be worthwhile, such as the empowering or religious examples, is judged to be beyond
the scope of, or even in conflict with, accepted scientific knowledge. Quite aside from nonscience knowledge having roles and places elsewhere in the school curriculum, a multi-
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dimensional school Science will show that science is complex and is a resource, along with
social, legal, ethical and other spheres of knowledge, in understanding humans and
phenomena of the material world.
O n these grounds it is reasonable to claim that in the cluster of curriculum goals
concerning worthwhile knowledge, most support a robust treatment of the nature of
science, and all the more so if several goals are included together. While it is true that
judgements of worthiness arise from complexes of curriculum goals, and the criteria for
judging worthiness will vary according to curriculum goals, science knowledge is widely
agreed to be worthwhile. A multidimensional character of science, such as argued by the
present thesis,fitsa variety of curriculum goals concerning worthwhile knowledge.
The different notions of worthiness of knowledge point to a need for different
curriculum stakeholders to clarify what is central and worthwhile in their views of the
curriculum and constructing rationales for these views. Thus the notion of worthwhile
knowledge applies to the science curriculum in various ways. It is reasonable to claim that
most school curricula, and certainly those addressed by the present thesis, value science
knowledge as worthwhile. The three traditional science curriculum goals mentioned above
represent three views of what is worthwhile. T o the extent they classify knowledge, they
represent respectively: the canonical or received knowledge of the discipline, which can be
characterised as propositional knowledge-that; knowledge of problem-solving and
investigation, including knowledge-how; and knowledge of applications.
122 Other calls for school Science to reflect the nature of science

Besides the content of actual curriculum goals, other support for science curriculum
goals is given in analyses of and theorising about science curriculum goals, by the
education, science and metascience communities.
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Calls from the science education literature for school Science to reflect the nature of science
F r o m a science education perspective, D e B o e r (1991, pp. 215ff) has described
several main goals of science education from its (mainly U S ) history, and their direct
relationship to the nature of science desired in schools. These goals include:
•

the mental discipline developed in students by science studies;

•

enculturation in science as a significant part of contemporary western culture;

•

the development of significant social and personal outcomes;

•

the development of economic well-being, national security and international
prestige; and

•

a better understanding of the physical world.

These, of course, are not mutually exclusive, even though particular curriculum initiatives
tended to emphasise only one or two each.
A second example is Matthews (1994), w h o in reviewing historical debates about the
science curriculum, discerned three main curriculum emphases in U S science curricula:
There have been three competing traditions in U S science education up to the
present time: theoretical, stressing the structure of the disciplines; applied,
stressing the science and workings of everyday things; liberal or contextual,
stressing the historical development and cultural implications of science. N o n e of
these traditions have, of course, been exclusive. (Matthews 1994, p. 13; emphases
added)
A third example is Roberts (1982; 1988), w h o has argued that there have been
different curriculum emphases in twentieth century U S science curricula, and they entail
different views of science as well as of learners, teachers and society. Roberts describes
seven such emphases, acknowledging that choosing sevenratherthan six or eight involves
a judgement 1 . Further, Roberts argues that the actual number is insignificant compared to
the concept of multiple emphases, and that the seven represent emphases that have been
tried,ratherthan what might be possible. The seven are as follows.
(i) Everyday Coping emphasises the importance of science 'for understanding and
controlling one's environment - be it natural or technological':

1

Roberts' analysis is in this respect similar to that used by the present thesis in constructing its six
dimensions of characterisation.
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W h a t is being valued is an individual and collective understanding of scientific
principles, as a means for coping with individual and collective 'problems'. The
student must apply, indeed must learn how to apply, the principles and
generalisations learned in the science classroom, if the message is to get through.
(Roberts 1982, p. 246; emphasis in original)
This approach characterises science knowledge not just as the body of received knowledgethat but as personal knowledge-that and knowledge-how. It also takes science activity to
include general problem-solving and information-acquisition skills, rather than just
laboratory investigation activities, and entails understandings of science in social and other
contexts, scientific purpose and scientific belief systems. Roberts notes that this emphasis
has been re-articulated several times this century and is an essentially optimisticratherthan
realistic view; by implication, while its optimism no doubt contributed to its recurrent
popularity, its lack of realism m a y have contributed to its lack of sustained and widespread
implementation.
(ii) Structure of Science emphasises 'how science functions intellectually in its o w n
growth and development [such as] the interplay of evidence and theory, the adequacy of a
particular model for explaining phenomena at hand ..., the changing and self-correcting
nature of scientific knowledge, the influence of an investigator's "conceptual principles" cm
the kind of theory developed, etc' (Roberts 1982, p. 247). This m a y be interpreted as
emphasising the interplay of science knowledge, structure and belief system in
characterising science.
(iii) Science, Technology, and Decisions emphasises 'the limits of science in coping
with practical affairs' such as distinguishing the boundaries between science and
technology, political decisions and personal decisions (Roberts 1982, p. 247). This is
somewhat the reverse of the Everyday Coping emphasis, and draws particularly upon the
dimensions context, purpose and activity.
(iv) Scientific Skill Development emphasises 'competence in the use of processes that
are basic to all science' (Roberts 1982, p. 247). Notwithstanding the usefulness of generic
problem-solving and investigative skills, the present thesis interprets this emphasis as a
characterisation not just limited to science activity, but Umited in its characterisation of
science activity. Roberts argues, and I think correcdy, that such a view communicates to the
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student the message that 'skilful use of means (scientific process) will automatically yield
... a correct end (product)' (Roberts 1982, p. 247), a message at odds with the
understanding of science activity argued in the present thesis.
(v) Correct Explanations emphasises the body of science knowledge-that as accepted
or received by the science community. This is roughly the reverse of the emphasis on
process, rather than knowledge-that in Scientific Skill Development:
This is the familiar 'master now, question later' emphasis in science education.
Ziman (1968) put it thus. "The job of the ordinary scienceteacher...is to m a k e all
plain, and plausible,toencourage the student to entrust himself [sic] freely to basic
theory. T o express doubts, to utter warnings, at this stage will inhibit the confident
use of the n e w technique, the n e w language" (p. 71). (Roberts 1982, p. 248)
Roberts noted (p. 248) that this emphasis is also a message 'about the authority of a group
of experts to determine the correctness of ideas', a view at odds with a robust

understanding of context as a characteristic of science2. The present thesis interprets this
emphasis as characterising science by limited notions of science knowledge and context
(vi) Self as Explainer emphasises the cultural and historic contexts of science, with

the goal of students appreciating science as an expression of human capability and therefore
of their own humanity:
The story [of science] is a long and interesting one, but to simply call it 'history of
science' is likely to mislead; probably the most c o m m o n image of history of
science is the dry catalogue of who-did-what-when. T o animate the history of
science is to examine growth and change in scientific ideas as a function of h u m a n
purpose, and of the intellectual and cultural preoccupations of the particular
settings in which the ideas were developed and refined. Other systematic (though
nonscientific) w a y s to explain events - e.g., religious, magical - can readily be
seen in a similar light, especially with regard to explanatory purpose (Roberts
1970). T h e n one has something other than 'ignorance' with which science can be
compared.
T h e student thus gets the message that the humanity of science is his [sic] o w n
humanity. For he, too, is an explainer of events, with his o w n purposes, his o w n
place in a matrix of intellectual and cultural preoccupations. (Roberts 1982, p.
248)
This emphasis characterises science multidimensionally, as a combination of public and
personal knowledges, activities that develop and refine ideas, explanatory and other

2

Some may argue that the apparent complexity of the present thesis shows that we do have to rely on
experts, in an informed way, in the end. This thesis does argue that a range of authorities should be
involved. Also, the complexity of the argument supporting a multidimensional characterisation
should not be confused with the actual characterisation, which involves just six dimensions as a
means of clarifying the range of characteristics for science educators and students.

Chapter 12: Conclusion

327

purposes, scientific and non-scientific belief systems and purposes, and historical, cultural
and intellectual contexts.
(vii) Solid Foundation emphasises the goal of science education as preparation for
future science education, a view that Roberts sees as emphasising the vast and complex
character of science but ignoring ultimate curriculum goals. One could add that it also
little to say about the character of science itself.
Roberts later summarised the views of science entailed in each of these emphases:

Everyday coping:
A meaning system necessary for understanding and therefore controlling everyday
objects and events.
Structure of science:
A conceptual system for explaining naturally occurring objects and events, which
is cumulative and self-correcting.
Science, technology, decisions:
A n expression of the wish to control the environment and ourselves, intimately
relatedtotechnology and increasingly relatedtovery significant social issues.
Scientific skill development:
The outcome of correct usage of certain physical and conceptual processes.
Correct explanations:
The best meaning system ever developed for getting at the truth about natural
objects and events.
Self as explainer:
A conceptual system whose development is influenced by the ideas of the times,
the conceptual principles used, and the personal intent to explain.
Solidfoundation:
A vast and complex meaning system which takes m a n y years to master.
(from Roberts 1988, p. 45, Table 1)
These emphases derive from different conceptions of the nature of science, alongside go
concerning the learner and society. While individually, most of these emphases make
limited characterisations of science, as a set they present a robust multidimensional

characterisation that is broadly consistent with that argued by the present thesis. This
recognised by Fensham, who when discussing Roberts' theory (Fensham 1994),
suggested applying different curriculum emphases in different years from K-12; that is,
progressively developing Roberts' set of emphases.
Roberts' theory of science curriculum emphases supports and is supported by the
present thesis. It supports this thesis in that it provides a means of addressing the
multidimensional character of science in such a way that more complex issues are dealt

progressively and after prepatory matters have been covered. Of particular importance t
present thesis, Roberts' notion of curriculum emphases goes beyond discerning different
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emphases to show they e m b o d y and promote particular and different characterisations of
science. That is, calls for curricula to embody particular emphases are perforce calls

embrace particular characterisations of science. Roberts' theory is supported by the pr
thesis in two ways. First, the dimensions of characterisation presented in the present

enable these differences in characterisation to be clarified, and compared with each o

and the metascientific literature. Secondly, Roberts' emphases need an argument to supp

Fensham's contention that a range of emphases should be presented: the idea of present

the range may seem appealing, but it needs more substantial support than just this fee
The present thesis provides that argument: that no single emphasis necessarily entails
robust, multidimensional characterisation, but the set of emphases does.

Calls from the scientific and metascientific literatures for school Science to reflect
of science

The metascientific and scientific communities and their literatures also call for scho
Science to reflect the nature of science, and for particular views of science, in the

curriculum. Perhaps the clearest example of the role of the scientific community in the

school Science curriculum is the US, in its response to Soviet science achievement dur
the Cold Wan
[The 1957 launch of the Soviet satellite] Sputnik brought the claims of reformers
of science education into national prominence. The launch triggered a flurry of
legislation, the principal being the 1957 National Defense [sic] Education Act,
which gave $94 million for science education in three years from 1958 to 1961,
and a further $600 million in the years from 1961 to 1975. Conferences and
meetings occurred across the country [such as the 1958] Yale conference
sponsored by the President's Committee on Scientists and Engineers (Elbers &
Duncan 1959).
The National Science Foundation was instrumental in the transformation of
school science into proto-university science, a process sometimes called the
professionalisation of school science. The NSF's first school curriculum grant
was for $1,725 in 1954; its 1956 grant to P S S C w a s $300,000. The [1957]
National Defense Act transformed this meagre level of funding, and subsequendy
transformed U S science education. In 1957 the N S F said that its curriculum
projects:
seek to respond to the concern, often expressed by scientists and
educators, over failure of instructional programs in primary and
secondary schools to arouse motivating interest in, and understanding of,
the scientific disciplines. General agreement prevails that m u c h of the
science taught in schools today does not reflect the current state of
knowledge nor does it necessarily represent the best possible choice of
materials for instructional purposes. (Crane 1976, pp. 56-7)
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The N S F put scientists firmly in the saddle of curriculum reform,teacherswere
at best stable hands, and education faculty rarely got as far as the stable door. The
P S S C project epitomised 'top-down' curriculum development its m a x i m was
" M a k e physics teacher-proof. In a 1962 explanation of its policies, the N S F said
that
Projects are directed by college-level scientists, and grants are m a d e to
institutions of higher learning and professional scientific societies.
Emphasis is placed on subject matter rather than pedagogy. (Klopfer &
Champagne 1990, p. 139)
(Matthews 1994, pp. 16-17)
This significant increase in support from the science community and the government as
stakeholders, led to a large number of high-profile curriculum projects:

The NSF supported the explosion of 'alphabet curricula' in the late 1950s and
early 1960s. The first curriculumtobe widely used was that of the MIT's Physical
Sciences Study Committee (PSSC). Then followed the Chemical Bond Approach
( C B A ) , Biological Sciences Curriculum Study (BSCS), Chemical Educational
Materials ( C H E M S ) , Earth Science Curriculum Project (ESCP), Introductory
Physical Science (IPS), Project Physics and a host of others. B y 1975 the N S F
supported twenty-eight science curriculum reform projects. A number of these
were directed at the elementary school: Elementary Science Study (ESS), Science
Curriculum Improvement Study (SCIS) and Science - A Process Approach
(SAPA). (Matthews 1994, p. 17)
Most of these emphasised what Roberts called the correct explanations approach, being

acontextual or internalist depending on one's metascientific perspective. However, a
attempted a more contextual approach, broadly a self as explainer emphasis, such as
Harvard Project Physics, the yellow version of the BSCS High School Biology, and the
smaller-scale Klopfer and Cooley Use of Case histories in the Development of Student

Understanding of Science and Scientists. In 1976-77 it was estimated that about nine
million students, or forty three per cent of the student population, were using NSFsupported science curricula. This is a significant proportion considering the large

often fiercely independent US school districts that make the decisions about curricu
models, texts and so forth.
In Australia, the far smaller number of state-based school systems prescribe

syllabuses but not texts or curriculum models. Also, with the possible exception of t
Australian Academy of Science (AAS), there is no central, scientific community/

government stakeholder with significant power and discretionary funding, like the NS
the US. Australian science organisations such as the Australian and New Zealand
Assocation for the Advancement of Science (ANZAAS), Commonwealth Scientific and
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Industrial Research Organisation ( C S I R O ) and the Australian Nuclear Science and
Technology Organisation (ANSTO) have a markedly lower profile in school Science than
comparable US organisations like the NSF and the AAAS. Nonetheless, the absence in the
early 1960s of a contemporary school Science text was met in NSW with a text produced

by a team of scientists and science educators: the ubiquitous, blue 'Messel' text (Mess
1964), a product of the Nuclear Research Foundation within the University of Sydney,
with the co-operation of the NSW Department of Education, the largest school system in
NSW. This also was a discipline-based, correct explanations emphasis, with chapters
based on major concepts of physics, chemistry, biology and geology. In both the US and
Australian examples, science tended to be characterised as an inductivist process.
Evaluations of these approaches showed some successes:

Paul Hurd (1970) summarised what were generally perceived to be the major
strengths and weaknesses of the n e w courses. H e listed the strengths under 14
specific points, the heart of which can be summarised in the following statements:
1. The n e w curriculum projects contained information that was more up to date
and had more scientific validity than the older courses.
2. The n e w courses engaged students in independent, 'discovery'-type
investigations, which were considered to be more characteristic of the
scientific enterprise and which were beUeved to lead to more meaningful
learning.
3. The n e w courses presented a more accurate picture of the nature of science
by 'stressing its nonauthoritarianism, its intuitiveness, its incertitude,
questions and doubts, its motivations, its dependence upon human qualities,
its processes of inquiry, and its unifying principles' (p. 95).
4. The n e w course were less concerned with 'subject coverage' and dealt
instead with a smaller number of 'significant concepts', taught in depth and
in context until the student has some intuitive feeling for the topic' (p. 95).
(DeBoer 1991, pp. 170-1; emphases added)
DeBoer judged these curriculum approaches as significant and unprecedented:
The courses achieved the sought-after rigour, and they presented the disciplines of
science in a more thorough and honest way. They presented the science disciplines
as logically structured areas of h u m a n investigation, they dealt candidly with the
nature of scientific research, and they encouraged students to think and act like
scientists within the structure that was established. (DeBoer 1991, p. 171)
As with other sources of curriculum goals, they also had shortcomings. We will address

the shortcomings in section 2 below, where we will also critique assumptions, by DeBoer
and others, about the nature of science and school Science.
1.3 The implementation of school Science should reflect the goals of science education
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While it is necessary that the goals of science education should reflect the nature of
science, it is not sufficient: the practice or implementation of school Science should do
likewise. This statement is implicit in curriculum goals, which otherwise would be empty.
M o r e than this, it is logically necessary in order to conclude that the implementation of
school Science should reflect the nature of science: the goals (the intention) must reflect the
nature of science, and the implementation (the practice) of science education must reflect the
goals so that school Science reflects the nature of science.
1.4 The implementation of school Science should reflect the nature of science

Taken together, sections 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 above comprise an argument that the
practice of school Science should reflect the multidimensional nature of science. W e will
turn n o w in section (2)toexamine critiques of the goals and practice of science education to
argue that the practice of school Science does not reflect the nature of thefield,science,
especially a robust, multidimensional characterisation of science.
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School Science does not reflect the nature of science as characterised

in the metascientific literature, either in its formal goals or its
enactment in schools.

Having set out the case for school Science reflecting a multidimensional

characterisation of science, we turn now to appraise the nature of science in the scho

curriculum. Following from section (1), this appraisal will address both the formal go
science education and the enacted school curriculum. In brief, the conclusion is that

the formal and enacted science curriculum poorly characterise science, leading to doub
about the rationale for including school Science as a mandatory component of the
curriculum.
School Science as unproblematic and problematic

A note of caution should be sounded here, that given a topic like school Science, with

so many goals, interpretations and stakeholders, it is possible to find fault with alm

aspect of it This argument has been well put by Eisner (1992) in his review of researc

curriculum ideologies. There he characterised curriculum subjects as problematic or no

depending on whether they are considered to be central to the curriculum, like science

marginal, like anthropology. This arises from ideological concerns, and applies direcd

issues such as the nature and purpose of science in the school curriculum. The problem

character of certain subjects arises from particular curriculum ideologies, and applie
ways:
First what is considered to be a given or believed to be axiomatic in education
enjoys a kind of security that is seldom threatened by marginalisation: there are
few people today for w h o m the development of literacy is a questionable aim of
schooling. In this sense, this particular aim is nonproblematic. H o w it ought to be
taught is another matter, but that it ought to be achieved is not In contrast,
whether subjects like the arts or courses in the psychology of child development
should be an important part of the curriculum is another question ...
Second, when a curriculum ideology emphasises the importance of a particular
subject that subject ineluctably becomes problematic. B y 'problematic' here I
m e a n that since decisions about the best ways of achieving the aims of highly
valued fields are almost always less than optimal, student performance in the
subject is typically a source of discontent and, in this sense, problematic. The
problematic character of the most valued subjects makes them continuous objects
of attention, whereas those subjects that are marginalised or neglected altogether
never achieve a problematic status. (Eisner 1992, pp. 302-3)
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Thus, in the first sense, science is not problematic, in that there is general agreement that
science should be included in the school curriculum, and usually has the status of a core
subject, mandatory for all students, at least until the senior secondary years. In the N e w
South Wales curriculum, for example, study of science is mandatory for years K-10, and
remains part of most students' selection in the senior secondary (11-12) years. Thus the
M c G a w Report, mentioned in Appendix B.6, provided data only on English, Mathematics
and Science to show h o w H S C scores vary according to gender and geographic
differences. In this sense, science is less problematic than, say, sex education classes,
which require parental endorsement in state schools, or Scripture classes, which are noncompulsory in state schools and receive varying emphases in non-government schools
according to variations in ideologies.
However, science is problematic in the second sense of Eisner's use: science, in the
curricula addressed by the present thesis, is highly valued and therefore, as Eisner points
out, is subject to high expectations and high levels of scrutiny. O f course, education
generally, not just at school level, has come under increasing public and political scrutiny in
the 1980s and 1990s, as w e have noted, but science education, particularly school Science
education, like literacy and numeracy, is a c o m m o n focus for this attention:
In the 1980s, more than 300 [US] reports called for a reform of education. There
is no precedent in history for such widespread reform efforts in education. These
reports m a d e fairly consistent recommendations for improving science education.
The particular goals and implied curriculum varied with the group making the
recommendations. [Of particular note among the reports influencing reform of U S
science education are] the American Association for the Advancement of Science
( A A A S ) report Science for All Americans (1989), the N S T A project Scope,
Sequence, and Coordination (Aldridge 1989,1992), and the National Center [sic]
for Improving Science Education ( N O S E ) reports on middle-level education
(Bybee et al., 1990) and secondary education (Champagne et al., 1991). (Bybee &
DeBoer 1994, p. 382)
Briefly, their goals are: social scientific literacy, in Science for All Americans; improved
learning of the canonical knowledge of science disciplines, by the reorganisation of
scientific knowledge, in Scope, Sequence, and Coordination; and a blend of knowledge
acquisition and personal and social improvement through coordinated development of local
school Science programs, in the N C I S E reports (Bybee & DeBoer 1994, pp. 382-4).
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In Australia, there has not been the same attempt at science curriculum reform based
on high profile and broadly influential reports, but nonetheless science is problematic in the
second sense of Eisner's term. For example, in the early 1990s there w a s an attempt to
nationally coordinate the complete school-level curriculum from K-12, resulting in national
profiles for each subject, including Science, intended as frameworks or guides for
curriculum development by each of the state systems. The mathematics and science profiles
in particular attracted considerable criticism from bodies representing academic disciplines,
such as the Australian Institute of Physics, and the print media for their lack of rigour and
undue emphasis on social factors (for example, The Age editorial of 31 M a y 1993, 'A
Failed Curriculum'; Bolt's article, 'Science G o n e M a d ' in the Herald Sun of 10 June 1993;
and the Public Statement on the Draft National Statement and Profile for Science, Australian
A c a d e m y of Science, 1993). It also came under attack because of the concentration of
interest on received knowledge at the expense of the more student-centred approaches to
science education developed in the 1970s and 1980s (Fensham 1995). The eventual effect
of this dispute has been mixed and, at the time of writing, unresolved. It w a s the
unresolved nature of this and other, related issues, that prompted the writing of the present
thesis, which argues that such issues are resolvable to a greater degree of consensus than
before, through better informed and clarified discussion. Criticisms of the rigour of the
science curriculum are discussed in section 3.1 below.
The argument that school Science does not reflect the nature of science, and that its
justification may therefore be compromised
Taking into account the caution, above, that critiques of school Science m a y be a
function of school Science being problematic in the second of Eisner's senses, this section
is set out as follows:
2.1 The goals of science education do not reflect the nature of science;
2.2

The practice of school Science does not reflect the nature of science;

2.3

The practice of school Science does not reflect the goals of science
education.

2.4

Therefore school Science does not reflect the nature of science.
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Therefore these shorteomings compromise the justification for science being

in the school curriculum.
2.1

The goals of science education do not reflect the nature of science

There are compelling arguments that the goals of science education do not reflect the

nature of science. These are based on analyses of both science curriculum goals and ge
curriculum goals.
2.1.1 Science curriculum goals

W e noted above a range of science curriculum goals and emphases that entailed

various views of the nature of science. While rationales for school Science draw on a r
of science curriculum goals, of which characterising the nature of science is but one,

criticisms of school Science frequently cite the poor representation of science in scho
a significant failing:

It has long been recognised that science education for the purpose of general
cultural development has been one of the primary roles of the secondary schools.
A s evidenced by student enrolments, however, our ability to translate this
recognised responsibility into effective programs is another issue. Responding to
this failing, Helgeson and colleagues (1978) stated:
A review of state requirements,... course enrolments from state and
national reports, and current reports of various groups regarding
educational needs indicate science courses are usually required in only
one or two years of the four year high school program. In the opinion
of the reviewers, it appears that the role of science in the secondary
school curriculum for general education remains unclear. W h a t
students should learn also remains unclear, (p. 37)
Perhaps the primary reason that the role of science remains unclear is that there are
so many valid and often competing justifications for science in the curriculum.
These justifications for teaching science affect what kind of science is taught and
the w a y s in which it is taught (DeBoer 1991, pp. 215-6; emphasis added)
The present thesis has shown at some length that there are many different views of scie
each of which characterise science in multiple dimensions. Applying this argument to th

three enduring science education goals identified by Bybee and DeBoer, above, and to th
various science curriculum emphases above identified by Roberts, above, suggests that
they selectively characterise science. That is, they characterise science incompletely
they selectively or incompletely draw on the multiple dimensions of characterisation.
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DeBoer, in the passage above, is correct in observing that there are so many valid and often
competing justifications for science in the curriculum. T h e present thesis argues that the
reason for this is the selective appeal to the nature of science. Each is valid because it
appeals to particular characteristics, or at least elements of dimensions, but appears to
conflict with other, reasonable justifications because they m a k e similarly selective appeals
to other dimensions or elements of dimensions. Thus the source of conflict is the use of
different, selective characterisations, rather than any view being necessarily 'right' or
'wrong'.
Indeed, in the present absence of any systematic, multidimensional analysis of
different goals and emphases, arguments about the inherent correctness or incorrectness of
a characterisation of science in these broadly accepted goals and emphases would be
difficult to sustain, (i) Thus, the goal of acquiring scientific knowledge is widely interpreted
as an internalist view of science knowledge-that. It represents not only an inadequate
characterisation of science knowledge but also an inadequate representation of the
multidimensional character of science. That is, it neglects to s h o w that science is also
characterised by other dimensions, and that science knowledge is defined by its necessary
combination with these other dimensions: purpose, activity, context, structure and belief
system, (ii) Similarly, the goal of learning the processes and methodologies of the sciences
neglects the role of purpose, context, belief system, structure and knowledge in
characterising scientific activities, that scientific processes and methodologies are variously
interpreted, and that scientific activities are m o r e than just processes and methodologies.
(iii) Understanding the applications of science m a y lend itself more easily than the first two
goals to a multidimensional characterisation of science, because it entails those goals and
lends itself easily to broader issues that entail other dimensions. However, this is not a
necessary outcome. It is possible that some overarching goal, concerning understanding the
multidimensional character of science, would entail at least the first two enduring goals and
lend itself well to the third.
A similar argument can be m a d e for Roberts' curriculum emphases. O f these, the self
as explainer and solid foundation emphases probably lend themselves most readily to a
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robust multidimensional characterisation of science. Both draw clearly on both the received
and personal senses of science knowledge, context purpose, activity, structure and belief
system. Still, a multidimensional characterisation is not a necessary outcome, nor are
specific elements of each dimension. The potential of the solid foundation emphasis is
clouded by its traditional use to justify proto-university, internalist characterisations of
science. The potential weaknesses of the other emphases are reasonably evident: everyday
coping m a y not attend to institutional science or to whole clusters of concepts that do not
arise in the everyday life of students; structure of science m a y only attend to the intellectual
contexts of science; science, technology and decisions m a y attend to boundary issues at the
expense of the accepted corpus of knowledge, and to broader rather than individual
contexts; scientific skills development has been broadly criticised in recent years for its
undue emphasis on process at the expense of received knowledge, but w e also noted above
that it can imply a detemunistic view of science; and w e have mentioned already in several
places widespread post-positivist criticisms of the traditional emphasis on correct
explanations.
2.12 General curriculum goals

General curriculum goals also affect the nature of school Science, because while they
are not routinely addressed by the science education or metascientific literatures, they
nonetheless apply to Science as a component of the general curriculum. General curriculum
goals have a broader scope than just science, because they reflect the aspirations of all
curriculum stakeholders. Therefore, as a set but not in every instance, they do not
necessarily entail a robust characterisation of science in the school curriculum. They arise
from m a n y sources, of which w e will mention three: policy, ideology and stnicture.
Policy as a source of curriculum goals
S o m e curriculum goals arise from educational and public sector policy, where
curriculum policy is defined as 'the formal body of law and regulation that pertains to what
should be taught in schools' (Elmore & Sykes 1992, p. 186). A major finding of recent
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research on curriculum policy is an increasing government presence in curriculum policy,
which Elmore and Sykes have interpreted in two ways: the curriculum as an instrument of
public policy (public policy perspectives on curriculum), and policy as an influence on
curriculum (curriculum perspectives on public policy) (Elmore & Sykes 1992, p. 185).
W h e r e the curriculum is interpreted as an instrument of public policy, there is a
distinction between policy as a statement of intent and policy as a statement of action. The
present thesis theorises about statements of intent, but in principle it applies both to policy
as intent (goals) and action (implementation). T h e public policy literature interprets
statements of policy intention variously, as: statements with uncertain consequences;
reflecting multiple forms of authority; symbolic rather than instrumental actions; and as
ideologies for organising authority.
W h e r e policy is interpreted as an influence on curriculum, there are different policy
traditions which are either goals or sources of goals. Elmore and Sykes discussed two such
goal clusters that are explicidy and commonly addressed in formal curriculum statements:
(i) worthwhile knowledge and (ii) societal goalstikechange, efficiency and consensus (a
rational system). Goal clusters can also be more critical perspectives identified by.
curriculum scholars as implicit in broader, socio-political policies, and not explicidy stated
in curriculum documents. Thus (iii) curriculum as control interprets the curriculum goals as
either responding to pressing social changes, by incremental changes to education practice,
or expressing the dominant interests of society. T h e rise of the curriculum as a rational
system in the 1980s and 1990s reflects societal/political interest in school Science serving
national interests, as w e will discuss, (iv) Where the curriculum is interpreted as capital, the
curriculum as an economic commodity transacted with other cultural entities within the
market
T h e curriculum-as-capital perspective examines the relationship a m o n g
[curriculum] benefits [such as certificates, diplomas and licences] and the
principles that regulate their distribution.
Analysis in this m o d e tends to reverse fundamental assumptions about
curriculum and its effects. The educational assumption is that the character of the
curriculum affects society and the economy through the knowledge and skills
conveyed to workers and citizens. The economic perspective proposed by the
curriculum-as-capital theorists, however, regards the interaction between the
educational, economic and social systems as affecting the character of the
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curriculum, and this reverse perspective sheds n e w light on curriculum policy.
(Elmore & Sykes 1992, p. 207)
Thus this view diminishes the value of studying science for its o w n sake or for
individual enrichment for example. R u b y (1991) has argued that national (Australian)
concern with national economic competitiveness has b e c o m e a criterion for judging the
appropriateness of curriculum goals and the effectiveness of the curriculum. T o extend that
argument, framing curriculum goals in terms of national interest devalues and probably
obscures other curriculum goals that m a y better serve national interests in the longer term.
The better justification is to include goals concerning the national interest along with
traditional science education goals such as personal and social development and the
acquisition of worthwhile knowledge. T h e complex, multifaceted nature of curriculum
theories is well served by a multidimensional characterisation of science.
Ideology as a source of curriculum goals
Another source of curriculum goals is ideology, where curriculum ideology is taken
to be the 'value matrix' used to justify the direction of the curriculum:
Curriculum ideologies are defined [here] as beliefs about what schools should
teach, for what ends, and for what reasons. Insofar as an ideology can be tacit
rather than explicit, it is fair to say that all schools have at least one ideology that
provides direction to their functions.
Ideologies are betief systems that provide the value premises from which
decisions about practical educational matters are made. (Eisner 1992, p. 302)
Educational ideologies also apply to the science curriculum. Educational ideologies, like
science ideologies, form part of belief systems: like Eisner, the present thesis argues that it
is belief systems that act as ideologies, and not just for science but for curriculum and other
endeavours also3. Also, it should be unsurprising that there is overlap between the goals
identified by studies in ideology and those identified in policy studies, considering the
overlap between policy and ideology. A recurring theme in policy studies 'is h o w policies
act as ideologies for organising and rationalising authority in political systems' (Elmore &
Sykes 1992, p. 211).

3

W e will pursue this line of thinking towards the end of the present chapter when speculating about
how the present thesis applies to areas of the curriculum other than science, and to the curriculum as
a whole.
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Eisner suggests six ideologies as representing the spread within the curriculum
literature, from which w e identify the following goal clusters: (i) to 'shape the views of
others so that they match the views of those w h o have already discovered the truth
contained in the orthodoxy' (religious orthodoxy)

(Eisner 1992, p. 307); (ii) the

development of h u m a n reason, orrationality(rational humanism); (iii) the development of
intelligence, and social reform, through the intellectual development of the individual child
(progressivism);

(iv) the 'critical understanding, critical evaluation, and informed

commitment to the improvement of society' (Kemmis, Cole & Suggett 1983 p. 15); (v) the
development of students as individual learners and emancipated or empowered citizens; and
(vi) to develop 'the ability to represent or recover meaning in the various forms in which it
can be experienced', the quest for meaning being a basic part of h u m a n nature (cognitive
pluralism) (Eisner 1992, p. 318). At the time of writing, however, none of these is as
dominant at Australian policy levels as ideologies of efficiency, accountability and national
benefit, as identified by R u b y (1991) and Sharpe (1991). further, none necessarily entails a
robust characterisation of science.4
Structure as a source of curriculum goals
A third source of curriculum goals that apply to the science curriculum is the structure
or organisation of the curriculum. Goodlad and Su (1992) have argued that organisational
structures bear direcdy on the definition and expression of a range of curriculum goals:
T h e primary purposes of seeking alternative w a y s to organise the curriculum are to
increase h u m a n accessibility to knowledge and w a y s of knowing, and to foster
understanding. T h e perspective one brings to the task is heavily influenced by
one's conception of knowledge, however well or ill formed. Ideally, the w a y the
curriculum is organised should enhance students' effectiveness as citizens,
workers, parents, and participants in the whole of life - their ability to take part in
the h u m a n conversation (Oakeshott 1962). Curriculum organisation is intended to
render knowledge in such w a y that it is readily accessible to large numbers of
people (Cremin 1971). (Goodlad & Su 1992, p. 328).

4

Eisner notes that it is preferable to speak of ideologies rather than a single ideology, considering 't
there is no single ideology that directs education' (Eisner 1992, p. 302), and we find proliferating
values in pluralist societies such as the U S and Australia. Thus we can identify differing ideologies
between school systems, or even between individual schools, but even within a single system or
school we can identify different ideologies, in the sense that ideologies vary from those expressly
given in mission statements or public policy documents to the tacit decisions made by schools and
individual teachers.
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Goodlad and Su do not suggest that the goal of a curriculum is its o w n structure; this is
nonsensical. Rather, different curriculum structures entail and enable different curriculum
goals: (i) to structure school learning around traditional, enduring disciplines, where each
has 'a presumed logical organisation' (subject disciplines) (Goodlad & Su 1992, p. 335); to
foster student interest and development by using them as the structural basis; (iii) to
organise the curriculum so that students are able to appreciate the significant issues that
affect people and their societies (major social issues); and (iv) in practice, some hybrids of
these three. However, none of these entails a robust characterisation of science.
Knowledge as a central and enduring curriculum goal
W e noted in section 1.2.1, above, that the acquisition of knowledge is an enduring
and significant - even central - curriculum tradition, whose characteristic goal, worthwhile
knowledge, has been interpreted variously, as: the tradition of the liberal arts; cognitivedevelopmental approaches to learning; efforts to improve the efficiency of instruction; social
reconstruction; and self-actualisation.
The organisation of knowledge around traditional disciplines and especially the
single-subject pattern, like science, has been particularly enduring throughout the twentieth
century. This is despite periodic criticisms that such an organisation tends to distort the
school curriculum unnecessarily in favour of tertiary studies and lack of consensus 'about
the nature of the structure of their discipline' (Goodlad & Su 1992, p. 335). There is a
plausible argument that this curriculum organisation m a y be a reason for the inability of the
curriculum to respond to continued criticisms:
Welch (1979) looked back on the pre-college science curriculum development
projects funded by the National Science Foundation - all discipline-oriented
approaches to curriculum organisation. His conclusion was that in spite of the
expenditures of millions of dollars and the involvement of some of the most
brilliant scientific minds, the science classroom in the late 1970s was little different
from that of 20 years before. Although there m a y be n e w books on the shelves and
clever gadgets in the storage cabinets, the day-to-day operations of classes are
largely unchanged - curriculum and instruction are organised and conducted
around the separate school subjects, a pattern of organisation that remains little
changed over the years. (Goodlad & Su 1992, p. 336)
Australian secondary school curricula have also tended to be structured around disciplines,
especially at the senior (11-12) level, and the m o r e contextualised and interest-based
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approaches the 1980s curricula are being replaced by more discipline-based in the 1990s
(Fensham 1995).
The present thesis has argued at length that the traditional characterisations of science
in the curriculum have been inadequate, and attempts to organise the science curriculum to
embody a supposed inherent structure of science - to reflect the discipline - are flawed.
Moreover, the mention, above, of the involvement of some of the most brilliant scientific
minds suggests a narrowness of curriculum stakeholders that, with respect to the scientists
involved, limited each conception of the curriculum. A discipline-based organisation does
not have to be in single subjects, but m a y be as correlated subjects (as in the N S W Science
and Technology K-6 syllabus), fused subjects or broad-fields of knowledge (all of which
are found in the integrated implementation of the N S W K-6 curriculum in many schools).
A multidimensional school Science has a stronger potential to meet the range of these
diverse goals than does a traditional, internalist, school Science. However, the term
worthwhile knowledge is vague like all such broad terms, and susceptible to interpretation
to suit the interests of any stakeholders. A s a result, it does not guarantee a robust
characterisation of science; it merely allows for it.
Goals associated with the curriculum as a rational system
Another cluster of general curriculum goals has re-emerged in the 1980s and 1990s in
western societies, associated with an increasing influence of conservative economic policy
on other public policy, including education policy. In this view, worthwhile knowledge is
partly defined by its value to the greater social benefit, including economic and other
benefits. Here, the curriculum is interpreted as a rational system for achieving change in
educational practice, improving the efficiency of the w a y the community uses resources for
education, and 'greater consensus on the core values a nation promotes through its
education system' (Elmore and Sykes 1992, p. 195):
Qirriculum, in this view, is a rational means for achieving collective social ends
and for making improvements on a scale that cannot be achieved by enlightened
individual actions. (Elmore & Sykes 1992, p. 195)
This view characterises the curriculum as a rational system that is 'susceptible to efficient
design' (Elmore & Sykes 1992, p. 198), and its central goal can be characterised as societal
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in the sense of meeting societal purposes such as change, efficiency and consensus. It has

been popular from time to time, particularly in the US, and has enjoyed a resurgence fr
the mid-1980s in the managerialist policies that came to characterise public policy in
western countries, such as the US, the UK and Australia (Ruby 1991). Criticisms in the
1970s of this approach, that the so-called 'scientific' approach of using surveys and

external consultants to implement a research and development approach to curriculum, do

not seem to figure in the more recent, and still current, political rhetoric of efficie
the rationally managed curriculum.
The goal of improving the efficient use of resources is linked to goals of increasing
national efficiency and economic well-being, especially through 'improved' science,
mathematics and technology curriculum goals. Ruby (1991) has made this point well. He
noted similarities between education systems in the US, the UK, France, New Zealand,

Australia and elsewhere, and, perhaps more strikingly, from across the political spect

traditional differences in political ideologies concerning the curriculum have diminis

Broadly, these changes call for greater external control over the school curriculum th
large-scale testing:

These new reporting and assessment strategies are tied to three shifts in public
policy during the 1970s and 1980s. The first is a shift in policy priorities from
increasing and monitoring input levels to measuring and improving outcomes. The
second is a shift in policy focus from the individual to the cohort or the population.
The third is a shift in policy goals from meeting individual needs and aspirations to
serving the national interests. Bentham's notion that serving the needs of
individuals would satisfy the needs of the state has been turned on its head: the
interests of the nation demand that individuals be educated to the highest level
possible. Like the other reforms these n e w assessment strategies do not totally
change structures and systems but aim to m a k e existing practices more effective.
They are attempts to improve the quality of outcomes by working harder, making
the content tougher, and by 'making the little buggers work harder' (Kirst 1988).
These intensification efforts are focused o n the modal group - they ignore the
upper quartile because they are the model for the reforms. They also ignore the
bottom quartile because for these children their family and social circumstances
and the basic structure of school limit any chance of success. (Ruby 1991, p. 22)
That is, Ruby argues that curriculum goals have shifted in recent years to reflect bro
changes in the goals of public policy, namely to improve the scores of widespread testi
of learning outcomes, to focus on the educational achievement of the group rather than

individual, and to serve national interests rather than the needs of individual student
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Accepting Ruby's analysis, the present thesis has something to say about each of
these goals. First large-scaletestingis restricted traditionally to that which is easily tested
and scored b y large-scale assessment instruments, namely recall of propositional
knowledge, and is unlikely without an explicit effort to reflect a more robust understanding
of science as proposed by the present thesis (Fensham 1992, p. 796). Secondly, learning is
done by individuals, and therefore the curriculum needs to address such matters as the
individual construction of knowledge and the belief systems of individual students (Lawson
1994). Thirdly, a focus on national economic interests, particularly as expressed in formal
statements in recent years, dismisses the role of science education in promoting the
scientific literacy of its citizens: earlier rhetorics like catering for individual differences
feature mainly at the school level and little with the policy elites. This is quite apart from the
likely dilution of national interests by pursuing a limited and inadequate characterisation of
science. Fourthly, clauses like making the content tougher simply beg the question of what
is meant by tougher. T h e present chapter will argue later that the scientific rigour of the
curriculum arises from a robust representation of a multidimensional characterisation of
science, not by increasing the recall of soon-forgotten acontextual knowledge with little
sense of the usefulness of science in real contexts. Moreover, a rigorous school Science
should be modelled on a robust characterisation of science, and not the achievements of the
upper quartile of students in traditional curricula. Such a curriculum model can then be
applied to suit the interests, needs and abilities of all students, including those w h o might
be encouraged to pursue further science studies and so also meet national interests.
It is legitimate that pluralist western democracies facing the twenty first century value
the contribution of school Science to national well-being, and a multidimensional school
Science is well suited to this task. However, the appeal of the curriculum as a rational
enterprise rests partly on the unstated benefits of an mstrumentahst curriculum to particular
stakeholders. This does not acknowledge that such a school Science is also well suited to
other curriculum goals, including goals of personal fulfilment and empowerment, and
longer term societal competence with scientific and technological matters. T o the extent that
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these goals are marginalised and even discarded, the characterisation of science in the
school curriculum is compromised.
A s it stands, a school curriculum predicated on narrowly defined goals of efficiency,
accountability, improvement and short term economic benefit implies a characterisation of
science that the present thesis rejects as a distortion. Such curriculum goals are consistent
with a multidimensional characterisation of science, but at best they do not encourage it and
at worst they endorse a flawed characterisation. W e will return to this matter briefly, in
section 3.4 below, to argue that a multidimensional is better than a traditional
characterisation as a basis for school Science meeting these broader social goals.
The curriculum as worthwhile knowledge and as a rational system are policies that
explicidy exercise the minds of curriculum stakeholders, and whose goals are those
probably expressed most clearly in school Science. T h e significant question here is the
nature of school Science they entail or preclude. If, as has been the trend in western
democracies since the 1980s, worthwhile knowledge becomes equated with that which best
serves the national interest, and national interest is defined narrowly, then other science
curriculum goals are diminished or excluded (Fensham 1995). Decisions such as these are
the prerogative of school systems, as is their right in pluralist democracies. W h a t the
present thesis challenges is the tendency toward large scale curriculum changes, such as the
national curriculum efforts in Australia and the U K , without making informed decisions
about their effects on the nature of subjects, such as influencing the character of school
Science.
Conclusion: the goals of science education do not reflect the nature of science
The present thesis argues that, based on its analysis, the three traditional goals of
science education and general curriculum goals do not reflect the nature of science as
characterised in the metascientific literature. While they are consistent with, and give scope
for, the multidimensional characterisation of science argued in the present paper, at best
they are inadequate in scope and definition, and at worst they give a distorted and
incomplete characterisation of science that lacks cohesion and rigour. They are neither as
explicit nor as thoroughgoing as the present thesis has argued. E v e n allowing that Bybee
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and D e B o e r reviewed research on science curriculum goals, and did not claim to be
representing the detail of particular goals, it appears that goals expressed as purposes of the
science curriculum are m o r e comprehensive 5 than goals expressed as content to be learned.
T h e traditional expressions of goals as statements of curriculum content (what is to be
learned) do not m a k e explicit the scope argued by the present thesis. T h e tendency of goal
statements to be broad allows for extended scope, but in practice this strategy has not lead
to broader interpretations. This is the main criticism of existing curriculum goals as they
apply to school Science.
22 The practice of school Science does not reflect the nature of science

The curriculum literature is replete with examples of curriculum initiatives, including
the science curriculum, that have failed to be implemented at every level. This includes
criticism, from several quarters, that the practice of school Science does not reflect the
nature of science: they include appraisals of student knowledge, teacher knowledge, public
understanding, curriculum content textbook contents, and so forth. Criticism of school
Science from most metascientific critiques is generally similar. For example, Matthews
(1994) has listed a long history of appeals for H P S studies to be included in science
education courses, including science teacher preservice training, and several authors in
L o w e (ed., 1987) and Jasanoff et al., (eds, 1995) have m a d e similar critiques from S T S
perspectives6.
Criticisms that in some respects school science inherently misrepresents science
First is the claim that school Science does not necessarily reflect the nature of science.
For example, Bernetta (1986) has argued that for m u c h of the twentieth century U S biology
texts m a d e litde or no reference at all to evolution, let alone a robust treatment. T h e

5
6

The term comprehensive is used here to mean a multi-dimensional characterisation of science, as
argued by the present thesis.
Note the earlier caution against doctrinaire distinctions between metascientificfieldslike HPS and
STS.
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physicist Richard Feynman, recalled by Bernetta, has argued that school Science textbooks
characterise science poorly because
... the book publishers and the state adoption agencies operate a closed system in
which they cyclically reinforce each other's ignorance, reward each other's
superstitions and preserve science education in this funny realm of Never Never
that never never was. (Bernetta 1986, p. ScSh3)
To the extent that texts equate with practice, school Science here does not reflect the
of science.
Criticisms that learning outcomes from school Science are not good science
From any reading of the science education literature, particularly from the 1980s on,
one cannot but be impressed with the staggering rise of studies that report children's

misconceptions of science concepts, and the resistance of these misconceptions to change:
There are approximately twenty-five hundred published studies on children's
misconceptions in science; the information on the resistance of science learning to
science instruction is overwhelming (Duit 1995). (Matthews 1994, p. 51)

This alone is sufficient to cause concern whether the three goal clusters are widely met,

because it indicates that traditional science curricula and teaching modes are not partic
effective in developing the ideas contained in the curriculum: not for individuals, and
therefore not improvement in society; explicitly not the development of scientific
understanding; and not the development and application of science skills.
This judgment is reinforced by other data comparing children's understandings, skills
and attitudes with those that characterise science:
But there are also many antieducational factors that are within schools' competence
and influence to affect. O n e disturbing finding in m a n y of the reports is that the
more science students do, the less they like it (Yager & Bonstetter 1984;
Brunkhorst & Yager 1986). The National Assessment of Educational Progress
data shows that traditional science instruction tends to negate natural interest, and
cause some of the best students to pursue other disciplines. In a 1991 report of the
National Science Board, Science and Engineering Indicators, nearly thirty percent
of all seventh-grader express a preference for a career in science or engineering.
This percentage steadily drops through high school, and by the end of high school
less than twenty-five percent of boys and, dramatically, less than ten percent of
girls express such a career interest (National Science Board, 1991). B y the end of
the 1980s fully seventy percent of U S school students took no more science and
mathematics than the m i n i m u m required to graduate from high school.
Also of concern is the degree to which even successful science education has
failed to transform students' intellectual outlook. O n e study found that belief in
astrology was largely unaffected by completion of a U S science degree: students
w h o commenced the degree program believing in astrology finished the program
believing in it Forty percent of the U S population, despite all their years at school,
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believe that astrology is scientific; astrology columns are more widely read in
newspapers than science columns. (Matthews 1994, pp. 33-4)
This critique also addresses all goal sets: personal and social goals, scientific
understanding, and the useful application of scientific techniques, such as reasoning from
evidence.
The present thesis shares these concerns that for m a n y students a science education
negates their natural interest, is not pursued beyond mandatory enrolment and fails to
transform their intellectual outlook. A multidimensional characterisation of science
legitimises school Science addressing Matthews' concerns by basing the school curriculum
robustiy in the literature. In Matthews' examples, above, our attention is drawn to students'
beliefs about astronomy and astrology (belief system) and the non-laboratory context in
which such students and citizens confront them. If Matthews and others are correct,
studying the characteristics of science more systematically will help school systems address
the educational, personal and social concerns he raises.
A related concern is that both the goals and implementation of school Science
misrepresent science by relying unduly on unrelated, acontextual facts and concepts,
without regard to any meaningful understanding. This has its roots in the nineteenth century
(DeBoer 1991) but persists a century later. The focus on concepts, noted above, has in the
first place been at the expense of 'much of the descriptive knowledge and the historical and
applied aspects of science' (Fensham 1992, p. 794). In the second place, it has been
adopted in a manner contrary to its original rationale:
The intentions for the understanding of the role of concepts in science have not,
however, been successfully included. M a n y current curricula are n o w overpacked
with the sterile or rote learning of concepts in the absence of an appreciation of
h o w these concepts originated in the data of science in the real world. (Fensham
1992, p. 794)
It would seem, then, that the rationale for a treatment in depth, including developing an
understanding of context, value and application, has not translated in classrooms; the
rationale for covering more concepts, however, has.

Chapter 12: Conclusion

349

Associated concerns about public science literacy
Related to these concerns over natural interest and intellectual oudook are concerns
that these deficient outcomes adversely affect public scientific literacy. M a n y studies of the
public understanding of science have shown very low understandings by the public
(Matthews 1994; W y n n e 1994). M a n y constructivist studies of students' understandings of
science concepts show considerable mismatches with accepted scientific understandings
even a m o n g tertiary science and technology students, w h o would have numbered among
the most able and most interested science students when at school (Wandersee, Mintzes &
Novak 1994). These examples indicate a considerable body of evidence for rejecting a
claim that the learning outcomes of school Science reflect the nature of science. W e have
discussed the public understanding of science in chapter 11 and Appendix B.6, and will
apply the present thesis to it in section 3.5 below, but the point here is the links that are
claimed between criticisms of public science literacy and school Science education:
Science education remains what it has been for decades: an indoctrination in an
objectivist conception of science and epistemology and a breeding ground for
uncritical and scientifically illiterate citizens. (Roth, M c G i n n & B o w e n 1996, p.
455)
This critique links a particular set of beliefs about the world and knowledge of it (objectivist
conception of science and technology) and a restricted sense of science knowledge
(indoctrination rather than critical understanding) to lack of scientific literacy. This
combination of factors is significant and w e will pursue the public understanding of science
in section 3.5 below.
2.3 The practice of school Science does not reflect the goals of science education

Just as there are criticisms that the practice of school Science does not reflect the
nature of science, so too there are concerns expressed from various sources that the enacted
curriculum does not match its goals. For example, where the curriculum is organised
around student interest and development, the central goal is to foster these qualities in
students. This has attracted considerable theoretical interest and enjoys support from
teachers as an educational principle, especially at primary (K-6) levels, but has had m u c h
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less impact on the formal curriculum, especially the secondary curriculum. Goodlad and Su
(1992, p. 336) have suggested three reasons for this: the probable non-compliance of
schools with the community's expectations of standards and scope (the second of Eisner's
senses of problematic subjects); the difficulty of constructing worthwhile educational

experiences in response to the often ephemeral interests of students; and the difficulty

students expressing an interest in what they have not yet learned. That is, there are oft
good reasons for this circumstance:
Most teachers conscientiously try to deliver the curriculum already specified. They
depart from it at theirrisk.Given the preceding traps and teachers' propensities,
w e should not be surprised to learn that curricula organised around students'
interests are nonevents. This conclusion does not negate another conclusion: M a n y
teachers d o attempt to motivate learning by endeavouring to connect what they
want to teach to students' expressed interests. However, such efforts are
pedagogical devices designed to attract students to a prearranged (and usually
subject-oriented) curriculum. They fall short of providing alternative patterns of
organisation. (Goodlad & S u 1992, pp. 336-7)

Fensham has also noted this effect, reporting that evaluations of the 1950/1960s curricu

the 1970s and 1980s revealed that the intentions of the curriculum developers were not we

reflected generally in classrooms. He cautions against being overly critical of the teac
role:
[I]t is wrong to conclude that this indicates necessarily a deficit on the part of
teachers. T h e teacher's first responsibility is to a particular classroom. Teachers
have to interpret the images the curriculum conjures up to them in order to translate
these images into a curriculum-in-classroom-use. Ben-Peretz (1975) used the term
"curriculum potential" to describe the creative but unintended (by the developers)
uses by teachers of s o m e project materials. (Fensham 1992, p. 794)

That is, it is an issue for curriculum developers to address rather than a deficit on th
teachers.
In many examples the goals of school science concern the nature of science, and these

are better summarised by saying that the enacted curriculum matches neither the goals nor
the nature of science. Taking learning outcomes as a measure of the enacted curriculum,
Hanbury Brown (1986, p. 156), for example, has reported that a poll of US citizens

showed 44% held beliefs consistent with special creationism (a short cosmological histor

divine creation of humans and little change of life forms) and inconsistent with evoluti
This is a special debate that is addressed in more detail in section 3.2 below, but here
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observed outcomes match neither the curriculum goal nor the nature of science because the
goal of acquiring science knowledge includes accepted science knowledge.
Examples of mismatches between the enacted and idealised science curriculum arise
from the broad perspective of all curriculum goals: they reflect the complexities of the
learning and teaching processes, the running of schools, the plethora of goals and pressures
that affect schools, and so on. The curriculum hterature is replete with studies of these
issues, but an example from science curriculum is conveyed nicely by Eijkelhof and
Kortland in their analysis of the Dutch Physics Curriculum Development Project ( P L O N ) :
It would be very premature to draw, in 1988, final conclusions about the impact of
the P L O N project on science education, particularly on the teaching of physics.
Processes of change in education take a long time and are influenced by m a n y
factors from inside and outside education, such as teachers' salaries, class size,
structure of education, job education, job opportunities, teacher training, n e w
examination programs, etc. Innovators' feelings often drift between hope and fear.
(Eijkelhof & Kortland 1988, p. 303)
This is especially relevant given two factors w e have discussed already as associated with
the science curriculum. O n e is Eisner's notion of curriculum subjects such as Science being
problematic w h e n they receive high expectations and the consequent likelihood of these
expectations not being met. The second contributes to the first namely the competing
interests of m a n y stakeholders, a recurring theme in the present thesis.
2.4 School Science does not reflect the nature of science

In summary, there are strong grounds for rejecting claims that traditional science
education goals are well grounded in current, scholarly understandings of the nature of
science. T h e conclusion from the present analysis of the metascientific and science
education literatures is that the three traditional, broad science curriculum goals are not m e t
Therefore, the inclusion of science in the school curriculum is not justified based on these
goals. That is, school Science does not adequately represent science as characterised in the
metascientific Hterature. This does not in itself m e a n that school or traditional science
education goals are not justified. Rather, it means that they are not justified as robusdy
characterising the scientific and metascientific literatures: they cannot claim the authority of
being well grounded in those literatures.
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Taken together, sections 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3, above, comprise a strong argument that
the practice of school Science does not reflect the nature of science as characterised in the
metascientific literature. This is despite the express intention of m a n y science curriculum
goals and science educators to convey the character of science. However, as argued above,
most science education goals and practice are based on characterisations of science that are
limited, non-rigorous, frequendy disputed outright in the metascientific literature, and at
odds with current scientific literatures. In addition, the implementation of school Science,
like the implementation of most school subjects, falls short of its stated goals. Therefore, it
cannot claim to represent science, at least in any robust orrigoroussense.

2.5 The failure of school Science to reflect the nature of science compromises the
justification for science being in the school curriculum

If the justification for science being included in the school curriculum is that the
nature of science contributes to the general goal cluster of the curriculum, and if neither the
goals nor the practice of school Science reflects the nature of science, then the very rationale
for science being included in the school curriculum is compromised. Whether science is
included because of its contribution to the mental disciphne of students, enculturation in a
significant h u m a n enterprise, significant other personal and social outcomes, national
benefits, or personal understanding of the material world, or some combination of these,
these goals arise largely through the perceived nature of science. N o w it could be argued
that the traditional, restricted characterisation of science for school Science is sufficient, or
even better suited, for these curriculum goals. T h e present thesis rejects this argument
because it found that science is characterised in multiple, interacting dimensions. At best a
traditional, internalist characterisation of science does not m a k e this clear, at worst it distorts
science b y neglecting significant aspects of the character of science and variations in
interpretation. A n education in science, rather than an indoctrination in it must equip
students for the complexities of science, its uses and mis-uses, and the capacity to deal with
novel arguments. These are reasons for science being in the school curriculum. They can
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They do not arise from the sort of school Science that is subject to the criticisms g
above.
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T h e present thesis applies to science curriculum issues.

The present thesis applies to issues involving the nature of science as it is
characterised in the science curriculum. In showing h o w science can be better characterised,
it suggests h o w these issues can be addressed. W e will examine six examples of current
debates that have implications for the science curriculum, and therefore about which the
present thesis should be expected to contribute. The examples were chosen simply because,
in the author's experience of curriculum development, they recur as significant to
curriculum stakeholders. These debates are about:
3.1 rigour in the science curriculum;
3.2 the inclusion of so-called creation science in the curriculum;
3.3 conservative versus progressive (right-wing versus left-wing) views about the
curriculum;
3.4 the contribution of science education to the national economy;
3.5 the public understanding of science; and
3.6 the relationship between science and technology.
S o m e of these are interrelated, but are addressed separately here because each has been a
substantial focus of public discussion.
3.1 Rigour in the science curriculum

The notion of rigour is often invoked in discussions about the curriculum, as for
example by the N S W Minister for Education and Training (Aquilina 1997). In science
education it is invoked usually in arguing for a thorough treatment of scientific concepts and
mathematical manipulations; by contrast, studies of science in its social context are
dismissed as lessrigorous.W h e r e this concept of rigour is specified, it is based on the
empirical foundations of scientific knowledge and the logic and rationality of scientific
deductions and mathematical analysis. Often rigour is vaguely specified or used without
elaboration or justification, which appears to be antithetical to the very notion of rigour
itself.

Chapter 12: Conclusion

355

Rigour is taken here to m e a n exactitude andrigidlyaccurate adherencetorules:
Rigour:
2.
the full or extreme severity of laws, rules, etc.: the rigour of the law (The
Macquarie Dictionary; emphasis in original).
The obvious questions are, W h i c h rules, or W h o s e rules? The present thesis argues that the
rigour of a public document like a curriculum syllabus cannot be demonstrated unless at
least it conforms to its literature, which is available to and arises from informed scholarly
and public debate and scrutiny. That is, the hterature comprises argument that can be
constructed and scrutinised with care by all interested parties. This is not to argue that
school Science is the same as science per se. Rather, it is to argue that to the extent school
Science purports to represent actual science, or sciences, it must show that it conforms to
the scientific and metascientific literatures. T o the extent that school Science embodies other
considerations, such as theories of learning and pedagogy, it must also show that it
conforms to those literatures to demonstrate itsrigour.Thus the following paragraphs
comprise an argument for curriculumrigourconcerning the subject Science.
(i)

There exists a body of extended, defended, critiqued, and publicly available
argument about the nature of science, comprising contributions from individuals
and groups widely recognised in society as capable of identifying and critiquing
the rigour of science claims, including practising scientists, philosophers of
science, historians of science, sociologists of science and contributors to science
policy. This body of argument comprises the metascientific literature.

(ii)

T h e present thesis argues that any claim to rigour must at least demonstrate
adherence to this body of critiqued and authoritative argument in the metascientific
literature. It further argues that this literature characterises science in a complex,
multidimensional fashion, and suggests that this complex characterisation can be
better understood in terms of knowledge, activity, purpose, structure, context and
belief system, than it can by traditional categories of characterisation. For example,
simplistic, uncontested, positivistic characterisations of science m a k e it difficult to
reconcile the widely accepted claims that science knowledge is both authoritative
and tentative. However, examination of science belief systems, purposes, contexts
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and activities shows clearly that science knowledge can be both authoritative and
tentative, in specialised senses of these terms, due at least to its empirical basis,
naturalistic beliefs, retesting of claims, the criteria for judgements, and competing
interpretations of meaning.
(iii)

T h e present thesis also applies to a curriculum framework that has traditionally
included a subject called Science, and that subject has traditionally claimed a
relationship to something larger in society, also called science. That is, they are
explicit decisions that the characteristics of science should be in the curriculum,
and that the school subject bears some relation to science, or the sciences, per se.
O n the basis of these decisions, the present thesis then seeks to inform any
decision about the correspondence between school Science and science.

(iv)

Debate about the nature of science in the school curriculum arises partly because
the assumptions about rigour and the criteria for establishing it are typically
inexplicit and poorly grounded. Rigour in school Science arises from several
sources, including: the explicit treatment of scientific belief systems, particularly
the assumptions and criteria for making judgements; the explicit treatment of
scientific structures, particularly the structures of logical arguments and scientific
language; the explicit treatment of the multiple, interactive, dimensions of science,
such as the interplay of beliefs, purposes and activities; and the use of teaching and
assessment strategies that promote students' intellectual engagement with these
characteristics.

(v)

Adoption of a particular view of science based o n poorly grounded debate is no
guarantee ofrigour,and at best can marshal only slim support for any claim to
rigour. In Australia,finalcurriculum documents typically present only a particular
characterisation without any demonstration ofrigour,whether or not competing
views of science have been proffered in the preceding curriculum debates. In such
a circumstance, rigour is tacitiy equated with the dominant or agreed view of the
curriculum stakeholders concerned. However, the agreement about the dominant
view typically arises from a process of negotiation between stakeholders
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(McKinnon 1991; Winder 1991; Walker 1991); the substance of argument in these
negotiations is not m a d e explicit. Attempts to ground therationalein the literature
are limited and sometimes specious: curriculum documents, such as syllabuses,
policy documents and text books, show little evidence of broad and robust
grounding. For example, the Science Profile that w a s part of the Australian
national curriculum framework project (Curriculum Corporation 1994) implies a
characterisation of science, but this is inadequate in several respects: it does not
show that there is a variety of views about science, nor does it illuminate any main
views; it does not show the multidimensional character of science, as the present
thesis advocates; it bears little relationship to the content strands, that reinforce
traditional, positivist (uncontested) views of discipline-based propositional
knowledge; and it gives little idea of h o w the statement on the nature of science can
be translated into the detail of the later sections7. These criticisms apply even more
strongly to the N S W science syllabuses, especially at the secondary school level,
most of which have little to say about the nature of science, and even less to say
about presenting more than a positivist discipline-based knowledge of science
concepts and investigative processes. Thus an argument forrigourthat is based on
a particular specialist representation in the curriculum development process can fail
also because that process has no explicit means of identifying and securing that
rigour. T h e present thesis argues that such a process can claim n o m o r e than
unsupported agreement on a particular view and does not demonstrate rigour.
(vi)

Such a process, of determining curriculum content by publicly unsupported
argument, is open to influence and even control by interest groups of whatever
ideological persuasion, whether academic, political, religious, social or economic.
Ideology is in itself not a bad thing; as noted earlier in this chapter, any statement
of curriculum goals represents a mix of educational and other ideologies. Also, as
previously mentioned, the present thesis is committed to a liberal, pluralistic

7

Criticisms of the statement of the nature of science in draft materials for the profile were widely
criticised in the media, for example from the Australian Academy of Science (1993).
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democracy (itself an ideology), and part of that setting is acceptance that groups
within such a society will compete for ideas and policy control. However, the
present thesis has argued that a characterisation of school Science that is grounded
explicidy in the metascientific literature makes this grounding clear by definition.
That is, the basis for making curriculum decisions about the nature of science
should be open and transparent.
A counter argument to the points (i) to (vi) above is simply to argue that the school Science
education of potential scientists and technologists has no time to be concerned with
anything but an essentially internalist curriculum. This view is often argued by claiming that
the increasing amount of scientific knowledge creates pressure for more science knowledge
to be covered, not less. There are several responses to this argument besides those given
above.
Rigour and the school education of scientists
First are arguments associated with the goal of providing a sound basis for the future
education of scientists and technologists. T h e general response is that a traditional,
internalist science curriculum is inadequate for the preparation of potential scientists and
technologists.
(i)

The essentially internalist and positivist character of school Science is strongly
contested in the metascientific hterature and science education literature concerned
with the nature of science. Metascientific argument covered in the present paper
has shown that positivist science has satisfied neither its o w n criteria, such as the
principle of verification, nor criticisms from non-positivist accounts. There are
compelling arguments that a stricdy internalist account of science failstoappreciate
the role of the scientific community and its interactions with the wider community,
and is wrong in implying the scientific ideas develop according to their internal
logic alone. That is, the traditional approach is not only less adequate, but less
rigorous.

(ii)

T h e strongest case for a strongly internalist and positivist school Science seems
only to be appeal to tradition. In overall structure, Australian school Science
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curricula were established during the influence of the positivist Received View of
science, but have not fundamentally changed since that view was discredited.
(iii)

There are plausible, even compelling, arguments that a broader notion of context
than simply the cognitive actually characterises science, and thattofail to account
for this is to fail to understand h o w science actually works. It is to fail to provide a
scientificrationale,reducing scientific commitment to poorly justified belief. That
is, a multidimensional characterisation is more rigorous.

(iv)

Although of derivative concern to the present thesis, the science education
literature also argues that robust understanding of scientific concepts will develop
by more time being spent on fewer concepts, rather than addressing more concepts
or, worse, masses of poorly related facts (DeBoer 1991, p. 222). While this in
itself does not preclude a strongly internalist approach, w h e n combined with
studies showing increased understanding resulting from a broader appreciation of
context, the traditional internalism of school Science is also poorly grounded in
learning theory.

(v)

For these reasons, the education of future scientists and technologists is likely to
be enhanced rather than diminished by a multidimensional characterisation.
Students would, for example, develop: a more thorough understanding of (fewer)
concepts; an appreciation of the rate of change and the scope of science
knowledge; and an ability to appraise the soundness of science claims both within
the science community and more broadly in society, through an appreciation of
science knowledge, beliefs, criteria, structure, purpose, activity, and context

(vi)

M a n y of the most significant issues confronting societies today are based in
science and technology, and most of these can be neither understood nor resolved
using internalist science arguments alone. There is a growing literature dealing
with the public perception of science and the w a y the public interact with sciencerelated issues. In matters as diverse as superstitions, ecology and nutrition, to
n a m e but a few, the opinion of the scientist is one among m a n y and sometimes one
a m o n g a number of scientific opinions. A n internalist argument - one comprising
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propositions of scientific concepts - will not win the day necessarily, because such
issues involve more than scientific propositions. F r o m a public perspective the
situation is even more nonsensical w h e n expert opinions differ, because each
expert constructs a different internalist argument
(v)

This creates the prospect of scientists, able to act only as mere technicians, having
less appreciation than interested non-scientists of h o w the broader picture of
science works in practice. This has strong implications for the control of science:
while certainly not arguing for the complete autonomy of the scientific community,
it creates the possibility of policy makers, corporations and public and private
interest groups controlling science without regarding the views of the practitioners.
In the companion chapter on context and Appendix B.l, w e noted that the
substantial portion of scientific research is funded either by private interests such
as business or particular interests arising from government and semi-government
policy, including military and other targeted funds. W e also noted increasingly
strong community interest in other scientific activity, such as by animal welfare,
environmental and reproductive technology interest groups. Thus the dependency
of scientific research on specific funding becomes increasingly evident, as is the
ability for external groupstoinstigate, redirect halt or in other w a y s alter scientific
research. These are legitimate processes in a pluralistic democracy. However,
scientists unable to appreciate and address these factors are severely restricted in
the contributions they can make.

(vi)

It ignores the pressure, addressed by the present thesis, for a m o r e scientifically
literate public. It is often the case, and increasingly so from the last quarter of the
twentieth century, that the general public expects and is likely to achieve greater
involvement in the running and funding of science. T h e view, during the
nineteenth and into the twentieth centuries, that science w a s benign and perhaps
all-powerful, dissipated in the second half of the twentieth century with public
concern over the role of science in non-benign issues, such as military
developments and pollution, and the failure of science to deliver expected benefits,
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such as curing serious illnesses. This shift in public perception is well
documented. Aligned with this shift has been a shift towards increasing public and
government intervention. T h e popular image of the disinterested and talented
scientist pursuing an individual enthusiasm applies to an increasingly insignificant
minority. F r o m these trends and the present characteristics of science, it is most
probable that the science of the future will be even more of a public and corporate
enterprise, and the scientist of the future will need expertise in achieving in that
culture. A n internalist curriculum is unlikely to prepare scientists with those
abilities.
Rigour and the goal of public understanding
Second are arguments associated with the goal of preparing a scientifically literate
citizenry. In seeking to serve the future needs of an educated citizenry, the above
arguments, of intelligibility, real-world understandings and rigour, still apply, but more
strongly. T h e intelligibility argument is more significant because the range of school
students would also include students of all abihties, including those of whatever ability w h o
find acontextual, internalist, science unappealing. Even if the internalist argument, that
political, personal, economic and other factors should not apply to 'good' science, is
advocated for particular approaches or subjects, the evidence is undeniable that they do
apply in 'real-world' science, meaning science as it is practised both within the scientific
community and in science-society issues. In both contexts a multidimensional
characterisation of science makes the nature of science clearer, in particular, informed public
debate about scientific issues requires this real-world, multidimensional understanding. W e
will address the public understanding of science as a curriculum issue in section (e) below,
but it is clear that the notion of an educated, 'scientifically literate citizen' would refer to
some understanding of science 'in the real world', and not just its frameworks of concepts
and propositions of knowledge-that.
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Rigour and the multiple goals of the general curriculum
Third are arguments associated with broader clusters of curriculum goals, where the
science curriculum is viewed as a means of serving the future needs of an educated citizenry
and, as a subset of this group or as a separate set future scientists and technicians. In this
case, all the above arguments still apply. T o argue some sort of externalist characterisation
for a generalist stream but an internalist characterisation for an 'elite' stream, is simply to
confuse the curriculum development by introducing prematurely how the curriculum should
be constructed, a question of means, without having determined what should be in it a
question of ends. At the very least this can distort the nature of school Science, making the
science curriculum lessrigorous.The present thesis is clear about the need for science in
the general school curriculum to be characterised more rigorously and comprehensively,
along with being more engaging, enriching and empowering for students. A
multidimensional characterisation of science has this capacity. The question for curriculum
developers should be h o w to construct a curriculum that provides a multidimensional
characterisation of science for all students.
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3.2 The debate about evolution and special creationism in the science curriculum

There is long-running debate over whether special creationism - often called by its

proponents creation science - should be included in the school Science curriculum eit

alongside or instead of evolutionary theory. This debate is a nice example of debate b
curriculum stakeholders about the nature of school Science, and a specific example of

debate about curriculum content Venezky (1992, p. 447) has described the US debate ove

theories of evolution and special creationism in biology textbooks as a 'battleground

social control power struggle' to influence the curriculum by influencing the content
school textbooks. He argues that for much of the twentieth century in the US, many

biology textbooks made little or no mention of evolutionary theory, despite its cenrr

biology and complementarity with theories in other science fields. Further, a number o

states passed legislation either barring the teaching of evolution or requiring equal
special creationism:
In 1920 Okalahoma oudawed the use of textbooks that taught evolution, and a few
years later Tennessee barred the teaching of evolution, whether from atextbookor
any other source.
The Scopes trial, held in Dayton, Tennessee, in 1925, involved a high school
teacher, John T h o m a s Scopes, w h o agreed totestthe validity of the state law
banning evolution from schools ... [T]he case presented the first of a series of
skirmishes between science and society. The prosecution w o n the case, only to be
reversed at the state level on a technicality. But the statute against the teaching of
evolution remained on the books in Tennessee.
Soon after the Scopes case w a s resolved, Mississippi and Arkansas passed
similar laws barring the teaching of evolution. It was the Arkansas law, k n o w n as
the Rotenberry A c t that reached the Supreme Court in 1968. T h e court then ruled
that it was illegal to bar the teaching of evolution in public schools and colleges
(De C a m p 1969). Tennessee countered in 1973 with a law requiring equaltimefor
special creation - that is, the Genesis version of h o w life began. The California
Board of Education had adopted a similar position in 1969. '[The] B o o k of
Genesis presents a reasonable explanation of the origin of life ... special creation
should be taught as an alternative to the theory of organic evolution' (cited in
Nelkin 1976). The Tennessee equal time law was declared unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court and was repealed in 1975. The California Board of Education, in
the meantime, also reversed itself and pressed publishers for a more extensive
treatment of evolution in biology texts.
In viewing the evolution controversies, it is critical to understand the nature of
the present-day objectors. They are not mainly the residents of rural Appalachia,
but middle-class citizens from areas like southern California and urban Texas,
m a n y with technical training (Nelkin 1976). Fundamentalist movements grew
rapidly in these areas in the late 1960s, perhaps as a response to the uncertainties
of technology. Creation research centers [sic] were established, and creationism
was pushed as a valid, scientific concept In parallel, high school courses and texts
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that taught evolution or that appeared to give science a role greater than that of
religion were attacked. Programs like M A C O S suffered from these movements, as
did a number of specific textbooks (Conlon & D o w 1975). (Venezky 1992, pp.
447-8)
This passage from Venezky raises several matters of interest to the present thesis. S o m e
issues are more general than the particular issue of special creationism and evolution, and
some are specifictoit
Effects of legislation on the curriculum
First is the general matter of legislatively determining the content of the school
curriculum: this is a m u c h broader curriculum issue than the particular matter of special
creationism. It concerns any example where curriculum stakeholders seek to define in
legislation what is science for the purposes of the school curriculum. Like the matter of
special creationism, it m a y also arise from the ideological goals of particular religious
orthodoxies. For example, the present author was once asked to provide confidential advice
to a school system about a non-mainstream view of science. The school system had a
request from a particular religious group for their children to be exempted from any
association with microchip technology. The reason for the request w a s that this group had
identified microchip technology with the Antichrist The immediate implications of such a
request were that students would have had to have been exempted from using computers,
videos, and so forth, in class. The broader implications for science education were that they
also would have been excluded from learning about microchiptechnologies.The effect for
these children was to present a view of science that is not endorsed, either by the scientific
community or mainstream education systems.
The impact of legislative approaches m a y also arise from curriculum goals arising
from other than religious orthodoxies. For example, w e have noted above that curriculum
goals are influenced increasingly by broader government policy. Thus, where the
curriculum is viewed as a rational system, it is under pressure for its (state-defined)
efficiency and accountability to be quantified and improved, partly by the mass testing of
student learning outcomes. T h e implication for the enacted science curriculum is that
curriculum content becomes that which is tested easily by large-scale instruments.
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Traditionally such instruments have favoured c o m m o n content and low-order intellectual
skills such as recall of propositional knowledge and formula manipulation. This opposes
the multidimensional characterisation of science advocated by the present thesis, which calls
for a demonstration of understanding of both knowledge-that and knowledge-how, of
analysis of contextualised science issues, purposes, and so forth. T h e same argument
applies where the goals of science education are to serve the economic and other needs of
society in training our future scientists and technologists; this is pursued in section 3.4
below. Alternatively, policies that view the curriculum as capital emphasise the value of
credentials conferred by a science education, where the pressure on the science curriculum
is to cover that content covered by the exit credential. W h e r e that credential is awarded on
the basis of external examinations, as in the N S W context the pressure is to teach to the
test.
The general point implied by Venezky, and supported by the present thesis, is that
legislative determination of the curriculum is, ultimately, a reflection of the legislative
process, and is no guarantee that a school subject in this case Science, reflects the hterature
of the field with the sametitle,science. Whether or not the curriculum is set out in
legislation, there must be some mechanism within the curriculum development process that
accounts for the literature that analyses the field. W h e r e the society claims to be a
pluralistic, participatory democracy, then that process must be open to participation,
scrutiny and revision. There is, of course, the possibility that legislation could be enacted to
require curriculum development to take account of the hterature. However, examples where
the curriculum has been legislated to a greater or lesser extent, such as the Education
Reform Act of 1990 in N S W and the national curriculum in the U K (Pring 1989), have
shown that legislators have not taken that option, instead legislating for frameworks ( N S W )
or frameworks and content (UK). In N S W the government delegates the role of curriculum
development to the statutory Board of Studies, but there is no requirement by regulation or
even public advice to demonstrate particular standards of scholarly analysis.
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Effects of textbooks on the curriculum
T h e second matter raised in Venezky's discussion is the role of textbooks in
determining curriculum content. This is probably more of an issue in U S education
systems, where school texts are endorsed at a system or board level, rather than in
Australia, where decisions about school texts are m a d e mostly at the individual school
level. Nonetheless, the general proposition remains that school texts present a view of the
nature of science, whether explicitly or not. There is widespread criticism from
metascientists that school Science texts address the nature of science poorly, such as by:
providing a distorted reconstruction of science (Singer 1959); omitting the very historical
detail that illuminates a particular scientific argument (Matthews 1994); tending to demand
low-level cognitive processes, focus on presenting knowledge content, impose time
structures on the coverage of the program, and encourage 'cookbook' type experimental
activities (Tobin, Tippins & Gallard 1994); using rhetorical devices that are not made
explicit (Lewenstein 1995); and with using technocratic and uncritical characterisations of
science (Edge 1995). The present thesis argues that a multidimensional characterisation of
science addresses each of these criticisms.
Effects of a science education on curriculum decisions
The third matter raised by Venezky is the role of curriculum stakeholders, many with
technical training, w h o objected to the teaching of a theory that the relevant scientific
community judges as central to the field. B y implication, Venezky finds it especially
remarkable that technical training, presumably built on a solid foundation of school Science
education, provides no guarantee that curriculum stakeholders would not reject a central
tenet of science. Similarly Hanbury B r o w n (1986, p. 157) has noted that m a n y creationists
'come from the technically trained middle class', but explains this as part of a traditional
conflict between faith andrationalism,where religious fundamentalism seekstouse reason
to support and even demonstrate religious faith.
In response, the present thesis does not advocate that science education should be an
indoctrination into science, especially to the exclusion of other elements of a broad school
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education. Rather, the response is that a science education should m a k e clear the belief
system(s) that underpin science, and enable citizens to identify and analyse conflicts (and
agreements) between belief systems used by scientists and others in society. Merely
learning propositions of science knowledge, devoid of purpose or meaningful context, and
with basic assumptions unexamined, as with traditional science curricula, is clearly
inadequate preparation for evaluating competing belief systems.
Effects of attitudes to science and technology on curriculum decisions
Fourth is Venezky's suggestion that even the well-educated middle classes, including
those with technical training, have adopted an anti-science stand perhaps as a response to
the uncertainties of technology. Again there is the inference that science education has left
citizens unprepared to analyse scientific issues, in this case the rapid pace of development
and its impacts on their lives. Again, the response must be for the school Science
curriculum to provide for an appreciation of the multidimensional character of science, such
as the rapid growth of scientific knowledge, and the purposes and contexts of its creation
and uses.
Effects of separation of church and state, and rhetorics of citizens' rights
Fifth is the contribution to this particular debate of t w o issues that probably
characterise U S society more than most other western societies: the separation of church
and state, and the rhetoric of citizens'rights.These are tacit in Venezky's passage no doubt
because they are presumed knowledge by his (mainly U S ) audience. The separation of
church and state in the U S meant that this part of the science curriculum content w a s argued
on the basis of whether the court ruled that special creationism w a s a scientific theory, and
therefore part of the science curriculum, or a religious tenet and therefore constitutionally
forbidden from U S schools. The significance of the legal location of this debate is noted by
Strahan (1987) in his description of the successful challenge to the 1981 Arkansas Balanced
Treatment of Creation-Science and Evolution-Science Act by a coalition of civil libertarian,
Protestant, Catholic and Jewish groups:
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M a n y biologists and geologists were called as expert witnesses. The defendant
included the Arkansas Department of Education and several of its committees and
officers. Their witnesses were mainly Creation 'Scientists'.
The trial was held in December 1981 and resulted in a clear verdict on all counts
for the plaintiffs. In his decision, the judge ruled that Creation 'Science' is no
more nor less than a particular religious doctrine and that a law enforcing its
teaching in government schools is therefore unconstitutional. The Act has therefore
been removed from the Arkansas statute books.
Scientists around the world can take some comfort from this case - for it could
conceivably have gone the other w a y - but it can be no more than cold comfort
While it would have been very convenient for fundamentalists to have the teaching
of Creation 'Science' blessed by law, absence of legislative enforcement will not
reduce their continued pressure on individual school boards and parent
organisations in the U S A and elsewhere. (Strahan 1987, p. 10)
That is, the debate about the nature of science in the curriculum took place in the chal
to the 1981 Act - in a legal framework - because presumably it was not provided for in t

curriculum development process. Strahan is correct in noting that a legal victory can be

cold comfort: the 1997 Australian legal challenge by the geologist Ian Plimer against th
Creationist Allen Roberts is such an example. Plimer's challenge was on the basis that

Roberts' claims contravened fair trading legislation; the court ruled that although Robe

claims were scientifically misleading in some respects, he was not engaged in trading un
the meaning of the Act and so was not guilty of contravening that Act (Williams 1997a,
1997b, 1997c, 1998; Hemsley 1997). Moreover, Strahan later noted that in the state of

Queensland, Australia, equal time for creationism and evolution in the science curriculu

was won without legislation or even parliamentary debate. In that case the debate was no

part of the curriculum development process, either, and Strahan stresses the intention o
avoiding debate as a means of influencing the science curriculum:
In a debate, two points of view are assumed to be of equal importance ... Hence
the rejection of the method of debate as a teaching tool in our ministry. ( H a m
1980, as quoted by Strahan 1987, p. 11)
In the companion chapter on context and Appendix B.l we discussed boundary work
as the means by which different groups seek to demarcate what is science from what is
non-science. Strahan's use here of inverted commas in Creation 'Science' to distinguish
from science is noteworthy as an example of boundary work. Equally, Ham engages in
boundary work from the other side:
The Creation Science Ministry teaches both the Biblical and scientific facts of
creation. The aim is to show h o w thisteachingis related to the Gospel and basic to
the truth of the Fall of m a n [sic]...
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Especially it is pleasing tofindthe [creationist] books in therightsection of the
[school] libraries under Science and History instead of Religion as the atheistic
D e w e y system would require. ( H a m 1980, as quoted by Strahan 1987, pp. 10-11)
This is nottoargue for a complete relativism here. T o the extent that this passage from H a m
represents special creationism, the present thesis has shown that the aim of showing h o w
scientific claims relate to religious texts (the Gospel) has long gone from science and
conflicts with the widely held purpose of science to provide naturalistic explanations with
empirical support. Further, the Fall of man is an axiological concept specifically a religious
one, and generally agreed to be beyond the limits of what empirically based knowledge can
tell us, that is, non-science.
The scientific credentials of special creationism
Sixth from Venezky's passage is the specific issue of whether special creationism
does belong in the science curriculum. T h e basis for this decision is whether special
creationism is a valid scientific theory: whether or not it m a y be an alternative to evolution.
A number of factors cloud debate on this issue, which is another reason w h y this example
is useful in highlighting potential difficulties in determining the nature of science in the
school curriculum. Complicating factors include the U S constitutional separation of church
and state, as w e have mentioned, the (mainly) U S rhetoric of citizens'rights,and the
emotive issue of religious belief. W e will use these three issues as foci for analysis of the
case for special creationism in school Science.
This argument, of which Venezky's is an example, can be interpreted using a
multidimensional characterisation of science, as follows. A subject, such as Science, is
included in the curriculum on the basis that it reflects a broadly accepted, well informed
view in society of the nature of science. The present thesis has s h o w n that such a view is
complex. That complexity should be reflected in a science curriculum for all citizens.
Debate about whether particular views, such as special creationism, are science, and
therefore included in the curriculum as science, should be part of the curriculum
development process. The curriculum development process is better able to compare views,
and m a k e informed judgments about them, w h e n it makes the characteristics of science
explicit, for example using a multidimensional characterisation as advocated by the present
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thesis. That is, whether these sorts of debates are argued in the courts, or (preferably) in the
curriculum development process, they need an analysis such as the present thesis to do this
job well.

3.2.1 The impact of separation of church and state on this issue of the science curriculum

There can be not only legal but political arguments brought to bear on science in the
curriculum, as with the U S constitutional separation of church and state, whose effect has
been to exclude religion from the school curriculum (Strahan 1987; Sockett 1992). T h e
response of the special creationist m o v e m e n t has been, variously, to argue that special
creationism is scientific, and therefore has a place in the science curriculum, or alternatively
that evolution is simply a religious belief, and therefore it should be excluded from the
science curriculum (Strahan 1987, p. 9). Clearly, one cannot have it both ways and argue
that evolution is scientific (but so is special creationism) or that it is not scientific (and is a
religious belief instead). In the examples of evolution and special creationism, as in all
others, the place of each theory in the curriculum must be argued on its o w n merits. Again,
a multidimensional characterisation can clarify the issues.
T h e present thesis interprets the claim that evolution is a religious belief as
highlighting the role of beliefs in characterising science to the neglect of the larger belief
system and other dimensions of science such as purpose, activity and knowledge. In this
respect it would be possible to think of all h u m a n endeavours as belief systems of one sort
or another: science, religion, mathematics, history, art and so forth. This is a distortion: the
present thesis argues that beliefs alone do not characterise science, but do so in combination
with characteristic activities, purposes, structures and so forth8. Mainstream curriculum
developers accept that evolutionary theory is scientific and deserving a place in the science
curriculum because the relevant scientific community accepts it as a scientific theory: it
gives a naturalistic explanation of observed phenomena; it is testable (sustains predictions);
it is in principle revisable (falsifiable), and as such m a k e s no claims to absolute truth but

g

At the end of this chapter w e will speculate about other fields also sharing these dimensions.
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rather to the best empirical knowledge w e have at the time; it is consistent with other
successful theories and understandings used by scientists (Strahan 1987; Archer 1987).
The m a n y claims by creationists that evolution is refuted by science draw o n a range
of scientific expertise that is difficult for the lay person, or even the science trained without
relevant expertise, including scientists from other fields and science teachers, to judge.
Nonetheless, detailed examination of these claims by scientists with the relevant expertise
shows that each of these objections is rejected by the relevant scientific communities
(Archer 1986). For the present thesis, evolutionary theory conforms with widely endorsed
understandings of scientific belief systems (in its naturalistic beliefs, assumptions and
criteria for decisions), knowledge (in being consistent with scientific knowledge from other
theories), purpose (in seeking a naturalistic explanation that meets agreed criteria), context
(in its acceptance by scientists with relevant, accredited expertise, that is, in both its
intellectual and disciplinary contexts) and activity (by arising from characteristic scientific
activity and sustaining predictions). S o for the purpose of the school curriculum, w e find
that the belief system embodied in evolutionary theory meets the criteria of scientific belief
systems, and in combination with other dimensions of science; therefore it m a y be included
in the science curriculum. Whether it is also a religious belief system is beyond the scope of
the present thesis, but it lacks belief in a supernatural power that typically characterises
religious belief systems.
Turning to special creationism, w e find claims that it is a religion ( H a m 1980, quoted
by Strahan 1987) and that it is scientific (Bliss 1978). W e will concern ourselves only with
the claim that special creationism is scientific; if it is a religion, then it belongs elsewhere in
the curriculum, not as science. The claim that it is scientific can be judged using the multidimensional analysis developed for characterising science in the present thesis. Here w e
find that a number of characteristics of special creationism differ significantiy in several
respects from those used to characterise science, using the dimensions demonstrated by the
present thesis to characterise science. These differences are found in: its belief system (God
as a causal agent in Nature, belief in the absolute truth of biblical text, and biblical text as a
higher criterion of authority than empirical evidence); knowledge (such as using a different
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definition of species to that used in biology, and inconsistency of creationist propositions
with other accepted science knowledge); purpose (in seeking to demonstrate the match of
religious text with contemporary empirical data); context (in rejection by and of accepted,
accredited authorities in relevant fields, the social context in which it arises, and the lack of
appropriate qualifications of most creationists); activity (in being unable to sustain
predictions or empirical tests of claims); and structure (in that creationist claims are
inconsistent with highly successful laws and theories).
A n objection to this is that, in Kuhn's characterisation of science, a n e w paradigm can
emerge w h e n sufficient empirical datafitsa different theoretical construct better than the
existing construct. O n this basis one could argue that special creation m a y simply be an
alternative paradigm to evolutionary theory. Thus a mismatch between different
propositions of knowledge or lack of endorsement by the existing scientific community
(context) alone m a y not be grounds for dismissing special creationism. However, a
multidimensional characterisation is more robust than this, and by considering the multiple
dimensions of science one can m a k e a curriculum decision more clearly. This is Archer's
argument. H e appeals to a scientific belief system that requires not only naturalistic
explanations but also empirical evidence as characteristic criteria for judgments. In turn,
these entail empirical activities, consistency with other empirically justified theories and
statements of law-like regularities, characteristic purposes and so forth. These are suitable
matters for curriculum developers to consider.
3 2 2 The impact of citizens' rights on this curriculum issue

We have noted in Appendix B.l on context the influence in (mainly) the US of
citizens'rightsas part of science-in-society debates. This brings a different set of pressures
to bear on the curriculum: the issue is that individuals or groups of citizens are curriculum
stakeholders and have aright,because of their citizenship, to have a say in the content of
the school curriculum. This is consistent with the changes, noted above, in some
curriculum goals towards increased choice and diversity, in a number of western (and
other) countries including Australia. Individual choice of curriculum content can thus, in
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one sense, be seen as an extension of individual choice of school system, school or school
management. In another sense, choice of curriculum content could be characterised as the
what of school education, and choice of school or management structure a question of how.
W e must ask, first, are there grounds for opposing the rhetoric of citizens'rightsto choose
curriculum content and second, if so, what are they?
There are grounds for questioning, but not opposing, the rhetoric that citizens have a
right to choose the content of the curriculum, in the societies w e have been discussing. The
present thesis has set as its context the mainstream curricula in contemporary, western,
pluralistic democracies, in which citizens are able to express their views about school
curricula among other things. The pertinent question here, however, is h o w theserightsare
argued or opposed concerning the nature of school Science. T o this there are several
answers, because although the present thesis is clear in arguing for a multidimensional
school Science, w e have yet to address the question of h o w and by w h o m relevant
decisions could be made.
O n e ground for questioning therightof citizens to determine the curriculum is the
nature of the view being expressed. If a citizen claims to be making a statement about the
nature of science, then that statement must be open to scrutiny, and the present thesis
argues that this is best done using a multidimensional characterisation of science in some
sort of open forum. T h e present thesis has argued that the nature of science cannot be
determined by one making an individual and arbitrary decision about some dimension of it
the nature of science is complex, multidimensional and not prescribed by any particular
individual or group. Judgements about the views expressed by individuals or groups must
be m a d e using a characterisation such as proposed by the present thesis, that is grounded in
public, scholarly statements about science.
Another ground for questioning thisrightis the locus of expression: the interaction of
citizens'rightsand the school Science curriculum turns on where and h o w theserightsare
expressed in the curriculum development process. Thisrightis manifest in different ways
in different countries: individualism as an ideology is strong in the U S , but less so in
Australia and elsewhere. It m a y be enacted by bureaucrats and politicians acting on behalf
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of citizens, by citizens participating in large-scale, public forums set up for just such
involvement, or by citizens acting singly or in small groups. In Australia, for example,
there are far fewer school systems than in the U S , and in N S W citizen involvement is
expressed formally but indirecdy through a statutory board that is responsible to the elected
government These factors have the effect of making education systems more responsive to
high level policy decisions and less to individuals and small groups: citizen choice,
therefore, operates indirecdy on the school curriculum as part of larger decision making
processes. It is not clear that larger forums necessarily lead to better decisions, but
pluralistic democracies are predicated on open and accountable decisions. Education
systems should be able to show that the curriculum development process is open and
accountable, and that there should be mechanisms for citizens to m a k e meaningful and
informed contributions to the process. A n y subsequent legal actions should have to take
into account that such contributions were duly allowed and considered in open and
informed discussions. The present thesis provides a framework that would promote such
discussion.
Therightof citizen choice also turns on the nexus betweenrightsand responsibilities.
Complete freedom of expression results in anarchy and the restriction of individual
freedoms through the unfettered actions of others. In pluralist democraciesrightscome with
responsibilities, including responsibilities in curriculum development. Science is included
in the curriculum because the goals of science education, such as science as worthwhile
knowledge and a significant discipline, include both personal and social benefits. The
present thesis has argued that the nature of science as knowledge and a discipline is
complex and multidimensional; to appreciate the nature of the dimensions and their mutual
interactions is to have a robust understanding of science. For example, the view of
curriculum as arationalenterprise, that rose to prominence in the 1980s in Australia and
other countries, argues that it is inadequate to satisfy the needs of the state simply by
serving the needs of the individual: that individuals need to be educated to the highest level
for the interests of the state, not for themselves (Ruby 1991). T h e present thesis argues
further that it is so worthwhile that citizens should have a more robust understanding of it,
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and h o w it affects their lives, than traditional, narrow, characterisations have allowed. This

argument, then, becomes a variant of the notion that with rights come responsibilities. The

right of citizens to participate in decisions about how science and technology affect their
lives brings with it a responsibility for those citizens to be as informed as possible. If

citizens, as a society, wish to be able to participate in the decision-making of that socie

which increasingly includes decisions calling on a knowledge of science, then citizens must

be appropriately educated. If citizens decide to devote curriculum time to something called

science, then it should be characterised robusdy - well grounded in its hterature, and that

the point where citizens' rights are enacted. The weaker version of this argument is that i
societies want their citizens to be prepared to make informed decisions, they have a
responsibility to ensure, and even require, their school systems provide appropriate

curricula. The stronger version is that individuals bear this compulsion to complete such a
education, a position more contestable in pluralist democracies.
Another matter that arises in the creationism/evolution debate, although not restricted
to it is the flow-on effect of allowing some non-science into the science curriculum. This
a version of the 'slippery-slope' argument, which has been used in legally comparable
contexts:

A slippery slope argument is a kind of argument that warns you if you take a first
step, you will find yourself involved in an irreversible sequence of consequences,
speeding faster and faster towards some disastrous outcome. A good example was
the argument used to support the majority opinion in the recent U S Supreme Court
decision not to ban burning of the American flag as a criminal act. Justice William
J. Brennan, Jr argued that any ruling to ban physical desecration of the flag would
leadtofurther cases that would 'enterterritoryhaving no discernible or defensible
boundaries'. Wouldn't the court then have to consider prohibiting the burning of
state flags, or the Constitution? Justice Brennan worried that in order to evaluate
these choices, the court would end up imposing its o w n political preferences to
suppress all kinds of unpopular protests. This kind of outcome is obviously
dangerous in a democratic country where freedom of speech is important (Walton
1992, p. 216)
Of course, when used without sufficient justification, a slippery slope argument can simply

be a rhetorical tactic to scare people from making a decision, but just as clearly it can b
valid technique for pointing out the consequences of a potential action (Walton 1992).
This is the argument underlying some objections to special creationism. For example,
Archer (1986) has argued that to let special creationism into the science curriculum as
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science is to let in a non-scientific world view or belief system. If so, this would be unjust
in a pluralistic democracy, in not also admitting all other religious belief systems,

particularly since the fundamentalist special creationism is not a mainstream religious bel
in western countries. The argument is then in danger of sliding down the 'slippery slope':

Were that the only logical consequence, maybe real science would just be able to
hang in there. But along with the m o r e conventional belief systems of other
mainline religions including Aboriginal D r e a m t i m e cosmologies, r e m e m b e r that
waiting impatiently just outside the door, with every bit just as m u c h right to
d e m a n d time in the science classes (as long as scientific methodology is n o longer
required for an idea system to be regarded as science), are the astrologers, the
diviners, the faith-healers, the psychics, the fork-benders, the astro-projectionists,
the geocentric fundamentalists w h o know that the earth is the centre of the universe
around which the sun and all other heavenly bodies rotate, the growing numbers
of flat-earth fundamentalists w h o know that N A S A ' s pictures of a round earth
taken from outer space were a deliberate hoax ... and undoubtedly m a n y other
groups would have an equivalent right to d e m a n d equal time in science classes.
This 'fair-go' consequence must surely follow if w e encourage the teaching of
even just one untestable religion in school science classes. (Archer 1986, pp. 3234; emphases in original)
Archer here draws attention to what he, and the present thesis, interprets as belief systems

The argument is that science is characterised partly by a methodology and belief system, but

to compare science simply with other belief systems is to introduce a relativism that ignore

the other dimensions of the character of science. Were the school subject to be called Belie
Systems, then one would justifiably compare scientific, religious and other belief systems.
But the subject is Science, and therefore should make clear that the belief systems that
characterise science do so because of both their own contents and their combination with
the characteristic activities, purposes and so forth. The implication of the court decision
mentioned above is that there are also problems with citizens' rights if a decision is made
that will lead indefensible and undemocratic decisions about the curriculum: to admit one
means that in fairness we admit all comers, with the result that no-one can study what was

9

Eisner (1992) has noted that 'curricular ideologies derive from what might be regarded as
Weltanschauungen - worldviews' (p. 302), just as w e have noted in most post-positivist views of
science. Curriculum is self-evidently an expression of human interests and activity, and very often
explicidy identifies a particular world view. Also significant are the world views embodied in the
belief systems of individual students, again as w e have mentioned. Students' own belief systems
must be addressed by the curriculum if students are to challenge their own, implicit beliefs with
belief systems characteristic of science. Hie implication for the science curriculum is that it must
recognise and make clear the worldviews it promotes, and address the worldviews of students in its
implementation.
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originally intended to be science. Religious belief systems m a y well have a place in the
school curriculum, but not as science: they are untestable empirically, entail non-naturalistic
beliefs, are not recognised as scientific by the science community, and so forth. Their place
in the curriculum has to be argued separately, and this is beyond the scope of the present
thesis.
3.2.3 The impact of the emotiveness of religion (and science) on this curriculum issue

The other complicating factor in the creationism/evolution debate over the science
curriculum is the emotiveness of both religious beliefs and science. T h e emotive character
of debate about religious beliefs manifests itself here in the claim by literal creationists that
to reject their particular beliefs is to reject all belief in God. T h e tension arises from
opposing, strongly held and strongly defended belief systems. There are considerable
theological and well as metascientific arguments that apply here, but w e will consider
briefly only two here.
T h e first is the claim that a scientific belief system entails therejectionof God. This is
generally a curriculum issue only where the curriculum goals arise from particular religious
orthodoxies. In this case, the objection to science is often cast as another 'slippery slope'
argument: that religious belief is based on a particular, literal interpretation of religious text
(the Bible in this case, but the Koran or other writings in other contexts), and that denying
one tenet such as an account of creation leads to denying othertenetsand any belief in God.
It is not an issue where the curriculum goals do not arise from religious orthodoxies, or
where the religious orthodoxy finds no conflict with science.
T h e second argument is that most religious orthodoxies - most mainstream religious
belief systems in western countries - have no substantial conflict with science. W e noted
above that the legal challenge to the 1981 Arkansas law was mounted by a coalition of civil
libertarian and mainstream religious groups, against the state education system whose
expert witnesses were mainly literal creationists. This shows that the evolution/creationism
debate is complex, and not simply, or even, a conflict between science and religion. It has
just as m u c h to d o with clashes between different religious belief systems:
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T o see that this conflict [between science and religion] is still with us today w e
have only to look at the clashes between science and the more rigid systems of
religious belief, such as the 'fundamentalist' branches of Islam or Christianity,
which insist on the central importance and infalhbility of the Koran or the Bible.
In recent years there has been a surprising growth of fundamentalist religions
particularly in the U S A . The Southern Baptists, Latter-day Saints and Seventh-day
Adventists, have been gaining ground at the expense of the less literally minded
a m o n g the Methodists, Episcopalians, Presbyterians, Disciples of Christ and
Northern Baptists. (Hanbury B r o w n 1986, p. 155)
For Hanbury Brown, the historical clashes between science and religion arise when the
limitations of both science and religion are not understood:
In principle the solution is deceptively simple; all we have to do is to recognise
which questions can be properly answered by science and which questions by
religion. Only by making sure that they both recognise their o w n limitations can
w e maintain their mutual respect, and at the same time prevent conflict between
these two ways of interpreting this mysterious world.
Pope John Paul U pointed out the importance of recognising these limitations
when he said in his address to the Commission re-examining the R o m a n Catholic
Church's treatment of Galileo:
'One thus perceives more clearly that Divine revelation, of which the
Church is guarantor and witness, does not of itself involve any particular
scientific theory, and the assistance of the Holy Spirit in no w a y lends
itself to guaranteeing explanations that w e would wish to profess
concerning the physical constitution of reality. It is only through humble
and assiduous study that the Church learns to dissociate the essentials of
its faith from the scientific systems of a given Age, especially w h e n a
culturally influenced reading of the Bible seemed to be linked to an
obligatory cosmogony.'
(Hanbury Brown 1986, pp. 154-5)
We have noted earlier in the chapter on belief systems the long history of thinking about
relationships between God, Nature, and the role of science, and that many well-known
names in the history of western European science, such as Copernicus, Galileo, and
Newton, had strong religious beliefs and, often, the backing of the Church. It is not
necessary here to explore the details of developments in theology, especially those in the

twentieth century, to be able to conclude that belief in evolution as a natural process does

not preclude a belief in God. Rather, belief that the two are mutually exclusive has as much

to do with competing religious beliefs than with science and religion, and in this respect
emotiveness of the creationism debate bears much of the character of other conflicts

between competing belief systems, such as intra-scientific, inter-religious, inter-racial a
political disputes. The present thesis interprets Hanbury Brown's solution, that we

recognise the questions answerable by science and religion, as applying a multidimensional
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characterisation of science, in particular here the role of belief system and context in
characterising science, to establish an agreed boundary between science and religion for the
purpose of determining curriculum content.
The emotiveness of religion as an issue in the science curriculum, expressed as
concern that science violates the expression of religious beliefs, is also related to the
emotiveness of science, expressed as concern about the role of science in societal changes.
In this respect the certainty offered by s o m e religious beliefs, and in particular
fundamentalist religious beliefs, offers a sense of security amidst increasing social
complexity and change. Various commentators have argued that theriseof various forms of
fundamentalism in recent decades is a response to increasing social uncertainty (for
example, Hanbury B r o w n 1986, p. 157; Strahan 1987, p. 11). This response is part of a
wider phenomenon, the rise of anti-science beliefs, a point noted in the discussion of
Venezky, above, and in the companion chapter on context and Appendix B.l. This also
affects the public understanding of science, whoserelationshipto the science curriculum is
discussed in part (e), below.
For the present thesis, the response to emotions like fear or loathing is not ignorance,
but education. Thus a science education should not be an indoctrination into an uncritical
acceptance of any and all claims by scientists, but rather the development of a critical
appreciation of the multidimensional character of science. Such a critical appreciation would
enable the citizen to examine the costs and benefits, the assumptions and implications, and
the judgments and actions entailed by various claims m a d e in the n a m e of, or against,
science.
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Conservative versus progressive (right-wing versus left-wing) views about the

curriculum

Another debate that affects decisions about curriculum development, including the
science curriculum, is the periodically prominent debate between conservative and
progressive curriculum stakeholders, including academics, policy makers, educationalists
and others. This debate has become more prominent again during the planning and writing

of the present thesis, as shown by the international shifts in education policy in the 198
and 1990s, mentioned above (Purpel & Shapiro 1995). Some commentators refer to this as

a clash between the political left and right. In this view, for example, literal creation

widely associated, particularly in the US but also in Australia, with conservative religi

and political groups that express a range of conservative ideologies such as 'the sancti
marriage, the family, male superiority, parental authority, corporal (and often capital)
punishment, and strong government' (Strahan 1987, p. 11).
In another view, as noted above, the curriculum is characterised as a rational system
for improving national or societal goals, by groups from across the political spectrum:
[rjntensification, assessment and demands for accountability could be seen as new
but more particularly, they are 'blue'. They reflect the ascendancy of conservatism
as the dominant political philosophy influencing education both in terms of
government ideology and in community acceptance. Sometimes this is ascribed to
the ' N e w Right'. This simple claim masks more complex shifts in the influence
and power of political ideas. T h e neo-conservatives have absorbed, endorsed or
generated m a n y 'populist critiques of curriculum reform, professionalism and
bureaucracy' and used them to support wider concerns about the failure of the state
to maintain standards and discipline in schools and society. T h e implicit demand
for a strong state role attracts even broader support encompassing traditional leftwing groups concerned about inequities produced by differential curriculum
offerings (Quicke 1988). This conservative influence crosses traditional party
division. Labor governments in N e w Zealand, Labor Governments in Australia,
(federally and in Western Australia and South Australia) and socialist governments
in France and Portugal have all adopted relatively instrumentalist policies on
education. (Ruby 1991, p. 2 2 ) 1 0

To some extent then, and in an educational context, traditional notions of a political le

right have become less discernible, but in the significant respect that the policies gene

10

Ruby's analysis has held since being written, as in the subsequent Labor governments in N S W and
the U K , which have broadly maintained the policy shifts begun by the conservative predecessors.
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have become more instrumentalist, more explicidy tied to national economic and other
political goals, and with greater emphasis on choice and less on equity.
With these changes have c o m e other 'conservative' shifts, in particular shifts in
academic argument and itsrepresentationin political and media contexts. S o m e of these can
be classed as attacks on political correctness, or PC:
The issue of and charges against P C have indelibly marked the terms of political
debate and commentary in the U S . Whether or not P C actually exists or if its an
accurate charge, the rubric of P C has c o m e to define a broad spectrum of liberalleft positions. Affirmative action, deconstruction, feminism, and multiculturalism
are all conflated under the banner of P C . A n d the aspersion of P C has become a
shorthand w a y to dismiss these positions out-of-hand, asridiculousor tyrannical,
shortcircuiting any sort of more elaborated debate or discussion. (Williams 1995,
p. 2)
This debate - the so-called PC Wars - is relevant to the present thesis because it includes
debates over the characterisation of science. Included in what Williams calls the broad
spectrum of liberal-left positions are critical analyses of traditional characterisations of
science as internalist, objective, value-neutral, and so forth. They are opposed by
conservative thinkers w h o characterise post-modernism, feminism, multiculturalism and
other liberal-left views as an amalgam of arguments that are weakly considered and not
politically neutral. This debate forms part of the e/i distinction, discussed earlier in the
companion chapter on context and Appendix B.l; Bunge and Latour were mentioned as
examples of largely opposing views of science. This is particularly interesting for any
discussion of the characterisation of science for the school curriculum because the
representation of science seems to be one of the more newsworthy elements of the P C Wars
for the popular press. Thus Gross and Levitt's 1994 book, Higher Superstition: The
Academic Left and its Quarrels with Science, and the later text The Flight From Science and
Reason (eds Gross, Levitt & Lewis 1997), have attracted press attention that generally
supports their attack on studies of science, technology and society, rather than critiquing
and clarifying the opposing views. For example, Sandall's (1996) review of Gross and
Levitt, published in The Weekend

Australian newspaper, was emitted The Rise of

Irrationalism: the tide gives the tenor of the review. For the present thesis, which addresses
the school curriculum rather than a particular metascientific standpoint, this is yet another
metascientific argument that is grist for the mill. However, it is mentioned here as an
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example of a debate in the public domain that can affect argument about the nature of school
Science: clearly, the readership of Sandall's review of Gross and Levitt would be far larger
and broader than the readership of Gross and Levitt's original text, and indeed a scholarly
rebuttal to Gross and Levitt such as in Science Wars (ed. Ross, 1996).
W h a t are curriculum developers to m a k e of such a debate? The response of the
present thesistosuch a book review in a broadsheet newspaper is that one would expect the
newspaper's readership to be able to make some sort of informed analysis and judgment of
the article. This should take into account that w e are speaking here of a general newspaper,
not a scientific journal for a specialist audience, so that w e should expect that any particular
article would strike the interest of a reasonable proportion of thereadership.Newspapers,
after all, are not in the business of running items that very few people will read; journals at
least m a k e some concessions here. Our reader, then, should have some understandings of
fundamental scientific concepts, but this alone is not enough: both sides appeal to the same
science knowledge. The reader should also be aware that different people and groups
construe, or characterise, science in different ways, and that m a n y of these views provide
useful, though different, insights into science. Thus, for example in Appendix B.l on
context, w e have seen than a number of views caution against extreme internalist and
externalist characterisations of science, and that Shapin is critical of m u c h ef\ debate because
opponents have frequendy attacked the extreme positions of opponents to m a k e their
position indefensible. Sandall, for example, seems to assume a logical positivist view of
science:
A stuffy concern with 'contradictions' - w e are told - is typical of those unable to
break with Baconian science and logical positivism - that is, with science and
logic. (Sandall 1996, p. 21)
There is no mention that received views of science, logic andrationality,change from time
to time, and that in the late twentieth century there is no single, agreed, metascientific
interpretation of these terms.
This is not to argue a complete relativism: w e have noted and accepted cautions of
extreme views of the sciences. Rather, these issues are complex and cannot be reduced
simplistically; a multidimensional view of science helps to represent and understand this
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complexity. Thus the reader should be aware that these characterisations appeal to multiple,
interactive, dimensions of science: knowledge, activity, purpose, structure, context and
belief system. This provides a framework on which to base an analysis and comparison of
characterisations.
Thus, for example, the critical reader would question Sandall's frequent use of the
term irrationalism. Given contemporary metascientific analysis, Sandall's argument is
weakened by not identifying that rationality is defined in various ways by various groups,
his o w n assumptions about rationality, and w h y he does not m a k e this clear. The critical
reader, however, would concur with Sandall's point that metaphors are used in science to
the extent that they are useful; the only question is whether Sandall (or Gross and Levitt)
have accurately represented Harding's critique of gendered metaphors in science. Finally,
the present thesis makes a qualified endorsement of one of Sandall's (and Gross and
Levitt's) conclusions about the state of science education:
M o d e m irrationalism is already having a devastating effect on science education:
'Many students in lower-level science courses are not only ignorant of science but
are ignorant as well of the fundamental frame of mind, the attitudes, the intellectual
rhythms needed if one is to acquire useful knowledge.' (Sandall 1996, p. 21)
The present thesis interprets and supports Sandall as arguing that students need to have a
more robust and multidimensional understanding of science. However, the support of these
remarks is qualified in several respects. First, Sandall makes unsubstantiated assumptions
about irrationalism and useful knowledge: the present thesis has shown that both of these
concepts are interpreted variously, and w h e n used the intended meaning needs to be made
clear. Secondly, Sandall's concern about the (unspecified) ignorance of students in lowerlevel science courses is not confined to just students doing those courses; the present thesis
has shown that dissatisfaction and mis-perception are widespread across the spectrum of
students. Thirdly, Sandall makes a logical error of the sort he criticises in making an
unsubstantiated claim about widespread irrationalism and then linking it causally with
science education; this is sloppy. Fourthly, surely the point of a science education is that it
enables citizens to address the very controversies about science that concern Sandall, Gross
and Levitt; the present thesis indicates that a science education of the very sort Sandall
seems to advocate could not do that.
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In summary, disputes between conservative and progressive ideologies are just one
example of m a n y possible public disputes concerning science and, as w e have seen in the
view of curriculum as a rational process, notions of political left andrightcan be blurred in
education policy contexts. In response to such conflicts there are three points to be m a d e
here about the nature of school science. First, a science education should enable students to
m a k e informed contributions to such conflicts, even if in a limited sense. Secondly, the
science curriculum should provide a characterisation of science that endures beyond a
particular argument that is influential for just a year or a decade, or within a particular
locale. Thirdly, a multidimensional characterisation of science is best able to support such
an approach.
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3.4 The contribution of science education to the national economy

We have noted earlier that there has been, during the 1980s and 1990s, in Australia,
the U S , the U K and other western, pluralist democracies, a shift in educational goals to
emphasise the national benefits of science education. Thus, a range of policy goals
increasingly characterise worthwhile knowledge as that which meets broader social and
national goals such as: economic advantage; the improved efficiency of the curriculum as
increases in the measured outcomes of state-defined goals and decreases in the costs of this
process; and the improvement of measured outcomes of the student cohort. This is
consistent with the discussion, in the companion chapter on context and Appendix B.l, of
the nexus between science, government and industry, which emphasises the utilitarian and
socio-political characteristics of science, especially the scientific development from the midtwentieth century:
Science, technology, and their applications are a ubiquitous part of the world
marketplace. In response to the United States' need to remain competitive in a
global economy, schools are called upon to provide programs in science that
engender scientific literacy in all students. (Simpson et al., 1994, p. 231)
Several questions arise from assertions like these. W h a t is (or can be) the contribution of a
robustly characterised science education to the national economy? W h a t is the role of a
robusdy characterised science education in meeting utilitarian curriculum goals? What is the
effect of adopting utilitarian curriculum goals on other science curriculum goals? W e will
address each of these issues here; the question of scientific literacy is dealt with in section
3.5 below.
It is areasonableexpectation that a pluralistic democracy should be abletoset a range
of curriculum goals that justify the place and nature of science education in the school
curriculum. For example, it is legitimate that the school curriculum should provide a
suitable grounding for, and indeed foster, those with the potential and interest in pursuing
further studies and careers in science and technology. This is a means of a society ensuring
an adequate supply of scientific and technological expertise that confers economic, social,
national security and other benefits to that society. It is also legitimate that the school

Chapter 12: Conclusion

386

curriculum should provide a suitable grounding for, and indeed foster, scientific literacy in
all students, as future citizens. This is a means of a society ensuring that its citizens can
express their democraticrightsby participating in informed decision making. The public
understanding of science has broader implications than just for the national economy, a
point addressed specifically in section 3.5 below.
However, science education is particularly valued by current policy elites because it
supports the scientific development that underpins the national economy as well as other
social benefits, such as health improvements. O f course, this is not to endorse an uncritical
indoctrination into science: the present thesis has argued that a multidimensional
characterisation of science is more likely to lead to an ability to weigh up both costs and
benefits and to evaluate competing claims made in the name of science. This is consistent
with the notion of a pluralistic, participatory democracy. There is no single, unified benefit
of economic development to society. Rather, the overall economic benefit is the s u m of
m a n y and varied individual developments, some of which represent sectional and shortterm interests. Citizens need to be able to participate in decisions about competing claims
for economic benefit, and other benefits, such as issues of health, quality of life and ethics,
for example.
A multidimensional characterisation of science provides a better preparation for all
these issues than does a traditional, narrow characterisation of science. There are several
arguments for this. First are the characteristics of science that m a k e it economically useful.
For example, w e have discussed in the companion chapter on context and Appendix B.l
the inextricable links between m u c h of contemporary science, government and industry.
W e have also discussed, in the companion chapter on knowledge and Appendix B.6, the
rapid and increasing development of science knowledge, partly due to scientific activity
meeting instrumental (government and industry) purposes. Thus students should recognise
that a considerable amount of scientific activity and knowledge arises from political and
industrial purposes and contexts, and not just from the disinterested, intellectual curiosity of
gifted individuals that receive most mention in school Science. Economic and other benefits
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have, in the past and probably also in the future, flowed from both applied and pure
research.
Second is the argument that national economic development requires a rigorous
grounding in science for at least the potential scientists and technologists. That is, the
science curriculum should provide a sound preparation fortertiaryscience and technology
studies. The debate about therigourof school Science was discussed in section 3.1 above,
but w e can apply that discussion also to the justification of school Science by national,
economic goals. That is, a multidimensional school Science is not only a more robust
characterisation, but likely to be more meaningful to students. It is therefore more likely to
increase student participation when, as w e have mentioned, enrolments are declining in the
senior sciences. It is also more likely to raise the standard of learning outcomes. Thus, for
example, the companion chapter on knowledge showed that scientific knowledge implies
personal understanding and not just recall of data, definitions and information. This
characteristic, together with the constructivist science education literature on children's
misunderstandings, strongly implies that the science curriculum should emphasise
soundness of understanding rather than merely covering m a n y topics. This point is made
almost routinely by science educators, and almost as routinely ignored in the
implementation of the science curriculum (Fensham 1995). Therapidlyincreasing body of
science knowledge is therefore not an argument for covering more content per se, but for
understanding the scope of science knowledge and examples of recent scientific
developments. Efforts by science curriculum developers to allow plenty of scope for
teachers torepresentthe vastness of science knowledge, and to select from this scope that
which best suits their students, are commendable. However, clearer efforts must be made
to prevent teachers from feeling obliged in some w a y to cover as m u c h as possible, and
instead to select the most fruitful and develop in students sound understandings of it. A
multidimensional framework assists curriculum developers andteachersto m a k e informed
selections.
Third is the body of criticism of traditional approaches to science education. For
example, w e have mentioned the extensive literature dealing with the ineffectiveness of
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traditional science education in dealing with children's prior conceptions. This literature
pays particular attention to the understandings children have of scientific concepts, and so
addresses the character of scientific knowledge as understanding, discussed in the
companion chapter on knowledge and Appendix B.6. Again, this indicates that the science
curriculum should emphasise science knowledge as understanding rather than superficially
covering large numbers of propositions to berecalled.W e have also noted criticisms, such
as Matthews (1994) above, that 'the m o r e science students do, the less they like it' (p. 33).
This is consistent with arguments that traditional science education is unappealing to m a n y
students: that it does not adequately redress unappealing stereotypes of science and
scientists; that the acontextual, positivistic character of school Science knowledge removes
the appeal of h u m a n interest and relevance; that it does not address conflicts with students'
o w n belief systems; and that it does not address anti-science sentiments in the community
arising from issues like pollution, food additives and nuclear radiation. That is, not only
does a traditional science education fail to address issues that interest children and
adolescents, but the approach discourages able students from pursuing higher levels of
science studies. T h e present thesis argues that this arises from the distorted characterisation
of science presented in m u c h school Science. This argument is supported by claims that
science should be studied in its historical, social and philosophical contexts (Lowe 1987b;
Matthews 1994).
T h e caveat on thisfineof argument is that science is characterised by more than its
industrial, economic and political uses, and that to justify science purely with its economic
or other utility is to distort, yet again, its characterisation. Thus, the criteria for scientific
judgement - demonstration of experimental support or refutation, logic of argument, and so
forth - are different from the criteria for economic judgement. For example, the economics
of producing a polymer arise from different criteria to those by which w e judge the purity
of a sample or its healthrisks.Also, the scientific community strenuouslyresistsattempts
to characterise scientific research solely as applied: the theoretical or economic usefulness of
a scientific development is often not appreciated until well after the event
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Finally, m u c h of the literature describes an inherent worth in studying science for its
own sake, as a significant expression of the human condition:

In the end, the purely instrumental utility of scientific knowledge may be less
important than the wider value to be gained from being acquainted with science as
one of the great expressions of the h u m a n spirit. Science has been and continues to
be one of the noblest achievements of mankind [sic]. F r o m a humanistic point of
view, its attainments are on a par with great achievements in art, literature, and
political institutions, and in this perspective, science should c o m e to be k n o w n for
the same reasons as these other subjects. (Trefil 1987, p. 151)
It is a reasonable goal of a society that it should prosper, and that its science curriculu
should contribute to this. However, it is a distortion of science, and potentially a great
distortion in school Science, to select only those dimensions of science that are narrowly

utilitarian in the short term. Furthermore, it is a distortion of the science education re
by a scientifically literate public, and the public understanding of science.
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3.5 Scientific literacy and the public understanding of science

The multidimensional characterisation of science proposed by the present thesis, and
its focus on the science curriculum for all students, has implications for debates about

scientific literacy of citizens, both in their own right and as a basis for judging model

science literacy. The significance of the public understanding of science and science lit
as educational goals cannot be overstated. We have seen in Appendix B.l that citizen
groups have already gained considerable momentum, especially in the USA but also
elsewhere. This has led some commentators to claim that the scientific community has
started to lose its political clout:
Questions of power, responsibility, and accountability continue to drive disputes.
But controversies have also changed overtime.In the 1970s and early 1980s, they
represented the so-called crisis of authority that prevailed in the political life of that
time (Salomon 1977). A n d they indicated the willingness of local groups to
mobilise against decisions that affected particular interests. B y the end of the
1980s, protesters increasingly framed their attacks on science in the moral
language of rights.
B y 1990 Yaron Ezrahi, in The Descent of Icarus, suggested that the attacks
against science represent a major conceptual change in the role of science in
society: "In the closing decades of the 20th century, the intellectual and technical
advances of science coincide with its visible decline as a force in the rhetoric of
liberal democratic politics' (Ezrahi 1990, p. 13). (Nelkin 1995, p. 447)
Nelkin's point can be interpreted as these citizen groups rejecting a purely internalist
for science, and identifying additional or alternative beliefs, criteria and purposes of
science.
The combination of these critiques of public understanding of science, however
science literacy might be defined, is a condemnation of the general science education
received by the citizens studied: that the traditional emphasis on knowledge but not
understanding, and on activities restricted to a notional set of experimental processes,
been inadequate.
We have argued above that the notion of rigour does not apply only to narrow,

instrumentahst views of science education for potential scientists and technologists, not

least reason being that with the increasing specialisation of science even scientists can

claim current expertise in areas outside of their own specialisation. In brief, the prese
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thesis claims that a multidimensional characterisation of science provides a more rigorous

and appealing curriculum as preparation for participation in a pluralistic democracy t

increasingly requires public participation in scientific and technological matters. Ap
B.6 on knowledge reviewed research on the public understanding of science; the present

section seeks to apply the findings of this field to the school curriculum. In particu
draws attention to those parts of various literatures - science education, public

understanding of science and science literacy - that address scientific literacy and s
education.
3.5.1 The public understanding of science (PUS) vs scientific literacy
At this point, it is important to note that the terms public understanding of science,

and scientific literacy of the public are not clearly distinguishable. Both are interp

variously, and sometimes interchangeably, in the literature and in more general contex

However, there is an important distinction between uses: a narrower sense that essenti
means knowledge, and a broader sense that means or implies more than just knowledge.
Also, many conceptions and analyses of PUS and scientific literacy are flawed. We will
discuss these uses and flaws using some examples.
Flaws in traditional measures of PUS and scientific literacy
a)

Unidimensional measures of knowledge are inadequate

We have noted in Appendix B.6 that much of the research on the PUS uses the
narrower meaning of knowledge recall and comprehension. This is flawed in several
respects. First, simple measures of propositional knowledge are inadequate:
Science, technology, and their applications are a ubiquitous part of the world
marketplace. In response to the United States' need to remain competitive in a
global economy, schools are called on to provide programs that engender scientific
literacy in all students. T h e traditional meaning of scientific literacy - an
understanding of the norms of science and knowledge of major scientific
constructs - is no longer adequate. Students today should be aware of the impact
of science and technology on society and the policy choices that must inevitably
emerge; that is, they must acquire favourable attitudes toward organised science
knowledge. According to the best available evidence, only 7 percent of adults meet
these standards (Miller 1983).
Knowledge acquisition reduces illiteracy, but effortstoreduce illiteracy m a y fall
short of the mark. Becoming literate does not guarantee widespread participation in
the scientific enterprise. Programmatic efforts to reduce illiteracy through
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knowledge acquisition alone m a y dotittlemore than produce persons w h o are
scientifically aliterate; that is, they possess knowledge but choose not to act on
their knowledge. For the general public to be attentive but indecisive is ominous
for a nation likely to become increasingly dependent on public support to sustain
an economy committed to science and technology.
T o produce scientifically literate graduates - persons w h o understand the
scientific approach, basic scientific constructs, and science policy issues and
exercise their civicresponsibility- science teachers, educators and policymakers
must insist on the development of favourable attitudes toward the use of science
along with the acquisition of knowledge as benchmarks against which the
condition of science education is assessed. (Simpson et al., 1994, p. 231)
The present thesis interprets this as a multidimensional characterisation. Thus Simpson et
al., characterise science literacy in terms of persons who understand (knowledge, context),
the scientific approach (activity and purpose), basic scientific constructs (structure and
knowledge), science policy issues (knowledge, context and purpose), exercise their civic
responsibility (activity, context, belief system), science teachers, educators and
policymakers (context), development offavourable attitudes toward the use of science
(activity, belief system, context, purpose), acquisition of knowledge (activity, knowledge),
and benchmarks (criteria as an element of a belief system). Accordingly, discussions of
science literacy tend to m a k e more complex (multidimensional) characterisations, arguing
forre-definitionsthat address the inadequacy of merely acquiring prepositional knowledge.
S o m e more recent, critical, studies of public understanding of science would question
Simpson et al.,'s use of the termfavourable attitudes toward organised science knowledge.
A n uncritically favourable attitude would be consistent with attitudes arising from an
indoctrination rather than an education, as in a presdisposition to accept the claims of the
science community. It would not equip citizens for contesting science claims in the public
domain, or for evaluating the competing science claims of vested interests. It is the
interpretation frequendy used in traditional studies of the public understanding of science
(Wynne 1995), as discussed in the companion chapter on context and in Appendix B.l.
These traditional approaches characterise public-science issues as a deficient public
understanding of an unproblematic and unscrutinised science. Thus some analyses argue
that the lay public has neither the interest nor the expertise to participate in disputes within
the science community. Others extend this argument to claim that the science in public
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disputes is too complex for the majority of citizens and they should not participate in those
disputes either:
In the modern world, the supposed complexity and esoteric nature of science
policy renders it inaccessible to popular comprehension and thus uncontrollable by
democratic decision making. Studies finding fewer than 7 % of the American
public scientifically literate (Miller 1991) and British attitudes toward science
incoherent and inconsistent (Ziman 1991)reinforcethe postulate that science is too
complex for nonexperts to administer and too subde for the letter of the law to
govern. Political processes developed for the governance of 'simpler' policy
problems within the ken of citizens and politicians are in this view inappropriately
applied to science policy, where the entry costs - specialised training and facility
with an arcane language - are inordinately high. (Bimber & Guston 1995, p. 557)
This, as discussed in Appendix B.l, is part of the argument that science is exceptional
because it is comprehensible only to exceptional people.
However, a favourable attitude could also be construed as valuing the collection of
evidence and understanding of arguments as part of informed participation. This second
interpretation arises more because of the increasing number of science disputes that are not
restrictedtoscience communities, and rejects the assumption that science is comprehensible
only to exceptional people. In considering the multidimensional characterisation argued in
the present thesis, w e could extend that to m e a n citizens also value elements of
characteristic belief systems, such as beliefs, assumptions and criteria for judgment
including empirical data and reproducible methods, the logical structure of argument, and
characteristic purposes of scientific activities, such as the pursuit of empirical data,
disconfirming results, naturalistic explanations, and so forth. Further, such citizens would
value making a multidimensional critique of published science claims, policy decisions, and
so forth, as a means of comparing actual claims with what idealised scientific activity might
produce. That is, favourable but not uncritical. Also, the present thesis has argued that
science knowledge is so immense and increasing so rapidly that a comprehensive personal
knowledge of science is not possible. Thus the public m a y not act because they choose not
to act on their knowledge, but because they are unable to act, whether because they lack the
requisite attitudes (such as conviction, scepticism or valuing civic responsibility), skills
(such as validating knowledge claims, or public advocacy) or knowledge (such as of
relevant scientific principles). Nonetheless, the central tenet of Simpson et al., is
persuasive: that knowledge alone - however science knowledge is characterised - does not
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equate with scientific literacy, although some knowledge is necessary for literacy, and that
particular attitudes and skills are necessary.
b) Flawed assumptions in traditional measures
Secondly, much of the research on public understanding of science collects data
based on the twin assumptions of public deficiencies in science knowledge and the
unproblematic character of canonical, or received, science knowledge11. Both of these

assumptions are flawed. Wynne (1995) is critical of approaches to the public understandin
of science that either uncritically devalue the belief systems and folk theories of lay

individuals, or uncritically fail to address assumptions and risks in decisions from with
the science community:
E. Martin (1989) has argued that working-class women reject dominant medical
views of menstruation because the whole medical-scientific construction of
menstruation represents it, in social terms, as 'failed reproduction'. This implicit
social construction reflects middle-class concerns for working careers and
inadvertendy denigrates working-class socialrelationsand values. A n alternative
cultural construction - of menstruation as the very process that creates 'the lifestuff
that makes us w o m e n ' is alive and well among working-class w o m e n , w h o more
positively value noncareer social relations, including motherhood. (Wynne 1995,
p. 376)
Wynne notes that this rejection was despite exposure to received biological knowledge,

arguing that it represented a 'healthy and legitimate resistance to dominant ideologies c
in scientific idioms'(p. 376). Testing the women's understanding did not assess their

assimilation into the dominant 'failed reproduction' characterisation of menstruation. Ot
examples were nuclear workers who routinely ignored safety warnings at nuclear sites, and
hypercholesterolemia sufferers who dismissed warnings about dietary fats:
Laypeople may ignore scientific knowledge because they regard it as irrelevant,
even though scientists assume it ought to be central to them ... These authors also
noted that survey methods of measuring public understanding of science inevitably
reduce 'understanding' to simple indices that cannot d o proper justice to the
complexity of what is being 'understood' in real-world contexts. Prewitt (1982)
has observed that scientists' o w n unreflective social assumptions about what is
relevant to lay people are built into scientific knowledge for public communication
and, furthermore, into the design of survey instruments to test public
understanding. For these reasons, Lay ton and colleagues (1986) questioned
whether such surveys test public scientific literacy or whether, instead, they
measure the degree of the public's social conformity to a stereotype held by
scientists of a 'scientifically literate public'. (Wynne 1995, p. 378)
11

See Appendix B.6.
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Thus m a n y of these studies are also flawed where the science community fails to identify its
o w n assumptions, either concerning its knowledge claims or public scientific literacy, or
fails to label as subjective and irrational instances where lay people support the scientific
community for non-technical reasons, such as significant social relationships, disinterest,
unsubstantiated trust, and so forth. The present thesis argues that the notion of scientific
literacy needs to take account of the belief systems, purposes, contexts, activities and
structures of (lay) public knowledge as well as of accepted science knowledge, in making
judgements about science literacy.
Students (and adults) have prior conceptions, folk theories and local knowledge that
m a y be useful to them 12 . Wynne's examples are examples where local, folk theories are
used successfully by individuals and groups, where this knowledge m a y be independent
of, or even in conflict with, knowledge accepted by the science community, or at least
where these folk theories have not demonstrated universal applicability or accepted
'scientific' validation. Part of the reason for the persistence of prior conceptions is that folk
theories are often correct for the individual. Folk theories are frequendy situational and m a y
conflict with other folk theories or accepted scientific theories; yet they are often useful to
the individual. Thus, in addressing scientific literacy, the science curriculum needs to
recognise that children and adults have prior conceptions and theories that areresistantto
traditional approaches to science education forreasonsthat are very sound to the individual.
T h e science curriculum should address the folk theories used by children, as part of
improving learning, and the folk theories used by adults, as part of the ways in which
citizens confront claims to science knowledge in public issues. This is as a response not
only to the immense science education research into children's prior understandings and
misconceptions, but also in response to the present thesis which has drawn attention to the
role of belief systems as an essential dimension of the science w e have judged the children
should learn. If a goal of the science curriculum is to produce a scientifically literate society,
then curriculum developers must recognise the limitations of the traditional deficit model of
public understanding of science, that is, that citizens are s o m e h o w deficient in their
12 We have mentioned already the immense literature on children's prior understandings.
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knowledge and appreciation of science, while science is s o m e h o w unproblematic. There are
several implications of this claim.
W e have also noted that while m u c h scientific knowledge is unproblematic within the
science community, it is by definition problematic within the science community w h e n
scientists disagree on approach or interpretation, and is often problematic in public
disputes13. Examples include: w h e n scientists d o not agree on the approach to investigation
or the interpretation of results outside the received paradigm; in examples of applied
research where commercial or strategic goals influence knowledge claims; and w h e n
research has wider, public implications. A s w e have discussed, in m a n y public disputes
both sides m a y claim the authority of science, and the assumptions, purposes, criteria and
contexts associated with each claim can be difficult to clarify. H e n c e the variety of
approaches to studying science controversies, showing that the range of contexts of
scientific disputes cannot be reconciled with the simple view that science knowledge is
unproblematic (see Martin & Richards 1995). T h e curriculum must address this if it is to
address scientific literacy. In other words, this dimension of science knowledge is better
characterised in combination with other dimensions such as context, belief system
(substantive beliefs, criteria and assumptions) and purpose.
T h e notion of scientific literacy s e e m s better fitted to a multidimensional
characterisation of science, where literacy is used in its broader sense to m e a n not just able
to read and write, but to m e a n educated or learned (The Macquarie

Dictionary). Thus the

scope of science literacy seems better suited to school students than does public
understanding of science, and therefore to the school Science curriculum14.

13

14

Martin & Richards (1995) have argued that it is both possible and necessary to use different
techniques of analysis to study scientific disputes within a scientific community and those that
include social controversy, even though 'science' is involved in both. Some approaches do not
assume that science is unproblematic.
Shamos (1995) has a pessimistic view about scientific literacy as a goal of science education,
because it has failed in the past and no solution is forthcoming. H e is more optimistic when the
emphasis on knowledge is lessened in favour of attitudes, skills and knowledge of social contexts of
science; or what w e have called scientific literacy. The present thesis interprets this as a
straightforward argument for a multidimensional characterisation of science.
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Flawed assumptions in what is important
Another aspect of flawed assumptions in measures of P U S or scientific literacy is in

what is important to measure. This is the case in making lists of what should be known. A
well k n o w n example is Hirsch (1987), w h o attemptedtom a p the content of cultural literacy
of U S citizens (Cultural Literacy: What Every American Needs to Know), which includes
concepts that indicate scientific literacy. Yet, even allowing for Hirsch's caution that such a
list must in s o m e sense be arbitrary and subject to change, there are m a n y curious
omissions: AIDS is included, but hepatitis is not, despite their c o m m o n association in
public health literature; gremlins is included, but mouse, either meaning the rodent or the
computing technology, is not; Walt Disney and Cecil B. De Mille are included, but Isaac
Asimov, Carl Sagan, David Suzuki and other science popularisers are not; theocracy is
included but theory is not the only mentions of law are law of contradiction and law of

universal gravitation; neither evidence, experiment, falsify, information explosion nor ri
are included. Yet, in the note on the scientific terms included in Hirsch's list, Trefil claims
that in compiling the list of terms for cultural literacy, broader criteria were used for the
science terms:
Because there is little broad knowledge of science even a m o n g educated people,
the kind of criteria usedtocompile our lists for the humanities and social sciences for example, W o u l d afiterateperson be familiar with this term? - simply can't be
used for the natural sciences. The gap between the essential basic knowledge of
science and what the general reader can be expectedtok n o w has becometoolarge.
Our criterion for choosing a science entry has been that the candidate must be truly
essential to a broad grasp of a major science. This criterion m a y not assure true
scientific literacy, but it should at least help overcome serious illiteracy. (Trefil
1987, p. 148)
Given the analysis of the present thesis, Trefil's criterion is hard to reconcile with
omissions such as those noted above. It is clear that Hirsch and his team have assumed
public scientific literacy to be farmliarity with an arbitrary list of key concepts, a strategy
that the present thesis finds quite inadequate. The difficulty of making arbitrary decisions
about which concepts to include is only one issue in a complex task: the present thesis
argues that the scientifically literate citizen would not only have understandings of key
concepts, but something of the complexities of scientific knowledge and its interactions
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with characteristic activities, purposes, contexts, structures, belief systems. This is
consistent with Trefil's general argument for public scientific literacy:

Some of my scientist colleagues are inclined to talk vaguely about the desirability
of citizens acquiring the competence to m a k e technical judgements. In reality, the
true benefits to be gained from a broad improvement in scientific literacy do not
derive from that ability. Scientists w h o do not specialise in a precisefieldin which
a technical question arises are scarcely better equipped than lay people to reach
technical judgements in that field. But all citizens must be equipped to m a k e
nontechnical judgements about technical questions.
For example, in the debate over the Strategic Defense [sic] Initiative ('Star
Wars'), it is a serious error to expect literate citizens, including nonspecialist
scientists, to m a k e highly specialised technical decisions. Instead, their education
should simply have provided them with the general facts and principles needed to
understand the terms of the debate - h o w a satellite works, what a laser can do,
and under what conditions such a system would be likely to succeed or fail.
Similarly, in the great nuclear safety debates of the 1970s, all participants had to
use the same basic scientific background for their arguments, and the real debate
centred on whether the admittedly small risks of accident were acceptable in the
tight of the benefits. Once basic technical issues are understood, policy questions
become ethical and political, nottechnical.(Trefil 1987, p. 150)
While the general thrust of Trefil's argument supports that of the present thesis, there
are some flaws. First, the notion of an issue simply having general facts and principles i
ingenuous at best. In issues like the Star Wars initiative or developing nuclear power
plants, part of the very debate was the status of information as facts: opponents were

suspicious that the information provided to the public came from interests - government an
industrial - whose purposes, contexts and belief systems were not disinterested and

objective. It is disingenuous to claim, as Trefil does, that all participants had to use t
same scientific background for their arguments.
Secondly, of the requirements listed to enable public decisions, satellite and laser are
mentioned in Hirsch's list, but not the conditions under which such a system would be

likely to succeed or fail. These conditions arise from the belief system used (criteria fo
judgment), the purposes and the contexts. This is the reason, for example, why the public

has been sceptical of the research carried out by tobacco companies on the health risks of
smoking. Thus knowledge alone of satellites and lasers is insufficient preparation for
decisions about their use in strategic defence; there is more than this.
Thirdly, the boundary work discussion in Appendix B.l on context showed that it is
not clear, especially in examples such as Trefil gives, where technical issues end and

policy, ethical, political and other issues begin. The very suggestion of developing nucl
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facilities or strategic defence initiatives is a political and ethical one, especially w h e n
government funds are directed to their research or contracts awarded for their development.
The knowledge produced by the scientists involved will arise because particular research
questions and activities were pursued toward particular goals in particular contexts. Given
different purposes and contexts, different questions would have been pursued, activities
carried out and knowledge produced. Likewise with ethical matters: what is argued to be
ethical in one political context m a y not be judged as ethical in another. N e w Zealand, for
example, m a d e a politico-ethical decision to ban nuclear powered ships from entering its
peats, to the annoyance of its strategic ally, the U S , whereas just across the Tasman Sea the
Australian government, also an ally of the U S , made the opposite decision.
Fourthly, despite Hirsch's terminology of literacy, Hirsch's attempt is an example of
the approach w e have noted as widely used in studies of the public understanding of
science, that accepts scientific knowledge as unproblematic while problematising public
knowledge.
Despite these criticisms, Trefil's central argument forteachingfor scientific literacy is
sound:
Should w e therefore conclude that science education is useless in producing
informed citizens? O f course not. O n e might just as well argue that because the
details of constitutional law can be understood only by legal experts, it's not
necessary for citizens to k n o w anything about the Constitution. W e understand
broad issues of national law because w e have been taught the main principles of
the Constitution and can m a k e broad judgements on the basis of that elementary
knowledge. Similarly, if w e gain basic scientific literacy, w e can m a k e intelligent
judgements about broad issues of technology. (Trefil 1987, p. 150)
d) Lack of focus on capability
Explicidy in Simpson et al., above, and implicidy in Trefil, above, is the criticism that
mere knowledge is inadequate in m o d e m scientific and technological societies: there must
be some capacity and propensity to acttouse, check and develop knowledge. That is, there
must not only be knowledge, but capability. Significandy for the present thesis, this has
includedrecognitionfor the role of science education:
M o r e recendy, a growing number of science education scholars voiced the opinion
that science education required a rather radical re-directioning. This direction
focuses not on pre-professional training. Rather, its focus is on the
interrelationship of science, technology and society ... These [STS] curricula
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stress the importance of decision making in science- and technology-related social
issues ... Fletcher Watson (1980) states that 'decision making must be the central
and crucial element of future curricula'. Aikenhead (1980) believes that science
education must lead to the creation of a 'science critical' public capable of making
decisions in science laden social issues. Kahle and Yager (1981) state that 'in
addition to assisting students to gain the information on which valid judgements
and decisions can be made, science education must prepare them in decision
making skills'. Bybee (1980) stresses that 'people need to be aware of science
related social problems and should realise that their personal decisions m a k e up
larger "social" decisions that can either perpetuate or alleviate social problems'.
This perspective is echoed by Zeidler (1982) w h o claims 'science education ...
demands that individuals b e c o m e informed citizens by maximising the
opportunities under which students m a y have practice and experience in decisions
concerning science and social policy'. N S T A (1983) posits that 'courses should
provide students with opportunities to develop skills in identifying science-based
social problems and in making decisions about their resolution'. (Fleming 1987,
pp. 313-4; emphases in original)
These views of science education characterise scientific literacy partly by a capabilit
even propensity to acquire and apply science knowledge in real contexts. Thus Jevons, fo
example, has described an interplay between scientific literacy, political literacy and
understanding the nature of science:
Three major educational objectives of teaching in the science, technology and
society area are identified: scientific literacy, political literacy, and understanding
the nature of science. Scientifically literate people are those w h o are both able and
wilting to inform themselves on issues with a science or technology content as and
w h e n such issues arise. Political literacy is a sense for the interplay of values as
represented by interest groups and pressure groups. Science needs to be
recognised as a h u m a n and social activity, not i m m u n e from h u m a n and social
influences. (Jevons 1987, p. 135)
Implicit in some of the examples given by Fleming, above, and explicidy in the present

thesis among others, is that scientific literacy entails some sense of political litera
characterised by Jevons, and an understanding of the nature of science. This sense of
political literacy, and hence scientific literacy, implies a willingness or propensity
to engage productively in real issues.
3.5.3 Preferred models of scientific literacy
This brings us to preferred goals of PUS and scientific literacy. For all the reason of
narrow associations of PUS with knowledge acquisition, the present thesis suggests that
the term public understanding of science is too problematic as a goal of the science
curriculum. On the other hand, the term scientific literacy does not seem to be used in
same pejorative sense, and implies instead some measure of capability rather than
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deficiency. The present thesis therefore advocates public scientific literacy as a goal of the

general science curriculum, rather than mere public understanding of science. The quest

that remains is how this scientific literacy can be described or measured for the school
curriculum.
There are various models of scientific literacy, including models proposed for goals

of science education. General statements may imply a notion of scientific literacy, as b

Simpson et al., above, or draw attention to particular science education goals that con
wider notion of literacy than mere acquisition of knowledge:
In his review of science curriculum developments in, mainly, the US and the UK,

Matthews (1994, pp. 29ff) has described several attempts to address science literacy. He

noted a variety of definitions, and rejected for the purposes of a general science educ
narrow, technical approaches to science literacy:

There are many ways to define science literacy: from a narrow definition where
literacy is the ability to recognise formulae and give correct definitions, to a more
expansive or liberal definition which includes understanding of concepts and some
degree of understanding about the nature of science and its historical and social
dimensions. There is no one correct definition of science literacy; it is a matter of
different conceptions proving their worth for the promotion of particular ends. For
schoolchildren, the overarching end is their educational development. The
contention of this book is that an expansive or liberal definition of literacy is more
conducive to this end than restricted definitions. This argument, as with so many
matters confronting science teachers, requires a vision of good education, a
philosophy of education. T h e liberal view of education underpinning this book
holds that education generally, and science education in particular, is not just a
means of developing 'human resources' so that countries can overcome their
balance of payments deficit, or stay competitive with other economies. The latter,
economistic view of education, promotes a narrow conception of science literacy.
(Matthews 1994, pp. 31-2)
Matthews' criticism, that the recent re-emergence of economic and other instrumentahst
curriculum goals works against the goal of general science literacy, is shared by a numb

of curriculum stakeholders including science educators and scientists, and including the

present author. However, as we have noted, the view of curriculum as a rational enterpri

has been influential, and perhaps dominant, in many western countries including Austral

since the 1980s. At best, one could claim that in that view, terms like scientific liter

not central goals of the emergent policy elites, and at worst they are neglected or even

considered antithetical. We have mentioned that the large body of constructivist researc

into children's prior understandings and their effects on curriculum and teaching outco
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does not figure in the political rhetorics of concern with the educational 'basics' and the

national, economic benefits of science education. Similarly, political concern with pu

understanding of science tends to be argued in terms of mamtaining 'standards', curric
efficiency and utility than with science literacy. There is a need to assert a robust
for science literacy as goal of the general science curriculum.
Perhaps the most comprehensive and explicit attempt to formalise the inclusion of

science literacy in the science curriculum has, to date, been in the US, notably effor

National Science Foundation (NSF), and the American Association for the Advancement of
Science (AAAS). In particular, Benchmarks for Science Literacy (Project 2061, AAAS

1993) set out a thoroughgoing attempt to set out a rationale for, and stages for achie

literacy, in science, mathematics and technology. It gives the following definition of
literacy:

A literate person is an educated person, one having certain knowledge or
competencies. But of course the rules keep changing with regard to precisely
which knowledge and competencies define literacy - the abilitytowrite one's name
and read a simple prose passage long since having been replaced by more
demanding requirements. In today's world, adult literacy has c o m e to include
knowledge and competencies associated with science, mathematics, and
technology. Project 2061 has undertaken, in [Science for All Americans], to
identify the knowledge and habits of mind that people need if they are to live
interesting, responsible, and productive lives in a culture in which science,
mathematics, and technology are central - that is, to describe what constitutes the
substance of science literacy.
People w h o are literate in science are not necessarily able to do science,
mathematics, or engineering in a professional sense, any more than a music-literate
person needs to be able to compose music or play an instrument Such people are
able, however, to use the habits of mind and knowledge of science, mathematics,
and technology they have acquired to think about and m a k e sense of m a n y of the
ideas, claims, and events that they encounter in everyday life. Accordingly,
science literacy enhances the ability of a person to observe events perceptively,
reflect on them thoughtfully, and comprehend explanations offered for them. In
addition, these internal perceptions and reflections can provide the person with a
basis for making decisions and taking action. (Project 2061, p. 322)
Again, this more complex view of scientific literacy uses a multidimensional
characterisation: habits of mind (belief system), ability (activity, context), knowledg
(knowledge), and think about and make sense of, reflect, making decisions and taking
action (activity), and to think about and make sense of and. for making decisions and
action (purpose).
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In his review of some approaches to science literacy as a curriculum goal, Matthews
presented an argument for a robust understanding of the multidimensional character of
science:

Paul Dehart Hurd, at the end of the 1950s, advocated a broad conception of
literacy that entailed students knowing something of the interrelationship between
science and society (Hurd 1958). H e has continued to emphasise this theme in
publications over the past three decades. In lamenting the failure of the N S F
discipline-based reforms of the 1960s to give students a sense of the broader
canvas of science, he said in 1987 - in words that H P S advocates can endorse that
A measure of scientific literacy is a measure of cultural awareness. The
traditional science curriculum leaves students foreigners in their o w n
culture. A problem in bringing about the essential reform of science
teaching is that there are too many scientists w h o are scientifically illiterate
and too few philosophers, sociologists, and historians of science and
technology w h o are interested in precollege science education. (Hurd
1987, p. 136)
A still more expansive definition was proposed by the [US] National Science
Teachers Association in 1982. It defined a scientifically literate person as one w h o
understands that society controls science and technology through the allocation of
resources; w h o uses scientific concepts, process skills and values in making
everyday decisions; w h o recognises the limitations as well as the usefulness of
science and technology in advancing h u m a n welfare; w h o knows the major
concepts, hypotheses and theories of science and is able to use them; w h o
distinguishes between scientific evidence and personal opinion; w h o has a richer
view of the world as the result of science education; and w h o knows reliable
sources of scientific and technological information and uses these sources in the
process of decision-making ( N S T A 1982).
Liberal accounts of scientific literacy are more expansive than professional
ones. Liberal accounts contain technical, social and cultural elements. A
scientifically literate person should k n o w some science (its content and processes),
something about science, and they should have internalised something of scientific
procedures and attitudes. Thus w e might expect a scientifically literate person to,
among other things:
1) Understand fundamental concepts, laws, principles and facts in the basic
sciences.
2) Appreciate the variety of scientific methodologies, attitudes and dispositions,
and appropriately use them.
3) Connect scientific theory to everyday life and recognise chemical, physical
and biological processes in the world around them.
4) Recognise the manifold ways that science and its related technology interact
with die economics, culture and politics of society.
5) Understand parts of the history of science, and the ways in which it has
shaped, and in turn been shaped by, cultural, moral and religious forces.
(Matthews 1994, pp. 32-3)
This is consistent with the analysis given in the present thesis. Matthews goes on to n
that the views of science literacy he has given are formal, and do not say exactiy what
meant by scientific methods, or values, or interactions with society. Decisions of tha
he says, are more contentious than general statements of science literacy, and arise in
curriculum implementation. This is so, and the AAAS Benchmarks for Science Literacy is
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an example of an attempt to set out the desired learning outcomes at various stages of
schooling. While that level of specification is beyond the scope of the present thesis, the
present thesis does, nonetheless, suggest some of the detail that would 'flesh out' general
statements of science literacy.

3.5.4 Towards a multidimensional definition of scientific literacy
Given the discussion of science literacy and public understanding of science, above,
the following is suggested as an example of robustly, orrigorously,basing a notion of
scientific literacy on the scholarly and refereed scientific and metascientific hterature.

A scientifically literate person has a richer view of the world, and is personally
empowered, as a result of science education. From this education, such a person
will, among other things:
1.

have a robust understanding of the multi-dimensional nature of science;

2.

have a richer understanding of themselves, others and their environments;
and

3.

have an enhanced capacity to apply these understandings to themselves,
others and their environment.

These three goal sets can be expanded as follows. The scientifically literate person
will, among other things:
1.1

appreciate that the character of science is multidimensional, that is, it is
characterised by the combination of characteristic knowledges, activities,
structures, contexts, purposes and belief systems;

1.2 appreciate the contributions and limitations of science as part of the human
experience;
1.3

appreciate that different people or groups distinguish between what is

scientific and non-scientific in different ways because of different belie
systems, contexts and purposes;
1.4 appreciate the large and expanding scope of science knowledge;
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understand that society controls science and technology through the
allocation of resources, education, the characterisation of science in the mass
media and other ways;

2.1

understand the major concepts, hypotheses and theories of science;

2.2

have current scientific understandings of self, others and the material
environment;

2.3

be able to access and evaluate scientific and other, related, information;

3.1 select and use appropriate and accepted scientific concepts, theories, process
skills and values in making decisions;, whether in specialist or everyday
contexts;
32

recognise the limitations as well as the usefulness of science and technology
in advancing human welfare;

3.3 judge the reliability of sources of scientific, technological and other
information, and use appropriate sources in the process of decision-making;
and
3.4 apply the multiple dimensions of science in judging the scientific merit of a
claim, such as evaluating results that claim to be scientific, seeking scientific
evidence, and distinguishing judgments made on other criteria, such as
personal opinion, economic, religious, aesthetic or political reasons.
Note that these statements include the knowledges, skills and attitudes of scientists and
technologists in their fields of expertise as well as in public and personal contexts.
Statements such as these could be expanded further using examples given in the
present thesis. Note that w e expect the scientifically literate person to k n o w where to find
sources of reliable information, h o w to access this information, and to be able to use it.
This entails the student, later the citizen, having access to such information. In turn, this
makes s o m e assumptions about the nature of the society in which the citizen lives. That is,
it is hard to argue that a citizen, having received an appropriate science education and being
scientifically literate, remaining scientifically literate in a society where citizens are denied
access to the information they need to m a k e informed decisions, and the political freedom to
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do so. This is essentially the argument made by both the philosophers Karl Popper, in The
Open Society and Its Enemies (1945), and Paul Feyerabend, in Science in a Free Society
(1978,1982). Although their characterisations of science differ in significantrespects,they
do m a k e somewhat similar claims about the interrelationship between the individual,
science and society: that the freedom to think in certain ways in a society entails
characteristics of the society, not just of a scientific community in isolation.
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3.6 The relationship between science and technology

The sixth and final example of a debate concerning the nature of school science is the
relationship between science and technology. The term science and technology is found
commonly in both specialist hterature and in general use, such as the mass media. W e have
seen, for example, that the A A A S Project 2061 Benchmarks for Science Literacy discusses
the natures of science, technology and mathematics in combination in its characterisation of
science literacy. Similarly, w e have also noted that the N e w South Wales primary (grades
K-6) curriculum comprises six K e y Learning Areas, one of which is Science and
Technology, presented in a single syllabus. ( W e should also note that science and
technology are separate in the N S W secondary curriculum, and in the Australian National
Curriculum Framework.) Thus, while science is presented as a separate component or
subject in most curricula, it is combined with technology in various contexts, leading to the
question of h o w its relationship to technology could or should be characterised in the
curriculum, considering the present thesis.
The ways in which the curriculum characterises therelationshipbetween science and
technology is ultimately a function of the education system that sets the curriculum. W e
noted early in the present thesis that there is no necessary connection between what various
parts of society, including the scientific community, regard as science and the
characterisation of this science in a school subject called Science: this connection is, at
bottom, m a d e by the decisions of education systems. This applies also to the relationship
between science and technology in the curriculum: therelationshipbetween the two will be
characterised according to the decisions of curriculum developers and the education system.
Thus in the N S W context science and technology are combined explicidy in the Science
and Technology K-6 syllabus; a notion of technology as at least applied science is implicit
in the Science 7-10 and the senior secondary General

Science and Science for Life

syllabuses; and technology is given scant treatment in the senior secondary discipline-based
courses of Physics, Chemistry, Biology and Geology. Other syllabuses in the N S W
secondary curriculum specifically address various aspects of technology. Just as the school
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subject Science should be grounded clearly in the scientific and metascientific literature if it
claimstorepresent the broader entity in society known as science, subjects purportingtobe
about technology should be grounded in the technological and metatechnological hterature.
Further, the relationships between science and technology in the curriculum should reflect
their characterisations in the hterature.
3.6.1 Characterising technology
W e turn, then, to characterisations of technology, both alone and with science, in the
literature. T h e literature o n technology is not as large as that on science, but there is
sufficient for the purposes of the present thesis. W e will take several approaches to
reviewing the characterisation of technology in the literature.
Characterisations from the metatechnology literature
First is the characterisation of technology given in summary statements of technology
in the literature; that is, the same strategy as the present thesis used for the analysis of
science s u m m a r y statements. See Appendix C. Clearly, an analysis as detailed as for the
science statements is beyond the scope of the present paper. However, a preliminary
analysis of a smaller set of statements indicates that the same dimensions of characterisation
hold for technology as for science: knowledges, activities, purposes, structures, contexts
and belief systems, although the semantic content of these dimensions is often different
from those of science. That is, w h e n applied to summary statements of technology, the
same six semantic categories account for alltextualunits in those statements as also account
for the text units in the s u m m a r y statements of science. Thus technology can be
characterised in similar dimensions, even though the content of those dimensions will differ
from science:
•

knowledges,

both knowledge-how and knowledge-that, including tacit

knowledge;
•

activities, most notably craft activities through history, but also a range of
other activities such as designing, making, organising and so forth;

•

purposes, chiefly to deploy resources to meet human needs or wants;
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structures, in several senses such as technological products, organisations,
systems, andtechnologicallanguage;

•

contexts, which lead to particular technological needs, resources and
capabilities; and

•

belief systems, that include the assumptions, beliefs, criteria for judgements
and attitudes that enable particular technological activities.

The summary statements of technology in Figure C.l, like those of science, show a variety
of characterisations of technology, but all can be represented using the same six dimensions
of characterisation. It is interesting that entries from general dictionaries tend to characterise
technology largely in terms of scientific application, and even simply as applied science,
whereas statements from the metascientific literature include m u c h broader views of
technology. W e will pursue these interpretations here.
Characterisations from the metascientific literature
The second approach is the characterisation of technology from a scientific
perspective. W e have noted earlier in this thesis the debates about pure, or basic, and
applied science. That is, some commentators mark the boundary between science and nonscience around the so-called pure sciences, as disinterested research for its o w n sake. This
leaves applied sciences, with their complicating characteristicstikeeconomic and political
purposes, as more to do with technology. S o m e , but not all, with this view characterise
technology as applied science, but in any case see science and technology as quite different
based upon an essentialist notion of science and non-science. Other commentators either
mark a different boundary or reject any such boundary: they either accept applied sciences
as sciences, or dismiss distinctions between pure and applied sciences as meaningless or
useless. These views also tend to characterise science and technology as being different,
but as less clearly so. They emphasise the idealised nature of pure science, that in practice
scientific research serves s o m e end or other, and either becomes, seamlessly, part of a
technological process, or is explicitly a part from the outset. W h e n discussed within a
scientific perspective, the technology tends to be analysed in terms of its relationship to
science, but w h e n discussed from other perspectives such as political, social or economic
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ones, other elements of technology are also brought into focus that do not arise from
science.
Characterisationsfromother literatures
Thirdly is the characterisation of technology from perspectives other than technology

or science. We have noted in discussing the history of science that a criterion in disce
the earliest human civilisations is the identification of technological artefacts, such
weapons and symbols for communicating ideas. This argument is that the artefacts

represent early technologies, and, perhaps secondarily, indicate experiential, trial-and

knowledge by which we later characterised science. For example, Zilsel (1942) has argued

that the emergence of classical science in the Scientific Revolution came about through

union of three existing traditions, one of which was the craft tradition of technology o
know-how held by artisans:

Edgar Zilsel's (1891-1944) theory related the emergence of modem science to
social change in early m o d e m Europe. His central thesis identified three separate
intellectual strata in late mediaeval Europe: university scholars, secular humanists,
and artisans. T h efirsttwo groups were the carriers of formally-systematised
rational, logical and mathematical modes of thought; the artisans were the
repository of experimental and observational techniques and causal thinking.
However, in the pre-capitalist social structure an unbridgeable gulf separated
practitioners of the 'liberal' and 'mechanical' arts. Systematic contact between all
intellectual strata was prevented by their distinct institutional and class locations
and by the prejudice entertained toward manual labour by social elites. With the
progress of mechanical technology and the social reordering brought about by
capitalism, Zilsel argued, the social barriers separating carriers of rational modes
of thought from carriers of causal and experimental thinking were lowered. The
city, as a politically free centre of capitalist production, provided a congenial
atmosphere for this development. 'Superior artisans' came to require the rational,
mathematical resources of university scholars and the secular learning of the
humanists, even as the scholars' contempt for technique was overcome by n e w
socio-economic realities. B y cl600 this merger of traditions w a s evident in the
work of Bacon (1561-1626), Galileo (1564), and Gilbert (1544-1603). In Zilsel's
view, the general characteristics of a scientific cosmology were produced through
the hybridisation of conceptualresourceswhich is in turn ultimately attributable to
capitalist socio-economic change. (Shapin 1983b, p. 450)
Thus the history of technology is not equivalent to the history of science.
Indeed, as discussed in Appendix B.l on context the predecessors of what is now
considered to be science are more accurately characterised as the concurrent traditions
craft and natural philosophy before the sixteenth century in Europe. Zilsel's thesis is

Chapter 12: Conclusion

411

the traditions of craft (technology) and natural philosophy were quite distinct at least until
the sixteenth century.
Partly consistent with this argument is Toffler's thesis, in The Third Wave (1981),
that characterises the history of technology by three distinct waves or stages15, none of
which derives from a necessary foundation in science. Toffler's three stages in

technological history are, in historical order, the Agricultural Revolution, the Industr
Revolution, and what is often called the Information Revolution. The Information

Revolution is an emerging wave of increasingly responsive, rapidly developing, diversifi
technology that has fundamental and diverse influences on, and from, all elements of
society:

For the purposes of this book we shall consider the First Wave era to have begun
sometime around 8000 B C and to have dominated the earth unchallenged until
sometime around A D 1650-1750. F r o m this m o m e n t on, the First W a v e lost
m o m e n t u m as the Second W a v e picked up steam. Industrial civilisation, the
product of the Second W a v e , then dominated the planet in its turn until it, too,
crested. This latest historical turning point arrived in the United States during the
decade beginning about 1955 - the decade that saw white-collar and service
workers outnumber blue-collar workers for the first time. This w a s the same
decade that saw the widespread introduction of the computer, commercial jet
travel, the birth control pill, and m a n y other high-impact innovations. It was
precisely during this decade that the Third W a v e began to gather its force in the
United States. Since then it has arrived - at slightiy different dates - in most of the
other industrial nations, including Britain, France, Sweden, Germany, the Soviet
Union, and Japan. Today all the high-technology nations are reeling from the
collision between the Third W a v e and the obsolete, encrusted economies and
institutions of the Second.
Understanding this is the secret to m a k e sense of m u c h of the political and
social conflict w e see around us. (Toffler 1981, p. 28)
The point is that significant issues arise from the nature and history of technology that

not necessarily arise from the perspective of the history and nature of science. Toffler
example, is keenly interested in the social implications of technologies, and the

technological implications for society. As another example, the technological achievemen
of non-western European cultures such as China, discussed in the companion chapter on
context and Appendix B.l, are much more straightforward than debates about the

boundaries of science and non-science: we can readily identify histories of technological
15

Toffler elsewhere acknowledges that he could have constructed any number of historical stages,
depending on the focus and level of analysis, just as the present thesis acknowledges its suggested six
categories or dimensions of characterisation could vary according to the focus and purpose of the
analysis.
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achievements regardless of questions of natural philosophy, such their theoretical
frameworks or underlying belief systems.

This discussion on the nature of technology, then, calls for a broader interpretation o

technology that acknowledges its frequent links with science without restricting techn

merely to applied science. From the perspective of the present thesis, and in particula

present section, it is the relationships between science and technology that need to be
clarified in the school Science curriculum:

Many modern technological developments are rooted in or closely connected with
scientific developments. What can be said about the nature of this relation?
First, one shouldrecognisethat there are no sharp definitions of the concepts of
science and technology. Often the two concepts have beenreifiedinto two 'things'
that can have a mutual relation. Science, then, is understood as the body of
knowledge widely accepted by the scientific community, which can be found
mainly in scientific journals and books. Technology in its turn is understood to
encompass both hardware and knowledge of the industrial arts (E. Layton 1977).
O n e w a y of relating science and technology, then, might be to look for the
similarities and differences between the two types of knowledge, for example, as
to their nature and structure. A different w a y would be to ask h o w scientific
knowledge is transformed into technology. The first is a static relationship; the
latter, a dynamic one, which actually refers to the activities of scientists and
technologists. (Smit 1995, p. 616)
This is not to argue that the science curriculum should also deal extensively with the
of technology: that could, and probably should, be dealt with in technology subjects.
However, the science curriculum should show how science is characterised commonly in
conjunction with technology, as discussed in the companion chapter on context and
Appendix B.l:

[Sjcience stands in a special relationship to industry, which is itself a source perhaps the major source - of negotiating power in the m o d e m state. The third
section [of our article] attempts to situate the actions of science elites, their allies,
and their potential or actual adversaries within the structural setting of marketoriented societies [which are broadly similar across technological societies with
very different polities and economies]. W h e n governments leave the development
and distribution of technologies to private corporations, publicly funded research
serves primarily as an inducement to the private sector to perform this function,
and only secondarily as a form of public choice of knowledge or technology.
Given the current structure of influence around science, research is m u c h more
likely to be pulled in directions chosen by industry than to be pushed toward
democratically chosen ends, no matter h o w open the priority-setting process in
government becomes. Thus democratic control of science depends ultimately on
democratic control of technology. (Cozzens & Woodhouse 1995, p. 535)
Many school curricula, including the NSW curriculum, already deal with, or have the
capacity to deal with, these issues, often disparately as science, design and technolog
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social studies. T h e argument of the present thesis is that a multidimensional school Science
has the potential to m a k e these elements explicit in ways that traditional science curricula do
not. Confining the science curriculum to a predominandy internalist characterisation of
science neglects one of the very characteristics of science that shows h o w science is used
and influenced by society and technology, and equally influences them. A traditional
assumption of science curricula is that students, having grasped a range of scientific
concepts, understandings, propositions and inquiry skills, will then be able to apply these
competencies in real contexts 16 . T h e present thesis has argued that internalist
characterisations of science do not m a k e these applications clear, and indeed, often reject
these applications as being beyond the realm of particular science communities. It has also
argued that metascientific analyses in the last decades of the twentieth century have largely
rejected stricdy internalist characterisations of science, m a n y of them arguing that w e need
to understand, a m o n g other things, the social and technological applications of science and
influences on it. It suggests that the links between science and technology can be m a d e by
making clear their shared contexts, purposes, and so forth. Because the school Science
curriculum provides both the preparation for future scientists and technologists, and the last
formal science education for m a n y others, it has to m a k e clear the nature of science in
relation to technology and society in general. In the same way, it has to m a k e clear the
nature of technology and of society, but that issue is beyond the scope of the present thesis.

16

This is commonly traced to Robert Gagne's notion of hierarchical learning, but also has direct roots
in science education to nineteenth century theorists (DeBoer 1991).
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T h e present thesis has implications for the selection of curriculum
models and resources, teacher training and school organisation.

Finally, we now turn, in sections 4 and 5, to a more speculative mode, to suggest
some wider implications and areas for further research arising from the present thesis.
Section 4 presents some issues that arise for the science curriculum generally, although they
could apply also to the broader curriculum. Section 5 speculates on some implications of
the present thesis for theorising about the curriculum generally. Specifically, it explores the
question of whether and h o w the present thesis could apply not just to science but other
subjects and the curriculum as a whole.
W e have discussed at length the implications of the present thesis for deciding which
curriculum models will best accommodate a robust characterisation of science: that is,
which will provide for adequately characterising science. However, it also has implications
for making decisions about curriculum materials, teacher training and school organisation.
4.1 Implications of the present thesis for selecting curriculum models

The present thesis argues that decisions about curriculum models should present a
multidimensional characterisation of science that is grounded clearly in the hterature. This
section will m a k e some recommendations that apply both within the present, narrow,
constraints of curriculum development practice, and within broader contexts. Section 1 of
the present chapter reviewed a variety of curriculum models that arise from a variety of
curriculum goals, such as those arising from various curriculum policies, ideologies and
organisations. M a n y of these goals are plausible to m a n y curriculum stakeholders, and the
multiple goals of curriculareflectthe multiple purposes of the curriculum and the pluralistic
nature of curriculum stakeholders. Further, a single goal can arise from more than one
perspective. For example, the goal of gaining knowledge can be justified by one or more
of: policy goals, including the goals of worthwhile knowledge, the curriculum as a rational
system and the curriculum as control; ideological goals, including the goals of religious
orthodoxy, rational humanism, progressivism, critical theory, reconceptualism and
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cognitive pluralism; and organisational and structural goals, including disciplinary
structures, structures based on the characteristics of learners, and structures based on social
issues. In this example, each of these goal clusters requires the gaining of knowledge,
although the nature of that knowledge is characterised variously.
Given the purpose of the present thesis, and particularly the discussion in the present
chapter, w e will m a k e the assumption that education systems will continue to offer a
subject Science, in the school curriculum, because they will continue to structure the
curriculum around worthwhile knowledge based on the established disciplines. This
assumption rests on the following prior assumptions. First the present thesis addresses the
mainstream curriculum in pluralistic democracies such as Australia, N e w Zealand, the U K ,
western Europe and the U S . Therefore, it does not place a great emphasis on curriculum
models, such as reconceptualism, progressivism and (at higher grades) child-centred
curricula, whose main support is from curriculum academics and not the spread of
curriculum stakeholders. While the present thesis acknowledges some of the insights and
potential benefits from those goals, which may indeed be included in actual curricula, it sets
a higher priority on making recommendations that have a higher chance of implementation
in the education systems it addresses. Secondly, the present thesis makes no claim that
there necessarily has to be a distinct school subject called Science, because a multidimensional characterisation could be presented both within a subject called Science or
within some other curriculum structure. However, considering the earlier comments, it
seems probable that the targeted education systems would be unlikely to delete from the
curriculum a subject called Science, even though its content m a y still be covered in a
reconceptualised curriculum.
A s a general statement, therefore, the present thesis evaluates the various curriculum
models according to h o w they allow for, or encourage, a multidimensional characterisation
of science. Thus the tendency towards increasing government presence in curriculum
policy, as noted by Elmore and Sykes (1992), means that arguments about the nature of
school Science needs to be m a d e partly at the political level; clearly, it is not enough to
restrict the argument to the domain of direct involvement in curriculum development In
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turn, this m e a n s that the argument has to be m a d e in the mass media to inform pubtic
opinion. It is significant, as noted earlier, that perhaps the dominant strand of science
education research since about the mid-1980s has been constructivism and the notion of
children's science, yet this is barely identifiable in curriculum policies during that time17.
Instead, the predominant educational themes in political policies across the political
spectrum in most western countries during this time has been increased efficiency, and socalled 'declining standards', as reflected in concerns with improving behaviour and
educational 'basics' - literacy and numeracy. Following from this, the enduring goal of
worthwhile knowledge has persisted, even strengthened, but with a shift towards
traditional notions of knowledge-that and narrow conceptions of knowledge as disciplines.
This is reinforced by increasing concerns with curriculum efficiency and examples of the
curriculum as a rational system, as a m e a n s of control, and curriculum as capital. Together
with shifts in goals at the level of government policy, from equity to diversity and choice,
these changes have supported curriculum models based around traditional subjects. This
has meant that evenrelativelyrecent additions to the curriculum, like technology, have been
introduced as n e w subjects, such as Design and Technology and Computing Studies in
N S W . In turn, this model has yet to address tensions in the total curriculum: the sense that
technology is a 'seamless web', applying across all subjects, is difficult to reconcile with
the discrete subjects that typically comprise secondary curricula. Attempts to
implementation technology as a cross-curriculum perspective are yet to be s h o w n to be
successful.
Some design implications of a multidimensional characterisation
T h e central question here is, what acceptable curriculum models entail, or at least
accommodate, a robust multidimensional characterisation of science? A n early decision has
to be whether a multidimensional characterisation is presented as a single subject or

17 The New Zealand science curriculum is a notable exception. Matthews (1995) is highly criti
because it is structured around a disputed (constructivist) characterisation of science. The present
thesis is also critical, but more because the opportunity created for establishing a multidimensional
approach, by rejecting the traditional positivist paradigm, was lost, and also because the replacement
was largely another single paradigm.
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whether different dimensions are emphasised in different subjects: the former would require
changes inteachertraining and resource development and allocation, and the latter would
capitalise on existing expertise and resources.
A n example of such a decision is in the preliminary development of the N S W Science
and Technology K-6 syllabus (1990), with which the present author was involved. At the
beginning of its development, there existed the 1980 Investigating Science K-6 Policy
(syllabus), whose stakeholders expected to see it retained in any n e w syllabus, but there
was n o technology syllabus and indeed no comprehensive, formal notion of technology in
the curriculum. Developmental work in computer education, mass media education and
craft and design education already existed, and each of these stakeholder groups expected to
see a n e w syllabus developed in 'their' area. Thus an early question to be answered was
h o w were science and technology to befittedinto a developing curriculum with fewer
syllabuses? O n e view put was to treat science, technology and society essentially as
separate: Science would cover natural science, mainly nature study; Technology would
cover the so-called technological sciences, like electronics and computing; Craft and Design
would cover mass media education, designing and making; and Social Studies would cover
the social implications of science and technology. This view w a s rejected in favour of
treating science and technology holisticly and in contexts that are meaningful to students. In
particular, to split technology artificially would leave the overall curriculum with no
comprehensive presentation of technology to guide teachers.
T o return to the present thesis, the same issue confronts school Science, as in the
difference between its traditional character and the multidimensional character argued here.
O n e could argue that the subject Science should remain essentially internalist and
acontextual, and interactions between science, technology and society could be done in the
social sciences and perhaps studies of technology. However, the present thesis argues that
while the social sciences provide the scope to treat the societal implications of science and
technology, and some n e w technology subjects have a broader scope than the narrowly
technocratic nature of traditional technology subjects, a robust, multidimensional
understanding of science is unlikely to form unless this characterisation is presented in a
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planned and cohesive course of study. Therefore, given the subject-based nature of
traditional, mainstream curriculum models, this goal is most likely to be achieved in a
single, multiple-stage subject, Science. Further sociological, mathematical, linguistic,
historical, technological and other implications can be linked to other subjects in the
curriculum, and perhaps even to new, dedicated elective subjects devised expressly to
pursue such issues as extensions. However, an overall, robust characterisation is most
likely when a subject is devoted to that purpose,regardlessof what additional courses m a y
become available as extensions.
Some broad, content implications of a multidimensional characterisation
The next question is, what should be the nature of such a subject? Given the analysis
in the present thesis, it should not comprise an extreme internalist or externalist view of
science. Students will need to develop understandings of current scientific knowledge, as
well as s o m e (metascientific) understandings about science. W e have seen earlier in the
present thesis that traditional school Science knowledge tends at the same time to be not
current enough and acontextual; it does not provide insights from historical, sociological
and philosophical perspectives. Thus careful thought will need to be given to provide a
balance between:
•

the enduring concepts, beliefs, activities, purposes, contexts and structures,
m a n y of which comprise most of traditional science curricula;

•

recent examples and likely or possible developments, so that school Science
remains up to date with the sciences and to give students an appreciation of
the pace and scope of changes in science;

•

science in historical, sociological and personal as well as intellectual
contexts, so that students develop a more robust understanding of science,
and see science as more relevant;

•

different metascientific views, so that students gain a variety of insights into
science - learning something about science, rather than simply science
concepts - and that different individuals and groups characterise science
differently and for different reasons; and
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the different dimensions of characterisation.

O n this last point, it is not intended that the six dimensions of characterisation presented in
the present thesis s o m e h o w be given equal time in the curriculum, nor that they be accepted
as immutable categories. M u c h time will still need to be spent dealing with accepted
scientific concepts and understandings, but students should develop an appreciation that
these understandings arise from, and in conjunction with, characteristic activities,
purposes, structures, contexts and belief systems. Further, the dimensions are not
presented as absolute or immutable, but as constructed from this analysis of statements
about science that built on the c o m m o n and enduring dimensions of knowledge

and

process.
These goals require sufficient time to address prior understandings and beliefs, and to
develop the broader framework of understandings and skills they entail. This is consistent
with long-term criticisms of the science curriculum that fewer topics should be covered, but
in greater depth, to foster knowledge as personal understanding rather than low-order
intellectual activities. S o m e of the more obvious strategies would be to include, or increase,
the use of case studies and extended investigations of current, historic and projected
examples of science, and the science involved in social and personal issues. These should
be selected so that, over the course of some years, students gain an understanding of the
multidimensional character of science, and an abilitytoapply this understanding to appraise
social and personal issues, claims to reliable or authoritative knowledge, and so forth.
This approach to science education should be m a d e clear at every level of curriculum
policy and curriculum statement from statements of the rationale for and general nature of
the science curriculum,toindividual syllabus documents.
4.2 Implications of the present thesis for teacher training

The education literature is clear that the central factor in the success or otherwise of
any curriculum is the teacher. In Australian and similar education systems, the most
c o m m o n l y required qualification for science teachers is a degree in science together with
additional training in education. This has been the traditional means of teachers learning
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something of the complexity and scope of science knowledge and gaining some competence
in laboratory and investigative skills. However, it provides limited preparation for teaching
about science. T h e teachers of multidimensional science will still need to have a robust
education in science, that is, tertiary studies in science. However, it seems probable that
m u c h of the metascientific expertise a m o n gteachers,at least in Australia, lies not just with
science teachers but also with teachers of the social sciences, technology, history,
linguistics, and so forth. For example, English teachers with knowledge of linguistics,
such as functional grammar, have detailed knowledge of scientific language structures and
genres; and m a n y historians and social scientists have sound knowledge of historical and
social contexts of science.
Clearly, some of the teaching force will need to have expertise in education about
science, and there are several possible strategies for addressing this. O n e possibility is to
leave the subject Science essentially as it is, dealing mainly with internalist understandings
of science concepts, propositional knowledge and experimental skills. Other characteristics
of science could then be dealt with by teachers with other expertise, as mentioned in the
paragraph above, either within the subject Science, or within their o w n subjects. This view
has some attractions, such as encouraging links across the curriculum that exist already to a
hmited extent and using existing expertise and patterns of teacher training. These strengths
should be kept in mind as w e examine the implications for the subject Science.
The present thesis has argued that school Science should be a robust education in and
about science. This means not just extending the traditional scope of school Science, but
treating science more comprehensively so that the interplay of its multiple dimensions can
be understood. School Science, therefore, should be taught as a cohesive and meaningful
entity. This means that the presentation of scientific understandings, for example, should
not be separated from the characteristic activities, purposes, structures, contexts and belief
systems that lead to this knowledge and give an understanding of its character. Similarly,
one could not meaningfully address the social impact and utility of science, for example, or
the characteristics of science language, in isolation of the theories, activities, purposes,
assumptions and criteria used by scientists and others in claiming this knowledge. It would
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certainly help to have other school subjects to deal with these characteristics also, or to have
other non-science teachers contributing their expertise in science. However, regardless of
these strategies, the teaching of science knowledge and experimental skills should not be
taught independendy of other characteristics, including the broader notions of science
knowledge and activity. That is, those responsible for teaching science will need to have a
broader understanding of science and about science than has been required traditionally. If
they also teach science with other curriculum specialists, either within the subject science or
in other subjects, that is all to the better, but there must be somewhere in the curriculum for
a robust and comprehensive treatment of science.
4.2.1 Implications for the pre-service training of teachers
The implication for pre-service teacher education is that tertiary studies should not
only be in science, in the sense of studies of physics or biology, for example, but also
about science, in the sense of science history, philosophy, sociology, policy, perhaps in
combination18. Similarly, studies in science pedagogy and programming should ensure that
beginning teachers are able to implement a robust characterisation with appropriate and
effective teaching and programming strategies. Thus, while the majority of Australian
science teachers complete an initial science degree, that degree should include s o m e
metascientific study, such as in H P S and S T S . This is not universally available in
Australian universities, but teacher employing authorities already set requirements for
patterns of study that teacher training mstitutions must furnish if their graduates are to be
employable; it is not a difficult issue in the m e d i u m to long term
4.2.2 Implications for the in-service training of teachers
There are also implications for the in-servicettainingof teachers. O n e is the task of
complementing the knowledge, skills and attitudes of existing science teachers: a robust,
multidimensional characterisation of science is outside the experience of m a n y science
teachers, and certainly outside the expertise of a good m a n y more. Thus teachers will need

1g

Notwithstanding that teachers' studies in metascience do not guarantee improved student learning
(Gaskell 1992).
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to have opportunities to develop metascientific understandings - understandings about
science, as well as scientific understandings of the material world. This should include at
least s o m e introductory work in the history, philosophy and sociology of science, to
develop an understanding of the multidimensional character of science, and s o m e
familiarisation with curriculum andteachingsupport materials.
Another is the ongoing maintenance of the currency of teacher expertise. This
recognises that traditional science curricula have emphasised the received knowledge and
laboratory skills that are believed to be centraltoscience, suitable prepatory work for higher
understandings and skills, and enduring. Thus traditional science curricula are far more
conservative than the present thesis advocates: while a syllabus m a y not be out of date in
the sense that it is based on enduring concepts, it can be out of date in the sense that it m a y
not include recendy developed understandings and theories. Appendix B.6 on knowledge
showed that one characteristic of science knowledge is therapidincrease of its volume and
rate development. Likewise Appendix B.l on context showed that another characteristic is
the increasing involvement in developing and disputing science of groups outside 'pure'
research, such as universities, industry, government and citizen groups. These
characteristics should complement enduring and fundamental knowledge and skills. T h e
conservative character of traditional school Science has meant that school Science programs
and teaching changed very slowly19. There is a need, therefore, for school Science to
include recent current and probable scientific developments, and to include recent current
and possible science issues requiring scientific literacy. In turn, education systems should
provide for regular updating of teachers' expertise in and about science, either by
encouragement or requirement, and either further formal post-graduate qualifications, or
other 'update' courses provided by school systems in collaboration with universities and/or
industries.
Non-teaching support staff, school executive staff, people with scientific and
metascientific expertise, and others, act as resources for science teachers and would also

19 For example, an academic chemist on the NSW chemistry syllabus committee complained to
present author in 1988 that secondary school chemistry was basically the chemical knowledge that
existed in the early 1900s!
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need training. For example, non-teaching support staff, both within and without the school,
provide logistical support for science education. This includes the laboratory assistants,
w h o provide and maintain apparatus, chemical stocks, and so forth, and manage
laboratories. Most laboratory assistants also have a role as teachers aids, managing the
inventory of science texts, audio visual resources, and so forth. The school executive are
also resources, in that they are necessary agents of change and implementation support:
logistical support at the school executive level is necessary to enable schoolstorespond to
curriculum changes. This is so particularly where teachers from more than one faculty
implement a particular syllabus, but also for coordinating the scope and overlap of the
school curriculum and the demands this places ontimetabling,resource allocation and
staffing. People with scientific and metascientific expertise areresourcesfor curriculum
development and implementation by education systems and schools, for teacher
development and as primary sources for students and teachers. This group includes not

only scientists, but could include metascientists, technologists, authors, and representatives
ofrelevantinterest groups, where their expertise is appropriate.
4.3 Implications of the present thesis for science education resources

There are implications for resourcing a multidimensional science curriculum model,
meaning human, material and organisational resources.
Resources would need to be produced to the extent that this multidimensional view of
science represents a change to existing curricula. A n e w curriculum would mean some
expansion of teaching resources, but not a significant amount. The greatest expense would
be the production and purchasing of resources like n e w texts, videos, kits and C D R O M s .
W e have noted earlier in the present thesis thattextsare not as centraltoAustralian curricula
as in some other education systems, such as in the U S . Regardless of the usage of any
resources, there will be a need for resources to be produced to support n e w curriculum
directions. W e noted earlier that in some school systems, such as in some U S systems,
resource producers have a say in the development of curricula and that this has helped
distort school Science. This thesis can only urge that those responsible for science
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curriculum development be firm in their requirements for a multidimensional
characterisation of science.
Organisational resources include the provision of curricula, curriculum
implementation strategies and teaching staff by school systems, and the participation of
teacher training institutions, teacher unions, groups of scientists and others with relevant
expertise. T h e need identified by the present thesis for up-to-date expertise in scientific
developments and social issues that involve science means that a more robust science
curriculum is likely to create or expand the need of schools and teachers to draw more
systematically on a wider variety of resources than previously. Having a syllabus that
specifies up-to-date science places demands for teachers with up-to-date expertise. This
would require more systematic support than the present ad hoc or absent arrangements.
Planned networks, involving universities and science teacher associations, would be an
effective solution.
4.4 Implications of the present thesis for school organisation

A multidimensional characterisation of science would lend itself well to more flexible
approaches to school organisation. Examples include: theme- or issues-based approaches
that integrate across two or more traditional subjects; a more flexible school organisation
that allows for extended investigations, visits to pertinent sites and groups, and so forth;
and m o r e flexible staffing to capitalise on the combined expertise of teaching staff.
However, none of these is a necessary condition. A multidimensional characterisation of
science would provide greater pressure for changes of these types if other curriculum areas,
like mathematics, technology and social studies, were also characterised in multiple
dimensions, as explored in section (5) below. However, an express intention of the present
thesis is to address the mainstream curriculum, and in that case w e have speculated above
that the most likely organisation of the school curriculum will continue to be the subjectbased model that has been the most favoured model. The reason is simply because a change
from this model is likely to lead to changes of school organisation, including staffing,
timetabling and resource management and other pressures such as industrial negotiation
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and fiscal planning, all of which contribute to pressures on schools to remain as far as
possible the same as they are. A multidimensional school Science can be implemented
within existing, subject-based curricula, and so issues of school organisation should be no
barrier to its implementation.
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T h e present thesis suggests several areas suitable for further research,
a n d possible tests of its claims.

Finally, it is common in theses of this type to suggest areas for further research. This
is not a e u p h e m i s m for suggesting that a piece of research did not reach the conclusions it
set out to reach 20 . T o the contrary, it is claimed that the present thesis has indeed
constructed a characterisation of science suited to theorising about curriculum development,
as it set out to do. This result can then be:
•

explored for its theoretical, practical, philosophical and other implications;

•

developed in detail to suggest particular strategies for its implementation in
particular contexts;

•

extended in scope to other domains within the curriculum, and perhaps to the
whole curriculum;

•

applied, not only in curriculum issues, but perhaps to other, non-curriculum,
fields such as policy or the public understanding of science;

•
•

tested

to see if its characterisation of science is sound and useful; and

analysed for its contribution to methodology, curriculum, science policy and
other issues.

Suggestions for further research are intended to s h o w that the analysis has extended the
field, and provides insights that support and stimulate further investigation. Accordingly,
the present thesis suggests that there is scope for further research based o n its analysis and
theorising about the science curriculum.
5.1 The present thesis may apply to other subjects or domains within the curriculum, and
to the curriculum generally.

20

This was suggested by the late Professor Ron King to a post-graduate colloquium hosted by the
Faculty of Education at the University of Wollongong; that he was dismayed that a number of theses
sent to him for examination did not reach their intended goals for the likely reason they were poor
examples of research. In some of those cases, the suggestions for further research should have been
part of the original study and acted upon!
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O n e emergent issue is whether the multidimensional characterisation proposed in the
present thesis applies more widely to the curriculum than just Science. This suggests the
hypothesis that the multiple dimensions used to characterise science in the present thesis
m a y apply also to other subjects in the curriculum, and perhaps to the curriculum generally.
That is, there is scope for further theorising that domains of the school curriculum, like
discipline-based subjects or the K e y Learning Areas in the N S W curriculum, can be
characterised using these same six dimensions: knowledge, activity, purpose, structure,
context and belief system. For example, w e have seen in the summary statements of
technology, given in Figure A.2, that the six dimensions constructed for science apply
equally totechnology.It is possible that alternative dimensions might have emerged had w e
started afresh from the metatechnological literature, but the dimensions constructed from the
science statements accounted for the admittedly smaller sample of technology statements
and text units. Further, informal discussions with a straw sample of historians and
mathematicians secured agreement that, in principle, these dimensions apply also to their
fields. Again, they reserved anyfinaljudgements because, given a chance to analyse their
respective literatures, they m a y prefer other dimensions, but that the set constructed for
science accounted for likely, comparable, statements in their fields. There are two choices
for applying the approach of the present thesis to otherfields:to construct a fresh set of
dimensions from the relevant literature, or to apply the six suggested here to the other field.
This choice in itself would be an avenue for further study.
A further hypothesis is that the curriculum as a whole is characterised in six
dimensions: knowledges, activities, purposes, structures, contexts and belief systems. In
this view, legitimate domains within the curriculum, like subjects, key learning areas or
domains, are cohesive clusters of these characteristics. That is, the curriculum could be
viewed as clusters of knowledges, activities, purposes, contexts, structures and belief
systems. This is not to argue that the curriculum is another 'subject', rather that if it is
analysed in the same w a y it m a y also be characterised as multidimensional, and have the
same dimensions.
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The argument is as follows. The six dimensions of characterisation are simply
linguistic categories - categories of the way language has been used to characterise science.
W e have noted that examples of characterisations typically use several, and often all,
dimensions in combination, where the dimensions act as an interactive set. That is, belief
systems, purposes, knowledges, processes, structures and contexts do not act
independently of each other. A decision about one or more entails decisions about at least
s o m e of the others. A n analogy would be spilling out a box of children's construction
bricks on the floor. Let us say that these bricks are characterised, within the set, by their
size, shape and colour. A decision to build something with them automatically clusters the
possible decisions that can follow, meaning the possible uses of the remaining blocks.
Choice of a red block automatically precludes the construction of an all-blue bridge. Choice
of a large, flat block necessarily limits the possible shapes that w e can end up with; in this
case w e can go on to build larger and stronger structures, but not small ones. Changing any
of these decisions means that a n e w cluster of characteristics will form or emerge. Thus
choosing a small block will allow structures that are smaller, but not as strong. Likewise in
science, a different belief will lead to different assumptions that m a y lead to different
purposes or activities; a different context m a y lead to different assumptions or structures;
any of these changes m a y lead to different knowledge claims.
The same applies to school subjects, and indeed the curriculum as a whole: initial
decisions about beliefs, or structures, or purposes, or concepts, for example, entails some
later decisions and denies some others. Thus the present thesis could be used both to
analyse existing curricula structures as clusters of these dimensions, and to construct n e w
curriculum domains, using the dimensions argued here.
5.2 The multidimensional characterisation of science can serve as an analytical
framework.

The multidimensional characterisation of science can serve as a framework for further
curriculum theorising, and analysing claims about the nature of School science, pedagogy,
curriculum policy, curriculum resources, ideology, and so forth. First it m a y serve as a
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stimulus to further theorising about characterising the nature of science in the school
curriculum. In particular it m a y stimulate other attempts to characterise science for the
school curriculum (or other purposes), with the possibility of suggesting that more or fewer
dimensions, or perhaps a quite different set of dimensions, characterise science more
meaningfully. Secondly, the characterisation attempted in the present thesis is significantiy
more robust than has been the trend in the science education and curriculum literatures.
Therefore it provides a well-grounded theoretical framework to use in analysing science
curricula, pedagogy, the understandings that students, teachers and others have of science,
curriculum policy, resources, ideologies, and so forth. That is, explicit or implicit
statements or assumptions in these literatures and public documents about the nature of
science and school Science can be analysed by comparison with the metascientific metaanalysis given here.
5.3 The multidimensional characterisation of science can serve as a basis for curriculum
and curriculum resource development

It should be remembered that the primary purpose of the present study was to provide
a framework that would allow curriculum stakeholders to meet and contribute their
respective insights. However, implicit in the present thesis is that this framework could also
serve as a theoretical framework for the (science) curriculum itself, and not just as a
meeting ground for stakeholders. T o recall Schwab's (1973) notion of subject matter as one
of four curriculum commonplaces, the six dimensions proposed here could easily serve as
curriculum commonplaces, just as knowledge and processes have served as organising
themes in traditional science curricula. In studying scientific or science-based themes,
students should gain an understanding of h o w these dimensions contribute to an overall
understanding of science. The present thesis can therefore serve as a basis not just for
furtherresearch,but also for development of curriculum and learning materials.
This multidimensional characterisation can thus be applied to texts and other
curriculum support materials as an adjunct to existing mainstream curricula and curriculum
resources. In this role it provides the criteria and conceptual resources for analysing or
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developing curriculum materials, teacher knowledge, and so forth. O n e avenue of research
is to devise, trial and evaluate such materials. Another is to evaluate existing curriculum
materials in terms of the present analysis rather than just in terms of the curriculum in
question. W e have argued that this would represent a more demonstrable and higher
standard of rigour.
5.4 Tests of the limits of this theory

Finally, in claiming to be a piece of scholarly theorising, and not empty speculation or
d o g m a , the present thesis claims to have testable limits and the capacity for falsification in
principle. O f course, a strong theme in the considerable discussion in Appendix B is that
there is no single view of what constitutes a scientific, or other, theory! However, the
present thesis set some limits as to the type and scope of its theorising, in particular to
address the mainstream curriculum and its stakeholders. Here, in the conclusion, it claims
to have met this goal: to have constructed a theory of the characterisation of science for use
in the development of mainstream school curricula in at least western, pluralistic
democracies.
First it accommodates the diverse views given in the hterature advocated by present
and likely stakeholders, including metascientific views that conflict, a goal set in the
introduction. This is because it was constructed from those very views. That is, it succeeds
because:
•

it does not reject contrary views of curriculum stakeholders;

•

it provides a better fit than other models for the diverse views of
stakeholders;

•

it accommodates diverse but broadly accepted science and general curriculum
goals; and

•

it provides a better grounding in the scholarly Hterature than existing
curriculum models and goals.

These claims could be tested by curriculum stakeholders reviewing the initial analysis and
subsequent argument.
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Secondly, its dimensions are suitable for the school Science curriculum, because they
are:
•

consistent with, and inclusive of, the widely used dimensions, knowledge
and processes;

•

discernible in examples of science appropriate to school students; moderate
in number and therefore neither too numerous to remember and understand,
nor so few astobe general and vague;

•

constructed using arelativelysti^ghtfbrward semantic analysis that does not
presuppose a particular philosophical stance; and

•

clear and meaningful as dimensions of science.

W e have noted that curriculum emphases, such as proposed by Roberts (1982), can be
differentiated and applied at different stages of the school curriculum. Similarly, different
elements within dimensions of science can be emphasised at different stages: some of the
more complex notions of belief systems and context for example, would not be addressed
until middle or supper secondary years, as is done n o w for grading conceptual difficulty.
This claim could be tested by analysing trials of multidimensional science curriculum
materials and/or courses.
Thirdly, it makes no claim that its characterisation is in s o m e w a y the true account
and indeed rejects the argument that there could be even a notion of any true view. It simply
claims to represent meaningfully and economically a large amount of data, namely the
variety of views of science in the metascientific literature. A m o n g these findings was that
to the extent there is a consensus among current metascientific views, it is that there is no
single, received view, and that notions such as truth are at least complex and in m a n y
views, contingent. This representation is offered to science curriculum stakeholders as a
useful and meaningful tool for grounding school Science better in the hterature.
Fourthly, the theory can be tested by looking for diseonfirming instances, as follows.
(i)

O n e type of diseonfirming instance would be the advent of a metascientific
argument that is accepted by science curriculum stakeholders but cannot be recast
using the six proposed dimensions. T h e present thesis has applied its
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multidimensional characterisation to show that it does apply to various
metascientific views, and facilitates comparisons and critiques of them. There must
always be the possibility that a future account will notfitmeaning that it cannot be
recast meaningfully in terms of the six dimensions. However, the broad collection
of views mentioned in the present thesis allfit;that is, the present thesis gives a
useful account of existing views. While this is unsurprising, since the dimensions
were constructed from the literature, inductively the multidimensional
characterisation appears likely to account for future metascientific views within
k n o w n paradigms. Discontinuation in this sense would be m a d e by appeal to
semantic and metascientific arguments.
(ii)

A second type of diseonfirming instance is if the present thesis can be shown not
to account for the data as it claims. Great pains were taken in the present thesis to
represent robusdy very substantial literatures, and to do so using methods of
analysis that m a d e clear their paths of reasoning. While individual stakeholders are
not expected to agree with some or even m a n y of the alternative views addressed
in the present thesis, it is hoped that they will agree that their preferred view is
adequately represented. However, argument that a particular view or particular
data is misrepresented, would be grounds for arguing that the thesis is
disconfirmed. Discontinuation in this sense would be m a d e by appeal to
metascientific and methodological arguments.

(iii)

A third type of diseonfirming instance is if any alternative theory accounts for the
same data more meaningfully, economically and/or more usefully. T h e sort of
curriculum theorising advanced in the present thesis is only as meaningful as it is
useful, or potentially useful. The present thesis has critiqued existing attempts to
characterise science, and found them to be inadequate. Thetestof its usefulness in
comparison with alternative accounts will depend on h o w school systems,
academics and others respond to it, and these responses will depend in turn on
m a n y additional factors, including the abitity of the present author (and others) to
follow up this thesis with further ideas. This type of test is somewhat different to
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the first two. Disconfirmation in this sense would be made not by appeal to
semantic or metascientific arguments, but to educational and other arguments: that
the thesis fails, or is found inferior, because it does not apply to the curriculum in
the ways it claims. Given the complexities of curriculum development and
implementation, this would be a difficult basis for disconfirmation: it would be
hard to show that curriculum failure was due explicidy to the implementation of the
present thesis. More likely, perhaps, is that a particular theory is blamed for
ideological or other reasons. Nonetheless it is possible, in principle, to show the
contribution of particular theories, such as given in the present thesis, to
curriculum failures.
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6 And in conclusion

It has proven a difficult task to provide a robust means of characterising science for
the curriculum: the literature is immense; the diversity of views about both science and
school Science is great; conflicting views are often fervently held; the balance between
depth and breadth is inherently difficult to strike in a task such as this; and the state of
science curriculum development is dynamic and difficult to encapsulate. For all these
reasons the thesis has finished up m u c h larger and more comprehensive than initially
expected. However, there are two reasons that perhaps are more significant. O n e is that as
the writing and thinking progressed, I became increasingly aware of the multiple
dimensions of science in text of m a n y kinds, including media reports, textbooks,
curriculum documents, advertisements, dramas, comedies, documentaries, cartoons: in
other words, in the daily experiences of students and citizens. The other is that, whenever
drafts of the thesis were presented to curriculum stakeholders from any constituency, its
central task was taken very seriously and perceived omissions and biases were keenly
contested. Time and again there seemed no solution other than to address explicidy each
characteristic and each dimension of science. Moreover, these interactions confirmed and
reconfirmed the decision to base the argument on the hterature analysis, because no other
source met the criteria of all concerned. These interactions also confirmed the importance of
the task for science curriculum stakeholders, even though its primary audience will be
restricted by its very thoroughness, and it contributes but one element of what will always
be a process that is complex and never to everyone's satisfaction.
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APPENDIX A
Figure A.l;
A collection of summary statements of science from the literature
S.l '(Science is)
la. the systematic study of m a n [sic] and his environment based on the deductions and
inferences which can be made, and the general laws which can be formulated, from
reproducible observations and measurements of events and parameters within the universe;
lb. the knowledge so obtained;
2. systematised knowledge in general;
3. a particular branch of knowledge;
4. skill; proficiency.'
The Macquarie Dictionary. 1985
S.2 "The task of science is to both extend the range of experience and to reduce it to order.'
Neils Bohr, Nobel physicist, quoted in NSW Department of Education 1988
S .3 '(Science is) all exploratory activities of which the purpose is to come to a better understanding
of the natural world.'
Sir Peter Medawar, Nobel scientist, quoted in NSW Department ofEducation 1988
S.4 'Science is
•
a developing body of knowledge - observations, concepts, laws and theories - which seeks
to explain objectively the world around us
•
a set of processes for observing, experimenting with, describing, classifying and analysing
the phenomena of that world
•
traditionally studied as a number of disciplines with fluid and overlapping boundaries.'
NSW Council of Science Syllabus Committees, 1987
S.S 'The term "science" defines a domain of human knowledge and activity within which scientists
seek the systematic organisation of knowledge about the composition and functioning of the
universe. Scientists attempt to acquire and organise knowledge about the universe and its parts
and to explain, through the formulation of laws and theories describing natural processes, the
interaction and interrelationship of those parts. A m o n g the characteristics that distinguish
science from other fields of h u m a n endeavour are the goal of explaining, with ever increasing
precision, the nature of the universe in terms of uniform natural processes and relationships, and
the commitment to the testing of proposed explanations by means of empirical observation and
experimentation.'
National Academy of Sciences of USA, quoted in NSW Department of Education 1988
S .6 'Science is the belief in the ignorance of experts.'
Richard Feynman, Nobel physicist, quoted in NSW Department of Education 1980, vol. 2, p. 5
S.7 'Science is built up with facts, as a house is with stones. But a collection of facts is no more
science than a heap of stones is a house.'
Henri Poincare 1902, quoted by Tripp 1985, p563
S. 8 'Science is an activity characterised by the search for understanding - for a satisfying explanation
of s o m e aspect of reality, this understanding being codified in statements of high generality
(laws and principles), these being accessible to experimental tests.'
Goldstein 1978, quoted by McKenzie 1987, p.167
S.9 'Modern science is a search for understanding expressed in laws or principles of greatest
generality and which are capable of experimental test'
McKenzie 1987, p.167
S.10 'Science is the attempt to make the chaotic diversity of our sense experience correspond to a
logically uniform system of thought'
Einstein 1950 quoted by Tripp 1985, p562
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"The purpose of science as an activity is to form conceptual generalisations about the m a n y
particulars of empirical evidence.'
Mannoial980

S.12 'Science is a word which describes a way of knowing.'
South Australian Science 8-10 Curriculum Guidelines, 'Science: A Way of Knowing cl988, p.
S. 13 'Science is a human activity that has evolved as a way of looking at the physical and biological
world and a w a y of ordering its many facets and checking the validity of this order.'
'Science: A Way of Knowing', p. 1
S.14 "The term "science" is usually assumed to have a very precise and well-defined meaning. But it
can in fact be used in a variety of ways to indicate:
(a) a set of procedures for verifying or falsifying claims about the world, and our place in it,
and thus is distinct from either tradition or authority; this set of procedures usually includes
highly technical measures often requiring mastery of mathematics;
(b) a set of conclusions or a body of knowledge about the world which result from these
procedures;
(c) an institution or set of organisational arrangements designed for educating and accrediting
scientists, approving or discrediting scientific conclusions, and for protecting the interests
of the scientific estate;
(d) a myth, that is, a systematic set of beliefs about the nature of reality, about the appropriate
w a y to relate to reality and about 'the discipline of the self (Foucault) necessary to achieve
an appropriate relationship to reality;
(e) an ideology, that is, ap organised w a y of thinking about reality which serves to maintain
and perpetuate structures and patterns of social domination and subordination.'
Kenny 1988, p. 24
S. 15 'Science is not just a collection of laws, a catalogue of facts, it is a creation of the human mind
with itsfreelyinvented ideas and concepts. Physical theories try to form a picture of reality and
to establish its connections I with the wide world of sense impressions.'
Einstein and Infeld 1938
S. 16 'Science is a world picture. It is not a technique; it is not a form of power; it is not even simply
an accumulation of knowledge. But it is a highly integrated form of knowledge which makes a
world view.'
Bronowski 1978, p. 39
S.l7 'Science is simply common sense at its best - that is, rigidly accurate in observation, and
merciless to fallacy in logic'
Thomas Huxley, quoted in New South Wales Department of Education,1988
S.l8 'We may conceive "science" Qierc taken in the broader and older sense to signify any general
understanding which can respond to challenge and questions) as a system essentially relating to
the development of knowledge. Component parts of this system are: the producers (researchers),
the process of research, the products, the interesses for these products, the reporting sub-system,
etc... This system forms itself part of a larger system: science in society. There are m a n y ways
of looking at science - at the knowledge-producing and knowledge-distributing industries.'
Radnitsky 1970, p. x
S.l9 'We conceive "science" essentially as a knowledge producing and knowledge improving
enterprise.'
Radnitsky 1970, p.l
S.20

'Science is an activity which takes place in a particular sort of tradition. The tradition is
essentially centred in a paradigm, or conceptual structure, which has a naturalistic metaphysics
and an empirical epistemology. The goals and objectives of the tradition are twofold, namely, to
predict and control phenomena revealed by the metaphysics and epistemology of the paradigm,
and to explain and understand these same phenomena.'
Gale 1979
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"The restrictive meanings of "science", limiting the term to empirical, positive (nonnormative),
operational, falsifiable propositions, or even to systematic study of natural (nonsocietal,
noncultural) phenomena, are confined to Anglo-American parlance. In French, German, Italian,
Russian, Japanese, and most other languages, the words for 'science' stand for systems of
knowledge acquired by sustained study. If one wishes to refer to natural sciences, the word
'science' will not do; one has to use a qualifying adjective or compound noun. There is no
difference in these languages between scientists and scholars; the French savant and the German
Gelehrte or Wissenschqftler m a y be a natural scientist, social scientist, historian, archaeologist,
philosopher, literary critic, or writer on jurisprudence or on any learned discipline. This is
reflected in the organisation of the academies of sciences in many countries ...'
Machlup 1980

S .22 'Taking account of the characteristics of science specified in the most authoritative dictionaries,
encyclopaedias, and philosophic treatises in languages other than English, I have formulated a
definition of science that reflects the broadest international consensus: science is a body of
coherent, systematic knowledge of any subject, formal or empirical, natural or cultural, arrived at
by any method whatever, provided it (1) is based on hard, honest and serious study and research
and reaches insights not available to laymen or superficial observers and (2) is designed for either
intellectual or general-pragmatic purposes, but not for immediate practical application in a
concrete case or situation.'
Machlup 1980
S.23 'Science throughout [this book] is taken in a very broad sense and nowhere do I attempt to
cramp it into a definition. Indeed, science has so changed its nature over the whole range of
h u m a n history that no definition could be made to fit ... Science, in one aspect, is ordered
technique; in another, it is rationalised mythology.'
Bernall969,p.3
S.24 'Since a definition is intrinsically impossible, the only way of conveying what is being
discussed... as science will be an extensive and unfolding description ... Here ... [are] the major
aspects in which science appears in the contemporary world.
Science m a y be taken, (1.1) as an institution; (1.2) as a method; (1.3) as a cumulative tradition
of knowledge; (1.4) as a major factor in the maintenance and development of production; and
(I.S) as one of the most powerful influences moulding beliefs and attitudes to die universe and
m a n [sic]. In (1.6) the interactions of science and society are discussed. B y listing these different
aspects of science I do not intend to imply that there are as many different "sciences". With any
concept so wide-ranging in time, connexion and category, multiplicity of aspect and reference
must be the rule. The word science or scientific has a number of different meanings according to
the context in which it is used.'
JJD.Bernall969.p.31
S.25 '[There has arisen] a standard view [of science], largely shared by reflective scientists, technical
philosophers, and the educated public alike, and laying great emphasis upon the objective
features of scientific thought... For the standard view has not only been widely entrenched and
long taken for granted; it has also ... enjoyed the staunch support of the dominant scientifically
oriented philosophies of our day. The current attacks thus challenge not only a firm set of
habitual attitudes, but ... the underlying moral motivation of these philosophies, thenupholding of the ideal of responsibility in the sphere of belief as against wilfulness,
authoritarianism, and inertia.'
Scheffler 1967, pp. 7-8
S .26 "The reality thus revealed undo1 the methodological publicity Of scientific method is, moreover, a
reality in which w e are ourselves but limited natural elements. Our wishes and perceptions have
not m a d e this reality, but have sprung up within it as functions of organic development in a
small corner of the universe of nature. Objectivity is not only, as w e have seen, a fundamental
feature of scientific method; the ontological vision in which it culminates is the vision of a
universe of objects with independent existences and careers, within which scientific inquiry
represents but one region of connected happening and striving. In short, for the standard view I
have been describing, objectivity is the end, as well as the beginning, of wisdom.'
Scheffler 1967, pp. 11-12
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'[The standard] view [of science] affirms the objectivity of science; more specifically, it
understands science to be a systematic public enterprise, controlled by logic and empirical fact,
whose purpose it is to formulate the truth about the natural world. The truth primarily sought is
general, expressed in laws of nature, which tell us what is always and everywhere the case.
Observation, however, supplies the particular empirical facts, the hard phenomenal data which
our lawlike hypotheses strive to encompass, and for which it is the ultimate purpose of such
hypotheses to account.'
Scheffler 1967, p.8

S .28 "The ultimate aim of science in the standard view is to discover truths about the external world.'
Riggs 1992, p.10
S .29 'What science gives us is criteria of judgement, methods and techniques for evaluating data, and a
commitment to logic and rationality. All h u m a n knowledge is value-oriented because it is
selective. W h a t is relevant to a scientific problem and what has meaning in science depends on
what w e are looking for and what w e are trying to accomplish.'
Grunfeldl973,p.l96
S .30 'Science is a deceptively inclusive word which refers to a variety of distinct though interrelated
items. It is commonly used to denote (1) a set of characteristic methods by means of which
knowledge is certified; (2) a stock of accumulated knowledge stemming from the application of
these methods; (3) a set of cultural values and mores governing the activities termed scientific:
OT (4) any combination of the foregoing.'
Merton 1973, p.268
S.31 '...the value posture hospitable to scientific endeavour is rationalistic in the choice of
alternatives, relativistic in judgement and expectation, and anticipatory of change. A pragmatic
rationalism m a y be contrasted with aritualisticmotivation for action. A relativistic stance m a y
be differentiated from an organic one; the relativist presumes that the effect of his actions will be
something less than absolute, and thus he does not call into play every moral, ethical or
religious precept to which he m a y subscribe on the occasion of his every judgement and action.
In short, he can bring differing value judgements into play in accord with specific roles... The
values of science, to become effective, must be supported by more general societal values, as
well as the public power, institutional structures, and class systems appropriate for the purpose.'
Silvert 1969, p. 231
S .32 'Science ... is common knowledge extended and refined. Its validity is of the same order as that
of ordinary perception, memory, and understanding. Its test is found, like theirs, in actual
intuition, which sometimes consists in perception and sometimes in intent. The flight of
science is merely longer from perception to perception, and its deduction more accurate of
meaning from meaning and purpose from purpose ...'
Santayana 1962, p.148
S.33 'Science is (and has been) considered by most of its investigators to be a community of
individuals engaged in similar and related activities of inquiry ... Insofar as science is itself a
community of inquirers, then it must necessarily have a philosophy, just like any other group of
people asking questions ... I a m not claiming here, in m y notion of a "community", that there
are not disagreements ... but I want to emphasise to you that these disagreements are
philosophical conflicts - conflicts, a m o n g other things, in regard to ultimate kinds of
explanatory ideas...'
Gale 1979, p.8
S.34 'Science is often conceived as a body of knowledge. Reflection, however, will lead to the
conclusion that this cannot be its true nature. History has repeatedly shown that a body of
scientific knowledge that ceases to develop soon ceases to be science at all. The science of one
age has often become the nonsense of the next... Science, then, is no static body of knowledge
butratheran active process that can be followed through the ages. The sheer validity and success
of the process in our o w n age has givenriseto a good deal of misunderstanding of its nature and
not a little misapplication of such terms as "science" and "scientific" ... [The terms] science and
scientific as employed in these [popular] connexions have no relation to the great progressive
acquisition of knowledge [called science ].'
Singer 1959, pp. 1-2
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"Thus, what I need to do now is to describe for you an element of scientific activity, namely, its
goals, which set it apart from other human activities.
The goals of science are twofold. Thefirstgoal is prediction and control The second is
explanation and understanding ... the two goals are not absolutes of all sciences. Some sciences
exist today which apparently aim for only one of the two objectives. Behaviourist psychologists
... usually ... seek only to discover correlations between behaviours, which will be used solely
for prediction and control... O n the other hand, some sciences are almost purely explanatory ...
[such as] evolutionary theory [which] can describe the course of biological changes in the past,
but... cannot be much used to make predictions about the future...
... O n e way to distinguish the prediction-and-control aspect of science from the explanation-andunderstanding aspect is this: Prediction and control involve statements which use only
correlations, whereas explanation and understanding involve statements which use causal
connections.'
Gale 1979, pp. 61-62

S. 36 'While there is far from a consensus of beliefs in [the "new philosophy of science"], most of
following contentions would be affirmed by those working in it:
that science is an open-ended, on-going activity, whose character has changed significantly
during its history
that science is not a monolithic enterprise
that good science can lead to false theories
that science has its roots in everyday circumstances, needs, methods, concepts, etc. of
human beings
that through examination of science w e will learn how to understand such notions as
"observation", "theory", "meaning", "reference", "explanation", "progress" and "rationality"
that the boundary between a "scientific" question and a "philosophical" question, especially
as regards foundational problems, is often blurry
that the function of the philosophy of science is descriptive, critical, and normative
that the philosophy of science is not self-sufficient, insofar as the methods of philosophy
need to be supplemented by concepts, principles, theories, etc., drawn from other
disciplines; though itremainsto be determined just what can be used and how.'
Neressian 1987, p. vii
S.37 'Our word "science" comes from a Latin word for knowledge. Much that we know does not
count as science, but this is often less due to its subject matter than to its arrangement For
nearly any body of knowledge that is sufficiently organised to exhibit appropriate evidential
relationships among its constituent claims has at least some call to be seen as scientific. What
makes for science is system, whatever the subject And what makes for system is the judicious
application of logic. Science is then afruitof rational investigation.'
Quine & Ullian 1978

S .38 '[Science is or involves] the methods by which we acquire knowledge of nature, and... set tha
knowledge within a more comprehensive metaphysics.'
Hani 1986, Preface

S.39 'Actual science is a very complex activity, so it is not surprising that there have been sever
theories, expressing different ideals of scientific reasoning, particularly for those steps of
reasoning by which laws of nature are formulated on the basis of factual evidence, and by which
the effect of new evidence on our confidence in the truth of laws is assessed.'
Hani 1986, p35

S .40 'Science is a collection of well-attested theories which explain the patterns and regularitie
irregularities among carefully studied phenomena.'
Hani 1986, p.62

S .41 ' [Popper] would say that [scientific] research is conducted toward the finding and the testi
highly testable hypotheses, whereas I say that it is very often conducted toward thefindingand
the testing of metaphysically relevant hypotheses. And as a rule... research tends to begin with
hypotheses which have a low degree of testability or are not testable at all.'
Agassi 1975, p219

S .42 'Empirical science manifests its empirical character more systematically than mathematics, an
manifests other characteristics as well, which are lacking in mathematics.
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But what about the claim that theories manifesting empirical character, i.e., refutable theories,
also necessarily manifest the other characteristics of science, i.e., they have infwmative content
explanatory power, simplicity, abstractness, generality, and precision? I simply reject this
claim.'
Agassi 1975, p218
S .43 'The aim of science is to attempt to comprehend the world rationally, as we all agree (including
the positivists w h o should disagree). But this is too vague. W h a t is therationalmethod and
what is comprehension? Rationality, said Popper, is manifest in empirical tests. H e later
generaUsed this: therationalmethod is the critical method. Is metaphysics rationally debatable?
Yes.'
Agassi 1975, p219

S .44 'The history of science, in so far as it is a history of scientific progress, consists not so much in
the progressive accumulation of facts as the progressive clarification of problems. W h a t makes a
natural scientist is not his knowledge of facts about nature but his ability to ask questions about
nature:firstto ask questions at all, instead of waiting to see what turns up; and secondly, to ask
intelligent questions, that is, answerable questions: intrinsically answerable questions, as distinct
from nonsensical questions...'
Collingwood 1945, p.42
S.4S 'The sciences are regional ontologies and ontology is general science. After all, every
substantive scientific problem is a subproblem of the problem of ontology, to wit What is the
world like?'
Bunge 1977, p. xiii
S .46 'Every science studies systems of some kind, whether natural (physical, chemical, biological, or
social) or artificial (technical). Moreover most sciences study nothing but systems. Thus
biology studies biosystems, sociology social systems, and technology technosystems. Physics
seems to be the only science that investigates not only systems, such as atoms and large scale
fields, but also putatively simple or elementary things such as electrons and photons. Even so,
physicists acknowledge that every such basic thing is a component of some system or other.'
Bunge 1979, p.l
S.47 'From the perspective of the standard view [of science, some version of which having been
adopted by most sociologists of knowledge], the natural world is to be regarded as real and
objective. Its characteristics cannot be determined by the preferences or intentions of its
observers. These characteristics can, however, be more or less faithfully represented. Science is
that intellectual enterprise concerned with providing an accurate account of die objects, processes
and relationships occurring in the world of natural phenomena. T o the extent that scientific
knowledge is valid, it reveals and encapsulates in its systematic statements the true character of
this world. A s Galileo puts it "the conclusions of natural science are true and necessary, and the
judgement of m a n [sic] has nothing to do with them". Although the natural world is, in a certain
sense, undergoing, continuous change and m o v e m e n t there exist underlying and unchanging
uniformities. These basic empirical regularities can be expressed as universal and permanent laws
of nature, which tell us what is always and everywhere the case. Unbiased, detached observation
furnishes the evidence on which on which these laws are built The creation of scientific
knowledge "begins with the plain and unembroidered evidence of the senses, with innocent,
unprejudiced observation ... and builds upon it a great mansion of natural law" (Medawar).
Indeed, observational laws are no more than general propositions summarising a body of reliable
factual evidence. The validity of the factual foundation of scientific knowledge can be guaranteed
with a high degree of confidence because science has evolved stringent criteria, for example, in
connection with experimental procedures, by means of which empirical knowledge claims are
evaluated and their accurate representation of empirical phenomena is ensured. Thus accepted
scientific knowledge, because it has satisfied these impersonal, technical criteria of adequacy, is
independent of those subjective factors, such as personal prejudice, emotional involvement and
self-interest which might otherwise distort scientific perception of the external world.'
Mulkay 1979, pp. 19-20
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'In pure or basic science - that somewhat ephemeral category of research undertaken by m e n
whose most immediate goal is to increase understanding rather than control of nature - the
characteristic problems are almost always repetitions, with minor modifications, of problems
that have been undertaken and partially resolved before.'
Kuhn, in Boyd et al., (eds) 1991,p.l43

S .49 'We use the word "science" here in its widest sense, including all the theoretical knowledge, no
matter whether in thefieldof natural sciences or in thefieldof the social sciences and the socalled humanities, and no matter whether it is knowledge found by the application of special
scientific procedures, or knowledge based on c o m m o n sense in everyday life ... What is usually
called science is merely a more systematic continuation of those activities which w e carry out in
everyday life in order to know something.
T h efirstdistinction which w e have to make is that between formal science and empirical
science. Formal science consists of the analytic statements established by logic and
mathematics; empirical science consists of the synthetic statements established in the different
fields of factual knowledge.'
Carnap, in Boyd et al, (eds) 1991, pp. 394-5
S.50 'Truisms from empiricist philosophy of science often turn out to be false, but one such truism
is certainly true: Scientific knowledge is experimental knowledge. It is characteristic of scientific
research that observational evidence plays a crucial role in the resolution of the issue between
contending hypotheses, and whatever sort of objectivity scientific inquiry has depends crucially
on this feature of the scientific method. It m a y be disputed what the limits of experimental
knowledge are, or h o w theory-dependent observations are, or h o w conventional or "constructive"
scientific objectivity is, but it is not a matter of serious dispute that the remarkable and
characteristic capacity scientific methodology has for the resolution of disputed issues and for the
establishment of instrumental knowledge is strongly dependent upon the special role it assigns
to observation.'
Boyd, in Boyd et al, (eds) 1991, p.349
S .51 'The topic of discovery dominates the imagination of scientists in their working lives as well as
that of students of science in their studies; as N . R. Hanson notes, "discovery is what science is
all about". It would appear that the primacy of discovery is derived from the ambitions of the
field from which it arises. Science, that peculiar culture which is the hallmark of Western
civilisation, makes the discovery or uncovering of nature its central focus.'
Brannigan 1981, p.l
S.52 'For Newton ... science was composed of laws stating the mathematical behaviour of nature
solely - laws clearly deducible from phenomena and exactly verifiable in phenomena - everything
further is to be swept out of science, which thus becomes a body of absolutely certain truth
about the doings of the physical world. B y his intimate union of the mathematical and
experimental methods, Newton believed himself to have indissolubly allied the ideal exactitude
of the one with the constant empirical reference of the other. Science is the exact mathematical
formulation of the processes of the natural world.'
Burtt 1932

S.53 'These... are the ethical principles inherent in scientific practice: the conviction that there exists
objective truth; that there exist rules of evidence for discovering it that on the basis of this
objective truth, unanimity is possible and desirable; and that unanimity must be achieved by
independent arrivals at convictions - that is, by examination of evidence, not through coercion,
personal argument or appeal to authority ... Science, like all other systems of thought seeks
answers to questions which m e n hold to be of importance. But whereas, in other outlooks,
answers are accepted that harmonise with particular world-views peculiar to different cultural
complexes, science seeks answers which are reducible to everyone's experience.'
Rapoport 1957, pp. 796ff
S.54 'The word "science" is used in two different ways. On the one hand it refers to a body of
knowledge, and on the other to a set of rules by which this knowledge is to be collected. In
neither sense is the meaning of the word clear cut... but [there is] a fairly widespread consensus
of opinion as to what science really is ...
A dictionary definition of science might be something along the following lines:
"Knowledge of the real world ascertained by observation, critically examined and classified
systematically under general principles." In broad, somewhat idealistic terms, w e can say that
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this knowledge should provide an explanation of what is of value in past discoveries and it
should also m a k e some prediction of future events. Furthermore, it should promote scientific
research (new discovery) by providing concepts which give a sense of understanding of the causes
of events in the world and which help to communicate this understanding to others. Scientific
knowledge should be universal in the sense of independent of space and time; it should be
presented explicitly so as to be intelligible to all qualified practitioners; and it should have
empirical relevance such that all can evaluate the correspondence between its theories and their
practical implications.'
Richards 1987
S.55 '[The economist] Galbraith himself attacks what he sees as the outmoded image of science still
held by many people, an image that m a y havefittedthe nineteenth century w h e n it was "the
product of the individual efforts of m e n of genius", but which is quite inappropriate for modern
science which is "a highly organised n e w profession closely linked with industry and
government" Its success has been achieved by "taking ordinary men, informing them narrowly
and deeply and then, through appropriate organisation, arranging to have their knowledge
combined with that of other specialised but equally ordinary men."'
Richards 1987, p.128
S.56 '...modern science has become inextricably linked with politics, while yet remaining
unanswerable to those whose lives are affected by its actions.'
Richards 1987, p.183
S.57 'Ron Giere suggests that the success of science is due to causal interaction between scientists
and the external world. This is similar to an earlier idea of Bas van Fraassen, w h o writes:
science is a biological phenomenon, an activity by one kind of organism which
facilitates its interaction with the environment... I claim that the success of science is
no miracle ... For any scientific theory is born into life offiercecompetition ... Only
the successful theories survive - the ones which in fact latched onto actual regularities
in nature.
In this passage, van Fraassen is referring to empirical success. Whilst the level of empirical
adequacy is of major importance to the assessment of any theory, it is not the sole consideration.
In cases of rival theories, which are underdetermined by the available data, empirical success does
not assist in making a choice between these theories at all.'
Riggs 1992, p.174
S .58 'There is, of course, more to the success of science than mere empirical success. In order not to
"beg the question" of the success of science and to avoid his account being labelled as normative,
Laudan outlines a set of goals for scientific research which are concerned with particular
cognitive features. The success of science, he argues, can then be gauged on the basis of h o w
well science can be said to have reached these cognitive goals. Laudan writes:
These goal states concern themselves with certain interesting epistemic and pragmatic
attributes. Consider a typical list of some of these aims:
a) to acquire predictive control over those parts of one's experience of the world
which seem especially chaotic and disordered;
b] to acquire manipulative control over portions of one's experience so as to be
able to intervene in the usual order of events so as to modify that order in
particular respects;
c] to increase the precision of the parameters which feature as initial and boundary
conditions in our explanations of natural phenomena;
d] to integrate and simplify the various components of our picture of the world,
reducing where possible to a c o m m o n set of explanatory principles.
If w e define cognitive "success" along these lines, then it seems uncontroversial to say
that portions of the history of science in the last 300 years have been a striking success
story.'
Against such criteria as this, science has indeed been successful. The question is "why"? Laudan
offers a more plausible explanation than Bas van Fraassen's proposal of theory elimination by
"natural selection". Laudan's argument is that the various methods of theory testing and of
theory selection employed by scientists are such that they produce reliable theories over time.
Those theories which w e c o m e to call "scientific" are efficient at advancing our cognitive aims
and, in general, they do so better than theories w e denote as "non-scientific".'
Riggs 1992, pp. 174-5

Appendix A: Figure A.1
S.59

20/8/98

444

'Science is a problem-solving sub-culture whose main value is truth. It is concerned with
developing testable statements about the world which in turn create images of the world which
correspond to what the world is really like. Problem-solving, therefore, is the main
preoccupation of scientists and indeed of the professionals in general whether they be doctor,
engineer, architect or planner.'
Boulding 1975, Editorial

S.60 "The aim of physical science is to establish highly general laws and theories applicable to the
world. The extent to which those laws and theories are indeed applicable to the world is to be
established by pitching them against the world in the most demanding way possible given the
existing practical techniques. Further, it is understood that the generality and degree of
applicability of laws and theories is subject to continual improvement'
Chalmers 1990, p.7
S.61 'The history of scientific thought ... is the history of a vision explored and controlled by
argument It is a vision and an argument initiated by ancient Greek philosophers,
mathematicians and physicians in their search for principles at once of nature and of argument
itself. B y natural science w e mean then a specific vision, created within Western culture, at once
of knowledge and of the object of that knowledge, at once of natural science and of nature. W e
m a y trace the characteristically Western tradition of rational science and philosophy to the
commitment of the Greeks, for whatever reason, to the decision of questions by argument and
evidence, as distinct from custom, edict revelation, authority or whatever else. O f course all
people asrationalbeings m a y decide questions by argument and evidence. It was the Greek style
of rationality to m a k e this explicit by analysis of the reasoning involved, in the manner of
Socrates. The Greeks developed thereby the conceptions of a problem as distinct from a doctrine.
At the same time by deciding that among the m a n y possible worlds as envisaged in other
cultures, the one existing world was a world of exclusively self-consistent and discoverable
rational causality, they committed their scientific successors exclusively to this effective
direction of thinking, and closed to them visions of things still open elsewhere. They introduced
in this w a y the conception of nature, comprising arationalscientific system, in which formal
reasoning matched natural causation, so that natural events and reasoned conclusions must
equally follow exactly from true principles. Hence the two fundamental conceptions from which
the characteristic style of all Western rational thinking has followed: causal demonstration and
formal proof.'
Crombie 1993, p2
S.62 'Philosophy and science were indistinguishable up to the end of the eighteenth century when
Kant convinced the majority of philosophers that science could deal only with the world of
appearance whereas philosophy dealt with the world of something called reality. There was never
a more superficial divorce, for both partners keptreunitingand separating like so many couples
w h o can neither live together nor live apart'
Boas 1965, p37
A.63 '[Philosophy] has amended the procedures of science ... It (philosophy) has taken over from
physics a conception of a permanent and indestructible material world and inferred religious
conclusions from the existence of that world. It has given to science certain rules, such as,
"Nothing is m a d e from nothing"; "Nature always follows the simplest course"; "Nature does
nothing in vain"; and these and similar rules have determined the kind of scientific conclusions
that would be acceptable ... Each of them is based on some metaphysical dogma, some dogma
that is usually unexamined. It is unexamined because it had been part and parcel of collective
thinking and seems self-evident'
Boas 1965, pp. 40-41
S.64 'Although curiosity and the desire to generalise are the mainsprings of the scientific mind, yet
clearly they cannot alone create a scientist originality and intelligence and perseverance are
necessities, and thefindingof pleasure in the use of the hands in delicate manipulations is very
nearly necessary.'
Baker 1943, reprinted in Baker 1975, p.81
S.6S 'The aim of natural science, as Findlay has said, "is to acquire as complete a knowledge as
possible of the material universe; of the objects, materials and phenomena and the relations
between the phenomena which m a k e themselves k n o w n to us or which w e apprehend by means
of our senses". B y following thisfinely-statedaim a structure of knowledge is built up which,
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as A . V. Hill remarks, "is approved by all sane men"; though it would be wise to add that only
the sane m e n w h o have studied it are in a position to give their approval. Approval is actually
an understatement of the feelings of m e n towards that "body of valid ideas" which constitute
science.'
Baker 1943, pM
S .66 'Science, as Alexander has said, is not "a mere repetition of facts; that would be a chronicle and
not science"'.
Baker 1943, p.84
S.67 'J. G. Crowther has defined science as "the system of behaviour by which man [sic] acquires
mastery of the environment". W e should laugh if a m a n set out to define "army" and gave a good
definition of "navy" by mistake; yet this is exactly comparable to what Crowther has done. His
definition is a good one, but not of science: it is a definition of technology ... one of the
contrasted subjects is called science or pure science or fundamental science, and die other is called
technology or applied science (or by those w h o distinguish between the two latter) technology
and applied science... Technology serves man's material needs directly, and his spiritual needs
indirectly (by providing, e.g., the ink and paper used by writers and composers). The [principal]
uses of science ... are two: to serve as an end in itself, like music, and to form a basis for
technology.'
Baker 1943, p.85
S.68 'Basic research in the natural sciences and engineering is aimed at broadening the base of our
knowledge of the natural world and of h o w w e can use it both for the sake of advancing that
knowledge and to provide the background for the solution ofrecognisedcurrent or future practical
problems.'
Australian Science and Technology Council (ASTEC) 1989, p. vii
S.69. 'Pure basic research is carried out without the goal of long term economic or social
benefits, apart from the advancement of knowledge, and no positive efforts are m a d e to apply the
results to practical problems or to transfer the results to sectors responsible for its application.
Strategic basic research is carried out with the expectation that it will produce a broad base
of knowledge likely to form the background to the solution of recognised current or future
practical problems.
There has been a long standing separation of scientific and industrial research in Australia
which has resulted in a persistent tendency to classify research objectives either as advancing
knowledge or as contributing to the immediate solution of an industrial problem.
While there are occasional examples of discovery, development or application occurring in a
linear fashion, a discovery more often contributes to an international matrix of information and
understanding. It can result in a greater or lesser rearrangement of the whole matrix, but more
usually justfillsin a gap. The international knowledge base which is developed in this way can
then be used to solve problems in a particular application.'
Australian Science and Technology Council (ASTEC) 1989, p.l
S.70 'The natural sciences and engineering are defined as the major fields of science (physical,
chemical, biological, earth, engineering and applied, and agriculture) excluding the social
sciences and humanities (which are concerned with the extension of knowledge about m a n [sic],
culture and society).'
Australian Science and Technology Council (ASTEC) 1989, p.l3
S .71 'At the heart of these questions [of funding research] are two opposing points of view. The first
is that scientists k n o w best h o w to do research and should be left alone to do it The second is
that most basicresearchis funded by the taxpayer and this investment should show some return
which will tangibly benefit the country ...
T o generate trust on the part of research managers, the researchers will need to change their
view of the aims of their research, and recognise that unless they have a well developed
international reputation, their chances of sustained funding will be improved if the reasons for
following a particular line of research can be related to reasons outside of their narrow discipline.
These reasons could include the following, which were prepared for the Bromley Report on
Physics (1972) in the United States, based on criteria put forward by Alvin Weinberg:
•
theripenessof the area for exploration;
•
the significance of the questions addressed;
the potential for discovery of fundamental new laws;
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the potential for discovery of generalisations of broad scientific applicability;
the attractiveness of the area to the most able scientists;
the potential stimulation of other sciences;
the potential contribution to engineering, medicine, applied science;
the potential contribution to technology;
the potential for immediate applications;
•
the potential contribution to the goals of society;
•
the contribution to prestige and international cooperation;
•
the contribution to national responsibilities;
•
the contribution to public education.'
Australian Science and Technology Council (ASTEC) 1989, pp. 6-8
•
•
•
•

S .72 'When we say that modern science developed only in Western Europe at the time of Galileo in
the late Renaissance, w e m e a n surely that there and then alone there developed the fundamental
bases of the structure of the natural sciences as w e have them today, namely the application of
mathematical hypotheses to Nature, the full understanding and use of the experimental method,
the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, the geometrication of space, and the
acceptance of the mechanical model ofreality.Hypotheses of primitive or medieval type
distinguish themselves quite clearly from those of the m o d e m type. Their intrinsic and essential
vagueness always m a d e them incapable of proof or disproof, and they were prone to combine in
fanciful systems of gnostic correlation. In so far as numericalfiguresentered into them, numbers
were manipulated in forms of "numerology" or number mysticism constructed a priori, not
employed as the stuff of qualitative measurements compared a posteriori.'
Needhaml969,p.l4
S.73 'In summary, first science is not an independent value-free dissociated activity which can be carried
on apart from the rest of h u m a n life, because second, it is, on the contrary, the expression in a very
precise form of the species-specific human behaviour which centres on making plans. Third, there is
no distinction between scientific strategies and human strategies in guiding our long-term attack on
h o w to live and h o w to look at the world. Science is a world view based on the notion that w e can
plan by understanding. Fourth, science is distinguished from magical views by the fact that it refuses
to acknowledge a division between two kinds of logic. There is only one kind of logic; it works the
same w a y in all forms of conduct and it is not carried out by any kind of formula but by an active
view of h o w you apply the logic of long-term planning strategies to the conduct of the whole of your
life. Finally, and most crucially, science is distinguished from earlier forms of trying to achieve a
unitary view of the world by the fact that there is only one form of truth in it There is no distinction
between m a n [sic] and nature, there is no distinction between the logic of magic and other logics, and
there is no distinction between means and ends.'
Bronowski 1978, pp. 17-18
S .74 'First science cannot be conceived as an isolated or independent activity because, second it must be
thought of as a world picture. This is h o w from n o w on w e shall see the world until someone comes
up with an even more sophisticated view. A n d third, that world picture has the characteristic of being
active; it thinks of knowledge as being directed toward planned action, die h u m a n species-specific
concept on which it rests is that human beings are planners, that they guide their conduct by looking
ahead and making choices, and that science is an expression of that quite general human approach.
For that reason it is an integrated approach. Y o u cannot in science, and this was m y fourth point
m a k e any bifurcation and say this part of life is scientific and specialised and that is not nature
belongs here, m a n [sic] belongs there; or means belong here but ends stand above all that over there.
A n dfinally,m yfifthpoint - above all you cannot make a distinction between power and knowledge,
and that's the central distinction which magic makes. There is no w a y of doing science which is
magical.'
Bronowski 1978, pp. 19-20
S.75 'Belief systems are not simply collections of norms which vary only in whether their substantive
focus isreligion,morals, politics, etiquette, appropriate research procedures, or love-magic. They are
structures of norms which bear some relationship to each other and vary greatly in the degree to
which they are systematic. W h a t is systematic about belief systems is the interrelatedness of the
various substantive beliefs. S o m e systems are moretightlyinterrelated than others.
At one end of the continuum are belief systems that consist of a few tightly linked general
statements from which a fairly large number of specific propositions can be derived. Confronted by a
n e w situation, the believer m a y refer to the general rule to determine the stance he should take.
Science is an example of such a belief system. The principle of the experiment remains the same
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regardless of the differences in empirical problems to which it is applied ... the rules of scientific
method, being systematic, m a y be applied to all kinds of data without regard to their location. Thus,
a high degree of system is in one sense an aid to diffusion of belief...
System also has consequences for social control. T o the degree that a system of beliefs is highly
systematic, social control m a y be affected on the basis of informal sanctions and m a y be easily
taught and learned. Belief systems with a relatively high degree of system seem to rely on rather
general internalised standards to maintain social control - standards such as generalised codes of ethics
(science) ... T o learn part is to learn all.
... In any kind of belief system that has a high degree of system - a scientific theory, for
instance - a change in one proposition requires adjustments in all others.'
Borhek & Curtis 1975, pp. 26-28
S.76 'Science accepts innovation, is systematic, and is intolerant. Much of the material scientists have
produced for mass consumption consists of polemics against competing belief systems such as
astrology, unidentified flying objects, folk medicine, and theological definitions of the nature of m a n
[sic] and the creation of the world (Polanyi, 1958). M u c h of the dispute within the sciences is
between the proponents of one paradigm or another and has the flavour of disputes between religious
systems (Kuhn, 1970). Although science takes on innovations as a matter of principle, it is not
tolerant of its competitors. Within thefraternityw e are not tolerant of our competitors, although w e
seek out innovations within our o w n speciality.'
Borhek & Curtis 1975, pp. 30-31
S .77 'The separability of the abstract belief system from its concrete expression depends on the ability of
persons not affiliated with the association or unspecialised structure that carried it socially to
understand and use it. Almost inevitably, this implies that the more systematic and empirically
relevant a belief system is, the greater the feasibility of preserving it as an abstract ideal apart from a
given concrete expression. In other words, the more a belief system depends on a specific person or
persons for interpretation, the less it can "stand alone". If its validation comes from empirical events
and the ability to systematically relate propositions according to an internally consistent logic, it can
be reconstructed and perpetuated by any social group with only a few hints. Science is such a belief
system. T h e logic of experiment can be applied by anyone w h o knows it regardless of his or her
connection with one of the traditional science-carrying institutions.'
Borhek & Curtis 1975, p.118
S .78 'Science covers the broad field of human knowledge concerned with facts held together by principles
(rules). Scientists discover facts and test these facts and principles by the scientific method, an orderly
system of solving problems. Scientists feel that any subject which m a n [sic] can study by using the
scientific method and other special rules of thinking m a y be called a science.
The sciences include: (1) mathematics and logic; (2) the physical sciences, such as physics and
chemistry; (3) the biological sciences, such as botany and zoology; and (4) the social sciences, such
as sociology and anthropology.'
The World Book Encyclopaedia 1971, Vol. 17, pp. 162-3

S .79 '... science is in a sense a cultural artefact A different society, with a different "cultural hypothes
... would have created a different science.'
Harman, 1988
S.80 '[Science is]
1. the state or fact of knowing; knowledge or cognizance of something specified or implied; also,
knowledge (more or less extensive) as a personal attribute (in Theology and occasionally in
Philosophy);
2a. knowledge acquired by study; acquaintance with or mastery of any department of learning;
2b. trained skill;
3a. a particular branch of knowledge or study; a recognised department of learning: often opposed to
art,
3b. a craft, trade, or occupation requiring trained skill;
4. a branch of study which is concerned either with a connected body of demonstrated truths or with
observed facts systematically classified and more or less colligated by being brought under
general laws, and which includes trustworthy methods for the discovery of n e w truth within its
o w n domain;
5a. the kind of knowledge or intellectual activity of which the "sciences" are examples. In early use,
withreferenceto sense 3: What is taught in the Schools, or m a y be learned by study. In modern

3 0009 03255381 5

Appendix A: Figure A.1

20/8/98

448

use chiefly: T h e sciences (in sense 4) as distinguished from other departments of learning;
scientific doctrine or investigation;
5b. in modern use, often = "Natural and Physical Science";
5c. formerly applied to the portions of ancient and modern philosophy, logic, etc., included in the
study for a degree in the School of Literae Humanifores (Oxford University).'
The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary nn Historical Principles 1973

S.81 'STS [Science and Technology Studies] is really a bunch of related academic subjects - such as
history of science, technology policy, sociology of science, philosophy of science, economics of
technological innovation, etc. They have all c o m e together to apply social science and humanities
techniques to understand science and technology as human, social, political institutions with
complicated histories and relations to the rest of society.'
Schuster 1993, p.l
S .82 '... the commonsensical and 2500 year old story that what makes science work is the proper use of a
thing called scientific method ... [which entails] a set of assumptions that have always underpinned
and guided Western thinking about scientific method...
"Science Discovers" Means:
(1) "Science Establishes Truths About Nature". H o w ? B y the use of the Scientific Method, which is
based on the following assumptions:
1. Nature is an objective system of facts.
2. H u m a n s can objectively observe and report facts.
3. Scientific knowledge is based on facts alone.
4. Theories are generalisations of facts and are proven true or "confirmed" by tests.
5. Science makes progress: Collecting more facts and successfully testing truer and more
powerful theories.
6. Scientific knowledge is objective and proven, and therefore has no social, personal or
political bias. So therefore
(2) "What Science Proves True about Nature is the Sole Basis for Technology and Social
Progress."' [sic]
Schuster 1993, pp. 3-6
S .83 '.. .all the talk about scientific method is one vast cultural myth. Now, myths are important in how a
society or institution works. W e should not use the term myth in a derogatory way. Myths are not
nonsense - they are very, very important Within a given society, even our own, there are myths that
help explain the nature and purpose of important social practices. A n d a myth often takes the form of
being a very emotive and convincing story about h o w that institution or that practice got started, or
h o w it works.
N o w in the West w e pride ourselves on being scientific and "rational" and so maybe w e have
less myths than other societies. That is what w e have been taught in the West since, well, the 18th
century. W e have science, so w e don't need myths. Well, I'm going to suggest that the story of
scientific method m a y be one of the most important constitutive myths of the modern W e s t In fact
it is the myth that there are no myths, because w e have science instead. In other words, the scientific
method m a y be a kind of mythic story that Westerners tell each other in order to explain w h y there is
Western science and what Western science is - so they can believe in Western Science, so they can
feel comfortable with Western Science.
This leads to the points about which I do not wish to be misquoted. Stewart Russell introduced
you to the notion of science and technology as "black boxes" in the engineering sense - social
scientists and arts scholars have backed away from examining the inside workings of science and
technology and have just looked at inputs and outputs. I'm going to suggest that the story of
scientific method has helped to cause this - because it is like a shield or barrier around science hiding
from us the real nature of what goes on inside the black box. Hiding from us that science is a messy,
complex human historical institution, which has been shaped, and is shaped by cultural, economic
and ideological forces. Science is, in Stewart's words, a seething mass of social-political contention.'

rsicl

Schuster 1993, p.l 1
S.84. '.. .discoveries in science - all discoveries in science - have a structure [which is] linkages of cert
changes of existing theory with certain specified material practices - they are not just new ideas, or
are they the uncovering of "things" waiting around in nature by themselves to uncovered, "found",
"discovered" by scientists. Discoveries are the association of slightly changed theory with certain
material procedures. Discoveries have to do with human interaction with nature, and with human
imposing of grids on nature - a discovery occurs when a change a h u m a n ideas, a change of human
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cultural belief is associated with certain actions and things in the world. The thing discovered is just
that it is not finding a thing there in itself before, and it is not just an "idea".
Here is an analogy that will help you understand this notion of what a discovery is: Think of a
car manufacturer coming up with a new model... N o w what is a new model car - do they exist in
nature? do they fall off trees? N o , human institutions produce them. But cars are real, and they are not
just ideas, they are physical objects in and of the world. They are the products of, or they exist in the
relation between our planning and designs and our practices of production and manufacture. I think
discoveries like dephlogisticated air are like technological artefacts - they are like n e w product lines.
For 2000 years w e have thought about discoveries in science in a naive w a y of bumping into preexisting objects, which involves human ideas, human theories, human plans, and human practical
implementation of those ideas. This does a lot to bring the study of science into line with the study
of technology.' [sic]
Schuster 1993, lecture 6, p.6
S.85 '[T]he entire scientific enterprise can be seen as the search for algorithmic compressions of
observational data. The goal of science is, after all, the production of an abbreviated description of the
world based on certain unifying principles w e call laws. "Without the development of algorithmic
compressions of data," writes Barrow, "all science would be replaced by mindless stamp collecting the indiscriminate accumulation of every available fact. Science is predicated upon the belief that the
Universe is algorithmically compressible and the m o d e m search for a Theory of Everything is the
ultimate expression of that belief, a belief that there is an abbreviatedrepresentationof the logic
behind the Universe's properties that can be written d o w n infiniteform by human beings."'
Davies 1992, p.l 36
S.86 'The popularity of "holistic science" in recent years has prompted a string of books, most notably
Fritjof Capra's The Too of Physics, that stress die similarities between ancient Eastern philosophy,
with its emphasis on the holistic interconnectedness of physical things, and modern nonlinear
physics. C a n w e conclude that Oriental philosophy and theology were, after all, superior to their
Western counterparts? Surely not W e n o w appreciate that scientific progress requires both
reductionistic and holistic approaches. It is not a question of one beingrightand the other wrong, as
s o m e people like to assert, but the need for two complementary ways of studying physical
phenomena. W h a t is interesting is that reductionism works at all. W h y is it that the world is
structured in such a w a y that w e can k n o w something without knowing everything? ...
T h e rise of science and the A g e of Reason brought with it the idea of a hidden order in nature,
which w a s mathematical in form and could be uncovered by ingenious investigation. Whereas, in
primitive considerations of cause and effect direct connections are immediately apparent to the sense,
the laws of nature discovered by science are altogether more subde. Anyone can see, for example, that
apples fall, but Newton's inverse-square law of gravitation demands special and systematic
measurement before it is manifested. More important it demands some sort of abstract theoretical
framework, evidently of a mathematical nature, as a context for those measurements. The raw data
gathered by our senses are not directly intelligible as they stand. T o link them, to weave them into a
framework of understanding, requires an intermediary step, a step w e call theory.'
Davies 1992, pp. 78-9
S.87 'Spinoza was a pantheist who regarded objects in the physical universe as attributes (rf God rather
than as God's creation. B y identifying G o d with nature, Spinoza rejected the Christian idea of a
transcendent deity w h o created the universe as afreeact O n the other hand, Spinoza was no atheist
he believed he had logical proof that G o d must exist Because he identified G o d with the physical
universe, this amounted to a proof that our particular universe must also exist For Spinoza, G o d had
no choice in the matter: "Things could not have been brought into being by G o d in any manner or in
any order different from that which has in fact obtained," he wrote.
This type of thinking - that things are as they are as aresultof some sort of logical necessity or
inevitability - is quite c o m m o n today among scientists. Mostly, though, they prefer to drop G o d out
of it altogether. If they areright,it implies that the world forms a closed and complete system of
explanation, in which everything is accounted for and no mystery remains. It also means that in
principle w e need not actually observe the world to be able to work out its form and content because
everything follows from logical necessity, the nature of the universe would be deducible from reason
alone ... If such a closed explanatory system were even possible, it would profoundly alter our
thinking about the universe and our place in it But do these claims of completeness and uniqueness
have any foundation, or are they just a vague hope?
Underlying all these questions is a crucial assumption: that the world is both rational and
intelligible. This is often expressed as the "principle of sufficient reason," which states that
everything in the world is as it is for some reason. W h y is the sky Blue? W h y do apples fall? W h y
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are there nine planets in the solar system? W e are not usually satisfied with thereply:"Because that's
just the w a y it is." W e believe that there must be some reason w h y it is like that If there are facts
about the world that must simply be accepted without reason (so-called brute facts), then rationality
breaks d o w n and the world is absurd.
Most people accept the principle of sufficient reason without question. The entire scientific
enterprise, for example, is built upon the assumedrationalityof nature. Most theologians also adhere
to the principle, because they believe in a rational God. But can w e be absolutely sure that the
principle is infallible? ... O f course, if the principle is false, then further inquiry into ultimate issues
becomes pointless.'
Davies 1992, pp. 161-2
S.88 '...the question of the reliability of scientific knowledge has become a serious intellectual issue.
Once w e have cast off the naive doctrine that all science is necessarily true and that all true knowledge
is necessarily scientific, w e realise that epistemology - the theory of "the grounds of knowledge" is
not just an academic philosophical discipline. Very practically, in matters of life and death, our
grounds for decision and action m a y eventually depend on understanding what science can tell us, and
h o w far it is to be believed.
But what is science? H o w is it to be distinguished from other bodies of organised, rational
discourse, such asreligion,politics, law, or "the humanities"? In an earlier work, I have tried to
show that scientific knowledge is the product of a collective h u m a n enterprise to which scientists
m a k e individual contributions which are purified and extended by mutual criticism and intellectual
cooperation. According to this theory the goal of science is a consensus of rational opinion over the
widest possible field.
From this point of view, m u c h can be understood about the ways that scientists are educated,
chooseresearchtopics, communicate with one another, criticise andrefinetheirfindings,andrelateto
one another as members of a specialised social group. The "consensus principle" thus leads direcdy
into what is n o w called the internal sociology of the scientific community. From there w e naturally
proceed to investigate the place of science in society at large, trying to throw light on such important
practical questions as the economics of research and development the organisation of scientific
institutions, priorities and planning of research, and the agonising ethical dilemmas facing the
socially responsible scientist'
Ziman 1978, pp. 2-3
S .89 'Let us enquire ... whether science as we know it is as universal and as unique as we often claim. Is
there evidence about humankind, about society, or about science itself, that might suggest the
contrary? Could our doubts be confirmed by the discovery that science is different in different epochs,
in different cultural settings?
Unfortunately, modern science is monolithic and monopolistic. "Western" science as w e know it
has unique roots in seventeenth-century Europe and has effectively eliminated all competitors. Apart
from its o w n self-critical activity, it has not been seriously challenged on its o w n grounds by an
independent body of knowledge developed in a quite separate human society.'
Ziman 1978, pp. 109-110
S.90 '... modem science is unique as a social institution. In no other civilisation was there a comparable
system of mutually communicating, criticising and socially-interacting observers, dedicated to the
principles of consensibility and consensuality.'
Ziman 1978, p.l 10
S.91 'Ideally, scientific knowledge is stored and communicated in a variety of more or less artificial and
formalised languages, or as reproducible material maps. But the doorway between the public noetic
domain and the private mental domain of each individual is open in thefirstinstance only to
messages expressed in the natural language of his particular social group.'
Ziman 1978, p.Ul
S.92 'Strict application of the principles of sociology of knowledge seems to lead to the inescapable
conclusion that science is no more than one of m a n y competing world pictures in the noetic domain,
and is not privileged by comparison with any other systematic scheme to which a social group can
subscribe, such as the famous magical beliefs of the Azande. But total cultural relativism, like
complete philosophical scepticism, is a sterile doctrine that inhibits further interesting and valuable
investigations.
T o escape from it let us avoid the vulgar error that the essence of science lies in its most
sophisticated results, its astonishing revelations of the nature of things, and the attendant
metaphysical interpretations which contrast so dramatically with alternative, "non-scientific" world
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pictures. It is sheer intellectual snobbery to fasten solely on those high-flown features of modern
scientific knowledge, ignoring the mundane foundations on which they rest Our model of science
emphasises the whole corpus of consensual knowledge, which is not necessarily true in every detail,
which m a y yet contain gross conceptual errors and fallacies, but which is not to be judged simply by
inspection of its most extreme and schematised theoretical consequences.'
Ziman 1978, pp. 119-120
S .93 'The whole strategy of science is directed towards the creation of a maximum consensus in the public
domain. Such a consensus must be based on, and held together by, a pre-existing mental harmony
between independent human beings on at least some matters of c o m m o n interest'
Ziman 1978, p.124
S.94 '[The philosophy of science is] a discipline in which the elements involved in scientific inquiry observational procedures, patterns of argument, methods of representation and calculation, and
metaphysical presuppositions - are analysed and discussed; and the grounds of their validity are
evaluated from the points of view of formal logic, practical methodology, and metaphysics. The
subject has been approached both with ontal preoccupations, with a concern for what kinds of entities
can properlyfigurein scientific theories; and with epistemic interests, with a concern for the concepts
and methods employed in studying natural and human phenomena.'
The New Encyclopaedia Britannica 1982, Micropaedia Vol. VIII p.984
S.95 'Quite apart from anything else ... there is one very important aspect of science ... - the scientific
method.
Science advances in a definite pattern. First and foremost scientists must make observations.
These observations must be careful and accurate; and as the results of more and more observations
accumulate in any onefieldthey often seem to form a maze of complicated facts which are difficult to
understand.
It is then, however, that the second important part of the scientific method is used. Scientists
look at the results of all their observations and try to develop a theory or a model of h o w whatever it
is they are investigating might work. A theory or model which is successful at the time is one which
fits all the observed results and makes them seem quite natural. This model or theory can then be
used to predict the results of n e w observations; if these turn out to be correct the model is further
substantiated. If, on the other hand, new observations give results contrary to the model, then it must
be either discarded in favour of a new model or discarded.
It is in this way that science advances.'
Messel (ed.) 1964, pp. 1-13,14
S .96 'There is no ... step by step scientific method which inexorably leads us to the truth, there never has
been and there never will be!'
Messel (ed.) 1987, p25
S.97 'Science can be thought of as systematic and formulated knowledge of natural phenomena which is
based on particular methods of inquiry and thinking. The methods of inquiry are, at their best firmly
grounded in attitudes such as open-mindedness and impartiality, such asrespectfor data tempered with
tentativeness about accepting results as final. Scientific methods of inquiry require a disciplined
approach but not necessarily a lock-step one: often it is necessary to stand back from an investigation
and take an overall view. This type of critical appraisal is a fundamental part of a scientific approach.
Scientific ways of thinking are used to explain natural phenomena by the development of theoretical
models and explanations. Science is a mixture of theoretical and practical methods centred around
these particular ways of thinking.'
A.C.T. Schools Authority 1984, p.2
S.98 'In common usage, the word "science" is applied to a wide variety of disciplines or intellectual
activities which have certain features in common. Usually a science is characterised by the possibility
of making precise statements which are susceptible to some form of empirical verification.'
Education Commission ofN.S.W. c.1987, p.2
S.99 'Despite the antiquity of the terms 'science' and 'philosophy', they acquired their present meanings
only during the nineteenth century. With the benefit of hindsight w e can find m u c h activity which
w e would call 'scientific' or 'philosophical' in earlier periods; but the respective practitioners did not
see themselves as divided into distinct camps, or at least in a w a y w e would recognise today.
Generally, m u c h of what w e n o w call philosophy was tacitly accepted as a proper part of science (or
'philosophy' as it was then called), but contrasted with the useless 'school metaphysics' of the
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universities. It was only when philosophy more or less as w e n o w k n o w it became a university
specialism in the nineteenth century that it became possible for scientists to leave the more
philosophical aspects of science to specialist philosophers.'
Ross 1990, p.814
S. 100 'LA. Richards attempted a less metaphysica answer to the same linguistic problem of what styles of
belief are demanded by literary and scientifi : texts from the reader. H e contrasts, without preference,
the 'statements' of science and the 'psei do-statements' of literature. Despite the derogatory
connotations of 'pseudo', Richards is attem >ting a dry and clear distinction which will preserve the
fullness of poetry. Statement (which w e mjght n o w call propositional discourse) demands belief;
pseudo-statement does not...'
Beer 1990, pp. 788-9
S.101 'Carnap's philosophical, which is to say Ijgical, analysis is practised on Einstein's theory as a
product, an achievement that is given, with j ts structure and content complete, and needing, from the
philosopher, only explication. Likewise, w th those items, such as laws and theories, that are the
characteristic structures of science in general Carnap takes these to be given. Indeed they are given in
that they are definitively characteristic of all natural science, in that any process or programme of
empirical, explanatory inquiry would only count as science if it were producing structures that
comprise confirmable empirical laws and testable theoretical laws and therefore structures that
constitute physical theories. Philosophical questions about processes and programmes resolve
themselves, consequendy, into logical questions about those structures.'
Hodge & Cantor 1990, p.843
S.102 'In highlighting the major shifts in the sociology of science I have suggested that it has been able to
explore more successfully and interestingly the n e w directions in which science and technology are
moving today. These 'new directions' are not simply of a cognitive or conceptual nature - n e w fields
of research for example, such as biotechnology - but also of an institutional character in fact both
feed back on each other, cognitive developments shaping and being shaped by institutional
developments...
I argued that there are four main developments in science and technology today ... First,
scientific labour inside the laboratory is typically being undertaken by interdisciplinary research teams
or trans-laboratory networks whose research is less easily divided into the basic-applied dichotomy of
the past... Secondly, and as a direct result of the previous point I have given considerable emphasis
to the w a y in which science and technology have become less easy to distinguish in practice than in
the past... Thirdly, the commercial exploitation of scientific knowledge has become necessary for
the survival of firms in certain industrial sectors of the economy, those that are likely to provide the
new manufacturing processes and products of the twenty-first century, such as bioscience,
information technology and new material sciences ... Finally, science and technology have become
subject to a growing promotion, monitoring andregulationby national and international agencies.
Webster 1991, pp. 152-3
S. 103 'Science is an ever-unfinished quest to discover facts and establish relationships between them. But
let us go beyond this. While not trying to propose a one-sentence definition of the whole complex
concept "science", w e m a y perhaps agree at the outset that the main business of science istotrace in
the chaos and flux of phenomena a consistent structure with order and meaning, that is,tointerpret
and to transcend direct experience. "The object of all sciences," in Einstein's words, "is to coordinate
our experiences and to bring them into a logical system." A n d Niels Bohr agrees when he says "The
task of science is both to extend the range of our experience and to reduce it to order."
Probably you will think these statements too all-inclusive; the same aim might well be claimed
by art or by philosophy. Thus T. S. Eliot has said, "It is the function of all art to give us some
perception of an order in life by imposing an order upon it" and A . N . Whitehead defined speculative
philosophy as "the endeavour to frame a coherent logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms
of which every element of our experience can be interpreted." Indeed, in science, as in art and
philosophy, our most persistent intellectual efforts are directed toward the discovery of pattern, order,
system, structure, whether it be as primitive as the discernment ofrecurringseasons or as sweeping
as a cosmological synthesis. In this sense, science is but one facet of the great intellectual adventure,
the attempt to understand the world of experience in each of its aspects...
O f course, the fundamental and distinct differences separating the sciences from the nonsciences
must not be denied. There are obvious points which set one apart from the other, for example, the
motivations of the investigators...
M u c h more clear-cut than the first is a second point of difference between science and
nonscience; it lies in the kind of concepts and rules the scientist uses, and the type of argument
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which will cause him to say, "Yes, I understand and I agree." This will occupy our attention to some
degree, as will a third point of difference: the observation that in the course of time, despite great
innovation andrevolutions,there accumulates in science a set of internationally acceptable, basic, and
fairly enduring conceptual schemes, whereas this can hardly be said for m a n y other h u m a n
endeavours...
All too often the suggestion is m a d e that the successes of science are the results of applying
"the scientific method." But if by "scientific method" w e mean the sequence and rule by which
scientists n o w and in the past have actually done their work, then two things become obvious. First
as for every task, there are here not one but many methods and uncountable variants and, second, even
these different methods are usually read into the story after the work has been completed, and so
reflect the actual working procedures only in aratherartificial and debatable way."
Holton & Roller 1958, pp. 214-216
S.l04 '...it is essential to understand science as an historically evolving body of knowledge and that a
theory can only be adequately appraised if due attention is paid to its historical context Theory
appraisal is intimately linked with the circumstances under which a theory first makes its
appearance.'
Chalmers 1982, p 35
S.l05 'In the preceding discussion I argued that, as a result of the evolution of scientific thought there has
emerged a broad and coherent picture of the universe and of life in it a view which, while incomplete
and in some aspects open to serious question, is at present the best picture available. In the present
section I will argue that this process of unification has not been restricted to the integration of beliefs
about the world, but that there has also been a progressive tendency toward unification of those
beliefs with the methods employed to attain well-grounded beliefs. That is, I will argue, the methods
w e consider appropriate for arriving at well-grounded beliefs about the world have c o m e more and
more to be shaped by those very beliefs, and have evolved with the evolution of knowledge.
Such a view of the intimate relation between knowledge and the methods of gaining knowledge
flies in the face of the traditional sharp bifurcation of the two. For it is, and has long been,
c o m m o n l y assumed that there exists a unique method, the "scientific" or "empirical" or
"experimental" method, allegedly discovered or at leastfirstsystematically applied in the seventeenth
century, which can be formulated wholly independentiy of, and is wholly unaffected by, the
knowledge which is arrived at by its means. It is as though scientific method is a set of abstract and
immutable rules, like the rules of chess, independent of the strategies of the g a m e but governing
what strategies are possible.
Yet the most strenuous efforts of scientists and philosophers have failed to produce agreement as
to precisely what that method is. Indeed, general philosophical theories about science according to
which there is an eternal scientific method which, once discovered, needs only to be applied to
generate knowledge, but which itself will not alter in the light of that knowledge, have proved either
empty or false.'
Shaperel984,p.l78
S. 106 'Such a major break as I am about to outline changes not only the sciences themselves but the whole
disposition of knowledge, discourse and practice in which the sciences inhere. The kind of knowledge
produced in any given scientific era is the outcome not only of the specific interaction of the sciences
but also of the relation of science to technology, philosophy, art and other intellectual and practical
concerns. Thus, for example, the relation between science and technology was very different during
the nineteenth century compared to n o w and was different again during the seventeenth century
compared with mediaeval times. So, too, therelationsbetween the sciences alter with each change in
the overall character of the formation of knowledge. In every new period new constellations of the
sciences arise, only to be dispersed when knowledge changes again.'
Rednerl987,p.62
S.107 'The official conception of the present disposition of the sciences is largely anachronistic, though
still influential, for the university system is even n o w formally administered according to it.
Historically it derives from the latter phase of the Classical scientific era of the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries...
For s o m e time, however, the departmental system has ceased to have any real cognitive relevance to
the actual research activities going on within university confines or outside in the research
institutions. For in the contemporary era of science this n o w Classic scientific disposition has lost
its meaning.'
Redner 1987, pp. 62-3
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'Each of the elements of the contemporary disposition of the sciences has been a long time in the
making. Only the constellations are relatively new, that is, the conjunction of all these elements as a
dominant system of sciences. W e can trace each of the main characteristics of contemporary World
science back into the nineteenth century; forms of technification, formalisation, abstraction, problemsolving andfinalisationhave always been there to some degree.'
Rednerl987,p.63

S.109 'For science, I will argue, is a social activity whose aim is the production of the knowledge of the
kinds and ways of acting of independently existing and active things.'
Bhaskarl975,p.24

S. 110 'Science is no longer a marginal pursuit of little practical use carried on by a handful of enthusiasts;
and it no longer needs to justify itself by a direct answer to the challenge of otherfieldsof knowledge
claiming exclusive access to the truth. A s the world of science has grown in size and in power, its
deepest problems have changed from the epistemological to the social. Although the character of the
knowledge embodied in a particular scientific result is largely independent of the social context of its
first achievement the increase and improvement of scientific knowledge is a very specialised and
delicate social process, whose continued health and vitality under n e w conditions is by no means to
be taken for granted. Moreover, science has grown to its present size and importance through its
application to the solution of other sorts of problems, and these extensions react back on science and
become part of it For an understanding of this extended and enriched "science", w e must consider
those sorts of disciplined inquiry whose goals include power as well as knowledge.'
Ravetz 1971, p JO
S. 111 'There are, therefore, grounds for believing that science grows as it does, so much faster than mere
people, because old knowledge breeds new. Furthermore, the key process seems to be that in which
very recent knowledge breeds n e w so much faster than it does when it later becomes packed d o w n into
the archive. Science grows very regularly, in a very structured way, and from its epidermis rather than
from its body. In terms of our present problem this model m a y be taken as giving a mechanism for
the 'transfer' from old science to new science...
Perhaps one should emphasise that this is the normal growth pattern of scientific research
and most published work occurs thus. W h a t does not usually happen is the ab initio growth of new
knowledge coming from almost nowhere. Only in that convenient mythology of science that
historians spend their lives trying to dispel, does it appear that the mountain-peak contributions of
Newton, Copernicus, and Galileo arose from the native genius of isolated minds. Innovation in the
sort of knowledge that is published in scientific papers arises w h e n n e w facts, n e w experiments, new
theories are added to the immediately preceding old ones in a very structured way. Transfer, from
outside the knowledge of m e n is a rare thing, though it m a y be very important w h e n it happens. I
hazard a guess, however, that even when some outside force, like the invention of the cyclotron,
makes knowledge growth burst out in new ways, it does so only in retrospect as w e attribute a
magnified power to the single great event and forget the less dramatic build-up of the host of related
researches clustered around the clear main line.'
de Solla Price 1972, pp. 168-9
S. 112 'We have been talking about science in a way such that there is an implicit definition for it Science,
tofitthis model, must consist of the scientific papers that are being cited, counted, and otherwise
manipulated in such studies. I therefore propose, as a formal definition, to take science as that which
is published in scientific papers. W e m a y define these in turn, either crudely as articles in journals in
the World List of Scientific Periodicals, or more artfully by making use of the knitted research-front
structure. W e m a y suppose quite reasonably (and the evidence bears it out) that the structure is what
makes science different from the nonscientific scholarship that is published in other periodicals that
are probably not in the World List'
de Solla Price 1972, p.170

S. 113 'Scientific theories are ways of looking at the world; and their adoption affects our general beliefs an
expectations, and thereby also our experiences and our conceptions ofreality.W e m a y even say that
what is regarded as 'nature' at a particular time is our own product in the sense that all the features
ascribed to it havefirstbeen invented by us and then used for bringing order into our surroundings.'
Feyerabend 1962, as quoted by Suppe 1979,p.l78
S.l 14 'Four sets of institutional imperatives - universalism, communism, disinterestedness, organised
scepticism- comprise the ethos of m o d e m science.
Universalism
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Universalism finds immediate expression in the canon that truth claims, whatever their source,
are to be subjected to preestablished impersonal criteria: consonant with observation and with
previously confirmed knowledge. T h e acceptance orrejectionof claims entering the lists of science is
not to depend o n the personal or social attributes of their protagonist his [sic] race, nationality,
religion, class and personal qualities are as such irrelevant Objectivity precludes particularism. The
circumstance that scientifically verified formulations refer to objective sequences and correlation
militates against all efforts to impose particularistic criteria of validity...

Communism
'Communism', in the non-technical and extended sense of c o m m o n ownership of goods, is a
second integral element of the scientific ethos. T h e substantive findings of science are a product of
social collaboration and are assigned to the community. They constitute a c o m m o n heritage in which
the equity of the individual producer is severely limited ... Given such institutional emphasis upon
recognition and esteem as the sole property right of the scientist in his discoveries, the concern with
scientific priority becomes a 'normal' response ... The institutional conception of science as part of
the public domain is linked with the imperative for communication of findings. Secrecy is the
antithesis of this norm; full and open communication its enactment...
Disinterestedness
Science, as is the case with the professions in general, includes disinterestedness as a basic
institutional element Disinterestedness is not to be equated with altruism nor interested action with
egoism. Such equivalences confuse institutional and motivational levels of analysis. A passion for
knowledge, idle curiosity, altruistic concern with the benefit to humanity and a host of other special
motives have been attributed to the scientist T h e quest for distinctive motives appears to have been
misdirected. It is rather a distinctive pattern of institutional control of a wide range of motives which
characterises the behaviour of scientists. For once the institution enjoins disinterested activity, it is to
the interest of scientists to conform on pain of sanctions and, in so far as the norm has been
internalised, on pain of psychological conflict... Involving as it does the verifiability of results,
scientific research is under the exacting scrutiny of fellow-experts... The demand for disinterestedness
has a firm basis in the public and testable character of science and this circumstance, it m a y be
supposed, has contributed to the integrity of m e n of science ... In this connection, thefieldof science
differs somewhat from that of other professions. The scientist does not stand vis-a-vis a lay clientele
in the same fashion as d o the physician and lawyer, for example. T h e possibility of exploiting the
credulity, ignorance and dependence of the layman [sic] is thus considerably reduced. Fraud, chicane
and irresponsible claims (quackery) are even less likely than a m o n g the 'service' professions ...
Organised scepticism
... [Organised scepticism is variously interrelated with the other elements of the scientific
ethos. It is both methodologic and an institutional mandate. T h e suspension of judgement until 'the
facts are at hand' and the detached scrutiny of beliefs in terms of empirical and logical criteria have
periodically involved science in conflict with other institutions. Science which asks questions of fact
including potentialities, concerning every aspect of nature and society m a y c o m e into conflict with
other attitudes towards these s a m e data which have been crystallised and oftenritualisedby other
institutions ... This appears to be the source ofrevoltsagainst the so-called intrusion of science into
other spheres. Such resistance on the part of organised religion has become less significant as
compared with that of economic and political groups. The opposition m a y exist quite apart from the
introduction of specific scientific discoveries which appear to invalidate particular dogmas of church,
e c o n o m y or state. It is rather a diffuse, frequently vague, apprehension that scepticism threatens the
current distribution of power.'
Merton, 1942, republished in Merton 1967, pp. 551-61
S.l 15 'Every science (in so far as we take this word to refer to the content and not to the human
arrangements for arriving at it) is a system of cognitions, that is, of true experiential statements. A n d
the totality of sciences, including the statements of daily life, is the system of cognitions. There is,
in addition to it n o domain of "philosophical" truths. Philosophy is not a system of statements; it is
not a science.'
Schlick, in Ayer (ed.) 1959, p36
S.l 16 'Science provides the best example of a rational endeavour, and it has long been held that the
scientific practice conforms to the classical model ofrationality.Recent work in the history and
philosophy of science cast considerable doubt of this second claim, and this, in turn, has led to
surprising n e w questions about therationalityof science, while adding fuel to doubts about the
viability of any notion of rationality ... I will argue that crucial scientific decisions are not rational
w h e n viewed in terms of the classical model, but that this should be read as a m a r k against the
classical model of rationality, rather than as an argument against the rationality of science. T h e
rationality of science will provide an important constraint on our attempts to construct a n e w model
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ofrationality.This does not mean that therationalityof science is an a priori truth, but only that, at
the present stage in the development of knowledge w e have no clearer example ofrationalendeavour.
Thus w e might as well pay close attention to scientific practice in attempting to develop a model of
rationality.'
Brown 1977, p. vii
S. 117 'On the one hand, a palpable sign of progress in the natural sciences is that over time, the relevant
units of criticism, such as particular claims and arguments, become smaller and more focussed. This
is the phenomenon that K u h n dubbed "normal science," which presupposes that a community of
inquirers share enough assumptions that they can devote their energies to solving well-defined
puzzles. O n the other hand, analytic philosophers have generally followed Camap's (1956) lead in
holding that criticism can be rationally applied to issues raised within a conceptual framework,
relative to its o w n standards, but not to issues raised about a framework, relative to some
"transcendent" or "metaphysical" standards. N o w combine these two points with an awareness that
major network questions remain unresolved in philosophy, and the result is the pattern that criticism
takes in contemporary analytic philosophy. It is a pattern quite unlike what one finds in the natural
and social sciences. Analytic philosophers diligently solve puzzles even if they remain unconvinced
that these puzzles are situated within the epistemically soundest framework available. Indeed, both
Carnap and Popper are, strictly speaking, irrationalists when it comes to evaluating alternative
conceptual frameworks prior to one's being adopted.'
Fuller 1993, pp. 201-2
S.l 18 'Eisenhower implicitly focuses on the three basic aspects of all scientific work: the organisational,
instrumental and cognitive - in short, people, machines and ideas. These can be ranked in this order of
importance because the changes that brought about the contemporary epoch of science can be graded
with this weighting scale. The most crucial changes took place in the organisation of science, that is,
in the socio-political system and institutional arrangements under which science is produced. Next in
importance were the changes in instrumentation, in the new technological machinery and the new
techniques of research m a d e available in all the sciences. O f least importance were the cognitive
changes, the n e w theories, ideas and hypotheses, which, although altered, were largely developments
of previous ones. This kind of weighting is more or less in historical conformity with the other
major changes in contemporary, so-called advanced society where the ideological or cultural
dimension is least altered and least developed whereas the technological and organisational dimensions
are most pronounced.'
Rednerl987,p.l7

S. 119 'Scientific knowledge is ... social knowledge. It is produced by processes that are intrinsically social
and once a theory, hypothesis, or set of data has been accepted by a community, it becomes a public
resource. It is available to use in support of other theories and hypotheses and as a basis of action.
Scientific knowledge is social both in the ways it is created and in die uses it serves.'
Longino 1990, pp. 75-6
S. 120 'As a professional scientist I am fully committed to the scientific method of investigating the world.
I believe that science is an immensely powerful procedure for helping us to understand the complex
universe in which w e live. History has shown that its successes are legion, and scarcely a week
passes without some new progress being made. The attraction of the scientific method goes beyond
its enormous power and scope, however. There is also its uncompromising honesty. Every new
discovery, every theory is required to pass rigorous tests of approval by the scientific community
before it is accepted. O f course, in practice, scientists do not always follow the textbook strategies.
Sometimes the data are muddled and ambiguous. Sometimes influential scientists sustain dubious
theories long after they have been discredited. Occasionally scientists cheat But these are aberrations.
Generally, science leads us in the direction ofreliableknowledge.
Davies 1992, p.14

S. 121 'In common usage the word science is applied to a wide variety of disciplines or intellectual activitie
which certain features in c o m m o n ... Usage is not however, always unanimous as to whether some
disciplines should always be called sciences or not and there is often lively controversy as to the
propriety of speaking of the social or historical sciences.
Usually a science is characterised by the possibility of making precise statements which are
susceptible to some sort of check or proof. This often implies that the situations with which the
special science is concerned can be m a d e to recur in order to submit themselves to check, although
this is by no means always the case. The observational sciences such as astronomy or geology in
which repetition of a situation at will is intrinsically impossible, and the possible precision is
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limited to precision of description. There is also usually the implication that the subject matter of the
individual science is something in the world of phenomena. Thus it is not usual to speak of the
'science' of mathematics or the 'science' of logic, even though both these disciplines are capable of
the highest precision.
A c o m m o n method of classifying sciences is to refer to them as either exact sciences or
descriptive sciences. Examples of the former are physics and, to a lesser degree, chemistry; and of the
latter, taxonomical botany or zoology. The exact sciences are in general characterised by the
possibility of exact measurement. Measurement is fundamentally description given by the use of
numbers. Given the system of measurement and the measuring numbers for any special situation,
that situation has been adequately described if it is possible to reconstruct a situation such that
measurement on it gives the same numbers. Because mathematics operates to large extent with
numbers, systems subject to exact measurement are also susceptible of mathematical analysis: this
susceptibility is one of the most important characteristics of the exact sciences. O n e of the most
important tasks of a descriptive science is to develop a method of description or classification that
will permit precision of reference to the subject matter.'
McGraw-Hill Encyclopedia of Science and Technology 1960, Vol 12, p.72
S.122 'What is "Science"? Our whole approach ... depends on how we might be tempted to answer this
question. But it is really m u c h too grand a question to be answered in a few words. Conventional
definitions of science tend to emphasise quite different features, depending upon the point of view.
Each of the metascientific disciplines - the history of science, the philosophy of science, the
sociology of science, the psychology of creativity, the economics of research, and so on - seems to
concentrate upon a different aspect of the subject often with quite different policy implications.
For example, if science is defined as 'a means of solving problems', this emphasises its
instrumental aspect Science is thus viewed as closely connected with technology, and hence an
appropriate subject for economic and political study. The implication that this instrument should be
used wisely and well puts it into the open arena of social conflict.
Another definition of science - as 'organised knowledge' emphasises its archival aspect.
Information about natural phenomena is acquired by research, organised into coherent theoretical
schemes, and published in books and journals. Although this knowledge is often profoundly
influential through its technological applications, there is m u c h to be said for treating it as a
politically neutral, public resource. T h e accumulation of scientific knowledge is thus a significant
historical process, worthy of special study.
O r w e m a y follow an old philosophical tradition by emphasising the methodological aspect of
science. Procedures such as experimentation, observation and theorising are considered elements of a
special method for obtaining reliable information about the natural world. From this point of view,
science m a y be regarded as essentially objective, and hence transcending all political considerations.
Finally, one might emphasise the vocational aspect of science by tacitly defining it as 'whatever
is discovered by people with a special gift for research'. This draws attention to such important
personal aptitudes as curiosity and intelligence, which are well worth psychological investigation.
Such studies might suggest that scientists should be recognised as members of a distinct profession,
of considerable political significance.
There is so m u c h that can be said about science from each of these and from other aspects that
there is a tendency within each metascientific discipline to treat its o w n special definition as selfsufficient. Thus, philosophers of science largely ignore its instrumental and vocational features,
whilst m a n y serious studies of the political role of science seem quite oblivious to its complex
methodological and vocational aspects. It is instructive to read books about science in this light It
almost seems as if each discipline has in mind a different 'model' of science, constructed around just
those particular features in which it happens to be interested.
In truth, science is all these things, and more. It is indeed the product of research; it does employ
characteristic methods; it is a body of organised knowledge; it is a means of solving problems. It is
also a social institution; it needs material facilities; it is an educational theme; it is a cultural
resource; it requires to be managed; it is a major factor in human affairs. Our "model" of science must
relate and reconcile these diverse and sometimes contradictory aspects.'
Ziman 1984, pp. 1-2
S 123 'But is the following not an intuitively plausible view of the development of science: that science is
precisely the discipline, par excellence, of determiningrelationsof relevance and irrelevance? The
development of science consists, in large part, of beginning with suppositions about what is and is
not relevant to a certain claim, and of graduallyrefiningthe claim and our understanding of what is
relevant to it and what is not of shedding certain beliefs as irrelevant of introducing n e w ones which
w e find to be more so; ofrefiningour modes of conceiving and describing the world around us so as
to bring out more clearly and firmly the ways in which things arerelatedto one another, oi finding
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out what is a relevant consideration for the acceptance or rejection of specific beliefs, and even of
finding out that w e must stick to the relevant
According to this picture of science, w e do not have in advance unalterable criteria of relevance,
of what is to count as a reason. W e arrive at n e w ideas, which enable us to do n e w things; and w e
elevate the considerations which led us to those ideas to the status of reasons, and the more general
character of that reasoning to the status of criteria of reasoning, to be tested further in terms of their
success. A s for success, the situation is similar: far from having or needing transcendent and
unalterable criteria of what is to count as successful, w e find that w e can do things with certain
approaches (things w e m a y not even have thought of beforehand), and then elevate certain general
aspects of those n e w approaches to the status of criteria of success and ways of looking for further
successes. W e found, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, that w e could understand material
substances in terms of what they are made of rather than in terms of their perfectibility; and looking
for constituents then became a standard method and criterion of success in understanding material
substances.
The process of developing such standards or criteria is far more complex than past and prevailing
philosophies of science have assumed. It must consist partly in arevisionof our descriptive language
to bring out better what w e have learned; it must consist further of revisions in our ways of learning
about nature; and it must consist of much else as well. But to put it as simply as possible, it must
consist not only of our coming to know about the world (the traditional focus of the theory of
knowledge); it must also consist of learning h o w to learn, to think, and to talk about nature; it m u s t
in short, consist of gradually coming to understand h o w to understand - of gradually reasoning our
what it is to reason - of learning what it is to learn. W e may, of course, always turn out to have been
wrong or misguided or confused in the beliefs w e have arrived at or the standards of rationality w e
have forged, or the understanding w e have developed of what it is to understand: to abandon the
Principle of [Inviolable Beliefs] is to abandon the offer of guarantees; the best w e can have in the w a y
of what w e take to be knowledge and reasons are, simply, the best w e have arrived at in our searches;
and even what w e take to be 'best' is a hypothesis which m a y be debatable and m a y berejectedlater
in the light of what w e then come to accept as reasons for doubt The possibility of doubt and error is
always open; but w e do have, or at least develop, better and worse hypotheses about what are better
and worse hypotheses, methods, descriptions, and so on.
Shapere 1984, pp. 416-7
S. 124 '[Sjcience is not a homogeneous set of activities. There is science for understanding and science for
manipulation and while they merge into one another, and the former frequently n o w provides the
basis for the latter, their styles and motivation are different Science for understanding is an
expression of h u m a n curiosity, the need to devise an intellectually graspable model of the natural
world which enables us to find our way around in it to think about it coherendy and to realise h o w
the things w e observe 'hang together'. Emotionally the development of such intellectual models
derives from the sense of wonder in the face of nature and has m u c h in c o m m o n with the creative
work of artists. The tests by which the models are judged are concerned not only with their
compatibility with observed facts and their powers of prediction but with their simplicity and
elegance - tests which are essentially aesthetic...
Science in this sense of the search for understanding, does not, in m y view, need to be justified
by the greater power it confers on humankind. It is its o w n justification as a source of enlightenment
and liberation: as a noble expression of the human spirit A society which failstogive it opportunity
and scope will thereby be the poorer. A n d a society which demands of its practitioners that they
subordinate their imagination to the priorities of the accountant the official and the military machine
will destroy their creativeness as surely as if it imprisoned them in concentration camps.
This is not to suggest that science motivated by the desire to manipulate aspects of the world in
which w e live has nothing in c o m m o n with science for understanding or that it does not have a
legitimate place a m o n g human's activities, butratherthat their purposes are different the attitudes of
mind of those w h o practise them m a y well conflict and above all that science for manipulation must
be justified by itsresults.It should be required to demonstrate that the benefits it confers on
humankind outweigh their costs - material, social and spiritual.'
Coombs 1985, p.2
S. 125 'Since publishing the Logik der Furschung (that is, since 1934) I have developed a more systematic
treatment of the problem of scientific method: I have tried to start with some suggestions about the
aims of scientific activity, and to derive most of what I have to say about the methods of science including m a n y comments about its history - from this suggestion...
T o speak of "the aim" of scientific activity m a y perhaps sound a little naive; for clearly,
different scientists have different aims, and science itself (whatever that m a y m e a n ) has no aims. I
admit all this. Yet when w e speak of science, w e do seem to feel, more or less clearly, that there is
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something characteristic of scientific activity; and since scientific activity looks pretty much like a
rational activity, and since a rational activity must have some aim, the attempt to describe the aim of
science m a y not be entirely futile.
I suggest that it is the aim of science to find satisfactory explanations of whatever strikes us as
being in need of explanation. B y an explanation (or a causal explanation) is meant a set of statements
one of which describes the state of affairs to be explained (the explicandum) while the others, die
explanatory statements, for the "explanation" in the narrower sense of the word (the explicans of the
explicandum).'
Popper 1956,1983, pp. 131-2
S.126 '[T]here is a tendency to forget that all science is bound up with human culture in general, and that
scientific findings, even those which at the m o m e n t appear the most advanced and esoteric and
difficult to grasp, are meaningless outside their cultural context A theoretical science unaware that
those of its constructs considered relevant and momentous are destined eventually to be framed in
concepts and words that have a grip on the educated community and become part and parcel of the
general world picture - a theoretical science, I say, where this is forgotten, and where the initiated
continue musing to each other in terms that are, at best understood by a small group of close fellow
travellers, will necessarily be cut off from the rest of cultural mankind [sic]; in the long run it is
bound to atrophy and ossify however virulently esoteric chat m a y continue within its joyfully
isolated groups of experts.'
Schrodinger 1952, quoted by Redner 1987, pp. 201-2
S.127 'Over the course of human history, people have developed many interconnected and validated ideas
about the physical, biological, psychological, and social worlds. These ideas have enabled successive
generations to achieve an increasingly comprehensive and reliable understanding of the human species
and its environment T h e means used to develop these ideas are particular ways of observing,
thinking, experimenting, and validating. These ways represent a fundamental aspect of the nature of
science and reflect h o w science tends to differ from other modes of knowing.
It is the union of science, mathematics, and technology that forms the scientific endeavour and
that makes it so successful. Although each of these human enterprises has a character and history of
its own, each is dependent on and reinforces the others.'
Science for All Americans, quoted in Project 2061 AAAS1993, p.3
S.128 'A scientific world view is not something that working scientists spend a lot of time discussing.
They just do science. But underlying their work are several beliefs that are not always held by
nonscientists. O n e is that by working together over time, people can in factfigureout h o w the world
works. Another is that the universe is a unified system and knowledge gained from studying one part
of it can often be applied to other parts. Still another is that knowledge is both stable and subject to
change.'
Project 2061 AAAS 1993, p3
S.129 'Scientific inquiry is more complex than popular conceptions would have it It is, for instance, a
more subtle and demanding process than the naive idea of "making a great many careful observations
and then organising them." It is far more flexible than therigidsequence of steps commonly depicted
in textbooks as "the scientific method". It is m u c h more than just "doing experiments," and it is not
confined to laboratories. More imagination and inventiveness are involved in scientific inquiry than
m a n y people realise, yet sooner or later strict logic and empirical evidence must have their day.
Individual investigators working alone sometimes m a k e great discoveries, but the steady advancement
of science depends on the enterprise as a whole. A n d so on.'
Project 2061 AAAS 1993, p.9
S.l30 'Scientific activity is one of the main features of the contemporary world and distinguishes present
times from earlier periods. A s an endeavour for learning h o w the world works, it provides a living for
a very large number of people.'
Project 2061 AAAS 1993, p.14
S.131 'By "science," Project 2061 means basic and applied natural and social science, basic and applied
mathematics, and engineering and technology, and their interconnections - which is to say the
scientific enterprise as a whole. The basic point is that the ideas and practice of science, mathematics,
and technology are so closely intertwined that w e do not see h o w education in any one of them can be
undertaken well in isolation from the others.'
Project 2061 AAAS 1993, p321-2
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Table A.l
A semantic analysis of
the s u m m a r y statements of science given in Fig. A.l,
based on Lay's (1982) suggested method for analysing definitions
Subject
S.l
Science

or,

Class:

•of m a n
• and [of] his environment
• based on the deductions and
inferences which can be made
• and the general laws which can
be formulated
• from reproducible observations
and measurements of events
and parameters within the
universe
la. is the ... study -"•• [which is] systematic
• of [humanity]
• [of human] environment
• based on the deductions and
inferences which can be
made,
• and the general laws which can
be formulated,
• fromreproducibleobservations
and measurements of events
and parameters within the
universe
so obtained [from la]
lb. is the knowledge
• in general
2. is... knowledge
systematised
• a particular branch of
3. is... knowledge

Key Words

la. is the systematic
study

4. is skill;
proficiency
S.2
The task of
science

Differentiae:

STUDY
• systematic
• [humanity]
• [human] environment
• deductions and inferences
• general laws
•formulated
•reproducible
• observations and measurements
• events and parameters within
the universe

KNOWLEDGE
KNOWLEDGE
systematic
KNOWLEDGE
•branch of
SKILL

is to [both] extend the •to order
range of experience
and
[is] toreduce[the
range of
experience]
reworked
to make science the subject in line with the structure of comparable texts. Thus:
This could be
[has as its] task, [to] ! • extend the range of experience T A S K
Science
reduce (die range (rf experience) • extend... experience
• reduce. ..[experience]
to order.
•order
S.3
of which the purpose is to
is all exploratory
Science
come to a bettor
activities
understanding of the natural
world
ACTIVITIES
[which are] exploratory
or, science is ... activities
• exploratory
of which the purpose is to
come to a better
•purpose
understanding of the natural
•come to
world
•understanding
• natural world
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Science

is a developing body
of knowledge
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[comprising] observations,
concepts, laws and theories
which seeks to explain
objectively the world around
us
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KNOWLEDGE,
BODY
• developing
• observations
•concepts
• laws
•theories
•seeks to
•explain
• world around us
This subject could be read as a body (of knowledge) or as knowledge (which is a body, not disconnected
elements).
for observing, experimenting
is a set of processes
PROCESSES
with, describing, classifying •set
and analysing the phenomena •observing
of that world
• experimenting
•describing
•classifying
•analysing
phenomena of that world
is ... a number of
[as] traditionally studied
DISCIPLINES
disciplines
with fluid and overlapping
•studied
• having traditions
boundaries
• fluid and overlapping
boundaries
S.5
within which scientists seek
defines a domain of
KNOWLEDGE, ACTTVnY
The term
human
the systematic organisation
•domain
'science'
of knowledge about the
knowledge
•human
and [defines] activity
composition and functioning • scientists
of the universe.
•seek
• systematic
• organisation
• knowledge
•universe
• [about the universe and its
[is to] attempt to
[The work
parts]
acquire
of
[knowledge]
scientists]
• about the universe and its parts
and organise
knowledge
• through the formulation of
and to explain
laws and theories describing
natural processes,
• the interaction and
interrelationship of those
parts.
This example introduces two conventions used in this Table.
a. The subject 'the term "science"', m a y be taken as simply 'science' for the purpose of this analysis; both
the sense and structure of the statement is retained. It has been left, therefore, in its original wording.
The subject 'the work of scientists', m a y also be replaced with 'science', but for a different reason. In
this case, w e m a y say reasonably that the work of scientists is 'science', or 'doing science'. The rest of
the sentence tells us what scientists do when they are doing 'science'. However, thisrequiressome
rewording of the sentence, which is given below.
b. This example is one of m a n y summary statements which discuss what their authors consider to be key
features but which are not worded as definitive statements. W e are not in a position, therefore, to infer
that no other characteristics are possible in the view of that author, merely that science is at least partly
characterised by, or at least entails, the characteristic in question. The wording used hereafter in such
examples is to begin with the stem, 'Science is or entails ...".
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also
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:
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• to acquire and organise
knowledge
• about the universe and its parts
* and to explain
• through the formulation of
laws and theories describing
natural processes,
• the interaction and
interrelationship of those
parts.

ATTEMPT
•acquire
•organise
•knowledge
• the universe and its parts
•explain
• formulation
• laws and theories
•describing
• natural processes
• interaction and interrelationship
of those parts

• of explaining
GOAL
• with ever increasing precision • explaining
• the nature ofthe universe in
i • precision
terms of uniform natural
\ • the nature of the universe
processes and relationships,
• uniform natural processes and
\ relationships
and
COMMITMENT
• to the testing of proposed
•testing
explanations
• explanations
i • by means of empirical
observation and
• empirical observation and
experimentation
experimentation
; • [which are] among the
• that distinguish science from
otherfieldsof human
characteristics that
distinguish science from
endeavour
otherfieldsof human
endeavour

S.6
• in the ignorance of experts.
is the belief
Science
This definiteM I was, quite obviously, not intended as a literal statement but, in the context of the article
meaning. The reworking suggested below is intended to
from which it w a s taken, had a more igurative
1
m a k e thefigurativeor implied meaniiig more explicit
[ATTITUDE]
\ [• and is sceptical of the
or, science [entails an attitude]
dependence on authority for
• [sceptical]
knowledge claims]
• [authority]
• [knowledge]

S.7
Science

is built up with
(related] facts,
[but is not built up
with unrelated
facts]

• as a house is with stones

BUILT

• [like] a heap of stones.

S.8
This definition is complex in two resj>ects. It contains a definition within a definition (it defines science in
terms of a search for understanding, tllen defines what is meant by understanding. It also provides both
explicit and implicit meanings, hence the second analysis of 'science' below. The complexity probably
arises because of the large number of ideas compressed into a single sentence.
• [which is] characterised by the A C T I V I T Y
is an activity
Science
search for understanding
•search
• understanding
•
[which
is]
satisfying
E
XPLANATION
[implies an]
•
which
is
concerned
with
some
•satisfying
explanation
aspect of reality
•reality
• is codified in statements
•codified
• of high generality (laws and
• [general] statements
principles)
• experimental tests
• these being accessible to
• laws and principles
experimental tests.
——*—

S.9

This is simikir to A1.8 above.
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SEARCH

• for understanding
• expressed in laws or principles
of greatest generality
• which are capable of
experimental test
• [as practised in m o d e m times]

• for understanding
• laws or principles
• greatest generality
• capable of experimental test
• modern times

!

is the attempt

i • to make the chaotic diversity of ATTEMPT
our sense experience
• chaotic diversity of our sense
experience
correspond to a logically
uniform system of thought
• make... correspond to
• system of thought
• logically
• uniform
•

S.ll

The
purpose
of
science
as an
activity
or, science
•

S.12
Science
:

S.13
Science

S.14
'Science*

is to form conceptual
generalisations

• about the many particulars of
empirical evidence.

[is or entails] activity : • [which has] purpose
• form[s] conceptual
generalisations about the
many particulars of empirical
evidence.

ACTIVITY
•purpose
• conceptual generalisations
• empirical evidence

is a word which
describes a way (rf
knowing.

KNOWING, WAY OF

is [an] activity

•

! • [of] human[s]
• that has evolved as a way of
looking at the physical and
biological world
• [that has evolved as] a way of
ordering [the] many facets [of
this physical and biological
world]
• [that has evolved as] a way of
checking the validity of this
order.

ACTIVITY
•human
• evolved
• a w a y of looking
• the physical and biological
world
•a way of ordering
• a way of
checking
•validity

[is a term which is]
usually assumed to
[be] very precise
and well-defined
but [which] can in
fact be used in a
variety of ways.
The entry immediately above does not. address 'science', or the term 'science' as defined, but instead
discusses the ways in which the term [the language) is used. It does not therefore, stand comparison
meaningfulljr with the other definitioris included in this table. It remains included in the interests of
presenting the several sections of the entry Al. 14.
SET, PROCEDURES
[is] set of procedures • for verifying or falsifying
[Science]
claims about the world and
• for verifying or falsifying
our place in it
claims
• distinct from either tradition or • about the world and our place
in it
authority
• usually includes highly
• distinct from either tradition or
technical measures
authority
• often requiring mastery of
• technical measures
mathematics
• [rnathematical]
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[is] a set of
• about the world
conclusions or a
• which result from these
body of knowledge
procedures
[is] an institution or
setof...
arrangements

[is] a myth, that is a
... setof beliefs

:

[is] an ideology, that
is [a]... w a y of
thinking
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SET,
CONCLUSIONS OR BODY,
KNOWLEDGE
• about the world
•procedures
INSTITUTION O R S E T O F

•• •
organisational
designed
for educating and
accrediting scientists
• approving or discrediting
scientific conclusions
• protecting the interests of the
scientific estate

• systematic
• about the nature of reality
• about the appropriate w a y to
relatetoreality, and
• about 'discipline of the self
(Foucault) necessary to
achieve an appropriate
relationship to reality
•organised
•about reality
• which serves to maintain and to
perpetuate structures and
patterns of social domination
and subordination.

ARRANGEMENTS
• organisational
• educating and accrediting
• scientists
1 • approving or discrediting
• scientific conclusions
• protecting the interests of the
scientific estate

MYTH OR SET OF BELIEFS
• systematic
• reality
* appropriate w a y to relate to
reality
• 'discipline of the self
i • appropriate relationship to
reality

IDEOLOGY OR W A Y OF
THINKING
! •organised
I • reality
• which serves to
•maintain
•perpetuate
• structures and patterns
•social
•domination
• subordination

S.15
This statement is worded, 'Science is not just a ...', which is taken to m e a n that science is at least in part,
or at least entails, a collection of laws and/or a catalogue of facts.
• a collection of
LAWS
is [partly] laws
Science
• collection
• a catalogue of
FACTS
is [partly] facts
•catalogue
CREATION
• of the h u m a n
is a creation
•of the human
mind
• with...freelyinvented ideas
mind
and concepts
• invented
• ideas and concepts
• which try to form a picture of T H E O R I E S
[is partly] physical
[Science]
reality
• try to form a picture
theories
• which try to establish ...
•reality
connections [between reality
• try to establish ... connections
and] the wide world of sense
• world of sense impressions
impressions.
S.16
• [and] is not a technique... [or] WORLD PICTURE
is a world picture
Science
a form of power... [or] even • not a technique
'
simply an accumulation of
• [not] power
knowledge
• [not] simply an accumulation
of knowledge
• which makes a world view.
KNOWLEDGE
is a highly integrated
•integrated
form of knowledge
• world view
S.17
• at its best
is c o m m o n sense
COMMON SENSE
Science
• at its best
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S.18
Science (in
the
broader
sense)

S.20
Science
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is rigidly accurate

in observation

ACCURATE

is merciless

to fallacy in logic.

• observation
MERCILESS
• fallacy in logic

[is] any general
understanding

• which can respond to challenge
and questions

UNDERSTANDING

[is] a system

' essentially relating to the
development of knowledge
[comprising] the producers
(researchers),
the process of research
the products (of research)
the interesses of these products
the reporting subsystem
which itself forms part of a
larger system: science in
society
• [which are] knowledge
producing
• and knowledge distributing

SYSTEM
• development
•knowledge
• producers (researchers)
• research process
•researchproducts
• interesses [of research products]
• reporting system
• part of [larger] system

is industries

S.19
Science

29/9/95

[is essentially an]
enterprise

• knowledge producing
• knowledge improving

• respondtochallenges

INDUSTRIES
•knowledge
• producing and... distributing
ENTERPRISE
•knowledge
•producing and.. improving

which takes place in a
AcnvnY
particular sort of tradition.
•tradition
Then follows an explanation of what the tradition of science is, which can be taken as further explanation
of the term science:
TRADITION
(Science
[is or entails a]
' essentially centred in a
paradigm
paradigm, or conceptual
tradition
conceptual
structure
structure
which has a naturalistic
naturalistic metaphysics
metaphysics and an empirical
empirical epistemology
epistemology
G O A L S A N D OBJECTIVES
[entails two] goals and to predict and control
predict and control phenomena
phenomena revealed by the
objectives
metaphysics
metaphysics and
epistemology
epistemology of the paradigm
to explain and understand these paradigm
explain
same phenomena.
understand
S.21
[which are] empirical, positive PROPOSITIONS
[is or entails]
Science
[in] Anglo-American parlance
(non normative), operational,
propositions
empirical
falsifiable
positive
[in] Anglo-American parlance
operational
falsifiable
in Anglo-American parlance
STUDY
[which is] systematic
or... study
systematic
' of natural (non societal, non
natural phenomena
cultural) phenomena.
non societal, non cultural
[in Anglo-American parlance]
T h e text unit below could be taken either as the class S Y S T E M S or as the class K N O W L E D G E , so both
given. T h e differentiae are set out under the two in ordertoavoid repeating lists.

are

is an activity
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of knowledge

[is not distinguished
from scholarship]
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acquired by sustained study
in French, German, Italian,
Russian, Japanese, and most
other languages,

SYSTEMS, K N O W L E D G E
• [systems of] knowledge
systems of [knowledge]
acquired by sustained study
in ... most other languages
[which] isreflectedin the
[SCHOLARSHIP]
organisation of the academies • organisation of the academies
of sciences in m a n y countries
of sciences
•in m a n y countries

s.2:
The text unit below could be taken either as the class B O D Y or as the class K N O W L E D G E , so both are
given. T h e differentiae are set out under the two in ordertoavoid repeating a long list
is a body of
[which is] coherent systematic BODY, KNOWLEDGE
1
knowledge
[in] the broadest international
[body of] knowledge
consensus
broadest international
of any subject formal or
consensus
empirical, natural or cultural, 1 body of [knowledge]
• arrived at by any method
coherent
whatever, provided it
systematic
(1) is based on hard, honest and of any subject
serious study and research and
formal or empirical
reaches insights not available
natural or cultural
to laymen or superficial
method
observers, and
study and research
(2) is designed for either
insights
intellectual or generalnot availabletolaymen or
pragmatic purposes, but not
superficial observers
for immediate practical
for either intellectual or
appUcation in a concrete case
general-pragmatic purposes
or situation.
not for immediate practical
application
broadest international
consensus
TECHNIQUE
[which is] ordered
is... technique
•ordered
• [which is] rationalised
is ... mythology
MYTHOLOGY
•rationalised
[is] an institution

in the contemporary world

INSTITUTION
in the contemporary world

[os] a method

in the contemporary world

METHOD
• in the contemporary world

[is] ...knowledge

[is] a... tradition

[is] a major factor in
...production
[is] one of the most
powerful
influences
moulding beliefs
and attitudes
[interacts with]
society

• a cumulative tradition of
• in the contemporary world

KNOWLEDGE

• of knowledge
• cumulative
»in the contemporary world
the maintenance and
development of
in the contemporary world
• to the universe and m a n
• in the contemporary world

• in the contemporary world
cumulative tradition
TRADITION
knowledge
cumulative
PRODUCTION
• maintenance and development
•in the contemporary world
BELIEFS A N D ATTITUDES
•tothe universe and [humanity]
• in the contemporary world

• [not as] different 'sciences',
[but]
• [having] multiplicity of aspect
andreference[with society]

SOCIETY
• multiplicity of aspect and
reference [with society]
• in the contemporary world
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• [because it is] wide ranging in
time, connexion and category

CONTEXT
•time
•connexion
•category

S.25
[Science]

[emphasises] objective
features

has... been widely
entrenched
[has been] taken for
granted
has ...enjoyedthe
staunch support of
... philosophies
[requires] afirmset of
...attitude
[and entails a] moral
motivation

S.26
Science

[is or entails a]
method

MMMMMmWIMIW

[is or entails] wisdom

S.27
[Science]

[is objective]

[in the] standard view
largely shared by reflective
scientists, technical
philosophers, and the
educated public alike

OBJECTIVE
• standard view
• shared byreflectivescientists,
technical philosophers, and
the educated public

ENTRENCHED
TAKEN FOR GRANTED
of our day
[which are] dominant [and]
scientifically oriented
[which are] habitual

[PHILOSOPHICAL] SUPPORT
•of our day
• dominant [and] scientifically
oriented
ATTITUDES
• habitual

[which is] underlying
[and which upholds] the ideal of
responsibility in the sphere
of belief as against
wilfulness, authoritarianism,
and inertia

M O R A L MOTIVATION
•underlying

[whichreveals]a reality in
which w e are ourselves but
limited natural elements
[of which] objectivity is... a
fundamental feature
[which culminates in an]
ontological vision ... of a
universe of objects with
independent existences and
careers, within which
scientific inquiry represents
but one region of connected
happening and striving.
[in] the standard view
objectivity is the end
as well as the beginning

METHOD

[in the standard] view

• ideal of responsibility
•belief
• against wilfulness,
authoritarianism, and inertia

•reality
• objectivity
•method
• ontological vision
• universe of objects with
independent existences and
careers

WISDOM
• standard view
• objectivity
•end
«beginning
[OBJECTIVE]
• [standard] view
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I • [which is] systematic public
• [which is] controlled by logic
and empirical fact
• whose purpose it is to
formulate the truth about the
natural world... [which is]
primarily... general,
expressed in laws of nature,
which tell us what is always
and everywhere the case
• [in which] observation ...
supplies the particular
empirical facts, the hard
phenomenal data which our
lawlike hypotheses strive to
encompass, and for which it
is the ultimate purpose of
such hypotheses to account
„_..„.,„„

S.28
(Science

[is or entails an] aim

ENTERPRISE
• systematic
•public
•logic
• empirical fact
•purpose
•formulate
•truth
• about the natural world...
•general
• expressed in laws
•of nature
• observation
•empirical
•facts
• lawlike hypotheses
• purpose
• to account
* W M I W W « »

M

- « M « « W * « W > W

M M M M

^ ^

AIM

• in the standard view
• to discover truths
• about the external world

• in the standard view
•discover
•truths
• external world

;

S.29
This quote is> actually worded as 'what science gives us is ...', which is not the same as saying science
actually is these things. However, it does match the intentions of the present exercise, namely to collect
statements ol? the sort, 'science is characterised by ...' and will therefore be included in the reworded format
to be consistent with the other statements in this analysis.
[Science]
[is or entails] criteria
CRITERIA OF JUDGEMENT
of judgement
[is or entails] methods • for evaluating data
METHODS
and techniques
• for evaluating data
•tologic and rationality
[is or entails]
COMMITMENT
commitment
• logic and rationality
KNOWLEDGE
• [that is] h u m a n
[is] knowledge
• [and therefore] value-oriented
•human
because it is selective. W h a t • value-oriented
isrelevanttoa scientific
• selective
problem and what has
• what w e are looking for and
meaning in science depends
what w e are trying to
on what w e are looking for
accomplish
and what w e are trying to
accomplish.
S.30
• a set of
[is] methods
Science
METHODS
• characteristic
•set
• by means of which knowledge • characteristic
is certified
•knowledge
•certified
--• a stock of
KNOWLEDGE
[is] knowledge
•accumulated
•stock of
• stemming from the application •accumulated
of these methods
•methods
VALUES AND MORES
[is] values and mores • a set of
•cultural
•set
• governing the activities termed •cultural
scientific, or
• governing [scientific] activities
METHODS, KNOWLEDGE,
[is] any combination
of the foregoing
VALUES IN
,

v

...

, ,

• • - ,

,

•-

COMBINATION
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[Science]

S.32
Science

S.33
Science

S.34
Science

[is or entails] the
value posture
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• [which is]rationalisticin the VALUE POSTURE
choice of alternatives,
• rationalistic
•relativisticin judgement and
• relativistic
expectation, and
• judgement and expectation
• anticipatory of change;
• anticipates change
• [where a] pragmatic rationalism • pragmatic [rather than
may be contrasted with a
ritualistic]
ritualistic motivation for •value
action;
•judgements
• [which calls] differing value
•roles
judgements into play in
•societal
accord with specific roles ... • values
• [which must be supported by
• public power
more general societal values, • institutional structures
as well as the public power, • class systems
institutional structures, and 1 •purpose
class systems appropriate for
the purpose.

is c o m m o n knowledge • extended and refined
COMMON KNOWLEDGE
I • [whose] validity is of the same• extended and refined
order as that of ordinary
• validity
perception, memory, and
• of the same order as that of
understanding
ordinary
• [whose] test is found, like
•perception
theirs, in actual intuition,
•memory
which sometimes consists in •understanding
perception and sometimes in • sometimes
intent
• intuition
•intent
is ... a community of • engaged in similar and related COMMUNITY OF
activities of inquiry ...
individuals
INDIVIDUALS
• [which] must necessarily have a • similar and related
philosophy, just like any
• activities of inquiry
other group of people asking • must... have a philosophy
questions...
• like any other group of people
• [whose] disagreements are
• asking questions
philosophical conflicts • disagreements are philosophical
conflicts, among other
conflicts
things, inregardto ultimate • ultimate kinds of explanatory
kinds of explanatory ideas...
ideas
is... [a]process

is... acquisition

S.35
[Science]
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PROCESS
[that is] active
•active
• that can be followed through
• through the ages
the ages
• [that is] valid and successful in • valid and successful
• in our own age
our own age
• misunderstanding of its nature
• [which] has givenrisetoa
• misapplication
good deal of
•terms
misunderstanding of its
nature and not a little
misapplication of such terms
as 'science' and 'scientific'...
•great progressive
ACQUISITION
• of knowledge
• of knowledge
• no static body of knowledge
•great
•progressive
•body

[is or entails] activity • [of which an element is its]
: goals
• which set it apartfromother
human activities

ACTIVITY
•goals
• which set [science] apart from
other human activities
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[Science]

S.36
Science

[is or entails] goals

is an... activity,

is... [an] enterprise

[is or entails] roots

[is or entails]...
notions

[is often not clearly
distinguishable
from philosophy],
S.37
Science

[is or entails]
knowledge
[is or entails]
knowledge

is [or entails] system

is ... a fruit of...
investigation
S.38
Science

[is or entails] the
methods
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• prediction and control
• [some] seek... to discover
correlations
• explanation and understanding
• [which] are not absolutes of all
sciences
• prediction and control involve
statements which use only
correlations, whereas
explanation and understanding
involve statements which use
causal connections.
| • [which is] open-ended
! • on-going
• [whose] character has changed
significantly during its
history
• [that is] not... monolithic
• can lead to false theories
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GOALS
• prediction and control
• seek... to
'discover
•correlations
• explanation
• understanding
• not absolutes [goals]
•of all sciences
• statements
• statements
•correlations
• causal connections
ACTIVITY
• open-ended
• on-going
• [changing] character
• history
ENTERPRISE
• not monolithic
• can lead to
•false
• theories

• in everyday circumstances,
needs, methods, concepts,
etc. of h u m a n beings

ROOTS

• [often characterised more by] its
arrangement [than by its]
subject matter
• that is sufficiently organised to
exhibit appropriate evidential
relationships among its
constituent claims

KNOWLEDGE
• arrangement
• subject matter
KNOWLEDGE
•organised
• appropriate
• evidential
• relationships
• constituent claims
SYSTEM
•subject
•judicious
• application of logic
F R U I T O F INVESTIGATION
•rational

• in everyday circumstances,
needs, methods, concepts,
etc. of human beings
• [such] as 'observation', 'theory', N O T I O N S
• observation
'meaning', 'reference',
'explanation', 'progress' and •theory
•meaning
'rationality'
•reference
• explanation
•progress
• rationality
[NOT CLEARLY
• especially as regards
DISTINGUISHABLE FROM
foundational problems
PHILOSOPHY]
• foundational problems

• whatever the subject
• and what makes for system is
the judicious application of
logic
• rational

• by which w e acquire knowledge
of nature, and...
• set that knowledge within a
more comprehensive
metaphysics.

METHODS
• acquire
•knowledge
•of nature
• set... within a more
comprehensive
• metaphysics
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Science

is ... activity

S.40
Science

is ... theories

l

S.41
Science

S.42
Science

S.43
Science

S.44
Science
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1
ACTIVITY
• [that is] very complex
• complex
• different ideals of scientific
reasoning
• ideals of scientific reasoning
j • steps of reasoning
• steps of reasoning by which
laws of nature are formulated •laws
•of nature
on the basis of factual
• formulated
evidence, and
• by which the effect of new
•evidence
evidence on our confidence in • confidence in the truth of laws
the truth of laws is assessed. •assessed
• collection
• well-attested
• which explain the patterns and
regularities and irregularities
among carefully studied
phenomena.

THEORIES
• collection
• well-attested
•explain
• patterns and irregularities
•carefully
•studied
• phenomena

[is or entails] research • conducted toward the finding
and the testing of highly
testable hypotheses [on
Popper's account]
• vary often conductedtowardthe
finding and the testing of
metaphysically relevant
hypotheses [on Agassi's
account]
• [which] tends to begin with
hypotheses which have a low
degree of testability or are not
testable at all.

RESEARCH
• conducted toward
• finding and... testing
• highly testable
•hypotheses
• metaphysically relevant

[is] empirical... i.e., [which it] manifests ... more
systematically than
refutable
mathematics,
• which are lacking in
[is or entails] other
mathematics
characteristics
Le., [is or entails]
informative
content,
explanatory power,
simplicity,
abstractness,
generality, and
precision
.

EMPIRICAL
(REFUTABLE)

[is or entails the] aim

[is or entails] the...
clarification of
problems

,,,,,
O T H E R CHARACTERISTICS
• lacking in mathematics
INFORMATIVE C O N T E N T

EXPLANATORY POWER
SIMPLICITY
ABSTRACTNESS
GENERALITY
PRECISION

• to comprehend the world
rationally
• as w e all agree (including the
positivists w h o should
disagree)
• [where]rationality[according to
Popper] is manifest in
empirical tests

AIM
•comprehend
•the world

• progressive
• [as shown in the history of
science]

CLARIFICATION O F
PROBLEMS
•progressive
• history of science

• rationally
• as w e all agree
•rationality
• empirical tests
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[is or entails the
asking of]
questions

S.45
Science

[is or entails study]

• of systems of s o m e kind
• whether natural (physical,
chemical, biological, or
social) or artificial
(technical). Moreover most
sciences study nothing but
systems.

:

nunnnnnnnnn

[is or entails]
knowledge

[is or entails] criteria

S.48
...Pure or
basic
science

• [that is] somewhat ephemeral
• whose most immediate goal is
to increase understanding
rather than control of nature
• [which] characteristic problems
are almost always repetitions,
with minor modifications, of
problems that have been
undertaken and partially
resolved before

[is] ...research

«

nwm

^^wwv^w

-

j

• instead of waiting to see
• answerable questions

ONTOLOGY
• [what... the world is like]

! STUDY
• of systems
I • whether natural... or artificial

• the natural world... as real and
objective
• [whose] characteristics cannot
be determined by the
preferences or intentions of
its observers
• [but can be] more or less
faithfully represented
• in the standard view
• concerned with providing an
accurate account of the
objects, processes and
relationships occurring in the
world of natural phenomena
• in ... systematic statements
•reveals...the true character of
this world
• [that] has satisfied...
impersonal, technical criteria
ofadequacy
• is independent of... subjective
factors
• [that are] stringent
• in connection with
experimental procedures
• by means of which empirical
knowledge claims are
evaluated and their accurate
representation of empirical
phenomena is ensured

[is or entails the
belief, or regards]
\

is that intellectual
enterprise

— —

| ASKING OF QUESTIONS
• about nature

[is] ontology [and] the • [for which] every substantive
sciences are
scientific problem is ... W h a t
regional
is the world like?
ontologies

S.46
Science

S.47
Science

• about nature
•.. .instead of waitingtosee
what turns up; and
• [which are] intrinsically
answerable questions, as
distinct from nonsensical
questions

472

BELIEF
• natural world
• real and objective
• preferences or intentions of...
•observers
• more or less faithfully
•represented
• standard view
INTFJTFCTUAL
ENTERPRISE
• accurate account
• natural phenomena

KNOWLEDGE
•impersonal
•technical
• [not] subjective

CRITERIA
• stringent
• experimental procedures
• knowledge claims
•evaluated
• accurate
•representation
• empirical phenomena
•ensured

RESEARCH
• somewhat ephemeral
• immediate goal
•understanding
•nature
• problems
• repetitions ... of problems
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Science...
in its
widest
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[is] theoretical
knowledge
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• n o matter whether in the field
of natural sciences or in the
field of the social sciences
and the so-called humanities,

and

Science [as
it] is
usually
called

is ... activities

Formal
science

[is or entails] analytic
statements

Empirical
science

[is or entails]
synthetic
statements

S.50
Science

S.51
Science

S.52
Science

• n o matter whether it is
knowledge found b y the
application of special
scientific procedures, or
knowledge based on c o m m o n
sense in everyday life
• which w e carry out in everyday
life in order to k n o w
something
• [but] a more systematic
continuation of those
activities
* established b y logic and
mathematics
j • established in the different
fields of factual knowledge

• [which] is experimental
[is or entails]
knowledge
knowledge
[is or entails] research • [in which characteristically]
observational evidence plays
a crucial role in the
resolution of the issue
between contending
hypotheses
• [and on which the] objectivity
[of] scientific method depends
•
[which
is remarkable for and is
[is or entails]
b y its]
characterised
methodology
resolution of disputed issues
and...
• establishment of instrumental
knowledge
• [and is] strongly dependent
upon the special role it
assigns to observation.
[is] that... culture

• [which is] peculiar
• which is the hallmark of
Western civilisation
• makes the discovery or
uncovering of nature its
central focus

473

KNOWLEDGE
•theoretical
• in thefieldof natural sciences
• in thefieldof the social
sciences
• scientific procedures
j • c o m m o n sense
• based on... everyday life

ACTIVITIES
• in everyday life
• in order to k n o w
• systematic

S T A T E M E N T S (ANALYTIC)
• established b y logic and
mathematics
S T A T E M E N T S (SYNTHETIC)
• in the different fields of factual
knowledge

KNOWLEDGE
• experimental

RESEARCH
• observational evidence
• resolution
• between contending hypotheses
• objectivity
• scientific method

METHODOLOGY
• resolution of disputed issues
• establishment
• instrumental knowledge
• observation

CULTURE
•peculiar
• the hallmark of Western
civilisation
• discovery or uncovering
•of nature
f • central focus

is the ...
mathematical
formulation

•exact
• of the processes of the natural
world

MATHEMATICAL
FORMULATION
•exact
• processes of the natural world

[is] composed of laws

• stating the mathematical
behaviour of nature solely
• clearly deducible from
phenomena
• exactly verifiable in phenomena
• far N e w t o n

LAWS
•mathematical
• behaviour of nature
• deducible from phenomena
• verifiable in phenomena
•for N e w t o n

j
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[is] a body of... truth • [which is] absolutely certain
• about the doings of the
physical world
[is or entails] methods f • union of mathematical and
experimental
• ideal exactitude
• constant empirical reference
• [for] Newton

| B O D Y OF TRUTH
•certain
• physical world
METHODS
• union of mathematical and
experimental
• ideal exactitude
• constant empirical reference
• [for] Newton

[is or entails] practice • [with] ethical principles
• conviction that there exists
objective truth
• there exist rules of evidence for
discovering it
• on the basis of this objective
truth, unanimity is possible
anddesirable
• unanimity must be achieved by
independent arrivals at
convictions - that is, by
examination of evidence, not
through coercion, personal
argument or appeal to
authority
[is a] system of
• [which] like all other systems
thought
of thought seeks answers to
questions which m e n hold to
be of importance
• seeks answers which are
reducible to everyone's
experience [unlike other
systems of thought where]
answers are accepted that
harmonise with particular
world-views peculiar to
different cultural complexes

PRACTICE
• ethical principles
• conviction
• objective truth
•rules of evidence
• discovering
| • unanimity is possible and
desirable
• examination of evidence
• not through coercion, personal
argument or appeal to
authority

[is or entails] a body
of knowledge,
and ...a set of rules

[is or entails] a ...
consensus of
opinion

SYSTEM OF THOUGHT
• like all other systems ...
• seeks answers
• questions which m e n holdtobe
of importance
• seeks answers
• which arereducibleto
everyone's experience
• [not] answers [that] are accepted
that harmonise with
particular world-views
peculiar to different cultural
complexes

KNOWLEDGE
•body of
• by which this knowledge is to RULES
•setof
be collected
• [for collection of] knowledge
• [which is] fairly widespread
C O N S E N S U S O F OPINION
• as to what science really is
• fairly widespread
• what science really is
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S.56
Science

is a... profession

[is]... linked with
politics
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I • of therealworld
* ascertained by observation,
• critically examined and
• classified systematically under
general principles, [and
which] should
• provide an explanation of what
is of value in past discoveries
• m a k e some prediction of future
events
• promote scientific research
(new discovery) by providing
concepts which give a sense
of understanding of the causes
of events in the world and
which help to communicate
this understanding to others
• be universal in the sense of
independent of space and time
• be presented explicitly so as to
be intelligibletoall qualified
practitioners
• have empirical relevance such
that all can evaluate the
correspondence between its
theories and their practical
implications

KNOWLEDGE

• inextricably
* while yet remaining
unanswerabletothose whose
lives are affected by its
actions

L I N K E D W I T H POLITICS
•inextricably
• yet remaining unanswerable to
those whose lives are affected
by its actions

•of the real world
• observation
• critically examined
•classified
• systematically under general
principles
• explanation
• of what is of value
• in past discoveries
•prediction
•of future events
• scientific research (new
discovery)
•concepts
• a sense of understanding
• causes of events in the world
• communicate
•toothers
• be universal in the sense of
independent of space and time
• explicitly
• intelligibletoall qualified
practitioners
• empirical relevance
• such that all can
• evaluate the correspondence
•theories
• practical implications
PROFESSION
• [according to] Galbraith
• the outmoded image of science • [accordingto]Galbraith
• the outmoded image of science
still held by m a n y people
still held by m a n y people
• [no longer] 'the product of the
•product
individual efforts of m e n of
• the individual efforts of m e n of
genius'
genius
• the nineteenth century
• the nineteenth century
• m o d e m science
• m o d e m science
• [which is] a highly organised
•
highly organised
new profession closely linked
with industry and government •new
• profession
• [whose] success has been
• closely linked with industry and
achieved by 'taking ordinary
government
men', informing them
narrowly and deeply and then, •ordinary m e n
• informing them narrowly and
through appropriate
deeply
organisation, arranging to
* appropriate organisation
have their knowledge
•arranging
combined with that of other
• knowledge
specialised but equally
•combined
ordinary men.'
• other specialised but equally
ordinary m e n

Sc defn anal Tables A1 -9

S.57
Science

is ... an activity

29/9/95

476

154 PM

• [or] a biological phenomenon
• by one kind of organism
• which facilitates its interaction
with the environment...
• [in which on van Fraassen's
account] only the successful
theories survive - the ones
which in fact latched onto
actual regularities in nature
• [but in which on Riggs'
account] the level of
empirical adequacy [while] of
major importance ... is not
the sole consideration

ACTIVITY
• biological
• phenomenon
• by one kind of organism
• interaction
• with the environment
• latched onto
• regularities in nature
• empirical adequacy ... not the
sole consideration

\

S.58
This entry d()es not begin with the usual, 'science is ...', or similar, but does discuss science as research.
The significanee of 'science is characterised as' comparedto'science is characterised by' is addressed in the
analysis of this table in Chapter 4. T h e notion of science as research seemstoimply the notion of science
asgoal-directed activity.
[is or entails research] • [which, on Laudan's account
Science
RESEARCH
• cognitive
has] cognitive goals
[concerned with] certain
•goals
interesting epistemic and
| • epistemic
•pragmatic
pragmatic attributes (and
•toacquire predictive control
which typically include]:
• to acquire predictive control • over ... parts of one's
experience
over... parts of one's
experience of the world
• to acquire manipulative control
• to acquire manipulative control • so astobe able to
over portions of one's
•intervene
experience so as to be able to • the usual order of events
intervene in the usual order of • modify that order
•to increase the precision ofthe
events so astomodify that
parameters
order
• to increase the precision of the * initial and boundary conditions
parameters which feature as
• explanations
initial and boundary
• of natural phenomena
•tointegrate and simplify
conditions in our
explanations of natural
• various components of our
picture of the world
phenomena
• to integrate and simplify the • c o m m o n set
•explanatory
various components of our
picture of the world, reducing • principles
where possible to a c o m m o n
set of explanatory principles
[is or entails] various • of theory testing and of theory METHODS
• theory testing and... selection
selection employed
methods
•theories
«... which... [overtime]
produce... theories over time • reliable
• efficient
[that] are
• cognitive
• reliable
• efficient at advancing our
•aims
• better than... 'non-scientific'
cognitive aims and, in
general,
• they do so better than theories
w e denote as 'non-scientific'
S.59
• [which is] problem-solving
SUB-CULTURE
isa... sub-culture
Science
• whose main value is truth
• problem-solving
• main value is truth
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is concerned with
developing...
statements

[is or entails]
problem-solving

S.60
(Physical)
science

[is or entails the] aim

S.61
Natural
science

[is or entails] a vision
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[which are] testable
[and are] about the world
which in turn create images of
the world which correspond
to what the world is really
like
• [which is] the main
preoccupation of scientists
• and indeed of the professionals
in general

DEVELOPING STATEMENTS
testable
about the world
create images
what the world isreallylike
PROBLEM-SOLVING
main preoccupation
of scientists
of ...professionals

1

to establish highly general laws A I M
and theories applicable to the
establish
world
highly general
1
[which are tested] by pitching
laws and theories
them against the world in the
applicable
most demanding way
to the world
possible given the existing
by pitching them
practical techniques
against the world
• generality and degree of
the most demanding way
applicability of laws and
possible
theories is subject to
given the existing
continual improvement
practical techniques
generality and degree of
applicability
subject to... improvement
continual
1

VISION
explored and controlled by
Western culture
argument
knowledge
• initiated by ancient Greek
philosophers, mathematicians of (knowledge) and of the
object of that knowledge
and physicians
1
search for principles at once of • of natural science and of nature
nature and of argument itself
' [that is] specific
' created within Western culture,
' at once of knowledge and of the
object of that knowledge,
at once of natural science and of
nature
• [traced to] the Greeks
[is or entails]
COMMITMENT
• to the decision of questions by •tothe decision of questions by
commitment
argument and evidence
argument and evidence
• as distinct from custom, edict • explicit by analysis (rf the
revelation, authority or
reasoning
whatever else
• conceptions of a problem as
• to make this explicit by
distinct from a doctrine
analysis of the reasoning
involved
• [developing] thereby the
conceptions of a problem as
distinct from a doctrine
The subject of the text unit below is entered as 'decision', being the literalrewordingof the term 'deciding
that' in the text unit However, its use here appears ambiguous. It seems reasonabletointerpret its
meaning literally, as a conscious decision, and morefiguratively,as a belief. Crombie uses the wording
'the commitment of the Greeks for whatever reason' earlier in the passage, apparently for the same intended
meaning. Rather ambiguously, Crombie then uses the term 'decision' in a different sense, and for this
reason some qualification is necessary to make the class clear. 'Belief would seem to be interchangeable.
However, the class is entered as D E C I S I O N because it is in the original.
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[is or entails the
decision]
'
•

[Science]

S.62
Science

S.63
[Science]

[is characterised by]
two fundamental
conceptions...:

:

• [that] the one existing world
was a world of exclusively
self-consistent and
discoverablerationalcausality
• [unlike] the m a n y possible
worlds as envisaged in other
cultures
• [and which] committed their
scientific successors
exclusivelytothis effective
direction of thinking, and
• closed to them visions of
things still open elsewhere
• introduced in this w a y the
conception of nature,
comprising a rational
scientific system, in which
formal reasoning matched
natural causation, so that
natural events and reasoned
conclusions must equally
follow exacdy from true
principles
• causal demonstration and
formal proof
• [to the extent it embodies] all
Western rational thinking

478
DECISION
• one existing world
• a world of exclusively selfconsistent and discoverable
rational causality
• effective direction of thinking
• closed to them visions of
things still open elsewhere
• conception of nature
• formal reasoning
• matched natural causation
• natural events
• reasoned conclusions
• true principles

FUNDAMENTAL
CONCEPTIONS
•causal
• demonstration
• formal proof
•Western
• rational
• thinking

DEALING ONLY WITH THE
WORLD OF
APPEARANCE

[is or entails dealing]
only with the
world of
appearance

• whereas philosophy dealt with
the world of something called
reality
• on Kant's account

[is or entails]
procedures

• [which have been] amended [by PROCEDURES
philosophy]
•amended
• [by philosophy]
RULES
• [which have] determined the
kind of scientific conclusions • [which] scientific conclusions
that would be acceptable
that would be acceptable
• based on s o m e metaphysical
• based on s o m e metaphysical
dogma
dogma... that is usually
unexamined... because it had • usually unexamined
• part... of collective thinking
been part and parcel of
collective thinking and seems • seems self evident
self evident

[is or entails] certain
rales

S.64
[Science]

29/9/95 1:54 P M

[is or entails] the
scientific mind

• whereas philosophy dealt with
the world of something called
reality
• on Kant's account

• [the mainsprings of which are] S C I E N T I F I C M I N D
•curiosity
curiosity and the desire to
generalise... originality and • desire to generalise
intelligence and perseverance •originality
... and thefindingof pleasure • intelligence
•perseverance
in the use of the hands in
delicate manipulations
• thefindingof pleasure in the
use of the hands
• delicate manipulations
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S.65
Natural
science

[aims] to acquire as
complete a
knowledge as
possible

| • of the material universe;
• of the objects, materials and
phenomena and
• therelationsbetween the
phenomena which make
themselves known to us or
which w e apprehend by
means of our senses
[is or entails the] aim • to acquire as complete a
knowledge as possible of the
material universe; of the
objects, materials and
phenomena and the relations
between the phenomena
which make themselves
knowntous or which w e
apprehend by means of our
senses.

or, science

r

S.66
Science

29/9/95

[is or entails] a
structure

• of knowledge is built up
• is approved by all sane men'
• only the sane m e n w h o have
studied it are in a position to
give their approval

[is or entails a] body

•of valid ideas
• [for which] approval is actually
an understatement of the
feelings of men towards

AIM
•acquire
•knowledge
• of the material universe
• of the objects, materials and
phenomena
• [and of] therelationsbetween
the phenomena which make
themselves known to us or
which w e apprehend by
means of our senses
STRUCTURE
• of knowledge
•approved
• by all sane m e n
• only the sane men w h o have
studied it
• give their approval

BODY
•of valid ideas
•approval
• an understatement
• feelings

_uL.uuu.iij

• that would be a chronicle and
is not a mere
repetition of facts;
not science
The difficult;y with transposing statements which characterise science in terms of what they are not, as in
the exam >le above, is noted. Thisstatement is interpreted to mean that indeed facts are part of the
definition or characterisation of science, but not facts alone or in themselves.
• [but] not a mererepetitionof FACTS
is [or entails] facts
or,
facts
• not a mere repetition
S.67
• by which man acquires mastery SYSTEM,
[is] the system of
Science
of the environment [on
behaviour
BEHAVIOUR
• acquires mastery
Crowther's account]
• of the environment
• [on Crowther's account]
• to serve as an end in itself, like U S E S
[is or entails] uses
Science
music, and to form a basis
•toserve as an end in itself
for technology
• to form a basis for technology
Although Balcer employed the term uses, the meaning in the context of the sentence could be interpreted as
goals. Uses has been designated as the', class, above, following the procedure of analysis applied to all
summary statements in this table. Hovvever, its ambiguous meaning above is noted for consideration later
in the analysi s.
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[is or entails] basic
research

:

• [which] is aimed
• at broadening the base of our
knowledge of the natural
world and of h o w w e can use

it
• both for the sake of advancing
that knowledge and
• to provide the background for
the solution of recognised
current or future practical
problems
S.69
[Science]

"

BASIC R E S E A R C H
• aimed
• broadening the base
• knowledge
• of the natural world
• of h o w w e can use [knowledge]
• for the sake of advancing that
knowledge
• to provide the background for
• the solution of
•recognisedcurrent or future
practical problems

[is or entails] research | • [which can be] basic
RESEARCH
• [which entails] the advancement •basic
ofknowledge
•advancement
• without the goals of long term • of knowledge
• without the goals
economic or social benefits
• no positive efforts... m a d e to • long term economic or social
benefits
apply the results to practical
• practical problems
problems
• [or which can be] strategic
• strategic
• expectation
• [to] produce a broad base of
knowledge [for] the solution • to produce a broad base of
of recognised current or future
knowledge
• [for] the solution of
practical problems
• long standing separation of
•recognisedcurrent or future
practical problems
scientific and industrial
• long standing separation of
research in Australia
• [with] research objectives either
scientific and industrial
as advancing knowledge or as
research in Australia
contributingtothe immediate • research
solution of an industrial
• objectives
problem
• advancing knowledge
• immediate
• occasional examples of
discovery, development or
• solution of
• an industrial problem
application
• discovery more often
• occasional examples
•discovery
contributes to an
international matrix of
• development
•application
information and
understanding
• contributes to an international
• can result in a greater or lessor
matrix
• information and understanding
rearrangement ofthe whole
matrix
• rearrangement
• whole matrix
• [which is] international
KNOWLEDGEBASE
[is or entails a]
• used to solve problems in a
•international
knowledgebase
particular application
• usedtosolve problems
• in a particular application

S.70
The natural are defined as the
majorfieldsof
sciences
science
and
engineer

ing

480
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• (physical, chemical, biological, F I E L D S O F S C I E N C E
earth, engineering and
• physical, chemical, biological,
applied, and agriculture)
earth, engineering and
• excluding the social sciences
applied, and agriculture
• [not] concerned with ... man,
and humanities
• (which are concerned with the
culture and society
extension of knowledge about [
man, culture and society)
j
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[is or entails] research • [which] should be left [to
RESEARCH
• should be left [to scientists] to
scientists] to d o it
• [or left to] research managers
doit
[because taxpayer] investment • [or leftto]research managers
should s h o w s o m e return
• investment should show s o m e
which will tangibly benefit
return which will tangibly
the country
benefit the country
• [and requires] sustained funding, • sustained funding
(which requires in turn]
•trust
• trust on the part of research
•researchmanagers
managers
•researchers
• researchers ... to change their
• to change their view of
view of the aims of their
• aims of their research
research
• well developed international
• [researchersto]have a well
reputation
developed international
• thereasonsfor
reputation
• following
• the reasons for following a
• a particular line (rf research
particular line of research [to] • related to reasons outside of
be relatedtoreasons outside
their narrow discipline
of their narrow discipline (in
• (in Australia, 1989)
Australia, 1989) [which
• the ripeness ofthe area
include]
• exploration
• theripenessof the area for
• significance of the questions
exploration;
addressed
• the significance of the
•potential
questions addressed;
•discovery
• the potential for discovery of
•fundamental
fundamental n e w laws;
• n e w laws
• the potential for discovery of
• broad scientific applicability
• attractiveness of the areatothe
generalisations of broad
scientific applicability;
most able scientists
• the attractiveness of the area to •potential
• stimulation of other sciences
the most able scientists;
• the potential stimulation of
• the potential contribution
other sciences;
• engineering, medicine, applied
science
• the potential contribution to
engineering, medicine,
• technology
applied science; technology;
• the goals of society;
the goals of society; prestige • prestige and international
and international cooperation;
cooperation;
national responsibilities;
• national responsibilities
public education;
• public education
• the potential for immediate
• immediate applications
applications.
[is or entails a]
structure

• [which] developed only in
STRUCTURE
Western Europe at the time
• Western Europe at the time of
of Galileo in the late
Galileo in the late
Renaissance
Renaissance
• [which has] the fundamental
• the application of
bases... the application of
• mathematical hypotheses
mathematical hypotheses to •to Nature
•understanding
Nature,
• the full understanding and use
• use (rf the experimental method
of the experimental method,
• primary and secondary qualities
• the distinction between primary • geometrication
and secondary qualities,
•of space
• the geometrication of space,
•acceptance
• the acceptance of the
• of the mechanical model of
mechanical model of reality
reality
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[is or entails]
hypotheses

HYPOTHESES
• the m o d e m type [being
distinguished clearly from]
•modern type
the primitive or medieval
• the primitive or medieval type
type
• intrinsic and essential
• [whose] intrinsic and essential
[precision]
[precision]... made them
\ • [capable] of proof or disproof
[capable] of proof or disproof, • [not] prone to combine
and [not] prone to combine in • fanciful systems of gnostic
fanciful systems of gnostic
correlation
correlation [in contrast to
• numbers were ... employed
mediaeval hypotheses]
• qualitative measurements
• [and in which numbers were]
•compared
employed as the stuff (rf
• a posteriori
qualitative measurements
• [not] manipulated
compared a posteriori [not] • forms of "numerology" or
number mysticism
manipulated in forms of
"numerology'' or number
•constructed
mysticism constructed a
• a priori
priori

is... behaviour

[which is] species-specific,
human
• which centres on making plans
• [and] not an independent valuefree dissociated activity which
can be carried on apart from
the rest of human life

BEHAVIOUR

[is or entails]
strategies

• [for] guiding our long-term
attack on h o w to live and
h o w to look at the world
• [which have] no distinction
[from] human strategies

STRATEGIES

is a world view

• based on the notion that w e can
plan by understanding
• distinguished from magical
views by the fact that it
refuses to acknowledge a
division between two kinds
of logic
• [whose logic] works the same
w a y in all forms of conduct
and is not carried out by any
kind of formula but by an
active view of h o w you apply
the logic of long-term
planning strategies to the
conduct of the whole of your
life
• distinguished from earlier forms
of trying to achieve a unitary
view of the world by the fact
that there is only one form of
truth in it There is no
distinction between m a n and
nature, there is no distinction
between the logic of magic
and other logics, and there is
no distinction between means
and ends

:

:

S.73
Science

• species-specific, human
• making plans
• not... independent value-free,
dissociated
• activity
• [cannot] be carried on apart
from the rest of h u m a n life
• [for] guiding
• long-term
• attack on h o w to live and h o w
to look
• at the world
• no distinction [from] human
strategies

WORLD-VIEW
• based on the notion
• w e can plan
•understanding
• distinguished from magical
views
•refusesto acknowledge a
division between two kinds
of logic
• same w a y in all forms of
conduct
• not... by ... formula
• active view of h o w
• apply the logic
• long-term
• planning strategies
•tothe conduct of the whole of
your life
• distinguished from earlier forms
• trying to achieve a unitary view
•of the world
•one form of truth
• no distinction between m a n and
nature
• no distinction between the
logic of magic and other
logics
• no distinction between means
and ends
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S.74
Science
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[is] a world picture

[is or entails
planning]

is an integrated
approach

[is not] magical

S.75
Science

S.76
Science
•

483
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is [or entails]... a
belief system

is systematic,...
accepts innovation
... and is
intolerant
-

WORLDPICTURE
• [and not] an isolated or
• [not]... isolated or independent
independent activity
• [which] has the characteristic of • activity
being active
• active
• [which] thinks of knowledge as • knowledge
being directedtowardplanned • directed toward planned action
• [humans] guide their conduct
action
• [whichrestson] the human
by looking ahead and making
species-specific concept...
choices
that human beings are
planners, that they guide their
conduct by looking ahead and
making choices
• [being the] expression of that [PLANNING]
quite general human approach • general human approach
• [by which humans] guide their • guide their conduct by looking
conduct by looking ahead and
ahead and making choices
making choices
• cannot... make any bifurcation INTEGRATED APPROACH
and say this part of life is
• cannot [separate] life [into]
scientific and specialised and
scientific [and not]; nature
[and] man; means [and] ends
that is not nature belongs
here, m a n belongs there; or
means belong here but ends
stand above all that over there
• [because in science] you cannot [NOT] M A G I C A L
• cannot make a distinction
between power arid
between power and
knowledge [but magic does]
knowledge
BELIEF S Y S T E M
• [that is] not simply [a]
• not simply [a] collection of
collection of norms which
norms
[varies from other belief
• structure of norms
systems] only in ... [its]
•relationshipto each other
substantive focus
• vary greatly
• [but is a] structure of norms
which bear some relationship •interrelatedness
to each other and vary greatly • substantive beliefs
in the degree to which they
• systematic
• tightly linked
are systematic
• [which is systematic because
• general statements
of] the interrelatedness ofthe • specific propositions
•derived
various substantive beliefs
• that consists] of a few tightly • the believer
* [to]referto the general rule to
linked general statements
from which a fairly large
determine the stance he
should take [when] confronted
number of specific
by a new situation
propositions can be derived
• [and which allows] the believer • high degree of system
[to]refertothe general rule • adjustments
to determine the stance he
should take [when] confronted
by a new situation
• that has a high degree of
system [which means that] a
change in one proposition
requires adjustments in all
others

SYSTEMATIC,
INNOVATIVE,
INTOLERANT
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S.77
Science

S.78
Science
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is ... a belief system

• [in which] validation comes
from empirical events and the
ability to systematically
relate propositions according
to an internally consistent
logic
• [which] can be reconstructed
and perpetuated by any social
group with only a few hints,
[eg.] the logic of experiment
can be applied by anyone
w h o knows it

BELIEF S Y S T E M
• validation comes from
empirical events
• the ability to ... relate
propositions
• systematically
• according to [a]... logic
• internally consistent
•reconstructedand perpetuated
• any social group
•logic
• experiment
•applied
• by anyone w h o knows it

[is or entails] ...
knowledge

• the broad field
•human
• concerned with facts held
together by principles (rules)
[which are discovered and
tested] by the scientific
method, an orderly system of
solving problems
• [which] include
• (1) mathematics and logic;
• (2) the physical sciences, such
as physics and chemistry;
• (3) the biological sciences,
such as botany and zoology;
and
• (4) the social sciences, such as
sociology and anthropology.

KNOWLEDGE

is ... a cultural
artefact

• in a sense
• [and would have been created
differendy by] a different
society, with a different
'cultural hypothesis'

1. [is] the state or
fact of knowing;
knowledge or
cognizance...;

• of something specified or
implied
• (more or less extensive) as a
personal attribute (in
Theology and occasionally in
Philosophy)
• of something specified or
implied
• (more or less extensive) as a
personal attribute (in
Theology and occasionally in
Philosophy)
• acquired by study
• of any department of learning

.

S.79
Science

S.80
Science

or,

484
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1. [is] knowledge

2a. [is] knowledge

2b. [is] trained skill;
3a. a particular branch • often opposedtoart
of knowledge or
study; a recognised
department of
learning
• requiring trained skill
3b. a craft, trade, or
occupation

• broad field
•human
• facts
• held together by principles
(rules)
• discovered and tested
• scientific method
• orderly system
• solving problems
• mathematics and logic
• physical sciences
• biological sciences
• social sciences

CULTURAL ARTEFACT
•in a sense
•created
• different society, with a
different 'cultural hypothesis'

KNOWLEDGE
•o/something

KNOWLEDGE
• [from] study
•of any field
SKILL

KNOWLEDGE
•branch of

OCCUPATION
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4. a branch of study

• which is concerned either with | STUDY
a connected body of
| • connected body
demonstrated truths or with
• of demonstrated truths
observed facts systematically •observed
classified
•facts
• and more or less colligated by
* systematically classified
being brought under general
• colligated by being brought
laws,
under general laws
• and which includes trustworthy i • trustworthy
methods for the discovery of
•methods
n e w truth within its o w n
• for the discovery of n e w truth
domain
• within its o w n domain
5a. [is] knowledge or • [of one a m o n g many] kind(s)
KNOWLEDGE OR
intellectual
• of which the 'sciences' are
INTFTTFCTUAL
activity
examples
ACTIVITY
• [which] m a y be learned by
• one of many kinds
study [in an early use of the
•study
word, in sense 3]
• as distinguished from other
• [as] sciences (in sense 4) as
departments of learning [in
distinguished from other
modem use]
departments of learning [in
m o d e m use]
D O C T R I N E O R INVESTIGAT[is] scientific doctrine • [in sense 4, in modern use]
ION
or investigation
• [in m o d e m use, often equated NATURAL AND PHYSICAL
5b. [is] "Natural and
with]
Physical Science'
SCIENCE
• [as a former andrestricteduse PHILOSOPHY
5c. [is] portions of
of the term]
ancient and m o d e m
philosophy, logic,
etc.

S.81
Science

[is] institutions

• [which are] human, social,
INSTTrUTIONS
political
• human, social, political
• with complicated histories and • with complicated histories and
relations to the rest of society
relations to the rest of society
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[is or entails]
scientific method

• [according to] the
commonsensical and 2500
year old story
• [which entails] a set of
assumptions
• that have always underpinned
and guided Western thinking
about scientific method
• based on the following
assumptions:
• Nature is an objective system
of facts
• H u m a n s can objectively
observe andreportfacts
• Scientific knowledge is based
on facts alone
• Theories are generalisations of
facts and are proven true or
'confirmed' by tests
• Science makes progress...
• Scientific knowledge is
objective and proven, and
therefore has no social,
personal or political bias
• W h a t science proves true about
Nature is the sole basis for
technology and social
progress.

SCIENTIFIC M E T H O D
• commonsensical
• 2500 year old story
• a set of
• assumptions
• have always underpinned and
guided
•Western
• thinking
• based on ... assumptions
•Nature
• objective
• system
•facts
• humans
• objectively
• observe and report
•facts
•knowledge
• based on facts alone
• true or 'confirmed'
• b y tests
• theories are generalisations
• makes progress
•proven
•true
•confirmed
• by tests
• makes progress
• no social, personal or political
bias
•about Nature
• sole basis for technology and
social progress

[is or entails] a ...
myth

• [that is] cultural
• [about] scientific method
• [that is] vast cultural
• [that is] messy, complex
h u m a n historical
• which has been shaped, and is
shaped by cultural, economic
and ideological forces

MYTH

is [an] institution

is ... contention

• [that is] seething
• social-political

• scientific method
• cultural
INSTITUTION
• messy, complex
• human historical
•shaped by
• cultural [forces]
• economic [forces]
• ideological forces
CONTENTION
•seething
• social-political
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S.84
Science

S.85
[Science]

DISCOVERIES
• [which] have a structure
• [which have] linkages of certain • structure
•linkages
changes of existing theory
with certain specified material | • certain changes of existing
theory
practices
•
certain
specified material
• [which] have to do with human
practices
interaction with nature, and
• have to do with human
with human imposing of
interaction
grids on nature
• [which occur] when a change of • with nature
•human
human ideas, a change (rf
• imposing of grids
human cultural belief is
•on nature
associated with certain
• change of
actions and things in the
• human ideas
world
•human
• which involve human ideas,
•cultural
human theories, human
•belief
plans, and human practical
• associated with certain actions
implementation of those
• things in the world
ideas
•human
• [which are] like new product
•ideas
lines
•human
•theories
•human
• plans
• practical implementation
• like new product lines
ENTERPRISE

[is or entails]
discoveries

[is or entails] an
enterprise
can be seen as the
search

SEARCH
• algorithmic compressions
• observational data
[is or entails] the goal • [which is] the production of an G O A L
abbreviated description of the •production
world based on certain
•abbreviated
unifying principles we call
•description
laws
•of the world
• unifying principles w e call
• [which avoids] the
indiscriminate accumulation
laws
of every available feet
• [not] indiscriminate
accumulation of every
available fact
BELIEF
is predicated upon the • that the Universe is
algorithmically compressible • the Universe
belief
• that there is an abbreviated
• algorithmically compressible
representation of the logic
•abbreviated
behind the Universe's
• representation of
properties that can be written • logic behind the Universe's
properties
down infiniteform by
human beings
• can be written down
• infiniteform
• by human beings
S.86
Science

• for algorithmic compressions
of observational data

[is or entails] progress • [which] requires both
reductionistic and holistic
approaches
•

._,

PROGRESS
• bothreductionisticand holistic
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[is or entails] the idea i • which was mathematical in
of a hidden order in
form and could be uncovered
by ingenious investigation
nature
• [that as exemplified by
Newton's laws of motion]
demands special and
systematic measurement
• [and] some sort of abstract
theoretical framework
•

S.87
[Science]

IDEA O F H I D D E N O R D E R IN
NATURE
• mathematical in form
• could be uncovered by
ingenious investigation
• special and systematic
• measurement
• abstract theoretical framework
!

;

[is or entails a] type
of thinking

[is or entails] an
enterprise

S.88
Science

488

• that things are as they are as a
result of some sort of logical
necessity or inevitability
• mostly [without] G o d
• [that] implies that the world
forms a closed and complete
system of explanation, in
which everything is
accounted for...
• [that] also means that in
principle w e need not actually
observe the world to be able
to work out its form and
content
• [that entails] a crucial
assumption: that the world is
both rational and intelligible
• often expressed as the 'principle
of sufficient reason'
• is built upon the assumed
rationality of nature

TYPE O F THINKING
• things are as they are as a result
of some sort of logical
necessity
• mostly [without] G o d
• world forms a closed and
complete system of
explanation
• w e need not actually observe
•the world
•tobe able to work out its form
and content
• assumption that the world is
both rational and intelligible
• principle of sufficient reason

ENTERPRISE
• based upon the assumed
rationality
•of nature

• [that is one among] other
DISCOURSE
bodies of organised, rational • [one among] other bodies
discourse, such as religion,
...such as religion, politics,
politics, law, or "the
law, or "the humanities''
•organised
humanities''
•rational
• [that is] the product of a
KNOWLEDGE
[is or entails]
collective human enterprise
•product
knowledge
• to which scientists m a k e
• collective
•human
individual contributions
• which are purified and extended •enterprise
by mutual criticism and
• individual contributions
intellectual cooperation
• purified and extended
• mutual criticism
• intellectual cooperation
•
[which]
is
a
consensus
of
G
OAL
[is or entails] the goal
rational opinion over the
•consensus
widest possible field
•rationalopinion
• over the widest possible field
[is or entails]
discourse
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[is or entails] the
scientific
community

• [whose] internal sociology
[arises from this] consensus,
including
• the ways that scientists are
educated, choose research
topics, communicate with
one another, criticise and
refine theirfindings,and
relate to one another as
members of a specialised
social group

[is or entails a] place • [that entails] economics of
... in society at
research and development
large
• organisation of scientific
institutions
• priorities and planning of
research
• agonising ethical dilemmas
facing the socially
responsible scientist
S.89
Science

Science

[Science]

S.90
Science
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is ...universaland
unique

• as w e often claim

[is or entails an ]
institution

• [that is] social [and] unique [in
modern times]
• in no other civilisation
• system of mutually
communicating, criticising
and socially-interacting
observers, dedicated to the
principles of consensibility
and consensuality

SCIENTIFIC C O M M U N I T Y
• internal sociology
• consensus
• scientists
i •areeducated
• chooseresearchtopics
• communicate
I • with one another
• criticise and refine their
findings
•relate
•toone another
• members of a specialised social
group
P L A C E IN S O C I E T Y A T
LARGE
• economics
•researchand development
•organisation
• scientific institutions
• priorities and planning
• research
• ethical dilemmas
• socially responsible scientist

UNIVERSAL,
UNIQUE
• as we often claim
• [in m o d e m times]
MONOLITHIC,
is monolithic and
• unique roots in seventeenthMONOPOLISTIC
monopolistic
century Europe
• unique roots in seventeenth• has effectively eliminated all
century Europe
competitors
• eliminated all competitors
ACTIVITY"
[is or entails] activity •self-critical
• has not been ... challenged... • self-critical
independentOy]
• not... challenged...
independentfly]
INSTITUTION
•social
•unique
•modem
• in no other civilisation
•system
• mutually
• communicating
• criticising
• socially-interacting
•observers
•dedicated
• principles
• consensibility and
consensuality
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i • stored and communicated in a
variety of more or less
artificial and formalised
languages
• or as reproducible material
maps
• [where] the doorway between
the public noetic domain and
the private mental domain of
each individual is open in the
first instance only to
messages expressed in the
natural language of his
particular social group

KNOWLEDGE
•stored
•communicated
•artificial
•formalised
•languages
• reproducible
• material maps
• public noetic domain
• private mental domain
• each individual
•natural
•language
• particular social group

•

is [a] world picture

[is or entails]
knowledge

S.93
Science
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[is or entails] the ...
strategy

• [but] is no more than one of
many
• in the noetic domain
• not privileged by comparison
with any other systematic
schemetowhich a social
group can subscribe
• [on a] strict application of the
principles of sociology of
knowledge
* astonishing revelations of the
nature of things, and the
attendant metaphysical
interpretations which contrast
so dramatically with
alternative, "non-scientific"
world pictures
•
[in]
m ohas]
d e m mundane
science
• (which

W O R L D PICTURE
•one of many
• noetic domain
• not privileged by comparison
with any other
• systematic scheme
• a social group
• subscribe
• [according to] principles of
sociology of knowledge
• revelations
• of the nature of things
• attendant metaphysical
interpretations
• contrast... with alternative,
"non-scientific" world
pictures
K• mNoOdWeLm E D G E

foundations
• [which is] consensual
• not necessarily true in every
detail
• m a y yet contain gross
conceptual errors and fallacies
• not to be judged simply by
inspection of its most
extreme and schematised
theoretical consequences

• mundane foundations
•consensual
• not necessarily true
•conceptual
• errors and fallacies
• [not only] extreme and
schematised theoretical
consequences

• towards the creation of a
m a x i m u m consensus in the
public domain
• based on ... a pre-existing
mental harmony between
independent human beings on
at least some matters of
c o m m o n interest

STRATEGY
•creation
• consensus
• public domain
• based on... a pre-existing
mental harmony
• between independent human
beings
• matters of c o m m o n interest
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INQUIRY
[is or entails] inquiry • [that includes] observational
• observational procedures
procedures
• patterns of argument
• patterns of argument
• methods of representation and • methods of representation and
calculation
calculation
• metaphysical presuppositions • metaphysical presuppositions
• [that are] analysed and discussed • analysed and discussed
[in the philosophy of science] • validity ...fromlogic, practical
methodology, and
• and the grounds of their validity
metaphysics [in the
are evaluated [in the
philosophy of science]
philosophy of science] from
the points of view of formal
logic, practical methodology,
and metaphysics
[is or entails]
scientific method

• a definite pattern

SCIENTIFIC M E T H O D
• definite pattern

[is or entails] no...
scientific method

N O SCIENTIFIC M E T H O D

[is or entails]
knowledge

KNOWLEDGE
• systematic and formulated
• of natural phenomena
• based on particular methods of
inquiry and thinking
METHODS
•attitudes
• open-mindedness and
impartiality
• respect for data
• tentativeness about accepting
results as final
• disciplined approach
• critical appraisal
• theoretical and practical
• ways of thinking

• [that is] systematic and
formulated
• of natural phenomena
• based on particular methods of
inquiry and thinking
[is or entails] methods •firmlygrounded in attitudes
such as open-mindedness and
impartiality, such as respect
for data tempered with
tentativeness about accepting
results as final
•requirea disciplined approach
• critical appraisal is a
fundamental part
• a mixture of theoretical and
practical
• centred around these particular
ways of thinking
[is or entails] ways of • [which are] used to explain
natural phenomena by the
thinking
development of theoretical
models and explanations

[is or entails]
disciplines
or activities

[is or entails]
statements

S.99
Science

29/9/95 154 P M

W A Y S O F THINKING
• [which are] used to
• explain.
• natural phenomena
• development
• theoretical models and
explanations

DISCIPLINES
• wide variety
• intellectual
ACTIVITIES
• wide variety
•intellectual
• wide variety
• [that are] precise
STATEMENTS
• [and] susceptible to some form •precise
of empirical verification
• susceptible to
• empirical verification
• wide variety

[entails] philosophical • [which] only when philosophy P H I L O S O P H I C A L A S P E C T S
more or less as w e now know • university specialism [since]
aspects
it became a university
nineteenth century
specialism in the nineteenth
century [were left to]
specialist philosophers
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S.100
This entry is actually discussing literary and scientific texts, but a close reading reveals an implied
summary statement of science.
BELIEF
[Science]
[is or entails] belief i • [which is demanded by]
• statement
statement [or] propositional
• propositional discourse
discourse
S.101
Science

S.102
[Science]

[is or entails] laws and • [which are] characteristic
structures of science in
theories
general
• in that any process or program
of empirical, explanatory
inquiry would only count as
science if it were producing
structures that comprise
confirmable empirical laws
and testable theoretical laws
and therefore structures that
constitute physical theories

[is or entails]
developments

• [in] n e w directions
• [that are] not simply of a
cognitive or conceptual
nature - n e wfields(rf research
• but also of an institutional
character in fact, both feed
back on each other, cognitive
developments shaping and
being shaped by institutional
developments
[of which the] four main
developments in science and
technology today [are]
• scientific labour inside the
laboratory is typically being
undertaken by
interdisciplinary research
teams or trans-laboratory
networks whose research is
less easily divided into the
basic-applied dichotomy of
the past
• science and technology have
become less easy to
distinguish in practice than in
the past
• the commercial exploitation of
scientific knowledge has
become necessary for the
survival of firms in certain
industrial sectors of the
economy, those that are
likelytoprovide the n e w
manufacturing processes and
products of the twenty-first
century, such as bioscience,
information technology and
n e w material sciences
• science and technology have
become subjecttoa growing
promotion, monitoring and
regulation by national and
international agencies

LAWS AND THEORIES
• characteristic structures
• process or program of
empirical, explanatory
inquiry
• would only count as science if
• producing
• structures that comprise
• confirmable empirical laws
• testable theoretical laws
• structures that constitute
physical theories

DEVELOPMENTS
• new directions
• cognitive or conceptual
• new fields
•of research
• institutional
* cognitive developments
shaping and being shaped by
institutional developments
• scientific labour
• inside the laboratory
• interdisciplinary research teams
• trans-laboratory networks
•researchis less easily divided
into the basic-applied
dichotomy of the past
• less easy to distinguish in
practice than in the past
• commercial exploitation
• scientific knowledge
• necessary for the survival of
firms in certain industrial
sectors of the economy
• new manufacturing processes
and products of the twentyfirst century
• bioscience, information
technology and n e w material
sciences
• subjecttogrowing promotion,
monitoring andregulationby
national and international
agencies
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| • ever-unfinished
• to discover facts and establish
relationships between them

• to trace in the chaos and flux of
phenomena a consistent
structure with order and
meaning, that is, to interpret
andtotranscend direct
experience

[is or entails] efforts | • our most persistent intellectual
• as in art and philosophy
• are directed toward the discovery
of pattern, order, system,
structure, whether it be as
primitive as the discernment
of recurring seasons or as
sweeping as a cosmological
synthesis
[is or entails] the
attempt

| • to understand the world of
experience in each of its
aspects
• [which is] but one facet of the
great intellectual adventure
[is or entails] the
• [which separate] the sciences
motivations of the
from the nonsciences
investigators
[is or entails] concepts • [which separate] the sciences
from the nonsciences
and rules... and
• the scientist uses
the type of
argument

[is or entails] a set of • [which separate] the sciences
from the nonsciences
... schemes
• [which] accumulate in science
• in the course of time
• despite great innovation and
revolutions
• [which are] internationally
acceptable, basic, and fairly
enduring conceptual
• [which] can hardly be said for
m a n y other h u m a n
endeavours

•

•

QUEST
• ever-unfinished
• to discover facts
• establish relationships between
them

MAIN BUSINESS
•to trace
• in the chaos and flux of
phenomena
• consistent structure with order
and meaning
•interpret
•transcend
• direct experience

EFFORTS
• our most persistent intellectual
• as in art and philosophy
• are directed toward
•discovery
• of pattern, order, system,
structure
•discernment
• ofrecurringseasons
• cosmological synthesis

ATTEMPT
•understand
• the world of experience
• but one facet
• intellectual adventure

MOTIVATIONS OF THE
INVESTIGATORS
• [which separate] the sciences
from the nonsciences

CONCEPTS, RULES, TYPE
OF ARGUMENT
• [which separate] the sciences
from the nonsciences
• the scientist
•uses

SET OF SCHEMES
• [which separate] the sciences
from the nonsciences
•accumulate
• in the course of time
• innovation and revolutions
• internationally acceptable
•basic
• fairly enduring
•conceptual
• other h u m a n endeavours
_
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[is or entails] methods • [meaning] the sequence and rule ! METHODS
•sequence
by which scientists n o w and
in the past have actually done •rule
1 • by which scientists
their work
• as for every task, there are here • n o w and in the past
• have actually done their work
not one but m a n y methods
• as for every task
and uncountable variants
\ • even these different methods are • many methods and uncountable
variants
usually read into the story
• read into the story
after the work has been
completed, and soreflectthe • after the work has been
completed
actual working procedures
only in aratherartificial and • actual working procedures
i • rather artificial and debatable
debatable way
way
[is or entails]
knowledge

• [which is] an historically
evolving body

KNOWLEDGE

[is or entails] theory

• [which] can only be adequately
appraised if due attention is
paid to its historical context
• [and whose] appraisal is
intimately linked with the
circumstances under which a
theoryfirstmakes its
appearance

THEORY

[is or entails] thought • [that is evolving]

• historically
• evolving
•body
• can only be adequately
appraised if
• historical context
• circumstances under which a
theoryfirstmakes its
appearance

THOUGHT
• evolving
PICTURE
[is or entails] a picture • [that is] broad and coherent
• of the universe and of life in it • broad and coherent
• of the universe and... life
• incomplete
• in some aspects open to serious • incomplete
• open to ... question
question
• best picture available
• the best picture available
•of unification
PROCESS
[is or entails a]
• [that] has not been restricted to •unification
process
the integration of beliefs
•restricted
about the world
• integration
• [but also concerns] those
• beliefs
beliefs with the methods
• about the world
employed to attain wellgrounded beliefs
METHODS
[is or entails] methods • for arriving at well-grounded
beliefs about the world
• well-grounded beliefs
• have come more and moretobe • about the world
shaped by those very beliefs
•shaped
• [and that] have evolved with the • by those very beliefs
evolution of knowledge
• evolved
• evolution
• knowledge
• [methods] of gaining
KNOWLEDGE, METHODS
[is or entails]
knowledge
• gaining knowledge
knowledge and...
•
[that
are]
intimately]
relat[ed]
•
intimately related
methods
• [that] flies in the face of the
•traditional
traditional sharp bifurcation
• sharp bifurcation of the two
between the two
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[is or entails a]
method

• [that] is, and has long been,
METHOD
commonly assumed [to be] a • long been, commonly
unique method, the
•assumed
'scientific' or 'empirical' or •unique
'experimental* method
•method
• allegedly discovered or at least •empirical
first systematically applied in •experimental
the seventeenth century
• discovered or at least... applied
• formulated wholly
•first...in the seventeenth
independently of, and is
century
wholly unaffected by, the
•applied
knowledge which is arrived at • systematically
by its means
•formulated
• as though... a set of abstract
• wholly independentiy of, and
and immutable rules, like the
... unaffected by
rules of chess, independent of •knowledge
the strategies of the g a m e but • arrived at by its means
governing what strategies are •set
possible
• abstract and immutable rules
• [no] agreement as to precisely • independent of
what that method is
• governing
• an eternal scientific method
•agreement
which, once discovered, needs • eternal scientific
only to be applied to generate •method
knowledge
• once [discovered]
• [about which] the most
• [once] discovered
strenuous efforts of scientists • applied to generate
and philosophers have failed
•knowledge
• the most strenuous methods
to produce agreement
• will not alter in the light of
• of scientists and philosophers
that knowledge
• failed
• to produce agreement
• empty or false [theories]
• will not alter
• in the light of that
•knowledge
;
• empty or false
• theories

[are or entail or inhere
in] knowledge

• [t]he kind of [which] produced
in any given scientific era
• is the outcome not only of the
specific interaction of the
sciences but also of the
relation of science to
technology, philosophy, art
and other intellectual and
practical concerns
• for example, the relation
between science and
technology
• [and] therelationsbetween the
sciences alter with each
change in the overall
character of the formation of
knowledge
• [of which] n e w constellations
... [arise] in every new
period, only to be dispersed
w h e n knowledge changes
: again

:

.
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[are or entail or inhere
in] discourse

KNOWLEDGE
•produced
• scientific era
•outcome
• specific interaction
•of the sciences
• relation of science to
technology
• [relation of science to]
philosophy
• [relation of scienceto]art
• [relation of science to] other
intellectual and practical
concerns
•relationbetween science and
technology
•relationsbetween the sciences
• alter with each change
• formation
•knowledge
• n e w constellations
• n e w period
•dispersed
• knowledge
• changes again
|DISCOURSE

....,„
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[are or entail or inhere
in] practice
S.107
[TJhe
[are or entail a]
sciences
disposition

•

-

,

•

S.108
[are or entail a]
[T]he
disposition
sciences

S.109
Science

is ... activity

\ PRACTICE

• [at] present
• [as officially conceived]
• is largely anachronistic
• still influential
• for the university system
• is ... formally administered
according to it
• Historically
• it derives from
• latter phase of the Classical
scientific era of the
nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries
• For s o m e time
• the departmental system
•has ceased
• any real cognitive relevance
• to the actualresearchactivities
• going on within university
confines or outside in the
research institutions
• in the contemporary era of
science
• this n o w Classic scientific
disposition has lost its
meaning

DISPOSITION
•present
• officially
•conceived
•anachronistic
• influential
• university
• system
•administered
•historically
•derives from
•latter phase
• Classical scientific era
• nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries
•time
• departmental system
•ceased
| • cognitive
• relevance
•researchactivities
• within university confines
•outside
•research
• institutions
• contemporary era of science
• Classic scientific
• disposition
• [comprising] elements
DISPOSITION
•contemporary
• elements
• a long time in the making
• contemporary
• Only the constellations are
• long time
relatively new
•making
• that is, the conjunction of all
• constellations
these elements as a dominant • relatively n e w
system of sciences
• conjunction
• the main characteristics of
• elements
contemporary World science
•dominant
back into the nineteenth
•system
century
•contemporary
• forms of technification,
• World science
formalisation, abstraction,
• nineteenth century
problem-solving and
• technification
finalisation have always been • formalisation
there to some degree
• abstraction
• problem-solving
•finalisation
• always been there
• [that is] social
• whose aim is
• the production of the
knowledge
• of the kinds and ways of acting
of independently existing and
active things
f

ACTIVITY
•social
•aim
•production
•knowledge
•acting
* of independently existing and
active things
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[was or entailed]
pursuit

• [but] no longer
• [that was] marginal [and] of
little practical use carried on
by a handful of enthusiasts
• and it no longer needs to justify
itself by a direct answer to
the challenge of other fields
of knowledge claiming
exclusive access to the truth.

PURSUIT
• no longer
•marginal
• little practical use
•carried on
• handful of enthusiasts
• no longer
•other fields
•knowledge
• access
•truth

[is or entails a] world

• [that] has grown in size and in
power
• [whose] problems have changed
from the epistemological to
the social

WORLD

[is or entails]
knowledge

[is or entails growth]

•changed
• problems
• epistemological
•social
•world of science
•grown
• [whose] character [is] embodied KNOWLEDGE
in a particular scientific result •embodied
[that] is largely independent • scientific
•result
of the social context of its
•independent
first achievement
• social context
• [whose] increase and
• achievement
improvement... is a very
specialised and delicate social • increase and improvement
process
•social
• whose continued health and
•process
vitality under new conditions • new conditions
is by no means to be taken
•taken for granted
forgranted
GROWTH
• to its present size and
• present size and importance
importance through its
application to the solution of • application
• solution of
other sorts of problems, and
these extensions react back
•react
on science and become part of •become
•disciplined
it
• [which to understand] w e must • inquiry
consider those sorts (rf
•goals
disciplined inquiry whose
•power
• knowledge
goals include power as well
as knowledge.
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GROWTH
• [that is] so much faster than
mere people
; • faster than mere people
• because old knowledge breeds
•old
new
• knowledge
• [and] very recent knowledge
•breeds
breeds new so much raster
•new
than it does when it later
• very recent
becomes packed down into
•packed down
the archive
• into the archive
• [that happens] very regularly, • regularly
in a very structured way, and • structured way
from its epidermis rather than • from its epidermis rather than
from its body
from its body
• [in] the normal growth pattern •normal
of scientificresearchand
•growth
most published work
•pattern
• [but] not usually happen [as]
•scientific
the ab initio growth of new •research
knowledge coming from
• published work
almost nowhere [such as] the •growth
native genius of isolated
• from almost nowhere
minds.
•
• in the sort of knowledge that is I Nnative
N O V Agenius
T I O N of isolated minds
published in scientific papers •knowledge
• [that] arises when new facts,
• published
new experiments, new
• in scientific papers
theories are added to the
•new
immediately preceding old
• facts
ones in a very structured way. • experiments
•theories
• old ones
•structured

• [that are] scientific papers
• that are being cited, counted,
and otherwise manipulated in
such studies
• [or] as that which is published
in scientific papers
• [which m a y be defined] in turn,
either crudely as articles in
journals in the World List of
Scientific Periodicals, or
more artfully by making use
of the knitted research-front
structure.
[is or entails] structure • [that] makes science different
from the nonscientific
scholarship that is published
in other periodicals that are
probably not in the World
List

PAPERS
• scientific
•cited
•counted
•manipulated
•published
•articles
•journals
• in the World List of Scientific
Periodicals
• knittedresearch-frontstructure
STRUCTURE
•published
•other periodicals
•World List
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[is or entails] theories • [that] are ways of looking at
the world
• [that affect] our general beliefs
and expectations
• and thereby also our
experiences and our
conceptions of reality
• [so that] what isregardedas
'nature' at a particular time is
our own product in the sense
that all the features ascribed
to it havefirstbeen invented
by us and then used for
bringing order into our
surroundings
[is or entails]
institutional
imperatives

• [in] m o d e m [times]
•sets
• universalism, communism,
disinterestedness, organised
scepticism
• [In universalism] truth claims
... are to be subjected to
preestablished impersonal
criteria: consonant with
observation and with
previously confirmed
knowledge
• [In communism] the
substantivefindingsof
science are a product of social
collaboration and are assigned
to the community
• [Disinterestedness entails] a
distinctive pattern of
institutional control of a wide
range of motives which
characterises the behaviour of
scientists
• [Organised scepticism entails]
the suspension of judgement
until 'the facts are at hand'
and the detached scrutiny of
beliefs in terms of empirical
and logical criteria
;

S.115
Science

S.116
Science
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THEORIES
• ways of looking
• at die world
• general beliefs and expectations
•experiences
• conceptions
• of reality
•used
• for bringing [order]
•order

INSTITUTIONAL
IMPERATIVES
• modem
• sets
• universalism
• communism
• disinterestedness
•organised
•scepticism
• truth claims
• subjected
•preestablished
•impersonal
•criteria
•observation
• previously
•confirmed
•knowledge
•social
• collaboration
•assigned
• community
•pattern
• institutional
•control
• motives
•behaviour
• scientists
• suspension of judgement
•detached
:
•scrutiny
• beliefs
•empirical
•logical
•criteria

[is or entails a]
system

• [in the sense of] content and
not to the human
arrangements for arriving at it
• of cognitions, that is, of true
experiential statements
• [not] philosophy

SYSTEM
•content
• not the human [arrangements]
• arrangements
• cognitions
•true
•experiential
• statements
• [nof] philosophy

[is or entails]
endeavour

• [that is] rational

ENDEAVOUR
• rational
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i • [that] conformstothe classical
model of rationality
• [as] it has long been held
• [that] are notrationalwhen
viewed in terms of the
classical model
• [that provides] an important
constraint on our attempts to
construct a n e w model of
rationality
• [where] scientific practice
[plays a part in developing] a
model of rationality

PRACTICE
•rationality
• long been held
DECISIONS
•rational
• classical model
•RATIONALITY
•practice

• such as particular claims and
CRITICISM
arguments
• claims and arguments
| • [that] become smaller and more• smaller and more focussed
focussed
• natural sciences
• in the natural sciences
• over time
• over time
• community of inquirers
• [where] a community of
• assumptions
inquirers share enough
• solving... puzzles
•well-defined
assumptions that they can
devote their energies to
solving well-defined puzzles

WORK

• the organisational, instrumental
and cognitive - in short,
people, machines and ideas
• the organisation of science [is]
the socio-political system and
institutional arrangements
under which science is
produced
• [the] instrumentation [is] the
n e w technological machinery
and the n e w techniques of
research m a d e available in all
the sciences
• the cognitive changes [are] the
n e w theories, ideas and
hypotheses, which, although
altered, were largely
developments of previous
ones

•organisational
•instrumental
• cognitive
•people
•machines
• ideas
• socio-political system
• institutional arrangements
•produced
•new
• technological machinery
•techniques
•research
•theories
•ideas
•hypotheses
• developments
• previous ones

• [which is] social
• [and] produced by processes that
are intrinsically social
• and once a theory, hypothesis,
or set of data has been
accepted by a community, it
becomes a public resource
• to use in support of other
theories and hypotheses and
as a basis of action.
• [and] is social both in the ways
it is created and in the uses it
serves

KNOWLEDGE

•social
•produced
•processes
•theory
• hypothesis
•set
• data
•accepted
• community
• public resource
•use
• in support
:•action
•created
• uses it serves
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[is or entails a]
procedure

PROCEDURE
• [that is] the scientific method
• scientific method
of investigating the world
• investigating
• [that is] immensely powerful
i • for helping us to understand the • the world
complex universe in which
• powerful
w e live
•understand
• [and has] enormous power and • the complex universe in which
w e live
scope
• [and] uncompromising honesty • power and scope
• [that requires passing] rigorous •honesty
tests of approval b y the
• rigorous
scientific community [for]
• tests of approval
every n e w discovery, every
! • scientific community
theory... to pass
•new
• [that] generally ... leads us in i -discovery
•theory
the direction of reliable
knowledge
•leads
•reliable
• knowledge

is [or entails]
disciplines
is [or entails]
activities

• [of which there are] a wide
variety
• [of which there are] a wide
variety
• [that are] intellectual
• making precise statements
which are susceptible to
s o m e sort of check or proof
• [which] often implies that the
situations with which the
special science is concerned
can be m a d e to recur in order
to submit themselves to
check
• [as in] astronomy or geology
• in which repetition of a
situation at will is
intrinsically impossible, and
the possible precision is
limitedtoprecision of
description
• [where] the subject matter of
the individual science is
something in the world of
phenomena

is [or entails] making

[is or entails
observations]

••

i

DISCIPLINES
• variety
ACTIVITIES
• variety
• intellectual
MAKING
•statements
•precise
•check
'ptooi
•special
• madetorecur
• submit
•check
OBSERVATIONS
• astronomy
• geology
• repetition
• intrinsically impossible
• precision
•description
• individual
• the world of phenomena
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[is or entails either
exactitude or
description]

• [where] examples of the former E X A C T I T U D E , or
DESCRIPTION
are physics and,toa lesser
degree, chemistry; and (rf the • physics
latter, taxonomical botany or •chemistry
zoology
• taxonomical botany
• [where] die exact sciences are ini • taxonomical zoology
general characterised by the
•exact
possibility of exact
• measurement
measurement, [where]
•description
measurement is
• use of numbers
fundamentally description
• [that studies] systems
given by the use of numbers
• mathematical analysis
• [that studies] systems subject to• method of description
exact measurement [and]
• [method of] classification
mathematical analysis: this
• [precision of] reference
susceptibility is one of the
•reference
most important characteristics
of the exact sciences
• [and alternatively] one of the
most important tasks of a
descriptive science is to
develop a method of
description or classification
that will permit precision of
reference to the subject matter

[sometimes is or
entails a] means

• of solving problems [which]
MEANS
emphasises its instrumental
• solving problems
aspect
• instrumental
• [and thus] viewed as closely
• with technology
connected with technology
• economic and political
• [with] economic and political
•used
[characteristics]
• wisely and well
• [and therefore] should be used
•social
wisely and well [which] puts •conflict
it into the open arena of
social conflict
• [which is] organised
KNOWLEDGE
• [and] archival
•organised
• [comprising] information about •archival
natural phenomena
• information
• [which is] acquired by research, • about natural phenomena
organised into coherent
•acquired
theoretical schemes, and
•research
published in books and
•organised
journals
• coherent theoretical schemes
[and] is often profoundly
•published
influential through its
• books and journals
: technological applications
• influential
• a politically neutral, public
• technological applications
resource
• politically neutral, public
• a significant historical process
resource
•historical
•process
j

[

;

S.122
Science

[is or entails]
knowledge

•

„
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[is or entails
methodology

• such as experimentation,
observation and theorising
• are considered elements of a
special method for obtaining
reliable information about the
natural world
• [and] from this point of view,
science m a y be regarded as
essentially objective, and
hence transcending all
political considerations

METHODOLOGY

[is or entails] the
discipline

• of determining relations of
relevance and irrelevance

DISCIPLINE
• determining
•relations
•relevanceand irrelevance

• experimentation
• observation
• theorising
•special
! •method
•obtaining
•reliable
• information
• about the natural world
• objective
• political
[is or entails
• by people with a special gift for I D I S C O V E R Y
discovery]
research
•research
• [involving] such important
• personal aptitudes
personal aptitudes as curiosity • curiosity
and intelligence
• intelligence
• [suggesting] that scientists
• members of a distinct
should berecognisedas
profession
members of a distinct
• political
profession, of considerable
political significance
t
[is or entails] product •of research
PRODUCT
• [which] does employ
•research
characteristic methods
• characteristic methods
[is or entails] a body • [that is] organised
BODY, KNOWLEDGE
of ...knowledge
•organised
[is or entails] a means • of solving problems
MEANS
• solving problems
INSTITUTION
[is or entails an]
• [that is] social
institution
• [and] needs material facilities •social
• material facilities
THEME
[is or entails a] theme [that is] educational
• educational
• [that is] cultural [and] requires R E S O U R C E
[is or entails a]
resource
to be managed;
•cultural
•managed
[is or entails] affairs • [that are] h u m a n
AFFAIRS
•human
S.123
Science

S c defn anal Tables A1-9
[is or entails]
development

29/9/95

1:54 P M

i • [consisting largely] (rf
beginning with suppositions
about what is and is not
relevanttoa certain claim
• and of graduallyrefiningthe
claim and our understanding
of what isrelevantto it and
what is not
• [namely] shedding certain
beliefs as irrelevant
• [and] introducing n e w ones
which w efindtobe more so
• of refining our modes of
conceiving and describing the
world around us so as to
bring out more clearly and
firmly the ways in which
things are related to one
another
• of finding out what is a relevant
consideration for the
acceptance orrejectionof
specific beliefs, and even of
finding out that w e must
to the relevant
relevance
[is or entails] criteria •ofstick
• of what is to count as a reason
• [which] w e do not have in
advance unalterable
• w e can do things with certain
approaches
• w e [can] understand material
substances in terms of what
they are made ofratherthan
in terms of their
perfectibility; and looking for
constituents then became a
standard method and criterion
of success in understanding
material substances
,__.„

504
DEVELOPMENT
• suppositions
• what is and is not relevant
•claim
•refining
•understanding
•shedding
• beliefs
• irrelevant
•introducing
•refining
• modes of conceiving and
describing
• the world around us
• bring out more clearly
• the ways in which things are
relatedtoone another
•findingout
• acceptance or rejection
• specific beliefs

CRITERIA
•relevance
• what is to count
•a reason
•in advance
• unalterable
• do things
•approaches
•understand
• material substances
• perfectibility
•looking
• for constituents
•method
• criterion of success
• understanding
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• of developing such standards or
criteria
• [that is]... complex
• [consisting partly of] a revision
of our descriptive language to
bring out better what w e have
teamed
• [and] our w a y s of learning
about nature
• [that is], our coming to k n o w
about the world
• [and] of learning h o w to learn,
to think, and to talk about
nature
• [even though] w e may... turn
outtohave been wrong or
misguided or confused in the
beliefs w e have arrived at, or
the standards of rationality w e
have forged, or the
understanding w e have
developed of what it is to
understand
• [that is], the possibility of
doubt and error is always
open; but w e do have, or at
least develop, better and
worse hypotheses about what
are better and worse
hypotheses, methods,
descriptions
• [that are] not a homogeneous

[is or entails a]
process

•

S.124
Science

[is or entails]
activities

[is or entails]
understanding

•

•

505
PROCESS
• developing
• standards or criteria
• complex
•revision
•descriptive
•language
• learned
• w a y s of learning
• about nature
•know
• about the world
•learning
•learn
•think
•talk
•about nature
•beliefs
• standards of rationality
•understanding
• of what it is to understand
•doubt
•error
•develop

ACTIVITIES
• homogeneous set
set
• for [understanding]
• [that includes] science for
understanding and science for
•understanding
• for [manipulation]
manipulation
• manipulation
• [whose] styles and motivation
•styles
are different.
• motivation
• [that is] an expression of
UNDERSTANDING
h u m a n curiosity
•expression
•human
• the need to devise an
intellectually graspable model • curiosity
of the natural world which
•devise
• intellectually graspable model
enables us to find our w a y
around in it, to think about it • of die natural world
coherently andtorealise h o w
•think
the things w e observe 'hang
•coherently
together'
• the things w e [observe]
• [where] emotionally the
•observe
development of such
• development
intellectual models derives
• intellectual models
from the sense of wonder in
• sense of wonder
the face of nature and has
•creative
m u c h in c o m m o n with the
•judged
creative work of artists
• compatibility
• [and] the tests by which the
•observed
models are judged are
• facts
concerned not only with their •prediction
compatibility with observed
• simplicity
facts and their powers of
•elegance
prediction but with their
•tests
simplicity and elegance - tests •aesthetic
which are essentially aesthetic
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[is or entails a] search • for understanding
• justified by the greater power it
confers on humankind
• source of enlightenment and
liberation: as a noble
expression of the h u m a n
spirit

S.125
Science

i

506

SEARCH

• understanding
•justified
•power
•humankind
• enlightenment
• liberation
• expression
• h u m a n spirit
[is or entails
This is not to suggest that
MOTIVATION
motivation]
science motivated by the
•desire
desire to manipulate aspects
•manipulate
of the world in which w e live •of the world
has nothing in c o m m o n with •understanding
science for understanding or
• human's
that it does not have a
• activities
legitimate place a m o n g
•purposes
human's activities, but rather •attitudes of mind
that their purposes are
• of those w h o
different, the attitudes of mind •practise
of those w h o practise them
• for [manipulation]
m a y well conflict, and above • manipulation
all that science for
•justified
manipulation must be
• demonstrate
justified by its results. It
•benefits
should be required to
•humankind
demonstrate that the benefits •material
it confers on humankind
•social
outweigh their costs •spiritual
material, social and spiritual
[is or entails] method • [that is] scientific
METHOD
• [and in particular] the aims of •scientific
scientific activity
•aims
• about its history
• history
ACTIVITY
[is or entails] activity • [that has an] aim
• for clearly, different scientists
•aim
• scientists
have different aims, and
science itself (whatever that
•activity
m a y mean) has no aims
•rational
• yet... there is something
characteristic of scientific
activity
• [that] looks pretty m u c h like a
rational activity, and since a
rational activity must have
s o m e aim, the attempt to
describe the aim of science
m a y not be entirely futile
[is or entails an] aim • to find satisfactory explanations A I M
• satisfactory
of whatever strikes us as
• explanations
being in need of explanation
•causal
• [where] an explanation (or a
causal explanation) is meant a •set
• statements
set of statements one of
•describes
which describes the state of
•the state of affairs
affairstobe explained ...
•explained
while the others, the
explanatory statements, for
the "explanation" in the
j
narrower sense of the word
—-
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Science

[is or entails] culture : • [that is] h u m a n
• scientificfindings... are
meaningless outside their
cultural context
• [where] a theoretical science
unaware that those of its
constructs considered relevant
and momentous are destined
eventually to be framed in
concepts and words that have
a grip on the educated
community and become part
and parcel of the general
world picture
• where the initiated continue
musing to each other in terms
that are, at best, understood
by a small group of close
fellow travellers, will
necessarily be cut off from
therestof cultural mankind
• in the long run it is bound to
atrophy and ossify however
virulently esoteric chat m a y
continue within its joyfully
isolated groups of experts

;

S.127
Science

[is or entails]

UNDERSTANDING

[is or entails]
endeavour

j
[

|
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CULTURE
• scientific findings
• cultural context
•theoretical
• constructs
•relevantand momentous
•framed
• concepts and words
• educated community
• world picture
• the initiated
•musing
•each other
•understood
• small group of close fellow
travellers
• cultural mankind
• atrophy and ossify
• within its ... isolated groups of
experts

• about the physical, biological, UNDERSTANDING
psychological, and social
• about the physical, biological,
worlds
psychological, and social
• over the course of human
worlds
history, people have
• h u m a n history
developed m a n y
• people
interconnected and validated
•developed
ideas
•interconnected
• successive generations to
• validated
achieve an increasingly
•ideas
comprehensive and reliable
• successive generations
understanding of the h u m a n
•achieve
species and its environment
• comprehensive
• particular ways of observing,
•reliable
thinking, experimenting, and •understanding
validating
• of the h u m a n species and its
• fundamental aspect of the
environment
nature of science
•observing
• other modes of knowing.
•thinking
• experimenting
•validating
•knowing
• [with] mathematics, and
ENDEAVOUR
technology
• mathematics and technology
• although each of these h u m a n
•human
enterprises has a character and •enterprises
history of its own, each is
• character and history of its o w n
dependent on and reinforces
the others
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[is or entails a] world • not something that working
scientists spend a lot of time
view
discussing
i • they just do science
• but underlying their work are
several beliefs that are not
always held by nonscientists
• [namely] that by working
together over time, people
can in factfigureout h o w the
world works
• [and] that the universe is a
unified system and knowledge
gained from studying one part
of it can often be applied to
other parts
• [and] that knowledge is both
stable and subject to change.

W O R L D VIEW
• working
• scientists
• a lot of time
•discussing
•do science
•work
•beliefs
• nonscientists
• working
• over time
•figureout
• h o w the world works
• the universe
• knowledge
•studying
•applied
•stable
• subject to change

[is or entails] inquiry

INQUIRY
• complex
•process
•making
• observations
• organising
• flexible
• rigid sequence of steps
• the scientific method
• doing experiments
•laboratories
• imagination and inventiveness
•inquiry
•logic
• logic and empirical evidence
• individual investigators
• working
• make great discoveries
• enterprise as a whole

• [that is] more complex than
popular conceptions would
have it
•process
• making a great m a n y careful
observations and then
organising them
• more flexible than the rigid
sequence of steps commonly
depicted in textbooks as "the
scientific method"
• more than just "doing
experiments"
• not confined to laboratories
• imagination and inventiveness
• scientific inquiry
• [where] strict logic and
empirical evidence must have
their day
• [where] individual investigators
working alone sometimes
m a k e great discoveries, but
the steady advancement of
science depends on the
enterprise as a whole.
[is or entails] activity • [that is] of the contemporary
world and distinguishes
present times from earlier
periods
• [and] an endeavour for learning
h o w the world works
• [that] provides a living for a
very large number of people

[is or entails an]
enterprise

ACTIVITY
• contemporary world
• present times
•earlier periods
• endeavour
• for [learning]
•learning
• h o w the world works
• people

• [that includes] basic and applied E N T E R P R I S E
natural and social science,
basic and applied
mathematics, and engineering
and technology, and their
interconnections
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i • [together with] mathematics andi IDEAS, P R A C T I C E
• mathematics
technology are ... closely
• technology
intertwined
•intertwined
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Analysis of classes determined from Table A.1 (Tables A.2 to A.8)
Table A.2
Classes of the subject Science
found in summary statements in Table A.1
Class
ABSTRACTNESS
ACCURATE
ACQUISITION
ACnvnTES/ACTlVnY

Entry number from Fig. A.1

42
17
34
3, 5, 8, 11, 13, 20, 35, 36, 39, 49, 57, 89, 98, 109, 121, 124,
125,130

AFFAIRS

122

AIM

28. 43, 60, 65, 125

ARRANGEMENTS
14
ASKING OF QUESTIONS
44
ATTEMPT
5, 10, 103
[ATTITUDE](S)
6,25
BASIC RESEARCH
68
BEHAVIOUR
67,73
75,77
BELIEF SYSTEM
14. 47, 85, 100
BELIEF(SI
BELIEFS A N D ATTITUDES
24
4, 14, 22, 52, 65, 122
BODY
BUILT
CLARIFICATION OF PROBLEMS
44
COMBINATION OF METHODS,
30
KNOWLEDGE AND VALUES
5, 29, 61
COMMITMENT
C O M M O N KNOWLEDGE
32
J:
C O M M O N SENSE
17
COMMUNITY OF INDIVIDUALS
33
CONCEPTS
103
CONCLUSIONS
14
CONSENSUS OF OPINION
54
CONTENTION
83
24
CONTEXT
CREATION
15
, 47, 123
CRITERIA
CRITERIA OF JUDGEMENT
29
CRITICISM
117
CULTURAL ARTEFACT
79
51, 126
CULTURE
DEALING O N L Y WITH THE W O R L D
OF APPEARANCE
DECISIONS)
61, 116
121
DESCRIPTION
DEVELOPING STATEMENTS
59
102, 123
DEVELOPMENT^)
4. 98. 121, 123
DISCIPLINED)
88, 106
DISCOURSE
84_j_122
DISCOVERIES/DISCOVERY
107, 108
DISPOSITION
DOCTRINE
80
EFFORTS
103
EMPIRICAL (REFUTABLE)
42
116, 127
ENDEAVOUR
19. 27, 36, 85, 87, 131
ENTERPRISE
ENTRENCHED
25
EXACTITUDE
121
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EXPLANATION/EXPLANATORY
POWER
FACTS
FIELDS OF SCIENCE
FRUIT OF INVESTIGATION
FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTIONS
GENERALITY
GOAL(S)/OBJECTIVES
GROWTH
HYPOTHESES
IDEA OF HIDDEN ORDER IN
NATURE
IDEAS
IDEOLOGY
INDUSTRIES
INFORMATIVE CONTENT
INNOVATIVE/INNOVATION
INQUIRY
INSTITUTION^)
INSTITUTIONAL IMPERATIVES
INTEGRATED APPROACH
INTELLECTUAL ENTERPRISE
INTOLERANT
INVESTIGATION
KNOWLEDGE/KNOWING
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8,42
15,66

70
37

61
5, 20, 35, 85, 88
110, 111

72
86

131
14
18
42
76, 111
944 129
14, 247 81, 83, 907 122

114
74
47
76
80
1, 1, 1, 4, 5, 12, 14, 16, 21, 22, 24, 29, 30, 37, 37, 47, 49, 50,
54, 54, 78, 80, 80, 80, 80, 88, 91, 92, 97, 104, 105, 106, 110,
119,122,122

KNOWLEDGE BASE
69
80
KNOWLEDGE OR INTELLECTUAL
ACTIVITY
15, 52, 101
LAWS
LINKED WITH POLITICS
56
103
MAIN BUSINESS
121
MAKING
MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION
52
122T 122
MEANS
17
MERCILESS
24, 26, 29, 30, 38, 52, 58, 97, 103, 105, 105, 105, 125
METHOIXS)
50, 122
METHODOLOGY
89
MONOLITHIC
89
MONOPOLISTIC
25
MORAL MOTIVATION
103,124
MOTIVATIONS OF THE
INVESTIGATORS/MOTIVATION
14,83
MYTH
23
MYTHOLOGY
NATURAL A N D PHYSICAL SCIENCE 80
96
N O SCIENTIFIC METHOD
[NOT CLEARLY DISTINGUISHABLE 36
FROM PHILOSOPHY]
74
[NOT1 MAGICAL
36
NOTIONS
25,27
OBJECTIVE
121
OBSERVATIONS
80
OCCUPATION
45
ONTOLOGY
42
OTHER CHARACTERISTICS
112
PAPERS
[PHILOSOPHICAL] SUPPORT/
25,99
ASPECTS
PHILOSOPHY
80
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PICTURE
. PLACE IN SOCIETY AT LARGE
[PLANNING]
PRACTICE
PRODUCT
PRECISION
PROBLEM-SOLVING
PROCEDURE(S)
PROCESSES)
PRODUCTION
PROFESSION
PROGRESS
PROPOSITIONS
PURSUIT
QUEST
RATIONALITY
RESEARCH
RESOURCE
ROOTS
RULES
[SCHOLARSHIPL
SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY
SCIENTIFIC METHOD
SCIENTIFIC MIND
SEARCH

SET
SET OF SCHEMES
SIMPLICITY
SKILL
SOCIETY
STATEMENTS
STRATEGY/STRATEGIES
STRUCTURE
STUDY
SUB-CULTURE
SYSTEM(S)
SYSTEM OF THOUGHT
SYSTEMATIC
TAKEN FOR GRANTED
TASK
TECHNIQUE
THEME
THEORY/THEORIES
WAYS OF THINKING/
THINKING/THOUGHT
TRADITION
TRUTH
TYPE OF ARGUMENT
TYPE OF THINKING
UNDERSTANDING
UNIQUE
UNIVERSAL
USES
VALUES AND MORES/VALUE
POSTURE
VISION
WISDOM
WORK
WORLD/WORLD PICTURE/WORLD
VIEW
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105
88
74
53, 106, 116,131

122
42
59
14, 63, 120
4, 34, 105, 123

24
55
86
21
110
103
116
41, 48, 50, 58, 69, 71

122
36
54, 63, 103

21
88
82, 95

64
9, 85, 124

14, 14, 14, 14
103
42
1,80
24
49, 49, 98
73, 93
65,72,112
1, 21, 46, 80

59
18, 21, 37, 67, 115

53
76
25
2
23
122
15,40, 101, 104, 113
14, 97, 105
20.24

52
103
87
18, 124,127

89
89
67
30, 31

61
25
118
16, 73, 74, 92, 110,128
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Table A.3
Classes of subjects from Table A.2 which indicate
that science is characterised by knowledge or concepts
COMBINATION OF METHODS,
KNOWLEDGE AND VALUES
COMMON SENSE
CONCEPTS
CONCLUSIONS
FACTS
IDEAS
INFORMATIVE CONTENT
KNOWLEDGE
KNOWLEDGE OR INTELLECTUAL
ACTIVITY
NOTIONS
TRUTH
UNDERSTANDING

30
17
1 103

14
15,56
"131

42
1, 1, 1, 4, 5, 12, 14, 16, 21, 22, 24, 29, 30, 37, 37, 47, 49, 50,
54, 54, 78, 80, 80, 80, 80, 88, 91, 92, 97, 104, 105, 106, 110,
119T122T122

80
36
52
18, 124,127
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Table A.4
Classes of subjects from Table A.2 which indicate
that science is characterised by activity
ACQUISITION
AcnvrnES/AcnvnY

34
3, 5, 8, 11, 13, 20, 35, 36, 39, 49, 57, 89, 98, 109, 121, 124,
125, 130

AFFAIRS
ASKING OF QUESTIONS
ATTEMPT
BASIC RESEARCH
BEHAVIOUR
CLARIFICATION OF PROBLEMS
COMBINATION OF METHODS,
K N O W L E D G E A N D VALUES
CONTENTION
CREATION
CRITICISM
DECISION^)
DESCRIPTION
DEVELOPMENTS
DEVELOPING STATEMENTS
DISCOURSE
DISCOVERIES/DISCOVERY
EFFORTS
ENDEAVOUR
ENTERPRISE
EXPLANATION
FRUTT OF INVESTIGATION

GROWTH
INNOVATIVE
INTELLECTUAL ENTERPRISE
INQUIRY
INVESTIGATION
MAKING
MEANS
METHOIXS)
METHODOLOGY
N O SCIENTIFIC M E T H O D
OBSERVATIONS
PLANNING
PRACTICE
PROBLEM-SOLVING
PROCEDURE(S)
PROCESS(ES)
PRODUCTION
PROGRESS
PURSUIT
QUEST
RESEARCH
[SCHOLARSHIP]
SCIENTIFIC M E T H O D
SEARCH
SKILL
STUDY
TECHNIQUE

TYPE OF ARGUMENT
WAYS OF THINKING/
THINKING/raOUGHT
WORK

122
44
5, 10, 103

68
67,73

44
30

~_

83
15
117
61,116

121
102, 123

59
88, 106
84,122

103
116, 127
19, 27, 36, 85, 87, 131
8, 42

H

37
110, 111
76,111
47
94,129
80
121

_
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50, 122
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74
53, 106, 116, 131

59
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Table A.5
Classes of subjects from Table A.2 which indicate
that science is characterised by intention, purpose or goal
AIM
GOAUSVOBJECnVES
MAIN BUSINESS
[PLANNING]
STRATEGIES/STRATEGY
TASK

28, 43, 60, 65, 125
5, 35, 20, 85, 88

103
74
73,93

2
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Table A.6
Classes of subjects from Table A.2 which indicate
that science is characterised by context
COMMUNITY OF INDIVIDUALS
CONTEXT
CULTURAL ARTEFACT
CULTURE
ENTRENCHED
LINKED WITH POLITICS
MONOPOLISTIC
NATURAL A N D PHYSICAL SCIENCE
OCCUPATION
OTHER CHARACTERISTICS
PAPERS
PLACE IN SOCIETY AT LARGE
PRODUCT
PROFESSION
RESOURCE
SCIENTIFIC C O M M U N I T Y
SOCIETY
SUB-CULTURE
TRADITION
UNIQUE
UNIVERSAL

33
24
79
51, 126

25
56
89
80
80
42
112
88
122
55
122
88
24
59
20,24

89
89

516
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Table A.7
Classes of subjects from Table A.2 which indicate that
science is characterised by structure, system, relation or syntax
ARRANGEMENTS
BODY
BUILT
DISCIPLINECS)
FIELDS OF SCIENCE
HYPOTHESES
INDUSTRIES
INSTrrUTTON(S)
INSTITUTIONAL IMPERATIVES
INTEGRATED APPROACH
LAWS
MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION
MONOLITHIC
PROPOSITIONS
SET
SET OF SCHEMES
STATEMENTS
STRUCTURE
SYSTEM(S)
SYSTEM OF THOUGHT
SYSTEMATIC
THEME
THEORIES/THEORY

14
4, 14, 22, 52, 65, 122

7
4, 98, 121, 123

70
72
18
14, 24, 81, 83, 90,122

114
74
15, 52, 101

52
89
21
14, 14, 14, 14
103
49, 49, 98
65,72,112
18,21,37,67,115

53
76
122
15,40,101,104,113
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Table A.8
Classes of subjects from Table A.2 which indicate that
science is characterised by some sort of subconscious mind-set,
including beliefs, attitudes, values, criteria for judgements,
disposition, assumptions
ABSTRACTNESS
ACCURATE
ASSUMPTION
[ATTITUDE](S)
BELIEF SYSTEM
BELIEF(S)
BELIEFS AND ATTITUDES
COMBINATION OF METHODS,
KNOWLEDGE AND VALUES
COMMITMENT
CRITERIA
CRITERIA OF JUDGEMENT
DEALING ONLY WITH THE WORLD
OF APPEARANCE
DISPOSITION
EMPIRICAL (REFUTABLE)
EXACTITUDE
FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTIONS
GENERALITY
IDEA OF HIDDEN ORDER IN
NATURE
IDEOLOGY
INTOLERANT
MERCILESS
MORAL MOTIVATION
MOTIVATIONS OF THE
INVESTIGATORS/MOTIVATION
MYTH
MYTHOLOGY
[NOT CLEARLY DISTINGUISHABLE
FROM PHILOSOPHY]
NOT MAGICAL
OBJECTIVE
ONTOLOGY
PICTURE
[PHILOSOPHICAL] SUPPORT/
ASPECTS
PHILOSOPHY
PRECISION
RATIONALITY
ROOTS
RULES
SCIENTIFIC MIND
SIMPLICITY
tAKEN FOR GRANTED
TYPE OF THINKING
VALUES/MORES/VALUE POSTURE
VISION
WISDOM
WORLD/WORLD PICTURE/WORLD
VTEW

42
17
87
6,25
75,77
14, 47, 85, 100

24
30
5, 29 ,61
47, 123

29
62
107, 108

42
121
61
42
86
14
76
17
25
103, 124
14, 83

23
36
74
25,27

45
105
25, 99

80
42
116
36
54, 63, 103

64
42
25
87
30, 31

61
25
16, 73, 74, 92,110,128
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Table A.9
Categorisation of the Differentiae in Table A.l
by the categories of classes identified in Tables A.3 to A.8
No. Conceptual

Active

Structural

Purposive

Contextual

Foundational

from
Fig.

Al
1

2
3

•understanding

4

• natural world
•concepts

•world around

us
5

• knowledge
• knowledge

,

• universe
• universe and
itsparts

• deductions and
inferences
•formulated
• observations
and
measurements
• of humanity
• [ofhuman]
environment
• of events and
parameters
within the
universe
•extend...and
reduce
(experience]
• exploratory
\ • c o m e to
• developing
• observations
• explain
• observing
• experimenting
• describing
• classifying
• analysing
•studied
•world around

• systematic
• general laws
• systematic
•branch of
[knowledge]

• reproducible

•order

•purpose

• laws
• theories
•set
•fluidand
overlapping
boundaries

•having
traditions

•seeks to

us
• phenomena of
that world
•seek
• acquire
•CH'ganise
• explain
• formulation
• describing
• explaining
• testing
• explanations
• observation
• experimentation
• the nature cf
the universe

• domain
• systematic
• organisation
• laws and
theories

: •human

• precision
• scientists
• empirical
•that
distinguish
science from
other fields of
human
endeavour
.

• natural
processes

;

u

• [knowledge]

• [authority]

• interaction and
intenelationship of those
parts
• uniform
natural
processes and
relationships
•[sceptical]
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•search
• experimental
tests

520
• satisfying

•codified
•[general]
statements
• laws and
principles

• reality

9

• understanding

•laws or
principles

10

• make...
correspond to

• for (understanding)

• m o d e m times

• capable of
experimental
test
• greatest
generality
• logically

•human
• evolved

• validity

• distinct from
either
tradition or
authority
• [mathematic-

•appropriate
w a y to relate
[to reality]
• 'discipline of
the self
• appropriate
relationship
[to reality]

• system of
tiiought
•uniform

• chaotic
diversity of
our sense
experience

11

•conceptual
generalisations
• empirical
evidence
• a w a y of
looking
• a w a y of
ordering
• a w a y of
checking
• the physical
and biological
world
•technical
measures
•procedures
• educating and
accrediting
• approving or
discrediting
•protecting
• maintain
•perpetuate
• domination
• about the
world and ow
place in it
• the interests

13

14

•purpose

• scientific
conclusions

; • about the
world

• organisational • for verifying
or falsifying
• systematic
claims
•organised
• structures and • which serves
patterns
to

al]
• scientists
•social
• subordination

\

'reality
* reality

ofthe

15

scientific
estate
•invented
•try to form a
picture
•try to
establish...
connections

• ideas and
concepts

'

16

• of knowledge

• not a
technique

• observation

17

i-

J

• collection
•catalogue

• of the h u m a n
: mind

i

• reality
• world of sense
impressions
• [not] simply
an accumulation
•integrated

• [not] p o w e r

• world view

• at its best
•fallacy in
logic
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18

• knowledge
•research
products
• knowledge

•respond to
challenges
• development
•research
process
• producing and
... distribut-

19

• knowledge

20

•conceptual
• understand

• producing and
... improving
•structure
•predict
• control
•explain

21

• knowledge

521
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• reporting
system
•part of (larger)
system

•producers
(researchers)
• interesses [of
research
products]
•part of [larger]
(system)

ing
•..

22

• knowledge
* insights

;

• phenomena
• acquired by
sustained
study

'natural
phenomena
•method
• study and
research

• systematic
• systems of
• organisation

»naturalistic
metaphysics
• empirical
epistemology
• metaphysics
• epistemology

•AngloAmerican
parlance
•in AngloAmerican
parlance
• non societal,
non cultural
• in ... most
other
languages
•ofthe
academies of
sciences
• in m a n y
countries
•in AngloAmerican
parlance

• positive
•operational
• falsifiable

•broadest
international
consensus
•of any subject
•natural or
cultural
• not available
to laymen or
superficial
observers
•broadest
international
consensus

•formal or
empirical

• empirical
• body of
• coherent
• systematic

.

• for either
intellectual or
generalpragmatic
purposes
:
•not for
immediate
practical
application
:

23

• tradition
•paradigm
•paradigm

•ordered

•rationalised
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•in the
contemporary
world
• in the
contemporary
world
• in the
contemporary
worid
•tradition
* multiplicity
of aspect and
reference
[with society]
•time
• connexion
•category
•in the
contemporary
world
• in the
contemporary
world
• in the
contemporary
worid

• cumulative
• maintenance
and
development
• cumulative

• knowledge
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25

• habitual

26

•method

;
•end

• standard view
•sharedby
reflective
scientists,
technical
philosophers,
and the
educated
public
•of our day
•dominant
[and]
scientifically
oriented
• standard view

• reality

27

28

• facts

•formulate
• observation
• to account

• about the
natural world
•discover

• systematic
•expressed in
laws
• lawlike
hypotheses
• of nature

•purpose
•purpose

•[standard]
view
• public
:

• to the universe
and
[humanity]
• underlying
• ideal of
responsibility
• belief
•against
wilfulness,
authoritarianism, and
inertia

• objectivity
• ontological
vision
• objectivity
•beginning
• universe of
objects with
independent
existences and
careers
•logic
• empirical fact
•truth
•general
•empirical

• in the standard • truths
view
• external world
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" " • for
• what w e are
looking for
and what w e
are trying to
accomplish

• evaluating
data

30

• knowledge
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• human
• selective

•characteristic
•cultural

•set
• stock of
•set

•is certified
•accumulated
•methods

31

•judgement and • institutional
expectation
structures
•judgements

•roles
•purpose

• relativistic
•societal
• public power
• class systems

32

•extended and
refined
• perception
• memory
•understanding
• intuition
• activities of
inquiry
•asking
questions

• intent

•of the same
order as that
of ordinary
• sometimes

33

• misunderstanding
• of knowledge

•active
• misapplication
• progressive

•terms
•body

35

• understanding

• prediction and
control
•discover
• explanation

• correlations
• statements
• statements
•correlations

36

• concepts
•meaning

37

• subject matter

•open-ended
• on-going
•not
•canleadto
monolithic
•methods
• observation
•theories
•theory
• explanation
•progress
• application of • arrangement
•organised
logic
• relationships

38

:

• acquire

• knowledge

.

I.

. . . . . I .

•rationalistic
• anticipates
change
•pragmatic
[rather than
ritualistic]
•value
•values
•validity

• similar and
• must... have
a philosophy
related
• like any other •disagreements
are
group of
philosophical
people
conflicts
• ultimate kinds
of explanatory
'
ideas
• through the
•valid and
successful
ages
• in our o w n
• of its nature
age
•great
• which set
•causal
•goals
• seek... to
[science] apart connections
from other
• not absolutes
human
[goals]
activities
•of all sciences
• history
•false
• in everyday
•reference
circumstances, •rationality
•foundational
needs ...of
problems
h u m a n beings
•character
•appropriate
• subject
• evidential
• constituent
claims
;
•judicious
:
•rational
• set... within •metaphysics
a more
comprehens-

1 ive
• of nature

• [scientific]
governing
activities

|

34

,

• logic and
rationality
•value-oriented

J
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•reasoning
•reasoning
• formulated
• assessed

40

• well-attested
•explain
•studied

29/9/95 1:54 PM

•ideals of
scientific
•evidence
• confidence in
the truth of

• complex
• steps of
•laws
•laws
• of nature
• collection

•phenomena
•findingand... • hypotheses
testing

41

• patterns and
irregularities
•carefully

• comprehend

• highly testable
• metaphysically relevant

• conducted
toward

42
43

524

•lacking in
mathematics
• as w e all agree •rationally
•rationality

• empirical tests

• the world

44

• progressive
• questions

• history of
science

• instead of
waiting to see
• answerable

•about nature

45

• [what... the
world is like]

46

47

•whether
natural... or
artificial
• knowledge
claims

• of systems
• observers
• account
• experimental
procedures
•evaluated

•technical

• standard view
•impersonal

•natural
phenomena
• empirical
phenomena

48
49

• understanding
•nature
• c o m m o n sense • scientific
procedures
•factual
knowledge

•real and
objective
• preferences or
intentions
• more or less
faithfully
•represented
•accurate
•[not]
subjective
• stringent
• accurate
• representation
•ensured
• natural world

i

• somewhat
ephemeral

•immediate
goal

•repetitions... • problems
of [problems]

• systematic

• in order to
know

• in thefieldof •theoretical
• established by
natural
sciences
logic and
• in the field of
mathematics
the social
sciences
•based on...
everyday life
• in everyday
life
• in the different
fields of
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• hypotheses
•experimental
•resolution...
• scientific
method
• resolution of
disputed
issues
• establishment
• observation
•discovery or
uncovering

• instrumental
knowledge

51

•of nature
• experimental

52

53

• mathematical
• mathematical
• union of

• processes of
the natural
world
• behaviour cf
nature
• systems

• discovering
•by
examination
of evidence
• not through
coercion,
personal
argument or
appeal to
authority
• seeks answers
• seeks answers

525

•between
contending

• its central
focus

• observational
evidence
• objectivity

•peculiar
• the hallmark
of Western
civilisation
• for Newton
• [for] Newton

• exact
• deduciMe
•verifiable
•certain
• ideal
exactitude
• constant
empirical
reference
•from
phenomena
•in phenomena
' physical world

• like all other
•peculiar to
different
cultural
complexes

•ethical
principles
•conviction
• objective truth
•rulesof
evidence
• unanimity is
possible and
desirable
• questions
which m e n
hold to be of
importance

• which are

;

.

.

_

.

.

_

—

i

reducible to
everyone's
experience
• [not] answers
[that] are
acceptedthat
harmonise
with particular
world-views
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•r

• [knowledge]
• explanation
•concepts
• a sense of
understanding

• observation
• critically
examined
•classified
• explanation
•prediction
• scientific
research (new
discovery)
• communicate
• evaluate the
correspondence

• [for collection
•body of
of] knowledge
•setof
• systematically
under general
principles
•theories

• fairly
widespread
• in past
discoveries
•toothers
• be universal
in the sense
of independent
of space and
time
•toall qualified
practitioners
• such that all

•causes of
events in the
world
• explicitly
• intelligible
•empirical
relevance

can
•practical
implications
• ofthe real
world

55

• knowledge

• of what is of
value
•offuture
events
• informing
•arranging

• what science
really is

• highly
organised
• through
appropriate
organisation
•combined

• [according to]• image of
Galbraith
science
•oubnoded
• still held by
m a n y people
•product
• [is no longer]
'the product of
the individual
efforts of m e n
of genius'
• the nineteenth
century
•modem
science
•new
• profession
• linked with
industry and
government
• 'ordinary men'
• narrowly and
deeply
•other
specialised
but equally
ordinarymen
• yet remaining
• inextricably
•to those
unanswerable
whose lives
are affected by
its actions
• biological
• empirical
\• by one kind of adequacy ...
organism
not the sole
consideration

:

:

56

1

57

• phenomenon
; • interaction

• latched onto
• with the
environment
• regularities in
nature

i

~
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• cognitive
• epistemic
•explanatory
principles
• cognitive

59

•about the
world

60

61

• knowledge
•reasoned
conclusions
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• theory testing • c o m m o n set
and...
•theories
selection
• the various
• intervene
components
•modify
• explanations

• the usual order
of events
•that order
•of natural
phenomena
• problemsolving
• testable
• create images
• what the
world is really
like
• establish
• highly general
• [which are
laws and
tested] by
theories
pitching them • generality
• practical
techniques
•subjectto...
:
improvement
• against the
world
• the decision of
questions by
argument and
evidence
• explicit by
analysis of
the reasoning
•formal
reasoning
• demonstration
• formal proof
• thinking

527

•better than...
•goals
'non•to acquire
scientific'
predictive
control
•to acquire
manipulative
control
• soastobe
able to
• to increase the
precision of
the parameters
• to integrate
and simplify
•aims
• over ...parts
of one's
experience

•pragmatic
• initial and
boundary
conditions
•our picture
• reliable
• efficient

• ofthe world

• of scientists
•of...
professionals

• main value is
truth
• main
preoccupation

• continual
• given the
existing

• applicable
• in the most
demanding
w a y possible
•degree of
applicability
•to the world

•Weston
culture
• their scientific
successors
• closed to diem
visions of
things still
open
elsewhere
• Western

•conceptions
• effective
direction of
thinking
•conception
•matched
natural
causation
•true principles
•causal
•rational
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• natural events

62

63

•amended
• thinking

64

•delicate
manipulations
• use of the
hands

65
•

;

•

"

•

•

•

'

n

'

:

•acquire
• knowledge
• of knowledge •approved
• of [valid] ideas •approval

I

528
•of a problem
as distinct
from a
doctrine
• of knowledge
and cf the
object cf that
knowledge
•of natural
science and cf
nature
• one existing
world
• a world cf
exclusively
self-consistent
and
discoverable
rational
causality
•cf nature
• natural events
• [on Kant's
•whereas
philosophy
account]
dealt with the
worid of
something
called reality
• [which]
•[by
scientific
philosophy]
conclusions
•part... of
collective
that would be
[thinking]
acceptable
•based on some
metaphysical
dogma... that
is usually
unexamined
• seems self
evident
•originality
• curiosity
•desire to
generalise
• intelligence
•perseverance
• thefindingof
pleasure
• by all sane
• the relations
between the
men
• only the sane
phenomena
men who
which m a k e
have studied it themselves
• give their
k n o w n to us
[approval]
or which w e
apprehend by
means of our
senses
•valid
• understatement
of the feelings
of m e n
towards
•feelings
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• ofthe material
universe
•ofthe objects,
materials and
phenomena

66

•not a mere
repetition
• acquires
mastery

67

68

• knowledge

• ofthe natural
world
• of how we can
use [that
knowledge]
• knowledge
• knowledge
• information
and
understanding

69

I

•ofthe
environment
• broadening the
base
• the solution
of

• advancement
•produce
• solution of
•research
• advancing
[knowledge]
• solution of
•discovery
• development
• application
•used

.

•toserve as an • [on
end in itself
Crowther's
•toform a
account]
basis for
technology
•recognised
•aimed
• for the sake of current or
advancing that future
knowledge
practical
• to provide the problems
background

• rearrangement • without the
• whole matrix
goals
• strategic
• objectives
•to[produce] a
broad base [of
knowledge]
•for the
[solution of]
• to solve
problems

• expectation
•basic
• long term
economic or
social benefits
•practical
problems
•recognised
current or
future
practical
problems
• long-standing
separation of
scientific and
industrial
research in
Australia
•occasional
examples
• contributes to
an
international
matrix
• international
• in a particular
application
•immediate
• an industrial
problem
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•[not]
concerned
with ... m a n ,
culture and
society
• physical,
chemical,
biological,
earth,
engineering
and applied,
and
agriculture
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•research
•research
• change their
view of
• following
•research
•exploration
•discovery
• should be left
[to scientists]
to do it

i

:

• n e w laws
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• aims of their
research
the goals [of
society]

531
• investment
should show
s o m e return
which will
tangibly
benefit the
country
•research
managers
• sustained
funding
• managers
•researchers
• well developed
international
reputation
•a particular
line of
•related to
reasons
outside of
their narrow
discipline
• (in Australia,
1989)
• the ripeness of
the area
•potential
•broad
scientific
applicability
•attractiveness
of the area to
the most able
scientists
•potential
• stimulation of
other sciences
• the potential
contribution
to ...
engineering,
medicine,
applied
science;
technology;
immediate
applications;
prestige and
international
cooperation;
[the goals] of
society;
national
responsibilities; public
1 education.
•

i

• trust
• reasons for
• significance of
the questions
addressed
• fundamental

=
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•Western
Europe at the
time of
Galileo in die
late
Renaissance
• m o d e m type
• primitive or
mediaeval
type
• a posteriori
• a priori

• application of • mathematical
hypotheses
•use of the
experimental • systems
method
• geometricat-

ion
•numbers...
employed
• qualitative
measurements
•compared
•[not]
manipulated
•constructed
•proof or
disproof
•combine

:
j

73

•understanding

;

74

• knowledge

•cf space

•to Nature

• activity
•attack
• apply the
logic

•not... by ...
formula

• on how to
live and how
to look
•at the world
• activity
•active
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• making plans
• [for] guiding
• w e can plan
•planning
strategies
• trying to
achieve a
unitary view

•primaryand
secondary
qualities
•acceptance
• intrinsic and
essential
[precision]
• [capable] of
• [not] prone to
•fanciful
• of gnostic
correlation
• forms of
'numerology'
or number
mysticism

• ofthe
mechanical
model cf
reality
• based on the
notion
•refuses to
acknowledge a
division
between two
kinds of logic
• active view of

•speciesspecific,
human
• not...
independent,
value-free,
dissociated
• [cannot] be
carried on
apart from the
rest of h u m a n
life
• long-term
• no distinction
[fiom] h u m a n
strategies
•distinguished
from magical
views
•works the
same w a y in
all forms of
conduct
• long-term
• to the conduct
of the whole
of your life
• distinguished
fiom earlier
forms

how
• one form of
truth
• no distinction
between m a n
andnature
• no distinction
between the
logic of magic
and other
logics
• no distinction
between
means and
aids

• ofthe world
;

• cannot
• directed toward • [not]...
•cannot m a k e a
[separate] life
planned action isolated or
distinction
• [humans]
[into]
independent
between
guide their
scientific [and
• general h u m a n power and
not, or] nature conductby
approach
knowledge
[and] m a n [or] looking ahead
means [and]
and making
ends
choices
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•facts
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• facts

• of something
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•derived
• [to] refer to
the general
rule to
determine the
stance he
should take
• adjustments
• vary gready

77

78

29/9/95

• not simply [a]
collection [of
norms]
• stracdire [of
norms]
• relationship to
each other
• interrelatedness
• systematic
• tightly linked
general
statements
•specific
propositions
• high degree of
• the ability to • system
systematically
...relate
•according to
propositions
an [internally]
•can be
consistent
reconstructed logic
and
perpetuated
• experiment
•applied
• discovered and • broad field
tested
* held together
• scientific
hy principles
method
(rules)
• solving
• orderly system
problems
• mathematics
and logic
• physical
sciences
• biological
sciences
• social sciences
•created

• [from] study
•observed
•methods
•study

•vary greatly | •norms
•norms
• [when]
confirontedby • substantive
anew
beliefs
situation
• the believer

-™"

• branch of
•for the
•connected
discovery of
body
new truths
• systematically
classified
• coUigated by
being brought
under general
laws

•internally]
•validation
•any social
comes from
group
empirical
• by anyone
events
w h o knows it • logic

•human

•a different
society, with
a different
: 'cultural
hypothesis'
•in a sense
•of any field
• of something
•of
• within its
demonstrated
o w n domain
•one of m a n y
truths
kinds
• trustworthy
• as
distinguished
from other
departments
of learning [in
m o d e m use]
•human,
social,
political
•with
complicated
histories and
relations to
the rest of
society
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•facts
• facts
• knowledge
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• thinking
• observe and
report
• by tests
•makes
progress
•confirmed
• by tests
•makes
progress

•asetof
• system
•theories are
generalisations

•2500 year old
story
• have always
•Western
•humans
• no social,
personal or
political bias
• sole basis for
technology
and social
progress

•scientific
method
•seething

• messy,
complex

•cultural
•human
historical
•shaped by
cultural,
economic...
forces
•socialpolitical
• existing
•human
•human
• cultural
•human

•certain
changes
• certain
specified
material
practices
• have to do
with [human]
interaction
• imposing of
grids
• change of
•associated
with certain
actions
•practical
implementation
•like n e w
product lines
• with nature
• on nature
• things in the
world
• production
• [not]
indiscriminate
accumulation
of every
available fact
\ •representation
• written d o w n
• description

• ofthe world

•structure
•linkages
•theory

• h u m a n plans

• commonsensical
• assumptions
• underpinned
andgukled
•based on...
assumptions
• objective
• objectively
• based on facts
alone
•true or
'confirmed'
•proven
•true
•Nature
• about Nature
• ideological
forces

• h u m a n ideas
•belief
• h u m a n ideas
• themes

.

\

• algorithmic
compressions
•abbreviated
•unifying
principles w e
call laws
• algorithmically
compressible
•abbreviated
• in finite form

-of
observational
data

• by h u m a n
beings

• the logic

\
'
:

• the Universe
•behind the
Universe's
properties
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• could be
uncovered by
ingenious
investigation
• measurement

87

•observe
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•both
reductionistic
and holistic
•mathematical
inform
•abstract
theoretical
framework
• systematic

,
;

• the world

• special

• to be able to
work out its
form and
content

;

535

• w e need not
actually
• things are as
they are as a
result of some
sort of logical
necessity
• mostly
[without] G o d
• world forms a
closed and
complete
system of
explanation
• assumption
•rational and
intelligible
• principle of
sufficient
reason
:• based upon the
assumed
rationality
• the world
• cf nature
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•findings
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• product of... •organised
enterprise
• organisation
•purified,
extended
•mutual
criticism
• intellectual
cooperation
•areeducated
•choose
researdi
topics
• communicate
• criticise and
refine
•relate
•research and
development
•research

89

• self-critical

90

•communicat- • system
ing,
criticising and
sociallyinteracting
observers

I.
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i

-•"

....1.

• priorities and
planning

536
• [one among] •rational
other bodies
•rational
... such as
opinion
religion,
•ethical
politics, law
dilemmas
or'the
humanities'
•product
• collective
•human
•individual
contributions
•consensus
•over the
widest
possible field
•internal
sociology
•consensus
• scientists
• with one
another
• to one another
• m e m b e r of a
specialised
social group
• scientific
institutions
•economics
•socially
responsible
• scientist
as w e often
claim
• unique roots
in
seventeenthcentury
Europe
• eliminated all
competitors
•not...
chaUenged...
independent-

Py)
•social
• dedicated to
•unique
the principles
•modern
• in no other
civilisation
* mutually
•socially
• consensibility
and
consensuality j

S c defn anal Tables A1-9

91

92

93

94

95
97

29/9/95

1:54 P M

537

•

•stored and
communicated

•conceptual

•formalised
languages
•language

• subscribe
• systematic
•[attendant
scheme
metaphysical] •schematised
interpretations
theoretical
consequences

•creation

•observational • patterns of
procedures
[argument]
• argument
• methods of
representation
and
calculation
• analysed and
discussed
• practical
methodology
• a definite
pattern
• systematic and • [which are]
• based on
usedto
formulated
particular
[explain]
• mixture of
methods of
theoretical and
inquiry and
practical
thinking
•
theoretical
•critical
models and
appraisal
explanations
• ways of
thinking
• explain
• development

• more or less
artificial
• public noetic
domain
• private mental
domain
•each
individual
•natural
[language]
•particular
social group
• one of m a n y
• noetic domain
• not privileged
by
comparison
with any
other
• a social group
•contrast...
with
alternative
nonscientific
world pictures
• modem
•mundane
• consensual
• extreme

•reproducible
• material maps

•according to
principles of
the sociology
of knowledge
• revelations
• foundations
•not necessarily
true
•errorsand
fallacies

• of the nature
of things
•basedon ... a
• consensus
• public domain pre-existing
mental
•between
harmony
independent
h u m a n beings
•matters of
common
interest
• metaphysical
presuppositions
•validity
• from formal
logic
• metaphysics

• attitudes
•openmindedness
and
impartiality
•respect for data
• tentativeness
about
accepting
results as final
•disciplined
approach

S c defn anal Tables A1-9
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phenomena

98
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•natural
phenomena
•verification

538

• wide variety
• wide variety

99

•intellectual
• precise
• susceptible to
empirical
[verification]

• university
specialism
[since]
nineteenth
century

100

•discourse

101

•processor
program of
empirical,
explanatory
inquiry
• producing
• testable

• statement
• propositional
• characteristic
structures
• structures that
comprise
•laws
•theoretical
laws
• structures that
constitute
physical
theories

• would only
count as
science if
• confirmable
empirical

,

S c defn anal Tables A1-9

102

• cognitive or
conceptual
• cognitive
• scientific
knowledge

29/9/95

•research
• [cognitive]
developments
beings shaped

by
[institutional]
developments
• research
• distinguish
• subject to
growing
promotion,
monitoring
and regulation
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539
• n e w directions • [research] is
• n e w fields
less easily
• institutional
[divided]
•cognitive...
• less easy [to
institutional
distinguish]
;
• scientific
labour
• inside the
laboratory
• interdisciplinary research
teams
•translaboratory
networks
• the basicapplied
dichotomy of
the past
• to [distinguish] in
practice than
in the past
•commercial
exploitation
• necessary for
the survival
of firms in
certain
industrial
sectors of the
economy
•new
manufacturing
processes and
products of
the twentyfirst century
• bioscience,
information
technology
and n e w
material
sciences
• by national
and
international
agencies
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•meaning
•understand
•conceptual
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•establish
[relationships]
•interpret
•transcend
•discovery
•discernment
• intellectual
adventure
•uses
• accumulate
• innovation
and
revolutions
• m a n y methods

• relationships • to discover
between them
facts
• consistent
•totrace
structure with • are directed
order [and
toward
meaning]
• of pattern,
order, system,
structure
• cosmological
synthesis
•sequence

and
unaccountable
variants
•read into the
story
•actual
working
procedures

• direct
experience
• ofrecurring
seasons
• evolving
•appraised

• the world of
experience

104

•body

•acceptable
•basic
• rule
• rather artificial
and debatable

way

• historically
• can only be
historical
adequately
context
[appraised] if
• circumstances
\
under which a
theory first
m a k e s its
appearance
:•

:
:
\
,

•everunfinished
• our most
persistent
intellectual
• as in art and
philosophy
• o n e facet
• [which
separate] the
sciences from
the
nonsciences
• the scientist
• in the course
of time
•internationally
[acceptable]
• fairly enduring
• other h u m a n
endeavours
• by which
scientists
• n o w and in
the past
• have actually
done their
work
• as for every
task
• after the work
has been
completed

• in the chaos
and flux of
phenomena

:

1

540

j

.
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105

• knowledge
• knowledge
•knowledge
• knowledge

• evolving
•shaped
• evolved
• evolution
•gaining
knowledge
•assumed
•method
•empirical
• experimental
• discovered or
at least...
applied
•applied
• formulated
• arrived at by
its m e a n s
• governing
•agreement
•method
• [once]
discovered
• applied to
generate
• the most
strenuous
methods
• tailed
• to produce
agreement
• will not alter

29/9/95 1:54 P M

541
•restricted
•traditional
• long been,
commonly
•unique
•first...in the
seventeenth
century
• wholly
independentiy
of, and...
unaffected by
•independent

•broad and
coherent
•incomplete
• unification
• integration
• intimately
related
•sharp
bifurcation
of the two
• systematically
•set
•theories

•opento ...
question
• best picture
available
•beliefs
• well-grounded
beliefs
• by those very
beliefs
•abstract and
immutable
rules
• empty or false

of
•eternal
scientific
•once
[discovered]
• of scientists
and
philosophers
• in the light of
that

• of the universe
and...life
• about the
world
•about the
world

106

•produced
•specific
interaction
• alter with
each change
• formation
•dispersed
• changes again

•outcome
• knowledge
• knowledge

;

!

• relation of
science to
technology
• [relation of
science to]
philosophy
• [relation of
scienceto]art
• [relation of
science to]
other
intellectual
and practical
concerns
• relation
between
science and
technology
• relations
between the
sciences
. •new
constellations j

• scientific era
• n e w period

:

'.
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107 • cognitive

•conceived
• influential
•administered
• derives from
•ceased
•research
activities
•research

108

• making
• elements
• technification • constellations
• formalisation • conjunctions
• abstraction
• elements
• problem• system
solving
• finalisation

109 • knowledge

• production
•acting
'Of
independently
existing and
active things
• little practical • disciplined
use
•carried on
• access
•changed
• grown
• embodied
• achievement
• increase and
improvement
•process
• application
• solution of
• react
•become
•inquiry
•power

110 • knowledge
•epistemological
•result
• knowledge

«

• system
•departmental
system
• institutions

•aim

•goals

542

•relevance
•present
• disposition
• officially
• anachronistic
• university
• historically
•latter phase
•Classical
scientific era
•nineteenth
and early
twentiedi
centuries
• time
• within
university
confines
•outside
•contemporary
era of science
•Classic
scientific
•contemporary
• long time
•relativelyn e w
•dominant
• contemporary
•World science
• nineteenth
century
• always been
there
•social

• n o longer
•truth
•marginal
• problems
•handful of
• taken for
enthusiasts
granted
• no longer
• other fields
• social
• world of
science
• scientific
•independent
• social context
•social
•new
conditions
•present size
anl
importance
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• faster than
mere people
•breeds
•growth
•research
• growth
• published
• experiments
•structured

• knowledge
• facts

112

•packed d o w n
•structured

113

way

• of reality
• knowledge

114

;

115

•knitted
research-front
structure

• for bringing
[order]

•order
• w a y s of
looking
•experiences
• used
• at the world
•sets
• subjected
• preestablished •organised
• observation
• pattern
• confirmed
• collaboration
•assigned
• control
• behaviour
• suspension of
judgement
•detached
•scrutiny
• empirical
• arrangements
•experiential
• statements

• conceptions

• content
• cognitions

116

;

• well-defined

• claims and
arguments
• soving...
; puzzles

:

:
\

(|

,

--ff

•

• general beliefs

and
expectations

•practice

117

•old
•new
• very recent
• into the
archive
•regulariy
•normal
• scientific
•published
work
• from almost
nowhere
• native genius
of isolated
minds
• in scientific
papers
•new
• old ones
• scientific
• articles
•journals
• in the World
List of
Scientific
Periodicals
•other
periodicals
•World List

• from its
epidermis
rather than
fiom its body
•pattern
• theories

•cited
•counted
•manipulated
• published
• published

543
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•modem
• universalism
• communism
•impersonal
• previously
•social
• community
• institutional
• scientists

• disinterestedness
• scepticism
• truth claims
•criteria
• motives
• beliefs
• logical
•criteria

•not the
human
• [not]
philosophy
• long been
held
•classical
model
• smaller and
more
focussed
•natural
sciences
• over time
• community
of inquirers

• true

•rational
• rationality
•rational
• assumptions
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118

• cognitive
•ideas
•ideas

• organisational • instrumental
•theories
•produced
• hypotheses
•techniques
•research
• developments

119

• data

• in support
•theory
* hypothesis
•set

120

• understand
• knowledge

•produced
•processes
• accepted
•use
•action
•created
•scientific
method
• investigating
•testsof
approval
•discovery
•leads
• the world

•theory

•powerful
•power and
scope
• scientific
community
•new

•honesty
• rigorous
• reliable

•check
•proof
•madetorecur
• submit
•check
• repetition
•description
• measurement
• description
•use of
numbers
• mathematical
analysis
•method of
description
• [method of]
classification
• reference
• systems

• statements

•variety
•variety
•special
• astronomy
•geology
• individual
• physics
• chemistry
• taxonomical
botany
• taxonomical
zoology

•precise
• intrinsically
impossible
• precision
•exact
• precision [of
reference

121

• the complex
universe in
which we live
•intellectual

•people
•machines
•sociopolitical
system
• institutional
arrangements
•new
• technological
machinery
•previous ones
•social
• community
• public
resource

• the world cf
phenomena
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122

123

• information
• information

| • about natural
phenomena
• about the
natural world
•understanding
• understand
• understanding
•know
• understanding

• solving
problems
•used
• conflict
•acquired
•research
• organised
• published
\
• influential
•process
• experimentation
• observation
• theorising
•method
• obtaining
•research
•research
• characteristic
methods
• solving
problems
•managed

•determining
•claim
• refining
•shedding
• introducing
• refining
• modes of
conceiving
and describing
• bring out
more clearly
• finding out
• acceptance or
rejection
• do things
•approaches
• looking
•method
• developing
• revision
• descriptive
•learned
• waysof
: learning
•learning
•leam
• think
•talk
• doubt
• develop

29/9/95
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•organised
•coherent
theoretical
schemes
•organised

• relations
• the w a y s in
which things
arerelatedto
one another
• complex
•language

• instrumental

i

r

™nr

•for
constituents

• with
technobgy
•economic and
political
•social
•archival
•books and
journals
•technological
applications
• politically
neutral,
public
resource
• historical
• special
•political
•personal
aptitudes
• members of a
distinct
profession
•political
• social
•material
facilities
•educational
•cultural
• human

• in advance

•wisely and
well
•reliable
• objective
•curiosity
• intelligence

•relevance and
irrelevance
• suppositions
• what is and is
not relevant
• beliefs
• irrelevant
• specific beliefs
•relevance
\• what is to
count
•areason
•unalterable
• perfectibility
• criterion of
success
•standardsor
\
criteria
• beliefs
• standards of
rationality
•error
\
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•material
• the world
substances
around us
• about the
•about nature
world
•about nature
• of what it is to
understand
• manipulation
•understanding
• facts
• expression
•understanding
•devise
•observe
•understanding
• development
•judged
•observed
•think
• prediction
•tests
•justified
• enlightenment
• liberation
• expression
• manipulate
• activities
•practise
• manipulation
•justified
•demonstrate
•ofthe world

125

126
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• concepts and
words

•

i

• homogeneous • for [understanding]
set
• coherently
•for
• intellectually
[manipulatgraspable
ion]
model
•purposes
• intellectual
• for [manipulation]
models

• ofthe natural
world
• the things we
[observe]
•set
•aims
• statements
•aim

• activity
• explanations
•describes
• explained
• the state of
affairs
•framed
• musing
•understood
• atrophy and
ossify

•theoretical
• constructs

:

.

——
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•styles
• human
•power
•humankind
• h u m a n spirit
•human's
• of those w h o
•benefits
•humankind
•material
•social

• motivation
• curiosity
• sense of
wonder
• creative
• compatibility
• simplicity
•elegance
• aesthetic
• desire
• attitudes of
mind
•spiritual

• scientists

•rational
•satisfactory
•causal

• scientific
findings
• cultural
context
•educated
community
• the initiated
•each other
• small group
of close
fellow
travellers
•cultural
mankind
• within its ...
isolated
groups of
experts

•relevant and
momentous
•world picture
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•understanding

128

129

130
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• interconnected
•developed
• achieve
•enterprises
•observing
• thinking
• experimenting
•validating
• knowing
•validated

• about the
physical,
biological,
psychological,
andsocial
worlds
• ofthe human
species and its
environment
• working
• knowledge
•discussing
• do science
•work
• working
•figureout
• studying
•stable
• subject to
change
• how the world
works
• the universe
• complex
• process
• making
• flexible
• observations • rigid
sequence of
• organising
steps
• the scientific
method
•doing
experiments
•inquiry
• working
• m a k e great
discoveries
•endeavour
• learning

• how the world
works

131

547
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• for [learning]

.

• intertwined

•-—..

•human
history
•people
• successive
generations
•comprehensive
• mathematics
aid
technology
•human
• character and
history of its
own

• reliable

• scientists
• a lot of time
• nonscientists
• over time
• applied

•belief

• laboratories
•individual
investigators
• enterprise as
a whole

• imagination

and
inventiveness
• logic
• logical and
empirical
evidence

•contemporary
world
• present times
•earlier periods
• people
:

r

• mathematics
• technology
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Table A.10
Comparison of categories of characterisation
between the classes and differentiae
Categories of characterisation in the differentiae in Table A.l
Categories Knowledge Activity
Context
Structure
Purpose
of
characterisation in
classes
4, 5, 5, 22, 4, 4, 4, 5, 14, 18,
1,1,4,4, 4, 22, 22, 55, 21, 22, 22,
KNOWJ» —' •» J ) 1-') 29, 32, 69, 22, 22, 22,24,
36,
37,49
21,
22,
22,
24,
30,
LEDGE
54, 54, 78, 30, 32, 32, 32, 32, 16, 21, 22, 103, 103, 24, 29, 29, 32,
92, 106,
32, 36, 36, 36, 49, 22, 22, 30, 103, 104, 32, 47, 49, 49,
J U * 3*T J^t ^^9
^^1
36, 37, 37, 105, 106, 49, 54, 54, 54,
106, 106,
54,
54,
54,
54,
66,
37, 47, 54, 106, 110, •^Ty ^*9 "^*» OZ'j
110, 119,
78,
78,
78,
80,
80,
54,
54, 78, 110, 110, 69, 78, 80, 80,
122, 124,
88,
88,
88,
88,
91,
78, 78, 78, 110, 110, 80, 88, 88, 88,
127, 127,
97, 104, 105, 106, 78, 78, 78, 119, 119, 88, 91, 91, 91,
106,106,106,106, 80, 91, 91, 119
91, 91, 91,92,
92, 92, 119, 119,
106,110,110,110, 92, 97, 104,
119, 122, 122,
119, 119, 119, 119, 105, 105,
122, 122, 122,
119, 119, 122, 122, 106, 106,
124, 127, 127,
122, 122, 122, 122, 106, 106,
127, 127, 131,
106,
106,
124, 124, 124, 124,
131
106,
119,
124, 124, 124, 124,
124, 127, 127, 127, 122, 122,
127, 127, 127, 127, 122, 124,
124, 124,
127
5,14, 54, 4, 54, 54, 97, 127,131
124,124,
80, 97,122,
tmft M i n y j y A h Ht
" " - " • •• ' • ^^—*-i--n*inrin. CILL

nnrn—innifiniiiii-irirnnnnnnnnnnmn-niinnnnnnnnnnni

9

127,127

" —

"

— - - -— -—

—

--.---- — - - - - - - f . — . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Foundation

16, 17, 22,
29, 32, 36,
36, 37, 37,
37, 47, 49,
^ * T , J*Tj ^ » »

54, 91, 91,
92, 92, 92,
110, 124,
124, 124,
124, 124,
124, 124,
127
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3 5 5 5
1,1,1,3,3,4,4,
1, 1, 5, 5, | 3, 9, 11, 14, 5, 5, 9, 13, 13, 1,8,9,9,
8,9,11,15 »; " » ^ » ^ > -J» J9 J9 J » 5, 5, 8, 8, 14, 27, 27, 14, 14, 14, 14, 10, 13, 26,
19, 27, 30, 5, 5, 8, 8, 10, 13, 8, 9, 10, 29, 35, 41, 15, 20, 21, 21, 26,27,27,
34, 34, 38, 13, 13, 14, 14, 14, 10, 14, 14, 48, 49, 58, 21, 24, 24, 27, 27,27,27,
48, 50, 58, 14, 14, 15, 19, 24, 21, 21, 23, j 58, 58, 58, 30, 34, 34, 34, 34,34,36,
58, 58, 58, j 26, 27, 27, 27, 29, 27, 27, 30, 58, 58, 58, 35, 36, 38,44,
37, 38, 39,
59, 61, 68, J v , J ^ J ^*9 ^*» w O ) 1 3*T»> y^t J O ) ! 67, 67, 68, 46, 48, 49, 50, 39,41,41,
69, 69, 69, 36, 36, 38, 39, 39, ! 36, 36, 39,! 68, 68, 69, 57, 57, 58, 59, 44,44,47,
80, 82, 82, 39, 39, 41, 44, 44, 39, 39, 39, ! 69, 69, 69, 59, 61, 61, 63, 48,50,50, j
82, 102,
47, 50, 50, 50, 50, 41, 48, 49, 1 69, 69, 69, 67, 68, 69,69,
52,52,53,
102, 102, 50, 52, 53, 53, 53, 50, 52, 52, i 71, 71, 73, 69, 69, 69, 69, 53,53,53,
103, 105, 57, 57, 57, 58, 58, 58, 58, 69, ! 80, 84, 87, 71,71,71,71,
53,57,58, I
105, 105, 58, 58, 59, 59, 61, 69, 71, 80, 97, 103,
71,71,71,71,
JO, Jo, Jo,
105, 109, 61, 61, 61, 63, 67, 80, 80, 82, 103, 103, 71,71,71,71,
59,59,61, |
110, 110, 68, 68, 69, 69, 69, 1 82, 82, 84, 109, 110, 71,71,71,71,
61,61,61,
111, 111, 69, 69, 69, 69, 69, ! 84, 84, 88, 118, 118,
71, 73, 73, 73, 61,61,69,
111, 118, 69, 71, 71, 71, 71, 94, 95, 97, 118, 122,
80, 80, 80, 82, 71,71,71,
118, 118,
71, 71, 71, 71, 73, 97, 103,
124, 124,
82, 82, 82, 82, 71, 80, 80,
120, 120,
80, 80, 80, 82, 82, 103, 103, 125, 125,
82, 83, 84, 84, ! 82, 82, 82,
121, 122,
82, 82, 82, 82, 82, 103, 103, 130
84, 84, 84, 88, 82,82,82,
123, 123,
83, 84, 84, 84, 84, 105, 105,
89, 98,102, 102, 82, 82, 82,
123, 124,
84, 84, 84, 84, 85, ! 105, 105,
102, 102, 102,
82, 84, 84,
86, 87, 89, 94, 94, ! 105, 105,
102, 102, 102,
124
84,84,87,
94, 94, 94, 97, 97, 105, 110,
102, 102, 102,
87,87,87,
97, 97, 102, 102,
111, 111,
102, 102, 102, ! 87, 87, 87,
102, 102, 102, 103, 111,111,
102, 103, 103,
87, 88, 94,
103,103, 103, 103, 111, 117,
94, 94, 94,
103, 103, 103,
103,103, 103, 103, 120, 121,
103, 103,103, : 97, 97, 97,
105,105, 105,105, 123, 123,
103, 105, 105,
97,97,98,
105,105,105,105, 123, 124,
105, 105, 105,
102, 102,
105,105, 105, 105, 127, 129,
105, 105, 105,
103, 105,
105,105, 105,105, 129, 129,
105, 105,105,
105, 105,
105,105, 105, 105, 131
109, 110, 110,
105, 105,
105,105, 109, 109,
110, 110,110,
105, 110,
110,110, 110, 110,
110, 111, 111, 116, 116, !
110, 110, 110, 110,
111, 111,111, 116, 117, 1
110,111, 111,111,
111, 111,111, 120, 120,
111, 111, 111,111,
111, 111,111, 120, 121,
111, 117, 117, 118,
111, 111, 116, 121, 121,
118,118, 118, 118,
116, 117,117, 121, 121,
120,120, 120, 120,
117, 117,118, 122, 122,
120,121, 121, 121,
118, 118,118,
122, 122,
121, 121, 121,121,
118, 118, 118, 122, 123,
'
121,121, 121,121,
120, 120,120,
123, 123,
:
121, 121, 121, 122,
120, 121,121,
123, 123,
i
122, 122, 122, 122,
121, 121,121,
123, 123,
\ 122, 122, 122, 122,
;
121, 121,121,
123, 123,
:
j
122,123,123,123,
124, 125,
121, 122,122,
:
123,123, 123,123,
122, 122,122,
129, 129,
123, 123, 123, 123,
122, 122,122,
129
;
123,123, 123, 123,
122, 124, 124,
;
123,123, 123,123,
124, 124,125,
j
123,124,124,124,
127, 127,127,
1
;
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Appendix B.l
Argument from the metascientific literature emphasising the dimension
context
Debates in the metascientific literature address many aspects of context in science,
which again supports a broad interpretation of scientific context. Appendix B.l outlines
the variations, implications and subtleties of several of these debates to indicate the scope
of the ways in which science is characterised partly by context:
B. 1.1
B. 1.2

Current metascientific views withrespecttocontext;
Boundary concerns;

B. 1.3

Context as being 'Internal' and 'External';

B. 1.4

Historical contexts of science;

B. 1.5

Intellectual contexts of science;

B. 1.6
B. 1.7

Socio-cultural contexts of science;
H u m a n contexts of science;

B.1.8

Organisational contexts; and

B. 1.9

Physical contexts of science.

This is not intended as an exhaustive list, but merely one which addresses significant
themes in characterisations of science in the literature.
/ .1 Current metascientific views with respect to context
The range of contemporary metascientific views, from HPS, STS and other fields,
makes stronger appeals to context than does the Received View that they challenge. Table
B.l.l indicates this range by presenting differing conceptions of context in metascientific
views. Boyd, Gasper and Trout (1991) list three views that comprise a current consensus
in H P S , in which context is taken to be: (a) intellectual or cognitive only, where scientific
knowledge is taken as given in sense experience {empiricism)', (b) intellectual and
psychological, and in s o m e versions also socio-cultural, where scientific knowledge is
taken as what is constructed {constructivism); and (c) intellectual, psychological, sociocultural and ontological, where scientific knowledge is taken is taken to arise from the
h u m a n investigation of an external and independently existingreality{scientific realism).
In his overview of S T S approaches, Callon (1995) has identified four main views
of science. W h e r e science is characterised as (a) rational knowledge, the distinguishing
characteristics are the cognitive and discursive contexts given in statements and networks
of statements. Callon sees this as paradoxical with respect to context, because the
generation and testing of statements can only take place within contexts that are protected
by institutions and society generally:"
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Without the public space of (free) discussion, science degenerates into beliefs
stamped with subjectivity. Science is synonymous with democracy or, to use
Popper's (1945) expression, open society. In an open society, institutions are
the revisable creations of h u m a n activity; the critical mind k n o w s no limits gods, Caesars, or tribunes. Questioning is permanently renewed and no state of
rest is satisfactory. The individual is privileged because she [sic] both introduces
and judges novelty. There is an analogous concern in the writing of Habermas
(1987) with pressing science into a space for public discussion and
communication. (Callon 1995, p. 35)
Thus the primary notion of context is intellectual or cognitive, but this seems to entail
broader, socio-political contexts that are not resolved or even clarified in these
characterisations.
Where science is characterised as (b) a competitive enterprise, there is a clear notion
of scientific context being the scientists (specialists) themselves, w h o interact and
compete, and w h o are contextually quite separate from lay audiences w h o are not
qualified to take part in these activities. It is the scientific community w h o interact socially
and internally to reward discoveries or contributions, using 'material devices and rules
that codify the formulation of knowledge and its transmission' (Callon 1995, p. 39), and
provide the context for free discussion and allocation of resources. T h e boundary
between science and its environment is clear, and marks the distinction between where the
rules, incentives and resources apply or not, although it 'must be sufficiently permeable
to transmit the influences that nourish science and ensure its social utility' (Callon 1995,
p. 41).
W h e r e science is characterised as (c) sociocultural practice, scientific activities and
outcomes are characterised as m u c h more than the simple generation and translation of
statements, and the activities of science are presumed to have no greater status or privilege
than those of other institutions:
The third model suggests that science must be considered to be a practice whose
cultural and social components are as important as the constraints that arise from
the order of discourse. (Callon 1995, p. 42)
Callon again finds this a paradoxical stance with respect to context, because it is 'only
moderately interested in questions of organisation and institutional forms. This
observation applies as m u c h to the internal organisation of scientific activity as to its
relations with the sociopolitical environment' (Callon 1995, p. 48). It is more concerned
with issues like rules, learning and boundaries, which include social and psychological
contexts, rather than with organisations per se.
Finally, where science is characterised as (d) extended translation, context is
interpreted as the interactions between actants - humans, technical devices and statements
- that are described as translation networks (Callon 1995, pp. 50ff). This suggests that
the traditional distinction between Nature and society is outdated. Studies that characterise
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science by translation networks include the growing genre of laboratory studies, that take
the laboratory as the primary contextual element.
Insofar as Boyd, et al, and Callon provide reasonable sketches of the fields of H P S
and S T S , respectively, clearly there are significant differences about context both within
and between fields. There are also some similarities: the notion of cultures or interests as
contexts for science, for example, is c o m m o n in S T S characterisations and consistent
with H P S positions such as constructivist characterisations and scientific realism (see, for
example, Chalmers 1976; Bhaskar 1983k). These debates about particular notions of
context are all examples of the general notion of context as a dimension of science, which
is used regardless of the metascientific tradition. The remainder of Appendix B.l
comprises examples to support this claim.
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1.2 Boundary concerns
All fields, including science, are characterised by boundaries that are established
between what is agreed as the field (in this case science) and what is not This m a y be
seen as part of a broader interest in so-called boundary work:
N o doubt, speech about the intrinsic and the extrinsic is characteristic of a wide
range of cultural practices and arguably of all. Bounding a practice is a w a y of
defining what it is, of protecting it from unwanted interference and excluding
unwanted participants, of telling practitioners h o w it is proper to behave within it
and h o w that behaviour differs from ordinary conduct, and of distributing value
across its borders. Practices that have not succeeded in making their boundarydiscourse stick are unlikely to be recognisable as distinct entities within the
general stream of cultural life. (Shapin 1992, p. 335)
Boundary work draws on a wide range of characterisations emphasising context and
other dimensions. It comprises characterisations of sufficient clarity to enable claims
about what is (inside the boundary of) science and what is not. Boundary claims m a y be
explicit or implicit. For example, the view that knowledge in the natural sciences arises
from the nature of the cosmos implies a boundary indicating science from non-science:
science is therefore different from other forms of knowledge, which are socially
constructed. This view is of course consistent with the positivist R V in H P S , but is also
well k n o w n from the work of the sociologist Karl Mannheim (1929, 1936). M a n n h e i m
considered that the sociology of knowledge applied to all forms of knowledge except
science, which was determined by an objective reality. Shapin notes a tendency for
internalist accounts to be normative, and for externalist accounts to be descriptive,
particularly in historical and sociological analyses; philosophical analyses have not
seriously addressed science and its context until recently. The first clear use of the e/i
distinction probably was given in Merton (1938) and more recent uses include Foucault's
analysis of the creation and manipulation of power in society:
M u c h Foucauldian work sees patterns of exclusion and inclusion, of 'controlling
and delimiting discourse', as systems making truth and power. (Shapin 1992, p.
335)
Boundaries as essential or constructed
Given this preamble, it is clear that a great number of the very m a n y metascientific
accounts entail boundaries between science and non-science, whether explicitly or
implicidy. There are two broad approaches to boundary work, essentialism and
constructivism:
Essentialists argue for the possibility and analytic desirability of identifying
unique, necessary, and invariant qualities that set science apart from other
cultural practices and products, and that explain its singular achievements (valid
and reliable claims about the external world). Constructivists argue that no
demarcation principles work universally and that the separation of science from
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other knowledge-producing activities is instead a contextually contingent and
interests-driven pragmatic accomplishment drawing selectively on inconsistent
and ambiguous attributes. Research in the sociology of science has raised doubts
about the ability of any proposed 'demarcation criteria' to distinguish science
from non-science. Attention has thus shifted from criticisms of essentialism to
examinations of when, h o w , and to what ends the boundaries of science are
drawn and defended in natural settings often distant from laboratories and
professional journals - a process k n o w n as 'boundary-work'. Essentialists do
boundary-work; constructivists watch it get done by people in society - as
scientists, would-be scientists, science critics, journalists, bureaucrats, lawyers,
and other interested parties accomplish the demarcation of science from nonscience. (Gieryn 1995, pp. 393-4) 1
Essentialist views of science boundaries
The major essentialist positions in boundary work have been given in philosophy
by Popper, in history by K u h n and in sociology by Merton (Gieryn 1995, pp. 394ff).
The essentialist criterion for Popper is falsifiability: that scientific claims can in principle
be refuted or contradicted by empirical observation. This can be done in any of three
ways: if the claim is judged to be potentially unfalsifiable, if no severe test is m a d e to
refute the claim, or if the claim is not rejected after being refuted, representing
respectively a belief, a practice and 'adherence into non-science' (Gieryn 1995, p. 396).
For Popper, non-science includes metaphysics, ideology, pseudoscience, mathematics,
logic, Marxism, astrology and Freudian psychoanalysis. For Merton the essentialist
criteria are his four social norms of science: communism, universalism, disinterestedness
and organised scepticism. For Merton, non-science is characterised by the absence of any
of these norms. A n example is ideology, such as racist assertions in Nazi Germany,
because it has interested and not disinterested purposes. Kuhn's account does have
constructivist characteristics: Popper dismissed K u h n 'as a historical relativist and
(worse) one w h o would allow the sociology and psychology of science to settle issues
(like demarcation) that are more properly settled by logic and methodology' (Gieryn
1995, p. 401). However, Gieryn interprets paradigmatic consensus as an essentialist
demarcation principle in Kuhn's characterisation. Thus the absence of paradigmatic
consensus in the social sciences d o o m s thosefieldsto incessant argument about ideology
and first principles, that precludes the coherent progress characteristic of the mature
physical sciences. Intriguingly, Gieryn mentions Kuhn's rejection of astrology as
unscientific because it has 'no puzzles to solve and therefore no science to practice'
(Kuhn 1977, quoted by Gieryn 1995, p. 403), but fails to identify puzzle solving or
problem-solving

as a demarcation principle. Elsewhere K u h n identifies 'the normal

Gieryn's account clearly identifies the present thesis as a constructivist example of boundary work,
because by definition a 'mapping' exercise like this thesis cannot presume the efficacy of any
single view. This thesis does not set out its own boundary for 'science', but seeks to address the
variation of views of science in ordertoinform the debate about what could or should be presented
in schools as 'science'.
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puzzle-solving research of the natural sciences' as a principle of demarcation from the
h u m a n sciences, which he sees as fundamentally interpretive CH- hermeneutic (Kuhn 1991,
pp. 22-3).
There are problems with essentialist accounts of demarcation. For example, the
falsificationist can never be sure when an empirical claim is replicated or corroborated:
Collins argues that there is no unambiguous and impersonal algorithm for
reproducing an experimental procedure. Scientists routinely face the problem of
deciding when areplicationis competent and authentic. 'Experimenter's regress'
is a paradox for those like Popper w h o want to 'use replication as a test of the
truth (falsification) of scientific knowledge claims' [Collins 1985] because
negotiation of the competence of a replication attempt is, at once, negotiation of
the reality of phenomena at hand. In his study of gravity w a v e experiments,
Collins reports that scientists' judgements about the competence of a replication
experiment hinged on whether the results of that experiment were consistent
with their theoretical assumptions going in. This research challenges an inherent
part of Popper's demarcation criteria, for h o w can refutation or falsification
occur if scientists sometimes exploit available rhetoric (human error, machine
failure, extraneous circumstances, technical infelicity) to neutralise potentially
falsifying observations by attributing them to incompetent or unauthentic
replications? (Gieryn 1995, pp. 397-8)
A similar problem arises with Mertonian norms, which take 'the supposed essential
qualities of science - those that distinguish it from non-science - and makes them into
matters for people in society to construct, interpret, negotiate, and deploy' (Gieryn 1995,
p. 400). A s for Kuhn's paradigmatic consensus, the paradigm itself is socially
constructed, which fails to address discrepancies between the beliefs - especially any
misgivings - held by the individual scientist, and the consensus view. Further, identifying
the consensus has particular problems: first is the problem of deciding the limits of the
membership of the research community w h o proclaim a consensus (who excludes the
dissenters?); second are the judgements about the beliefs of other scientists (who accepts
the n e w belief and w h e n did they decide?); and third is the decision about just what is
agreed upon. Research by Gilbert and Mulkay reports considerable variation between
scientists o n each of these three points (Gieryn 1995, p. 404). Thus essentialist
approaches to date are flawed because each is subject to telling criticisms.
Constructivist views of science boundaries
Constructivist approaches to boundary work, on the other hand, seek to articulate
explicitly, rather than assume, the question of what is science by describing examples of
boundary work inrealsituations:
The challenge is to explain the cognitive authority of modern science without
attributing to it essential qualities found by sociologists to be anything but
essential...
Boundary-work occurs as people contend for, legitimate, or challenge the
cognitive authority of science - and the credibility, prestige, power, and material
resources that attend such a privileged position. Pragmatic demarcations of
science from non-science are driven by a social interest in claiming, expanding,
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protecting, monopolising, usurping, denying or restricting the cognitive
authority of science ...
'Unique' features of science, qualities that distinguish it from other
knowledge-producing activities, are to be found not in scientific practices and
texts but in their representations. (Gieryn 1995, pp. 405-6)
Gieryn describes four types of boundary work, as represented in examples of empirical
studies (pp. 424ff).
First is demarcation by monopolisation, where one view dominates and excludes
the alternatives. A n example is the 1660s debate between Robert Boyle and Thomas
Hobbes, which Shapin and Schaffer (1985) characterised as a contest for cultural
authority, between Boyle's experimentation based on the authority of Nature and
Hobbes' rational, deductive philosophy. Boyle's argument eventually held sway - it
monopolised the argument - and the role of experiment was legitimised. A s a further point
of interest, Shapin and Schaffer argue that this happened less because of any internalist
criteria concerning experimentation versus reasoning than with h o w it was represented
and widely accepted as a peaceable and antidogmatic resolution that appealed to diverse
interests in Restoration England seeking to construct a peaceable and antidogmatic
society.
The second is demarcation by expansion, where insiders seek to push back the
boundaries of their field into territory claimed by other fields. A n example is
D'Alembert's eighteenth-century mapping of knowledge, which has been characterised as
an example of explicit boundary work by outlining three divisions of knowledge, giving
great prominence to reason and playing d o w n the scope and authority of m e m o r y and
imagination (Gieryn 1995, p439).
The third type of boundary demarcation is expulsion, where insiders seek to 'expel
non-real m e m b e r s from their midst' (Gieryn 1995, p. 432). T h e example is the
posthumous rejection of the work of the eminent British psychologist, Sir Cyril Burt The
anomalies in Burt's work that progressively came to light were dealt with in ways that
demonstrate a concern to identify thefieldof psychology, but not Burt's work, as part of
science. Thus Burt wasfirstcharacterised by sloppiness (outside the borders of science
because properly done psychology is rigorous like science); second by personal
idiosyncrasies and troubles (outside the borders of science); and third by separating
Burt's behaviour and intentions (outside the borders of science) from the content and
validity of his claims (inside the borders).
The fourth type of boundary demarcation is protection, meaning the erection of
barriers to 'protect the resources and privileges of those inside' (Gieryn 1995, p. 434):
Successful boundary-work of this kind is measured by the prevention of the
control of science by outside powers - or, put the other way, protection of the
autonomous control of science by scientist-insiders. (Gieryn 1995, pp. 434-5)
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Examples of boundary-work by protection include dealing with complaints about animal
experiments by appealing to the higher values of medical research (inside) compared with
cosmetics (outside), and blaming the explosion of the Challenger spacecraft on
'management decisions' or 'manufacturing' (both outside).
The significant boundary is with politics, which is usually kept outside but nearby:
For scientists, the mapping task is to get science close to politics, but not too
close. W h y ? A key to the legitimation of scientists' cultural authority is the
perceived pertinence of science for political decision making: A s government
officials turn to scientists for expert advice before promulgating regulations or
statutes, they are simultaneously measuring and reproducing die authority of
science over claims about reality (Mukerji 1989). T o o great a distance between
science and politics threatens a critically important route for scientists'
legitimation via their perceived political utility - and in particular their claim on
government funding for their research. (Gieryn 1995, pp. 434-5)
T h e relationship between science and politics is thus symbiotic: this utilitarian role
legitimises science, and the appeal to scientific authority legitimises government
decisions. Both groups seek to be close but not within the other's boundary: scientists
seek to preserve the objectivity and neutrality of their field, and politicians and
bureaucrats seek to preserve their discretionary power. This can be achieved in various
ways: lobby groups often seek to discredit the science of their opponents; key players in
regulation often seek to change the characterisation of an issue from science to politics or
vice versa, as it suits their purposes; sometimes the boundary is blurred, as w h e n
scientists prepare advice or a position paper, and sometimes the distance between the two
is increased, as w h e n scientists working for a government agency (or company) distance
themselves from the science of their employer (Gieryn 1995, pp. 435-9). The present
thesis argues that in the literature, boundaries between science and non-science are
matters of context, argued by combinations of knowledges, activities, purposes,
structures and belief systems.
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1.3 Context as being 'internal' and 'external'
Much metascientific debate, including debate about the nature of science in the
school curriculum, hinges on the distinction between externalism and internalism
(henceforth e/i). Internalism and externalism are powerful and recurrent themes in the
metascientific literature, whether explicit or implicit, particularly since about the second
world war. This distinction is interpreted broadly here, to include 'the conventional
distinction between the content of knowledge and the context of production' (Callon
1995, p. 51). That is, the distinction is between characterising the intellectual products of
scientific cognition as having either cognitive (or internal) sources only or non-cognitive
(or external) influences (Shapin 1992, p. 348). T h e e/i debates excite interest because
they underpin m a n y competing characterisations of science within and between scientists,
philosophers of science, historians, and sociologists of science.
Debate over contexts of discovery and justification
The e/i debates arose partly inreactionto the positivist R V , which held that the only
adequate analysis of a scientific theory is a rational reconstruction of its finished form
(Suppe 1979, p. 126). This view distinguished between activities that can be analysed in
this way, and others that cannot, which entailed acknowledging the former and rejecting
the latter as the proper concern of science. This dichotomy derives from John Herschel's
(1830) distinction between contexts of discovery and verification (Lossee 1980) and
Reichenbach's distinction between contexts of discovery and. justification. Herschel
(1830) proposed a twofold pathway of reasoning in science2: the formation of hypotheses
about observations, and then the testing the hypothesis and making predictions from it.
H e called the process of forming the hypothesis 'discovery' (Herschel 1830, p. 199),
whether this be careful and cumulative induction as argued by Francis Bacon, or 'forming
at once a bold hypothesis' (Herschel 1830, p. 198), or a combination of the two; the
process of working from the hypothesis he called 'verification' (Herschel 1830, p. 208).
For Herschel, it does not matter which process generates the hypothesis; the significance
lies in whether subsequendy the hypothesis is verified or not This is similar to
Reichenbach's distinction between the contexts of discovery and justification.
The R V , particularly as proposed by Reichenbach's distinction, dismisses the
context of forming hypotheses - discovery - as not subject to rational reconstruction and
therefore not a concern of science:
Reichenbach (1938) introduced the phrases context of discovery and context of
justification to mark the distinction between the w a y a scientific or mathematical
result is discovered and the w a y in which it is presented, justified, defended,
2

As discussed in the companion chapter cm activity and in Appendix B.5.
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and so on, to the scientific or mathematical community. B y this distinction he
wishes to mark the difference between, for example, Kepler's working analogy
that the solar system must be analogous to the Holy Trinity and the resulting
empirically justified theory which Kepler ultimately presented. According to
Reichenbach, problems in the context of discovery properly are the concern of
psychology and history, not philosophy; epistemology is occupied only with the
context of justification. According to this view, which has been held by almost
all adherents to the Received View, a philosophical analysis of theories m a y
ignore factors in the genesis of theories, confining its attention to theories as
finished products. Thus rational reconstruction is capable of dealing with
problems in the context of justification, hence in epistemology. (Suppe 1979, p.
125)
In this view, reconstructing the logic of the deductive arguments in justification
demonstrates the rationality of scientific conclusions.
T h e alternative position, which is not just the acknowledgment of discovery but of
its significant contribution to scientific activity, has become more influential with postpositivist characterisations of science. There are n o w m a n y metascientific views that
address discovery. While both the positivist and post-positivist positions recognise that
the notion of discovery entails more than just intellectual or cognitive factors, the former
rejects discovery as non-scientific because of this, and the latter views seek to explicate
the role of discovery in science for exactly the same reason. T h e legacy of these e/i
debates has been to emphasise the interest in whether science is characterised best by a
cognitive context only, or by more than the cognitive, or whether the cognitive depends
on other contexts. Thus while a strict internalism is concerned only with the context of
justification, the various externalist views acknowledge both the contexts of justification
and discovery.
Classic internalism and externalism
Internalism and externalism are categories 'devised by historians for their o w n
purposes and convenience' and therefore should be understood as tools for understanding
science (Morrell 1983b, p. 211)3. T h e y are of particular interest in the present thesis
because in their extreme forms they represent strongly opposing characterisations of
science, and the e/i distinction is the subject of considerable, and sometimes intense,
metascientific debate. The heat of these debates indicates that e/i arguments are often taken
as characterisations, and not merely interpretative concepts; hence Morrell's caution,
above and below.
A s interpreted here, the term internalism describes the rejection of psychological,
socio-cultural or historical factors and considers only the rational demonstration of
cognitive content:
[Internalism is] the view that science is primarily an abstract intellectual
enterprise insulated from social, political, and economic circumstances.

3

As are the six categories or dimensions suggested by the present thesis.
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Internalist historians focus on the obviously intellectual aspects of setting and
solving problems concerned with the understanding and the control of the
natural world; they highlight conceptual frameworks, methodological
procedures, and theoretical formulations. For these historians, often concerned
to defend science as the supremely rational form of thought, changes in past
science were exclusively or chiefly occasioned by the solving of inherited and
abstract problems within a particularfieldof inquiry.
T h e appeals of internalism are real. It avoids the naivety of c m d e forms of
externalism, such as the Hessen thesis. At its best, it reveals science as an
a w e s o m e intellectual enterprise; and shows the importance in the past of
perceptions and attitudes which were often different from those of today. It
emphasises the continuity, coherence and progressiveness of science. In its
idealist form, it portrays past science as esoteric, imaginative, and creative
intellectual work, far removed from routine factual compilation...
Science is a remarkable form of intellectual inquiry. A s a non-doctrinaire
approach, internalism will therefore remain an essential tradition in history of
science, provided it is understood that internalism is nothing m o r e than a
category devised by historians for their o w n purposes and convenience. (Morrell
1983b, p. 2 1 1 ) 4
(Hessen's thesis characterises Newtonian science by its socio-economic context, an
externalist view).
Clearly, the concept of internalism is useful, since it draws attention to a strength of
the empiricist tradition, including the R V , as a characterisation of science. That strength,
as judged by empiricists, is the attempt in scientific thinking to distinguish the factors that
contribute meaningfully to an understanding of Nature from those that do not. The
rejection of metaphysical concepts by the logical positivists is an example of this.
In clarifying the characteristics of an internalist view of science, however, Morrell
referred to the opposing view, externalism:
[Externalism is] the view that social, political, and economic circumstances
affect the pursuit of knowledge of Nature.
Whereas internalism is concerned primarily with science as knowledge,
externalism examines science and scientists in the socio-cultural setting.
Externalist historians are interested in scientific groups (both institutionalised
and informal), the reasons for the development of certain kinds of scientific
research, scientific careers and patronage of science. They claim that social and
economic circumstances have affected the rate and the direction of some
scientific work. Committed externalist historians usually assume that the
response to such circumstances has on occasion helped to constitute scientific
knowledge itself [as studied in thefieldof] (sociology of scientific knowledge).
Externalism has its attractions. It sees science as part of culture (in the same
w a y as philosophical ideas and religious beliefs are a part of culture) thereby
making history of science a part of general socio-cultural history. It stresses the
w a y s in which political, technical, economic and military interests affect science.
Unlike internalism, it asks questions about the location and timing of movements
in the science of the past; and it draws attention to the varying receptions of
scientific knowledge. Internalism tends to separate knowledge and its uses;

Hessen's thesis is a Marxist characterisation of Newtonian science by socio-economic context, that
Newton's scientific work was inextricablytiedto emerging manufacturing needs (Shapin 1981b,
pp. 185-6). The notion of socio-cultural contexts of science derives from externalism, and is
addressed later in a dedicated subsection.
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while externalism tends to relate them by studying the interests served by the
different uses to which knowledge was put...
Externalism is a category devised by historians. For this reason, some see the
commitment of Johannes Kepler (1571-1630) to neo-Pythagorean beliefs as
external to his work on the laws of planetary motion; others see it as internal. In
cases where scientists' o w n perceptions give no clues, it is difficult to sustain
the distinction between external and internal motives and causes. Because
science is a social as well as an intellectual phenomenon, externalism as a nondoctrinaire approach will persist. Generally, however, dogmatic externalism,
like its internalist equivalent, is best avoided because it invites distortion and
anachronism. (Morrell 1983a, pp. 145-6)
Thus Morrell argues that accepting the insights of these views while avoiding extreme
positions is useful. T h e fact that particular examples can be deemed as internalist in some
views and externalist in others supports his cautionary note.
A range of eli positions
Morrell's caution against extreme internalist or externalist positions points to a
range of other positions that either sit somewhere between the two or else deny the
validity of the distinction per se. A number of the summary statements, for example, refer
to a 'standard view' of science that approximates the R V : they are internalist
characterisations of science but do not use the label internalism. This is not surprising: a
standard or received view is, by definition, the generally accepted view and does not need
to account for its differences from any number of non-accepted views. Its proponents
m a y not even be aware of such alternatives. (This suggestion is itself part of the e/i
debate). Beyond the existence or not of such assumptions, however, there is a growing
literature that is partly or wholly devoted to developing explicit internalist and externalist
conceptions of science, of debating the approaches and questioning the nature and
existence of differences between the two. S o m e examples of these various approaches
follow.
a) A strict internalism characterises science as an intellectual or cognitive enterprise
and either rejects any influence from external contexts or omits reference to them. T h e
general position of strict internalist characterisations of science is given above in the quote
from Suppe concerning the Received V i e w and Reichenbach's distinction between the
contexts of discovery and justification. For Schuster (1990), the 'canonical' statement of
the internalist position in science history is given in the writings of Alexandre Koyre
(1892-1964) which, using the example of the Scientific Revolution, characterise science
by the intellectual contents of science, such as concepts, theories and ideas:
Koyre' held that the development of m o d e m science depended upon a revolution
in ideas, a shift in intellectual perspective, involving the establishment, within or
above scientific thought, of a n e w metaphysics or set of deep conceptual
presuppositions, which in turn shaped thinking, experience and action in the
emerging fields of modern science, especially classical mechanics and
Copernican astronomy. (Schuster 1990, p. 219)
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T h e present thesis interprets this 'intellectual perspective ... or set of deep conceptual
presuppositions' as a belief system5. A belief system is not necessarily an internalist
construct: Borhek and Curtis (1975), for example, have proposed a m o d e l of belief
systems that comprises a mixture of internalist and externalist notions, that is discussed at
length in Appendix B.2. Koyre, however, is clearly concerned with an intellectual, that is
internalist, characterisation.
General science texts are usually internalist. They are concerned traditionally with
only the cognitive content - the propositions, laws, concepts and so on - and techniques
of the particular field of science. Singer has argued that in omitting reference to any
context other than cognitive, science texts have perpetuated an internalist characterisation
of science, that is, perpetuated a distorted characterisation of science:
In this matter [of confusing or failing to distinguish the three processes of
choosing facts, drawing an hypothesis or conclusion, and testing the
conclusion] scientific articles, and especially scientific text-books, habitually
give a false impression. These scientific works are composed to demonstrate the
truth of certain views. In doing so they must needs obscure the process by
which the investigator reached those views. That process consists, in effect, of a
series of improvised judgements, or 'working hypotheses', interspersed with
imperfect and merely provisional demonstrations. M a n y hypotheses and m a n y
demonstrations have had to be discarded w h e n submitted to a further process of
testing. Thus a scientific article or book which tells nothing of these side issues,
blind alleys, and false starts tends, in s o m e sort, to conceal the tracks of the
investigator. For this reason, a m o n g others, science can never be learned from
books, but only by contact with phenomena. (Singer 1959, pp. 256-6)
Externalist writers, mostiy writing later than Singer, add a range of other factors whose
omission also distorts an accurate characterisation of science, but would certainly agree
cm the central point of the distorted view. O f course, traditional characterisations of
science as knowledge or a conceptual framework are internalist characterisations. This
thesis specifically addresses scientific knowledge, including its c o m m o n internalist
characterisation, in the companion chapter on knowledge and Appendix B.6.
b) A less strict internalism is the view that, ideally, science has an intellectual
context only, but that in practice some external factors impinge o n the proper (internal)
working of science. Other (external) factors include the personalities involved
(psychological context), strategic and tactical considerations (political contexts), and the
availability of the state-of-the-art facilities (organisational and physical contexts). M a n y
general historical accounts, including some that are not so recent, either represent or
include (mosdy) internalist histories because they focus on the development of logically
justified concepts and not their discovery or invention, but mention other factors (see
Singer 1959, 1960; M a s o n 1962; ed. Williams 1969; Losee 1980; eds B y n u m , B r o w n e
& Porter 1983; and Oldroyd 1989). M a s o n and Oldroyd include a wider range of
contextual factors, but nonetheless the emphasis in each is on the intellectual context A s
5

See chapter 7.
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part of their dictionary format, B y n u m , B r o w n e and Porter do address externalist factors
specifically (as in Morrell's entries, above) but in general the entries are not from an
externalist perspective.
c) In the middle of this notional continuum, the relative standing of e/i positions is
less clear: views m a y characterise external factors as constituting internal science, or
internal factors as constituting external science. The former includes the view that science
is an intellectual enterprise characterised by external factors: that the essential or defining
concerns of science are indeed intellectual, as the internalists argue, but that these cannot
be properly understood without considering the range of external factors that contribute to
and shape them. The latter is similar, but arises from a different set of analytical interests.
In this approach, science is best understood as a social enterprise centred in a particular
group of subcultures, which are characterised particularly by intellectual factors. For
example, in discussing the diversity of views a m o n g sociologists of science, Shapin
(1992) observes that m a n y are sceptical of e/i factors and do not feel the need to invoke
external factors to explain science as an essentially social enterprise:
While arguing for the inreducibly social character of scientific activity, it was
never any of these sociologists' (of scientific knowledge) case that
considerations pertaining to the wider society (what are conventionally called
'external factors') must be part of any particular sociological account. Whether
or not an externalist account w a s indicated was regarded as a wholly contingent
matter. Indeed, sociologists noted, it is entirely plausible that the
professionalised and insulated status of m u c h modern science means that
considerations relating to individuals' party-political affiliations, class
background, religion, and the like are rarely relevant to explanations of theorychoice or fact-judgement. (Shapin 1992, p. 352)
Bhaskar's scientific realism can also be interpreted as a middle ground position. It posits
an independent reality that determines the cognitive possibilities for us, while requiring
analysis of the social production of this knowledge (Bhaskar 1983k, p. 363).
d) A strict externalism characterises science as a social enterprise of no special
status: that science is an activity within society and is best understood by being interpreted
in the w a y that all other subcultural groups are interpreted, and not according to the
constructs used within the group itself. Thus B u n g e (1991, p. 538) distinguishes
'moderate or weak externalism' from 'radical or strong externalism':
Moderate or weak externalism: Knowledge is socially conditioned.
M l (Local). T h e scientific community influences the work of its members.
M 2 (Global). Society at large influences the work of individual scientists.
Radical or strong externalism: Knowledge is social.
R l (Local). T h e scientific community emanates or constructs scientific ideas, all
of which have ultimately a social content
R 2 (Global). Society at large emanates or constructs scientific ideas - hence there
are no inside-outside, micro-macro, content-context, and discourse-praxis
distinctions. (Bunge 1991, p. 538)
Note that Bunge identifies a strong externalism with a rejection of eA boundaries; he cites
Latour's (1987) characterisation as an example of a radical externalism. B y w a y of
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comparison, Latour is for Shapin an example of h o w a rejection of e/i distinctions
dissolves the conventional differences between science and society and gives fresh
insights into science:
Latour rightly points out that what counts as 'science' and what counts as
'society' are the results of trials of strength. Thus, to speak of 'social influences
on science' is, in the current sociological commonplace, to use as a resource
what ought to be a topic of inquiry ... H e argues that w e do not encounter
m o d e m social action without encountering also the technical and scientific, and
symmetrically, that w e never confront science without confronting social action
and politics. T h e objects which students of science seek to analyse are never
'pure science' and 'pure society': they are 'actor-networks' in which the humans
are connected to other humans, things to other things, and things to humans.
Where is the external social which is said to influence science? A n d what is the
internal domain which is said to develop according to its immanent logic? The
traditional e/i debate is said to be vacuous because it manipulated the wrong
ontology.
A s a metaphysics for science studies, Latour's actor-network theory ...
rightly dissolves any discourse which depends upon 'society' and 'science'
having distinct real essences. Yet it remains unclear what historians and
sociologists are supposed to be able to do with the n e w ontology ...
According to Latour, historians and sociologists should no longer talk of
'science' and 'society' but only 'stronger and weaker associations' of
heterogeneous elements. W e must, he says, abandon e/i discourse because
crucial terms in that discourse are analytically invalid: 'science' and 'society' do
not exist as pure forms, and certainly not within their common-sensical
boundaries ... So far as the historicist practitioner is concerned, Latour's
metaphysics appears as a useful way, along with others, to clear the mind of
some current prejudices before setting out to study science. (Shapin 1992, pp.
355-7)
Unsurprisingly, Latour's characterisation has provoked some reaction. F r o m an
internalist perspective, 'trials of strength' are acknowledged only to the extent they are
trials of evidence, and other shows of 'strength' such as political or rhetorical are
dismissed as non-science. From some externalist perspectives, trials of any kind of
strength m a y have affected the scientific outcome but are not identified unless w e look for
them and their effects. For Shapin, above, and others, Latour offers a framework into
which can be placed e/i issues of context. For others, such as Bunge (1992, pp. 51ff),
removing the distinction between work inside the laboratory and other work removes the

opportunity to analyse critical characteristics of science especially mental processes, o
internal factors . Bunge identified in what he calls the NSS {new sociology of science,

particularly. Latour & Woolgar, Knorr-Cetina, and Latour) a critical lack of attention to
fundamental internal characteristics, combined with attention to largely misleading
external factors:
The advocates of the NSS ... [assert] that there is nothing special about science,
'nothing of any cognitive quality.' Thus to quote Latour (1983): 'Scientific fact
is the product of average, ordinary people and settings, linked to one another by
no special vices' (p. 162). Never mind what the inscriptions m e a n and h o w their
content is checked for consistency and truth: Only the 'technology of inscribing
(writing, schooling, printing, recording devices)' matters ...
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T h e constructivist/relativist view of scientific research is a sociologised
version of Bacon's, according to which the scientists are only busy with
collecting (or rather constructing) data, making inscriptions ... S o m e h o w the
spotting of problems, the conception of hypotheses, the design of experiments,
and the checks for truth d o not occur in the ' Wittgensteinian/phenomenological/
Kuhnian model of scientific activity,' as Collins (1983) calls it
Thus Latour and Woolgar (1983) and Knorr-Cetina (1981) believe that the
essence of laboratory w o r k is the manipulation of artefacts ... (Bunge 1992, p.
57)
For Bunge, these characterisations are merely operationalist and confuse the means (the
artefacts and observable activities) with the ends (the construction and testing of theories,
essentially internalist activities). T h e reply to Bunge's critique is that the rationalisation of
science from within the culture of science proves nothing to those seeking to characterise
it objectively from without Hence the appeal of Shapin's position, in part (e) below, that
there remains m u c h to do in resolving e/i issues about context in science. Nevertheless,
externalist characterisations such as Latour's are useful resources in understanding
science, and are employed, in turn, in the other characterisations.
e) Other positions are more reflexive in terms of the e/i debates, arguing that the e/i
debates are unclear and need clarification, or that the arguments arising from an e/i
distinction are not meaningful, and that alternative conceptions are more useful. Thus,
Shapin (1992) has argued that, while e/i debates were prominent in the academic history
and sociology of science from about the beginning of the Second World War, they are no
longer perceived as useful or even meaningful ways to characterise science:
If in the 1960s the central problematic of the academic discipline k n o w n as the
history of science was pointed to by reference to the 'internal' and the 'external',
by the late 1980s such usages increasingly betrayed the amateur, the neophyte,
the outsider, or the out of touch. Within a generation the discourse of
'internalism' and 'externalism' seems to have passed from the commonplace to
the gauche. (Shapin 1992, p. 333)
A s an example, Fuller (1991, p. 232) judges S T S as the 'successor' to H P S , largely
because H P S became 'embroiled' in e/i debates, while S T S , claiming contributions from
historians, philosophers and social scientists, addressed instead more productive images
of science. H e broadly aligns H P S and S T S with internalist and externalist positions,
respectively. Bunge (1991) takes a contrary position to Fuller, and identifies externalism
as a characteristic of both the S S and the N S S . H e judges the SS, given in Bemal (1939),
Price (1964) and Merton (1938; 1973), as useful in distinguishing 'the conceptual content
of science from its social context and [holding] that the latter influences the former
without however, fully determining it' (Bunge 1991, p. 534). However, he judges the
N S S , given in Knorr-Cetina and Mulkay (1983), Barnes (1977), Bloor (1976) and
Latour and Woolgar (1979), as a 'regression' because its stronger case for external
factors fails to m a k e the same distinction (p. 525). Similarly, Slezak (1994a; 1994b) has
criticised developments in S S K because of a perceived strong externalism. These
positions contrast with that of the influential report, Science for All Americans ( A A A S
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1989, in Matthews 1994, p. 39) which calls for a 'moderate externalism' in U S high
school science.
A n alternative meta-analysis of these debates sees them as unresolved and needing
further consideration. This view is more likely to accept some tension between multiple
viewpoints, and in this sense acknowledges a post-modern eclecticism: e/i distinctions of
s o m e sort remain useful constructs for characterising science. In discussing the
judgement that e/i distinctions are no longer current, Shapin (1992) pleads for a more
critical appraisal of e/i issues before laying the debate to rest For the purposes of the
present thesis, the very existence of e/i debates demonstrates vigorous characterisations of
science that foreground context.
Shapin's critique ofthe e/i discourse
Shapin (1992) provides a useful critique of the eAfield.H e argues for maintaining
an interest in e/i issues, albeit a more pragmatic and sceptical interest, including a more
systematic consideration of e/i issues that remain unresolved to his satisfaction. His
discussion of shortcomings in the several decades of eA debate comprises a basis for a
m a p of thefield,indicating areas both having received attention and needing attention.
First, e/i theories were never clear about e/i characteristics, and were typically
characterised by opponents to m a k e them extreme or 'indefensible'.
Secondly, there has been confusion between eA as referring to a theory of change 'scientific change proceeds (wholly/mainly/partly) in response to intrinsic/extrinsic
factors' - and as referring to a focus or approach to research:
Thus, externalism and internalism have been widely treated as those styles of
research which happen to attend (wholly/mainly) to factors attracting the labels
'external' or 'internal'. Yet a practitioner w h o attends (generally or in a particular
instance) to external factors m a y hold (in general or in that instance) an
internalist theory of scientific change. A n d vice versa. ... A style of research
does not amount to a theory about scientific change. (Shapin 1992, p. 346)
Thirdly, eclectic mixtures of external and internal factors relied on seeming
generally sensible and failed to explain h o w such mixes actually resulted in scientific
change. Fourthly, there is an asymmetry between eA accounts: it is possible to suggest a
completely internalist account of science history, but not an externalist one.
Fifthly, there is wide variation, overlap and ambiguity between what different
accounts consider to be external and internal:
Thus in one form of accounting, external explanation is established by showing
the influence of non-scientific forms of culture upon science, while in another
the entire domain of the cultural (or cognitive) is taken as intrinsic and only the
non-cultural as extrinsic. Externalist accounting has, in various manifestations,
identified its explanans as non-scientific culture (erroneous, irrational,
metaphysical, aesthetic); scientific culture other than the variety allegedly
influenced; yesterday's science (traditions or authority structures); social
structures and processes within science (such as interested attachments to
methods, schools and knowledge-claims); social and economic structures
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outside of science (considered as non-cognitive, and actively conceived as
interests or passively as reflections of extrinsic realities). Similarly, externalist
explananda have been characterised as encompassing scientific culture as a
whole, including its methodological and metaphysical elements, its dynamics or
foci of interest. Debates have been so poorly focused that the general form of
'key' achievements in externalism have been taken as identifying the 'key' tenets
of internalism. (Shapin 1992, p. 348)
Shapin interprets this variation as the imprecision of thefield.This is significant in the
present thesis, but perhaps more significant here is that this variation constitutes a useful
'map' of the 'territory', that is, the various w a y s in which science is characterised by
context Shapin presses the point by invoking 'arrangements of present-day science' as
examples of externalist influences on different research areas of 'internal' science:
... H o w e v e r vigorously modern scientists m a y strive to blend politically
endorsed directives to their o w n ends, it is unlikely that anything like a H u m a n
G e n o m e Initiative would have autonomously emerged from an internal agenda
of molecular biology. T h e identification of 'disinterested curiosity' as an
individual motive is not incompatible with the claim that curiosity tends to flow
towards the heaviest concentrations of cash. 'Actor-oriented' analysis is laudable
but it is also insufficient, since other actors m a y affect the behaviour of those in
w h o m w e happen to be interested. (Shapin 1992, p.348)
Sixthly, there is no adequate explanation of causation: the externalists (with the
Cartesians) have not explained h o w the non-cognitive shapes the cognitive, and the
internalists (with the idealists) have not explained h o w ideas cause ideas, since it implies
agency or action to products of human agency. The related concept, of an eA division into
science as cognitive and society as non-cognitive, has not been 'systematically defended'
either (Shapin 1992, p. 349).
Seventhly, the point of action of eA theories is unclear: the notion of individual
motivation c o m m o n in externalist accounts is often unclear, and the notion of ideas
causing other ideas in internalist accounts has not addressed questions of psychological
and sociological influences.
Eighthly, the c o m m o n l y m a d e equation between 'external' and 'social' is
unjustified, and ignores sociological factors within science. Although there has been
m u c h work in S T S from the 1970s identifying 'social influences' in scientific claims, the
equation between the external and the social remains influential. This influence reflects a
long-standing tradition in western European cultures that assumes that rational thought is
the activity of an individual:
It is a pervasive w a y w e have in our culture of stipulating the posture and
circumstances in which valuable culture ought to be made. M a n y features of the
history of these debates, including explicit statements by participants, lend
support to the notion that e/i w a s deeply shaped by concerns to say 'good' or
'bad' about science. In important respects, this evaluative-descriptive discourse
traces back to the Greek preference for contemplation {theoria) over praxis, and
it surfaced in just that form in die 1930s and 1940s debates over whether
modern science emerged in the isolated scholar's study or the craftsman's
collective workshop. Both the secular-philosophical religious sensibilities
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stipulate solitude as the proper site for the appearance of truth. A n d empiricistinductivist models of scientific discovery are powerfully supported by
individualistic conceptions of social order. In the 1980s, philosophers' role in
the e/i debates predominandy took the form of a defence of reason against 'the
social', and, even though important philosophical resources were available for
understanding scientific activity as a collective phenomenon, some of the most
polemic interventions by philosophers of science simply assumed the validity of
contrasting 'the rational' and 'the social'. (Shapin 1992, pp. 350-1)
Finally is the tendency to interpret historical examples using present-day
interpretations of science eA boundaries. Given the different interpretations of what the eA
field is, this clouds historical analysis.
Shapin's argument for further attention to eA debates, and rejection of absolutist
characterisations, suits the purpose of the present thesis in its attempt to describe and
'map' the variations in characterisations. Further, the present thesis interprets the
difficulties Shapin described as arising from inadequate characterisations of science.
Schuster's critique ofthe e/i discourse
Schuster is m o r e strident in his criticism of e/i debates (and of the
continuity/revolution debates, discussed below). H e has argued that they are 'selfdefeating', 'dominated by the clash of simplistic interpretations', and lingering 'for the
lack of anything better' (Schuster 1990, p. 222). H e puts this d o w n to the internalists
concentrating exclusively on cognitive issues and the externalists on social issues:
Internalists were inclined to believe that scientific ideas have a special and
autonomous cognitive status, and hence the history of science unfolds through
the internal logic and dynamics of ideas alone. They failed to grasp that scientific
sub-cultures are relatively autonomous just because they have well-developed
social and political micro-structures through which knowledge is produced, and
that the micro-structures are variously exposed to, and depend upon, the larger
factors studied by the externalists. A similar point was missed by the externalists
from the other direction. Concentrating on large-scale social and economic
factors, they were loathe to grant autonomy, and an inner dynamic, to
intellectual traditions and subcultures. Therefore they, like the internalists, failed
to appreciate that intellectual sub-cultures are not merely systems of ideas, but
also have 'internal' social structures, and political dynamics, partially buffered
from the direct impact of larger factors, through which knowledge is
manufactured. (Schuster 1990, pp. 222-3)
Schuster's argument is that both the eA debates and continuity/revolution debates arise
from a universal but false assumption that there is a simple defining feature or
characteristic of modem science, whose cause will explain, for example, the Scientific
Revolution. Hence the debates: different views entail different defining dimensions,
which are then turned into historical categories and become bases for historiographical

analysis. Schuster's solution is to recognise this flaw, and instead construct an alternati
characterisation ofthe sciences as 'sub-cultures' and 'social and cognitive enterprises'
(Schuster 1990, p. 223).

Appendix B.1: Context

572

The general utility of an e/i distinction
T h e e/i distinction and the accompanying debates are useful in clarifying
characterisations of science. For the purpose of the present thesis, it is clear that (a) e/i
distinctions represent a considerable literature that clearly characterises science by context
and (b) concepts based on e/i distinctions remain useful in informing us of the ways in
which science has been and can be characterised. Granted, the e/i debates to date are
flawed, and even 'analytically flawed' (Shapin 1992, p. 334). However, the debates have
touched on significant issues in developing our understanding of science and should not
be dismissed without assessment. Besides the direct characterisations they provide, they
have other implications in discussing characterisations of science.
First, e/i debates arose, and continue to arise, quite legitimately as exercises in
establishing the boundaries between what is agreed as a field (in this case science) and
what is not Boundary concerns are foci for discussion not only by metascientists, but
also in wider society, as discussed in section 1.2 above.
Secondly, whilst accepting all the cautions about embracing extreme e/i positions,
an e/i framework can still usefully inform the rise of m o r e eclectic interpretations of
science. Extreme externalism, such as in Zilsel^ and especially in the early 1950s, was
relatively short lived and replaced by a more eclectic approach that advocated a judicious
mix of e/i factors and avoiding extremes. This is Morrell's approach, above. T h e
sensitivity to nuances in eclectic approaches suits the wider 'jumble of post-modernist
sensibilities' (Shapin 1992, p. 345).
Thirdly, the insights from eA debates can inform further metascientific analyses.
For example, Shapin suggests two possible methodologies. One, following Barnes
(1974), is historicism, in which: (a) historical events be interpreted in their o w n terms,
(b) a 'naturalistic actor-oriented inquiry into scientific boundaries' be used (Shapin 1992,
p. 352) and (c) caution be used where describing actors' positions will exclude other
actors. The other is Latour's (1987) abandonment of distinctions between science and
society.
Finally, eA distinctions provide grounds for caution about interpreting metascientific
analyses and characterisations simplistically. Note that the collections of viewpoints
identified in Table B. 1.1 not only differ, but that an eA distinction does not correspond to
a distinction between H P S and S T S approaches (however each of these terms is
interpreted). F e w current positions in H P S are stricdy internalist and few in S T S are
stricdy externalist Constructivist approaches such as K u h n (1959), Toulmin (1961,
1972, in Suppe 1979) or Hanson (1958), and scientific realism such as Bhaskar (1975)
or Chalmers (1976), incorporate similar insights to those from constructivist S T S

Zilsel's thesis 'related the emergence of modern science to social change in early modern Europe'
(Shapin 1981b). It is discussed in section 2.6(a), below.
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approaches. Likewise, m a n y positions within S T S do not deny internalist characteristics
but seek to provide a more accurate account by addressing a more comprehensive set of
factors.
Most importandy, taking a position on what is allowed as a statement of legitimate
context is fundamental to m a n y characterisations of science, both in scientific and wider
forums. It is therefore grist to the mill for the present thesis.
Other analyses of context can be m a d e besides those based on eA questions, of
course. Given that some commentators n o w see the eA debate as no longer useful, the
very use of the term context could be seen to reinforce the e/i dichotomy, and so mire the
present thesis in old debate. However, context remains a useful label for a category of
characterisation, and although e/i issues are passe for some metascientists, they remain
contested by others. This is especially so for curriculum stakeholders, w h o cannot be
expected to be up to date with every position within such broadfieldsas science and
metascience. T h e following sections will illustrate this by sketching analyses focussing
on historical, intellectual, socio-cultural, human, organisational and physical contexts.
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1.4 Historical contexts of science
There is a general sense of an historical context of science, in which we understand
present day science to have antecedents. A n historical context is useful both in its o w n
right as any history is of interest, and more importandy here because understanding the
antecedents affords us a better understanding of h o w contemporary science c a m e to be as
it is. There is also a more restricted sense of historical context, in that at least descriptive
histories of science provide m u c h the same account, which is generally identified as the
western (European) scientific tradition.
Restriction to a western European scientific tradition
T h e present thesis is concerned mainly with the western European scientific
tradition. This is the notion of Aristode, Ptolemy, Copernicus, Galileo, Newton, Einstein
and others as constituting a tradition of science, a well-known characterisation of science
history. T h e notions both of a generally undifferentiated, single 'western' culture, and of
a similarly undifferentiated, single tradition of science, are both problematic. That this
tradition of science emerged largely in western Europe must be reconciled with its practise
n o w in diverse cultures around the world, but the label reflects its history. In this and in
some other respects the notion of what constitutes a 'western' culture, or for that matter a
'European' culture can be contested, but this level of cultural analysis is beyond the scope
of this thesis.
T h e reader is reminded that the present thesis specifically addresses the western
European tradition of science because it is that tradition that comprises, largely or wholly,
the content and justification of science in the school curricula that concern this thesis. This
is so even where some curricula have begun to include examples of 'science' from other,
non-Western cultures. The present thesis claims to apply to those curricula, but it seeks
firsdy to inform the characterisation of western European science, since that is the science
of primary (and sometimes the sole) interest to the curriculum stakeholders. However,
even the very term science should be used cautiously in cross-cultural contexts, because
Anglo-European meanings associated with its use m a y not apply in the same w a y in other
cultural contexts. This is discussed more fully in section 1.6, below.
The notion of a scientific tradition
T h e case for an historical context for science is easily m a d e : under thetitleof
history of science there is a substantial literature, courses of study and departments in
universities. T h e notion of a western European scientific tradition is well k n o w n ,
particularly as given in a large number of texts with both general and particular themes.
(See, for example, the bibliography in the present thesis, and the entries and
bibliographies in B y n u m , Browne and Porter (eds) (1983), and in Olby, Cantor, Christie
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and H o d g e (eds) (1990)). Depending on the detail of the particular history, a fairly
c o m m o n sequence of names is given in demonstrating this tradition: typically from the
Ionians, Plato and Aristode and others in ancient Greece, through Arabic science and the
Middle Ages to the Scientific Revolution with the likes of Copernicus, Galileo and
Newton, d o w n to Kelvin, Rutherford, Bohr, Einstein and others in the twentieth century.
For example, Thomdike (1923-58), although interpretatively dated, provides extensive
historical detail of investigative activity. This list is characterised commonly as a tradition,
and hence a context, because ideas and arguments are identified as sequences in which
individuals refer to antecedent ideas and arguments in making their o w n positions. Thus
Aristotle referred to the Ionians and Plato, Francis Bacon referred to Aristode, and so
forth. There is n o point in recounting these histories here; rather, the assumption will be
m a d e here that the reader has at least passing familiarity with this history of science and
certainly has access to such general accounts. T h e present thesis is more concerned to
show h o w it is this tradition that forms part of the arguments that (1) the history of
Western European culture is partly characterised by its science, and that (2) Western
European scientific tradition is unique. Certainly the notion of this historical tradition - as
the context within which science has operated - is a widely k n o w n concept by which
science is characterised
The tradition referred to above is k n o w n commonly as the western scientific
tradition, or some variant of it as in this example:
M o d e r n science owes most of its success to the use of these inductive and
deductive procedures, constituting what is often called 'the experimental
method.' The thesis of this book is that the m o d e m , systematic understanding of
at least the qualitative aspects of this method was created by the philosophers of
the W e s t in the thirteenth century. It w a s they w h o transformed the Greek
geometrical method into the experimental science ofthe m o d e m world.
T h e outstanding scientific event of the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries
was the confrontation of the empiricism long present in the West in the practical
arts, with the conception of rational explanation contained in scientific texts
recendy translated from Greek and Arabic. (Crombie 1953, p. 1)
This tradition is characterised commonly as an almost linear development of ideas, with
litde indication of context Intellectual context is restricted typically to the explicitiy
antecedent ideas, with little mention m a d e of the m a n y concurrent debates between
competing ideas, except for a small number of examples like the phlogiston theory. Less
attention still is given to the influence of factors external to the actual ideas themselves and
the very assumptions that there is such a tradition. Singer (1959) notes that this portrayal
has had the effect of distorting the representation, or what in this thesis is called the
characterisation, of science.
The notion itself of an historical tradition dates from the middle of the eighteenth
century in Europe, and has influenced the characterisation of science:
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W e can date the emergence of this specifically historical concern with the global
and epochal significance of science to the middle decades of the eighteenth
century. It is associated with the intellectual movement which dominated that
time, known to historians as the Enlightenment (Christie 1990, p.7)
In standard histories of Western European science, the scientific tradition is considered to
have arisen just once, with the Ionians in ancient Greece, while the direct antecedents to
m o d e m science are more commonly regarded as dating from the period ofthe Scientific
Revolution. For example, Singer (1959, pp. 3-5) has observed that while elements of
what is k n o w n n o w as science can be discerned in even the most ancient civilisations, the
Greeks were thefirstto theorise about h o w scientific ideas developed and h o w these
ideas influenced beliefs in the general culture. (The significance of these beliefs is
addressed in the companion chapter on belief system and their distinctiveness can be
gauged by comparison with other cultures there and later in this chapter.)
From these early times developed beliefs, concepts and techniques, some of which
proved to be antecedents for subsequent science. The following arbitrary examples
include some well known themes and names, drawn from entries in Macmillan Dictionary
ofthe History of Science (eds B y n u m , Browne & Porter 1983). There is an example for
each of belief system, activity, purpose, knowledge, structure and context, to show that
any dimension of science can be considered in its historical context:
a)
The belief that the cosmos is subject to arithmetic analysis can be traced through:
•
the numerical analysis of vibrating strings and ascription of occult
•

meanings to natural numbers, by Pythagorus (c560 - c480 B C ) ;
the development and application of mathematics by Plato (427-347 B C ) ,
Brahe (1546-1601), Descartes (1596-1650), N e w t o n (1642-1727),
Einstein (1879-1955) and Hawking.

b)

The techniques of dissection, as used to understand and manipulate the structure
and function of living things, can be traced through the dissection work of
Alcmaeon of Crotona (fl c500 B C ) , da Vinci (1452-1519), Vesalius (1514-

c)

1564), Harvey (1578-1657), and Grainger (1801-1865).
The aim of developing an understanding of the cosmos based on natural, rather
than supernatural, causes can be traced through:
•

thefirstrecordednaturalistic explanation (Thales of Miletus c624-546 B C ) ;

•

the classification of matter into the four elements, air, earth,fireand water,
which tend to their natural places (Empedocles c492-432 B Q ;

•

the explanation of substances as discrete, not continuous, and comprising

•

unchanging particles called atoms (Democritus c460-371 B Q ;
the appeal to observation (Aristode 384-322 B C ) ,

•

the appeal to inductivereasoningbased on as broad a base of observations
as possible (Francis Bacon 1561-1626),
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•

the notion of facts as stable clusters of sensations (Ernst M a c h 1836-

•

1916);
the explanation of the radiationfieldof a charged particle as action-at-adistance, according to a relativistic interpretation of Dirac's quantum
electrodynamics, and using experimentally-determined values (Richard
Feynman 1918-sl988).

d)

Our (chemical) knowledge of the properties and relations of matter can be traced
through:
•

the opposing beliefs that the cosmos in constant change (Heraclitus 540-

•

475 B C ) or essentially unchanging, from Parmenides (c515-c450 B C ) ;
the body of alchemic understandings of the elements (Paracelsus 14931541);

•

the corpuscular theory of matter based on experimental experience (Robert

•

Boyle 1627-1691);
the identification of solubility and temperature as factors by which
chemical reactions can be reversed (Berthollet 1748-1822); and

•
e)

the classification of chemical reagents on the basis of whether electrons are

transferred or shared in reactions (Ingold 1893-1970).
The relations between the sciences have been structured and restructured
numerous times throughout the history of science (Porter 1983b), for example
as:
•

the three fundamental types of knowledge, geometry, arithmetic and music
(acoustics), by Pythagoras (c560-c480 B C ) ;

•

the three purposes or end-uses of knowledge, being the theoretical
sciences (physics and philosophy), the practical sciences (ethics and
politics) and the poetic sciences (aesthetics), by Aristode (384-322 B C ) ;

•

the three classes of certainty of knowledge, being philosophy (knowledge
of things by causes), history (knowledge of things as facts), and poetry
(feigned knowledge), by Francis Bacon (1561-1626);

•

the ranking of knowledge from the abstract to the complex, being
mathematics, astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology and sociology,
following August Comte (1798-1857);

•

the historical division into those dating from antiquity which are relatively
abstract and deductive (such as arithmetic and geometry), those dating
from only the last couple of hundred years which have an experimental
basis (such as biology, geology and the expanding number of hybrid fields
emerging in the twentieth century), and chemistry, which straddles the
two.

Appendix B.1: Context

f)

578

T h e notion of an historical tradition of western European science is supported by
the statements (a) to (e) immediately above, but is more strongly m a d e by
pointing out that the people in such lists typically acknowledge the earlier
contributions of others, as w e have seen.
S o m e accounts of a scientific tradition are more interpretive and seek to explain the

nature of changes. That is, they seek to explain h o w and w h y changes came about, and
not just give the changes. For example, rather than describe the changes in accepted
science knowledge, Oldroyd (1989) has traced the development of hypothetico-deductive
reasoning, and its impact on knowledge and beliefs about knowledge. Also, Redner
(1987) has argued that there have been three epochs of science history that are
characterised not just by differences in knowledge content but also by different criteria of
what constitutes knowledge and what the knowledge means. Oldroyd's account is
discussed in Appendix B.5; Redner's is discussed in section 3 of Chapter 6. Accounts
such as these are significant in the present thesis because they show clearly h o w deeper
analysis and understanding is helped by accounting for the multidimensional character of
science.
Whig histories and other approaches
Historical analyses, particularly from the second half of the twentieth century, have
tended to become more critical of older science histories for being partisan or Whig
histories. In a general sense, Whig or liberal histories have tended to 'favour progressive
movements in history', identify contemporary beliefs and practices as the goals for
previous beliefs and practices, and reconstruct 'the progressive march of history
focussing on those past developments which anticipated the present' (Wilde 1983, p.
445). Such accounts therefore tend to ratify, if not glorify, the successful revolutions and
individuals, and judge past events and controversies in terms of the present M a n y of the
earlier histories of science have this approach to characterisation, and its effectremainsin,
for example, the overwhelming preponderance of material on the successes N e w t o n and
Darwin, compared to their failures and those of their contemporaries. The belief that the
positivist knowledge of the Received View was superior to earlier knowledge is another
example. Current characterisations emphasise the value in interpreting historical events in
their o w n terms:
[Hjistorians have demonstrated the superiority of an approach which attempts to
reconstruct in all their aspects, the problems faced by earlier thinkers rather than
judging the past with the benefit of hindsight... [They have also] shown that
m a n y ideas which have been superseded and m a y even appearridiculousto the
modern scientist played an important role in the early development of the
sciences by focussing attention on problems and organising the investigation of
them. Aristotelian physics, phlogiston theory and Mosaic geology are three
examples of such ideas. (Wilde 1983, pp. 445-6)
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Thus the W h i g histories, mostiy older accounts but also some recent popular ones, tend
to ignore or devalue those w h o opposed or confounded progress to where w e are now,
and instead trace the successful precursors to contemporary science in terms of
contemporary science. M o r e recent scholarly histories present m o s d y different
characterisations, attempting to interpret events more in their o w n terms.
Science history as continuous or discontinuous
While e/i debates have been the subject of considerable historiographical and
metascientific interest, as discussed above, another contested point has been the
characterisation of scientific development as essentially continuous or discontinuous; that
is, whether science history is characterised essentially by revolution or continuity
(Schuster 1990, pp. 217ff). A s with the differences between e/i positions, or between
W h i g and other histories, the revolution/continuity dichotomy is another difference
between historical characterisations of science:

Some historians of science, such as Butterfield, Kuhn and many others, have
seen the science of the seventeenth century as marking a radical departure from
the science of all previous periods; and they speak confidendy of 'The Scientific
Revolution'. Others such as D u h e m and Crombie, however, have been inclined
to trace science back from the seventeenth-century science movement,
emphasising rather the continuities with earlier theories and practices, though not
thereby underestimating the seventeenth-century achievement
It would also be possible to emphasise historical continuity or discontinuity at
the metascientific level as well as at the level of science itself. Undoubtedly,
some seventeenth-century writers on metascience, notably Bacon and Descartes,
emphasised the novelty of their methodological pronouncements. But... it is not
difficult to observe the ways in which certain aspects of their thought clearly
betrayed their intellectual ancestries. A n d the same m a y be said of Galileo's
metascientific remarks, even though his o w n scientific work w a s so very
distinctive, involving specifically a mathematisation of physics, with the
selection and isolation of particular features of the observed phenomena for
experimental examination and mathematical description. (Oldroyd 1989, p. 48)
For example, Bronowski (1978) sees the scientific Revolution as a hugely significant
event in h u m a n history, marking a fundamental departure from ancient mythology, and
'an irreversible step in the cultural evolution of [humanity]' (p. 2). H e chides C. P. S n o w
and others for emphasising the undoubted continuity from 'before the Middle Ages into
modem science ... [B]ut it is my view that those continuities give a false perspective o
the great threshold from which the burst of modem science comes' (Bronowski 1978, p.
23).
A s with e/i debates, a case can be m a d e that revolution/continuity arguments are

deployed by involved parties as a means of explaining revisions and reinterpretations in
science:
... In other words, no revisions are inherendy and essentially revolutionary or
continuous in nature; rather these terms are deployed by interested parties ...
seeking to explain the process. O n the one hand, historians w h o advocate
continuity are simply over-stressing the existence of conceptual borrowing and
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reinterpretation. They therefore tend to hypostatise a history of ideas and their
inner, gradually unfolding logic of development. O n the other hand, historians
w h o advocate revolutionary displacement of conceptual fabrics are simply
overplaying the fact that no revised conceptual framework is exactiy like any
previous one. A case for 'revolution' can almost always be m a d e out by
selectively stressing certain aspects of change at the expense of others. (Schuster
1990, p. 223)
This does not deny the revolutionary characteristics of m a n y scientific changes such as
evolutionary and relativity theories. However, it does remind us of elements of continuity
and development and, importantly in the present thesis, highlights the differences
between views as significant indicators of characterisation. Most significandy for the
present thesis, ongoing debates about historical interpretation argue that there is no 'fixed'
history of science, and that revisions in historiography show continuing interest in
characterising science by its histories.
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/ .5 Intellectual contexts of science
Simply interpreted, the intellectual context of science is the set of cognitive
resources, including ideas, the accepted science knowledge and the intellectual climate,
available to scientists which they use to describe and explain Nature 7 . A s the intellectual
context that surrounds and shapes scientific thinking, it can be considered both as the
internalist notion of the conceptual framework and as the externalist notion of other nonscientific conceptual resources - ideas, concepts, beliefs - that influence scientific
thinking. Standard internalist histories of science are replete with ideas that have been
progressively developed in science, and so represent the development of an intellectual
context For example, R o n a n (1982) credits Heraclitus with establishing a view, taken up
by others later in history, that the cosmos is essentially changing, rather than essentially
constant:
... in an unstable state of flux, so that what w e perceive with the senses is
s o m e h o w transitory, not true knowledge - a view which w a s later to receive
wide currency and militate against setting too m u c h store by practical
observation. (Ronan 1982, p. 71)
This view is part of the intellectual context of the rationalist approach, what K u h n would
later call the paradigm 8 , associated with Plato and his followers. There are similar
conceptual antecedents for Aristode, for example. In describing the physical world,
Aristode drew on concepts handed d o w n from earlier thinkers, such as the geometry of
Pythagoras (Singer 1959, pp. 52-56). T h e influences of existing beliefs within his
society were thus his intellectual context: the belief in the perfection of the circle, for
example, underpinned his proposal that the sublunary and celestial regions above were
spheres. Circularity as the basis for cosmological structure also dates from Pythagoras.
Likewise the schema of the four elements, which he increased tofive,dates at least back
to Empedocles and Aristode's version again shows influences from Pythagoras. The
difference between celestial and terrestrial physics w a s also part of the intellectual context
in which Aristode worked: that two different physical systems operated w a s accepted at
least as far back as the Pythogoreans. In turn, historians trace the continued use of
Aristode's natural philosophy in Arabic countries and in mediaeval Europe, its eventual
critique and replacement in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by other concepts, and
the subsequent development and critiques of the newer ideas. Thus within science there is
often the sense of a shared historical-intellecmal tradition or context:

7

8

These and other dimensions are addressed in the companion chapters on knowledge and belief
system, and at greater length in Appendices B.2 and B.6.
Kuhn's now-widely used concept of paradigm is more than just the intellectual context although
the intellectual context would be taken by most to be part of a paradigm. Paradigm is a complex
concept, partly because it was imprecisely defined in thefirstplace and partly because it was later
widely interpreted This is discussed below in section 2.6.
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The communal character of science is further reflected in the recognition by
scientists of their dependence upon a cultural heritage to which they lay no
differential claims. Newton's remark - 'If I have seen farther it is by standing on
the shoulders of giants' - expresses at once a sense of indebtedness to the
c o m m o n heritage and a recognition of the essentially cooperative and cumulative
quality of scientific achievement (Merton 1942, in Barnes (ed.) 1972, p. 74)
It is this intellectual context that includes the body of knowledge by which science is
commonly characterised: that Newton used concepts and beliefs that were available to him
and enjoyed some acceptance.
The two cultures debate
A widely known and enduring theme in academic circles is to oppose the intellectual

context of science against that of literature and/or religion (Seymour-Smith 1988). It is
probably best-known as the 'two cultures' debate, after the Rede Lecture at Cambridge by
C. P. S n o w (1959), The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution and the reply by F.
R. Leavis (1962) in the Richmond Lecture at Cambridge:

Snow diagnosed society's intellectuals as divided, unable to speak to each other,
having no c o m m o n language. Each group he called a 'culture'; he maintained
that scientists can't read and that 'humanists' can't understand even simple
scientific concepts such as the second law of thermodynamics. Leavis' answer
was perhaps no more ill-mannered and shot with sour irrelevancies than Snow's
original lecture, brashly in favour of scientific culture in the interests of human
survival, was ill-argued. The kernel of the dispute m a y be found, in a civilised
form, in T. H. Huxley, A Liberal Education and where to Find It (1868) and
Science and Culture (1881), and in Matthew Arnold's answer, Literature and
Science (1882). A. N . Whitehead's Science and the Modern World (1927) is a
brilliant and reconciliatory essay by a truly distinguished mind. (Seymour-Smith
1988, p. 878)
Notwithstanding these criticisms, it is Snow's paper that has served in recent decades to
focus this long-standing difference of views about the intellectual context of science.
First, while Snow's use of the term culture can be interpreted broadly, particularly
considering externalist critiques, it is the intellectual context that is the basis of t

that one set of ideas, or one conceptual framework, is taken as evident and true by some,

but is inaccessible to others. Bronowski (1978) has interpreted this as a debate clearly

about intellectual contexts, as 'an old way of thinking and a new way of thinking' (p. 4
He argued that the Scientific Revolution marked a profound revolution in the way of

thinking, that is, it was an intellectual revolution. Moreover, he sees this as creating

intellectual imperative because humanity is confronted with having to use this new way o
thinking, presumably because to fail to do so is to make do with a demonstrably inferior
mode of thinking. He criticised Snow (1969) for presuming that teaching scientific
developments, such as the second law of thermodynamics or molecular biology, to

humanities students can bridge the gap between the two cultures of thinking. While there

is a need for 'all those literary boys' to increase their scientific literacy, Bronowski
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that scientists have a responsibility both to construct this whole h u m a n outlook - a view
of humanity and Nature that is based on a scientific world view - and to communicate it:
[Scientists bear a heavy and, in m y view, an increasing responsibility from n o w
on, for exhibiting the h u m a n implications not merely of what they do, but of
their w a y of thinking. A n d if you want an alternative tide you could substitute
'the scientific w a y of thinking is a h u m a n w a y of thinking'; and it is becoming
for us the only h u m a n w a y which w e can treat as a unifying discipline.
(Bronowski 1987, p. 5)
Bronowski argues that it is not sufficient for the two groups to share their ideas - their
conceptual frameworks - because the logical coherence of scientific knowledge separates
it from other types of knowledge^. In the terminology of the present thesis, scientific
knowledge has a distinct intellectual context, which is mainly an internalist notion.
Secondly, Snow's two cultures can be interpreted also as the differences between
the intellectual contexts of particular scientific expertise and any other intellectual context.
For example, Ravetz (1971) points to the increasing specialisation of the intellectual
context of most scientists, although the degree of specialisation varies. This means that
scientists, as their specialisations increasingly narrow, are correspondingly less able to
make informed judgements about claims beyond their o w n specialisation, including other
areas of science. That is, different intellectual contexts - specialist knowledge structures
and contents - within 'science', exist not only between but within fields:
It might seem that the group of people whose view of science is the most
important and valid are the working research scientists themselves. But although
research is at the centre of scientific activity, it remains as one very specialised
part of a large and complex whole. The experience of the research worker will,
in its o w n way, be as specialised as that of the student. His task is to achieve
n e w results in a specialfield;even if he teaches part-time (as at a university)
there will usually be litde or no connection between the n e wresultshe is creating
and the established knowledge which he is passing on. Also, unless he is
already in a position of seniority and responsibility, he will have little
involvement in the work which requires him to see his o w n efforts in the context
of thefieldas a whole, making the judgements and decisions which determine
the directions of future research. (Ravetz 1971, p. 16)
Thus Ravetz argues that the more specialised the work of the individual researcher, the
more restricted the intellectual context In this way, the intellectual context is not only
removed from the 'lay' public, including the community of arts intellectuals, but from
other scientists whose work is also, but differendy, specialised.
Thirdly, Snow's characterisation, a m o n g others, has been used as an indicator of
the (then) current understandings or characterisations of science, from which n e w and
hopefully better characterisations could be developed. For example, E d g e (1995, p. 8)
takes the two cultures debate, 'sparked by C. P. Snow', and the parallel developments in
science policy, to be characterisations of science as a unique and undifferentiated entity:

9

Bronowski, it seems, is an essentialist in his boundary work.
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It w a s c o m m o n to hear talk of a 'scientific culture', objective and hard-nosed,
contrasted with a 'humane culture', which consisted (presumably) of everything
else, and w a s characterised by a regard for subjective feelings and values. (Edge
1995, p. 8)
This is a broader notion of context than stricdy intellectual, although the distinction is
clear between knowledge characterised as either objective or subjective. Also, S n o w and
others characterised the cultures as two fairly undifferentiated entities: a scientific culture
rather than cultures, and likewise a single, undifferentiated human culture. Edge traces the
effect of the two cultures debate to calls to reform science education by 'humanising' and
'contextualising' it and indeed this tradition is part of the curriculum background of the
present thesis. E d g e notes that m u c h of this tradition was the critical scholarship that
emerged in S T S and S S K (sociology of scientific knowledge)fields,but the present
paper includes also shifts in otherfieldssuch as H P S and linguistics. For example,
B o w d e n (1995) has argued that Snow's two cultures influenced developments of S T S
methodologies. Traditional histories focussed on the development of particular ideas or
artefacts, and in so doing distorted the interpretation of problem-solving inrealcontexts.
For example, the design of an ocean sewage outfall might be construed traditionally as the
solution of a bounded problem of sewage disposal. A n alternative would be to construe
the design as a choice or tradeoff between competing solutions in a wider context, arising
instead from a discourse of problem understanding and choice:
In short, this viewpoint attempted to replace the authority of technical solutions
with h u m a n values and the related issues of ethics and political choice. (Bowden
1995, p. 70)
That is, the two cultures debate contributed to broadening the notion of scientific context
from only intellectual to include other contexts. B o w d e n notes that the strengthening of
free-market ideologies and policies in the 1980s served to check and to counter m a n y
initiatives seeking to politicise science based on this critique.
Auxiliary statements
The intellectual context of a theory is given in its theoretical statements, at least in
the verificationist R V and Popper's falsificationist alternative (Boyd 1991a, pp. 7,11).
This arises because these views distinguish all non logical terms in scientific theories as
being observational terms or theoretical terms:
The initial verificationist conception identified the cognitive content of a theory
with the set of observational consequences deducible from the theory alone.
(Boyd 1991a, p. 7)
However, D u h e m and others have argued that the cognitive claims of a theory cannot
arise from the statements of that theory alone because they rely on the theoretical
statements of any number of background or auxiliary theories. This is a strong criticism
of falsificationism: that it m a y be impossible to decisively refute or falsify a theoretical
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claim because these auxiliary statements would also have to be identified, tested and
falsified. It is also a chief argument for the theory-dependence of observations:
[T]he import of a theory depends both on its o w n theoretical structure and on the
theoretical structures of the background theories available as auxiliary
hypotheses.
Scientific methods for employing theories in making observational
predictions are thus theory-dependent methods: the result of their applications
depends on the theoretical structure of the theories in question. It is an important
fact n o w universally accepted, that m a n y or all of the central methods of science
are theory-dependent. This theory-dependence of method was initially surprising
for philosophers attracted to logical empiricism ... (Boyd 1991a, pp. 7-8)
Boyd's comment about universal acceptance needs some qualification, since he points out
that while falsificationism is no longer influential within H P S (nor S T S ) , it remains
influential among philosophically-inclined scientists, 'perhaps because of its apparent
commitment to an antidogmatic conception of scientific inquiry' (Boyd 1991a, p. 11).
While Popper agrees that theoretical and observational terms are theory-laden, he holds
that one can m a k e straightforward observation statements of 'publicly observable material
objects', resulting in simple observation statements that are testable (Suppe 1979, p.
170). Thus while the appeal of falsification is recognised as a pragmatic criterion for
practising scientists, it does not address the wider intellectual context found in auxiliary
statements.
Other characteristics ofthe intellectual context of science
Although discussed in later chapters, some final points about intellectual context
should be mentioned here. First, the body of scientific knowledge - the framework of
concepts and understandings - is massive and rapidly increasing , and its total
comprehension is well beyond the capacity of any individual. Secondly, this knowledge
is fundamentally linked to experimental and reasoning activities, and with criteria
associated with a belief system, that give science knowledge a special status in society: on
the one hand it is authoritative because it is empirical and subject to experimentaltestand
review, and on the other it istentativein a special sense, for the same reasons. The status
of science knowledge in society is taken up in the following section on socio-cultural
contexts.
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/ .6 Socio-cultural contexts of science
The discussion of eA debates touched on notions of socio-cultural contexts. This
term and its root terms, society and culture, are variously interpreted in an immense
sociological literature and, particularly with society and culture, are also used in general,
non-academic senses. A s c o m m o n l y used, society is taken generally to mean 'a body of
individuals living together as m e m b e r s of a community' {The Macquarie Dictionary).
However, it can also be taken to m e a n more than just individuals, to include the practices
and patterns of interactions between them as in an ecological sense:
Society:
(12) (Ecology) A closely integrated grouping of organisms in the same species
held together by mutual dependence and showing division of labour. {The
Macquarie Dictionary)
Accordingly, the present thesis interprets society generally, as the body of individuals
living together, particularly its origin, development, organisation and functioning, as
analysed and described in thefieldof sociology. Culture is also interpreted generally, as
the cumulative w a y s a group of people lives and transmits these ways of living between
generations:
Culture:
(Sociology) T h e s u m total of ways of living built up by a group of h u m a n
beings, which is transmitted from one generation to another. {The Macquarie
Dictionary)
The following definition of culture provides a useful indication of the possible contextual
factors from a sociological analysis:
[Culture is the] 'social heritage' of a community: the total body of material
artefacts (tools, weapons, houses, places of work, worship, government,
recreation, works of art, etc.), of collective mental and spiritual 'artefacts'
(systems of symbols, ideas, beliefs, aesthetic perceptions, values, etc.), and of
distinctive forms of behaviour (institutions, groupings, rituals, m o d e s of
organisation, etc.) created by a people (sometimes deliberately, sometimes
through unforeseen interconnections and consequences) in their ongoing
activities within their particular life-conditions, and (though undergoing kinds
and degrees of change) transmitted from generation to generation. (Fletcher
1988, p. 195)
Thus a strong externalism holds that the material and mental artefacts and the behaviours
of scientists are merely artefacts and behaviours within the larger society. More moderate
variants of externalism would hold that the artefacts and behaviours of the larger society
contribute to science to varying degrees, depending on the viewpoint of the analysis.
Characterisations of science by socio-cultural context draw on m a n y interpretations of
culture and subculture; they illustrate the complete spectrum of eA characterisations. They
m a y focus, for example, on sciences as subcultures; subcultures within sciences; or the
influence of or effect on particular groupings of people or society at large.
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Science as part of a larger socio-cultural context

Religion and science
The relationship between the Christian church and the western European scientific
tradition provides m a n y examples commonly given as influences of the socio-cultural
context on science. For example, science histories commonly characterise Aristotelian
science partly by its relationship to mediaeval theology and the Christian church (Singer
1959, p. 54). T h e early and mediaeval Christian church opposed certain doctrines
supported by the followers of Democritus and Epicurus, w h o argued for an atomic view
of matter and denied the centrality of G o d (or gods) in h u m a n existence. T h e Church
instead supported Aristotle's cosmology, in which G o d is the highest Cause, the
unmoved Mover, as the most viable alternative (Tarnas 1991, pp. 64-77). Aristode's
view that matter is continuous was central to his cosmology, just as Democritus' atomism
w a s central to the Epicureans' view; atomism therefore remained precluded from
widespread scholarly attention for several centuries.
Aristotelian science and mediaeval Christian theology did not completely agree,
however, as with the concept of infinity:
The finiteness of the universe both in space and time became necessary to all the
theological systems of the Middle Ages and notably that of the Western Church.
It was effectively unquestionedtillthe time of Bruno (died 1600). Thus Aristode
himself could not be completely accepted. The philosophical return to the
conception of a universe infinite both in space and time is a landmark in the
history of science. (Singer 1959, p. 55)
Debate over God'srelationto the universe also formed part of the flux of ideas that
emerged in seventeenth century. That is, theological views formed part of arguments
between the competing ontological views that emerged during that time. For example,
Rene Descartes (1596-1650) proposed an account of an essentially ordered universe that
reflected its divine order, in which the motion in the universe is conserved from the initial
motion given by God. The Cambridge Platonists Henry M o r e (1614-87) and Ralph
Cudworth (1617-88) objected that Descartes excluded G o d from the world, and instead
proposed intermediary principles by which G o d intervenes in the working of the
universe. For Nicolas Malebranche (1638-1715), G o d direcdy caused all activity in the
universe. T h o m a s Burnet (1635-1715) and William Whiston (1667-1752) sought to
develop a 'sacred physics' that explained biblical events like the Deluge by physical law,
such as the near passage of a comet. Isaac Newton (1642-1727) rejected these views and
argued that the Universe is essentially unstable, needing periodic divine intervention to
correct it. In turn, Leibniz (1646-1716) rejected Newton's idea of an imperfect world
needing God's intervention, and argued instead for a perfect universe and transcendent
God. These debates, essentially between a view of an orderly world whose design w a s
evidence of creation by a supremely wise G o d and a view of an active world disrupted
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miraculously by God, continued into the eighteenth century. B y the nineteenth century the
debate narrowed to 'a discussion of the physical development of an orderly universe
through time' (Schaffer 1983, p. 169). Thus Immanual Kant (1724-1804) removed the
necessity for invoking G o d in epistemological argument, and Pierre Simon de Laplace
(1749-1827) demonstrated that the Solar System was stable over time, thus removing
Newton's necessity for divine intervention. The positivist tradition that followed from
Laplace and others also separated God from naturalistic arguments.
Economic, political and military contexts
Argument about socio-cultural contexts of science is less concerned now with
religious views than with economic, political and military issues. Redner (1987)
characterises a fundamentally different science emerging in the twentieth century by a
complex of different contextual factors, especially economic, political and military. For
example, he quotes from the valedictory address of President Eisenhower of the U S A ,
the influential twentieth-century militarist and politician:
Today the solitary inventor, tinkering in his shop, has been overshadowed by
task forces of scientists in laboratories and testingfields.In the same fashion,
the free university, historically the fountainhead of free ideas and scientific
discovery, has experienced a revolution in the conduct ofresearch.Partly
because of the huge costs involved, a government contract becomes virtually a
substitute for intellectual curiosity. (Eisenhower 1961, 1038, as quoted in
Redner 1987, p. 15).
These remarks directly confront the popular image of solitary, intellectual, curiositydriven scientific activity untainted by worldly contexts with a more pragmatic and
utilitarian characterisation that clearly entails a broader notion of context. Ravetz (1971)

was influential in raising awareness of the 'technocratic conception of science' becomin
a more useful characterisation than science as the pursuit of truth:
The obsolescence of the conception of science as the pursuit of truth results from
several changes in the social activity of science. First, the heavy warfare with
'theology and metaphysics' is over ... This is not so m u c h because of the
undoubted victory of science over its ancient contenders as for the deeper reason
that the conclusions of natural science are no longer ideologically sensitive.
W h a t people, either the masses or the educated, believe about the inanimate
universe or the biological aspects of humanity is not relevant to the stability of
society, as it w a s once thought to be. The focus of sensitivity is n o w in the
social sciences; and the techniques of control by those in authority vary in
subtlety in accordance with local requirements and traditions ... Also, the
experience of modern scientists in their work, seeing the rapid rate of
obsolescence of scientificresults,makes the vision of the pursuit of truth not so
m u c h wrong as irrelevant. But, more important the attention of the general
educated public ... is n o w on the visible triumph of technology based on applied
science. Applied science has n o w become the basic means of production in a
modern economy. The prosperity, and economic independence, of a firm or of a
nation does not rest so m u c h in its existing factories as in the 'research and
development' laboratories, where the industry of the future is being created and
the competition of the future is being met. Thus, industry has been penetrated by
science. (Ravetz 1971, pp. 20-21)
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In this passage, and his ensuing argument, Ravetz characterises science by industrialeconomic context using several key issues. These are: w e n o w recognise examples of
industrial-economic contexts from at least the Scientific Revolution; industrial-economic
links with science are n o w recognised 'by those w h o plan the future of our societies'
(Ravetz 1971, p. 21); science is increasingly linked with technology; and the technocratic
view of science, as with so m a n y characterisations, is flawed. Each is expanded in the
following paragraphs.
There are examples of industrial-economic contexts in the history of science
First industrial-economic contexts of science before the twentieth century received
relatively little attention until around the time of the second world war (Ravetz 1971, p.
22). For example, Zilsel (1942) has argued that modern science emerged in Europe due to
afreeingup of conceptual resources that arose, in turn, from the socio-economic changes
that accompanied theriseof capitalism. Briefly, he argued that the discrete social strata of
late mediaeval Europe fragmented the intellectualresourcesof society: university scholars
and secular humanists held the expertise in formal and systematic rationality, logic and
mathematics, while the artisans held the empirical expertise in experiment, observation
and causal thinking. These social strata were distinct until the emergence of cities as
centres of political and economic freedom, in which the emerging capitalism drove the
breaking d o w n of these traditional social divisions (Shapin 1983b, p. 450).
Policy makers recognise the interrelationships between science, industry and economics
Secondly, the recognition ofthe significance of interrelationships between science,
industry and economics (therefore also government) has resulted in characterisations of
science by parties not traditionally recognised for their scientific or metascientific
credentials. Notably, these parties include politicians, public servants and company
executives w h o are more likely to have qualifications in law, accountancy or economics
than in science or technology (Ravetz 1971; Redner 1987; Cozzens & Woodhouse 1995).
It is true that government policies and position papers draw on scientific and
metascientific expertise, but it is significant that these poUcies and papers are written
within and evaluated in terms of policy frameworks determined by governments and other
policy stakeholders. For example, in the late 1980s and early 1990s the Australian
Government sought to develop science and technology policy partly in the context of
innovation and technology transfer to industry, as part of its policy of economic reform:
The relationship between science and technology effort and economic growth
including the role of innovation in the growth process is important in national
policy considerations. Indicators based on R & D have m a d e an essential
contribution to assessment of the health of the national science and innovation
system and have helped guide the decisions of policy-makers. (Department of
Industry, Science and Technology 1994, p. 1)
and in therespectiveannual report:
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T o ensure that the Government has a sound basis on which to m a k e policy
decisions to maintain a strong science base and facilitate increased innovation,
the Division delivers ... advice concerning national science and technology
policies ... During 1994-95 three publications werereleasedaimed at providing
a further understanding and awareness of the characteristics, resourcing and
spread of innovation and science within Australia. [These are] The Pace of
Change - Technology Uptake and Enterprise Improvement... Australian Science
and Innovation Resources Brief 1994 ... [and] Innovate Australia - the Pace of
Change. (Department of Industry, Science and Technology 1995, p. 132)
While the Resources Brief presented a range of indicators, including allocation of funds,
numbers of science research students, and so forth, it is clear from the report extract
above and even thetideof the department - Industry, Science and Technology - that the
government emphasises particular characteristics of science that relate more to broader
political and economic policy factors than to cognitive or logistical factors internal to
science communities or disciplines.
Science and technology are often associated, but their differences are not uniformly
agreed
Thirdly, there has been increasing interest in the distinctions and relationships
between science and technology. T h e characterisation of technology as applied science
had been dismissed as an academic concept by the 1970s, at least in the S T S literature,
but the relationship between science and technology remains unresolved10 (Bijker 1995,
p. 240). W e have noted above that government and industrial policy in Australia explicidy
links science and technology in addressing the contribution of research and development
activity to the economic performance of Australia. Ravetz (1971, p. 21) has argued earlier
that the view of science as a 'basic factor of production' - the technocratic view - is a
'simplified and vulgarised' form of Francis Bacon's equation of knowledge and power,
and hasreceivedconsiderable attention particularly from Marxist historians:
Even in the nineteenth century, 'science' w a s given m u c h credit for the advances
in technology which so dramatically transformed life in the advanced nations;
and so it is the widespread adoption of this view, rather than the insight itself,
which is characteristic ofthe present age. (Ravetz 1971, p. 21)
There are various indicators that support such a view. Redner (1987, pp. 66-84) has
characterised a fundamentally different science emerging in the twentieth century, as
mentioned earlier, partly on the basis of the convergence of several historical
developments concerning technology and science. These are the progressive appUcation
of scientific theory to technology (the 'scientification of technology'), a tendency towards
problem-solving, and a fundamental change in the role of technology in science (the
'technification of science').

1°

The present thesis examines, in the concluding chapter, the science-technology relationship as a
suitable application of a multidimensional characterisation of science.
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Thus the Umited examples of scientific knowledge being applied to technology up
into the nineteenth century were mosdy in instrumentation. This only changed when more
complex technologies developed:
Proper scientification of technology began when the industrial processes
themselves, at certain advanced stages of their development demanded scientific
knowledge, and, simultaneously, when scientific knowledge became the source
of n e w industrial processes and technical developments, as in the electrical and
chemical industries. (Redner 1987, p. 67)
The place of problem-solving in science has changed. Redner has argued that while it had
a traditional role peripheral to the main goal of developing theories and laws, in the
twentieth century it came to have a central role in creating new knowledge (1987, pp. 80-

81). Thus much contemporary scientific activity is established precisely in order to solv
problems, as in nuclear physics and molecular genetics:

The concentration on problem-solving in [molecular genetics], as in any other
science, c a m e to exercise an extremely wide-ranging influence on the whole
character of the scientific undertaking, affecting the general goals of the science,
its specific research programs and the methods and techniques employed. A s
Yoxen (1982) points out, the attitude of molecular biologists to life changed as
theresultof the problem-solving impetus ...
A concentration on solvable problems in turn affects and is affected by all the
academic political aspects of science in a vicious circle of cumulative causation.
T h e need for publishable results means that only those problems are tackled
which promise to be solvable with the available techniques in the period of time
for which the funding is allocated ...
Problem-solving of this kind pushes science ever further in the direction of
technology. A n y distinction between a scientific research laboratory and a
technical institute disappears. Both specialise in solving useful problems on
contract Thus once molecular biology had gone in the direction of genetic
engineering it assumed the problem-solving propensities of a technological
enterprise. (Redner 1987, pp. 82-3)
Redner argues that technified, problem-solving approaches render the science less likely
to make any fundamental breakthroughs in uncovering the unknown, a situation observed
in most of physics, chemistry and systematic biology. He notes an even stronger ('almost
pathological') situation in the social sciences, where this tendency has distorted the
identification of and approach to significant social issues, sometimes counter-productive
(p. 84). Technification, the third of Redner's twentieth century developments, refers to

changes in the role of technology, rather than to economic or poUtical contexts, so it is
direcdy relevant here.
Technocratic views of science are popular but flawed
Fourthly, technocratic characterisations of science have strengths and flaws. From
the foregoing discussion it is clear that governments and industry benefit from the
efficient and timely use of scientific knowledge and skills. However, Ravetz (1971, pp.
21ff) cautioned that the strategic support of science by governments and industry has

distorted the operation of science. Technification led to increased speciaUsation of labo
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as in most industrial enterprises, which affected not only the work of individual
researchers, but increased the need for administrative and executive activity. Also,
strategic economic funding, usually by clearly specified, short-term contracts, has
displaced m u c h of the traditional funding for science, eroding support for science not
characterised by expected and specified short-term outcomes. Technocratic approaches to
science also affect science in more fundamental ways:
[TJhe assimilation of the production of scientific results to the production of
material goods can be dangerous, and indeed destructive to science itself. For
producing worthwhile scientific knowledge is quite different from producing an
acceptable market commodity, like soap. Scientific knowledge cannot be massproduced by machines tended by semi-skilled labour. Research is a craft
activity, of a very speciaUsed and deUcate sort (Ravetz 1971, p. 22)
Ravetz argued that technocratic approaches tend to w o r k against traditional
characterisations of quality control ofthe sciences. They tend to fragment communities of
scholars w h o share a c o m m o n knowledge base and ethos, and weaken the traditional
means of quality control, which depend on individual commitment and integrity. Redner
extended this argument to posit the emergence of a World science in the twentieth century
that is characterised partly by itstendencyto technification.
In summary, these characterisations of science in relation to technology are
examples where science is characterised by the socio-cultural contexts of which it is part.
A s w e have seen, a moderate externalism acknowledge these contexts even if as
deleterious influences on the 'proper' workings of 'pure' science. This is consistent with
views that see a clear distinction between pure and applied sciences. However, as w e
have also seen, s o m e views argue a stronger externalism by holding that these sociocultural factors are inextricably Unked to, and fundamentaUy influence the outcomes of,
science. These views typicaUy reject normative views of science, that seek to describe an
idealised state, in favour of descriptive views that describe science as it is actuaUy
practiced. A s w e will see time and again in this thesis, recent metascientific analyses such
as these invariably present complex characterisations of science.
(b) Science as a subculture and subcultures within science
Science is characterised by socio-cultural contexts not only in the sense of larger
contexts, but also in the sense of subcultures within scientific cultures.
Scientific paradigms
The contextual term paradigm, from T h o m a s K u h n (1962), is commonplace in
metascientific thinking and, despite its declining influence in H P S , has spread to other
fields and even to general use. K u h n proposed initially that a paradigm is the general set
of assumptions, laws and activities adopted by a community of scientists: the 'accepted
examples of actual scientific practice - examples which include law, theory, appUcation,
and instrumentation together - [that] provide models from which spring particular
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coherent traditions of scientific research' (Kuhn 1962 p. 10, quoted in Suppe 1979, p.
136).
K u h n characterised mature science as taking place within two main contexts: normal
science done within a paradigm, and revolutionary science when a n e w paradigm replaces
an existing one. The early, formative years of a science discipline are characterised by
m u c h debate and fluidity of ideas, and there is no accepted paradigm, which resembles
m o r e usual characterisations of the arts and most of the social sciences (Kuhn 1963, in
K u h n 1972 p. 87). Since then, several commentators and K u h n himself have c o m e to
regard this account as having become something of a doctrine for aU purposes. That is,
the notion of a paradigm has been interpreted widely in the Uterature to support a variety
of incompatible arguments (Suppe 1979, p. 137). In response to criticism that the term
w a s ambiguous, K u h n instead distinguished a general meaning, as the disciplinary
matrix, and a narrower sense, as the exemplar (Suppe 1979). Despite these criticisms, the
notion of a paradigm remains commonplace in metascientific thinking and more broadly
in other fields, thus representing a strong point of characterisation by context The
intellectual context is clearly central to the notion of a paradigm - scientists doing normal
science work within an accepted framework of concepts, or a conceptual perspective - but
a paradigm, by whichever definition, is a m u c h broader notion of context than merely the
cognitive. Because of the increasingly specialised character of science, different cognitive
contexts form part of the different paradigms that characterise the different sciences; that
is, different subcultures.
Weltanschauungen characterisations
A n u m b e r of metascientific theories arose from critiques of the R V arguing that
scientific theories can only be understood from within a Weltanschauungen

or

Lebenswelt, which is the general notion of a conceptual perspective (Suppe 1979, pp.
125ff). Following Reichenbach's distinction between the contexts of discovery and
justification, most proponents of the R V argued that epistemology is concerned only with
the context of justification, because it can be subjected to rational reconstruction. Thus
theories are confirmed or disconfirmed by judgements passed on theirfinalversion, w h e n
they are either further confirmed or (following Popper) are falsified. Weltanschauungen
theorists, o n the other hand, argue that our experiences of the world are shaped by our
language and the concepts w e use to determine which questions to ask and which
answers to accept. (The present thesis argues that these are part of the beUef system of the
observer, a point addressed in the companion chapter on beUef systems). They also argue
that, contrary to the positivists' account, theories are rarely rejected w h e n they fail to pass
a test, but are modified according to epistemic factors of science. T o account for this,
theories must be analysed to determine 'the epistemic factors governing the discovery,
development, and acceptance or rejection of theories' (Suppe 1979, p. 126). That is,
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theories can only be understood by accounting for the conceptual perspective or
Weltanschauungen:
FuU epistemic understanding of scientific theories could only be had by seeing
the dynamics of theory development, the acceptance or rejection of the theories,
the choosing of which experiments to preform, and so on. T o understand a
theory was to understand its use and development. (Suppe 1979, p. 126)
They therefore reject Reichenbach's dismissal of the context of discovery.
Weltanschauungen analyses characterise science as a social enterprise in which the
participants share a c o m m o n language, methodology, conceptual framework, and so on.
The present thesis interprets this as meaning the participants share a c o m m o n context:
shared structures, purposes, knowledges, betief systems and activities.
Several of the better known Weltanschauungen characterisations, which feature in
most introductory metascientific texts pubUshed from the 1970s, present accounts of
science involving this notion. In contrast to the positivist R V ,

Weltanschauungen

analyses characterise science as involving an interplay between theory, observation,
meaning and facts, as given in these three theses:
1) Observation is theory-laden: The Weltanschauungen
determines or
influences h o w one views, describes, or interprets the world; hence adherents to
different theories will observe differenttilingsw h e n they view the same
phenomena.
2) Meanings are theory-dependent: The descriptive terms (both observational
and theoretical) used by a science undergo a shift in meaning when incorporated
into, or used in conjunction with, a theory; thus the principles of a theory help
determine the meanings of the terms occurring in them, and so the meanings of
such terms wiU vary from theory to theory; hence changes in theory result in
changes of meaning.
3) Facts are theory-laden: W h a t counts as a fact is determined by the
Weltanschauungen associated with a theory; as such there is no neutral set of
facts for assessing the relative adequacy of two competing theories; rather, the
adequacy of a theory must be assessed according to standards set by its
associated Weltanschauungen. (Suppe 1979, p. 191)
For example, Toulmin (1953, 1961) proposed that scientific theories are instrumental:
they are neither true nor false but comprise laws, hypotheses and ideals of natural order
that serve as rules for drawing inferences. Therefore they are judged by h o w fruitful they
are, and the criteria for this judgement are the presumptions and ideals of natural order
comprising the intellectual perspective or Weltanschauungen (Suppe 1979, pp. 127ff).
Kuhn's (1962) characterisation of science has been mentioned above. Like Toulmin's
account, it sees science as working within a Weltanschauungen

or paradigm that

develops, but whereas Toulmin sees the Weltanschauungen as evolving by adding n e w
ideals of natural order, K u h n sees the development of a scientific Weltanschauungen as
discontinuous, and subject to extensive revision or replacement by another. Hanson
(1958) argued that observations are theory-laden because they are shaped by a conceptual
pattern arising partly from the meanings attached to terms and partly from the 'lawlike
generaUsations, hypotheses, and methodological presuppositions one holds in context'
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(Suppe 1979, p. 165). While Feyerabend also holds that theories are m a d e within a
Weltanschauungen

(see summary statement 113), he agrees with Popper that science

grows, or should grow, by the proliferation of competing theories. Thus for Feyerabend,
there should be competing Weltanschauungen:
O n Feyerabend's view it is imperative that the same scientists or scientific
community be able to understand and compare many radically different theories
or Weltanschauungen: it would not suffice to split science into a number of
competing schools, each with its o w n single theory or Weltanschauungen.
However, w h e n the theories involved are general theories which function as
Weltanschauungen for viewing the world, it becomes questionable whether there
are any persons psychologically able either to alter world views when
entertaining alternative theories or to switch from one Weltanschauungen to
another at will. Thus it is questionable whether his analysis is psychologicaUy
possible. (Suppe 1979, p. 180)
Weltanschauungen analyses, like other metascientific views, have their critics.
While each of the views above is subject to its particular criticisms, there are also
criticisms ofthe general Weltanschauungen approach (Suppe 1979, pp. 191ff). General
criticisms can be m a d e of each of the three central theses given above, concerning
observation, meaning and objectivity. First, observation within a Weltanschauungen can
be interpreted as the Weltanschauungen partly constituting the object and its properties
being observed. This leads to an extreme relativism, in which each Weltanschauungen
constructs its o w n reaHty. A n extreme relativism is problematic because any such analysis
must itself berelative.However, none of the Weltanschauungen analyses discussed reties
on this view. It is therefore dismissed in favour of a more acceptable interpretation, that
the objects and their properties exist independentiy of the Weltanschauungen, but the kind
of object and property they are observed as being and having is determined partly by the
Weltanschauungen.

For Suppe, this is a sufficient but not necessary account of

observation, because it only holds if theories influence observations and (partly)
determine the Weltanschauungen; writing in 1977, he calls for further work to be done on
this.
Secondly, as with the observation thesis, the thesis that the

Weltanschauungen

determines meanings has two possible interpretations (Suppe 1979, pp. 199-208). The
stronger version, as in Feyerabend's eartier writings and B o h m , holds that the meanings
of terms in a theory are determined by all the principles in the theory. This version has
been subjected to severe criticisms. For example, because both predictions and
observations are expressed in the same language using the same meanings, the evidence
(or 'facts') used in testing a theory cannot be relevant unless they are consistent with it
Thus the testing of a theory is circular, and this version is rejected. The weaker version,
as in Toulmin, Hanson and Kuhn's later writings, holds that the meanings of terms in a
theory are only partly determined by the principles in the theory and that only some
principles m a y apply to some terms. The weaker version m a y be defensible, but as stated
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it does not support any of the Weltanschauungen analyses reviewed and, for Suppe and
Shapin, is not very useful because analyses of meaning are 'of Utde help in understanding
the workings of scientific concepts and theories' (Suppe 1979, p. 208). That is, theories
cannot be fully understood as linguistic entities.
Thirdly, the objectivity thesis is also subject to a range of criticisms, but Suppe
concludes that a defensible version is possible, that 'the Weltanschauungen

determines

which facts one can entertain, which of those facts are relevant to the adequacy or
development of the theory, and which facts one is able to determine observationaUy' (pp.
216-7), while allowing for an independent and 'objective' reaUty, and the requirement of
empirical support for the theory. T h e present thesis argues that the criteria used for
making such choices are part of the beUef system.
T h e nature of a Weltanschauungen

is complex and not consistent between

metascientific accounts, and the notion of h o w a Weltanschauungen is shared by a group
of scientists is less clear. Suppe judged Weltanschauungen characterisations as failing to
m a k e the case for a necessary and causal Weltanschauungen.
notion of a Weltanschauungen

H e concluded that the

is nonetheless useful for interpreting certain aspects of

science and, while still debated by philosophers of science, appearing to be less fruitful
than pursuing instead semantic or linguistic analyses of science. T w o decades after
Suppe's comments, the notion of a perspective or Weltanschauungen

characterising

science remains debated in H P S and pursued vigorously in S T S analyses. Thus some
versions of constructivism and some other characterisations such as Bhaskar's scientific
reaUsm hold that contextual factors something like a Weltanschauungen partly shape our
understanding of an independent reatity. The following subsections address two notable
examples: gender and science, and non-western European traditions of science.
(c) Science as characterised by the effect of, or the effect on, particular groupings of
people
Feminist critiques of science: is the context of science masculine?
O n e perspective of analysis that emerged in the post-positivist critical debates in
metascience was feminism. Feminist critiques seek to m a k e clear the effect of gender on
characterisations of science. A s usual with aggregations of theories such as groups or
fields, and especially withfieldsthat arerelativelyn e w and growing rapidly, the notion of
'feminist critiques of science', or 'gender and science', puUs together a wide variety of
views and approaches. These include differences in conceptions of feminism, of the
boundaries andrelationshipsbetween science and otherfields,and of what the matters of
interest are (Keller 1995; Gieryn 1995). Nonetheless, there is sufficient structure and
pattern to discern some trends and potential trends of characterisation. This is outlined in
the foUowing paragraphs, drawing chiefly on KeUer's and Gieryn's reviews of the field.
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Despite variations in feminist critiques of science, they often begin from an interest
in the relationships between gender, objectivity, and science:
The historicaUy pervasive association between masculine and objective, more
specifically between masculine and scientific, is a topic that academic critics
resist taking seriously ... The virtual silence of at least die nonfeminist academic
community on this subject suggests that the association of masculinity with
scientific thought has the status of a myth which either cannot or should not be
examined seriously. It has simultaneously the air of being 'self-evident' and
'nonsensical' - the former by virtue of existing in the realm of c o m m o n
knowledge (that is, everyone knows it), and the latter by virtue of lying outside
the realm of formal knowledge, indeed conflicting with our image of science as
emotionaUy and sexually neutral... (KeUer 1978, quoted in Keller 1995, p. 81)
For KeUer and others, myths about science should be investigated to discern whatever
reaUties and influences they indicate, rather than dismissed as ineffectualfictions.The
tinks between masculinity and objectivity are therefore overdue for analysis whatever is
the initial view:
The principal point I wish to emphasise is that the role of gender ideology is but
one aspect of the constitutive role of language, culture, and ideology in the
construction of science, and hence, though the roots of such analyses have been
and must continue to Ue in feminist theory, I take their place in science studies to
be just one part of that more general inquiry. I suggest that work in this area not
only has raised novel kinds of questions for historians, philosophers and
sociologists but also offers some more novel models of and sites for analysis
that might even be of use to those w h o are not w o m e n , w h o m a y not even be
gendered, and w h o don't necessarily think of themselves as feminists. (KeUer
1995, p. 86)
Feminist critiques argue that both a gendered vocabulary and wider cultural factors have
wide-reaching impUcations for our understanding of, and hence characterisations of,
science, and these impUcations should be investigated.
Three issues of characterisation arise from studies in gender and science (KeUer pp.
86ff, and Gieryn pp. 420ff). First is the involvement of women in science. Analyses of
w o m e n in science show that m e n have been, and are, far more highly represented in
science, particularly in certainfields,and 'especiaUy so at the highest levels of honour
and power' (Gieryn p. 420). These studies expUcidy concern characterisations of science
and their effects, both in marginalising the contributions of w o m e n , and in discouraging
the involvement of women:

Londa Schiebinger (1989) offers the well-known example of midwifery - and
less famiUar ones of medical cookery, h o m e economics, and debates in Parisian
salons - to illustrate h o w some investigative, discovering, and practicaUy useful
activities dominated or controlled by w o m e n get defined as presecience,
superstition, applied arts, or the humanities w h U e boundaries ofrealscience get
laid d o w n in their professionalisation. (Gieryn 1995, p. 421)
There is a correlation, then, between changes in the scientific status of certain activit
over time, and gender. This is compounded by the institutionaUsation of science over

time, in which the scope of scientific activity reduced to what took place in institution
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whde women's involvement in institute ns was marginal. The milder argument from
these studies is that science has been, and is, characterised by m e n , especially in
influential positions. The stronger argum nt is that the dominance of m e n in science has
influenced other characteristics of science, such as the relative status and support of
different scientific endeavours, and even the construction and practice of science itself.
This leads to the second and third issues in the interaction between gender and science.
The second focus of interest is scientific constructions of sexual difference. Gieryn
(p. 422, citing Rossiter 1982, and Schiebinger 1989) argues that 'demarcations' between
notions of male and female 'co-evolved' with demarcations between scientific and other
knowledges. Thus objectivity, reason and mind came to be seen (that is, characterised) as
male, while subjectivity, feeling and Nature c a m e to be seen as female. The
characterisation of science as the exemplar of the impersonal, the rational and the general
fitted the construction of maleness and not femaleness:
W o m e n were n o w constructed to be inappropriate for science, and (not by
accident) science was trotted out to lend its growing authority to that myth.
Biological studies of sex differences (especiaUy in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries) discovered in the female body - brain, skull, pelvis - a
machine less efficient for the inteUectual demands of science than for mothering
(Shiebinger 1989). Harding (1991) concludes that 'women k n o w very w e U that
knowledge from the natural sciences has been used in the interest of our
domination and not our Uberation'. (Gieryn 1995, p. 422)
Moreover, continues Gieryn, these gendered characterisations have affected the
involvement of w o m e n in science: they have made science less appealing and more
formidable as a career choice for girls, they have legitimised the relegation of w o m e n in
science to subordinate activities removed from the vanguard of research, and they have
legitimised the relegation of w o m e n scientists to 'generaUy lukewarm-to-cold scientific
fields for which their feminine talents were thought to be especiaUy appropriate: "home
economics, botany, and child psychology'" (Gieryn p. 422).
The third focus of interest is the use of gender in scientific constructions of subjects
and objects (KeUer 1995, pp. 86ff). This is the most significant for the present thesis.
Critics of characterisations Unking gender and science might retort to the first point that
the involvement of w o m e n in science is an interesting social and personnel issue, but
does not concern science itself. T o the second they might reply with some boundary
work: that the use of science in constructing sexual differences was an example of bad
science, and bad science is eventuaUy found out andrejectedby doing more science, not
less. Such a critique, however, must concede that the third point concerns science itself.
(Of course, regardless of their reception, the first two points are characterisations of
science in the Uterature, and if accepted they support the third point). There is a range of
feminist analyses concerning 'the impUcations of gendered vocabulary in scientific
discourse' (Keller 1995, pp. 86-7), ranging from reading scientific texts to more
fundamental issues such as the scientificrepresentationof Nature:
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In aU of these examples, metaphors of gender can be seen to work, as social
images in science invariably do, in two dimensions: They import social
expectations into our representations of nature and, by so doing, they
simultaneously serve to reify (or naturalise) cultural betiefs and practices.
Although the dynamics of these two processes are almost surely inextricable,
m a n y feminists focus on the latter, emphasising their effects (usuaUy negative)
on w o m e n ; here m y focus w U l be on the former, on their influence on the course
of scientificresearch.(Keller 1995, p. 87)
Analyses of past and current research inreproductiveand developmental biology show
how scientific discourses can be gendered and not neutral. First notions of gender are
extrapolated into

'extraphysical properties' such

as active/passive

and

independent/dependent as discussed above. Then these properties are ascribed to parts of
the whole, such as subprocesses. Perhaps the paradigm example is the traditional
characterisation of the sperm cell as 'active' and able to 'penetrate' the egg, and the egg
ceU as merely 'drifting' and being 'penetrated'. KeUer's argument is that no mechanism
for the activity of the egg w a s postulated because none w a s assumed to exist Recent
research, however, emphasises the mutual activity of the two gametes, which KeUer
interprets as reflecting a shift in metaphor (pp. 87-8). There are sirmlar accounts of
biological understandings of sex determination and of the relationship between the
cytoplasm and nucleus in the cell. M o r e subtle uses of metaphor in scientific
explanations, particularly gendered metaphors, include the debate between genetic
determinism and organising (or 'master') molecules as explanations in developmental
biology. Keller observes that part of such debates is concern over whether particular
explanations are being used to serve ideological purposes:
... [F]eminist arguments for the use of gendered metaphors to (a) legitimate an
agenda for scientific knowledge aimed at the domination of nature and (b)
facditate the projection of that agenda onto explanatory models for natural
phenomena are often read in caricature, to approximate a kind of conspiracy
theory. For just this reason, it is necessary to clearly emphasise what is not
being claimed in these analyses. O f particular importance is the fact that no
causal claims are being m a d e , either for gender (hardly the only source of
productive metaphors for science) or for language more generaUy. Metaphors of gender or anything else - clearly do not, by themselves, drive the production
of scientific knowledge; nor is language, by itself, capable of conjuring material
effects. But language does guide the h u m a n activities necessary to the
construction of material effects. (KeUer 1995, p. 90)
Thus for KeUer gendered metaphors in science are but an example of the larger issue of
the use of metaphor generaUy in science. She cads for further attention to the effect of
metaphors on mind-sets and the possibiUties of alternative mind-sets11.

11

The present thesis addresses particular issues arising from the use of language and metaphors
respectively in the companion chapters on structure and belief system, and in Appendices B.2 and
B.4.
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Science and non western European contexts
The present thesis focuses on the western European scientific tradition, as defined
in section 1.4 above. The reason for this focus, as mentioned eartier, is to address the
concerns of science curriculum stakeholders: it is imperative that curriculum stakeholders
understand that the proposed analysis applies to the scientific tradition notionally
addressed by the science curriculum. However, the question of science in non-western
contexts arises and must be addressed.
M a n y accounts of the western European scientific tradition characterise it in part by
comparison with other, non-western, cultures; therefore, some cross-references to nonwestern cultures should be mentioned as examples of characterisations mainly by context
For example, it is traditionally assumed that western European science alone is universal
and acultural:
B y and large, past cross-cultural work has taken Western 'rationaUty' and
'scientificity' as the bench mark criteria by which other culture's knowledges
should be evaluated. So-called traditional knowledge systems of indigenous
peoples havefrequentiybeen portrayed as closed, pragmatic, utilitarian, value
laden, context dependent, and so on, implying that they cannot have the same
authority and credibiUty as science because their localness restricts them to the
social and cultural circumstances of their production. These were accounts of
dichotomy where the great divide in knowledge systems coincided with the great
divide between societies that are powerful and those that are not. Here w a s a
satisfying explanation of the relation between knowledge and power. (WatsonVerran & TurnbuU 1995, pp. 115-6)
Comparisons of this sort, that contrast fundamental assumptions, betiefs, and so on, raise
significant questions about applying the characteristics of one culture to interpret the
characteristics of another, and by what characteristics (serving as criteria) the t w o are
compared. These are critical issues for the present thesis w h e n it argues that the proposed
six-dimensional characterisation of science is a framework that enables useful
comparisons between cultures as w e U as within. In claiming to be well-grounded in a
broad selection of the metascientific Uterature, the present thesis acknowledges the
diversity of views and emphases. This diversity of focus ranges from recognising the
evident successes of the Western European scientific tradition, to seeking be sensitive to
the successes of other traditions, as w e wiU see.
The term science denotes a western European concept
First, there are fundamental difficulties in judging other cultures by the criteria of
western science: what is regarded in the West as science m a y not only be absent in other
contexts but blind us to other ways of thinking and conceptualising the cosmos. T h e very
use ofthe word science in non-western contexts should be m a d e with caution, because it
entails applying a concept that describes the western European experience to those in
other cultures. For example, Ronan (1982, p. 8) takes a broad view of what is science:
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'science is something that has appeared in every culture on Earth; it has grown naturaUy
out of man's [sic] innate curiosity about the world in which he finds himself. O n the
other hand, Agren (1983, p. 65) cautions: 'The use of the Latin word science in a nonWestern setting has risks'. Applying the characteristics by which Western European
science is understood to a different cultural context runs the real risk of failing to
appreciate the characteristics of the other culture. T o recognise the inherent problems even
in naming comparable, non-western, traditions with western European science, w e wiU
use the term natural philosophy, an older term in the western European tradition than
science.
Criteria for characterising natural philosophies (sciences) in different cultures
The second issue in characterising natural phdosophies, or sciences, across cultures
is the criteria used for making such a comparison: that is, what features are used to
characterise traditions in both cultures. Presumably, for any comparison to be made there
must be some recognisably comparable elements which western scientists would regard
as science, while at the same time acknowledging or claiming that the culture in question
did not develop a tradition as w e understand science. This section wdl give some
examples from the Uterature that characterises differences and similarities between natural
philosophies, particularly by the underlying betiefs about the cosmos (ontological beUefs)
and the orientation necessary to have knowledge of it (epistemological beliefs),
frameworks of knowledge, and various activities and purposes.
There is a far greater western Uterature on western European science than on
traditions of natural phdosophy in other cultures. There is some work, for example, on
the achievements of the Babylonians and Egyptians, particularly as precursors to the
Ionians, and of the Arabs (especially Islamic science), w h o kept ative the AristoteUan
tradition in the Middle Ages. Likewise, there is some work on the (mainly Hindu) natural
phdosophy in India, especiaUy mathematics, and in China, especiaUy with technology. In
the case of Chinese natural phdosophy, what is k n o w n in the West is dominated at this
stage by the scholarship of one person, Joseph Needham, and it wiU take some time
before his scholarship - especially the effect of his Marxist interpretation - can be
evaluated against a widerfieldor scholarship (see variously Sivin, de SoUa Price and
Nakayama, aU in Nakayama and Sivin (eds) 1973). Even against these standards, there is
far less than this amount available for m a n y cultures. For example, among the indigenous
peoples of Australia, the Pacific, the Americas and Africa, both contemporary and
historical, this literature is comparatively small and only recently emerging. S o m e
examples are given below.
The present thesis argues that its categories of characterisation apply equaUy w e U to
traditions of natural inquiry in other cultural contexts, even though it w a s developed from
Uterature m o s d y addressing the western European scientific tradition. Therefore it is a
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useful means of characterising similarities and differences between traditions of natural
philosophy. T h e basis of that argument is that the proposed categories are categories of
meaning, within which an extensive selection of metascientific arguments can be placed.
This gives rise to a reasonable (inductive) expectation that other views can also be
described in terms of the proposed categories.
Non-western examples in western scholarship
T h e third issue in characterising science across cultures is that various groups in
Western societies are showing increasing interest in non-Western traditions. O n e example
is the increasing interest in Western societies in non-Western medicine; another is the
interest in non-Western land management practices; and a third is an interest in moving
beyond traditional assumptions that Western culture, including and perhaps especially
Western science, are inherently and self-evidently correct and superior. In this context,
s o m e science curricula n o w have a broader scope than only the western European
scientific tradition. Increasingly, curricula in western systems seek to broaden their
scope, and curricula in non-western countries seek to address indigenous or local
traditions. These matters are addressed in part 4 of the present chapter in the discussion of
the curriculum impUcations.
Eurocentric characterisations of the sort criticised by Watson-Verran and TurnbuU
simultaneously characterise non-Western 'science' (mostiy negatively) and Western
'science' (mostiy positively). A n example is accounts that attempt to explain w h y the
Scientific Revolution occurred in Europe but not in other cultures. S o m e characterisations
point out there w a s no similar explosion of ideas in China, in spite of the m a n y
pioneering developments there in science and technology up to that time:
... the perenniaUy good talking point of w h y China did not have a scientific
revolution and a full-scale industrial revolution like those that threw the W e s t
into dominance. Or, if you like, w h y was the W e s t out of step in undergoing
these curious manifestations? (de Sofia Price 1973, p. 18)
T h e difference between science in China and Europe is often couched in a negative sense,
representing the difference as a failing in China:
... the tantalising problem of cultural history, the fatiure of the Chinese to
develop isolated rudiments of scientific feats into a self-sustaining practice of the
scientific method. (Jaki 1974, pp. 31-32)
and again:
W h y China lost its former lead and fell behind Europe is almost the first
question that a layman asks about Chinese civiUsation, a question from which
sinologists tend to shrink into their separate compartments, afraid of being
caught up in inconclusive generaUsations. (Graham 1973, p. 45)
T h e 'tantaUsing problem' referred to by Jaki is that despite the possibiUty that any number
of these developments could have triggered a self-sustaining tradition as in Europe, they
did not. H e therefore judges Francis Bacon's characterisation as inadequate because it
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fails to account for the 'fadure' of the Chinese, and instead posits a theoretical framework
as a distinguishing characteristic that led to a (Western European) scientific tradition:
Printing, gunpowder, and magnets, these were the factors which in Francis
Bacon's estimate did more than anything else to usher in the age of science. It
might have shocked him to leam that for aU their gunpowder, magnets, and
printing skiU the Chinese remained hopelessly removed from the stage of
sustained, systematic scientific research. They had rockets for centuries, but
failed to investigate their trajectories, or to probe into the regularities offreefaU.
Unlike in the W e s t bookprinting did not lead in China to a major inteUectual
ferment. Although magnets were installed on Chinese ships, which formed the
best navy in the world during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, their
captains never had the urge of a Vasco de G a m a , Columbus and others to
circumnavigate the globe. (Jaki 1974, p. 32)
There are several problems with this Eurocentricism. First the notion of the
difference between Europe and China being somehow a fading on the part of China is
probably unproductive. It is Eurocentric in that European assumptions are unquestioned
and Chinese assumptions undervalued:
The pervasive recognition, characterised as postcoloniaUsm, that the West has
structured the inteUectual agenda and has hidden its o w n presuppositions from
view through the construction ofthe 'other' (see Clifford 1988; Diamond 1974;
Nandy 1988; Said 1978) is nowhere more acute than in the assumption of
'science' as a foil against which all other knowledge should be contrasted.
(Watson-Verran & TurnbuU 1995, p. 137)
Nor is there any guarantee in choosing an author w h o is sympathetic to his/her subject
For example, Joseph Needham's knowledge of and respect for science in China is
acknowledged, yet Arthur Wright and Arthur H u m m e l are critical of Needham for not
accounting for a fundamentally different set of attitudes and priorities displayed by the
Chinese: an interest in people and society rather than Nature (Nakayama 1973, p. 35).
Secondly, characterising the difference between China and Europe as a Chinese
failing is also problematic because it can become a rather hoUow analysis:
The trouble is that explanations of China's fadure to attain modem science are
generally no more than proofs that she was not foUowing the route by which w e
arrived at it (Graham 1973, p. 53)
That is, there is an assumption - that the present thesis interprets as part of a beUef system
- that the 'proper' and only way of developing science is the way it has developed in
Western Europe. Moreover, it easily leads to the conclusion that other natural
philosophies would arrive at the same result as Western European science has if they
foUowed the same development. This conclusion results direcdy from the acceptance of a

particular characterisation of science. It is also susceptible to a faUacy of historica
interpretation:
We must glean our anticipations of the modem science of life from far and wide,
from sources that their authors would not have agreed had anything significant
in common. M u c h of what early Chinese thinkers had to say about motion, heat
and light is just as scattered. The basic concepts that they used to explore
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physical phenomena are precisely yin-yang, the Five Phases, the trigram and
hexagram systems of the Book of Changes, and others that used to be invoked
(even by early twentieth-century Chinese thinkers) as chieflyresponsiblefor the
fadure of Chinese to learn h o w to think scientifically.
But to place the responsibdity there is to commit one of the most elementary
faUacies of historical explanation, namely to present a description of what the
world was like before X as though it were an explanation of w h y X happened so
late or faded to happen at all. Since the concepts I have mentioned were the
vocabulary of early scientific thought, it is as misguided to call them an
impediment to modern science as to consider walking an imr^diment to the
invention of the automobde. But that faUacy is a very tempting w a y out of
difficulties into which w e inevitably fall if w e ignore the limitations of
positivistic analogies and take them for fuU explanations. (Sivin 1973, p. xvn)
Identifying assumptions in western European science
The third issue in characterising sciences across cultures is identifying, or not,
assumptions and beUefs about western science. T o characterise non-Western science as
'failing' can divert attention from h o w science is characterised. The reverse strategy - to
look instead at w h y a scientific revolution took place in Europe - can and, on Graham's
account, should be put. Probably the best known passage advocating the reverse case is
from Einstein:
Development of Western Science is based on two great achievements, the
invention of the formal logical system (in EucUdean geometry) by the Greek
phdosophers, and the discovery of the possibiUty tofindout causal relationship
by systematic experiment (Renaissance). In m y opinion one has not to be
astonished that the Chinese sages have not made these steps. The astonishing
thing is that these discoveries were made at aU. (Albert Einstein, quoted by
Graham 1973, p. 50)
The present thesis argues that the character of science is multi-dimensional, and therefore
to understand this significant historical (contextual) change, one must examine also the
other dimensions of characterisation.
Clearly, there is a balance to be struck between a 'hegemony of Western
rationaUsm' which precludes the possibiUty that science could be other than what it is,
and an 'unbridled culturalrelativism[that] can only lead to the proliferation of [narrow
interest] ghettos and dogmatic nationalism' (Watson-Verran & TurnbuU 1995, p. 138).
Western European science has m a d e very obvious successes, which need to be
understood, but these successes should not blind us to recognising and understanding
successes from within non-Western traditions. A s a solution, Watson-Verran and
TurnbuU identify an intersection of 'the social study of science with anthropology,
postmodernism, feminism, postcolonialism, literary theory, geography, and
environmentalism' into which aU knowledge systems can be placed (p. 115). In this
context aU knowledge systems exhibit a tension between the local and the global. The
global is characterised by the 'strength of standards, generaUsations, theories, and other
assemblages of practices with their capacity for making connections and at the same time
providing for the possibiUty of systematic criticism' (p. 136). The local is characterised as
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the site of both systematic practice and 'local resistance', where abutting or overlapping
knowledge systems conflict and seek legitimisation through systematisation. The
intersectingfieldsjust mentioned focus on contextuaUty, understanding the role of social
Ufe, and on explaining knowledge outcomes that are the exception or are undetermined,
but a balance must be maintained to avoid creating a n e w hegemony that celebrates the
local and rejects the global (pp. 137-8).
Watson-Verran and TurnbuU give several examples. O n e is the Gothic cathedrals,
which 'have the appearance of the rationality, order, calculation, and uniformity that
typify Western science' (p. 118), but were built without overall plans or architect
supervision by successive teams of masons. Each team had their o w n 'local' knowledges
of geometry, technique and measurement, which they applied using reproducible
templates. Second, the Anasazi, a group of North American Indians w h o Uved in the
desert around 200-700 AD., budt a thriving and complex society of up to 10 000, with
structures including massive irrigation systems, networks of roads, and massive
buddings several stories high and underground. This w a s enabled by systems of
agriculture, storage and organising people that used knowledge and information that was
developed, sustained and transmitted using (mainly) an accurate calendar, 'along with
ritual, myth, poetry, and architecture' (p. 120). The calendar was based on an astronomy
that exhibited characteristics of Western science, such as observational and theoretical
frameworks, even though it was locally limited because only the priest had the
knowledge. Similar examples of local knowledges with global characteristics include the
Incas, w h o m a d e simdar developments to the Anasazi, but also developed a powerful
system of calculation, and the Micronesians, w h o successfidly navigated the Pacific using
a powerful system of navigation that was transmitted (but locaUy restricted) oraUy.
Even analyses claiming to be culturally sensitive, such as that by Watson-Verran
and TurnbuU, above, need to be read with a careful eye to sensitivity. They characterised
global knowledges by strong standards, generalisations, theories and systematic
criticism. These are characteristics by which western European science is usually
recognised, as indicated in the quoted text: have the appearance ofthe rationality, order,
calculation, and uniformity that typify Western science. Thus if global is substituted by
Western European science, their analysis assumes the appearance of the Western
hegemony they seek toredress.Further, the analysis can veer close to being read as these
people are (unexpectedly) admirable because they are like us. Clearly, this is not
intended, but the possibdity highUghts the difficulty of constructing analyses which seek
to be sensitive to multiple contexts. The present thesis interprets such analyses on two
levels:firstsimply as an example of a genre of characterisation in the Uterature, which
therefore should be included, and second as an example of analyses that identify
characteristics of what Westerners agree is science in non-Western contexts, where those
characteristics arose in non-European contexts.
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contexts of science

Science is characterised sometimes by people as individuals rather than in groups:

that it is characterised by particular professionals (scientists), or by the characterist
individuals such as personal and psychological factors. The rejection of the context of
discovery by the positivist R V meant that h u m a n contexts were not recognised as
characterising science. This was certainly so whde the RV dominated, and continues due
to the residual influence of that view, as noted earUer. This means that paradoxicaUy,
h u m a n contexts remain more widely acknowledged in popular media rather than in
scholarly positivist characterisations of science as objective and free of h u m a n context
H u m a n contexts are, however, the subject of attention generally in S T S and in postpositivist H P S . This section wdl outiine some analyses of human contexts in science.
The stereotypic characterisation ofthe scientist
The popular stereotype of the scientist, as used in the mass media, draws strongly
on human contexts. The characterisation of the scientist as a white, older male, wearing a
laboratory coat and spectacles, and a Uttie disheveUed, is a powerful and popular image,
reported in m a n y studies including those of school chddren:
Although these studies have used a variety of methods... they agree that images
tend to appear in several clusters: 'devd', 'out of this world', 'wizard/genius',
and 'war'.
T w o early studies were a survey of high school students by M e a d and
Metraux (1957) and a review of comic books and other 'pop culture' items by
BasaUa (1976). Both identified the stereotype of white-coated, male scientists
with extraordinary powers, often divorced from social responsibdity. These
tentative analyses have been expanded by LaFoUette (1990) and Nelkin (1987).
In a content analysis of 11 major magazines in thefirsthalf of the twentieth
century, LaFoUette identified several major themes, especially a 'myth of
scientific differentness' that stressed the 'extraordinary inteUigence, foresight
[and] modesty' of scientists. 'Piercing eyesight'reflectedthe superb capabiUties
of insight attributed to scientists. LaFoUette found the stereotypes of scientists
divided into 'magician or wizard', 'expert' and 'creator/destroyer'. Nelkin used
a more qualitative analysis when looking at newspaper coverage of science and
technology in the last generation; she emphasised die number of 'pioneering',
'frontier' and mditary images to be found in writings about science. (Lewenstein
1995, pp. 354-5)
Lewenstein notes a number of other studies which examine images of science and
scientists, few of which distinguish between characterisations in mass and speciaUst
media.
Psychological contexts
There is some recognition of psychological factors in the metascientific Uterature.
For example, Brannigan (1981, pp. 12ff) critiques four models of scientific discovery
that he characterises as psychological: they are given respectively in the works of
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Hanson, Blackwell, K u h n and Koestler. Thus for Hanson, discovery is the
psychological reassignation of the value of an object, fact or pattern, which is a type of
learning: to 'see in famiUar objects what no one else has seen before' (Brannigan 1981, p.
14). For BlackweU, discovery is also a type of learning but is a shift in gestalt, either as
elaboration of existing structures or transformation of structures. Kuhn's account deals
with both the psychological activity of the individual and the social change of the
scientific community: 'According to Kuhn, discoveries occur w h e n the conceptual suit of
a paradigm no longer fits the body of knowledge, and unthreads in the form of
anomaUes' (Brannigan 1981, p. 21). In Koesder's account discovery is the 'synthesis of
a single idea with two apparendy inconsistent contexts', a psychological process which
accounts not only for scientific discoveries, but also artistic creations and comic
inspirations (Brannigan 1981, p. 27). Brannigan's critique of psychological accounts of
discovery in favour of a sociological explanation is discussed in Appendix B.5.
In CaUon's four models for the dynamics of science (1995), three especiaUy a U o w
for psychological and other h u m a n contexts as factors in scientific development.
Characterisations of science by competition highUght particularly the role of incentive and
reward. Characterisations of science by sociocultural practice highUght social factors, but
these include individual identification with group characteristics as w e U as psychological
characteristics such as confidence. Characterisations of science by extended translation
highlight the interactions and translations between aU (human and non-human) actors or
actants in a translation network, but a U o w for individual h u m a n factors as part of this
network.
Elements of these psychological accounts describe mental activity are discussed in
Appendix B. 5 and summarised in the companion chapter on activity, but the notion of
psychological context is broader than this. It also includes notions such as incentive,
motivation and interest which are inconsistent with the positivist legacy. A n example of a
theoretical treatment is the notion of human agency, as posited by Taylor and subjected to
considerable discussion in Htiey, B o h m a n and Shusterman's (1991) compilation of
views on the so-caUed interpretive turn in phdosophy:
For m u c h of this century, positivist philosophy of science reinforced the
distinction [between explanation and interpretation] through its view of the unity
of science, which demanded a reduction of all sciences, including the social and
behavioural sciences, to the ontology and methods of physics. T h e result w a s a
clear demarcation of the scientific enterprise and interpretive disciplines. The
distinction also impUed a normative distinction that served to privdege the views
about reason, knowledge, and the knowing subject inherent in the positivist
view of science.
T h e recent impetus for rejecting the demarcation of the natural and h u m a n
sciences has c o m e initiaUy from within the phdosophy of the natural sciences, in
chaUenges to positivism by the postempiricist philosophers of science such as
T h o m a s Kuhn, M a r y Hesse, and Paul Feyerabend. For positivism, the standard
Ust of differences between the sciences and other forms of inquiry had derived
from a view of the natural sciences that turned on the supposed neutrality of
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observation, the 'givenness' of experience, the independence of empirical data
from theoretical frameworks, the ideal of a univocal language, and betief in the
rational progress of science. With therejectionof positivism and its thesis of the
unity of science, m a n y of the historic reasons for drawing a line between the
natural and h u m a n sciences simply disappeared; distinctions between the
discipUnes were blurred by the suggestion of a m u c h looser and interpretive
conception of natural scientific inquiry. (Htiey, B o h m a n & Shusterman 1991, p.
3)
A distinction of this sort, between the natural sciences and the human sciences, is an
example of boundary concerns, as w e have discussed above in section 1.2. It is
mentioned here, however, because it arises from the notion of human agency in science.
The debate about this distinction is given in the sixteen contributions to Htiey, B o h m a n
and Shusterman (eds) (1991) and, in essence, turns on the question of human agency in
science. O n the one hand is the view, given in Taylor, Kuhn and others, that the human
and natural sciences are distinguished essentiaUy by the question of human interpretation.
For Taylor the h u m a n sciences are interpretive w h d e the natural sciences are not; for
K u h n the natural sciences do have an interpretive basis, but are fimdamentally concerned
with problem solving (Kuhn 1991, pp. 22-3). O n the other hand is the view, given by
Rorty and others, that post-positivist views of science render such distinctions no longer
useful, if they ever were. Rorty (1991 pp. 59-80) argues that all inquiry is
recontextualisation, meaning the reaUgnment and reformation of beUefs. W h d e this view
is contentious (and is debated by other contributors), the point here is Rorty does not
oppose by rejecting the notion of h u m a n agency, but by arguing for universal human
agency. Hence the debate is within the interpretive turn, not between interpretation and
something else such as objectivity. This brings the range of contextual factors - social,
organisational and others -tobear on natural science, but particularly as they apply to the
interpretive individual.
Human contexts in experimentation
CoUins and Pinch (1993) describe a number of episodes in science to show, among
others things, this interpretive characteristic of actual rather than idealised science:
[Our book] presents a view of science as faUible and untidy, a matter of craft
rather than logic. T o do this it examines a series of experiments, some famous,
such as the proofs of relativity theory, and some not so famous. In each case it
shows that scientific certainties do not c o m e from experimental method, but
from the w a y ambiguous results were interpreted. (ColUns & Pinch 1993,
Frontispiece)
[W]e are going to display science, with as Uttiereflectionon scientific method as
w e can muster. W e are simply going to describe episodes of science ... W e are
going to say what happened. Where w e doreflectas in the cold-fusion story, it
w d l be reflections on matters human not methodological. TheresultswiU be
surprising. T h e shock comes because the idea of science is so enmeshed in
phdosophical analyses, in myths, in theories, in hagiography, in smugness, in
heroism, in superstition, in fear, and, most important, in perfect hindsight that
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what actually happens has never been told outside of a smaU circle. (Collins &
Pinch 1993, p. 2)
Thus, for example, Collins and Pinch recount an early (1919) experimentaltestbetween
Einstein's and Newton's predictions of the effect of gravity on Ught waves. W h d e not
widely understood even today, relativity theory was at that time not even widely
understood among the physics community, and the opportunity for an experimental test
under the supervision of so eminent a physicist as Eddington was significant. Briefly,

Einstein's and Newton's theories gave different predictions of the minute bending of U
rays such as might be measured as they passed near the large gravitational field
surrounding our sun. A solar eclipse in 1919 gave an opportunity to measure this. The
experiment required photographs to be taken of the sky during the eclipse (during the
day), to be compared with photographs taken of the sky before and after the ectipse (but
during the night when the sky was dark). T w o series of photographs were taken, one in
Brazd (Sobral) and one off the West African coast (Principe). That theresults'confirmed'
relativity theory, and so contributed significandy to the shift from Newtonian mechanics,
has become part of science lore. However, Collins and Pinch show that the results were
not logicaUy compeUing or decisive as the popular accounts imply, because (a) the

difficulties in setting up such an experiment reduced the margin of confidence; (b) th
photographic plates were not aU clear; and (c) thefinalmeasurement data, on modern
statistical analysis, could be interpreted in various ways depending on which plates were
accepted or rejected:
In either case, it would be difficult to be able to provide a clear answer.
Nevertheless, on 6 November 1919, the Astronomer Royal announced that the
observations had confirmed Einstein's theory ...
D o the results come d o w n on Einstein's side in an unambiguous way? The
answer is that they do not. T o make the observations c o m e out to support
Einstein, Eddington and the others took the Sobral 4-inch results as the main
finding and used the two Principe plates as supporting evidence w h d e ignoring
the 18 plates taken by the Sobral astrographic. In the debate which foUowed the
Astronomer Royal's announcement, it appears that issues of authority were
m u c h to the fore. O n 6 November 1919, Sir Joseph Thomson, the President of
the Royal Society, chaired a meeting at which he remarked: 'It is difficult for the
audience to weight fully the meaning of thefiguresthat have been put before us,
but the Astronomer Royal and Professor Eddington have studied the material
carefully, and theyregardthe evidence as decisively in favour of the larger value
for the displacement'...
In 1923, however, an American commentator, W . CampbeU, wrote:
Professor Eddington was inclinedtoassign considerable weight to the
African determination, but, as the few images on his smaU number of
astrographic plates were not so good as those on the astrographic
plates secured in Brazd, and the results from the latter were given
almost negUgible weight, the logic of the situation does not seem
entirely clear. (Quoted in Earman & Glymour, 1980, p. 78)
Eddington justified ignoring the Sobral astrographic results by claiming that they
suffered from 'systematic error' ... It appears, however, that at the time he was
unable to educe any convincing evidence to show that this was the case.
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In the end, Eddington w o n the day by writing the standard works which
described the expeditions and their meaning ... (Collins & Pinch 1993, pp. 50-

D
In concluding, Collins and Pinch acknowledge that this was not the only experimental
work being done on relativity theory at that time, and that an overaU case was forming
that supported the theory. However, despiterepetitionsseekingtomeasure the bending of
Ught by the sun, there w a s no decisive evidence of it until 1952, despite 1919 remaining
the date accepted by the scientific community.
Personality as a human context
Other accounts of h u m a n context address factors such as the personaUty of the
scientist. T w o of the better k n o w n of such accounts is Watson's (1968) account of his
and Crick's work on the structure of D N A , and Koesder's (1959) account particularly as
it deals with the personal trials of Kepler. O n e is struck in the former by the role of
personal ambition and in the latter (notably in the case of Kepler) by mood, and in both
by the conviction that individual personaUty, interest and persistence were significant
factors in the successes of these scientists.
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1.8 Organisational contexts of science
Science is sometimes characterised by organisations of people and resources: it is
practised in universities, research-oriented companies and government instrumentaUties;
scientists are organised into departments, faculties, disciplines or teams; and scientists
interact using organisations like professional associations and scientific societies. T h e
organisation of m o d e m universities into faculties and departments of science, and of
scientists in universities, government departments and private firms into research teams,
is self evident at a public level. M o d e m universities are organised typicaUy into faculties
or departments, some of which like Science, or of Chemistry, expUcitly characterise
science. Less well known, at least publicly, are roles of organisation identified through
historical and other analyses. For example, the fundamental changes summarised in the
notion of the Scientific Revolution are characterised partly by the formation of n e w
organisations and societies and, subsequently, the reorganisation of existing
organisations such as within the universities (Singer 1959; Oldroyd 1989; Ross 1990).
Thus Ross (1990, p. 799ff) notes that the contemporary characterisation of science as
being empirical and mathematical, and quite different from abstract and speculative
philosophy, only began to emerge around the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. T h e
earUer indistinctness corresponded with the mediaeval organisation of the universities,
which remained until the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries: a lower faculty of Arts or
Philosophy (these being interchangeable terms) and the higher faculties of Theology,
Medicine and Law. Arts subjects were held in lower esteem because they were mandatary
prerequisites to study in the higher faculties but not avadable for higher study themselves,
and the age of Arts students roughly corresponded with m o d e m secondary school age.
T h e indistinct science and phdosophy were found, except in parts of medicine, in the
curriculum of Arts/Philosophy, and were taught by people with no speciahst expertise as
w e would recognise today. There was n o concept of a professional scientist or
philosopher.
Given this context, it is unsurprising that the n e w science emerged outside the
university system. Its proponents either had non-academic professions or none, and as a
consequence were unfettered by the existing discipUnary boundaries. They pursued their
interests and aptitudes, and began to organise themselves accordingly:
However, the seeds of demarcation [of science] were already being sown. T h e
seventeenth century saw the foundation of a number of societies and journals, a
few of which were, from the start, effectively 'scientific' in the modern sense in particular the Paris Academy of Science, and the Royal Society of London for
Improving Natural Knowledge, and its associated journal. (Ross 1990, p. 803)
W h d e descriptive histories of the scientific societies have been avadable for s o m e time

(the prestigious societies having their o w n historians from their inception), more recent
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accounts have m a d e more various critical analyses (Porter 1990, p. 36). Thus, the
organisational context of science at this time delayed 'the institutionatisation of the
emergent distinction between science, phdosophy and other disciplines' (Ross 1990, p.
804). The existing organisation of the universities did not suit the rapidly changing field,
as noted above, and when the universities did take up the n e w science, they did so within
their existing organisation and scattered it throughout the Arts faculty.
The trend to more critical historical analyses arose from a concern to interpret and
explain rather than merely to describe, which has had the effect of identifying a wider
range of causes and effects than given in the earUer historical accounts:
Thus Morris Berman's history of the early years of the Royal Institution, to
mention just one instance, w a s to d w e U on the rapidity with which the initial
idealistic aims of the Institution were abandoned under pressure from its
financial backers. Such histories of formal scientific institutions have broadened
out into studies of informal networks of practitioners ('invisible coUeges'), into
examinations of amateur as w e U as professional science and into analysis of
wider 'audiences' for science. They have often drawnfruitfullyupon the
conceptual apparatus developed by sociologists of contemporary science,
probing the 'social system of science' with its career structures, citation patterns,
reward systems, inteUectual propertyrights,publication networks and so forth.
(Porter 1990, p. 37)
Thus organisation is given as a characteristic which affected scientific development and
outcomes. Porter cites Ben-David's (1971) characterisation ofthe successive eminence of
science in England, France and G e r m a n y as an account of organisation of science,
although he is critical of its 'distracting teleology' (Porter 1990, p. 37). Ben-David's
account is m a d e partly in terms of different organisational contexts: the infant new science
flourished initially in England with the support of a cadre of amateur enthusiasts or
'virtuosi', but later flourished in France which had estabUshed a state machinery of
eminent professional scientists, and later sttilflourishedin Germany where the reformed
universities attracted eminent professors surrounded by teams of P h D students.
Universities played a key role in the development of scientific ideas in nineteenth century
Europe (Mason 1962, p. 549).
Porter also interprets Kuhn's (1962) characterisation of science by paradigms as a
characterisation partly by organisation:
[Paradigms] were structures of thought {Gestalten). But they were also
identified with an elaborate social scenario - the innovating scientist in his fieflike laboratory, flanked by a bodyguard of coUeagues and students, pioneering a
distinctive repertoire of techniques, experiments and (more widely), the
endorsement of such paradigms through discipleship, text-books, patronage,
and scientific education. (Porter 1990, pp. 37-8)
This is a clear characterisation of science by the organisation of physical, human,
conceptual, strategic and other resources.
A final point about characterisations in terms of organisational context is that they
are sometimes indistinct from those in terms of structure, arising from the sometimes
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indistinct use of language in characterisations. This simdarity is discussed in section 3 of
Chapter 6, and organisations as structures are discussed more extensively in the
Appendix B.4 and summarised in the companion chapter on structure.
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1 .9 Physical contexts of science
A popular characterisation of science, especially in the mass media, is by its
physical context: it is practised in laboratories andfieldsites, and uses characteristic
artefacts such as experimental apparatus. Laboratories, experimental apparatus and
laboratory coats are strongly identified in the pubUc mind as characteristics of science,
because they are manifest and tangible artefacts. W e have mentioned already the persona
of the scientist as part of the h u m a n context but part of the popular characterisation of the
scientist involves the artefacts and paraphernalia surrounding the (usually male)
stereotypic scientist. This notional scientist usuaUy wears a white laboratory coat, but
figures wearing other protective clothing and carrying other paraphernaUa are commonly
identified as scientists or technicians; schoolchddren, for example, often put pens in the
top pocket of scientists they are asked to draw. The mass media and other forums exploit
these images w h e n characterising science: any number of movies, television shows,
animated cartoons and print media charicatures resort to these stereotypes to characterise
science or scientists succinctly. Thus the physical contexts of science - the physical or
tangible artefacts and locations - largely shape pubUc characterisation of science. In the
sense that these tangible artefacts and locations are self-evident they are taken here as
relatively unproblematic and needing no further elaboration.
The role of artefacts and locations
O f greater metascientific significance is the interpretation of the role of artefacts and
locations in science. Thus a stronger argument for physical context is that it partly
constitutes, or is integral to, science. This view is part of the post-positivist cUmate of
metascience, and includes scientific apparatus:
Scientific apparatus m a y likewise be seen as creating a m a n - m a d e [sic] (i.e.,
social) milieu for science. Shapin and Schaffer have recently argued, for
example, that the development of pneumatology in the seventeenth century
hinged upon the invention - and not least the highly-prized actual physical
possession - of specific pieces of apparatus, above all, the air p u m p , as a means
of generating experiences unknown in the regular course of Nature and of
creating inteUectual authority. (Porter 1990, p. 38)
That is, scientific apparatus helps create the conditions in which scientific claims are
made, tested, falsified or confirmed. Porter argues that the work of Guericke, Boyle and
Hook, protagonists of the early work with the air p u m p , had to 'win control of the
grounds of beUef, since someresultscontradicted the accepted authorities of knowledge
and c o m m o n sense. Such a contradiction is less striking in the twentieth century, he says,
w h e n scientific knowledge is the accepted (albeit criticised) authority; that is, there is an
acceptance that scientific knowledge is not always commonsensical. Wolpert (1992)
pursues this argument, claiming that science 'does not m a k e c o m m o n sense', firsdy
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because it is often counter-intuitive and secondly because it requires awareness of the
pitfaUs of c o m m o n sense thinking (The Unnatural Nature of Science, 1992). In the early
work with the air p u m p , the physical apparatus played a role in demonstrating the vaUdity
of s o m e counter-intuitive and counter-authoritative beUefs, although together with other
strategies such as reasoning and argument.
M o r e striking examples of this are probably the major theoretical developments in
twentieth century physics - the quantum and relativity theories. In the increasingly 'hightech' areas that characterise m u c h contemporary science, the making and testing of
scientific claims without the apparatus is inconceivable. This has m u c h to do with the
increasing interdependence between science and technology, as discussed earUer. W e
have mentioned Redner's (1987) detailed account, in which Classical science is
characterised by scientific apparatus that were used as craft tools to test theories devised
independentiy of the tool, whereas in World science the relationship between theory and
instrument is reversed:
... for utdising these tools in a science restructures the whole process of research
and alters the very meaning of data and knowledge ... [T]he instrument itself is
being explored and theories devised and objects found to satisfy the results of
that exploration. Thus in such a science technification assumes prominence over
aU the other factors of science. In m a n y other sciences technification is almost of
equal importance in that the phenomena being studied would not exist or at least
would not be avadable for purposes of investigation without highly technified
means. This is particularly die case in sciences dealing with extreme conditions
not usuaUy encountered interrestrialnature ... (Redner 1987, p. 65)
This argument for the role of apparatus in technified science is perhaps less obvious than
for the use of tools in classical science. The comment, above, that scientific apparatus
help create the conditions in which scientific claims are made, sttil holds, but Redner
extends this role of apparatus in technified science. Thus he characterises chaos theory,
for example, as entirely a product of using computers, and inconceivable without them.
Redner claims that the role of computers, in this example, is not fundamentaUy to
measure or interact with an external reaUty, buttogenerate data which itself becomes the
subject of study. T h e same appUes to m a n y areas of contemporary science which are
pursuing extremes of temperature, pressure, electric and magneticfields,energies, and
intervals of time; the example of the cyclotron, as given earUer, is a specific instance.
These sciences develop only to the extent of technological development. Marcuse (1970)
has also argued an integral role for technology in science, that science, through its world
view (which the present thesis interprets as part of the betief system) and it appUcation in
technology, helps determine the nature of the industrial society. In his view, the
positivistic scientific world view in which Nature is controllable - a 'technological
universe' - legitimises or reifies a functional role for both people and Nature in serving
technological/capitaUst organisations (Marcuse 1970, pp. 136-7).
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Laboratories as the contextualfocus
Another strand of vigorous interest in S T S is laboratory studies, in which focus of
attention is on laboratories rather than either experiments or the sociology of organisations
(Knorr Cetina 1995, pp. 140ff). Laboratory studies are not limited to a notion of the
physical laboratory, but rather take the context of the laboratory and everything in it as the
basis for analysis: the physical context is the setting for a range of activities and resources
in which knowledge is constructed. The genre of laboratory studies began by noting that
the experiment traditionaUy underpinned the epistemological claims of science. They
found, however, that the experiment w a s typicaUy characterised by its methodology testing theories, experimental design, control group, factor isolation, blind and double
blind procedure, andreplication- which has had the effect of leaving unexamined what
actuaUy happens (realtimeprocesses).
This is a different approach to both methodological characterisations of experiment
which concerned only technical content, and organisational characterisations, which
concern the influence of organisational structure and activity on scientific outcomes. B y
shifting the focus to the laboratory, laboratory studies were able to 'consider the technical
activities of science within the wider context of equipment and symboUc practices within
which they are embedded', without ignoring the 'technical content' of scientific activity
(Knorr Cetina 1995, p. 143). This is intended to characterise all activities that produce
scientific knowledge: technical, symboUc and poUtical. Although grouped under a single
label, laboratory studies provide a range of characterisations of science; they do not posit
a single, agreed model. However, there are some c o m m o n themes thattilustratethe use of
physical context in characterising science.
Primarily, laboratory studies construe laboratories as significant in scientific
development and therefore theoreticaUy important in understanding science. T h e success
of science arises in part from laboratory activities that are m o r e than just the
methodological, or concerning rationahty or vaUdation. Based on work by Merleau-Ponty
(1945, cited by Knorr Cetina 1995, p. 144ff), the response in laboratory studies has been
to investigate h o w laboratories serveto'reconfigure' the 'system of self-others-things':
The system of 'self-others-things' for Merleau-Ponty is not the objective world
independent of h u m a n actors or the inner world of subjective impressions but
the world-experienced-by or the world-related-to agents. W h a t laboratory
studies suggest is that the laboratory is a means of changing the world-relatedto-agents in ways that a U o w scientists to capitaUse on their h u m a n constraints
and sociocultural restrictions. T h e laboratory is an 'enhanced' environment that
'improves upon' the natural order as experienced in everyday life in relation to
the social order. (Knorr Cetina 1995, p. 145)
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T h e environment in the laboratory can be 'enhanced' for scientific study in several ways:
by substituting versions of the objects under study, such as growing ceU cultures rather
than entire plants; by spatiaUy relocating the objects into the laboratory, so they can be
studied independentiy of their distribution; and by temporaUyrelocatingthe objects, so
they can be studied independentiy of natural cycles. Thus laboratories a U o w certain
properties to be selected for study in the local conditions and social order. This means that
there are both epistemic and social effects:
The power of the laboratory (but also of course its restrictions) resides precisely
in its exclusion of nature as it is independent of laboratories and in its
'enculturation' of natural objects. The laboratory subjects natural conditionstoa
'social overhaul' and derives epistemic effects from the n e w situation. (Knorr
Cetina 1995, p. 146; emphasis in original)
O n e approach of laboratory studies has been to characterise the system of self-othersthings as a network of actors or 'actants', as in Latour (1987). In these accounts all
entities - h u m a n and non-human - that have the abdity to 'act' are characterised as actants,
which could be a researcher carrying technical activity, another person w h o 'creates
statements and constructs artefacts', a technical artefact that produces activity as part of
the study, or a statement which attributes a property of action (CaUon 1995, pp. 53-4).
Each ofthe actants contributes meaning, and is considered connected to the other actants
by a network of interactions. For example, humans might contribute meaning by
theorising, or by acting in one w a y rather than another, a piece of apparatus contributes
meaning by the particular w a y it responds or works, rather than by responding in some
other way. T h e network develops by the action of actants on other actants, and so
translates their meaning:
T h e power of actors (such as a captain of industry, or the Rijkswaterstaat or a
Mafia leader) does not consist of something inherendy special in those
individuals or institutions but originates from the networks they control. A
characteristic ofthe actor-network approach ... is its ontological basis. B y not
accepting a fundamental distinction between human and non-human actors,
which is central to western sociology and indeed to most post-Kantian thinking,
die actor-network approach is based on a pre-modem footing ... A 'principle of
generaUsed symmetry' is adhered to: Analyse the human and non-human world
with the same conceptual framework; in other words, the explanation of the
development of sociotechnical ensembles involves neither technical nor social
reductionism ... (The actor-network approach draws on semiotics. B y using the
term actant, the traditional social science connotations of the word actor are
avoided). (Bijker 1995, p. 251)
B y characterising aU participants or actants equaUy, the contribution of each actant to the
overaU meaning is better understood, and avoids biasing the explanation in terms of social
factors such as politics, finance or fear, or on technical factors such as increased
knowledge or better equipment. Actor-network characterisations clearly appeal to more
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than just the physical context, but they are mentioned here because they propose a
fundamental re-characterisation of the physical context as a means of better understanding
scientific progress.
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Table B.l.l
Examples of key metascientific characterisations
by context
Author

Viewpoint

Suppe 1973,
1979

Received View

sceptical
descriptive
Weltanschauungen
(worldyiew)
semantic or
model-theory

Bhaskar 1983

historical
realism
empiricism

idealism
realism

Nussbaum 1989 rationalism
empiricism/
positivism
construcUvism

„

Boyd, Gasper
and Trout 1991

Pickering 1992

Reference to context, as in
contribution to knowledge
normative abstract historicalintellectual context only, as in
the reduction of earlier theories
into more inclusive ones, or the
expansion of scope of theories;
no cultural or psychological
context
various but limited reference;
actual rather than ideal
descriptions of mainly abstract
intellectual context
various; science as human
activity within conceptual and
cultural perspective
various; description of abstracted
phenomena within specified
scope
actual practices, in historical and
contemporary contexts
no reference to ontological,
psychological or social contexts

psychological context (mental
constructs or ideas)
intellectual context, perhaps
psychological context
(Platonic, Aristotelian, and
perceptual or empirical realism)
intellectual, ontological and
social contexts (scientific
realism)
psychological, as in mental
constructs
aeon textual (implicit intellectual
context)
(a) inner disciplinary criteria
(rational, logical, empirical)
(b) outer-disciplinary
factors/values (social psychological, historical)
Scientific methods and
knowledge are not acontextual,
but are theory-dependent

post-positivist
consensus
comprising (a)
post-positivist
empiricism, (b)
neo-Kantian
constructivism,
and (c) scientific
realism
objective (that is, intellectual
empiricism
context only)

Identified in the w o r k of
Carnap

Achinstein, Rapoport

Bohm, Feyerabend, Hanson,
Kuhn, Popper, Toulmin
Beth, Suppe, Suppes, van
Fraasen
Lakatos, Shapere, Toulmin
Francis Bacon, Berkeley,
Hobbes, H u m e , Locke, M a c h
(positivism), Mill, Russell,
Vienna Circle (logical
empiricism)
Berkeley, Fichte, Hegel, H u m e ,
Kant, Plato, Schelling,
Aristotle, Bachelard, Bhaskar,
Duhem, Feyerabend, Hanson,
HamS, Hesse, H u m e , Kant,
Koyr6, Kuhn, Plato, Popper,
Putnam, Quine

Descartes, Kant, Plato
Bacon, Comte, Hempel, H u m e ,
Locke
(a) Popper, Lakatos, partly K u h n
(b) Kuhn, Toulmin, partly
Lakatos

(a) Partly Popper
(b) Hanson, K u h n
(c) Boyd, Goodman, Kripke,
Putnam, Quine
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Callon 1995

sociology of
scientific
knowledge
(SSK)
science as
rational
knowledge
science as
competitive
enterprise
science as
sociocultural
practice

science as
extended
translation

relative to culture
relative to interests

Kuhn, Feyerabend

intellectual context of researchers
as utters of statements; science
as part of an open society
intellectual context of researchers
as members of disciplines with
internal orders and functional
internal/external boundaries
socio-cultural and epistemic
contexts; statements only have
meaning within a context;
researchers within constraints,
demands and interests; networks
of relations; rules; boundaries
between science and its
environments constructed by the
actors
activities and interactions of all
participants ('actants')

Hesse, Holton, Popper

Althusser, Ben-Cole, David,
Freudenthal, Hull, Merton,
Popper
Bachelard, Barnes, Collins,
Fleck, Knorr, Kuhn, Mulkay,
Pinch, Ravetz, Rudwick,
Schaffer, Wise, Wittgenstein

A m a a n , Callon, Foucault, Knorr
Cetina, Latour, Pickering, Wise,
Woolgar
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Table B.1.2
A comparison of the conceptual organisation of
four general texts in the history and philosophy of science
Collingwood
(1945)

Singer (1959)

,

i
I

\

Charon (1970)

Harr* (1985)
Philosophy of science
! is concerned with
explicating science,
through
A. Metaphysics
B. Logic
C. Epistemology

'•

:
:

:

Greek view of Nature

Renaissance view of
Nature

| 1. The Rise of Mental
Coherence
The foundations: to
c.400 B C .
2. The Great Adventure
Unitary systems of
Thought: Athens, 400300 B C .

A. Metaphysics as
categories:
a Materials
b. Individuals
c. Qualities
! d. Relation
space
time
causal relations
Threemain
metaphysical theories:

1. Aristotelian
Part 1: Rational
Cosmologies
1. World created by God:
Pythagoras
Philolaus
Heraclides
Plato
Aristotle
Aristarchus
2. World seeking itself:
3. The Second
Ptolemy
Adventure:
Divorce of Science and Saint Augustine
Philosophy: Alexandria, Aquinas
300 BC.-AD. 200
4. The Failure of
Inspiration
Science the Handmaid
of Practice: Imperial
Rome, 50 BC.-AD. 400
5. The Failure of
Knowledge
The Middle Ages:
Theology, Queen of the
Sciences, c. A D . 400-c.
1400)
6. Revival of Learning: 3. World subordinate to
Rise of Humanism;
sun: Copernicus
Attempted Return to
Antiquity (1250-1600)
Jm)ll __L

:

i
i
:

i

i

j
!
!
!
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4. World subject to
laws: Kepler
5. A world system:
Galileo's single
hypothesis
6. A n a priori world:
Descartes

: 7. The Insurgent
! Century
Downfall of Aristotle
(1600-1700): N e w
Attempts at Synthesis
.

:

8. The Mechanical
World
Enthronement of
Determinism, 17001850
9. Culmination of the
Mechanical View of the
World, c. 1850-c. 1900
The modern view of
Nature
Consequences of this
view:
• Change progressive,
not cyclical
• Nature no longer
mechanical
• Teleology reintroduced
• Substance resolved into
function
• M i n i m u m space and
m i n i m u m time

| 2. Corpuscularian
1 (i) Ultimately there is
only one substance, and
change is possible
because it is divided
into units, which are
capable of motion and
hence rearrangement.'
'(n) The arrangements
of the corpuscles is the
real essence of bodies,
and defines their
primary quaUties.'
'(iii) Geometry as the
science of shape, and
mechanics as the
science of motion are
the fundamental
sciences.'
(iv) Changes in our
ideas of secondary
qualities are the result
of changes in the
i arrangement and state of
motion of constituent
corpuscles.'
(v) Basically the only
real happenings were
redistributions of
motion brought about
through action by
contact'
(vi) The ultimate
properties of corpuscles
were their power to fill
space (their extension),
and their power to resist
instantaneous
increments of motion
(their inertia).'

1

7. A world subject to
one law: Newton

:
:
\
:

Part 2: Relativistic
cosmologies: Einstein

i

3. Powers
The corpuscularian
inheritance:
• principle of structural
explanation
• qualitative to
quantitative
• differentiation of
instruments
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B. Logic
Forms of reasoning in
science:
Logic as rules of correct
reasoning
Inductivism
Falsifiability
Positivism
C. Scientific
Knowledge:
Epistemological theories
Phenomenalism
Fictionalism
Scepticism
Realism
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Appendix B.2
Argument from the metascientific literature emphasising the dimension
belief system

Debates in the metascientific literature characterise science variously by belief system
which again supports a broad interpretation of science. Appendix B.2 indicates aspects of
belief system as it used in characterising science:
B .2.1

The notion of a belief system

B.2.2
B .2.3

S o m e current metascientific positions
The role of belief system in characterising a western European scientific

B.2.4

tradition
Causality

B. 2.5

Attitudes to Nature

B .2.6

Nature and magic

B.2.7

Nature and G o d

B .2.8

Nature and mathematics

B.2.9

Metaphysical beliefs

B .2.10 Experimentation
B .2.11 Models and metaphors
B.2.12 Other belief systems
This list addresses some recurring themes, and is not definitive; it is intended as an
indication of scope.
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2. / Beliefs as a system
The literature contains a variety of arguments that there is a coUective and interrelated

set of meanings for terms such as belief, attitude, value and criteria for judgements. Jo
Heil, for example, has argued that belief has a central place in epistemology, a long
tradition in western philosophy, where it forms an enduring account or standard picture:
The ground-level epistemological concepts of truth, falsity and justification apply
primarily to beliefs, and only derivatively, if at aU, to knowledge. Belief is thus
central to epistemology.
Plato, in the Meno, set the tone for subsequent discussion. There, and in the
Theaetetus, he distinguishes knowledge, belief, opinion and judgement, and
advances a conception of these states of mind according to which they incorporate
a pair of components, one intentional or representational, one causal. In F. P.
Ramsey's phrase, a belief is viewed as a 'map of neighbouring space by which w e
steer' (Ramsey, 1978, p. 134).
This dual-component picture of belief constitutes what has become the standard
picture. It w a s embellished, for instance, by H u m e , w h o regarded beliefs as
'ideas' supplemented by a particular 'sentiment or feeling' in virtue of which those
ideas c o m e to serve as guides to behaviour. This conception, like Descartes',
depicts beliefs as conscious episodes. Although w e are often conscious of our
beliefs, however, our being conscious of them seems inessential to their
psychological role.
The standard picture is nowadays reflected in the notion that beliefs are to be
located a m o n g the propositional attitudes, states of mind comprising (1)
propositional contents paired with (2) attitudes toward those contents. In addition
to beliefs, these include desires, wishes, intentions, fears, doubts and hopes. The
objects of beliefs, then, are taken to be propositions. (Hed 1992, p. 45)
This relationship between propositions of knowledge and belief, widely accepted in H P S
and other fields, is discussed in Appendix B.6 and the companion chapter on knowledge.
Here, Heil observes that other concepts such as truth, falsity and justification, that
commonly characterise science, also entail or represent beliefs. Beliefs are also
characterised by attitudes or dispositions (sentiment or feeling) which, in some interrelated
sense, guide our behaviours and judgments. Hed (1992, pp. 45-8) notes that this standard
picture of belief has been remarkably resilient, but also notes some criticisms of it and
alternatives to it; w e wdl mention some of these both in this chapter and in Appendix B.6.
For the present it wdl be more helpful to consider h o w the Uterature accounts for the nature

and interrelatedness of beliefs, attitudes, values, criteria and so on. The most plausible
useful approach is to consider that these concepts are related because they are elements
system of beliefs. It wdl therefore help to consider a theory of belief systems.
The notion of a belief system
Given the often unstated and unrecognised character of beliefs, attitudes and so forth,

it will help to examine the notion of belief system as an organising concept for these se
cognitive states. Rokeach (1972) has argued that beliefs, attitudes and values are
interrelated and affect behaviour
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[BJeliefs, attitudes and values are aU organised together to form a functionally
integrated cognitive system, so that a change in any part of the system wdl affect
other parts, and wdl culminate in behavioural change. (Rokeach 1972, p. ix)
Rokeach traced historical attempts to clarify and distinguish terms such as attitude, value,
belief, sentiment ideology, and so forth, and proposes that it is meaningful to speak of
them together as a belief system:
A belief system represents the total universe of a person's beliefs about the
physical world, the social world, and the self. It is conceived as being organised in
several dimensions, and additional dimensions can be added as required by further
analysis or empirical research. A belief system can further be analysed in terms of
subsystems of varying breadth or narrowness. (Rokeach 1972, p. 123)
Thus for Rokeach (pp. 123ff), a belief system can be considered as comprising subsystems
such as attitudes, ideologies and values. Various kinds of beliefs include faith, delusions,
and stereotypes; sentiment he judges to be an older term usuady synonymous with attitude.
However, this is a general model that tends to emphasise psychological aspects of belief
systems.
A model better suited to the present thesis is that of Borhek and Curtis (1975), which
explicidy discusses scientific belief systems as one among m a n y possible belief systems,
and which has scope and detati suited to breadth of the present analysis. W e wdl examine
this theory in some detad.
A theory of belief system
Borhek and Curtis (1975) have argued that beliefs have a partly social character, and
that they can be better understood using a theoretical framework of belief systems that
accounts for beliefs, values and attitudes. They argue that systems of beliefs are found
universally in culture; science is, or entads, one such belief system. Their theory is a
general account that can accommodate a variety of metascientific viewpoints. It provides a
coherent account of the sometimes implicit mix of beliefs, attitudes and values found in the
summary statements; it is plausible and relevant to the concerns of the present thesis.
Borhek and Curtis characterise belief systems by defining properties and elements.
Following their interest in the sociology of belief, Borhek and Curtis argue that belief
systems are explained by more than the psychology of individual believers. T h e defining
properties follow from this assertion. Thus people are personady committed to belief
systems. A t the same time, belief systems exist independentiy of those individuals w h o are
committed to them: thus belief systems can exist longer than the life spans of individual
believers. Belief systems also vary in substantive content and in the definition of their
boundaries, examples including science and orientations within science, orientations within
the study of history, religious groups, political groups, and so on. W e w d l return to some
of these defining properties of belief systems in later discussion, but it is the proposed
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elements of belief systems that wdl best inform this stage of the argument for beliefs in
science.
Elements of a belief system
The elements of a belief system include the beliefs, attitudes, values and criteria for
judgements, together with other statements that could comprise a belief system:

Many of these elements are implicit understandings within most belief systems.
Indeed, m a n y belief systems are formady incomplete in that no real stance is taken,
implicidy or explicidy, on some issues ...
Our emphasis on systems of belief is not meant to represent an analytic
framework imposed by the investigator, but rather to represent an important
characteristic of the w a y people use beliefs. The necessity for considering system
is clear from the fact that out-of-context beliefs are meaningless. M o r e importandy,
when people use one or more beliefs, they adduce the system (whether it exists or
not) to a variable degree. (Borhek & Curtis 1975, p. 8)
Borhek and Curtis propose seven possible elements, although one or more may be absent
in particular cases. The order, which is reproduced here, reflects the logical order requir
to understand a belief system, although this order appears to be the reverse order of the
development of elements in practice.
(i) Thefirstelement of belief systems in this model is values, which interact with
behaviour
Implicidy or explicidy, belief systems define what is good or valuable. We refer to
'ultimate' values or goals here in the sense that they are the values in terms of
which proximate goals are justified. Although w e shall speak of goals and values
as guiding behaviour, 'justifying' or 'legitimising' would usually be more
appropriate. Values tend to be abstract summaries of the behavioural attributes
which society rewards, formulated after the fact Groups tend to think of
themselves, however, as setting out to do various things in order to implement
their values. That is, values are perceived as a priori, w h e n they are in fact a
posteriori to action. (Borhek & Curtis 1975, p. 9)
This difference between the perceived and actual role of values, whde it may be perplexing
to the observer, reveals the role of values in the functioning of the group of believers.
Courses of action are legitimised by these values, and the commitment of individuals to
coUectively agreed values 'aUows almost automatic concerted coUective action' (p. 9). New

courses of action can then be based on principles derived from earlier experience and agree
upon. The relationship between the abstract nature of beliefs and the concrete nature of
actions based upon them can lead to other consequences that may be also unclear to the
observer at first:
The substitution of concrete and observable social behaviour for abstract and
unmeasurable values frequentiy results in these values acquiring implications they
did not initiaUy have. For example, science m a y be taken as valuing expanded
understanding; at the abstract level this m a y not imply the value of greater
government expenditures on the space program, but at the concrete level it might
entail exacdy that. (Borhek and Curtis 1975, p. 10)
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There is also the implication, argued in this chapter, that just as some core values entail
attendant values, some beliefs that are fundamental will entati attendant beliefs.
(ti) T h e second element in belief systems is the criteria of validity: the criteria by
which statements m a d e within the belief system are validated. These can and do change
within belief systems, although their level of abstractness and stability are measures of
difference between belief systems. The clear definition of mathematics as a belief system,
for example, relies upon the clarity of the main criterion for validity - consistency. Other
belief systems have to rely on more concrete criteria:
At the abstract level, the intuition of science uses logic and empirical truth with the
implicit assumption that they ought to be compatible in the long m n . Concretely,
adjustments between the logic w e understand and the events w e can observe have
to be made. Arigid,perfectionist insistence that ad our methods be perfect before
w e speak would lead to sdence and the death of science. In practice w e a U o w a
littie of what pool players cad 'slop'. Moreover, there are other criteria in actual
scientific thought such as parsimony, elegance, and practicality. (Borhek & Curtis
1975, p. 10)
Criteria of validity apply in this case to decisions about activity, as do other elements of
belief systems. A criterion historically applied to science is simplicity, often k n o w n as
Ockham's (or Occam's) razor.
(id) The third element is logic, which can also be taken to include language. This is
the set of rules by which substantive beliefs within the belief system are related to each
other, and w d l differ between belief systems such as algebra, ethics, physical science and
musical harmony, for example. The rules in systems such as science and law are 'worked
out and very explicit' (p. 11) and, once known, can be applied in n e w actions within the
belief system. This is often proposed as part of the rationale for processes as characteristics
of science (see Mdlar & Driver 1987); such a rationale is discussed in the companion
chapter on activity. Scientific language is discussed in the companion chapter on structure
and Appendix B.4.
(iv) T h e fourth element is the perspective, or cognitive map. This comprises
statements about the individual believers, the group itself, the environment external to the
group of believers, and the and the relationships between and relative standing of ad three:
Central in most perspectives is some statement of where the belief system and/or
the group that carries it stands in relation to other things, especially in relation to
other groups and world views ...
T h e perspective m a y be stated as a mythology. It explains not only w h o w e are
and h o w w e came to be in cognitive terms, but also w h y w e exist in terms of the
values. Meaning and identification are provided along with cognitive orientation.
(Borhek & Curtis 1975, pp. 11-12)
The perspective m a y comprise a set of conceptual tools or a classification system, which in
themselves select particular features of the external environment for attention. In the
example of a cricketer, different belief systems could cad to attention the batting average,
the personality, the state of grace and the trajectory of the bad. The present thesis argues
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that different belief systems could draw attention to different characteristics, such as
knowledge or the institutional structure. Thus physicists, ecologists and mining geologists,
for example, and philosophers, historians and sociologists of science, no doubt differ in
their scientific perspectives.
(v) The fifth element is the substantive beliefs. Substantive beliefs are the actual
content of the belief system, and can only be understood in terms of thefirstfour elements:
values, criteria of validity, logic, and perspective. Scientific laws represent substantive
scientific beliefs, as discussed in the companion chapters on knowledge and structure and
Appendix B. (An implication of Borhek and Curtis' theory is that the other dimensions
proposed in the present thesis also include substantive beliefs; this is argued shortly.)
Substantive bedefs are by their nature more expdcit in the thinking of behevers than
thefirstfour elements:
Historically, of course, the previous four elements m a y have been budt up around
a substantive beUef to give it meaning and justification. T h e individual believer is
usuady better able to verbalise substantive beliefs than he [sic] is values, criteria,
logical principles, or orientation, which are apt to be the unquestioned bases fiom
which he proceeds. (Borhek & Curtis 1975, p. 12)
That is, the conscious concern of the believer is usuady the substantive beliefs; however,
they are based on values, criteria, logical principles and orientation or perspective. These
bases for the substantive bedefs are usuady the concern of the phdosopher or meta-analyst,
w h o is often trying to clarify inexplicit assumptions. Thus the believer m a y have
substantive bedefs without there being a framework of assumptions to support these
beliefs, and Borhek and Curtis observe that this has been the case with, for example,
religious systems:
It seems clear that such systems evolve highly detaded and highly systematic
theologies long after they come into existence and that they c a m e into existence as
a bundle of rather specific substantive beliefs. The believers interact share specific
consensuses, and give themselves a name. Then professionals work out an
orientation, logic, sets of criteria of validity, and so forth. (Borhek & Curtis 1975,
pp. 12-13)
W h d e not claiming that science is a religion, this seems a reasonable analysis of the relative
standing of science and metascience. T h e variety of metascientific views presented in the
present thesis indicates that w h d e scientists continue to 'do science', various theories of
science continue to be argued as w e try to understand science better. S o m e of these
accounts, while lacking unanimous support, are sufficientiy plausible to have been used to
inform scientific practice. In any event, the values, criteria, logical principles and
perspective, tending to be the 'unquestioned bases' for scientific activity are the very
elements identified within the summary statements on which this chapter is based.
(vi) T h e sixth element of bedef systems is prescriptions and proscriptions, which
refer to observable behaviour and include norms for behaviour and recommendations for
policy or action. Paul Feyerabend's Against Method (1975) is in part an example of both
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the 'statement-of-what-is wrong' and the visionary polemic that fulfils this role.
Prescriptions and proscriptions more closely describe actual behaviour than do substantive
beliefs, and are therefore more subject to pressures for change from the real world. It is
reasonable to infer that they are more subject to external, or social, cultural or institutional
pressures than are substantive bedefs and the other elements that underpin them.
(vii) Seventh and last of the proposed elements of bedef systems in this model are
'associated bedefs concerning means to attain valued goals', summarised as technology:
S o m e such bedefs concern the legitimacy or appropriateness of means, while
others concern only the effectiveness of various means. Technological bedefs are
not used to justify or validate other elements of a bedef system, although the
existence of technologies m a y limit alternatives a m o n g substantive beliefs.
(Borhek & Curtis 1975, p. 13)
T h e reference here to legitimacy or appropriateness of means implies some belief
concerning criteria of validity, although this is not clear. Technological bedefs, in the sense
here of being elements of a belief system, concern means rather than ends, and include the
physical activities normady associated with groups, as w e d as organisational strategies and
tactical procedures. Technological bedefs represent a m u c h more pragmatic level of bedefs,
concerned as they are with doing:
(Technology is often the meeting ground for fundamentady different bedef
systems, often to the dismay of purists. There is a kind of pragmatic marketplace
of bedefs, with die remarkable feature that specialists tend to be excluded by their
expertise and the purity of their thought. (Borhek & Curtis 1975, p. 14)
Thus technicians, requiring less commitment to the detail of the bedef system, are more
pragmatic, less ideaUstic. Changes in practice, meaning changes in thetechnologicalbedefs
of a bedef system, can cause changes in the other elements even though these other
elements are logically prior. T h u s there have been scientists regarded as great
experimenters, but w h o m a y have writtentitdeanalysis of their experimental success: they
have contributed m u c h to science but formady dttie to metascientific theory.
This is but one of m a n y possible models of a bedef system, but it serves to show that
this concept integrates a number of elements like bedefs, assumptions, values, attitudes,
criteria for judgements, and world views, that are identified, in the summary statements of
science. A s the present chapter w d l show, these elements are identified more broadly in the
metascientific Uterature, and constitute an integral part of multidimensional characterisations
of science.

Appendix B.2: Belief system

2.2

631

Current metascientific views of belief systems, or elements of belief systems

There are various accounts of betief system in the metascientific Uterature. Table
B.2.1 presents an overview of various analyses of metascientific viewpoints, to enable
some comparisons based on notions of knowledge. Each view addresses at least one aspect
of belief system.
In contemporary H P S , the present thesis recognises three main positions: postpositivist empiricism, ideaUsm or neo-Kantianism, and scientific readsm. In (a) empiricism
w e gain our knowledge from experience, that is, from sense data; in strong empiricism,
such as positivism, certain knowledge arises only from our perceptions *. In (b) idealism or
constructivism our knowledge is structured by the intedect, as in the theory-laden-ness of
observations or the selection and interpretation of observations through a world view or
Weltanschauungen:
The constructivist asks, 'What must the world be like in order that a methodology
so theory-dependent as ours could constitute a w a y of finding out what's true?'
She [sic] answers: "The world would have to be largely defined or constituted by
the theoretical tradition which defines that methodology'. (Boyd 1983, p. 207)
In strong idealism or constructivism, w e can only k n o w what the mind is capable of
construing or constructing. In (c) scientific realism the possibdities of our knowledge are
given in, or constrained by, an external reality, but our knowledge of it is produced sociatiy
and psychologicady:
[T]he world might be one in which the laws and theories embodied in our actual
theoretical tradition are approximately true. In that case, the methodology of
science might progress dialecticady. Our methodology, based on approximately
true theories, would be a reUable guide to the discovery of n e w results and the
improvement of older theories. The resulting improvement in our knowledge of
the world would result in a still more reliable methodology leading to sttil more
accurate theories, and so on. (Boyd 1983, p. 207)
A s with the meta-analyses in the companion chapters, different H P S perspectives
such as empiricism, idealism and reaUsm, are interpreted variously by different authors; see
Table B.2.1.
This is also the case in contemporary STS, as given in Callon's (1995) overview of
approaches in thefield.Thus, where science is characterised as (a) rational knowledge,
knowledge is given in scientific statements that m a y have different assumptions in different
accounts:
Nature's reaUty is asserted and the statements produced are seen as an increasing
theoretical approximation or a better experimental description. Or, alternatively,
one m a y not express any opinion about this reatity and simply concentrate on the
endless production of more and more robust or reUable statements. Whether the
1

These views largely represent differences in beliefs about being (ontology) and knowledge
(epistemology).
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statements that are produced tend toward the truth, relate together ever-increasing
numbers of empirical observations, or increase our ability to control and
manipulate the world, the tragic beauty of M o d e l 1 is that it is scientists and
scientists alone w h o have to choose which statements to preserve and which to
discard. (Callon 1995, p. 36)
W h e r e Callon refers to the tragic beauty, presumably he means that the idealistic
characterisations given in normative accounts, such as positivism, saw science as the only
guarantee of true and objective knowledge, and therefore scientists as the only people
qualified to m a k e judgments about truth and objectivity. S o m e see a beauty in the order of
Nature, and this view of science would argue that only science can give us true knowledge
of that beauty. The tragedy, presumably, is that only scientists can appreciate the true
beauty. This view of science is contested: various alternative characterisations argue that
there can be no absolute objectivity and that in many, if not all, instances, claims to
scientific knowledge are not made only by scientists. The tragic beauty arises because of the
shift from normative accounts in metascience - one science should be - to descriptive
accounts - what actuady happens.
W h e r e science is characterised as (b) a competitive enterprise, it simply assumes the
content of the knowledge to be published and judged by colleagues. However, it places
great importance on the preservation of scientific rationadty from external influences in
society:
Science produces knowledge, but the institution that supports it has an essential
function, that of enabling rational knowledge to develop. W h e n the dynamics of
science are hindered, reason is affected. (Cadon 1995, pp. 41-2)
W h e r e science is characterised as (c) socioculturalpractice, it assumes that 'science
must be considered to be a practice whose cultural and social components are as important
as the constraints that arise from the order of discourse' (Callon 1995, p. 42). This model
argues that to extract scientific statements from their context of production and negotiation
is to 'strip them of their meaning' (p. 43). This is because science 'is involved in social
relations that have their o w n logic' (p. 49). Thus, for example, Barnes has argued that
scientific knowledge has always been in response to particular interests, but that this is
insufficient to account for knowledge:
Scientific knowledge can be seen always as a response to one kind of interest, that
of prediction and control, but its contents are organised and structured according to
different and changing social configurations. (Cadon 1995, p. 49)
That is, the history of science shows that science responds to problems that are historicady
contingent; this can be interpreted both narrowly, in the sense of predicting and controlling
phenomena by the activities of scientists, and in the broader sense that wider social groups
such as industry and governments affect outcomes by supporting or proscribing particular
activities and purposes. The present thesis interprets Barnes as characterising science here
by knowledge, purpose (interest), context (historical and social factors) and beUef system
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(the criteria and assumptions that these other dimensions embody). Another example is the
work of Codins and others on the reptication of experiments:
N o reptication has ever resembled the experiment that inspired it, even when the
instruments have been perfecdy caUbrated and procedures highly standardised.
Transfer involves loss and creation, elimination and addition. (Cadon 1995, p. 49)
Where science is characterised as (d) extended translation, it concerns the production
of statements, as in model (a), butrejectsthe assumptions of that model:
T h e notion of translation network suggests that it is not only the distinction
between nature and society that is outdated, but that the conventional opposition
between macro- and microanalysis (between global change and local action) is
outdated. (Cadon 1995, p. 58)
That is, the characterisation of science as a translation network interprets phenomena,
artefacts and people together as actants; it rejects traditional distinctions between Nature and
society, and between large-scale distinctions (science and society) and small-scale
distinctions (such as the behaviour of experimental phenomena and the instruments that
measure them).
The remainder of this chapter is structured around ways in which science is
characterised by bedef system or its elements.
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The role of belief system in characterising a western European scientific tradition

The notion of a Western European scientific tradition can be characterised partly by
the historical changes in bedef systems. This tradition is discussed more fully in the
companion chapter on context and Appendix B.l, but its mention here recognises the
(changing) inteUectual context within which ad scientific work is done 2 . Tracing historical
changes in bedef systems shows that since antiquity there have been competing bedefs
about the nature ofthe cosmos and our knowledge of it Thus science history often contains
conflicting betiefs, is not a linear sequence of single views of the world, and that some
beliefs have been enduring in the history of science d o w n to the present day.
For m e m b e r s of western European cultures this complexity m a y not be apparent, but
the present section w d l highlight s o m e betief systems that, mostiy, share a betief that the
cosmos is subject to h u m a n inquiry through sense data, and that the inquiry itself is subject
to rational analysis, debate and modification. BeUef in some regularity in the cosmos aUows
a degree of confidence in making generalisations from experience (sense data) and in
making predictions. T h e examples also idustrate a second and related recurrent theme
identified b y Oldroyd (1989), the attempt 'to establish s o m e kind of correspondence
between thoughts and things' (p. 4). Study of the history of science highUghts the
importance of various historical betief systems to the development of contemporary bedefs
and, ultimately, to h o w w e characterise science; as historical analysis develops, so to does
our understanding of science, in this case the development of scientific bedef systems
(Christie 1990; Matthews 1994).
The emergence of a particular belief system in Greece c600BC
T h e beginning of the western European scientific tradition is characterised partly by
the emergence of a different bedef system: a distinctive world view or views as one or more
of a number of competing systems of bedefs about the universe or cosmos. Although some
authors discern elements of what is characterised n o w as science in even the most ancient
civdisations, most accounts characterise the Greeks, and more specificady the Ionians, as
thefirstto theorise about h o w scientific ideas developed and h o w these ideas influenced
beliefs in the general culture (Singer 1959; Hutton 1962). Thus Thales of Miletus (c6245 4 6 B C ) is thefirstperson w e k n o w to have held a 'betief in the constant and universal
sequence or cause and effect in the material world' (Singer 1959, p. 34). The significance

2

One interpretation is that all of science is (a) belief system and (b) context. To reduce the
characterisation to one or two dimensions misses the point of a multidimensional characterisation,
which is that scholars characterise science in different dimensions, or with different foci or emphases.
The possibility of a satisfying characterisation based only on belief system or context does not
represent characterisations of science by it structural features, for example, or its aims and purposes.
The more accuraterepresentationis that belief system is one of several dimensions used in the
metascientific literature.
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of Thales was that he attempted to explain Nature by the natural and not the super-natural,
to see Nature as dynamic rather than static, to m a k e clear the value of systematic
observation as a basis, and to show the possibility and value of mathematical
representations (Singer 1959, pp. 13-17).
Thales w a s able to compare and draw on a number of belief systems and
knowledges. The Greeks of his time had inherited knowledge bases from a variety of
cultures: mathematics, astronomy, botany and zoology mainly from the Babylonians and
Egyptians. A s a merchant and traveder, Thales observed that the deities worshipped in
various cultures as supreme and omnipotent were in fact specific to each culture only. H e
thus sought to explain change and variation in the world by natural causes, and not by
supernatural intervention:
A s with every Ionian thinker, the ultimate object of the thought of Thales was to
find a formula for ad things. H e thus set himself the task of discerning constancy
amidst the diversity and variety of nature. This is but to say that his science was a
part of his philosophy. T o the general question 'Of what is the world made?' he
would answer 'Water', meaning thereby some mobile essence, changing, flowing,
without distinctive shape or colour, yet presenting a cycle of existence passing
from sky and air to earth, thence to the bodies of plants and animals, and back to
air and sky again. (Singer 1959, pp. 16-17)
This change in underlying belief marks a separation of thought from other cosmologies of
the time that is commonly characterised as beginning the western European scientific
tradition. W h d e the particular idea is clearly no longer current, the significance is that it
represents an attempt to seek some natural, underlying basis from which ad the change and
variation can be explained. For example, Gale (1979, pp. 12-13) has argued that these early
bedefs have a partly scientific character because they entati a world view or bedef system in
whichrealityis ultimately accessible through normal, natural processes or perceptions; that
is, a naturalist view. It was a break from non naturalist approaches, that entailed bedef that
the world required the action of gods, that reatity is ultimately inaccessible to (transcends)
normal human perceptions. The explanation of ad change and variation by a single principle
or ultimaterealityphdosophy n o w describes as a monistic explanation (Kreyche 1984). The
attempt to improve our understanding of Nature by the reduction of m a n y theories to a
single coherent theory has continued as a strategy from Thales d o w n to the present
(Aronson 1983, p. 365). Also, Thales was able to demonstrate the value of careful
observations of Nature, by which he impressed the Ionians with accurate astronomical
predictions (learnt in Mesopotamia), and of mathematics, by which he m a d e practical, not
just theoretical, generaUsations of Egyptian geometry.
Further, Thales' contribution was not left as an isolated piece of work. It would be
reasonable to speculate that in an unsympathetic context - say, opposition from academic or
church authorities - Thales' work would have amounted to nought. S o m e histories claim

Appendix B.2: Belief system

636

that this w a s the case in other cultures3. B u t it is claimed, this did not happen in Greece at
that time. Instead, a tradition emerged where such ideas were debated and alternatives
proposed. W h e r e Thales proposed water as the 'first principle' of Nature, for Anaximander
it w a s the apeiron (an indefinite and infinite entity), for Anaximedes it w a s air, for
HeracUtus is -wasfireand for Pythagoras it was circling stars (Singer 1959, p. 69). Thus,
instead of being confined to the assumptions of a single belief system, the Ionian
phdosophers of the seventh and sixth centuries B C . established a tradition of seeking
naturadstic explanations and proposing and debating competing cosmologies:
According to Aristode, the characteristic of this Ionian cosmology is the fact that
whenever its devotees asks the question: 'What is nature?' they at once convert it
into the question: 'What are things m a d e of?' or 'What is the original, unchanging
substance which underlies all the changes of the natural world with which w e are
acquainted?' (Codingwood 1945, p. 29)
Collingwood identifies in this transformation three principles. T h e first two are
'indispensable presuppositions of any "science of nature'":first,there are natural things,
that is, things not m a d e by humans; second, these natural things constitute a single world of
Nature, that is, that these things can also be identified positively by general statements. The
third principle is peculiar to the Ionian school of thought, that what is c o m m o n to these
natural things is that they are m a d e of a single substance or material (Codingwood 1945,
pp. 29-30), such as water or air. These are significant statements of a bedef system, more
significant and enduring than individual propositions that water or air are the actual
principles.
This scientific tradition became, in effect, a tradition of proposing, clarifying and
debating various metaphysical bedefs: that is, one of using language and refining concepts.
Jaki (1974) has argued that, although their methods are often lost to us, Greek thinking was
characterised by clearly formed bedefs and concepts that aUowed clear choices:
T h e word 'atomic', which our age uses as its hallmark, has an ancestry leading
back to Pericles. Then and there it was clearly perceived that matter had to be either
discrete or continuous. Decision on this represented the touchstone of truth for
Democritus as well as for Aristode. In the latter's words the verification of a
stricdy smallest quantity could be of such portent as to shake the very foundations
of philosophy.
Ancient Greek phdosophers showed equady keen interest in questions having
to d o with the very large. There again, a fundamental pair of alternatives was
formulated with all possible clarity: the world could only befiniteor infinite in
extent. (Jaki 1974, p. vd)
For Jaki, this clarity w a s characteristic of early Greek thinking and not of other cultures: he
characterises the conceptstt,the yin and the yang, for example, as inherendy vague, which
he interprets as having inhibited Chinese science. While Jaki's analysis is somewhat
Eurocentric, the point here is that his analysis is based on fundamental ontological bedefs:
betiefs about the ultimate nature of matter and the formation of clear ontological alternatives.
3

See discussions in section 2.12, below, the companion chapter on context and Appendix B.l.
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However, Collingwood has argued it was not sufficient that the Ionians asked
questions: what was being asked was also important. In this respect, the Ionians 'faded'
and the beginning of a scientific tradition lies more clearly with Aristotle. The ultimate
'failure' of the Ionian school of thought w a s that they were committed to answering
questions that no refinement of experimental technique could ever answer
1.

H o w can w e form a clear mental picture of the universal primitive
substance?
2.
H o w , from this primitive substance, can w e deduce the world of nature?
(Collingwood 1945, p. 43)
Nonetheless, this inquisitive attitude and the ontological beliefs such an approach entails
serve to characterise science:
The history of science, in so far as it is a history of scientific progress, consists
not so m u c h in the progressive accumulation of facts as the progressive
clarification of problems. W h a t makes a natural scientist is not his [sic] knowledge
of facts about nature but his abdity to ask questions about nature: first to ask
questions at ad, instead of waiting to see what turns up; and secondly, to ask
intelligent questions, that is, answerable questions: intrinsically answerable
questions, as distinct from nonsensical questions ... (Codingwood 1945, p. 42)
That is, this approach impUes an inquisitive attitude, which reflects a basic bedef that the
cosmos is open to such interrogation. O n this view, bedefs about the nature of readty and
the w a y in which humans can articulate with this readty characterise the emergence ofthe
Western European scientific tradition. T w o and a half thousand years later, it is the basic
bedefs and orientations of the Ionians that are more recognisably science to us than their
particular explanations or methods of inquiry.
Plato's belief system: beliefs, knowledge and being
W e will confine the present summary of scientific bedefs in antiquity to two later
thinkers w h o had tremendous influence on the history and phdosophy of science: Plato and
Aristode. The contributions of Plato (427-347 B C ) and Aristode (384-322 B C ) , a student
of Plato's, have been significant and enduring in the Western European scientific tradition:
[T]he themes stated by Plato and Aristode have recurred repeatedly and are
represented even today by tworivalapproaches (to the philosophy of science) one (Platonic) based in logic, the other (Aristotedan) based in the history of
science. (Encyclopaedia Britannica 1982,16-377)
Their o w n writings and the dterature addressing their work are far too extensive to cover
here, and w e will simply mention some betiefs about the cosmos and our knowledge of it,
drawing on general science histories (Singer 1959; Charon 1970; Ronan 1982; entries in
B y n u m , Browne & Porter (eds) 1983; Harre* 1986; Oldroyd 1989).
Like the Ionians and others w h o fodowed them, Plato also sought to explain the
apparent uniformity that underlay changes in Nature by proposing a single principle of
reality (Oldroyd 1989, p. 6). But Plato was particularly concerned to separate what
constitutes knowledge (episteme)fromopinion (dogma). For Plato, the world w e perceive
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with our senses - the world of opinion - comprises change and variation, and the senses can
be deceived by dlusions of other reasons. However, the world of Ideas - the world of the
intellect - contains true knowledge which is real, unchanging and certain. Plato therefore
proposed that readty is based on forms or Ideas, not material bases like water or air that the
Ionians had proposed: for Plato, reatity exists in a transcendental domain of ideas or forms
and not in the material world that w e perceive. Objects in the material world are only copies
of the perfect forms, which accounts for the variations between similar objects as w e
perceive them. The basis for this account was geometry, in which w e understand the
concepts of perfect geometricfiguresandrecogniseour attempts to draw them even though
the drawnfiguresare accepted as never being perfect So it is with the objects w e observe.
W e m a y observe physical objects, but w e only have beUef or trust w e m a y observe repUcas
of objects, which are even less real, but w e only have imaginations or delusions. W e m a y
make a correct judgement based on sense data, but that is not knowledge; knowledge would
be the apprehension of the form or Idea. W e can understand mathematical entities, by
mentally representing them; even more securely, w e can know forms or Ideas through
dialectical discussion. Plato gives several accounts of h o w w e apprehend the perfect Ideas
(Oldroyd 1989, pp. 8-15). In the Symposium

he suggested becoming famtiiar with

examples that represent the Idea - beautiful objects to apprehend more closely the Idea
'beauty', for example. In the dialogue Meno he suggested that w e have some a priori or
innate knowledge, of which it is the task of education to draw out. In the Republic he set
out a scheme in which one can ascend from mere opinion (doxa) to true knowledge
(episteme), through parallel states of knowing - epistemology - and equivalent states or
levels of being - ontology.
Plato believed ideas to be real, and in this sense his theory is an example of realism
(Bhaskar 1983k). However, over the course of his writing, Plato's reaUty changed from
the material cosmos to an ideal realm existing apart from the material cosmos, that is, a
transcendent reatity (Oldroyd 1989, p. 8). Because these ideal forms came to be thought of
as existing separately from the material world Plato's cosmology can also, and is more
usually, considered to be an example of idealism. T o the extent that Plato proposed that
knowledge is to be deduced from soundfirstprinciples, his theory is also an example of
rationalism. Plato's writings marked the beginning of a strong tradition in phdosophy
whose influence has remained d o w n to the present, and indeed Whitehead caded ad
Western philosophy 'a footnote to Plato'. Because Plato's theory downplays the
contribution of observational data and his interest was mainly in mathematics he is largely
set apart from those considered as scientists, although rationalism is found later in the
history of science, and the methods of contemporary theoretical physicists, for example,
have a strongly rationadstic element
The writings of Plato raise matters of enduring phdosophical interest in the role of
bedefs in the Western European scientific tradition. O n e is whether ideadstic or readstic
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beliefs of the cosmos are better. Another is whether classes of objects, like Plato's Ideas or
forms, have a real existence or whether it is the individual entities that ready exist. That is,
whether or not the proper objects of our inquiry into the cosmos are universals or
particulars.
Aristotle's belief system: knowledge and being
Aristode's work is often characterised as more recognisably scientific than Plato's
(Singer 1959; Oldroyd 1989; Motiand 1990); this, and particularly his emphasis on
observation, is discussed in Appendix B.5. However, it also appdes to his betief system
which, although complex, contained enduring elements. For instance, his bedefs about the
nature of the cosmos and the ways knowledge might be gained of it are significantly
different to Plato's:
B y accepting that physical matter was as significant as its F o r m or Idea, Aristode
defined a sphere of influence within which truly scientific work could be done. T o
this extent he was much more of a scientist than Plato, w h o saw no value in the
investigation of matter. A s aresult,Aristode budt up a great deal of knowledge on
all manner of subjects, including biology, astronomy and physics. T o ad these
observations he apptied his rigorous logical method, which inquired into the
various causes of the things he observed; only one of these causes, the 'prime
mover' did he consider to be beyond the scope of reasoned investigation. (Ronan
1982, p. 103)
That is, by turning around Plato's ontology so that universals were individual objects rather
than classes of objects, Aristode enabled scope for a knowledge of objects, that is, science
knowledge. Thus for Aristode the universals exist in the objects or particulars that are
perceived with the senses, not in Ideas. However, Bhaskar (1983k, p. 362) has
characterised both Aristode's and Plato's beliefs as realist in the sense of bedeving 'the
objects of scientific knowledge exist and act independentiy of the knowledge of them'.
Aristode's cosmology and physics was the basis for scientific explanation until the late
Middle Ages, onlyreplacedby the developments from Copernicus, Gatileo and others that
are characterised commonly as the Scientific Revolution.
Valuable scientific work was completed within the AristoteUan system (Singer 1959;
Harre 1985). M u c h of the Aristotelian belief system encompassed existing betiefs, and it
had undoubted successes in reconcding earUer disparate views and accommodating several
philosophical problems that had arisen.
Belief in God
First, Aristode beUeved in an omnipotent G o d w h o is perfect and the ultimate cause the 'unmoved mover' of ad physical bodies in both the heavenly andterrestrialrealms. This
is a departure from completely naturalistic belief systems and explanations of cause.
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Belief in a principle of life (psyche or soul)
Secondly, he believed that living and non-living things are distinguished by a
principle of life, or psyche, that is often referred to as soul (Singer 1959, p. 47). Harr6
(1985, p. 127) has argued that Aristotelians used the growth and behaviour of plants and
animals as a descriptive analogy, not necessarily to label a betief that everything was ative
and change was organic. In any event, this principle of life, or soul, served to orient and
integrate the functioning of the organism towards a more perfect end. Bedef in a principle
of life is vitalism, and belief in a purposeful existence in which every part serves an end is
teleology. In this respect he shared the cosmology of the ancient Greeks, for w h o m Nature
wastivingand development was purposeful, i.e. teleological. Development was bedeved to
be the process of becoming more perfect. These beliefs opposed the views of Democritus
and his fodowers w h o explained the actions of all things in terms of the atoms of which
they were made, which is a mechanistic bedef. The opposition of vitadst and mechanist
beliefs continued for two thousand years and 'has ceased to separate students of tiving
things only in the twentieth century' (Singer 1959, p. 48).
Belief in perfection as a function of change
Third is a belief in perfection as the purpose of ad change. Thus Uving things grow
towards a more perfect state and terrestrial things m o v e towards their correct place. The
bedef in the inherent beauty and perfection ofthe circle, and especiady the celestial spheres,
was held by the Pythagoreans:
Circular movement is perfect since the circle is the perfect figure. Circular
movement represents the changeless, eternal order ofthe heavens. It is contrasted
with rectilinear movement which prevads on this our changing and imperfect earth.
(Singer 1959, pp. 53-5)
Thus in the Aristotelian tradition of belief, the Earth was at the centre of the universe, a
widely-held and long-standing bedef in many cultures. The Earth was also believed to be
spherical, a belief held by the Pythagoreans. It also owed something to observations of
ships going d o w n over the horizon; that is, bedef in circularity also had an empirical
character. Aristode's Earth, which was stationary at the centre of the universe, was
enveloped by nine concentric, crystaldne spheres, an idea developed from that of Eudoxus
(c400-347BC). O n the outermost sphere, which was also fixed, was found God, the
'unmoved mover' w h o caused movement both of the other spheres and on Earth. The other
spheres carried the m o o n , sun,fiveplanets and the stars. The innermost sphere, on which
was the m o o n , marked the boundary between two realms - the ethereal above, where
m o v e m e n t was circular and eternal, and the sublunar below, where movement was
rectilinear and discontinuous.
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Different terrestrial and celestial belief systems
Thus, fourthly, the physics of the terrestrial and celestial realms are different: they
represent different metaphysical betief systems. The bedef that two different physical
systems operated was accepted at least as far back as the Pythagoreans. T h e sublunar
region, being furthest from God, is imperfect and subject to decay. The celestial bodies are
m o v e d continuously in perfect circles by the unmoved mover, God, and act as efficient
causes of movement in the sublunar realm. Change in the sublunar region is also caused by
the interaction of matter, and is accounted for in terms of matter comprising four elements
in the sublunarregion,each of which having quaUties. These qualities cause m u c h of the
change in the sublunar world, change being for the end of attaining perfection, either in
substance to a perfect Form, or thereturnof an object to its naturalrestingplace.
Fifthly, Aristotelian physics is different from his biology, which is m u c h more
empirical, as w e have noted; this is partly a difference in bedefs about knowledge and the
material world.
Sixthly, Aristode believed that the whole cosmos is m a d e of a basic and universal
matter, which is continuous, unlike the atomism of Democritus.
Seventhly, matter comprises elements, whose properties are given by combinations
of quaUties. Aristode accepted the theory of Empedocles (c492-432 B C ) that matter is made
of four elements, or unchanging substances: earth, fire, air and water, and that other
substances comprise mixtures of these four. Interactions of these elements accounts for
change and decay. T h e unchanging perfection of the celestial realm, which is predicated
partly on observations of little change over long periods of time and partly on the bedef that
it is near to God, was accounted for by Aristode adding afifthelement the aether, which
exists only in the celestial realm. The appearance and behaviour of the four elements in the
sublunar realm are represented by their qualities or natures. The four active quaUties,
hotness, dryness and their opposites, were later added to as ad hoc explanations by later
scholars, revealing an inherent flaw in Aristode's system of explanation. Eighth, the
universe isfinitein space, since it is bounded by the outer sphere, but is infinite in time,
since it can be neither created nor destroyed (Singer 1959, p. 55).
Beliefs about knowledge, language and being
Aristode also distinguished between thinking about things and putting into language
what w e think about these things, so distinguishing knowledge (epistemology), statement
(language) and being (ontology); this has been an ongoing interest in metascience d o w n to
the present (Amadio 1974, p. 1169). The betief that knowledge, language and an ontology
are linked also comprises an ongoing debate in western phdosophy, although again for
Oldroyd, Aristode's account is not satisfactory:

Appendix B.2: Belief system

642

O n the one hand, forms were immanent essences; and on the other they were
expressed in terms of verbal definitions. There was a most unfortunate conflation
of logical and ontological properties. Language and reality were supposed
somehow to be in a state of correspondence, one with another, so that the physical
features of the world could be elucidated by linguistic analysis. Aristode did,
however, lay emphasis on the need for empirical inquiry. (Oldroyd 1989, pp. 256)
Nonetheless, Aristode's linking of knowledge, being and language remained an important
characteristic of later belief systems in this scientific tradition. The union of knowledge,
language and ontology is reflected in Aristode's view of what knowledge w e can gain of
things. In the Categories, one of the works comprising the Organon, Aristode proposed ten
categories of what w e can know, such as Substance, Quantity, Place, Time and Relation
(Oldroyd 1989, pp. 16-7). These categories contributed to an ongoing philosophical
interest in categorising metaphysical qualities; for example, they were later developed into a
very influential thesis by Kant.
Beliefs about the empirical interrogation of Nature
Both Singer and Oldroyd emphasise Aristode's plea for empirical inquiry: Aristode
'advises his readers to compare his views with those that they themselves reach' (Singer
1959, pp. 55-6). The separation of celestial and terrestrial physics meant that the celestial
realm, and the laws regulating movements in it was beyond the experimental examination
of humans. In other respects, Aristotle advocated empirical inquiry as the means to
knowledge of the material world, although theriseof a scholastic tradition of adherence to
existing ideas was more influential in the pre-eminence of Aristode's world view in Europe
for two thousand years. See the historical section in the companion chapter on context, and
Appendix B.l.
The demise ofthe Aristotelian belief system
The eventual demise of the Aristotedan system was slow and piecemeal, and can be
characterised partly by fundamental bedefs, both flawed AristoteUan betiefs and the rising
influence of several competing bedef systems:
About the middle of the seventeenth century there were four different currents of
thought about the structure of matter existing side by side and partly blending with
each other:
(1) The peripatetic [Aristotelian] doctrine of the four elements, in which,
however, the originally essential feature of homogeneity of the minima
naturalia was already beginning to lose ground to the conception that the
smallest particles of a chemical compound are aggregates of independentiy
subsisting particles.
(2) The doctrine of the three principia or tria prima (salt, sulfur, mercury),
originating from Paracelsus andreferredto as the Spagyristic doctrine.
(3) The Cartesian doctrine that matter is identical with extension, but that it exists
in three degrees of fineness.
(4) The Democritic-Epicurian theory of atoms revived by Gassend.
(Dijksterhuis 1986, p. 434)
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Bhaskar has argued that the lack of clear and consistent beliefs upon which a
conceptual framework could be built led to unsatisfactory, ad hoc theorising in Aristotelian
natural phdosophy. This became increasingly evident as alternative betief systems emerged:
But the [Aristotelian] system lacked a clear criterion for inteUectual intuition, which
facilitated its dogmatic degeneration in the Middle Ages. It also lacked any
principle of composition of the constituent elements, such as could perhaps have
been provided by the development of Democritus' briltiant atomism. This resulted
in a loss of explanatory power, as forms proliferated in the w a k e of the
identification of more and more kinds of matter - to theridiculeof the 17th-century
atomists such as Boyle.
Aristotelian metaphysics gradually broke d o w n under the impact of the
development of the non-anthropomorphic, quantitative, mechanistic and nonteleological conception of Nature associated with Copernicus, Galtieo, Newton
and Darwin ... The theory of causadty gave w a y to the positivism of H u m e and
the transcendental ideatism of Kant (Bhaskar 1983a, p. 27)
That is, the beliefs that underpinned Aristotedan science werereplacedby other bedefs: the
cosmos was no longer beUeved to act according to human characteristics; the cosmos could
be w e d represented mathematicady; a mechanistic metaphor was more helpful rather than an
organistic one; and, as a result natural change was neutral in the manner of a mechanism
rather than purposeful in the manner of organic development.
Natural philosophy belief systems in the Middle Ages
There was some development of the Aristotedan system by Islamic scholars during
the Middle Ages, but it decdned in Europe, largely due the displacement of secular
phdosophy by the Christian Church. Collingwood (1945, p. 93) characterises this as 'a
sustained polemic against the mediaeval thought inspired partly by Aristode and partly by
the philosophical views impdcit in the Christian religion'. Dijksterhuis (1986, p. 100) has
argued that scholarship in Europe was essentiatiyrestrictedto the monasteries from around
A D 5 2 9 , w h e n the Emperor Justinian closed the 'last school of pagan philosophy in
Athens', to at least the twelfth century. H e characterises mediaeval science in Europe as a
'subordination' of science to theology, in 'a period of profound inteUectual decline' (p.
100). That is, this period in Europe can be characterised as a period in which the
ontological claims inherent in a Christian bedef system were valued over the ontological
claims of the extant Greek secular writings. This is known as scholasticism:
scholasticism:
Servile adherence to the methods and teaching of the schools; narrow or
unenlightened insistence on traditional doctrines and forms of exposition. (Shorter
Oxford Dictionary 1973)
It is related to, but more general than, the term Scholasticism, sometimes distinguished, as
here, by the use of upper case:
Scholasticism:
The doctrines of the Schoolmen; the predominant theological and phdosophical
teaching of the period AD1000-1500, based upon the authority of the Christian
Fathers and of Aristode and his commentators. (Shorter Oxford Dictionary 1973)
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This represents the teachings of Aristode as they became better k n o w n and as interpreted by
Thomas Aquinas.
Thus the rise of scholasticism is characterised partly by a belief that reliable
knowledge of the cosmos is to be gained from the accuracy of encyclopaedic transcriptions
and compilations of what remained of 'thefinalphase of ancient culture':
This purely receptive assimdation of what had been handed d o w n was to be ad for
the time being; the inteUectual powers of the western world were not yet developed
far enough to be capable of independent scientific work, nor did the sources of
Antiquity as yet flow abundandy enough to reveal ancient science in ad its wealth.
(Dijksterhuis 1986, p. 101).
A s a consequence of this reliance on the authority of texts, the empirical basis for
knowledge became less valued, and typically this period is characterised as less scientific.
Other bedef systems were also influential by the sixteenth century, especiaUy magical
and mystical accounts of Nature, such as in alchemy and Hermeticism (Sheppard 1983, pp.
9-10; Keder 1983a, pp. 184-5). For example, Dijksterhuis (1986, p. 280) characterises the
'fundamental principles of hermetic thought' by ontological bedefs: human nature and form
embodies the nature and form of the cosmos (parallelism of the macrocosm

and

microcosm); different entities within the cosmos exhibit causal sympathies or affinities with
other entities (cosmic sympathy); and the cosmos is living and has a soul (the living
universe). This serves as a reminder that the history of science is not characterised by a
stricdy linear succession of unique bedef systems: at every stage there are m a n y betief
systems competing, some alike, some not The emergence of 'classical science' in the
Renaissance could therefore be characterised as the replacement of one codection of betief
systems with another. T o this should be added the observation that for most authors the
difference before and after about the seventeenth century is far greater and more significant
than within either of the 'Aristotedan' or 'classical' eras. Moreover, for Dijksterhuis (1986)
the shift in beliefs that characterise the Scientific Revolution was far more significant than
the shift from classical to m o d e m science. The status of the Scientific Revolution is
evaluated in Appendix B.l, but it is certainly the case that many bedefs and assumptions
that sttil have meaning in science today date from the seventeenth century, whereas few date
to before that
Changes in belief around the seventeenth century
Historians w h o emphasise the change in the Scientific Revolution, rather than longterm continuity, do so partly by shifts in beUefs about Nature and h o w reUable knowledge
could be gained of it. That is, different metaphysical systems were proposed and n e w
epistemological possibitities emerged. Indeed, for Bronowski (1978, pp. 22-3) it is the
shift in belief systems that marks this period as an episode of significant change. H e
therefore rejects the claims of some historians of science, such as Thorndike (1923-58),
w h o downplay the notion of a scientific revolution and draw attention to the continuity from
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before the Middle Ages d o w n to the present day. T o represent this period largely in terms

of the continuities gives 'a false perspective of the great threshold from which the bur
modern science comes'. Especiady, it fads to highdght the importance of the fundamental
metaphysical bedefs, and the attitudes and orientations they entati:

(There) are in magical and particularly alchemical practices many techniques which
later formed an important part of technology and experimental science. N o w that's
undoubtedly true. But alas, in m y view, this has nothing to do with the case. O f
course there were people of aU kinds practising ad kinds of alchemyrightup to the
days of Newton, whose alchemical writings are so voluminous that they were
never published. Nevertheless, m y main interest is in their attitude toward h o w the
world works and h o w you m a k e it obey, and not at ad in their discoveries of h o w
you smelt this or m a k e that process in metallurgy work. (Bronowski 1978, pp.
22-3; emphasis added)
The present thesis interprets Bronowski to be arguing here that particular knowledge
outcomes and experimental activities alone do not distinguish science from alchemy or
magic, but such a distinction can be made in terms of bedef systems, in particular betief

about how the world works and how you make it obey. The present thesis extends
Bronowski's idea to argue that we distinguish science by its characteristic bedef system
combination with activities, knowledges, contexts, structures and purposes.
A number of metaphysical systems were proposed or contributed to by individual
scientists and phdosophers, including Harriot, Gatileo, Descartes, Boyle, Locke, Hooke,
and Newton. Accounts which seek to underline the significance of these changes draw

attention to the shifts in the underlying betiefs - mostly ontological and epistemologic
betiefs, and other, related, beliefs. For example, Codingwood has characterised the
development of a general Renaissance cosmology which differed from that under the
previous, Aristotelian system, largely in terms of shifts in metaphysical betiefs:

The Renaissance view of nature began to take shape as antithetical to the Greek
view in the work of Copernicus (1473-1543), Telesio (1508-88), and Bruno
(1548-1600). The central point of this antithesis was the denial that the world of
nature, the world studied by physical science, is an organism, and the assertion
that it is devoid both of intelligence and of Ufe. It is therefore incapable of ordering
its o w n movements in a rational manner, and indeed incapable of moving itself at
ad. T h e movements which it exhibits ... are imposed upon it from without, and
their regularity is due to 'laws of nature' likewise imposed from without Instead
of being an organism, the natural world is a machine ... The Renaissance thinkers,
tike the Greeks, saw in the orderdness of the natural world an expression of
inteldgence: but for the Greeks this intedigence was nature's o w n intelligence, for
the renaissance thinkers it was the intedigence of something other than nature: the
divine creator and ruler of nature. This distinction is the key to ad the main
differences between Greek and Renaissance natural science. (Collingwood 1945,
p. 5)
Several shifts of beliefs are given or impUed in this passage: the decline in the betief of
Nature as organismic, and with it betiefs about causality, the decline of betiefs that n
ensouled, and a change in beliefs about the relationship between Nature and God. Needham
(see summary statement 72) makes simtiar references to betiefs: the nature of reality an
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abdity to represent it mathematicady; experimentation as a surer w a y to gain knowledge of
Nature; a revision of betiefs about metaphysical entities; and the usefulness of a n e w model
of reatity. This last point has its o w n special interest because the mechanical model of
reatity became discredited during the twentieth century, i.e. a m o n g physicists at least this
betief is no longer held. Yet Needham, writing in 1969 and drawing on the historical,
philosophical and sociological theorising up to that time, sttil claimed that the adoption of
that model contributed to the shift from one scientific belief system to another which retains
some modernity d o w n to the present. This raises s o m e interesting questions: was the
mechanical model a necessary part of the development of Western European science, and if
so, is it a necessary part of the development of science in general? Did it instead serve some
other function in the development of ideas, or perhaps serve no particular function, i.e. that
its use was coincidental but not causal? These questions and others contribute to a larger
debate about the nature of science which the six companion chapters address as a set The
important point here is to draw attention to the use of belief systems, by Collingwood,
Needham and others, in characterising this significant period in the history of science.
S o m e beliefs that form part of these arguments are detaded in the remainder of the present
chapter, including section 2.11 on models and metaphors.
The considerable change in betief systems at the time of the Scientific Revolution is
marked by various terms: the 'Corpuscularian philosophy' (as by Harr€) and the
'Renaissance view of Nature' (as by Collingwood). It is the beUef systems that arose in this
period that are quite evidendy antecedent to m o d e m science. For Oldroyd (1989, p. 49) the
period is significant partly because the developments from thattimeretainsome currency
d o w n to the present whereas the science from earUer times have been largely superseded, hi
large measure the science of Aristode, Galen and Ptolemy strike us as the study of history.
For Bronowski (1978) it is more than this: whdst s o m e features of 'science' from the
ancient Greeks had persisted, the 'Scientific Revolution' - particularly the advent of
Baconian science - marked a fundamental departure from betief systems (often characterised
as mythologies). It is fundamental changes in belief system such as this that K u h n later
described as a paradigm shift.
Because the beliefs dating from the Scientific Revolution d o w n to the present are
more complex and developed from a great m a n y figures over an extended period, w e wdl
address belief systems from that time thematicady in the sections that follow: causatity,
attitudes to Nature, beliefs in magic and in God, mathematics, metaphysics, and the use of
models and metaphors.
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2.4 Beliefs about cause
Notions of cause and effect are central to science, and a scientific world view is
commonly characterised as having betiefs of cause and effect that are distinct from other
world views or belief systems (see, for example, Johnston 1986). The present section
highlights some bedefs about cause that characterise science or scientific betief systems.
Discussion of various theories of cause, and the seeking of causal explanations as a longstanding purpose of science, is given in the companion chapter on purpose and Appendix
B.3. Aristode's theory of cause, for example, is interpreted here as contributing to a system
of betief about the material world.
In Aristotelian science a thing or event was believed to arise from four kinds of cause:
the material from which something is made, as in the bronze of a statue (material cause); the
form or organisation, as in the form of bronze as a statue (formal cause); the agent that
brings something about, as in the sculptor of a statue (efficient cause); and the sake for
which something happens, as in the purpose of a statue, such as a representation (final
cause). Aristode himself noted that there was a tendency for the formal, efficient and final
causes to merge, as in the case of reproducing species (Molland 1990, p. 562). These
betiefs about cause have been interpreted as betiefs that enable scientific inquiry:
T h e Aristotelian insistence on both formal and material causes is of considerable
significance because it gave form a degree of independence from matter not found
in more mechanical views of nature, where the tendency was to explain everything
in terms of the arrangement of material particles. Aristotelian science was far less
reductionist and for that reason could be accused of appealing to occult virtues,
properties of bodies that had to be accepted as brute facts, not explicable in terms
of something supposedly more intetiigible. (Modand 1990, p. 562)
Occult virtues, as w e shall mention later, were properties that could be inferred, and hence
were not subject to empirical test such as gravity, levity and magnetism. However, later
scholars, particularly the Hermetic philosophers in the Middle Ages, proposed occult
virtues as empty, ad hoc explanations of every puzzling phenomenon, such as the
dormative virtue of opium (Heilbron 1983d). It was betief in formal causes, meaning that
the form of a body gave it its qualities, that enabled beUef in occult properties.
However, it w a s the metaphysical betief that Nature tended to develop towards
unreatised perfect forms, that is, an ontological beUef that change in Nature is teleological,
that became most objectionable to later thinkers. In the sixteenth century teleological
explanations c a m e under attack from several quarters, including Francis Bacon, w h o
reatised that to explain a cause as a tendency towards that effect is no explanation at ad
(Codingwood 1945, p. 93). A different belief emerged of h o w Nature changes:
The assumption that change must be explained [by the action of material things
already existing at the commencement of the change] is already a conscious
principle in the phdosophers ofthe sixteenth century. Thus Bernardino Telesio, in
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the middle of the century, regards nature not as drawn onwards by something
outside itself to imitate forms having an eternal and immaterial existence, but as
possessed of an intrinsic activity of its o w n , namely heat in virtue of which it
generates motion in itself and thus produces ad the various types of structure
found in the natural world. (Collingwood 1945, p. 94)
This represents two significant changes in belief. O n e is that causes were beUeved to reside
(or were immanent) in Nature, rather than outside Nature (or transcendent); this belief
encourages empirical study of particulars, a significant characteristic of m o d e m science.
The other change in the account of causation was from a teleological account of four causes
to two causes, being formal and efficient causes only. Both accounts of cause are based on
ontological betiefs, provided by organismic and mechanistic metaphors respectively.
The influence of Hume on beliefs about cause
The most influential account of cause since the Scientific Revolution has been
Hume's (Sanford 1995). Hume's notion of cause is usuady interpreted as entading several
beliefs: (a) causes and effects are events; (b) the causal event is prior to, or at least
concurrent with, the effect event; (c) cause and effect are close in time and space; and (d)
cause and effect have a necessary connection (Quinton 1988, p. 113). In post-Humean
philosophy, however, Sanford characterises only (a) as a majority view, (b) is a
controversial view because it commonly involves a circular argument: to say that an event is
first because it is the cause is circular if w e then say it is the cause because it is first
(Sanford 1995, p. 80). (c) is opposed by a prevailing view that continuous causal paths
connect causes and effects: many causes and effects are not close in time and space, such as
Ught switches and electric lights which m a y or m a y not be immediately close.
There is at least one other implicit belief in this and most other betiefs about cause:
that Nature exists continuously through causal changes:
It is often assumed in physical theories that the points of space and time are
continuously ordered, and that physical processes m a y be represented by
continuous functions. (Bostock 1983b, p. 79)
This is known sometimes as the L a w of Continuity, but the problem is that it does not seem
to explain cause in quantum physics:
According to the L a w of Continuity any quantity in passing fiom one magnitude to
another must pass through ad intermediate magnitudes of the same class. The a
priori proof of this law is that discontinuous action is not compatible with the
concept of continuous time.
The Copenhagen interpretation of quantum events rejects both the notion that aU
changesrequireexplanation and that particles conform to the L a w of Continuity.
Discontinuous action, annihilation of elementary particles, whether stable or
unstable, and the radioactive decay of nuclei are ad taken as basic and needing no
explanation, when in fact such changes and violations of spatial indifferences are
precisely what ordinarily and in all other areas of science would require
explanation. (Madden 1983, pp. 55)
That is, the beliefs about cause and effect that apply to explanations in both everyday events
and in classical physics do not seem to apply in quantum physics. Finady, (d) can be
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interpreted in several ways in post-Humean phdosophy: it is a prevailing view among
philosophers that a is necessary for b if and only if b is sufficient for a, but it is a
controversial view that 'a totality of conditions necessary for an occurrence is jointiy
sufficient for it' (Sanford 1995, p. 82). Scientific betiefs about cause contribute to betiefs
about Nature, G o d and magic, a m o n g other things. These are also taken up in this
appendix; as noted above, some philosophical views of cause are discussed in the
companion chapter on purpose and Appendix B.3.
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Attitudes to Nature
Beliefs about the material world, or cosmos, are characterised c o m m o n l y as betiefs

about Nature, although this term has two related uses:
In both Greek and Latin the words for Nature (physis; natur a) were etymologicaUy
connected with the idea of genesis of birth. In neither case, however, did the rootidea persist; rather, the concept of Nature developed in a two-fold fashion,
referring (a) to the essence or nature of a thing or type of thing, and (b) to the
world at large, particularly to the physical or 'natural' world. Both uses are in
Aristode (383-322 B C ) . . . Both senses presuppose a contrast between what exists
by 'by nature', or 'naturaUy', and that which does not in the one case the latter is
the merely accidental or conventional, whereas in the other one, natural is
distinguished from supernatural (and 'a state of Nature' is distinguished from 'a
state of Grace'), or is distinguished from that which has arisen through h u m a n
actions. (Mandelbaum 1983, p. 289)
Mandelbaum notes that the two senses are related, but nature as an essence of things tended
to characterise Classical and Mediaeval science, while Nature as the physical world has
tended to characterise science the Renaissance. W e wdl confine our attention here largely to
the second view, of Nature as the material world or cosmos'*.
We have mentioned attitude(s) to the cosmos, or material world, as part of a scientific
belief system: the literature describes various attitudes, entailed by the Aristotelian-Islamic
belief system, in the beliefs that emerged in the Scientific Revolution, and subsequendy
d o w n to the present. The present section wdl highUght some distinguishing features of each
of these, and the later section on beliefs in other cultures wdl clarify s o m e of these as they
have been used to characterise the western European scientific tradition.
Mystical attitudes to Nature
Codingwood has argued that even in the sixteenth century, European beliefs about

Nature encouraged a mystical attitude or orientation to Nature. In the Aristotedan tradition
the fundamental ontological beliefs that Nature was ensouled and teleological implied
epistemological betiefs that knowledge of the cosmos w a s revealed and magical. Nature in
the Aristotelian tradition was believed to be:
a material imitation of a transcendent immaterial model, [implying] that some
things in nature were accidental...
But [in thefifteenthcentury] nature was still regarded as a Uving organism, and
therelationbetween nature and m a n [sic] was conceived in terms of astrology and
magic; for man's mastery over nature was conceived not as the mastery of mind
over mechanism but as the mastery of one soul over another soul, which implied
magic; and the outermost or stellar sphere w a s still conceived in Aristotelian
fashion as the purest and most eminently tiving or active or influential part of the
cosmic organism, and therefore as the source of ad events happening in other
parts; hence astrology. This magical and astrological conception had powerful
This is designated in the present thesis by the capitalised form, Nature; capitalisation in quotations,
however, is left as in the original, whichever is used by the author.
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enemies from the first notably Pico della Mirandola,... Savonarola and Calvin;
but in spite of this, the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries were predominandy given
over to these occult sciences, which only died out by degrees, and died very hard,
in the popular witchcraft of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
(CoUingwood 1945, pp. 95-6)
The changes to this view were highly significant, and were based on fundamental beliefs
about the cosmos: the decline in the belief of Nature as organismic, as having a soul, and

with these, the decline of magical betiefs. (We wdl examine magical beliefs in more deta
Section 2.6 below).
Mandelbaum (1983) noted that Nature as the material world is also used either as the
aggregate of that world minus voluntary human action, or 'it can also refer to whatever

underlying physical forces or laws are believed to account for that which occurs' (p. 2
S o m e accounts have personified the power of Nature:
[B]ut even when such a personification has been rejected, as by Descartes (15961650), Nature has been viewed as a unitary power or force governing all
phenomena through unchanging principles or laws. (Mandelbaum 1983, p. 290)
This was a view held by the Hermetic tradition of alchemists, w h o shared with the
Aristotelians a belief that Nature w a s a living whole. However, the belief in laws as
governing principles was ultimately successful as part of the mechanistic betief system:
The mechanistic philosophy identified the laws governing the physical world with
the laws of mechanical action, and Nature as the aggregate of ad things was
viewed as a great machine. The parts of that machine,tikethe parts of man-made
[sic] machines, were assumed to act because of their configurations, the contacts
between them, and the transfer of motion from part to part. Excluded from the
explanation of natural processes were appeals to purposive action, to secret
powers and vital forces; a strict mechanical determinism was believed to hold
throughout the natural world. (Mandelbaum 1983, p. 290)
The significance of Copernicus' belief system
A significant contribution to the change in these betiefs was Copernicus's alternative

account of the solar system, De revolutionibus orbium coelstium, published posthumously
in 1543. Its displacement of the Aristotelian-Ptolemaic conception of the earth at the
of the universe by a heliocentric solar system is one of the best-known episodes in the
history of Western European science, but for Collingwood itsrealsignificance is a change
of betief and attitude, which is usuaUy under-appreciated:
The philosophical significance of this new astronomy was profound, but it has
often been misunderstood. It is commonly said that its effect was to diminish the
importance of the earth in the scheme of things and to teach m a n [sic] that he is
only a microscopic parasite on a smaU speck of cool matterrevolvinground one of
the minor stars ...
... The true significance of his astronomical discoveries was far more
important. It consisted not so m u c h in displacing the world's centre from the earth
to the sun as in implicidy denying that the world has a centre at aU ... Itsrealpoint
was that the material world has no centre; and this was rightiy regarded as a
revolution in cosmology, because it destroyed the entire theory of die natural
world as an organism. A n organism impUes differentiated organs; in the spherical
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world-organism of Greek thought there was the earth in the middle, then water,
then air, thenfire,and lasdy, for Aristotle, the quinta essentia of the world's
outermost envelope; now, if the world has no centre, the very basis of these
differentiations disappears; the whole world is m a d e of the same kind of matter,
the law of gravitation applies not only in the sublunaryregionsas Aristotle thought
but everywhere, and the stars, instead of having a divine substance of their o w n ,
are homogeneous with our earth. This idea, so far from diminishing the scope of
man's powers, vastiy enlarged it for it taught him that scientific laws established
by him on earth would hold good throughout the starry heavens. It w a s direcdy
owing to Copemicus's denial of geocentric astronomy that Newton could imagine
the force which kept the m o o n in orbit to be the same that drew his apple to the
ground. For Aristotle, nature is m a d e of substances differing in quality and acting
heterogeneously: earth naturally moves towards the centre, fire a w a y from the
centre, and so forth. For the n e w cosmology there can only be one substance,
qualitatively uniform throughout the world, and its only differences are therefore
differences of quantity and of geometrical structure. (Collingwood 1945, pp. 968)
This passage is a clear statement of changes in betiefs and attitudes from a different belief
system. First is the ontological betief that the earth orbits an unremarkable star, our sun^.
F r o m this follow a number of attendant beliefs, such as the universal applicability of
physical laws derived on earth, and attitudes, such as an inquiring attitude concerning the
heavens. Although morerecentaccounts judge Collingwood's depiction of the cause of the
decline in the belief of an organismic cosmos is an oversimplification (see for example
Schuster 1990), the betiefs and assumptions are clear.
The mechanistic world view
T h e (historicady) rapid and complex rise of a mechanistic world view is w e d
documented. For example, Dijksterhuis (1986) gives a technicady detailed account of the
mechanisation of the world picture from Pythagorus to Newton, that also argues for a n e w
attitude to Nature emerging at this time. Dijksterhuis gives accounts of contributions from
mechanics, astronomy, philosophy, theology, social changes, and individual personaUty,
to n a m e some, in the development of a mechanistic world view. For ad thesereasons,the
mechanisation of the world picture appeared to be a more useful conception than the
organismic one. Mandelbaum (1983, p. 291) traces historical interest in several themes
arising from the mechanistic belief system. For example, most scientists and Enlightenment
phdosophers took mechanism to be an explanatory principle of the physical world, but few
apptied it also to the h u m a n mind; thus this world view usuady entailed a separation of
h u m a n mind from Nature. Against the Enlightenment phdosophers, others, notably the
G e r m a n Romantics such as Schelling (1775-1854) and Goethe (1749-1832), proposed
betief systems thattinkedhumanity with Nature:
Nature was held to be animated by non-mechanical, vital forces, expressing
themselves in electricity, magnetism, chemical affinities, in crystal growth, and in
The reader might ask at this point, When can we say we know this? This is an example of the
interface between knowledge and belief, an enduring issue in philosophy since Plato, and discussed
by the present thesis in the companion chapter on knowledge.
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all living things (life). T h e Romantics were concerned with visible Nature, not
with the abstract conception of inert particles governed by mechanical laws. For
them, as for Fichte (1762-1814) and Hegel (1770-1831), the Divine was
immanent in both Nature and m a n [sic]. Their task was to heal the breach that had
developed between reason and feeling, philosophy and reUgion, and Nature and
m a n (Naturphilosophie). (Mandelbaum 1983, p. 291)
The challenge from evolutionary theories
Whde the Romantics did not exert a lasting influence, the early mechanistic view of
unchanging laws was chaUenged fundamentady by two developments in the nineteenth and

early twentieth centuries. The first was the rise of evolutionary theories, notably thos
Charles Darwin (1809-82) and Herbert Spencer (1820-1903). The widespread acceptance

of evolutionary theory not only supported the explanation of tiving things by physical a
chemical processes, but clearly identified humanity as part of the cosmos:

The greatest impact of [evolutionary] theory was not its incompatibility with
religious orthodoxy, but the clear implication that m a n [sic], in his origin and his
nature, was part of the rest of the organic world. With subsequent applications of
the idea of evolution to ad phenomena, a n e w conception of the world as a single,
progressive, developmental whole came to be widely shared ... [I]n the late 19th
century, and w e U into the 20th, the idea that aU aspects ofreatityare governed by a
law of directional change w a s widely shared. In contrast to earlier deterministic
conceptions of Nature, as operating according to a single set of unchanging laws,
the n e w evolutionary conception of reatity held the only unchanging law to be one
of development responsible for continuous change. (Mandelbaum 1983, p. 291)
This idea of a single law of development accommodated existing religious betiefs, and in
particular the religious derivation of scientific laws which were believed to reflect di
decreed phenomena. Part of this belief system was the 'assumption that laws should be
viewed as governing and determining events' (Mandelbaum 1983, p. 291). However, it
was difficult to fit aU known laws into such a scheme.
The challenge from positivism and beliefs about laws
The second development of that period, the rise of positivism, overturned the
assumption that laws prescribed or governed events:

When critical positivists, such as Ernst Mach (1838-1916), insisted that laws are
simply descriptive, not prescriptive, m u c h of what had been characteristic of both
the mechanical and the evolutionary views of Nature was undermined. Laws came
to be interpreted as ways of ordering and summarising regularities among
observed phenomena, and not as controding them. (Mandelbaum 1983, p. 291)
That is, laws came to be interpreted as descriptions of regularities, not as prescriptio

rise of the positivist RV in the twentieth century meant that metaphysical interpretatio
the natural world, such as beliefs in fundamental categories were 'looked upon with
suspicion':
[P]hdosophers of science have been more inclined to emphasise the structure of
scientific explanations rather than to generalise concerning the nature and structure
of an independent world. (Mandelbaum 1983, p. 292)
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The impact of the mechanistic view is ad the more interesting because in the latter half
of the twentieth century the unreserved adoption of one model is contentious: in postpositivist views of science the picture is more complex. S o m e of these views are extensions
of historically enduring viewpoints. For example, Aune (1995) has noted two current but
opposing views of Nature. O n e is a rationalist view 'that Nature has a structure that can be
k n o w n a priori' (Aune 1995, p. 349), that things behave as they do because or their
essence or nature:
Aristode's conception ofthe natural world was developed by mediaeval and early
rationalist philosophers into the view that nature consists of a system of essences
on which G o d has chosen to bestow existence. This view has adherents even
today; they contend that the distinguishing features of individual essences (or
'possible individuals') are discoverable from necessary truths to which w e have
access a priori. (Aune 1995, p. 439)
This view is opposed by an empiricist view, dating from Locke, that w e can only know,
and therefore classify, natural entities based on their observable properties. In the empiricist
betief system, w e cannot k n o w essences, nor distinguish objects by them: w e can only
distinguish and classify objects according to their properties. This is compatible with the
view that 'our decision to adopt a certain convention [of classification] is often affected by
our empirical betiefs about the world' (Aune 1995, p. 350). Yet both these views entati a
betief that Nature is m a d e up of objects or things:
In spite of significant differences these earlier views aU involve the idea that Nature
consists mainly of persisting things (individual substances) spread out in space,
interacting with one another, and enduring in time; the persisting things that, at
least for non-Aristotelians, are not spread out in space (namely, minds, spirits or
inteltigences) are intimately associated with bodies that are. (Aune 1995, p. 350)
Some recent ontological beliefs
However, A u n e also points out that betief in persisting things, although historicady
enduring, is not a necessary belief, and indeed is absent from some current views of
Nature:
According to most current views, Nature does not contain such things as minds or
intelligences; and on some views it is not a system of persisting things but an
extremely complex 'process' - a system of overlapping events or singularities in a
multidimensional 'field'. (Aune 1995, p. 350)
For example, in recent decades ecological and other post-modem movements have
proposed views of Nature that are more holistic than the traditional mechanistic view.
Perhaps the best k n o w n of these is Lovelock's Gaia hypothesis, that the Earth, or Nature,
be considered as a superorganism, not as the multiple entities studied by traditional,
reductionist science:
The entire surface of the Earth including life is a superorganism and this is what I
m e a n by Gaia. (Lovelock 1995, p. vii)
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The Gaia hypothesis is pursued further in section 3 of Chapter 7. Davies and Gribbin
(1991) have argued that hypotheses like the Gaia hypothesis m a y not be inconsistent with
world views emerging from otherfieldsof science like quantum mechanics, that is, views
that Nature is better thought of as events infieldsrather than persisting things:
Far from dominating the activities of the cosmos, matter seems to assume an
almost peripheral role. The main activity comes instead from the most insubstantial
entities conceivable, a foam of fleeting quantum wormholes, nothing more than a
froth of empty space whipped into half-real tunnels, knots and bridges. A n d it is
only by leave of the special properties of this foam that ordinary matter exerts the
influence it does in the Universe today; for had the weight of space not been so
incredibly close to zero, it would have been quantum vacuum energy, not the
gravitation of matter, that determined cosmic dynamics.
... [Scientists are increasingly thinking of the physical Universe as less a
collection of cogs in a machine, more as an information-processing system. Gone
are the clod-like clumps of matter, to be replaced instead by 'bits' of information.
This is the shape of the emerging universe paradigm - a complex system in which
mind, intelligence and information are more important than die hardware. (Davies
& Gribbin 1991, pp. 276-7)
Rapidly emerging and complex developments such as these have been of great
metascientific interest. Realists have re-asserted an independent reatity determining the
possibilities of science knowledge and experiment making sense (see Bhaskar 1983k).
Constructivists have emphasised the complex and negotiable character of Nature as studied
by science. In the foUowing example, Knorr-Cetina argues that the conventions of using of
concepts like Nature are central, which in this respect is more consistent with the
conventionatism implied by empiricism than is often recognised:
Constructionism holds reality not to be given but constructed: It sees the whole as
assembled ... There are, for constmctionism, no initial, undissimulatable 'facts':
neither the domination of workers by capitalists, nor scientific objectivity, nor
reatity itself...
Constructionist studies disassemble by multiplying - they multiply the players,
the events, and the mechanisms associated with sustaining entities such as
scientific facts ... D o they also disassemble the material world to which scientific
'findings' refer? Yes, if w e m e a n by this real-world entities represented by
scientific descriptions. N o , if w e m e a n the existence of a material reatity, or the
real-time intervention in and causal interaction with this world. Constructionism as
exemplified in die first laboratory studies is neither nihilism nor scepticism, nor a
doctrine that reduces objects to something tike imputed and subjected meanings.
Constructionist studies have recognised that the material world offers resistances;
that facts are not m a d e by pronouncing them to be facts but by being intricately
constructed against the resistances of the natural (and social!) order. W h a t
constructionism departed from, however, is the idea that the laws and propositions
of science provide literal descriptions of material reality, and hence can be
accounted for in terms of thisreatity,rather than in terms of the mechanisms and
processes of construction. Constructionism did not argue the absence of material
reatity from scientific activities; it just asked that 'reality', or 'nature', be
considered as entities continually retranscribed from within scientific and other
activities. The focus of interest, for constructionism, is the process of
transcription. (Knorr Cetina 1995, pp. 147-9)
Davies (1988, p. 107) acknowledges that 'there is by no means unanimous agreement
among physicists, let alone phdosophers, either on the nature or existence of reality, or
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even its very meaningfulness'; this is clear from the analysis above. W h a t he also notes,
however, is that the 'intuitive picture of reality' held by 'most ordinary people' - what
phdosophers would call naive realism - comprises beliefs that are contrary to those in
variousfieldsof contemporary science.
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Nature and magic

Science is characterised sometimes by being distinguished from magic. We are not
concerned here with the use of magic to m e a n clever tricks 'based upon dlusion and
deception', but rather
... any change with characteristics andresultswhich w e do not expect nor usually
see in changes. In short, magic is praetematural6 rather than supernatural'
(Thomdike 1967, pp. 27-28).
Historically, magical beliefs predate scientific beliefs, and the distinctiveness of the
scientific beliefs of the Ionians and other Greeks in antiquity is characterised in some
accounts by their differences from these traditional magical betiefs. However, various
magical and scientific belief systems remained concurrent alternatives for m a n y centuries
and, as w e shad discuss, some twentieth century authors remain concerned at the rising
public interest in belief systems that the scientific community characterise and reject as
superstitions and other betiefs. Recent analyses also point to some inherent difficulties in
making clear distinctions between science and magic; the present section w d l give an
account of some of these characterisations and the issues they raise.
There is general agreement that magical belief systems comprise a set of beliefs about
the cosmos and the appropriate orientation to it (Thomdike 1923-58; Thomdike 1967;
M c D o u g a d 1911, 1974; Bernal 1965; Lloyd 1979; R o n a n 1982). That is, magical belief
systems are characterised by betiefs about, and attitudes towards, the cosmos and h o w it
works:
a legitimate w a y of expressing a synthesis of the natural world and man's [sic]
relationship to it (Ronan 1982, p. 10)
primitive man's [sic]... attitude toward nature (Thomdike 1967, p. 29)
a number of beliefs which I believe are ad intimately related and which are the
marks of a certain attitude towards the world (Thomdike 1967, p. 33).
Note that these statements of early magical betief systems seem to apply equaUy w e U to
science belief systems. A s they stand, they do not distinguish between science and magic.
This is significant: recent scholarship has drawn attention to simdarities and overlaps
between belief systems that are usuady characterised as magical or scientific. Keder has
argued that it is inherendy difficult to distinguish magical beliefs unequivocady:
Magical practices are c o m m o n to wed-nigh ad h u m a n cultures, but it is seldom
easy to distinguish magical techniques from more realistic ones, because in either
case the result was the justification. (KeUer 1983b, p. 242)
For example, Ronan has argued that betiefs in early cultures had an experiential character
that was scientific. A n instance is the belief that some phenomena or circumstances wdl be

6 Preternatural: out of the ordinary course of Nature; abnormal (The Macquarie Dictionary
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more beneficial than others, or more disastrous than others: an 'appreciation that man's
[sic] survival depends on the behaviour of the natural world' (Ronan 1982, p. 10). This
reflects a desire to k n o w the future; interest in prediction also characterises science.
However, beliefs that lucky or unlucky events are behaviours of Nature that result
from choices supported beliefs in omens. This marks a difference from typical scientific
betief systems. Another subde but significant difference is that magical and scientific belief
systems characteristically share a betief in a connection between the actions of people and
the behaviour of the cosmos, but do not share betiefs about the nature of the cosmos and
the appropriate orientation to it A n example is the magical betief that people can influence
the cosmos, that there is 'an understanding of some connection between m a n [sic] and the
world around him, some primitive comprehension that given therightprocedure, m a n can
control the powers of Nature and set them to work for his o w n good' (Ronan 1982, p. 10).
This belief is consistent with betiefs that underpin the justification of the scientific
experiment as a controUed intervention in Nature, and highlights the problems of simplistic
characterisations of science and of magic; see the discussion of experiment in Appendix
B.5.
Traditional scholarly accounts characterise magic and science as quite different, with
magical betiefs being pre-scientific or pre-rational. Recent accounts tend to criticise the
assumptions about both magic and science in such distinctions, and the notion that scientific
beliefs simply replaced magical beliefs as a sort of linear development The present section
wdl review s o m e characterisations of magic and science, and critiques of those analyses.
a) Some cautions about characterising differences between science and magic
Characterising magic and science as being clearly distinct presents a variety of
problems. First while m a n y older or traditional accounts m a d e clear distinctions between
science and magic, recent analyses have pointed to problems in comparing different belief
systems. For example, Appendix B. 1 on context discusses post-positivist critiques of the
traditional assumption that western European science is the paradigm for rationality
(Watson-Verran and TurnbuU 1995). Thus it can be easy not to recognise where belief
systems are indistinct by closing off further analysis: on the one hand by assuming a priori
that 'other' beliefs - mediaeval, ancient European or beliefs from other, traditional, cultures
- are simply 'magical' and therefore 'irrational'; on the other hand by assuming a priori the
rationality of western European science betief systems and neglecting their analysis. Lloyd
(1979) mentions this as a specific issue in characterising betiefs as scientific or as magical,

that is found also in other traditional characterisations of science versus non-science, such
as primitive versus civilised, pre-logical versus logical, and pre-scientific versus scientific:
First there is the major phdosophical issue of understanding alien societies, that is
of the commensurability or incommensurabitity of the m o d e s of thought, betiefs
and values of different societies. T o translate the concepts of any given society into
those of any other is to interpret them, and - so it has been argued - in so doing
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inevitably distort them, in particular by prejudging certain key issues relating both
to the nature of truth and to that of rationality. There are, then, some have said, no
culture-independent criteria that can be used as the basis of 'objective' judgments
concerning other societies, and a society can only be understood from 'within',
that is by die actors themselves, not by outside observers. (Lloyd 1979, pp. 1-2)
These problems in appreciating differences, Lloyd continues, clearly apply also to different
groups within the one society; this also is argued in Appendix B.l. Also, it is only the first
of four issues he identifies as affecting analyses of science and magic.
The second issue affecting analyses of science and magic arises in anthropology. It
relates specifically to studies of what is loosely characterised as magic, and that is 'a
critique of the old idea which saw magic as, broadly speaking, faded applied science'
(Lloyd 1979, p. 2). Thus the earlier analyses are often regarded as interpretively dated
because they use what are n o w regarded as simplistic notions of mystical, common-sense
and scientific. A n example of the more recent approach is Cavendish (1977):
Magic is an attempt to exert power through actions which are believed to have a
direct and automatic influence on m a n [sic], Nature and the divine. It is impossible
to isolate the history of magic completely from the history of religion or science.
Theretigious,scientific and magical attitudes to experience are distinct from each
other in theory. The religious impulse is to worship, the scientific to explain, the
magical to dominate and command. But in real life attitudes are not kept in separate
compartments and the distinctions are frequentiy blurred. In the distant past
everything strange was magical, or retigo-magical, and this w a s true of humans as
w e d as the environment. (Cavendish 1977, pp. 1-2)
Lloyd argues that such distinctions are simplistic because they rest o n narrow
characterisations, such as observational data being the simple and sole criterion of science
and objectivity:
A n y attempt to contrast magic as a whole direcdy with science is n o w seen to be
liable to distort the nature and aims of the former. Magic, so it has been forcefuUy
and in part, at least, surely righdy argued, should be seen less as attempting to be
efficacious, than as affective, expressive or symbolic. T h e criteria that are relevant
to judging magical behaviour are not whether it achieves practical results but
whether it has been carried out appropriately or not. (Lloyd 1979, p. 2)
For Lloyd, the trend in anthropological analyses of belief systems is towards more
ethnographic inquiries, that describe h o w the people w h o practiced those beliefs interpreted
them. Thus there has been a m o v e away from labels such as mystical and. pre-scientific,
towards descriptions; the criteria for judgment accordingly shifts from whether particular
beliefs are effective, towards h o w skilfully the beliefs are used. The present thesis extends
Lloyd's critique, to argue that a multi-dimensional characterisation of science, and indeed of
magic, identifies a more complex interplay of characteristics that clarifies the simdarities and
differences.
T h e third issue raised by Lloyd arises in post-positivist metascience, that generaUy
recognises the role of consensus in forming scientific betiefs:
[TJhe effect of [Kuhn's] work has certainly been to draw attention to the role of
the consensus in the scientific group and to that of their shared implicit
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assumptions, and this in turn has m a d e it easier to see the important simdariries
between the scientific, and other, communities, and between science itself and
other belief-systems. (Lloyd 1979, pp. 3-4; emphasis added)
Thus there has been a shift not only in anthropological interpretation but in metascience,
that is, our views of the nature of science.
The fourth issue Lloyd sees as affecting analysis of the relationship between science
and magic arises from developments in studies of linguistics and the technology of
communication. These analyses also question traditional dichotomies such as primitive
versus advanced, but from the view of the linguistic and other cultural resources avadable
to various cultures. In this view, the traditional characterisation of so-caded pre-scientific
societies as those unable toreflectshould bereinterpretedas traditional societies not having
the appropriate linguistic tools for 'constructive mmination' (Lloyd 1979, p. 4).
Lloyd does not advocate a complete relativism, merely that recentresearchin several
fields has been more conscious of identifying assumptions. For example, 'it is also agreed
on ad sides' both that myth and magic were important in antiquity, and that 'inquiries that
are recognisable as science and phdosophy were developed in the ancient world' (Lloyd
1979, p. 5). There is also agreement that in Europe there was 'some kind of developmental
sequence' (p. 5) in which scientific practices and betiefs emerged from early, magical
beliefs, but this should not be taken to m e a n that a scientific set of betiefs simply replaced
earlier magical betief systems, because a number of betief systems remained in use over a
thousand years, nor that this sequence should be taken as appUcable to other, non-western
European cultures.
b) Characterising magical beliefs systems in antiquity and mediaeval times
Traditional histories identify a range of betief systems and practices under the label
magic:
Magic w a s (and continues to be) a system of betiefs underpinning a body of
technical or craft knowledge and practice, which sought to capture and control the
powers and processes of Nature for man's [sic] (or perhaps merely the individual
adept's) advantage. Such magical traditions appeared in the earliest civilisations
and manifested themselves in a number of different but related arts and sciences.
There are major divisions, such as those between Spiritual, Demonic and Natural
Magic, or astrology and alchemy, and innumerable smatier divisions between
different sorts of divination - palmistry, scrying, sortilege, hariolation and m a n y
more. These different forms of magic had their o w n techniques and procedures
and their o w n specific justifications but they were ad founded upon a particular
view of the world. (Henry 1990, pp. 583-4)
Keder (1983b) has characterised varieties of magic as two broad, overlapping classes of
magical practice that e m b o d y two notions of cause and effect: sympathetic magic,
representing a betief that phenomena are caused by the attraction of likes orrepulsionof
opposites; and spirit magic, representing a betief that natural phenomena can be countered
by the greater powers of spirits, souls and demons. The purpose of both was to control
Nature: the former by expert knowledge of affinities and antipathies; the latter by the secret
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knowledge of enlisting or controding the power of spirits. W e wdl examine both of these as
examples of betiefs that are central to widespread belief systems, used typicady as contrasts
with scientific betiefs.
Spirit magic
There w a s widespread belief across m a n y early cultures in souls or spirits as the
animating principle of living organisms. M c D o u g a d (1911) has argued that this w a s not
equivalent to the m o d e m conception of the h u m a n soul, which has been developed over
centuries of phtiosophical and theological debate. In early betief systems, souls or spirits
had an almost paraUel existence to the physical body. They were partly material, in that they
had a simtiar form, had simtiar needs and experienced simtiar emotions to the body. At the
same time they were partly immaterial, in that they were usuaUy invisible, or appeared only
as apparitions, and were less dependent of the normal physical constraints of time and
space. McDougall argued that support for this belief came from the experience of sleep and
dreams. T h e appearance of dead relatives andfriendsin dreams w a s believed to be the
appearance of their spirits or souls after the deaths of their material bodies. T h e first-hand
experience of strange adventures and visiting other places in one's o w n dream was
simdarly believed to be the experiences of one's o w n spirit w h d e separate from the body:
Sleep is regarded as due to its temporary withdrawal from the body; trance, coma,
and other serious illness, as due to longer absence; and death is thought to imply
its final departure to some distant place. (McDougall 1911, p. 1)
Similarly, the ghost-soul was believed to concern breath, where air passes in and out ofthe
body during life but not in death, and the shadow, which bears a likeness to the active
person but disappears w h e n lying d o w n in sleep or death (McDougad 1911, p. 3; Ronan
1982, p. 70). Thus the soul or spirit w a s believed to be the animating principle that gave
life to the body, and capable of separate existence during life and continued existence after
the death of the body.
Elements of animistic views of the cosmos are found in examples from m a n y
cultures, as mentioned in section 2.12 below. Other betiefs are given in the literature as also
characterising the differences between the Western European scientific tradition and other
traditions of thought. Jaki's (1974) detailed analysis of cosmological beliefs in various
cultures points to a number of features which he claims mitigated against the formation of a
scientific tradition as it did in western Europe. W h d e interpretatively contentious - Jaki
makes historical and cultural judgements from the perspective of twentieth century western
Europe - his analysis provides m a n y examples of differences in beliefs. Central a m o n g
these are beliefs that the cosmos is cyclic and attendant beliefs to this cyclic nature,
including various accounts of and attitudes towards causality. Second is the omnipotence of
deities that discourages human inquiry into the cosmos. Third is the effect of the concepts
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avadable for describing and discussing the cosmos. These are discussed in section 2.12
below.
Sympathetic magic
There were other beliefs about cause and effect, such as a betief that one part of
Nature, such as rain, can affect another part, such as crop growth:
an essentially imitative and sympathetic kind of theory of the working of the
universe. (Bernal 1965, p. 87)
Ronan (1982, p. 10) described this as a notion of natural cause and effect, not simply of
unrelated phenomena, and not of some other relationship between phenomena: that the
phenomenon of rain causes the phenomenon of crop growth. Using examples like this,
Ronan argued that m a n y very early beliefs about the cosmos have arecognisablyscientific
character. W e have noted Lloyd's caution that recent anthropological approaches have
identified sktil or efficacy as the goal of some traditional magical practices, not control.
However, as w e have also seen, Keder identified influence or control over Nature as the
goal of two main magical belief systems, spirit and sympathetic magic. The present thesis,
in the companion chapter on purpose and Appendix B.3, identifies control over Nature as a
characteristic goal of science; clearly, this goal alone is insufficient to make a distinction
between science and magic without accounting for the betief systems.
Implicit in beliefs of sympathy and affinity are related betiefs about the appropriate
orientation to the cosmos. That is, characterisations of science versus magic often refer to
beliefs about appropriate activities and goals: beliefs about h o w humans are able to
influence Nature in this way. This is a point of distinction in some accounts:
T o m a k e life go as he [sic] wished, he must be able to please and propitiate or to
coerce these forces outside himself. In this endeavour his faculty of association
probably led him to conclude that things resembling each other or having any
seeming connection must be related by strong bonds or sympathy and have power
over each other. Since he had already attributed human characteristics to [nonhuman] matter, he naturady n o w observed no distinction between the animate and
the inanimate, the material and the spiritual. A wooden image might be used to
affect the fate of a h u m a n being, or the utterance of atiuring and terrifying sounds
to produce change in unfeeling and unresponsive matter. (Thomdike 1967, pp.
29-30)
The connection between the body and its spirit was m a d e typically with artefacts of the
body: clippings of hair or nails are c o m m o n examples. The connection is more than simply
historical or symbolic; there is believed to be an affinity or sympathy between the two. The
notion of affinities and sympathies leads a system of beliefs about sympathetic magic,
which is either contagious (requiring physical contact between the two things which have
an affinity) or imitative magic (in which the two do not have to touch but be in proximity).
Thus another person could be influenced by means of a doll or effigy which featured a
clipping of hair or some other artefact from that person. The performing of a rain dance by
the witch-doctor or shaman was simdarly imitative. It also led to systems of totemic
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organisation, in which tribes or other groups identified themselves with whatever animal,
plant hero or other whose features or qualities were sought for the group.
Ronan has argued that this system of beliefs about the cosmos entails a particular
orientation to the material world that was not an investigative or inquisitive attitude:
... Magic gave expression to what was, by and large, an animistic view of Nature.
The world was populated with and controlled by spirits and hidden spirit forces,
residing perhaps in animals, or trees, or in the sea and wind, and the magician's
task was to bend these forces to his [sic] purpose, to m a k e the spirits co-operate.
H e m a d e invocations, cast spetis and prepared potions, because he saw a world of
affinities and sympathies. This oudook might lead to sympathetic or imitative
magic, where m e n might eat the flesh of an animal in order to absorb some of its
qualities, or dress up like the animals and enact their capture and death so that their
hunt might be blessed with success. Drawing or painting pictures of animals or
makingfigurinesof them extracted power from them, so weakening them and
helping their capture. The magical world was a world of relationships rather than
independent objects, and was based on man's o w n interrelations with the life and
conditions he found around him in a world where forces were personified and
everything had a specific influence. (Ronan 1982, p. 11)
The microcosm/macrocosm analogy
Betiefs that the cosmos has human characteristics are k n o w n in anthropomorphic
myths from antiquity, in the early natural philosophies of China, India and Persia, and in
the writings of many of the early Greeks, including Plato and Aristotle. They m a y be
summarised as betief that the human form is a microcosm of the macrocosm of the universe
- that the form of humans is analogous to the form of the cosmos, and vice versa. For
Thomdike (1967, p. 29) it is a 'safe assumption' that there would have been no reason to
suppose the surrounding environment was any different from the human observer. Thus
the cosmos w a s believed to be ensouled, and subject to the same emotions, foibles and
goals as people: capricious, capable ofrespondingin wrath, capable of being persuaded by
bribes, gifts or threats, and so on. Although this betief did not greatiy concern Aristode or
m a n y of the early Greek medical and astronomical writers it remained popular with idealist
phdosophers, and others, down to the Scientific Revolution in the seventeenth century. The
belief that spirits reside in ad things in Nature is animism (Bynum 1983). A d aspects in
Nature were believed to possess this animating principle, including other animals, plants
and inorganic objects that today are believed to be inanimate, or animate but lacking
consciousness. This beUef, and the microcosm/macrocosm analogy, were part of a betief
system that supported magical betiefs in correspondences and sympathies. Thus m a n y
writers in antiquity and the Middle Ages sought to identify numerological correspondences
between the h u m a n form and the cosmos, that is, number

mysticism; similarly the

alchemists sought correspondences, or sympathies, and antipathies between h u m a n and
inorganic chemicals. These beliefs were supported by Aristode's notion of occult virtues,
which could not be direcdy observed.
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Interestingly, Keller (1983c) has argued that the microcosm/macrocosm analogy has
some similarities with recent views of the Universe as an evolving organism, but this belief
is not part of a belief system that includes correspondences and souls.
c) The influence ofthe mechanical belief system
The mechanistic belief system that emerged in the Scientific Revolution opposed aU
these beliefs at once: the nncrocosm/macrocosm analogy and betief in correspondences, the
belief in souls, spirits and demons, and beliefs about the appropriate w a y to gain
knowledge of that universe:
Predicting the future changed into a scientific instead of a religious, magical or
psychic exercise. (Cavendish 1977, p. 122)
The emerging view of Nature in the Scientific Revplution entailed a rejection of
betiefs that the cosmos is organic and ensouled, and with them the decline of magical views
of Nature (Bronowski 1978; Easlea 1980). Bronowski has characterised science as an
interpretation of Nature (see summary statements 16, 73, 74) that is distinguished from
magical world views by beliefs that arose during thefifteenthto seventeenth centuries. O n
his account science is a unified w a y of looking at the world, or a world view, which in the
tight of the preceding discussion w e would term a betief system. This belief system is
distinguished from earlier unitary views of the world by acknowledging only one form of
truth or logic. Humanity is assumed to be part of Nature and subject to the same rules of
investigation and rationality. This, on Bronowski's account, is the central difference
between the scientific betief system(s) that emerged at this time and the magical betief
systems it began to replace. O n e cannot do science by magic, nor does science apply to
only one part of the cosmos. This standpoint entails a betief that the nature of the cosmos is
uniform or consistent such it can be investigated scientificaUy and not magicaUy:
The form of magic that I shad discuss is the notion that there is a w a y of having
power over nature which simply depends on hitting therightkey. If you say 'open
sesame' then nature wdl open for you; if you are an expert then nature wdl open
for you; if you are a specialist of some kind or if you are remote, if you are
esoteric, if you are an initiate there is some w a y of getting into nature which is not
accessible to other people.
N o w this was the dominant theme of aU those centuries up to the fifteenth. A n d
ad primitive forms of magic - sympathetic magic, the kind of magic you read about
in Levi Strauss for instance, magic that structuralists talk about - aU come back to
this notion: there is a w a y of having power which is esoteric and does not depend
on generaUy accessible knowledge. N o w I think that is fundamentally dangerous,
because it recurs in every generation...
(Bronowski 1978, p. 20)
This passage is especially interesting because, again, it does not in itself m a k e a clear
distinction between science and magic, despite Bronowski's evident betief that they are
quite distinct. It therefore emphasises h o w difficult it is to support traditional boundary
work in establishing such a distinction. M o r e information is needed.
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Bronowski describes a shift in thinking around 1500 to 1550, concerning h o w this
magic could work. H e draws attention to the power of memory and imagination, especiaUy

in people of great faith or betief. He acknowledges the power of persuasion from one
person to the next - seemingly a sped - but then develops this to a consideration of wh

the persuasion or sped could work on dead or inanimate matter. He then describes a shif
betiefs about the conditions under which such a sped could work:

In black magic, the betief was that you would make nature mn against her [sic]
wdl. In white magic, you began to say, 'Well you know, let's m a k e nature work
with us. There is a harmony; w e could exploit it' Finally came the concept of
natural law itself. A n d that was represented, in a most spectacular way, for the
first time in the writing of Francis Bacon between 1600 and 1620. It was Francis
Bacon ... w h o was thefirstperson to say 'knowledge is power.' It was Francis
Bacon w h o said in the Novum Organum 'we cannot c o m m a n d nature except by
obeying her.' At this point, the scientific revolution was really complete.
(Bronowski 1978, p. 33)
These shifts represent shifts in ontological betiefs, from a betief that the cosmos can
respond to esoteric commands and incantations, to a betief that the workings of the cos
can be distorted if not commanded, to a betief that the workings of the cosmos can be
neither commanded nor distorted. This is when people dared to break magical taboos and
realised there was no magic. Bronowski quotes Pompanazzi (1462-1525) as providing in
his book Of Incantations a clear statement indicating this shift in betiefs:
It is possible to justify any experience by natural causes and natural causes only.
There is no reason that could ever compel us to make any perception depend on
demonic powers. There is no point in introducing supernatural agents. It is
ridiculous as w e d asfrivolousto abandon the evidence of natural reason and to
search for things that are neither probable nor rational. (Bronowski 1978, p. 33)
It is true that magical beliefs died harder in the general populace than in scientific
writings and practice, but the demise of magical betiefs in this context is clear:
(Any) ideas which required non-mechanical action without contact began to look
more implausible as the 17th century drew on. Although some scientists
maintained a belief in the possibility of demonic witchcraft, that too declined
rapidly after cl660, for the new science seemed utterly hostile to immaterial forces
and animistic powers. B y the 18th century, not only was the Renaissance natural
magician gone, but spirit magic had descended into cozening and conjuring tricks.
(Keller 1983b, p. 243)
d) Contemporary issues
It is also true that superstitions and logics of argument, simtiar to the arguments for
magic we have discussed, remain today. For these reasons Bronowski extends the
implications of his belief that the cosmos is explained by a single, uniform logic: (1)

scientific view precludes a magical view, and (2) saying that something is so doesn't m

it so. For Bronowski these beliefs make a claim on the logic of argument in everyday lif
My definition of magic is (simply) the view that there is a logic of everyday life,
but there is also a logic of another world. A n d that other logic works in a different
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w a y and if you can only find the secret key, if you can enter into some magical
practice - particularly if you can find therightform of worlds - then either the
Almighty will be on your side, or you wdl coUect the votes, or people wdl believe
that because you cad it peace, that it's not the same word as war, and ad those
other things which Orweti has portrayed so britiiantiy but which ready always
c o m e up to the same thing: trying to c o m m a n d the world and particularly the
opinions of other people by s o m e formula which is other than the truth.
(Bronowski 1978, pp. 11-12)
This claim has obvious implications for the place of science more widely in contemporary
society and therefore for the place of science in the general education of the populace, the
subject of the present thesis. But it provides food for thought even as an internalist
statement. For example, quantum theory provides some difficulties with the simultaneous
interpretation of sub-atomic and macro phenomena (Madden 1983; Wheaton 1983). The

present thesis suggests that this arises because of two different betief systems that ar
easily reconciled, at least by those without a current working knowledge of quantum
theory. At this level quantum theory could be considered as entailing a magical belief
system as Bronowski describes. However the present thesis argues that this difficulty ties
in Bronowski's characterisation, which is inadequate. Instead, one has to consider the
complete belief system, not merely some elements of it, and in combination with other
dimensions of science. Thus magical beliefs are typicaUy characterised as entailing
preternatural and/or supernatural betiefs, which are just as typically excluded from scientific
belief systems. Further, scientific betiefs are linked to broader intellectual (internalist)
contexts, peer (external) review, experimental test (activity), and so forth.
This sort of argument has been put by m a n y commentators, but the foUowing is a
strident example, from the physicist Ian Johnston on the Science Show, a radio program of
the Australian Broadcasting Corporation:
The strongholds of science are under siege. Beyond the ramparts of rationality
there sits encamped a vast army of ratbags, aU scuttlingtikeores about their weird
machines, cranking up their theories, whipping up their disciples and raiting
against the despised establishment Against this horde ordinary rational m e n and
w o m e n can at best engage in guerrdla warfare - cut off a few stragglers, harass the
occasional rearguard and snipe from cover. For though some battles might be
won, the war is never-ending.
Ratbaggery seems to be on the increase. The Australian writer Christopher
Koch, in a recent interview about his latest novel The Dutchman which is
peripherally concerned with occult practices, said he believed that w e are more
superstitious today than at any time since the 14th century. I don't k n o w if he has
anyfiguresto back this up but I, for one, a m inclined to agree with him. W h d e
n e w bits of ratbaggery are continuady appearing, none of the old ones ever seem
to die out A s time goes on, there are simply more and more of them. (Johnston
1986, p. 34)
In this classic piece of boundary work, Johnston lists some of these 'ratbaggeries', in
which he includes a rise in fundamentalism (presumably both religious and political),
eastern mysticism, new religions, articles on astrology and numerology that are
commonplace in the popular press, UFOs and extraordinary medical claims by folk with no
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medical training and whose claims they wiU not subject to external scrutiny. In his
introduction to Johnston's article, the editor Robin Wdliams observed that Johnston's
broadcast resulted in a flood of correspondence protesting that science is fallible, but that
this misses the point:
Besides, [Dr Johnston] is not claiming that science holds ad the answers, only that
there are too many scoundrels trying to dupe us and that they m a y get away with it
m u c h more in the present climate of uncertainty and depression. (Wdliams 1986,
P-2)
A constructivist approach to boundary work suggests that delineating science from
'ratbaggery' is difficult and wdl vary depending on whose views are considered. For the
m o m e n t , Johnston's argument reminds us that belief systems (at least a m o n g other
dimensions) remain in use in current times by those wishing to characterise science and
distinguish it from non-science. The present thesis suggest that clarifying the respective
belief systems, together with their interdependent contexts, knowledges, purposes and so
forth, is a means of scrutinising such claims.
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2.7 Nature and God
Roughly paradel to the shift in betief that Nature is organismic to a mechanised
Nature, were changes in beliefs about the relationship between G o d and Nature. A n
organism can have its o w n intedigence, but a mechanism impties a creator and, for some, a
controller. Such changes in fundamental ontological betiefs therefore led to clashes, which
in the history of western European science were usually with the established Christian
church in Europe. The clashes between Church authorities and Copernicus and Gatileo, for
example, are widely k n o w n in science history. Conflicts such as these can be represented
as conflicts between betief systems and also as chadenges to power and authority7. T o cast
the slow emergence of classical science merely as a conflict between belief systems
concerning Nature, one being based on theological principles and another based on
observation, is to miss the subtiety and complexity of what was clearly a significant
phdosophical debate.
Scholasticism in both senses of the word w a s not the only confounding factor in the
re-emergence of Aristotelian teaching in Europe. Nor would it be correct to characterise
Aristotelian science of this time as being based on observation. S o m e of the complexity of
the debate is accounted for by a reconciliation of what Dijksterhuis (1986, p. 129) caded
'the religious and the intellectual world-conception, of faith and science'. This
reconciliation of views** was due largely to the English Franciscan Alexander of Hales, the
G e r m a n Dominican Albert von Bollstadt (later k n o w n m o r e c o m m o n l y as Albertus
Magnus), and in particular the Italian Dominican Thomas Aquinus (later to be St Thomas).
In this synthesis, the Aristotelian betief system became accepted in the thirteenth century as
the phdosophical counterpart to accepted Christian beliefs. This was despite conflict with
Christian beliefs from such Aristotetian claims that the Earth had existed from eternity and
would exist into future eternity. In brief, a 'synthesis' was achieved by urging Christians to
study Nature even more carefudy:
Therefore in complete contrast with the dominant patristic view, T h o m a s in the
opening pages of the second book of the Summa contra Gentiles urges the
necessity of studying science: it supports religious instruction and helps to
eradicate errors. The works of G o d reveal His wisdom and power. Studying
created things wiU therefore intensify man's [sic] love of God. (Dijksterhuis 1986,
p. 131)
In opposition to the bookish tradition which had c o m e to dominate mediaeval science in
Europe, this was to be done by studying Nature rather than what previous scholars had said
about Nature. In contrast to the view accepted in the Middle Ages, science was not lost,

7
8

See the companion chapter on context and Appendix B. 1.
The 'Thomistic synthesis'; see Dijksterhuis 1986, pp. 128-135.
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awaiting rediscovery. Nor, however, was ad knowledge already present; it grew with the
contributions, including mistakes, of those w h o studied Nature.
Thus by the seventeenth century there were several centuries of phdosophical and
institutional ties between what had been antithetical betief systems:
Seventeenth century natural phdosophers inherited two different concepts of
God's relation with His Universe: (a) as supremely wise, G o d had constructed an
orderly and rational world displaying evidence of design; (b) as supremely
powerful, G o d was able to disrupt this order miraculously and was the source of
activity in the world. (Schaffer 1983, p. 169)
These two beliefs concerning the relationship of G o d to Nature elicited various responses at
that time of intedectual ferment and in the scientific tradition that fodowed d o w n to the
present (Schaffer 1983; Dijksterhuis 1986; Oldroyd 1989). S o m e historical examples of
betiefs about God's relation to the universe are given in Appendix B.l.
T h e relation of G o d to Nature, and hence also the relation of G o d to science,
continues to be debated d o w n to the present Both in phdosophical circles and among the
general community, it has remained a contentious dispute that concerns fundamental beliefs
about Nature, G o d and science:
Four hundred years ago science came into conflict withreligionbecause it seemed
to threaten Mankind's [sic] cosy place within a purpose-built cosmos designed by
God. The revolution begun by Copernicus andfinishedby Darwin had the effect
of marginalising, even triviatising, human beings. People were no longer cast at
the centre of the great scheme, but were relegated to an incidental and seemingly
poindess role in an indifferent cosmic drama, like unscripted extras that have
accidentady stumbled onto a vast movie set. The existentialist ethos - that there is
no significance in h u m a n life beyond what humans themselves invest in it - has
become the leitmotif of science. It is for this reason that ordinary people see
science as threatening and debasing: it has alienated them from the universe in
which they live. (Davies 1992, pp. 20-1)
It is highly significant that these conflicts are characterised less by particular knowledge
claims or activities, the traditional categories of characterisation, than by fundamental
concerns with betief systems.
There are several examples that show that science continues to be characterised partly
by beliefs about Nature and God. The theoretical physicist Stephen Hawking reported
attending a conference, hosted by the Vatican, on cosmology and involving the respective
roles and claims to truth of religious and scientific betiefs (Hawking 1988, p. 122).
Another physicist Paul Davies, is one of several scientists w h o has written recendy about
these respective roles, and what he characterises as shift in the traditional boundaries
between the two:
In later years I began doing research on topics like the origin of the universe, the
nature of time, and the unification of the laws of physics, and I found myself
trespassing on territory that for centuries had been the near-exclusive province of
religion. Yet here was science either providing answers to what had been left as
dark mysteries, or else discovering that the very concepts from which those
mysteries drew their power were actuady meaningless or even wrong. M y book
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God and the New Physics was afirstattempt to grapple with this clash of
ideologies. The Mind of God is a more considered attempt.
Since publication of thefirstbook, a lot of n e w ideas have emerged at the
forefront of fundamental physics: the superstring theory and other approaches to
so-called Theories of Everything, quantum cosmology as a means of explaining
h o w the universe might appear from nothing, Stephen Hawking's work on
'imaginary time' and the cosmological initial conditions, chaos theory and the
concept of self-organising systems, and advances in the theory of computation and
complexity. In addition, there has been an enormousresurgenceof interest in what
might be crudely described as the science-religion interface. This has taken two
distinct forms. First, a gready increased dialogue between scientists, phdosophers,
and theologians about the concept of creation and related issues. Second, a
growing fashion for mystical thinking and eastern phdosophy, which some
commentators have claimed makes deep and meaningful contact with fundamental
physics. (Davies 1992, pp. 13-14)
Thus Davies characterises science, or at least physics, as appearing now to address
questions that have traditionaUy been the subject of religious beliefs, not science bet
particular, he notes scientific speculation about the origin ofthe Universe. We could i
also developments in cloning mammals that unfold as this thesis is being written.
There are several approaches to this 'science-religion interface'. Davies points to two
a m o n g practicing scientists w h o are also religious. S o m e appear unconcerned about

disharmony of belief: those who practice conventional retigion seem to keep the two bet
systems separate, 'as if science rules six days a week, and retigion on Sunday' (Davies
1992, p. 15). Others, who attempt some harmony between their beliefs, seem to adopt

relatively liberal views of retigion whde 'imbuing the world of physical phenomena with
significance that many of their fellow scientists find unappealing' (p. 15). Davies' ow

conclusion fits in the second camp: his argument is that the nature of the cosmos entati
thinking beings w h o can speculate and inquire about the cosmos, even though our very
rales of reasoning probably preclude us from ultimate knowledge of it. Davies remains

open-minded about the possibiUty that mystical experiences may be perhaps the only mean
of gaining such knowledge, but he speculates that the self-awareness of humans who can
inquire scientificaUy is not accidental:
The central theme that I have explored in this book is that through science, we
human beings are able to grasp at least some of nature's secrets. W e have cracked
part of the cosmic code. W h y this should be, just w h y Homo sapiens should carry
the spark of rationality that provides the key to the universe, is a deep enigma. W e ,
w h o are the children of the universe - animated Stardust - can nevertheless reflect
on the nature of that same universe, even to the extent of glimpsing the rules on
which it runs. H o w w e have become linked into this cosmic dimension is a
mystery. Yet the linkage cannot be denied.
W h a t does it mean? What is M a n [sic] that w e might be party to such privdege?
I cannot believe that our existence in this universe is a mere quirk of fate, an
accident of history, an incidental blip in the great cosmic drama. Our involvement
is too intimate. The physical species Homo m a y count for nothing, but the
existence of mind in some organism on some planet in the universe is surely a fact
of fundamental significance. Through conscious beings the universe has generated
self-awareness. This can be no trivial detati, no minor by-product of mindless,
purposeless forces. W e are truly meant to be here. (Davies 1992, p. 232)
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A s it does with claims by other others, the present thesis argues that Davies' claim that w e

have cracked part ofthe cosmic code is a statement of betief: that Davies is ready expres
a betief system rather than an immutable truth. After aU, the history of science is replete
with eminent and astounding thinkers whose statements have later been modified or
rejected. However, that is not the significant point here. The significant point is that Davies'
argument characterises science partly by betiefs: that w e h u m a n beings are able to grasp at
least some of Nature's secrets, and, because he cannot believe that h u m a n rationatity is
accidental, by implication Davies believes that is 'meant to be'.
Beliefs that science and religion can co-exist
There are other approaches to the 'science-religion interface' that also demonstrate
that science continues to be characterised partly by beliefs about Nature and God. In
discussing scientists w h o also hold religious beliefs, Davies focussed on the matter of
reconciling scientific andreligiousbeliefs. Variations of this approach have been advocated
by other scientists (Hanbury B r o w n 1986; Falconer 1987). Usuady, they emphasise a need
to dissociate religious betiefs from scientific betiefs about Nature:
Nevertheless there will always be people who insist that the doctrines of
Christianity must be supported by supernatural authority, and that it is the
existence of an authority external to nature which is the basic difference between
religion and humanism. In that case the important point as far as the relations
between science and religion are concerned, is that any concept ofthe supernatural
which is used should not involve, in any w a y whatever, the contra-natural.
(Hanbury B r o w n 1986, p. 178)
That is, Hanbury B r o w n accepts that it is reasonable for an individual to have both religious
and scientific belief systems, but they wdl be mutually incompatible if thereligiousbetiefs
entail a belief that Nature can be m a d e to act counter to its usual behaviour (contra-natural).
This contra-natural behaviour is a different sense to manipulating phenomena in

experimental conditions, which is a test for knowledge in science. This is put succincdy b
Archer:
A crisis looms. While scientists have become rapt in the utterly fascinating
business of exploring the nature of the universe, of which the evolutionary process
is a part, they have as a group faded in the important responsibdity of adequately
communicating this understanding to the general community. A consequence of
this fatiure has been the rapid growth of a vocal minority w h o incorrecdy perceive
an inevitable consequence of scientific inquiry to be the discovery that there is no
God. They fear that the study of evolution wdl reveal a God-less origin of, and
God-less purpose for, life.
T w o vitally different matters are being confused here. The business of science
is to observe, explore and understand every possible aspect of the material
universe withoutregardto the existence or otherwise of super-natural phenomena.
It cannot be the business of science to pass judgement on the existence of spiritual
phenomena because it is impossible to subject such matters to scientific analysis
(Wielert 1983). (Archer 1987, p. 14)
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Archer's is a clearer characterisation of science than Johnston or Davies, above, although it
is sttil an instance of boundary work 9 . Also, it is a pertinent analysis of the opposition of a
mainstream scientific belief system and certain religious betief systems in western (and
s o m e non-western) cultures.
Beliefs that religious beliefs take precedence over scientific beliefs
Beliefs such as those expressed by Archer and Hanbury B r o w n are direcdy opposed
by s o m e groups, typically outside the scientific community, w h o argue that religious betief
ultimately over-rides scientific belief. Nelkin (1995) has argued that this view has been
especiady strong in the U S A , w h o s e individualistic culture has fostered a rhetoric of
citizens'rights.This includes the rights of citizens, as advocated by these groups, to
choose religious betiefs that conflict with science beliefs:
Studies of controversies suggest their origins in a range of political, economic, and
ethical concerns (Engelhardt & Caplan 1987; G r a h a m 1979; National A c a d e m y of
Sciences, Institute of Medicine 1991). First the most intense and intractable
disputes concern the social, moral, or retigious implications of a scientific theory
or research practice. T h e controversy over the teaching of evolution in public
schools has persisted at the level of local [US.] school districts, even after a U S .
Supreme Court decision seemed to bring closure to the issue (Nelkin 1984) ...
Creationists see the teaching of evolution as a threat to theirrightto maintain the
retigious faith of their chtidren. (Nelkin 1995, pp. 447-9)
Thus for Nelkin, the science-religion interface needs to be interpreted as part of the wider
issue of public controversies concerning science that includes animal rights, control of
reproductive technologies and pollution. T h e example of Creationism in the science
curriculum is discussed further in thefinalchapter of the present thesis, as an example of a
significant science curriculum issue that can be informed by the present thesis.

9

in this passage, Archer characterises science not just by belief system (...ofthe material universe
without regard to... super-natural phenomena) but by purpose (the business of science is to...)
activity (subject ...to scientific analysis).
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Nature and mathematics

The tradition of western European science, especiaUy from the Scientific Revolution,
is characterised partly by a significant role for mathematics (see, for example, Taton 1975).
This entatis beliefs about the mathematical nature of the cosmos that have persisted d o w n to
the present:
Science is predicated upon the belief that the Universe is algorithmically
compressible and the modern search for a Theory of Everything is the ultimate
expression of that belief, a belief that there is an abbreviated representation of the
logic behind the Universe's properties that can be written d o w n in finite form by
human beings. (Davies, in summary statement 85)
Developments in mathematics were m a d e concurrendy, and often interdependentiy,
with other developments in science. That is, the beliefs associated with the developments in
mathematics arose interdependentiy with other beliefs and were included in the development
of scientific belief system(s), notably theriseof the corpuscular view of the cosmos. The
increasing use of mathematics in describing and analysing natural phenomena presupposes
decisions about what entities in the cosmos - what metaphysical qualities - can be
quantified, what can be ignored, and so forth. S o m e details of developments in
mathematics are given in Appendix B.5; the present section will simply argue that
mathematics has historicady played a role in forming and clarifying science betief systems.
Histories that emphasise the continuity of betiefs point to the use of mathematics in
natural phdosophy from antiquity. W e have noted the use of mathematics by Thales, and
that the works of Plato and Aristode represented two different approaches to the use of
mathematics in constructing a world view. That is, they proposed two different belief
systems concerning the place of mathematics in ontological and epistemological beliefs.
Dijksterhuis (1986) has traced mathematical developments in the Western European
scientific tradition from the ancients through to Newton and, by implication, d o w n to the
present
Histories that emphasise discontinuity of beliefs point to the significance of the
changes labeded the Scientific Revolution, in this case the fundamental changes in the
mathematical character of science (see N e e d h a m in summary statement 7 2 and Davies in
summary statement 86). In particular these changes are characterised as the re-emergence of
the belief (foUowing Plato's teachings) that the cosmos could be described mathematicady;
this provided the basis for aflourishingof mathematical scientific activity. For example,
graphical representation, introduced by Oresme, enabled the more sophisticated conceptions
of variability to be developed that are so important in conceptuatising motion, among other
things. Newton and Leibniz developed the mathematics of infinitesimals which, through
differentiation and integration, became a useful and widely used tool for analysing physical
change. The increasingly clearer and quantifiable concepts of force, motion and change
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contributed to the reassessment of ontological beUefs, particularly the long-held betief in the
perfection of circles and spheres, and that the structure of the cosmos shows spherical and
circular forms (Dijksterhuis 1986, p. 263).
The work of Gatileo Galilei (1564-1642) showed a combination of elements from
both Aristode and Plato. At the time of Gatileo, orthodox physics was Aristotelian and
astronomy was Ptolemaic. That is, the physical cosmology was Aristotelian although the
Aristotelian experimentation had largely been replaced by scholastic interpretation of
Aristotelian texts (Singer 1959, pp. 55-56), as mentioned above. Also, the AristotelianIslamic cosmology had been fused with theological doctrines of the R o m a n Catholic
church, in the Scholasticism fodowing Thomas Aquinas. Gatileo revived the experimental
basis of Aristode, but proposed a cosmology that was both different to that of Aristode's
and (as with Plato) capable of being represented mathematicaUy:
In Aristotle's physics, motion was regarded as a quality: a body would be moving
or stationary according to whether it possessed the quality of motion. But it was
not possible to treat such an Aristotelian property satisfactorily in terms of
numbers, and hence examine the phenomena of motion in more than a general
manner. B y contrast, Gatileo's falling bodies were, so to speak, 'mathematical'
entities, moving in 'mathematical' space. A d their attributes (such as colour, smeU,
weight, etc) were disregarded (for the purpose of the experiment on fading
bodies), and attention was focussed solely on position and time. S o in a sense
Galileo was no longer dealing with real bodies moving in real space, but with
'mathematicalfictions'.(Oldroyd 1989, p. 58)
Thus Oldroyd characterises Gatileo as drawing on both Aristode and Plato, but not w h o U y
following either tradition. Gatileo sought mathematical representations of the cosmos,
unlike 'the generalisations of everyday experience that characterised the physics of
Aristode' (Oldroyd 1989, p. 53). However, unlike a strict neo-Platonist, he represented the
cosmos using mathematical models and experiment
M o r e important than any of the individual changes in beliefs was that they fitted
together as a coherent set or system of beliefs: a plausible and useful synthesis of
ontological, epistemological and methodological beliefs. These include notions of
experimentation, the use of mathematics, as described above, and the relation of this
mathematics to metaphysical entities, as wdl be shown below. For example, John Hedbron
makes such a distinction between Gatileo and his Mediaeval predecessors in terms of these
beliefs:
But these anticipators [such as Nicole Oresme (c 1320-1382) and D o m i n g o de Soto
(c 1494-1560)] do not appeartohave shared Gatileo's approach: they investigated
laws of motion as mathematical possibilities, he as testable descriptions of Nature.
(Hedbron 1983b, p. 229)
S o these mathematical developments are not simply technical or methodological
advancements, but shifts in beliefs as to what the mathematics represents: n e w ontological
and epistemological possibilities. It is the ontological and epistemological implications that
are most significant:
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A particular importance attaches to the revival of interest in Plato's phdosophy and
the metaphysic of mathematics as the key to truth which powerfully affected (in
different ways) both Gatileo and Kepler. The introduction in the late 16th and early
17th centuries of mathematical theories applicable to actual natural events (such as
the fall of heavy bodies) - as distinct from mathematical models 'saving the
phenomena', as in astronomy - w a s the greatest innovation in theory-construction
since Aristode. (Hall 1983, p. 379)
T h e best-known example of saving the phenomena is no doubt the preface to the
posthumous publication of Copernicus's De Revolutionibus. It is thought that this was
added by Osiander to 'save the appearances'. This line of thinking argues that making
ontological claims in contravention to Church doctrine was regarded as hazardous, and that
Osiander felt it was safer to stay with the precedent in Mediaeval scholarship to claim only
that the cosmos behaved as if the theory were so: as theoretical possibilities only. This
denied to Copernicus the credit for the impetus to development in theorising that is claimed,
above, for Gatileo. M o r e significantly, it changed the ontological beliefs entailed by
interpreting Copernicus as proposing a system of hypothetical, rather than real, entities.
The effect of Osiander's change was to argue that scientific theories are instrumental, and
do not describe a reality. Instrumentalism became an enduring characterisation of science
betief systems, and is opposed to realist interpretations of science:
[InstrumentaUsm is the] view that a scientific theory is nothing more than a device
or instrument for yielding correct predictions about the course of Nature, and
theories must therefore be assessed not as true or false, but only as effective or
ineffective as prediction ... [G]ood theories generate reliable predictions, but have
no real explanatory function. (Richards 1983b, p. 209)
Strong instrumentalism denies that theories can ever be true; a weaker instrumentalism
allows that s o m e theories might be true, but w e can never k n o w if they are.
Instrumentalism has traditionaUy been one of the arguments againstrealism,and remains a
central belief in some contemporary characterisations of science that deny an independent
and knowable reality, such as some post-positivist empiricist and constructivist belief
systems. Against this, post-positivist versions of realism and constructivism claim that
scientific activity is intelligible only if it does manipulate an external reatity, even though
our knowledge of it is imperfect (Bhaskar 1983k; Knorr Cetina 1995).
Gatileo's was not the only contribution relevant in that period. The Cartesian belief
system proposed by Rene Descartes w a s very influential for several generations, being the
most ambitious attempt at a cohesive world-view or belief system since Aristotle
(Dijksterhuis 1986, p. 408; Singer 1959, p. 264). Descartes' conception enabled strong
ontological claims to be m a d e about the relationship of mathematics to the cosmos,
displaying 'the fundamental correspondences of number and form' (Singer 1959, p. 226).
This belief has remained d o w n to the present day:
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... Kepler and Galileo were deeply convinced that... the structure of the world
was essentiady mathematical in character and a natural harmony existed between
the universe and the mathematical thought of the human mind.
N o w the standpoint taken by Descartes cannot be better described than by
saying that by carrying this conception to its extreme he virtually identified
mathematics and natural science. Natural science is mathematical in character not
only in the wider sense that mathematics ministers to it... but also in the much
stricter sense that the human mind produces the knowledge of nature by its o w n
efforts in the same way as it does mathematics. (Dijksterhuis 1986, p. 404)
Thefinalclaim by Dijksterhuis represents a version of constructivism that is not shared by
all. However the belief that mathematics describes the objects of scientific study is
consistent with a wider variety of views, as in Davies, above.
M o r e recendy, Redner (1987) has argued that what he terms the World science that
has emerged in the twentieth century is fundamentaUy mathematical in ways not w e U
appreciated even by m a n y scientists. Physicists use increasingly complex mathematics as
their means of analysing and describing the cosmos: the mathematics of the very large
(cosmology) and the very small (particle physics) is increasingly removed from
experimental testability (Hawking 1988; Davies 1988; Davies & Gribbin 1991). Richard
F e y n m a n is an example of a physicist w h o has cautioned against the substitution of
mathematics for experimental testing.
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Other metaphysical beliefs

Science is also characterised by beliefs about the ultimate nature of being (ontological
betiefs). A significant change used to characterise the Scientific Revolution was theriseof
the belief that the material world ultimately comprises interacting particles. W e have seen
that Codingwood (1945, pp. 96-98) drew a connection from Copernicus's denial of a
special place in the universe for the earth, to a denial of an organic (and ensouled) cosmos,
and to a belief in the uniformity of Nature, including uniformity of substance. These
changes entati metaphysical betiefs about the ultimate nature of substance. In this period the
overall shift of these betiefs were to a cosmos m a d e oftinycorpuscles arranged in empty
space, rather than being continuous as in the Aristotelian belief system. W e have noted in
an earlier section that by the seventeenth century there were several, competing belief
systems about the ultimate nature of substance in the cosmos, summarised as the
Aristotelian, alchemaic (Spagyristic), Cartesian and atomistic systems. These broad
characterisations characterise shifts from and to betief systems by changes in basic
ontological beliefs. Thefirsttwo were persisting mediaeval betief systems, as w e have
seen, and the second two were emergent or re-emergent belief systems, which w e wiU
discuss briefly below. Galileo's contribution is included as representing something of a
watershed between the old and the new belief systems.
The Aristotelian belief system
Both Aristode and Plato had rejected the betief that the cosmos was composed of
discrete, indestructible entities called atoms as proposed by Democritus (c460-371BC), on
the basis that such a betief entailed beliefs in self-moving bodies and the existence of a
vacuum in which they moved. Aristode did aUow, however, for a m i n i m u m size of the
interacting entities:
Elsewhere [Aristotle] argues against Anaxagorus that divisibility is subject to a
naturaltimit,which could not be exceeded without impairing the substantial form.
Each substance is thus assumed to possess its o w n characteristic smadest particles,
its minima naturalia, which might be compared to the molecules of later chemistry.
(Dijksterhuis 1986, p. 24)
Aristode actuaUy argued this in terms oftivingthings, and it is unclear whether this claim
was m a d e of inanimate entities. However it w a s interpreted by the scholastics that ad
substances comprised their o w n minima naturalia, and so it is necessary to distinguish this
Aristotelian-scholastic belief from the atomism of Democritus. Dijksterhuis (1986, p. 205)
has argued that there are four such differences. (1) Minima naturalia have the properties of
the macro-body they compose, and so differ qualitatively from each other, Democritean
atoms differ only as aresultof differing numbers. (2) Minima have a characteristic size for
each substance; atoms exist in differing sizes. (3) T h e geometric form is irrelevant to
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minima, but important for atoms. (4) Chemical reactions, in which the n e w substances have
different chemical properties, are accounted for by the simple spatial rearrangement of
atoms, but by the internal transformation of minima. Scholastic treatment of this belief
system w a s limited to metaphysical speculation and reliance on doctrinal interpretation, and
the limits of this approach are clear w h e n compared with the competing betief systems
described below.
The alchemaic (Spagyristic) belief system
T h e Swiss Paracelsus (1493-1541) is associated, despite a few examples from
antiquity and the period of Islamic science, with the beginning of the treatment of medical
conditions with chemicals, an activity k n o w n as iatro-chemistry (Dijksterhuis 1986, pp.
279-281; Singer 1959, pp. 199-200; Brock 1983, p. 118; and Sheppard 1983b, p. 198).
His contribution to science is intriguing and mixed, partly due to his iconoclastic
personality and obscure writing, and partly to his advocacy of a mixture of hermetic betiefs
that were popular at that time. In c o m m o n with what Dijksterhuis (p. 278) caUed the
'Aristode-myth of Scholasticism', Paracelsus opposed any corpuscular conception on the
basis of needing to 'understand h o w the whole can be something else than the s u m of the
parts' (Dijksterhuis 1986, p. 281). In conflict with the Aristotedan system of four elements,
however, Paracelsus claimed that substances are m a d e from three Principles which give
each substance its characteristics. Rather confusingly, the three names were already given
to particular substances: mercury and sulfur had been identified as principles by Islamic
scholars, to which Paracelsus added salt. O n Singer's account, the Principle mercury
represented the nature of metals, sulfur represented combustibility and changeability, and
salt represented resistance tofire.O n Dijksterhuis' account, they represented respectively
the active spiritual in Nature, the mediatory principle and the passive corporeal. This
variation of interpretation is consistent with the imprecise conceptions c o m m o n to alchemic
and mystical belief systems of that time. Paracelsus' contribution remains important,
though. H e w a s influential in reaffirming some useftd empirical alchemic doctrines, such as
that the substances comprising a compound can be retrieved from it Also, the assumption
of the tria prima reoriented the focus of others away from acceptance of doctrine, as in the
Aristotelian-scholastic belief system, and toward observation of Nature.
Galileo's ontological beliefs
Galileo's change of thinking about metaphysical entities is regarded often as a
watershed between the old and n e w belief systems, as w e have noted. T h e Aristotelianscholastic idea of the irreducible essence of entities - their qualities - was they could be
either sensed direcdy (manifest) or inferred (hidden or occult). The weakness of this system
w a s exposed progressively, as the Hermetic phdosophers in particular resorted to providing
explanations by introducing n e w qualities in an ad hoc fashion (Hedbron 1983d, p. 353).
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That is, they proposed explanations by inventing n e w terms that were labels only, and did
not add to the testable meaning of existing concepts or betiefs. (There is a paraUel with
developments in twentieth century physics: Feynman a m o n g others has criticised this field
for the tendency to provide explanations by postulating mathematical entities, rather than
basing them on empirical data).
In contrast to these mediaeval betiefs, Gatileo's ontology is generaUyrepresentedas a
twofold change: what qualities represent, and their relationship to mathematics.
Mathematical beliefs of the cosmos entati decisions about what aspects of Nature can be
quantified legitimately, and what cannot. Gatileo's contribution w a s to provide a basis for
these decisions. In doing this, Galileo drew upon the distinction m a d e by Democritus
(c460-371BC) between two groups of qualities of Nature:
[TJhose qualities inherent in and those produced by inorganic bodies: shape, size,
location in space and time, and motion were quantifiable, mathematically
manipulable, and, since they comprised the reality behind the experience, the
business of physics; aU other quaUties - taste, colour, heat, sound, etc. - were in
the observer, not in Nature, and originated with the activity of variously shaped
bits of matter on his [sic] sensory organs (Saggiatore (The Assayer, 1623)). This
radical demarcation between what Robert Boyle later called primary and secondary
qualities became the metaphysical cornerstone of succeeding versions of
corpuscular philosophy. (May 1983, p. 82)
That is, there were two basic shifts in betiefs at that time: a belief that metaphysical quaUties
are either inherent in bodies or are produced by them, and a belief that primary quaUties can
be represented mathematicaUy. These two betiefs alone are sufficient to characterise the

classical physical science that developed from that time, even down to today, whereas the
betiefs they replaced arerecognisablythose of antiquity.
The preciserelationshipbetween mathematics, ontology and scientific experiment has
remained a subject of discussion from that time, continuing the dialogue between the betiefs
expounded by Plato and Aristode. This is w e U put by Oldroyd who, in discussing Gatileo's
speculations about the nature of the cosmos in The Assayer, observes:
Galileo gave an important statement in relation to the question of mathematical
abstraction, in which w e can recognise what has c o m e to be k n o w n as the doctrine
of primary and secondary quaUties ...
W h a t Gatileo seems to have [said] was that a body, to be a body at ad, must
have at least the qualities of shape, position, motion or rest, contiguity (or spatial
relation to other bodies), and number. Such so-caUed primary qualities really
inhere in bodies themselves; others such as taste and feel, which came to be catied
secondary qualities, only inhere in the m i n d of the observer. This is an
epistemological/ontological doctrine that was to engender a considerable amount of
phdosophical discussion in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries ... The point
to be noted here is that Gatileo seems to have distinguished those qualities that
were susceptible to investigation by means of mathematical analysis from those
that were not. Here, then, w e have one of the chief sources of the doctrine of
primary and secondary qualities, which ... w a s to interact in philosophically
interesting ways with the seventeenth century doctrine of matter - either
corpuscularian or atomistic. (Oldroyd 1989, p. 59)
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Oldroyd's closing comments here, differentiating corpuscularian and atomistic conceptions,
uses a restricted sense of matter being corpuscular as advocated in the Cartesian phdosophy
following Descartes, and contrasted with the atomism revived by Gassendi. These two
ontological beliefs are outlined below.
The Cartesian belief system
The fourth belief system, the Cartesian cosmology, is only part of Descartes' vast
contribution to Western European thought. Its basic ontological beliefs revised
metaphysical qualities, largely as mathematical entities:
Descartes regards the universe as infinite and devoid of any empty space. The
primary quality of matter is extension, but there are also derived (not secondary)
qualities of divisibility and mobility, which are created by God. (Singer 1959, p.
262)
[In the sense of] reduction of phenomena to kinematic or geometrical quantities
(corpuscular phdosophy), [Cartesian cosmology] limits the ingredients of physical
theory to size, shape, motion, impenetrability, and, perhaps, inertia [and is] to be
opposed to Newtonian [cosmology]. (Hedbron 1983a, p. 53)
Although Cartesian cosmology had considerable currency for a time and remained
influential in France until the mid eighteenth century, it faded to account for a number of
phenomena such as planetary motion as described by Kepler's laws. It was inconsistent
with and defeated by Newton's physics (Singer 1959, p. 262). Nonetheless, it was
Descartes w h o , with Gassendi (1592-1655) and Boyle (1627-91), was mainly responsible
for popularising the mechanical philosophy in the seventeenth century. It was, however,
the conception developed progressively by Boyle, Newton and then Dalton (1766-1844)
that ultimately prevailed, and that Oldroyd characterised as atomistic in die passage above.
The atomistic belief systems
Thefifthsystem of betiefs current in Europe in the middle of the seventeenth century
was that of Gassendi w h o , like Gatileo and Descartes, developed physics as a study of
matter and its motion. Gassendi's cosmos represented a revival of the atomism of
Democritus and Epicurius, although with the initial creation of atoms and their motion being
given by G o d . Subsequent to this initial divine act, Gassendi's cosmos was entirely
explainable in terms of primary qualities:
[For Gassendi, everything within the universe could be explained by] the
magnitude, arrangement, shape, and motion of invisible, extended, physically
indivisible, ponderable, impenetrable atoms moving in an infinite void. Motion is
rectilinear w h e n unconstrained, indestructible, and non-transferable ... Atoms act
upon one another only by impact... (May 1983, p. 82)
The details of the nature of the interactions between these four competing belief
systems in seventeenth century Europe are beyond the scope of this section, but their more
or less concurrent existence certainly serves to highlight the role of basic betiefs in the
development of science and characterisations of it. In any event a more or less consensus
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view emerged which is summarised by Harre" as the Corpuscularian system in its more
general sense:

'(i) Ultimately there is only one substance, and change is possible because it is
divided into units, which are capable of motion and hence rearrangement'
'(ii) The arrangements of the corpuscles is the real essence of bodies, and defines
their primary quaUties.'
'(iii) Geometry as die science of shape, and mechanics as the science of motion
are the fundamental sciences.'
(iv) Changes in our ideas of secondary qualities are the result of changes in the
arrangement and state of motion of constituent corpuscles.'
(v) Basically the only real happenings were redistributions of motion brought
about through action by contact'
(vi) The ultimate properties of corpuscles were their power to ftil space (their
extension), and their power to resist instantaneous increments of motion
(their inertia). (Harr6 1985, p. 138)
Harre continues that Boyle attempted a proof of corpuscularianism, but Boscovitch showed
incoherencies and contradictions in ontological betiefs of 'mechanical action by contact
among solid, incompressible bodies' (p. 138).
At this time, some who advocated atomism further thought that the corpuscles could
be derived by the processes of analysis (Harre" 1985, p. 128). Boscovitch's objection to
belief in corpuscular matter anticipated later developments in physics and metaphysics,
interpreted the cosmos by fields rather than entities or things:
If a material thing is regarded as a perduring occupant of space capable of being
perceptuaUy identified, then m a n y objects of scientific knowledge, though
dependent for their identification upon material things, are immaterial. Indeed, R.
J. Boscovitch (1711-87) and I. Kant (1724-1804) and others have argued that the
ultimate objects of scientific knowledge, wherever the 'ultimate' m a y faU for us,
cannot be thingish (corpuscularian), but must be field-like. (Bhaskar 1983f, p.
249)
Even though the objections of Boscovitch and others proved to have more currency in later
twentieth century science, atomistic or corpuscularian notions from that time remain in
popular consciousness today, perhaps due to their compatibdity with the simpler atomic

models proposed earlier in the twentieth century. For example, mass is treated as a prope

in Newtonian physics but as a relation in Einsteinian physics (Chalmers 1982, p. 162); t

latter is a difficult concept for those whose idea of matter is ball-and-stick models of
molecules.
Bhaskar (1989, pp. 15-18) rejects both empiricism and idealism/constmctivism on

the basis of their shared ontology, that is, their shared beliefs about being. This view

described in discussion of experimentation in Appendix B.5, and mentioned in section 2.1
below, on beliefs about experimentation.
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2.10 Beliefs about experimentation
Beliefs that experimentation is an appropriate way to gain knowledge of the material
world have characterised science, particularly from the Scientific Revolution, d o w n to the
present. These beliefs served to enable and influence experimentation, and in turn were
influenced and legitimised by the considerable experimental successes from the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries onwards. Borhek and Curtis, for example, link the capacity for
experimentation by any suitably trained person direcdy to the nature of the scientific betief
system (see summary statement 77). Bhaskar has argued that the very inteUigibdity of the
experiment rests on particular beliefs about Nature:
At the experiment's core is the notion that the conditions for producing a given
effect can be separated into independentiy variable factors, in such a w a y as to
demonstrate h o w the factors behave in their natural (i.e. the non-experimental)
state. (Bhaskar 1983c, p. 136)
S o m e of these betiefs date from antiquity. For example, Aristode's inductive-deductive
method rests on the assumptions or beliefs that the cosmos is regular, not capricious, and
free from wdful supernatural intervention. A s w e have mentioned, the decline of both
mediaeval scholasticism and magical beliefs represented the decline of beliefs that were
antithetical to experimental interrogation of Nature. This is not to say that the only science
activity of inquiry is experiment, because clearly somefields,such as astronomy and
medicine, have m a d e advances even w h e n a strict sense of experiment has not been
possible. Nonetheless, experiments are characteristic activities of science, as discussed in
the companion chapter and Appendix B.5 on activity; the point here is that they are m a d e
possible and used because of betiefs about the nature of the cosmos and the appropriate
orientation to it
The emergence of beliefs that entaded experimental inquiry of Nature competed with
and contributed to the decline of the other betief systems, although they emerged over some
time (Bhaskar 1983c; Oldroyd 1989, pp. 149-56). Bhaskar (1983c) has listed several
betiefs that proved to be critical, and their proponents:
•
Belief in the need for 'independent testing of the principles reached by
induction and active experimentation to extend the factual (or inductive) basis
of science',firstattributed to Robert Grosseteste (cl 168-1253) and his pupd
Roger Bacon (cl219-92) (Bhaskar 1983c, p. 136).
•

Belief in 'the need to differentiate accidental from essential (or necessary)
correlations and to decide between alternative hypotheses for the data',
attributed to Francis Bacon (1561-1626) (Bhaskar 1983c, p. 137).

•

Logic and methodological betiefs, in the methods for establishing agreement,
attributed to D u n s Scotus (cl266-1308), and difference, by Wtitiam of
O c k h a m (cl285-1349), as part of the development of a logic of experimental
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inquiry, with various contributions from Francis Bacon, Isaac N e w t o n and
David H u m e (1711-76).
•

These culminated in thefiveCanons of induction proposed by John Smart
M d l (1806-73). Although c o m m o n l y discussed as elements of activity,
Miti's Canons are actuady principles for conducting inductive inquiry. That
is, they are elements of a betief system; this is discussed in section 3 of
Chapter 7, and induction and experimentation are discussed in Appendix B.5
on activity.

T h e point here is that a particular belief system, through its beliefs, assumptions and
criteria, justified and gave form to an experimental approach that characterised western
European science from that time d o w n to the present. It included betiefs about the proper
orientation toward the material world in order to gain knowledge of it
Bhaskar (1989) has argued that of the three main phdosophical characterisations of
science that comprise the current consensus - post-positivist versions of empiricism,
idealism andrealism- experimentation is inteltigible only according to the betiefs of
scientific realism. Broadly, he claims that there are three domains of reatity, and the
empiricist and rationalist traditions, which share an ontology that Bhaskar calls empirical
realism, codapse the three domains of reatity into one. In his view, empiricalrealismis
flawed because of several betiefs about being (ontology) and knowledge of being
(epistemology). First w e shape our beliefs about the nature of the cosmos according to
what w e experience and reason, whereas empiricalrealismdefines Nature (ontology) by
categories of experience (epistemology). The purpose of empirical realism is mainly to
justify betief; therefore it seeks certainty and in doing this it examines only certain
phenomena. Secondly, empirical realism assumes that the world is essentiady
experienciable, whereas scientific realism assumes that some things happen to be
experienciable and are therefore significant for science. Thirdly, empiricalrealismdoes not
account for the fact that the circumstances where experience in science is epistemicaUy
significant are sociatiy produced circumstances (Bhaskar 1975, p. 28). Thus, according to
empirical reatism, the world is human-dependent (empirical) and knowledge is activityindependent (asocial). O n the other hand, scientific reatism characterises science by
consciously and sociaUy produced knowledge of an objective, or intransitive, world. Thus
experiments need to be recognised as consciously contrived manipulations of reatity: the
world is human-independent (transcendentaUy real) and knowledge is human-dependent
(social).

Appendix B.2: Belief system

684

2.11 Models and metaphors
Science is characterised often by models and metaphors that are used to represent
elements of betief systems: fundamental betiefs, assumptions, values and attitudes. Models
and metaphors are useful because they succincdy represent complex ideas. Scientists and
others use a variety of models, both formal and informal, but the representational function
of the language overlaps with that used for metaphors: sometimes there can be no
meaningful distinction between labelling something an informal model or a metaphor, so
this section will deal with both. The key characteristic is the use of language for
representation, which applies to metaphors and models of ad types:
SemanticaUy, metaphor can be understood as a transfer of a term between different
contexts of meaning. Metaphors thus emerge, in the 'hermeneutic' approach, as
crucial for understanding conceptual transfer between scientific disciplines, or
between science and other areas of culture. (Golinski 1990, p. 116).
Metaphoricalredescription(e.g.tightas waves rather than particles) is often held
to be central to theoretical changes in science. A n e w metaphor does not merely
provide 'answers' to pre-existing 'questions': rather, by radically recasting our
perceptions, it creates n e w problems, observational terms and experimental
strategies, and hence largely determines the nature of empiricalresults... Analysis
of metaphor dluminates such problems as h o w to talk about unobservables, and
the nature of changes in the meaning of theoretical terms. (Edge 1983, p. 264)
[Models are] an interpretation of a formal system and/or arepresentation,normady
by analogy (but sometimes by metaphor), of one thing by something else. Models
m a y be m a d e for mnemonic, heuristic, explanatory, or test purposes. (Bhaskar
1983h, p. 272)
The characterisation of the Scientific Revolution partly by the adoption of mechanistic
beliefs is an example that can be considered as both model and metaphor of a mechanical
system. It uses well k n o w n images such as clock mechanisms to embody the notion of
similar interactions between corpuscles or atoms (Codingwood 1945; Singer 1959), but its
interpretation as model or metaphor depends largely on the interpretive viewpoint
For example, Needham (1969, including summary statement 72) implied or seems to
imply the necessity of a mechanical model of Nature in order to m a k e the shift from
primitive or mediaeval science to modern science. The assumption that any science in any
culture would need to progress through a period of adopting a mechanical model, as the
Europeans did in the seventeenth century, in order to finatiy develop modern science is a
strong argument for the power of models and metaphors. (Needham's other assumption,
that the Western European conception of science is the 'best' conception in any case, raises
questions of historical and socio-cultural interpretation that are discussed in sections 2.6
and 2.12 of Appendix B, and in the companion chapter on context) The historical use of
the mechanistic beUef system or mechanical philosophy, however, is worth mentioning in
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the context of the present argument Oldroyd's account in his discussion of Locke, put this
wed:
Locke intended his empirical philosophy to be used as an underpinning for, or
philosophical justification of, certain major metaphysical assumptions of the
science of his day, being chiefly concerned with giving a warrant for the
mechanical philosophy and principle of causality - that like causes are always
followed by like effects, every effect having a cause, there being no uncaused
(physical) events. The mechanical philosophy in the seventeenth century took on a
great variety of forms, but in general it assumed that there was a world of atoms or
corpuscles below the level of the visible world. A n d the coalitions and interactions
between these small particles, and perhaps their intrinsic attributes, might be held
responsible for, or explain, the phenomena of the world of everyday experience.
In addition, the mechanical phdosophers supposed that aU physical, chemical and
biological phenomena, and to some extent mental phenomena as wed, were to be
accounted for in mechanical terms. So in m a n y seventeenth- and eighteenthcentury scientific writings w e find a heavy reliance on mechanical models and
analogies. Both Descartes and Newton were, in their different ways, mechanical
phdosophers. Boyle and Hobbes were phdosophers of this kind par excellence.
(Oldroyd 1989, p. 87)
So regardless of the argument over the necessity of a mechanical model, its
widespread and long-term deployment indicates its usefulness. Consideration of usefulness
implies, of course, some context in which it was useful, and the use of scientific ideas in
the industrial revolution in Europe is taken up in the companion chapter on context
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2.12 Other belief systems
Some accounts characterise a western European scientific tradition by contrasting its
fundamental assumptions and beliefs with those of other cultures. This raises several
fundamental difficulties in using the criteria of western science to judge traditions in nonwestern cultures, which are discussed above and in the companion chapter on context. One
is the very use of the word science in non-western contexts, and another is the (often
unrecognised) assumptions used in making cross-cultural comparisons: hence the decision,
made in the companion chapter on context to use the term natural philosophies rather then
become enmeshed in disputes about what constitutes science in non-western contexts. This
section gives some examples to show h o w the literature characterises contemporary western
European science by differences and similarities between belief systems, in particular the
underlying beliefs about the cosmos (ontological betiefs) and the orientation necessary to
have knowledge of it (epistemological beliefs).
Briefly, several themes emerge in accounts that contrast western European science
with other natural philosophies, where the differences between western and non-westem
betief systems arises from one or more of these themes. Thefirsttheme is the identification
of the cosmos with a god or deity; that is, a betief in pantheism. Another is a betief that
events in the cosmos are cyclic, often accompanied by related betiefs in reincarnation. A
third is a belief that the cosmos and its entities are organic , that is, an animistic view.
Arising from one or more of thefirstthree themes, the fourth theme is the belief that the
cosmos is by its nature unknowable by humans, and it is this betief that is argued to
characterise the significant difference between western European science and other natural
phtiosophies.
A s w e have seen, the Ionians adopted an inquisitive orientation to a cosmos explained
in naturalistic terms. The accounts reviewed here contrast this with other metaphysical
views that did not admit human inquiry. The proper orientation in those cases was to accept
that the w a y of the world was as it was, and could not or should not be interrogated by
humans. This is not to say that the Ionians' belief systems were immediately and
completely distinct fiom other betief systems, such as those in India and China at that time,
because they were not. For instance, Jaki (1974) noted strong cyclic elements in various
Greek cosmologies, including Aristotle's. O n CoUingwood's account, Thales believed the
cosmos to be animistic in a fashion not dissimdartowhat w e have discussed:
... Thales conceived the world of nature as an organism: in fact as an animal. This
is confirmed by the fragments which have c o m e d o w n to us of Thales' o w n
utterances. According to these fragments, Thales regarded the world (the earth
plus the heavens) as something 'ensouled', a living organism or animal, within
which are lesser organisms having souls of their o w n ; so that a single tree or a
single stone is, according to him, both ativingorganism in itself and also a part of
the greattivingorganism which is the world. O n e such organism within the world
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is the earth; which Thales, w e are told, conceived asfloatingupon an ocean of
water. Since he certainly thought of the earth as alive, and certainly thought of it
and everything in it as made of water, and probably also thought, as his pupds
certainly thought, that everything in nature was constantly passing away and
therefore in need of constant renewal or replacement, he m a y possibly have
conceived the earth as grazing, so to speak, on the water in which itfloats,thus
repairing its o w ntissuesand thetissuesof everything in it by taking in water from
this ocean and transforming it by processes akin to respiration and digestion, into
various parts of its o w n body. W e are told, moreover, that he described the world
as something m a d e by God. That is to say, the vital processes of this cosmic
organism were not conceived by him as self-existent or eternal (for he said that
G o d is 'older' than the world) but as depending for their existence on an agency
prior to them and transcending them (Collingwood 1945, p. 31)
This general world view clearly bears greater simdarity to the Chinese and other early
cosmologies than it does to post-Renaissance Western European science. A general world
view, w h d e it is part of a characterisation of a natural science, is therefore not the
determining characteristic. The present thesis argues that any world view arises from a
betief system that only partly characterises a science or natural phdosophy.
Likewise, some commentaries on the Aztecs contrast their betiefs with those of the
Western European scientific tradition (Soustede 1964; Jaki 1974). Aztec cosmology drew
on earlier cultures, such as the Mayas, and was extant up until the European invasion in
1519. Briefly, the Aztecs believed that the cosmos was grim, demanding and capricious
and thus not subject to human comprehension; the proper orientation to it was therefore one
of submission and awe, not investigation. T w o particular features of the Aztec cosmology
at this time should be noted. The first is the integral role gods were believedtohave in both
the creation and continuation of the cosmos. The second is the centratity of cycles in the
Aztec cosmology, in which the physical manifestation of the world, including space and
time, w a s subordinate to the cycles. SousteUe (1964) has argued a that there w a s a
significant link between the cyclic view of Nature - in which special significance was
attached to the regularreappearancesof the sun and Venus, and offlowersfoUowing the
rains of the n e w season, for example - and betiefs in h u m a n reincarnation, which
dominated 'the whole of ancient Mexican thought, and their whole vision of the world'
(SousteUe 1964, p. 118). These betiefs were central to the Aztec conception of the cosmos
and the destinies of people, and from them arose attitudes about the appropriate orientation
to this cosmos, as w e shall see.
The Aztecs betieved the cosmos to have been created and ruled by m a n y gods - a sun
god, rain god, m o o n god, maize god and so on - to w h o m worship and sometimes sacrifice
w a s believed to induce the god's favour and, through totemic association, the desired
outcome. The sun, which w a s central to Aztec life, was betieved to have been created by
one god throwing himself into afire:the sun's continued movement was secured by human
sacrifice and the offering of blood, without which it would stop and the world would end in
darkness and disaster. Thus basic betiefs about the nature of the cosmos led to behaviours
of sacrifice and worship as appropriate ways to interact with Nature.
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The Aztecs conceptualised the earth as symbolised by, but not literaUy, a 'monster
with wide-open jaws which swallows the sun in its setting, the remains ofthe dead and the
blood of the sacrificed' (SousteUe 1964, p. 116). T h e significance of this betief here is not
the image itself of the monster, but that the earth w a s organic (and therefore having simtiar
characteristics to humans), required sacrifices of blood, accounted for other beliefs about
the dead, and w a s a fearful image, inspiring a w e and terror. Significandy, it did not invite
inquiry as to its nature beyond this image.
T o the Aztecs, units of time recurred, somethingtikethe seven recurring day units in
our calendar but also physically recurring. T h e cyclic nature of the cosmos was very
significant, in that it aUowed no h u m a n escape and against which there could be no human
intervention or control. The belief that there could be n o h u m a n intervention in Nature is
also fundamental. T h e world in which the Aztecs lived w a s betieved to be the fifth such
world, the previous four being represented by the four suns in Aztec calendars. Like the
previous worlds, the world of the Aztecs w a s believed to be ephemeral, an dlusion of
reality beyond which were terrible monsters, and that would end catastrophically. The
complicated system of Aztec cycles was set out in the Aztec calendar, which also formalised
the fundamental betiefs that characterised the Aztec conception of the cosmos, by linking
ontological, retigious and mystical beliefs. Thus a system of signs, numbers and influences
were assigned to the cycles, and to gods, cardinal points (north, south, east and west) and
qualities; space and time were undistinguished, as multiple instances of space-time:
T h e qualities peculiar to each of these 'moment-loci' ... follow one another
cyclically in abrupt, total change according to a determinate rhythm, in conformity
with an everlasting order. (SousteUe 1964, pp. 123-4)
While it is tempting to foreshadow here Einstein's notion of space-time, Soustetie's point is
that the Aztecs' idea was too imprecise to measure, and in any case w a s believed to be
beyond h u m a n control. Once again, basic ontological betiefs both provide for and limit the
concepts available for further thinking about and investigation of the cosmos. In this
instance, the effect was to entati a betief that events concerning nature and of humans were
localised and disconnected:
In the absence of a generaUsed notion of space and time, the basic conceptual
foundation also was missing for a consideration of the succession of events as a
rationally explorable chain in which each link causally acts and is also acted upon
(Jaki 1974, p. 52 ).
The combined effect of these betiefs profoundly influenced the orientation of the
Aztecs to the universe. This is to be expected: if one holds certain beliefs to be true then a
certain orientation - meaning an attitude, a belief in what actions are effective inrelationto
Nature - necessarily fodows. For example, given the belief that Nature was cyclic, terrible
and disjunctive, the proper orientation was to submittothe
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cyclic, rhythmic, and basicady violent transformations of nature around [them]...
Indeed, nature for the Aztecs was a source of fear which they ultimately came to
honour and worship (Jaki 1974, pp. 52-3).
SousteUe also characterises the Aztec orientation to the cosmos as a reactive attitude, clearly
related to a set of beliefs:

At bottom the ancient Mexicans had no real confidence in the future, their fragtie
world w a s perpetually at the mercy of some disaster: there were not only the
natural cataclysms and the famines, but more than that, on certain nights the
monstrous divinities of the west appeared at the crossroads, and there were the
wizards, those dark envoys from a mysterious world, and everyfifty-twoyears
there was the great fear that fed upon all the nations of the empire when the sun set
on the last day of the 'century' and no m a n [sic] could ted whether it would ever
rise again. (Soustede 1964, p. 114)
Quite clearly, such attitudes are fundamentady at odds with a betief that the cosmos
could be subject to inquiry. Another attitude, concerning the orientation to the cosmos,
arises from the belief that the fate of each individual was subject to strict predestinat
Indeed, man [sic] had but an insignificant place in the Mexican vision of the
world. H e w a s governed by predestination; neither his life nor his after-tife were
in his o w n hands, and determinism ruled every phase of his short stay on earth.
H e was crushed under the weight of the gods and the stars: he was prisoner of the
omnipotent signs.... Horror and horrifying monsters surrounded him on ad sides:
ghosts and apparitions m a d e their dark signals of despair. (Soustede 1964, p. 126)
A n attitude of resignation and defeat is implied as arising from the belief in
predestination. SousteUe argues that betief in predestination influenced what it was in
Nature that the Aztecs looked for and, by implication, their notion of cause and effect.
Thus, the interpretation of events was in terms of omens:
Minds that were so very much under the domination of fate could not but be
uncommonly sensitive to omens, whether they were drawnfromtittleeveryday
happenings or from extraordinary phenomena. A n unaccustomed noise in the
mountains, the cry of an owl, a rabbit running into a house, or a wolf crossing the
road foretold disaster. (Soustede 1964, p. 125)
Belief in o m e n s represents a particular belief in cause and effect. T h e relative
significance of ordinary and extraordinary events and their explanations is arecurringissue
in characterising natural philosophies. A betief in omens is consistent with interest in
extraordinary, rather than ordinary, phenomena Thus an uncommon and presumably
unexpected event would prompt the search for an other uncommon event that could be
deemed to be associated with it. The associated event is then presumed to have been an
o m e n for the first event, and there is interest in future in being watchful for further omens

so that future events can be predicted. This has some simdarities with post hoc analysis
the Western European scientific tradition, which would also seek extraordinary phenomena
that closely preceded an extraordinary event to try to establish a cause and effect
relationship. But the use of observational data - of symptoms or phenomena - to make
naturalistic predictions or construct explanations is different to an interpretation in
omens, which are non-naturalistic.
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A s afinalcomment on the Aztecs, the belief in predestination also related to the
calendar, as mentioned above, by linking ontological and mystical betiefs, and by assigning
various significances to the cycles, ontological qualities, gods and the cardinal points. This
enabled a person's destiny to be worked out using the complicated calendar. The Aztecs,
like aU central American peoples foUowing the Mayas:
[They] worked out complex chronological systems, and this for two purposes: the
first was tofindfixed points in order to understand and foresee the succession of
natural phenomena, the seasons, and the movements of the stars, and so to
regulate theritesthat were necessary to their proper sequence; the second was to
determine the fate of each and the fortunes of each undertaking by means of a body
of portents which m a d e up a coherent whole quite as 'scientific' for those people
as our rational explanations of the world aretous. (Soustede 1964, p. 124)
The closing comment from Soustede illustrates two points. First it underscores the point
that each belief system m a d e sense within its o w n cultural context. Secondly, the language
he uses nonetheless indicates an analysis in terms of our (western European) beliefs: their
betief system is 'quite as "scientific"', w h d e ours are 'rational explanations'. The
unacknowledged bias in such claims does not alter the fact that nonetheless ontological and
epistemological betiefs are used in the characterisation of science. A comparison of betiefs
between cultures, and the resulting insights into the nature of beliefs, wdl be given later and
address the effects of such cultural biases. The point here is that the Aztecs claimed
observational support of the cosmos for their beliefs, which w a s SousteUe's final point,
above. A n d in turn, this raises a question which w d l recur in this chapter, as to h o w these
differ from beliefs held in the Western European scientific tradition, which also claims to
support ontological beliefs with observations. Examples from other cultures wdl needtobe
given before a satisfactory analysis can be attempted.
Hindu (Indian) cosmology
A comprehensive m o d e m western analysis of Hindu science has yet to be done, and
would be problematic (Ronan 1982, p. 187). Nonetheless, there is sufficient k n o w n of
Hindu science to serve as an example here. A s for the Aztecs, the cosmos was betieved to
be cyclic and animistic, but is a clearer example of pantheism:
The basis of Hinduism is an animistic religion with a large number of different
gods not unlike those of the Egyptians, and dieretigiousactivities of the Hindu are
devoted to ritual observances which permit every aspect of life to c o m e into tune
with these various gods and spirits. For it is accepted that the universe is in danger
of being destroyed by chaos, and the sacrifices offered by m e n could help to
strengthen the gods ... This betief has been important in the mingling of physical
and spiritual studies as can be seen in the widespread practices of yoga and other
forms of asceticism. The Hindu religion has encouraged spiritual inquiry, and has
developed lofty concepts of the unity of Nature and of the Divine Principle ...
(Ronan 1982, p. 188)
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Jaki points to pervasive references in ancient Hindu literature to a cosmos identified
with an 'undifferentiated, eternal' being, the Brahman. There is again a world-view that
discouraged inquiry, or what Jaki characterises as rational inquiry:
Escape from [the preoccupation with the wheel of cycles] w a s well-nigh
impossible either emotionally or conceptually. Only confusion in logic could be
generated by a pantheistic description of the cosmos in which the supreme deity
w a s defined as being cause and effect simultaneously...
... (I)n the universe everything was the prey of blind, capricious convolutions
or cycles. T h e laws of those cycles permitted no rational explanation, as it was a
patendy absurd task to m a k e a critical analysis ofthe breathing of Brahma, which
allegedly regulated the universe. If m a n [sic] was a tiny part of a huge cosmic
animal, there remained little if any psychological possibility that he could ever
achieve a conceptual stance which would put him outside the whole for a critical
look at it. (Jaki 1974, pp. 19-20)
Once again, the particular concepts in themselves are not the most significant factor.
Concepts such as B r a h m a are recognisably not part of the Western European scientific
tradition, but it is also true that m a n y concepts within the Western European tradition have
gained and lost favour. Thales' answer of water is just one such example. O n Jaki's
account, it is the belief that the universe was capricious and that humanity could only be
part of a living universe, and the attitudes attendant to those beliefs that works against a
scientific tradition (tike the western European one). H e argues that the underlying belief that
the cosmos w a s a deity m a d e an understanding of the cosmos futile and denied a betief that
the cosmos is open to inquiry.
Chinese natural philosophies
In China, as in Mexico and India, the orientation to inquiry was shaped by a set of
general beliefs about the cosmos, or metaphysics. T h e example of China is worthwhde
pursuing in a little more detail, because ofthe interesting questions about science raised by
comparisons between the Chinese and European situations. T h e companion chapter on
context discussed the difficulties in interpreting natural phdosophies in non-westem
cultures, but used China as an example. T h e particular example here is that there was a
scientific revolution in Europe that spurred a prolonged and flourishing science tradition,
but not in China, even though m a n y developments in Chinese natural phdosophy were
concurrent with, or predated, similar developments in Europe. Jaki (1974) and others have
characterised this as a 'fatiure' of the Chinese, but as the companion chapter on context
discusses, this is a contentious judgement. The point here is that beliefs are central to these
interpretations.
Chinese history shows periods of significant practical scientific and technological
achievement long periods of peace, 'material prosperity, active social interplay, creativity
of mind, and possibly of contacts with other cultures' (Jaki 1974, p. 31). Cultural
achievements were passed on from generation to generation. The Chinese made comparable
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developments in knowledge and technologies to the Europeans, and in m a n y cases Chinese
inventions preceded European equivalents by centuries:
It was around 350 B C . that the astronomer Shih Shen drew up his catalogue of
some 800 stars, and that the central storing of manuscripts got under w a y in the
Imperial Library. In thefieldof technology the same age also witnessed further
improvements in water works and the extension of the Great W a d ... During [the
age of the Warring States (220-581)] the Chinese invented the vertical waterwheel
and the wheelbarrow, devices highly indicative of continued technological interest.
(Jaki 1974, p. 31)
Before the H a n period (220 B C . - 220 A D . ) , the Chinese m a d e effective use of horses
ahead of other civilisations, and they invented the stirrup, which in mediaeval times they
modified into the collar harness. During the H a n period they discovered that magnetic ore
indicated direction, and invented paper making. In the Thang period (618-906) they became
thefirstto print books and make gunpowder, made great advances in crafting porcelain and
developed water-driven mechanical clocks. In the Sung period (960-1279) magnets were
used for travel, moveable clay types were used for printing, iron mongery was highly
developed and Chinese algebra was equal to that in Europe about 1250. Yet Francis Bacon
had characterised the Scientific Revolution in Europe as significant and unique because of
the printing press, gunpowder and the magnetic compass!
According to Needham's thesis, Bacon got it wrong because printing, gunpowder
and magnets were developed in different cultural contexts. W e w d l also draw attention to
different bases in betiefs. Both Jaki and Needham argue that the Chinese advances were not
incorporated into a theory capable of development. They conclude that the essential
difference was the set of beliefs w e identify in the post-Renaissance Europeans as a
mechanistic conception of the cosmos, and the absence of this set of beliefs in Chinese
thinking:
N e e d h a m seeks the elements that inhibited Chinese science. H e enumerates
various factors. T o develop m o d e m science, 'Interest in Nature was not enough,
controlled experimentation was not enough, eclipse-prediction and calendarcalculation were not enough - ad of these the Chinese had' (Needham, 1956).
W h a t was missing, then, was the establishment of a mechanistic phdosophy.
(Nakayama 1973, p. 39)
The absence of a mechanistic philosophy as the explanation, of course, m a y or m a y
not be the case: noting Sivin's caution, above, w e cannot claim that this description gives
an explanation of cause and effect. Just because it happened one way in Europe does not
mean it was the only possible way. It is difficult to judge the likelihood of one possibiUty
among m a n y being the only possible cause. In any event the mechanistic cosmology has
since been rejected by Western European science. There are several possible interpretations.
A belief in a mechanistic cosmos m a y have been a useful, and perhaps necessary,
development in the Western European scientific tradition: useful or necessary to provide a
model sufficiendy successful to aUow other belief systems to be rejected. It m a y also be
that, a m o n g all the other developments from the time of the Renaissance onwards, a
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mechanistic belief system was not necessary, nor even useful except that it did not clash
and inhibit other developments. It was certainly useful in the contemporaneous advances in
technology, and considering the social and economic usefulness that began to be perceived
of science, the conclusion must be that the mechanistic belief was useful in the Western
European context.
The Europeans' belief in a mechanistic cosmology marked a clear difference between
Chinese and European sciences. For example, Ronan's introduction to Chinese science
begins in terms of beliefs (Ronan 1982, p. 133),referringto 'an outlook on the world and
on science which w a s different in m a n y aspects from that characteristic of the W e s t ' This
general statement does gloss over the fact that there were several schools of thought that
contributed to Chinese natural philosophy, and some indication of this diversity follows.
Confucianism and Taoism are the two schools of thought which are most widely known in
the West, although there have been contributions from other schools, such as the Mohists,
the Logicians and the Legalists (Ronan 1982, p. 133).
Ronan's characterisation of the fundamental distinction of Chinese science is in terms
of fundamental beliefs about the nature of the cosmos:
But it wdl be a help in understanding [the Chinese'] achievements if w e realise that
even from very early times, the Chinese looked on the entire universe as a vast
organism, of which m a n [sic] and the natural world were both a part. This had a
profound impact on the w a y they explained phenomena that they observed; in
some cases it helped them attain an understanding long before this was achieved in
the West, but in a few instances it prevented them finding the true explanation for
the w a y die world behaved. (Ronan 1982, p. 133)
Despite Ronan's notion of true explanation being at odds with the post-positivist rejection
of absolute truth, even a weaker interpretation of true explanation as unfalsified or strongly
confirmed can still be understood intermsof a set of betiefs about the nature of the cosmos
(ontological betiefs).
The similarity of the concepts described in this passage to concepts being brought to
contemporary Western European science, such as the notion of Gaia - of the earth as a
living system - is striking. Clearly, the same comments as applied to Nakayama's
paraphrasing of Needham's attention to the mechanistic cosmos, above, apply here to
Ronan's attention to the organismic conception of the Chinese universe. Ronan's equation
of Western European scientific explanations with 'the true explanation' again reveals a lack
of acknowledgment of the framework within which he w a s describing betiefs, and an
unacknowledged assumption of a particular stance within Western European phdosophy.
Some Chinese belief systems: the Mohists
There were several schools of Chinese belief, namely the Mohists, the Legalists and
the Confucians, and a number of developments, that could have become antecedents for a
science in the Western European tradition but did not. For example, the followers of M o Ti
(c. 500 B C . - 425 BC.) held betiefs resembling those identified with the Western European
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scientific tradition. In something approximatetothe relative status of academic and technical
knowledge in Europe, the Mohists advocated:

equality, brotherhood, and practical artisanship ... [which] had some unmistakable
characteristics of scientific mentality. It was in a book ascribed to M o Ti that there
appeared definitions about space, duration, causality, geometric figures, and
energy that have some depersonalised, abstract, and quantitative flavour. In
addition, the Mohists strove for practical implementation of general propositions.
M o Ti himself earned fame not only for his dicta but also for the budding of
catapults and other war machines in defence of security and equality. But what for
the Mohists was a systematic effort to control the future on the basis of past
experiences, soon became branded as cheap utilitarianism and lack of refinement
(Jaki 1974, p. 25)
The Mohists consequendy exerted no lasting influence on Chinese thinking, as also was t
case with the Logicians and the Legalists. The Logicians were not clearly differentiated
from the Mohists but did provide some phdosophical explication of 'concepts (eg. white,
hard, horse, etc.) as distinct from particular things' and a codection of paradoxes designed
to stimulate consideration of 'fundamental questions' (Ronan 1982, p. 141).
The Legalists' belief system
In the fourth and third centuries B C the Legalists advocated a harsh, authoritarian
system of social organisation, the details of which are beyond the scope of this thesis.
However, their concern for prescriptive detati led to attempts to quantify observations and
something akin to natural laws as in European science. This is explained in the fodowing
passage, which is quoted in fuU because it includes m a n y examples of the use of betiefs and
attitudes in discussing science:
But however severe and unbending the Legalists were, their efforts are important
in the history of Chinese science, because it was they w h o began the custom of
detailing everything precisely - of quantifying in numbers ad conceivable matters,
from the widths of chariot wheels to human conduct...
In stressing theraleof preordained law, the Legatists came close to the concept
so strong in Europe, of the L a w s of Nature. It was a natural concept in die
Western world, because there were always betiefs in personal guiding deities,
mosdy omnipotent They ruled m a n [sic] and the world around him, so the idea
that things,tivingor inanimate, behaved according to a divinely ordained law was
to be expected. But this was not so in China, where there was no belief in a
personal, guiding and lawgiving deity. The universe was an organism: it operated
because everythingfittedinto its natural place and acted according to its nature.
W h e n the Legalists fell, their scheme went with them, the stimulus to express
processes in numbers could not bereplaced.Chinese law could not help because it
w a s quite different from predetermined law in the Legalist sense where every
crime and punishment was quantified; Chinese law knew only the 'natural law' of
custom and usage tempered by what was fair and humanely desirable. That is not
to say that China had no codes of laws, but they were codes with a humanistic
bias. They reflected the Chinese attitude to die universe where everything
happened because of an inbutit universal tightness, harmony and wed-estabtished
custom. Crime and legal disputes were looked on more as disturbances in man's
[sic] relationship with Nature than anything else. Indeed, in the T'ang code of law
it was stated specificaUy that it is dangerous to m o v e from this kind of natural law
to a law of legaUyfixedpunishments. (Ronan 1982, pp. 142-3)
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T h e Legalists developed atinkbetween language and ontology, which matched increased
specificity in language with increasing specificity in ontology; this principle is universady
applicable. T h e structure of Western European science as laws of Nature is explained by
Western European beliefs that everything - humans and their environment - operated
because they were guided by divinely ordained laws given by powerful, personal guiding
deities. A s discussed in the companion chapters on context and structure, this betief is
considered to have predisposed the Europeans to look for lawlike regularities. However, by
characterising Chinese science by a belief that 'the universe was an organism [that] operated
because everythingfittedinto its natural place and acted according to its nature', Ronan
draws attentiontothe influence of the organism metaphor the nature of entities is explained
in terms of the parts of an organism. T h e usefulness of betiefs in characterising science is
shown later in the paragraph, for they indicate h o w the processes and conceptual structures
of the two systems must differ w h e n the basic beliefs are fundamentally different. The
Chinese belief (or what R o n a n calls an attitude) that in Nature 'everything happened
because of an inbudt universal Tightness, harmony and weU-estabtished custom' is in itself
not dissimdar to that of Aristode. However, it does indicate a significant difference between
the Chinese and (especially post-Renaissance) European ontologies, including different
notions of cause and effect. T h e linking in China of crime and legal disputes with the
relationship between h u m a n s and Nature contrasts the effect that the mechanistic,
corpuscularian belief system brought to the wider ontology of post-Renaissance European
science, that clearly separates social and natural phenomena and their explanations.
The Confucians' belief system
Confucianism, following the teachings of Confucius (552 B C . - 479 B C ) ,
developed a view of nature as cyclic and operating by laws' that were similar to social
customs. A s such they were subde and subject to unpredictable changes. A central concept
was //, that Jaki characterises as vaguely defined and something akin to social customs:
The ways of society and nature had to be 'felt', and this implied a ready acceptance
of what is an invariable component of the organismic outlook on existence,
namely, that every process has a rhythmic or cyclic patterning. (Jaki 1974, p. 26)
T h e descriptors that apply here are for a subjective, intuitive and qualitative approach,
focussing on organic explanations. In 136 B C , Confucianism became the official state
doctrine and as a result its influence became more entrenched. The doctrine of this time was
set out in detail by Tung Chung-Shu, w h o presented a cyclic and organismic, or animistic,
view of the world as paraUel to the individual human, society and history. Thus the
posture, anatomy, physiology and behaviour of the h u m a n form correlated with the earth
and the cosmos in a w a y thatreflecteda belief that the h u m a n form and function reflected in
microcosm the form and function of the cosmos in macrocosm The appropriate orientation
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with the cosmos w a s to acknowledge and respect the links between h u m a n and cosmic
cycles:
T h e key to success and harmony was therefore one's docdity and wtilingness to
merge into the rhythm of cosmic cycles that were also the patterns of h u m a n
history. (Jaki 1974, p. 27)
A s with the Indian example, it is not the concepts in themselves but the attendant beliefs and
implied necessary orientation to Nature that is of interest here. Thus the concept of the
cosmos being modelled in the h u m a n form is not in itself the significant difference from
Western European science, but the analogy lead to a betief that the proper orientation for
understanding the cosmos w a s to contemplate the h u m a n form. This attitude is strikingly
similar to attitudes that have gained favour in western cultures since the 1960's, such as the
Gaia hypothesis that interprets the earth as a kind of superorganism (Yearly 1995, p. 459).
The Taoists' beliefs
The third group, the Taoists, sought to find the order of the cosmos by c o m m u n i n g
with Nature, rather than by reflecting on social life as did the Confucians. Like the
Confucians, however, the Taoists valued intuition, though not to the same extent. For the
Taoists, nature was 'conceived as the continual interplay of pairs of opposite forces and
qualities' such as gravity and lightness, stillness and movement, softness and hardness,
weakness and strength, which, notes Jaki, are paradoxical and unpredictable:
Nature for Taoism is an aU-encompassing tiving entity animated by impersonal
volitions ... A s a result Nature could not be expected to yield her [sic] secrets to
analytical reasoning or to systematic research activity. (Jaki 1974, pp. 28-9)
The proper orientation to Nature was rather to respond to the ebb and flow of the Yin and
Yang. In this w a y the 'intimate, organic unity' of the individual with Nature would be least
disturbed. Note again the similarities not only to the Aztec and Indian betiefs, but alsotothe
holistic and organistic beliefs that have resurged in western cultures in recent decades, in
opposition to the reductionist and positivistic beliefs that dominated metascientific thinking
for the first half of the twentieth century. O f this, more later.
The effect of beliefs on Chinese natural philosophies
It remains to examine particular betiefs held by the Chinese, or outcomes of them,
and suggest their effect on Chinese science or natural phdosophy. Thefirstis the general
beliefs about the cosmos or metaphysical system, the available concepts provided by this
world view, and beliefs about their proper use. The Confucian conception of an organistic
cosmos in h u m a n form, discussed above, is an example. A n attendant betief w a s that
understanding of the cosmos was to be gained by contemplation of the h u m a n form.
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Jaki's characterisation of differences between Chinese and Western European natural
philosophies
Jaki advances a furtherfivereasons for the difference between science in China and
in Europe, ad of which relate to underlying betiefs and attitudes. The first is the lack of
impact of empirical knowledge - observational data - on the broader world view or
cosmology in China prior to the seventeenth century. Thus, for example, the Chinese had
developed extensive astronomical data (such as the recording of each sighting of HaUey's
comet for over two thousand years). But this had no impact on the organistic (animistic)
and cyclic view of nature. So the periodic movements of the sun, m o o n and planets were
interpreted as 'something analogous to the behaviour of animals that go in and out of their
hiding places' (Jaki 1974, p. 33). Jaki argues that this approach results from an attitude that
is reflective and responsive rather than inquisitive. The present thesis interprets this as the
observational activities having no impact on the betief system, and there being no unified
world view.
T h e second reason stems from the cyclic world view: the Chinese conception of
causal connections between events. The view that everything has a cyclic nature did not
lead to western view of cause and effect, since the order of interpretation of events could
even be reversed. This contrasts with the western view of causes fodowed by effects, with
a third class of coincidental events not causadyrelated.A striking example given by Jaki
demonstrates the effect of the different betiefs concerning cause, effect and time:
[T]he Chinese saw nothing inordinate in attributing the political fatiure of a certain
prince to the sacrificing of humans at his burial.
... In such an outlook, measurable, quantitative aspects of events occurring
closely in time could have no particular significance. Their frequency or order of
magnitude commanded no special interest nor did the normal sequence of events.
(Jaki 1974, p. 34)
It is difficult to conceive of people not learning by induction, at least in the sense of
everyday understandings. However, this example points clearly to a different notion of
cause and effect that mitigated against learning inductively from experience in at least some
contexts. W e have noted, for example, that the Europeans had persisted with the
Aristotelian belief that the terrestrial and celestial realms were governed by different
physics, a belief that prevented a unified view of the world. It is quite possible, therefore,
that other belief systems also precluded a unified view of the world. Certainly Jaki's
example implies that the relationship of explanations and predictions to observational data
was not clear. In turn, this m a y be attributed to an underlying belief concerning the
reliability or predictahtiity of Nature: regularities were not expected.
Thirdly, Jaki argues that there w a s an unconfident attitude in investigating Nature, a
'despondency about man's [sic] ability to decipher the exact patterns of nature' which he
attributes to this world-view and the attendant attitudes of introspection and 'self-
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centredness' (Jaki 1974, p. 35). This air of resignation and defeat is found even in the
writings of the prominent sixteenth century thinker W a n g Yang-Ming w h o describes
himself and a friend as becoming mentaUy exhausted trying to fathom the principles of the
structure of bamboo. H e concludes:
'... I knew there wasreallyno one w h o could investigate the things under heaven.
The task of investigating things can only be carried out in and with reference to
one's body and mind.' (quoted by Jaki 1974, p.35)
F r o m a Western European scientific perspective one might comment here that there is no
betief here that Nature can be understood by a reductionist approach: by examining the parts
rather than the whole. In turn, this entatis beliefs about metaphysical qualities or categories,
which enable some justification for examining the cosmos considered in this w a y and not
that - by examining these metaphysical categories and not those.
Fourthly is an attitude, stronger than resignation or despondency, of resistance to
European science. Its effects ranged from a rejection of European-sourced maps, which did
not show China as the centre of a (probably) flat Earth, to specificrejectionof the methods
and underlying attitudes and betiefs of European science. Jaki (1974, pp. 36-9) notes the
'fatiure' of the Jesuits to estabtish the European scientific tradition in China over more than
two hundred years, despite repeated demonstrations of particular successes. Writing in
1799 about Chinese and European mathematics and mathematicians, Juan Yuan concluded:
'Our ancients sought phenomena and ignored theoretical explanation. Since the
arrival of the Europeans, the question has always been concerning explanations,
circular orbits, m e a n movements, eclipses, and squares. T h e foreigners think the
earth revolves about a fixed sun ... but the theory of Tycho has been modified
m a n y times during the last century and I betieve that it wdl be again ... Therefore I
do not see upon what the Europeans base their arguments ... and ready it does not
seem to m e the least inconvenient to ignore the western theoretical explanations
and simply to consider the facts.' (from L. van Hee, 1926, quoted by Jaki 1974,
p. 39)
Interestingly, Juan Y u a n does not characterise the identification of the earth with the human
form as theorising. This illustrates the difficulty noted above in making judgements about
beliefs from within a particular belief system. Also as noted above, however, it serves
nonetheless to show the significance of ontological and epistemological betiefs in
characterising science.
Finally w a s the manner in which related concepts were defined and used. T h e
vagueness of the central concept // has already been mentioned. T h e concepts of Yin and
Yang, also mentioned already and probably better k n o w n to people in contemporary
western cultures, are likewise characterised as vague, but this is only part of their difficulty
with respect to science in the Western European tradition. T h e meanings attached to each
changed significandy over time, so that the Yang, which started as meaning bright sunlight
c a m e to represent maleness, hardness and weighdessness, then later still aU that is hot dry
and pure, including fire, roundness, movement, peace, eating, wealth, cheerfulness,
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celebrity and profit T h e Yin grew as the opposite of each of these. Also, the interplay
between the Yin and the Yang implied reversals at times, and discussions of phenomena
were more poetic than accurate with an aim of reproducibility (Jaki 1974, pp. 44-46). T h e
lack of precision available for conceptualising the c o s m o s affects not only the language
avadable for describing phenomena, but reveals an underlying betief the cosmos is only to
be understood in these imprecise ways. It also implies a belief, once again, Nature is
capricious, although the patterns in the meanings attached to the Yin and the Yang indicate
belief in some, albeit imprecise,regularityor order.
In summary, the Aztec, Indian and Chinese examples demonstrate that: (1) different
beliefs about the cosmos (ontological betiefs) are associated with different cultures; (2)
beliefs about the appropriate w a y to relate to the cosmos arise with these world views; and
(3) these other beliefs and attitudes were not conducive to developing a tradition simtiar to
the Western European scientific tradition10. T h e examples from these cultures exhibit
metaphysical, logical, epistemological and linguistic frameworks and resources, against
which the metascientific literature contrasts belief systems in the western European
scientific tradition. T h e claim that Thales and the subsequent Ionians and, later, other
Greeks, embarked upon a different course can be m a d e partly in terms of betief systems
that they developed, but the claim in itself is simplistic. Belief systems are complex, and
there have been a n u m b e r of beliefs held at various stages of the western European
scientific tradition that were similar to those held in other cultures. A s with other
characteristics of science, enduring beliefs have probably persisted because they were
fruitful: these include naturalistic ontologies, betiefs in a uniform and (mathematicaUy)
regular cosmos, beliefs supporting experimentation, andfruitfulmetaphors and models.
The complex nature of betief systems serves as a caution against simplistic comparisons
between different belief systems. A s noted in the companion chapter on context, there is a
balance to be struck between recognising, o n the one hand, the successes of betiefs that
have underpinned and guided western European science, and o n the other, the fruitfulness
of other betief systems, including non-western and earlier European betief systems. T o
conclude the summary: (4) there is often overlap between different betief systems; (5) there
are difficulties in distinguishing belief systems; and (6) belief systems have changed over
time, including belief systems that characterise western European science.

10

The problems with making judgements between cultures was discussed in the companion chapter on
context This thesis supports the post-positivist argument that it would be ethno-centric not to be
astonished if non-western cultures developed the same tradition as western cultures. The very
identification of belief system as a dimension of characterisation serves to draw our attention to the
beliefs, assumptions and attitudes entailed in characterising modern western science and characterising
differences from other natural philosophies.
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Table B.2.1
Examples of characterisation of key metascientific viewpoints
by belief system
Author

Viewpoint

E x a m p l e s of reference to Identified in the w o r k of

Suppe 1973,
1979

Received View

Knowledge is given only in
experience.
Observation can be independent
of theory (observation and theory
statements are distinct).
Theories can be analysed by
rational reconstruction.
Rational reconstruction concerns
only the context of justification,
and not the context of discovery
(ie, science concerns
justification, not discovery).
L a w s are true, or approximately
true.
Theories can be analysed by how
they are actually used, not by
their rational reconstruction.
Scientific knowledge is not
aeon textual, but instead is
meaningful only within a
Weltanschauungen; Laws are
neither true nor false: they
represent regularities (Toulmin);
Science develops incrementally
(Toulmin); Science develops
discontinuously (Kuhn);
Discovery can be understood
(Hanson); Knowledge by falsified
or verified, never proven true
(Popper); There is no
characteristic method of science
(Feyerabend)
Scientific knowledge is given in
the language of theories.
Scientific knowledge arises from
the reasoning by which theories
are developed as well as fiom
experimental data.
Knowledge of the cosmos is
given in experience.

iwmwmwww

sceptical
descriptive
Weltanschauungen
(world view)

IMMMMWIMMW

semantic or
model-theory
historical
realism

Bhaskar 1983

empiricism

idealism
realism

Nussbaum 1989 rationalism

Camap; the Vienna Circle

Achinstein, Rapoport

Bohm, Feyerabend, Hanson,
Kuhn, Popper, Toulmin

Beth, Suppe, Suppes, van
Eraasen
Lakatos, Shapere, Toulmin

Francis Bacon, Berkeley,
Hobbes, H u m e , Locke, M a c h
(positivism), Mill, Russell,
Vienna Circle (logical
empiricism)
Knowledge of the cosmos is
Berkeley, Fichte, Hegel, H u m e ,
what w e make or construct.
Kant, Plato, Schelling
Aristotle, Bachelard, Bhaskar,
Knowledge of the cosmos is
given in an externalreality,but Duhem, Feyerabend, Hanson,
is constructed.
Harre, Hesse, H u m e , K a n t
Koyr6, Kuhn, Plato, Popper,
The order discovered in Nature
Putnam, Quine
exists independently of people.
Knowledge can be proven or
Descartes, K a n t Plato
confirmed; it is mainly acquired
by the power of the intellect
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empiricism/
positivism
,

constructivism

Boyd, Gaspar
and Trout 1991

Pickering 1992

Callon 1995

post-positivist
consensus
comprising (a)
post-positivist
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Knowledge can be proven or
confirmed; it is mainly acquired
by the evidence of the senses.
Knowledge cannot be proven.
The best current knowledge is
acquired according to (a) inner
disciplinary criteria (rational,
logical, empirical) (b) outer
disciplinary criteria (socialpsychological, historical).
The definitions of scientific
concepts and terms are theorydependent.

Bacon, Comte, Hempel, H u m e ,
Locke
(a) Popper, Lakatos, Toulmin,
partly K u h n
(b) Kuhn, Toulmin, partly
Lakatos

(a) Partly Popper
(b) Hanson, K u h n
(c) Boyd, Goodman, Kripke,
Putnam, Quine

Scientific culture exists in a field A s given by Suppe
of knowledge and knowledge
claims.
Scientific knowledge arises
Kuhn, Feyerabend
within various cultural contexts.

Scientific concepts at different
levels of abstraction are linked
together by generalisations and
to the natural world by instances
grouped under observation terms.
'New scientific knowledge
entails seeing n e w situations as
being relevantly like old ones.'
(P. 4)
The cognitive or disciplinary
organisation of science arises
from scientific statements, and
constrains the social organisation
of science. Model 2 applies here.
The cognitive/disciplinary
organisation of science is
encouraged by the social
organisation of science
(internally); external boundaries
are clear, beyond which scientific
structures break down.
Organisational and institutional
forms are only moderately
significant more significant are
social structures, such as master
- disciple relationships.
Boundaries are constructed by
actors.
There are two perspectives on
organisation: (1) the overall
dynamics of networks of actants;
(2) the internal management of
the elements of networks.

Barnes, Bloor, Callon,
Cartwright, Collins, Garfinkel,
Gilbert, Knorr Cetina, Latour,
Law, Lynch, Mulkay, Shapin,
Woolgar

Hesse, Holton, Popper

Althusser, Ben-Cole, David,
Freudenthal, Hull, Merton,
Popper

Bachelard, Barnes, Collins,
Heck, Knorr, Kuhn, Mulkay,
Pinch, Ravetz, Rudwick,
Schaffer, Wise, Wittgenstein

Amaan, Callon, FoucauU, Knorr
Cetina, Latour, Pickering, Wise,
Woolgar
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Appendix B.3: Purpose

A p p e n d i x B.3
Argument from the metascientific literature emphasising the dimension
purpose

Debates in the metascientific literature address many aspects of purpose in science,
which again support a broad interpretation of scientific purpose. This scope is indicated
by the review of the following metascientific arguments in Appendix B.3:
B . 3.1

Current metascientific views withrespectto purpose;

B.3.2

T h e role of purpose in characterising a western European scientific
tradition;

B.3.3

Purpose as seeking
a) knowledge
b) solutions to problems
c) regularities
d) causes
e) other ends

B . 3.4

Control of Nature as a purpose of science

B . 3.5

The strengthening of utilitarian purposes in the twentieth century

B . 3.6

Critical perspectives on scientific purposes

3.1 Current metascientific views with respect to purpose
While analysis of text units from the summary statements indicates that science is
characterised by purpose, more complex and sometimes subde notions of purpose are
embedded in metascientific argument in the literature. M o r e particularly, there are
different notions of scientific purpose, and these are useful in characterising different
views of science. T h e six metascientific analyses in Table B.3.1 indicate some of the
main metascientific approaches in the literature. Each provides a categorisation of
viewpoints: the categories within each represent the variety of viewpoints identified by the
author, and the differences between them underscore the differences between analyses of
metascientific viewpoints. T h e categories are not discrete, and clearly more than one label
can represent m a n y individual thinkers. T h e present paper interprets each viewpoint as a
complex of characteristics, of which purpose is but one. Table B.3.1 highlights the
purposes constituted in each viewpoint, to help discern similarities and differences
between metascientific accounts, and to show the use of purpose in characterising
science.
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A s a general statement, ad views characterise science as having a purpose or goal of
generating knowledge about the cosmos: activities are carried out and structures are m a d e
to this end, whether implicitly or explicitly, and whether directiy or indirectiy1. S o m e
views, having tacitiy accepted the creation of knowledge as general purpose, focus on
h o w or w h y this is done, or on other purposes. S o m e of these foci and additional
purposes d o not enjoy consensus and are sometimes disputed; the present section will
present some examples of h o w scientific purpose is characterised in the literature.
The three broad views that comprise the post-positivist consensus within H P S constructivism, post-positivist empiricism and scientific realism - can be partly
characterised by purpose. H P S views primarily characterise science by knowledge, and
thus typicady the purpose of scientific activities and structures is to develop this
knowledge. Typical subsidiary goals are to predict and explain.
In (a) constructivism or neo-Kantianism, as given by Boyd, Gasper and Trout (eds
1991) and Bhaskar (1983k), the purpose is to construct knowledge sociatiy or mentally,
such that it conforms to psychological structures, a Weltanschauungen,

or other

contextual factors.
In (b) empiricism, the purpose is to generate certain knowledge of the cosmos,
where its certainty is guaranteed by conformity to methodological and logical rules.
Francis Bacon's empiricist goal of controlling Nature fodows from this assumption of
certainty.
In (c) scientific realism as given in Bhaskar (1983k), the purpose is to construct
knowledge of an external reality, by cognitive and social means.
Within S T S , Gallon's (1995) four models of scientific development also indicate a
general acceptance of a goal of developing knowledge about the cosmos. However, this
goal is sometimes assumed, implied or receives only passing mention: the generady
criticaltenorof S T S approaches means that they commonly interpret such a goal in terms
of functional, ideological and other goals.
Thus, where science is characterised as (a) rational knowledge, a characteristic
purpose is to generate statements of codified knowledge by which this rationality can be
demonstrated.
W h e r e science is characterised as (b) a competitive enterprise, a characteristic
purpose is not only to generate statements but to test or scrutinise them against competing
statements.

1

See the respective dedicated companion chapters on activity and structure and Appendix B; the
present chapter addresses them to the extent they are characterised by purpose. The reader is
reminded that the separation of these categories of characterisation into the companion chapters is
an analytical device of the present thesis, and that the six are proposed as an interactive set not as
individual alternatives.
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Where science is characterised as (c) sociocultural practice, characteristic purposes
are to achieve a variety of cognitive and sociocultural ends:

To account for the dynamics of scientific activity, there is no need to invent new
sociological explanations. Barnes (in Interests and the Growth of Knowledge,
1977) provides the clearest and most systematic presentation of this point of
view. Inspired by the Marxist tradition, of which w e m a y also find traces in
Habermas's work, he writes: "Knowledge grows under the impulse of two great
interests - an overt interest in prediction, manipulation and control, an overt
interest in rationalisation and persuasion' (p. 38). Thus, in the phrenological
controversy studied by Shapin (1979), w e find a mixture of sociopolitical and
cognitive interests. The endeavour to clarify the possible existence of the frontal
sinuses is as m u c h to score points in the class straggle in Edinburgh as to leam
anything about the brain. These two families of interests are to be found in ad
societies; if certain ones like our o w n have developed science, it is for contingent
historical reasons. Interests linked to prediction and control have been intensified
and then inscribed in specific institutions.
M o r e generally in [sociocultural models], the explanation ofthe underlying
scientific dynamics depends on the particular sociological models used. W e have
just evoked Barnes's macrosociology but there are microsociological
possibilities. In Pickering's recent texts, w e find an explanation that makes no
distinction between a scientist and any other goal-oriented social actor: 'Doing
science is real work' (Pickering 1990). Science is a practice and is analysed like
ad practices; a researcher has resources, tries toreachher [sic] goals, and seeks
to create coherence between the disparate and sometimes intractable elements that
m a k e up her environment (instruments, theoretical, and experimental models),
some of which resist ad reorganisation. (Cadon 1995, p. 45)
Here, Callon appeals to examples - from Barnes, Shapin and Pickering - that exemplify
characterisations by context, but note that particular and various intentions, purposes or
aims arise from particular and various contexts. Thus we interpret Barnes's notion of
knowledge growing under the impulse of two great interests to mean that scientists
develop knowledge to meet two main sets of interests or goals: on the one hand, to gain
or increase scientific prediction, manipulation and control, and on the other hand to
achieve rationalisation and persuasion. These two aims align with Shapin's identification
of cognitive and sociopolitical aims. Pickering's notion of science as work explicitly
entatis goals as for any work: work is purposive activity.
Where science is characterised as (d) extended translation, a characteristic purpose
is to establish coherence between actants (technical devices, statements and human
beings) because, in these characterisations, meaningful statements about the world
depend on this coherence.
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3.2 The role ofpurpose in characterising a western European scientific tradition
Historical accounts of science partly characterise the western European scientific
tradition by scientific purposes. While a broader survey of this tradition is given in
Appendix B.l, as part of the discussion of historical contexts, the present section wdl
draw on the literature to illustrate the development of purpose in characterising an
historical tradition. This wdl comprise examples from antiquity, the Scientific Revolution,
and developments leading into the twentieth century. Scientific purpose in the twentieth
century merits particular discussion, and is addressed further, in section 3.5 below.
W e have noted earlier that the western European scientific tradition is generally
characterised as beginning with the Ionian naturalists, a characterisation drawing on
purpose as m u c h as on any of the other dimensions. Thus part of the metascientific
interest in Thales and the Ionians is 'the naturalist aim of explaining the observed variety
of natural processes by means of deterministic laws about the basic underlying matter'
that is traced through to Democritus and others (Irwin 1989, p. 50). In rejecting Homer's
appeal to authority and tradition, the ancient naturalists sought to develop an account
based on an interplay of reason, observation and phenomena:
Heraclitus raises some of the right questions in the theory of knowledge
(epistemology; Greek episteme, 'knowledge'). H e rejects the traditional appeal
to the Muses, and does not want to be accepted as an authority. 'Don't listen to
me', he says, 'but to the logos.' Grasp of the logos ('reason', 'account',
argument' are all aspects of the meaning) is not the mere accumulation of
information. Heraclitus criticises excessive trust in the senses: 'The eyes and
ears of those w h o have the souls of barbarians are bad witnesses for h u m a n
beings'. Unquestioning confidence in the senses is like children's trust in what
their parents ted them, reflecting fatiure to m a k e deeper inquiry. (Irwin 1989,
pp. 33-4)
That is, Heraclitus argued a particular purpose of inquiry: naturalistic inquiry should aim
for a reasoned explanation of observations, not the mere accumulation of observational
information. While Heraclitus differed from some of his contemporaries in the relative
emphasis he placed on observation and other activities, w e recognise that these activities
represent different attempts to achieve the same, underlying, goal. Similarly d o w n
through history w e identify activities as scientific pardy by their intention or purpose. W e
noted in the preceding section that all current metascientific views presuppose some basic
aim of acquiring reliable knowledge of the cosmos, and w e can add that this basic aim can
be traced throughout the history of science. T h e different approaches to this aim, and
others, help tofidin the picture.
Socrates and Plato pursued different aims, respectively ethics and metaphysics,
from those of the early naturalists, and partly because of this their work is considered
usuady less scientific than that of the Ionians before them or of Aristode afterwards.
Aristode sought to reconcile the earlier tradition of studying Nature with the dialectical
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approach derived from Plato (Irwin 1989, p. 118). T h e historical domination of
Aristotelian science meant that Aristode's notion of purpose in natural phdosophy had
considerable historical influence on conceptions of scientific purpose, and sttil influences
current conceptions of scientific purpose. Aristotle is significant to the present discussion
of scientific purpose in two ways, because w e discern in his account two senses of the
term purpose: (a) in the sense of the purpose or aim of natural philosophy (or science),
and (b) in the sense that Aristode's complex system of natural phdosophy includes the
notion of ontological purpose, or the ends to which natural things develop. The two are
related. In (a), the aim of Aristode's natural phdosophy was to search for the causes of
things (Oldroyd 1989, p. 30), according to his schema of four causes. In a technical
sense this aim is to seek the answer to the question Why?, 'about some entity or event in
our experience', for which there are four standard answers as explanations. O n e of the
four answers or causes is (b), an explanation in terms of purpose in Nature. A n example
of a standard account of Aristotelian causes is Mason's summary:
Aristotle, like Plato, considered that intellectual designs and purposes were the
formative and guiding principles of ad natural processes. However, Aristode
had a richer view of causality than Plato as he accepted also some of the
doctrines expressed earlier upon the matter. There were, Aristode indicated, four
main types of cause ... (Mason 1962, p. 43; emphases added)
Thus the purpose of Aristotelian scientific inquiry was to inquire: W h a t Matter is
involved? W h a t F o r m is Involved? W h a t was responsible for there being this
phenomenon to investigate? and W h a t E n d was sought? A scientific explanation was
made w h e n these four questions could be answered, that is, Material, Formal, Efficient
and Final Causes could be given to accountrespectivelyfor the matter, form, m o d e and
direction of change. M o r e recent analyses point out that Aristode's schema has been
misrepresented often as being teleological, because he valued the causes that referred to
ends (tele,finalcauses) as the most important (Tiles and Tdes 1993, p. 96). This is the
basis for crude comparisons between Aristotelian and m o d e m science based on purpose:
This has traditionally and rather misleadingly been caded Aristode's Theory of
the Four Causes. It is often said that Aristotelians sought four causes: a Material
Cause, a Formal Cause, an Efficient Cause, and a Final Cause. It is then usuady
remarked that m o d e m science has reduced this fourfold quest to one since it is
said w e nowadays recognise only the efficient cause. This is, at best, a half truth
...(Harr61985,p. 126)
Thus characterisations of Aristotelian purpose, particularly in comparisons with m o d e m
science, are sometimes flawed: to characterise Aristotelian science as simply teleological
is wrong in omitting reference to ad four; to attribute m o d e m meanings of cause to the
Aristotelian notion of answering four types of question is imprecise; and to characterise
the difference between Aristotelian and m o d e m science as a reduction of the four
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Aristotelian causes to one (or two), is 'a half truth' because in m o d e m science
embryology, at least, uses teleological explanations2.
The developments that characterised the Scientific Revolution, such as the demise
of the Aristotelian system, also include notions of purpose. Bronowski has argued that
the Scientific Revolution is significant because it marks a fundamental change between
'an old w a y of thinking and a n e w w a y of thinking' (Bronowski 1978, p. 4). T h e 'new
way' is characterised by the goal of constructing a single, unitary system of knowledge of
the world, and which, according to Bronowski, has not been achieved outside science:
W e are faced with having to try to budd a unitary theory of the world - one
which involves all h u m a n life and yet is conceived in the scientific discipline
which, in m y view, has transformed the world since 1600, plus or minus a
hundred years. In m y view, this is a unique endeavour. There has never before
been a m o m e n t in history w h e n there has been an attempt to see the world as
whole and from a single core or type of explanation. (Bronowski 1978, pp. 5-6)
That is, the aim of explaining the world by a unitary system of knowledge is central to
Bronowski's characterisation of science after about 1600, and the criterion by which he
delineates that science from ad other h u m a n endeavours from that time onwards. T h e
present thesis interprets this as a difference in purpose.
The investigative tradition following the Scientific Revolution is characterised by
the development of several notions, aspects or 'levels' of scientific purpose. (These
variations of purpose are pursued below in sections 3.3 and 3.4). For example, Francis
Bacon seems to have accepted and developed Aristode's goal of searching for causes:
Bacon, like Aristode, believed that the search for causes was the proper role for
the scientific investigator. (Oldroyd 1989, p. 30)
However, the aim of identifying teleological causes w a s challenged. Aristotelian
ontological purpose - the metaphysical belief that Nature tended to develop towards
unrealised perfect forms or ideologically - c a m e under attack from several quarters,
including Francis Bacon, w h o realised that an explanation of causality as a tendency
towards that effect is no explanation at ad (Collingwood 1945, p. 93). T h e need for
teleological explanations disappeared as different beliefs emerged of h o w Nature changes:
the Aristotelian assumptions about organistic development in Nature were replaced,
notably during the sixteenth century, with different assumptions that Nature has intrinsic
and mechanical causes (Collingwood 1945, p. 94). The more immediate purpose of
Bacon's experimental, inductive and qualitative approach w a s to generate axioms,
hypotheses and theories of wide generality, for the higher purpose of cotiecting reliable
knowledge of the cosmos. In turn, the higher purpose of seeking this knowledge w a s
Bacon's celebrated notion of control of Nature and equation of knowledge with power
through the control of Nature:

2 Some systems, or complexes of events, like embryonic growth, make sense only if interpr
being directed towards some purpose. (Quinton 1988)
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The object of Bacon's science, then, seems to have been the mastery of nature
by the discovery of forms. (Oldroyd 1989, p. 63)
Oldroyd notes that Bacon used the word form to mean something like a law of Nature,
which described the appearance of a 'nature', and was thus taken as its causal
explanation. The interrelatedness of knowledge, causes and laws as goals is taken up in
section 3.3 below. The view of scientific purpose as seeking control over Nature has
been very influential and is elaborated in section 3.4 below.
Bacon's characterisation of science, including scientific purpose, was very
influential in seventeenth century England, eighteenth century France, and the nineteenth
century work on evolutionary biology and geology (Mason 1962, pp. 141ff). Thus
Robert H o o k e (1635-1702), w h o is noted for his scientific successes, 'was one of the
first secretaries ofthe Royal Societies of London, and some ofthe early members of that
organisation specifically set out to perform scientific investigations in the manner
recommended by Bacon' (Oldroyd 1989, p. 66). However scientific progress in the
seventeenth century mostiy came from the mathematical-deductive approach of Gatileo
and Descartes. N o w , w h d e Descartes 'had read Bacon's views on scientific method and
sympathised with his aims', his purpose w a s to seek out the laws that he believed
controded Nature (Mason 1962, pp. 166ff).
In the development of metascientific views following the evident successes of
science from the Scientific Revolution, the purpose(s) of science underpinned much
argument. For example, Newton sought to develop general explanatory laws, as did
Descartes, but unlike Descartes he emphasised the role of experimental evidence as their
basis. Thus Newton's Method of Analysis, and his Synthesis and Axiomatic Method,
'share as a c o m m o n objective the explanation and prediction of phenomena' (Lossee
1980, p. 90). Newton's belief that scientific laws are contingent and revisable meant that,
on his account, necessary knowledge could not be a goal of science:
Newton repudiated the Cartesian program of deducing scientific laws from
indubitable metaphysical principles. A n d he denied that a necessary knowledge
of scientific laws can be achieved in any manner. According to Newton, the
natural philosopher m a y establish that phenomena are related in a certain way,
but cannot establish that therelationcould be otherwise.
It is true that Newton did suggest that if w e could k n o w the forces that
operate on the minute particles of matter, w e could understand w h y macroscopic
processes occur in the ways that they do. But Newton did not maintain that such
knowledge would constitute a necessary knowledge of Nature. O n the contrary,
he held that all interpretations of natural processes are contingent and subject to
revision in the light of further evidence. (Lossee 1980, pp. 93-4)
A s noted in Appendix B.2, Newton's notion that science knowledge is revisable seems to
have been insufficiendy acknowledged by the positivist R V , and given due recognition in
post-positivist metascience.
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Like Newton and Locke, David H u m e (1711-76) was sceptical about the possibility
of necessary knowledge of Nature (Lossee 1980, p. 101). H e argued that what w e
believe to be a causal relation is nothing more than a mental inference about the constant
conjunction of sequential events. This is a different notion of causal explanation to those
of Aristode and Bacon, and has been a very influential view. In response, Kant (17241804) considered H u m e to have missed a significant characteristic of science, the goal of
systematic knowledge of Nature:
Kant betieved that H u m e was preoccupied with inductive generalisation. Kant
held that this emphasis draws attention from the most important feature of
science - the attempt to achieve a systematic organisation of knowledge ... Kant
regarded the systematic organisation of experience as a goal to be sought by the
knowing subject. (Lossee 1980, p. 108)
O n the other hand, John M d l (1806-73) endorsed the goal of seeking causal explanations,
but refined it to allow invariable sequences to be causal, like vigorous bubbling when
sodium is added to water, or non-causal, like night fodowing day (Lossee 1980, p. 155).
A s metascientific thinking developed, purposes were related also to what are n o w
regarded as constructs, such as laws and theories. Thus Norman Campbed (1880-1949)
argued that 'the aim of science is the discovery and explanation of laws', where laws are
explained only as they are incorporated in theories (Lossee 1980, p. 139). For Henri
Poincare (1854-1912), laws such as Newton's laws of motion are means to higher goals,
serving both as conventions that define scientific concepts, and as empirical
generalisations (Lossee 1980, p. 168).
The positivist R V and variants of it provided a normative prescription of purpose
which was very influential for much of twentieth century H P S , and remains influential in
somefieldsof science and in public perceptions. Positivism is taken usuady as a strict
form of empiricism (Brown 1977, p. 21). Thus w e m a y take a goal of general
empiricism, as given by a line of British phdosophers beginning with Francis Bacon, to
be the formation of knowledge based on sense experience or introspection (Bhaskar
1983b, p. 121). Positivism holds that the goal of genuine knowledge can be reached only
through sense experience (Brown 1977, p. 21). More specificady, positivism as given by
August Comte (1798-1857) is the view that valid knowledge can only be gained by the
'description of the coexistence and succession' of phenomena that are 'real, useful,
certain, precise, organic and relative' (Bhaskar 1983i, p. 333). Comte's idea that sciences
develop through three stages characterises the development of sciences by changes in
purpose: the initial theological and later metaphysical stages comprise 'the search for inner
natures and essential causes' whereas thefinalpositive stage comprises the search for 'the
invariant show of phenomena' (Bhaskar 1983i, p. 334). T h e invariant succession of
phenomena were interpreted as natural laws, and the search for these laws was a notable
aim of science in the nineteenth and into the twentieth centuries by empiricists or
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positivists such as Comte, John Herschel (1792-1871), M d l and Ernst Mach (1838-1916)
(McMullin 1990, pp. 832-5).
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3.3 Purpose as seeking solutions to problems, knowledge, regularities and causes
While the preceding section highlighted historical notions of scientific purpose, it
should be emphasised that most accounts appeal to more than one notion of purpose. For
example, w e noted above several notions of purpose in the work of Francis Bacon: as a
search for axioms, laws or theories as expressions of pattern or regularity in phenomena;
as a search for knowledge of Nature; as a search for the causes of natural phenomena; and
for gaining control over Nature. This does not reflect changes of mind by Bacon, but
rather, according to a prevailing view in phdosophy, that 'questions of causation,
inductive support, laws of nature, and counterfactual conditionals^ are bound closely
together' (Sanford 1995, p. 83). Thus the different purposes identified by Bacon, and
subsequendy highlighted variously in different metascientific accounts, can be taken as
reflecting different emphases of a complex notion.
There is, too, a sense in which each of the goals addressed in the present section acquisition of knowledge, problem-solving, identifying regularities (laws) and identifying
causes - can be regarded as just the acquisition of knowledge. However, this fads to
reflect both different purposes of knowledge, and the different foci found in
metascientific accounts. Accordingly, the present section sets out several of these notions
of purpose to s h o w this variation, but with the understanding that they are presented
separately simply to reflect the different emphases or perspectives given in different
accounts. Causes, inductive generalisations and laws of Nature, are widely held to be
related, as noted above, and in any event comprise the knowledge that is also given as a
goal. A s a result, usually more than one are found in combination in any one account
The purpose of gaining control over Nature is addressed separately in section 3.4 below,
because it is not part of this complex notion of purpose, and because it has particular
significance in characterising applied science.

Counterfactual conditionals are 'if-then statements about what would have happened if something
else had occurred', as in, 'If a had not happened then b would not have occurred' (Sanford 1995, p.
82).
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Acquisition of knowledge as an aim
M a n y metascientific accounts emphasise the goal of acquiring (discovering or

constructing) knowledge. The acquisition of knowledge seems to be included as a goal in
most accounts, even if it is implied or presumed in accounts that emphasise other goals;
as w e have noted, identifying the solutions to problems, or regularities, or causes, which
are all given as goals, constitute knowledge and can be regarded as variants of that goal.
Acquisition of knowledge is measuredfrequentiyas publication in science journals, texts
and reports. The acquisition of knowledge was a central goal from antiquity - w e have
noted it in the work of the Ionians and Aristode, for example - and it remained central in
the vigorous metascientific debates from the Scientific Revolution onwards. While
knowledge was an aim of both empiricist and idealist traditions, the former saw it
achieved through the intermediate aim of collecting observational data of phenomena
while the latter required the intermediate aim of analysing mental activities. The present
thesis explores various notions of knowledge in the companion chapter on knowledge
and Appendix B.6.
b) Problem-solving as an aim
W e have noted above that Popper (1956) acknowledged, almost in passing, that
individual scientists have their o w n aims as they do their work. This very pragmatic
notion of purpose should not be overlooked: it is clear that, whether or not an individual
scientist is concerned day-by-day with theorising or debates about causation, she or he
routinely addresses numerous problems of greater or lesser significance. Individual goals
of problem-solving are clearly evident in the great burst of experimental activity that
marked the Scientific Revolution, and in subsequent scientific activity d o w n to the
present. It is the individual goals, mentioned by Popper, above, to which individual
scientists work by identifying problems of natural inquiry and seek to solve them. This
corresponds with the day-to-day goal of problem-solving that K u h n later described
(1959) as the routine aim of normal science working within an existing paradigm.
Increasingly, these individual goals have been shared by the members of aresearchteam,
but that does not affect their nature, which also increasingly, concerns solving problems
or puzzles. Moreover, problem-solving is usuady presumed in discussions of other
goals, as given below.
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Identifying regularities as an aim
T h e third purpose of science, identified in the work of Bacon and others, is to

identify regularities or patterns of order in Nature. These regularities are expressed as
axioms, laws or theories. Until relatively recendy, this process was almost universally
described as discovering laws, arising from the betief that natural laws were part of an
external reality. S o m e current, post-positivist accounts n o w describe the process as
constructing laws, arising from the different betief that laws, axioms and theories are
mental constructions or interpretations of regular phenomena. This betief arose in turn
from the realisation that laws, theories and such are not immutable truths but are changed
and even rejected as w e develop better explanations. In this sense, this aim has changed,
from discovering to constructing, but in a broader sense the aim of identifying such
regularities - whether by discovering, constructing or some other activity -remains.Thus
science is able to describe and/or explain economicady a large amount of empirical data,
given in observation statements, by means of a smad number of general statements, given
in theoretical statements or mathematical axioms. The characteristics of laws, theories and
axioms are discussed in the companion chapter on structure and Appendix B.4.
This search for lawlikeregularitiesis evident particularly in empiricist and positivist
characterisations of science, as in the following examples. Comte's positivism
characterised science as maturing through three stages which in turn are characterised
partly by changes in purpose:
C o m t e claims that each science goes through three stages, the theological, the
metaphysical andfinallythe 'positive' where the vain search for absolute
knowledge is abandoned, and energies turned to the only achievable scientific
goal which is the discovery of empirical laws, 'relations of succession and
resesmblance'. W h a t characterises the 'positive spirit' is the search for such
laws in every domain of nature; though the methods of the different natural
sciences are irreducibly different and there are complicated patterns of
interdependence between them, they have in c o m m o n a stress on exact
prediction, which is both the test and die practical outcome of the discovery of
law. This is true in the social domain just as m u c h as in the natural, though the
laws are m u c h harder to establish there. (McMullin 1990, p. 832)
Other examples show some variation in the conception of the nature and purpose of this
goal and ofthe laws themselves. Thus John Herschel (1792-1871) characterised science
as seeking lawlikeness as correlations:
Science [for John Herschel] is a search for lawlikeness in nature; the goal of
induction is to discover the causal relations, or invariable correlations, between
phenomena. (McMullin 1990, p. 833)
John M i d (1806-73) sought both those sequences that were invariable and those that held
only in certain circumstances:
Mill distinguishes between 'empirical laws', regularities which hold only under
limited circumstances, and 'basic laws of nature', absolutely invariable
sequences. T h e aim of science is to determine the basic laws and to deduce the
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empirical laws from them, showing w h y these take the form they do under the
limitations specified. (McMullin 1990, p. 834)
Ernst M a c h (1838-1916) saw the formulation of laws as a means to higher goals:
The aim of science [for Ernst M a c h ] is to formulate 'laws', that is, economical
descriptions of sensations, enabling m o r e effective prediction and
communication. (McMullin 1990, p. 835)
T h e development of laws remains a goal of science in contemporary
characterisations, even if the notion of laws changed overtime.W h d e in general laws are
no longer characterised as truths, they remain goals of science because they state the best
current, economical generalisation of regularities of phenomena:
Physics develops the taxonomy of its subject matter which best suits its
purposes: the formulation of exceptionless laws which are basic in ... several
senses ... But this is not the only taxonomy which m a y be required if the
purposes of science in general are to be served: eg., if w e are to state such true,
counterfactual supporting generalisations as there are to state. (Fodor 1991, p.
440)
d) Identifying causes as an aim
The fourth purpose of science is to identify the causes of phenomena. Aristode,
Francis Bacon and David H u m e , a m o n g others, saw identifying causes as a scientific
purpose4, and in section 3.2 above w e traced some historical examples of seeking causes
as scientific purposes. Hume's characterisation of cause as an interpretation of conjoint
events, and responses to his view, have dominated discussion of cause d o w n to the
present. This debate remains unresolved, and there are several current views (Sanford
1995, p. 79). For example, two majority5 views of causation that arise from H u m e are
that w e cannot direcdy perceive causal relations, and that seeking causes equates with
discerning patterns of phenomena, and hence laws. Conversely, the betief that a cause is
earlier than its effect, w h d e popular in general Western culture, is a controversial view in
philosophy because it has theoretical drawbacks and critiques from physics.
Another view, prevailing in philosophy, is that causes and effects are events. This
view is an example of h o w an argument for cause, constructed and critiqued in physics,
has implications for scientific purpose. This commonsense view of cause and effect
equates with that of classical physics, but not with that of quantum physics. M a d d e n
(1983, pp. 54-6) has argued that in ordinary life and in classical science, the
phdosophical interpretation of cause is generady taken to be an event plus a particular or
entity, which together lead to an effect, which is another event. That is, the effect event is
explained in terms of the causal event and the characteristics of the particular. For
example, w e might explain the effect event of a can codapsing as fodows:

4
5

See Appendix B.2 on belief system.
Majority, as used here by Sanford, means supported by a majority of metascientists.
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causes the effect event
(the can
collapses)

On this view, to seek the cause is to identify the mechanism of the causal event and the
identity and characteristics of the particular: that is, the purpose of science is to identify
these components of the process. However, an implication of this view is that, just as the
effect event requires explanation, the causal event also requires explanation and so cannot
itself form part of the ultimate explanation, while the characteristic of the particular is
unchanging and so requires no explanation. T h e solution to these difficulties is not
agreed, although achieving or constructing an explanation must remain at least part of the
purpose.
The question of causality in quantum physics presents different difficulties because,
as discussed in Appendix B.2, it is not justified by our 'commonsense' belief in
continuity:
T h e Copenhagen interpretation of quantum events rejects both the notion that ad
changes require explanation and that particles [are continuous]. Discontinuous
action, annihilation of elementary particles, and the radioactive decay of nuclei
are all taken as basic and needing no explanation, w h e n in fact such changes and
violations of spatial indifferences are precisely what ordinarily and in all other
areas of science would require explanation. (Madden 1983, p. 55)
Sometimes this is thought to be resolved by allowing quantum mechanics to apply only at
microscopic levels, but questions remain unanswered about h o w the microscopic and
macroscopic are related, and indeed w h e n and h o w to draw the boundary between the
two. Thus, following this notion of causation, in classical physics the aim of identifying
the cause is to identify the causal event and the characteristics of the particular, but these
are problematic, whereas in quantum physics simtiar types of causal events are taken as
needing no explanation! T h e reader is reminded here of the discussion, in Appendix B.2,
of the occult virtues, characteristic of Aristotelian science, being qualities that needed no
further explanation. This has implications for the public understanding of science, which
w e wdl discuss in the concluding chapter. Study of the public understanding of science
highlights as one of m a n y issues the acceptance or not of 'scientific' explanations by the
general public, w h o are often called upon to accept scientific explanations without
meaningful understanding. This can be worryingly like occult virtues - a label without an
explanation.
e) Other notions of aim
Various accounts argue other aims or purposes of science, and it is worthwhde to
note briefly a couple of these. A n interesting historical example is the change, in the
Scientific Revolution, from seeking to describe Nature to seeking to represent reality.
This is noted frequently in the literature as a change in the interpretation of the
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significance of the mathematical procedures. The Aristotelian and Ptolemaic approaches
of the Middle Ages, which were sanctioned by the R o m a n Catholic church, had been
interpreted as being functional descriptions but not representing reality. This w a s called
saving the phenomena, as discussed in Appendix B.2 on betief system.
Turning to contemporary characterisations, the mixture of post-positivist accounts
of science vary in their notions of scientific purpose, as they do with other characteristics.
While again these characterisations centre around the purpose of obtaining reliable
knowledge of Nature, it is useful to suggest a distinction between those that are
concerned with the intermediary goals by which this knowledge can be obtained, and
others for which the goal of reliable knowledge is itself an intermediary goal for some
higher purpose. A s an example of the former, Stephen Toulmin has argued that science
aims to describe and provide understandings of Nature through the intermediate aim of
developing and using particular explanatory activities and structures:
Stephen Toulmin's views on science... were that the foundation of science is to
build up systems of explanatory techniques; a variety of representational
devices, including models, diagrams, and theories is employed to describe and
reason about phenomena. (Suppe 1979, p. 670)
Examples of the latter include the purposes of control and ideology, whose variation and
complexities merit separate discussion; this is given in section 3.4 below.
Finally, the companion chapter on context and Appendix B.l argue that h u m a n
contexts comprise one of the ways by which the literature and mass media characterise
science. Included in h u m a n contexts are personal characteristics, such as ambition and
curiosity. These characteristics also contribute to scientific purpose: that a scientist
pursues investigations within a particularfieldpartly due to personal aims arising from
interest or ambition.
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3.4 Control ofNature as a purpose of science
A pervasive theme in the literature is that science is the means by which humanity
gains control of Nature: that through accumulatingreliableknowledge of Nature w e are
better able to explain, manipulate and m a k e ever more reliable predictions about it Thus
knowledge, explanation, manipulation and prediction can be characterised as intermediary
goals by which w e can achieve the higher goal of control. A s noted earlier in section 3.2,
Francis Bacon saw controding Nature as a purpose of science:
Bacon accepted as a moral imperative that man [sic] is to recover the dominion
over nature which he lost in the Fall. H e repeatedly emphasised that m e n must
control and redirect natural forces so as to improve the quality of life of their
fedow human beings. Thus the discovery of Forms is only the proximate goal of
scientific inquiry. O n e must gain knowledge of Forms before one can coerce
nature to serve h u m a n purposes. But the ultimate goal of scientific inquiry is
power over nature. Bacon's emphasis on the practical application of scientific
knowledge stands in marked contrast to Aristode's position that knowledge of
nature is an end in itself. It is this emphasis on the control of natural forces that
most clearly sets apart Bacon's phdosophy from the Aristotelian phdosophy he
hoped to overthrow. (Lossee 1980, p. 68)
That is, science has a utilitarian purpose, which is identified in developments of science
during the Industrial Revolution and especiady in twentieth century science. August
Comte affirmed prediction for the purpose of power - savoir pour prevoir, prevoirpour
pouvoir (literally to know to foresee, to foresee for power) - in proposing his positivist
characterisation of science. This notion became highly significant with the rise in
influence of positivism. Note, however, he also affirmed the Aristotelian goal of
knowledge as its own end:
There can be no doubt that Man's [sic] history of nature must furnish the only
basis of his action upon nature; for it is only by knowing the laws of
phenomena, and thus being able to foresee them, that w e can, in active life, set
them to modify one another for our advantage. Our direct natural power over
everything about us is extremely weak, and altogether disproportional to our
needs. Whenever w e effect anything great it is through a knowledge of natural
laws, by which w e can set one agent to work upon another - even very weak
modifying elements producing a change in the results of a large aggregate of
causes. The relation of science to art m a y be s u m m e d up in a brief expression:
From Science comes Prevision; from Prevision comes Action.
W e must not, however, fall into the error of our time, of regarding Science
chiefly as a basis of Art. However great m a y be the services rendered to
Industry by Science, however true m a y be the saying that Knowledge is Power,
w e must never forget that the sciences have a higher destination still, and not
only higher but more direct - that of satisfying the craving of our understanding
to k n o w the laws of phenomena ...
Our business, it is clear, is with theoretical researches, letting alone their
practical application altogether. Though w e m a y conceive of a course of study
that should unite the generalities of speculation and application, the time is not
come for it. (Comte 1855, pp. 39-40)
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T h efirstparagraph, above, succinctiy characterises science by the goal of controlling
Nature through the ability to predict In the second and third paragraphs, however, Comte
cautions that the greater purpose is developing the knowledge for its o w n sake, setting
out the traditional dichotomy between pure and applied sciences. Section 3.5 below
argues that, given the increasingly utilitarian approach to science in the twentieth century,
Comte's judgement that the time is not c o m e for uniting theory and application is n o w
judged by m a n y commentators to apply no longer.
Control as an ideological goal
Control as an end or purpose of science is increasingly part of recent metascientific
argument. The quote from Callon (1995) earlier in this chapter centred on Barnes' (1977)
identification of prediction, manipulation and control as an end or interest sought in the
production of knowledge. Habermas has been very influential in advancing this
argument, arguing that control arises from the equation of knowledge with h u m a n
interests, and rejecting the positivist notion that reason is free of interests or ideology
(Alcoff 1992, pp. 78-9). For Habermas, natural science is a knowledge-producing
enterprise a m o n g other knowledge-producing enterprises, where each is characterised by
its o w n goals or interests:
There are three categories of process of inquiry for which a specific connection
between logical-methodologicalralesand knowledge-constitutive interests can
be demonstrated. This demonstration is the task of a critical phdosophy of
science that escapes the snares of positivism. T h e approach of the empiricalanalytic sciences incorporates a technical cognitive interest; that ofthe historicalhermeneutic sciences incorporates a practical one; and the approach of critically
oriented sciences incorporates the emancipatory cognitive interest that... was at
the root of traditional theories. (Habermas 1968, 1971, p. 308; emphases in
original)
That is, Habermas identifies different goals, or interests, with different sciences6. H e
explains these goals as fodows (Habermas 1968, pp. 308-317). Technical cognitive
interest is the interest in 'technical control over objectified processes', meaning
prediction, manipulation and control of Nature. Practical interest is the interest in 'the
attainment of possible consensus a m o n g actors in the framework of a self-understanding
derived from tradition', which entails the goal of understanding other people.
Emancipatory

interest seeks freedom through the identification of ideology and

compulsion:
T h e systematic sciences of social action, that is economics, sociology, and
political science, have the goal, as do the empirical-analytic sciences, of
producing nomological [or law-like] knowledge. A critical social science,
however, will not remain satisfied with this. It is concerned with going beyond
6

Note that Habermas uses the term science to mean body of scholarly knowledge, as interpreted in
European contexts, and not to mean merely natural science, as interpreted in Anglo-American
contexts. See Machlup (1980) in summary statements 21 and 22.
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this goal to determine when theoretical statements grasp invariantregularitiesof
social action as such and w h e n they express ideologicady frozen relations of
dependence that can in principle be transformed. T o the extent that this is the
case, the critique of ideology, as wed, moreover, as psychoanalysis, take into
account that information about lawlike connections sets off a process of
reflection in the consciousness of those w h o m the laws are about. Thus the level
of unreflected consciousness, which is one of the initial conditions of such laws,
can be transformed. O f course, to this end a criticady mediated knowledge of
laws cannot through reflection alone render a law inoperative, but it can render it
inapplicable. (Habermas 1968, p. 310; emphases in original)
This goal of identifying the ideologies of knowledge claims is achieved through the
activity of reflection.
This notion of control needs to be understood within wider contexts of
interpretation. Alcoff (1992) identifies Habermas's view as an example of critical theory,
which, along with phenomenology, hermeneutics, post-structuralism and feminism, is
one of thefivemajor orientations in twentieth century continental epistemology. This is
the French-German approach to epistemology, which is more concerned with the strategic
effects of truth claims, and less with truth and knowledge as the representation of reality,
as in the Anglo-American tradition. Post-structuralist approaches, although disparate,
probably share 'the belief that knowledge systems are ultimately contingent and connected
intrinsically to power relations and to desire' (Alcoff 1992, p. 79). Thus Derrida rejects
the Western notion that knowledge and language are neutral and transparent, arguing that
beliefs are not determined by reality but by plural and shifting interplays of textual
elements: thus the goal is to persuade. Foucault also rejects the neutrality of rationality,
but characterises it more in terms of power: thus the goal is to maximise power. In
response to Habermas, Hesse has argued that the goal of control is inseparable from the
goal of human self-understanding, because theories of both embody the same view of
humanity and are constructed with the same categories, such as functionality, selection
and survival (Rouse 1991, p. 50). Thus interpretations within continental epistemology notably critical theory, hermeneutics, post-structuralism and feminism - characterise
science strongly in terms of goals such as power, persuasion and ideology. Critical
perspectives of scientific purposes arise from views such as these, and are discussed at
greater length below in section 3.6. Unsurprisingly, stronger versions of this approach
have drawn criticism from those w h o characterise science by goals such as rationality and
objectivity (see Gross & Levitt 1994).
T o conclude, while the goal of control over Nature is widely embraced, there is
tension between accounts which see this as part of a central goal concerning power and
persuasion, and those which see power and persuasion as external to science. The
substantial debate in the literature, between internalist and externalist characterisations, is
a central one to the present thesis, and is discussed at some length in Appendix B.l. The
present thesis interprets debates such as these as exercises in boundary work that can be
clarified by a multidimensional characterisation of science.
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The strengthening of utilitarian purposes in the twentieth century

To appreciate the nature of scientific purpose in the twentieth century, it is
worthwhile reviewing the historical relationship between science and technology, which
is well documented in the literature. The brief account fodowing draws mainly from
Keller (1983d). Most histories trace two traditions dating from Antiquity: craft,
characterised largely as an empirical activity, and learning, particularly as it involved
explanatory theories. These traditions were mostly separate from Antiquity, through the
Middle Ages, until the Scientific Revolution. For example, although w e note from
Antiquity the construction of large buildings and irrigation systems, weapons that threw
missiles, the water wheel, the screw press and gear transmission, these developments
were essentially independent of the concurrent developments in natural philosophy7.
Thus, although each involved mathematics, none entailed theories about Nature, raw
materials and so on. B y the late Middle Ages there had been notable developments in
techniques and inventions. C o m m o n examples include distillation in alchemy, lens
grinding for spectacles, instruments for measuring angles in astronomy, the compass,
gunpowder and developments in fortifications. Again, mathematics was used in ad - for
example, Leonardo da Vinci's inventions can be geometrically analysed - but the
theoretical developments that characterised the natural phdosophy of the day remained
largely separate.
Although Francis Bacon urged that theory and craft practice should leam from each
other, so that rational experiment would produce n e w inventions to increase the control of
Nature, practical benefits from experimentation were indirect for a long w h d e (Keder
1983d, p. 413). First, the union of the two was slow: w e m a y trace this process over at
least the period from the 1600s to the 1800s. For example, it was Boyle (1627-91) w h o
brought a m o r e scientific approach to the preparation of chemical compounds as
compared with that of the alchemists. Yet the first clearly scientific technology is not
identified until a n e w industry, the manufacture of artificial dyesruffs through chemical
analysis and synthesis, emerged in Germany in the mid 1800s. Secondly, the union was
unclear: as science and invention came together in, for example, the testing and
construction of n e w instruments and the developments of existing industries, it was not
clear w h e n theory informed practice and practice informed theory:
It is unclear then h o w far the application of steam power w a s scientific
technology and h o w far the work of craftsmen w a s guided by scientific
education, however elementary. (Keder 1983d, p. 413)
Thirdly, the union was piecemeal: different instances, in differentfieldsand in different
countries developed at differenttimes.The emergence of n e w scientific technologies of
7

See Appendix B.l.
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the 1800s, notably in organic chemistry and electricity, is easdy identified but it varied in
different countries; the gradual application of theory in existing technologies was less
clear.
In Whig histories a significant factor in most cases of breakthroughs and
developments was the achievement of individuals. These histories characterise the science
of this period as the flowering of the era of great pioneers and polymaths: John Smeaton
(1724-92), James Watt (1736-1819), Antoine Lavoisier (1743-94), H u m p h r y Davy
(1778-1829), Sadi Carnot (1796-1832), James M a x w e d (1831-79) and T h o m a s Edison
(1847-1931) are a few of many well known examples. Thus many of the science-based
industries of the twentieth century were established in the nineteenth centuries, and for
more recent industries such as information technology and genetic engineering, the model
for large scale science-industry collaboration was established.
The significance here of this history is that, as the utilitarian purposes of technology
merged with science, science became characterised increasingly by utilitarian purposes.
Whereas the scientific outcomes of the earlier individuals such Newton and Gatileo had

little impact on, and certainly tittie use to, many people, the work of Pasteur and Maxwe
had wide practical application m u c h quicken
In part, that means that the intersections of science and production and of science
and society actually became closer. At the d a w n of die Industrial revolution,
James Watt did not actuatiy need to k n o w the theory of latent heat to hit upon the
idea of making the steam engine m o r e efficient by introducing a separate
condenser; a hundred years later, by contrast, only afirst-ratechemist would
have been able to develop synthetic dyes. But it m e a n s something more
significant too that the traditional boundaries between science and industry and
science and its applications began to dissolve; the very introduction ofthe terms
'pure science' and 'applied science' paradoxically witness that process. The
development of electricity during the nineteenth century offers a classic instance
of this. Without top-level scientific research by m e n such as Faraday, the
electrical industry could never have developed; yet ad the electricity which the
scientist investigated and utilised was entirely man-made [sic]. In the present
century, the development of plastics and artificial intedigence offers further
instances of h o w die scientist has b e c o m e utterly bound up with society
precisely because what he is investigating is n o longer 'Nature' ('out there' as it
were) but the products of previous sdentific-technical ingenuity and industry.
A s Latour has convincingly argued, this transformation has immeasurably
enlarged the scope of scientific-technical inquiry; but it also sets n e w problems
for the historian or historical sociologist of science, since the categories
traditionally deployed for understanding the work of a Kepler or a Newton
(notions for example of 'discovery') seem patentiy inappropriate for an adequate
grasp of the m o d e m laboratory or international research network. (Porter 1990,
pp. 44-5)
The quickening application of science, as described by Porter, is a complex matter:
undoubtedly the technologies became more complex and changed more rapidly, but this
does not explain the application of scientific developments. Part of the answer must be
that the emerging industrial technologies increasingly deployed materials and phenomena
that were produced more or less directly by the efforts of scientists, notably electric
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current and synthetic chemicals. Thus an increasing number of scientists were working to
solve problems that by definition had short-term, utilitarian purposes; this w a s not the
case for the Newtons and Gatileos of earlier times.
These utilitarian outcomes are identified as the wide-ranging and practical
applications in, and (frequentiy indistinct) interactions with, industry, commerce,
government, the military, community-based groups and government. A n early and
influential account of this was given by Ravetz:
Science becomes direcdy involved with society at large w h e n it is applied to
the solution of technical problems, involving the production of the means for the
performance of a function, or practical problems, involving the achievement of
the purposes of individuals or groups of people ... The investigation of practical
problems, and their solution through large-scale practical projects, encounters
every pitfall of scientific and technical problems, and then s o m e peculiar to
itself. Conflicting ideologies and purposes are at the heart of every urgent
practical problem; they lack the accepted criteria of quality for their solution; the
sciences involved in them are usuady immature; and in their execution they are
prone to distortion by the natural tendencies of bureaucratic operation. (Ravetz
1971, p. 408)
Ravetz does not argue that the character of science is solely determined by its usefulness,
for he does proceed to remind us that, writing in 1971, that 'a large part of scientific
research proceeds as before, in a social context which is sttil mainly 'academic' rather
than industrialised' (Ravetz 1971, p. 409). That is, its goals remained largely cognitive.
Nonetheless, as he points out, as science is increasingly enmeshed in a wider social
context, so too is the value of science increasingly measured by its usefulness to society:
the sciences will continue to be supported 'so long as they are considered as performing
these functions better than any feasible alternatives' (Ravetz 1971, p. 410).
In the less than three decades from Ravetz's book to the present thesis, a substantial
S T S field and literature has emerged that has identified and critiqued the multifarious and
inextricable links between the goal complexes of the sciences and other social
endeavours. This corpus is too substantial to explore here, but an indication of its scope
and, by inference, the complexity of an overati characterisation, can be gained by a simple
review of the m o r e relevant entries in the review of the S T S literature given in Jasanoff et
al (eds) (1995). They include the fotiowing.
•

Studies of engineering identify both internalist goals, for developing the
cognitive discipline, and externalist goals, relating to the broader social
application of engineering activity, as for metascientific analyses (Downey &
Lucena 1995).

•

Feminist studies of technology characterise technology as shaped by male rather
than female interests or purposes, in m u c h the same w a y as w e identify
technology as being shaped by military or capitalist purposes (Wajcman 1995).

•

Sociohistorical studies of technology, notably as case studies, provide detaded
accounts of the multiple participants in technologies, that inform the balance
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between characterisations of technology as deterministic (meeting its o w n ends)
and socially produced (meeting social ends) (Bijker 1995).
T h e spreading use of computers rarely creates its o w n ends by 'causing' direct
social change, but does create possibilities and pressures for meeting social
ends, notably industrial, mtiitary and commercial purposes (Edwards 1995).
T h e H u m a n G e n o m e Project promises to reconfigure the nature of biology,
medicine and society, though not always in the ways initiady envisaged; it arose
through an intriguing mix of social and cognitive goals, but as it proceeds
debates are opening about the future purposes and ends of the emerging database
(Hdgartner 1995).
Studies of the construction and disputation of scientific boundaries show that
characterisations science and non-science arise from the purposes of those
constructing the characterisations, where scientists do not always have control
over the characterisation of science (Gieryn 1995).
Studies of science controversies (Nelkin 1995), including public decision
making (Martin & Richards 1995) and environmental debates (Yearley 1995),
frequently entail boundary disputes, and accordingly also identify in
representations of science the goals of those constructing the representations.
This is ad the more interesting in disputes where not only scientists but political
interest groups lose control over the characterisation of science, i.e. of the
legitimisation of goals and purposes.
Different theoretical perspectives on decision making posit different goals, of
which Martin & Richards (1995) identify four: superior knowledge (in positivist
accounts); superior political/economic/social resources (in studies of group
politics); superior persuasiveness/knowledge/politics (in S S K accounts); or the
hegemony of the dominant social structure (in studies of social structure).
Studies of science as intellectual property show that, as international economic
growth is increasingly based on knowledge, so too is scientific knowledge
increasingly valuable to economic and political goals (Etzkowitz & Webster
1995).
Claims that science is exceptional or special in public policy can be analysed in
terms of four essential goals, that itresultsin: knowledge or truth; an esoteric
complexity beyond the average citizen; self-governing norms; or a unique
contribution to national economic wed-being. Each of these has been used in
arguing for strategic and material improvement in U S public policy (Bimber &
Guston 1995).
Utilitarian goals of science in western democracies foreshadow increasingly
similar future science priorities, in more and more countries, as given in national
science policies (Elzinga & Jamison 1995).
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A significant proportion of the world's science effort is directed towards military
purposes (Smit 1995).

•

There is tension, in less developed countries, between universal science which
favours Western goals, and localised science that addresses local problems and
goals (Shrum & Shenhav 1995).

•

There is tension, internationally, between the notionally unifying tendency of the
universal goals of science and technology, and competition between companies
and nation states, whose goals conflict (Ancarani 1995).
T o select one of these accounts as an example, Cozzens and Woodhouse reviewed

studies of the interrelationships between science, government and industry, and the
politics of scientific knowledge, from which they concluded that this interplay 'is in fact
the most influential power relationship running through the politics of science', yet it is
underrepresented in and undervalued by the literature (Cozzens & Woodhouse 1995, p.
548). They identified U S post-war involvement of industry in not just applied science,
but the directions and funding of so-called pure research also. Even though industry
funding of pure research increased mostiy from the 1980s, thereby changing the mix of
public and private research funding, there was a longer tradition in which captains of
industry advised government, and 'pure academics' served on the boards of private
companies. Marxist studies thus interpret this goal as the state 'providing conditions for
the accumulation of capital' by the exploitation of knowledge from state-funded research;
non-Marxist studies interpret the goal stighdy differendy, as the state supporting early,
tentative and unprofitable research that business could not afford to risk (Cozzens &
W o o d h o u s e 1995, pp. 548-9). Whatever the interpretive perspective, and whether in
liberal democracies or other social systems, there is a clear goal argued for science in
underpinning or 'driving' the economic well-being of the country. Thus the notion of
industrial sciences includes not just the research and development carried out on the
premises of private and state industries, but funded, 'applied' research within the
universities and a considerable proportion of 'pure' scientific research whose funding,
and hence purpose, is influenced by a broader group of stakeholders than an academic
community of scientists.
A s a final and specific example, utilitarian purposes of science are clearly
identifiable in recent science policies, as, for example, in Australian science policy on
pure and applied science8.

8

See Appendix B.l.
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Critical perspectives on scientific purposes

It is clear that much of the substantial corpus of research reviewed in section 3.5,
above, has more to say than merely identifying the increase and pervasiveness of
utilitarian purposes of science. It is not just that science, government and industry are
related, but that in this interrelatedness they share c o m m o n goals. T h e S T S literature in
particular provides compeding critiques that the cognitive goals (of seeking objective
knowledge) traditionally used to characterise science simply fail to account for the
directions or ends taken by scientific research; this is quite aside from phdosophical
critiques of positivism or empiricism. It has strong implications for the interaction of the
public with science. W h e n public interest groups question or oppose science that is
aligned with industry and government goals, they seek to acquire and legitimise their o w n
knowledge base. Cozzens and Woodhouse (1995) have given examples of these complex
interrelationships between goals, notably in the politics of research funding, the problems
of expertise in policy making, chadenges to the authority of professional knowledge and
the relations between science, business and government.
Straightforward cognitive goals are not usually a problem where a knowledge
dispute remains clearly within the scientific community. The purpose is agreed to be the
development of scientific knowledge (Martin & Richards 1995, p. 512):
Sometimes the scientific evidence is incomplete or contradictory. In these cases,
scientific debate is legitimate. Once the uncertainties are resolved, though, only a
few maverick scientists can be expected to hold out against the persuasive power
of the evidence...
Sometimes there is genuine cognitive controversy. Different scientists appear
to have valid reasons for different reasons about nature. In most cases, this does
not persist once various objective tests have been m a d e , such as definitive
experiments and repeatedreplications...
A limitation of [this] positivist approachtiesin its dependence on scientists
for determining what should be studied. (Martin & Richards 1995, p. 510)
Martin and Richards'referenceto this as a positivist approachrefersto its derivation from
internalist, positivist characterisations of science, it being one of four models they identify
for analysing decision making in science. It is not restricted, however, to the
philosophical position of positivism; rather, it applies whenever the debate simply
concerns cognitive goals, notably in debates within the scientific community. It does not
apply well w h e n the debate is not confined to scientists, as in public disputes and in
industrial science; hence the critiques.
The goals of modern science and the diminution of cognitive goals
The first critique is that utilitarian purposes of science cause deviations from
characterisations of so-called 'pure' science. That is, quite apart from any 'addition' of
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utilitarian goals, the cognitive goals traditionady associated with science are diminished
and fragmented:
Technification of the natural sciences - despite its undoubted achievements - is
causing serious problems even in standard scientific work. Ravetz has explored
at length the problems of what he calls 'industrialised' science, which is very
largely technified science. T h e loss of skid and craft competence among the
general run of research workers as a result of the overutdisation of big
machines, methodological techniques and routines of organised research
procedure is gradually revealing ad the symptoms of work in bureaucratised
organisations. There is a diminution of inventiveness, a lack of personal
responsibility, over-authoritativeness, and, eventuady, an absence of purpose.
Such science cannot even serve practical ends adequately ... as Ravetz points out
...(Redner 1987, pp. 70-1)
Thus, for Redner and Ravetz, purposes have considerable effects, and changes in
purpose manifest in changes in other dimensions that the present thesis interprets as
changes in activities, structures and knowledge, for example.

Differences between the goals of modern (industrialised) science and classical (idealised)
science
Secondly, to the extent that science is characterised by utilitarian purposes, its
character shifts. O n the one hand it becomes more clearly distinguished from traditional
and popular idealisations of science, that are not characterised by utilitarian goals. O n the
other hand science becomes less clearly distinguished from industry and government,
because increasingly it shares their goals. Thus, in contrast with the traditional
characterisation of science as pursuing objective knowledge of reatity, scientists
increasingly work to goals arising from the interests of government and industry:
Nelkin and Pollak (1979) point out that m u c h of what passes for 'participation'
in current governance can just as w e d be understood as attempts by the powerful
to co-opt the public. Laird found this phenomenon in the Carter administration's
energy policy procedures (Laird 1993), and it has long characterised nuclear
waste policy (Walker et al, 1983). (Cozzens & Woodhouse 1995, p. 545)
The work of those scientists in U S energy policy and the nuclear industry is devalued,
even dismissed, by their opponents in the public arena because the scientific work is
characterised as directed toward the goals of the government and nuclear industry, and
these bodies have vested interests in certain outcomes. Thus the goals of science are
increasingly at odds with popular idealisations of science, particularly in the second half
of the twentieth century.
Martin and Richards (1995) have argued that different analyses of science decision
making apply in different circumstances and yield different insights. Thus disputes within
the scientific community can be analysed using the positivist model, mentioned above,
and for the sociology (construction) of scientific knowledge; disputes outside the
scientific community can be analysed fruitfudy in terms of the politics of the disputing
parties, and the social structures. They advocate analyses that integrate these approaches,
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thereby providing 'a m o r e comprehensive and coherent understanding of scientific and

technical disputes ... [and] enhancing opportunities for public participation in decision
making' (Martin & Richards 1995, p. 525).
The goals of modern science and its place in a pluralistic democracy
Thirdly, the science-industry-government nexus has implications for the role of
science in a pluralistic democracy, since the public access to science and its goals is
difficult at best:

One naive notion that runs through no small portion of the early STS
controversy studies is the hope that citizen participation wtil s o m e h o w hold the
experts accountable. S T S quickly learned, however, that participation without
decision power is meaningless ...:
T h e promise of technology assessment was that it would ensure a
better balance of the costs and benefits of scientific and technological
progress by atiowing for more democratic participation in the selection
of technical choices. Genuinely opening up the channels for such
participation, however, would have required a substantial shift in
control over decision-making away from private into public channels.
This ... w a s a step that neither the scientific, the corporate, nor the
political establishment was willing to take. (Dickson 1984, p. 259)
A major barrier to effective citizen participation in government decision
making is the subtle denigration of nonprofessional knowledge in the
educational system and throughout government interactions...
A c o m m o n view among scientists is that the public is neither interested nor
competent in the governmental matters scientists deal with. (See Prewitt 1982)
According to this argument, a deficit of knowledge disqualifies citizens from
participating in science-intensive areas such as regulatory policy. (Cozzens &
W o o d h o u s e 1995, pp. 545-6)
Thus the access of citizens to scientific knowledge and expertise is systematicady denied
and that this is only overcome through strenuous efforts largely without help from the
scientific community. This conclusion is supported by many studies. For example,

Martin and Richards' study, above, argued that understanding scientific concepts alone is

necessary, but unlikely to be sufficient, for the public participation in scientific matt
that concern them^. Studies of the public understanding of science are no more
encouraging, suggesting on the one hand that many projects carried out in the name of

'public understanding of science' tacidy serve to legitimise existing scientific practice
on the other that scientists are less committed than the public to goals of testing and
reformulating scientific knowledge (Wynne 1995). The scientific community argues that
it cannot be retesting every proposition every time a citizen disputes it, for that would
quash any progress at all; citizen groups argue that in public disputes involving science
claims the phenomena causing concern are underplayed by the science establishment,
whose goals are too often suspect because they are not value-free.

9

The present thesis extends this critique to argue that understanding science concepts is necessary,
but in combination with having understandings of other dimensions of science.
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There are counter examples. Cozzens and Woodhouse point to 'dozens' of studies
that show h o w citizens have sought to build their o w n body of scientific knowledge in
reaction to what they perceive as threats to their lives or communities, such as matters of
pollution. It is interesting that these arise from goals both different to those of

professional scientists (solving different problems) and simtiar (claims conforming to
simtiar standards and criteria):
[S]tudies of local controversies [show] that local knowledge is often more
accurate or complete, even by conventional scientific standards, than the
knowledge imported by 'experts' to a local situation ...
[Contemporary social] movements seldom begin from knowledge goals.
Instead, they develop them in the process of trying to solve some other problem.
(Cozzens & Woodhouse 1995, p. 546)
The goals of modern science and anti-science sentiments
Finady, the science-industry-government nexus is given in shared goals, and this
fuels popular anti-science rhetorics. The protest movements from the 1960s are well
known examples, in which large social movements in western countries opposed war and
the military industries, the atomic b o m b and nuclear industries, and poduting industries
and technologies. Accompanying this was widespread criticism of the involvement of
science in all of these issues that were suddenly and widely unpopular. At the same time,
other issues became more popular, such as non-Westem medicine and phdosophies, in
part because theyrepresenteda rejection of (western) science. This is well documented. It
can be interpreted as part of the attempts by citizen and community groups to resolve
conflicts with the science-industry-govemment nexus:
Professional science and citizen knowledge are often complementary, in
different ways in different situations. W h e n one looks back at the sciencegovernment relationship from this viewpoint, it appears that there are a number
of areas where citizens care enough about the issues to build their o w n
knowledge bases with which to challenge professional knowledge. The
batdegrounds of the politics of knowledge are not necessarilyfieldsof science
but the issues raised in government by a range of contemporary social
movements.
These movements seldom begin from knowledge goals. Instead, they
develop them in the process of trying to solve some other problem. In the
process of neighbourhood environmental protest, for example, citizens m a y
realise that the observations that spurred them to action - illness, visible
pollutants, foul smells - are being discounted in favour of contradictory
'scientific' evidence that claims safety. The political issue then becomes
knowledge itself - whose wdl count, that is - as protest groupsfightto have their
o w n experience counted as real, true and valuable. The women's health
movement likewise revalues women's understanding of their o w n bodies and
deprofessionalises the health care setting ... T h e wider alternative health
movement, as well as the deep ecology movement, have developed simtiar
critiques of the limitations of professional knowledge and the political
implications of science. The debates over abortion, creationism, and animal
rights also illustrate that various American publics are wtiling to retrieve the
definition of key aspects of their lives and cultures from the experts, when
enough is seen to be at stake. (Cozzens & Woodhouse 1995, pp. 546-7)
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This presents three matters concerning goals. First, Cozzens and Woodhouse show in
this list of issues where citizens have sought to redefine concepts that are used both for
their o w n cultural identities and by science. While this is interesting, it is not as
problematic as the potential mix of outcomes that it implies: there is a likely tension
between issues that are usefully 'redefined' by citizens, as w h e n pollutants have been
identified despite lack of access to official data, and those where the 'usefulness' is open
to debate. Examples of the latter, of course, raise immediately the question of 'use' to
w h o m , but one could suggest medical treatments with a demonstrated efficacy that have
been rejected on the basis of a religious or other beliefs. There is a tension, for example,
between seeking to have w o m e n claiming greater control over their health and not being
denied treatments that are available and effective. Secondly, there can be a tendency to
characterise conflicts between citizens and the scientific community, especially where the
citizens win out, as seizing upon and rectifying a premature or misguided (or mis-aimed)
conclusion by scientists: that is, as a scientific aberration or pathology. The genre of
studies reviewed by Cozzens and Woodhouse (and by the other essays in Jasanoff et al)
is more critical: it identifies this as a structural and inherent characteristic of science when
its goals identify it as part of industry and/or government. Thirdly, an argument given by
scientists that they do not share the goals of industry and government, is that science is
value-free and neutral, that its goal is objectivity. For example, Lipscombe and Wdliams
(1979) have analysed arguments from scientists and others for the neutrality of science,
of which the fodowing example, although perhaps overwrought, sharply characterises the
strength of views opposing science in the anti-Vietnam war movements of the 1960s:
Whether one takes an optimistic or pessimistic view of the probable
consequences of the massive transformation of the natural and man-made [sic]
environment and the conditions of social life that are tradeable in the end to the
innocent classical delight in knowledge, the conclusion is inescapable, that the
claim of moral innocence must n o w be dismissed as a mere vestigial survival of
an earlier and safer era. It is one thing for a pure geometer to demand to be left
alone ... It is quite another thing to hear the same plea of moral blamelessness
and 'neutrality', in the sense n o w of moral innocuousness, m a d e by
contemporary scientists working directly, say, for the military establishment
W h e n the immediate consequences of scientific activity are so plain and so
obvious, a plea of 'scientific neutrality' can only be properly characterised as an
expression of deliberate myopia or, to put it more bluntly, moral irresponsibility.
Allow m e to offer an example of this kind of irresponsibility. In The New
York Times for December 27,1967 (p. 8), there appeared an interview with D r
Louis Frederick Fieser w h o was in charge of a team of Harvard University
scientists developing napalm during World W a r n. H e is reported as having said
that he felt free of 'any gutit'. H e is also quoted as saying 'You don't k n o w
what's coming. That wasn't m y business, That is for other people, (my italics) I
was working on a technical problem that was considered pressing.' H e went on
to say: 'I distinguish between developing a munition of some kind and using it.
Y o u can't blame the outfit that put out the rifle that killed the President I'd d o it
again, if called upon, in defence of the country.' W h e n asked about the use of
napalm in Vietnam, D r Fieser said, *I don't k n o w enough about the situation in
Vietnam. It's not m y business to deal with political or moral questions. That is a

Appendix B.3: Purpose

730

very involved thing. Just because I played a role in the technological
development of napalm doesn't m e a n I'm any more qualified to comment on the
moral aspects of it'
T h e moral callousness of these remarks is matched by their confusion of
thought... (Lipscombe & Williams 1979, pp. 51-2; emphases in original)
Lipscombe and Williams object to the notion expressed that one needs 'moral
qualifications' in order to assess the consequences of one's action, as an ethical matter.
But in the present argument, w e might also object that this scientist confuses or misidentifies the goals of his activity: what he represents, and no doubt believes, is that he
was working towards a disinterested and objective solution of a technical problem.
Lipscombe and Williams' implicit objection is that the scientist failed to identify that his
work was directed towards a larger goal of producing a technical product with military
uses. In theirfirstparagraph, Lipscombe and Wdliams reject the isolation of purely
knowledge goals from the goals that drive the development of the knowledge in the first
place. This is the same argument that has been put forward by community groups w h o
oppose poduting industries, for example, and the use of live animals in experiments: they
do not accept that the goal is the disinterested pursuit of knowledge. T h e present thesis
interprets these different goals as arising from differing belief systems, in particular
different beliefs about whether science is value-free or value-laden.
In closing, w e have noted tensions between the largely institutionalised authority of
science and the interests and needs of citizens. Such tensions are central to notions of a
scientifically literate citizenry and therefore, the present thesis argues, to the school
science education of future citizens.

\
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Table B.3.1
Examples of characterisation of key metascientific viewpoints
by purpose
•».»"»-

'

Author

Viewpoint

Suppe 1973,
1979

Received View

sceptical
descriptive

Weltanschauungen
(world view)
semantic or
model-theory
historical
realism
Bhaskar 1983

empiricism

idealism
realism

Nussbaum 1989 rationalism
empiricism/
positivism
constructivism

BoycLGaspar
and Trout 1991

empiricism

Examples of reference to
purpose
T o generate empirically
verifiable knowledge; to
construct an account that can be
rationally reconstructed
(a) T o generate an account that
reflects identifiable aims
(b) To generate an account that
meets one or more of several
criteria (such as mathematical
and semantic criteria)
T o construct knowledge that is
consistent with a
Weltanschauungen
T o describe, predict and explain
phenomena within an intended
scope
T o develop knowledge of the
world that is philosophically
justified
T o generate knowledge of the
world by the inductive analysis
of experiences.

T o construct knowledge by
mental activity.
T o generate knowledge of an
external reality.

T o generate or discover proven,
true or confirmed knowledge
T o generate or discover proven,
true or confirmed knowledge
T o generate the best available
knowledge according to
(a) internal criteria (rational,
logical, empirical)
(b) external criteria (social,
historical, psychological)
T o generate knowledge of the
world that is consistent with
experimental (a) verification
(Camap, Hempel) or (b)
falsification (Popper)

Identified in the w o r k of
Camap

(a) Achinstein
(b)Rapoport

Bohm, Feyerabend, Hanson,
Kuhn, Popper, Toulmin
Beth, Suppe, Suppes, van
Fraasen
Lakatos, Shapere, Toulmin

Francis Bacon, Berkeley,
Hobbes, H u m e , Locke, M a c h
(positivism), Mill, Russell,
Vienna Circle (logical
empiricism)
Berkeley, Fichte, Hegel, H u m e ,
Kant, Plato, Schelling
Aristotle, Bachelard, Bhaskar,
Duhem, Feyerabend, Hanson,
Harre, Hesse, H u m e , Kant
KoyreA Kuhn, Plato, Popper,
Putnam, Quine
Descartes, Kant Plato
Bacon, Comte, Hempel, H u m e ,
Locke
(a) Popper, Lakatos, partly Kuhn
(b) Kuhn, Toulmin, partly
Lakatos

Carnap, Hempel, H u m e , Popper
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Pickering 1992

Callon 1995

post-positivist
consensus
comprising (a)
post-positivist
empiricism, (b)
neo-Kantian
constructivism,
and (c) scientific
realism
scientific
knowledge as
objective
(logical
empiricism)
scientific
knowledge as
relative to
culture
scientific
knowledge as
relative to
interests
(sociology of
scientific
knowledge SSK)
science as
rational
knowledge
science as
competitive
enterprise
science as
sociocultural
practice
science as
extended
translation

(a) Partly Popper
T o produce explanations of
experimental data that correspond (b) Hanson, K u h n
(c) Boyd, Goodman, Kripke,
with the facts or with reality.
Putnam, Quine

T o generate true or verifiable
knowledge of the world

T o extend the culture's
knowledge of the world

Kuhn, Feyerabend

To construct knowledge of the
world for use, not simply for
contemplation.

Barnes, Bloor, Callon,
Cartwright, Collins, Garfinkel,
Gilbert Knorr Cetina, Latour,
Law, Lynch, Mulkay, Shapin,
Woolgar

To generate statements and
networks of statements (codified
knowledge) about the natural
world.
T o generate statements about the
natural world, to test these
statements, and to scrutinise the
statements of others.
To generate knowledge meeting
both cognitive and sociocultural
goals.

Hesse, Holton, Popper

Althusser, Ben-Cole, David,
Freudenthal, Hull, Merton,
Popper

Bachelard, Barnes, Collins,
Fleck, Knorr, Kuhn, Mulkay,
Pinch, Ravetz, Rudwick,
Schaffer, Wise, Wittgenstein
A m a a n , Callon, Foucault Knorr
T o link technical devices,
statements, and human beings in Cetina, Latour, Pickering, Wise,
Woolgar
stabilisedrelationsin order to
produce statements about the
world.
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Appendix B.4
Argument from the metascientific literature emphasising the dimension
structure
Debates in the metascientific literature address many aspects of structure in science,
which again supports a broad interpretation of structure as a dimension of
characterisation. Appendix B.4 addresses this scope as fodows:
B . 4.1
B. 4.2

Current metascientific views with respect to structure;
The unity of science;

B.4.3

The role of structure in characterising a western European scientific
tradition;

B . 4.4

Structures of knowledge (cognitive structures)
a) laws
b) theories
c) disciplines
d) other cognitive structures

B . 4.5
B.4.6

Organisational structures
Language structures

4.1 Current metascientific views with respect to structure
Metascientific argument in the literature presents various notions of structure. Table
B.4.1 summarises several analyses of metascientific viewpoints, to enable some
comparisons based on notions of structure. Each view addresses at least one aspect of
structure explicidy, and usually more than one.
In contemporary H P S , the current consensus is that there are three main positions:
post-positivist empiricism, idealism or neo-Kantianism, and scientific realism. In
empiricism, the central notion of structure is structures of knowledge - inductive
structures of experiences and deductive structures from hypotheses - on which
organisational structures are based. Thus disciplines as organisations arise from, and
closely reflect, disciplines as intedectual and logical structures. In idealism, structure also
centres on knowledge, but knowledge as structured by the intedect; organisational
structure varies more between accounts, but tend to focus on the h u m a n and social
characteristics of scientific structure. Scientific realism characterises science knowledge
by several notions of structure. First, the possibilities of our knowledge of the cosmos
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are constrained, or structured, by an external reatity; second, this knowledge is socially
produced, or structured. Thus this view combines several notions of structure at its
focus: natural (ontological), knowledge (epistemological) and social and psychological
structures.
In contemporary S T S , Callon (1995) has described four main approaches, (a)
Where science is characterised as rational knowledge, it concerns the structures of
scientific statements. The meanings of these statements are assumed to arise simply and
transparently 'in the system of the statements' (Callon 1995, p. 42). Social structures
arise from these cognitive structures, and serve them by providing the unfettered space
for free and frank discussion, (b) W h e r e science is characterised as a competitive
enterprise, the internal structure provides a system of rewards and sanctions. There is no
agreed explanation of the roles of laboratories and research teams. T h e external structure
makes a clear distinction between the structures of science and those of non-science;
boundaries are clear and firm, but allow some nourishment to and from society. This
model of structure also applies to science as rational knowledge, (c) Science as
sociocultural practice emphasises the social characteristics as m u c h as the disciplinary
ones, but it makes weaker references to structure than the first two models. Because it
takes science to be a human activity alongside ad other human activities, an emphasis on
sociocultural practice concerns tacit knowledge, as proposed by Polyani. Tacit
knowledge is implicit and uncodified (unstructured) compared with formal knowledge,
although it includes structures such as rules and 'language games' (Cadon 1995, p. 42).
However, the perspective of science as sociocultural practice is less concerned with
organisational and institutional structure. It does address rules, by which social
organisation is possible, and which help to understand power structures such as masterdisciple relationships. Boundaries between science and its environment are 'constructed
by actors themselves in various hybrid settings' and are therefore contextual rather than
absolute structures (Cadon 1995, p. 49). The meanings of scientific statements are not
given just in their structure, as for science as rational knowledge, but in their context too.
(d) Science as extended translation is concerned with the production of statements, as in
model (a), but is concerned with the process of their production and 'nonpropositional
elements in this process' as in model (c) (Callon 1995, p. 50). Thus it characterises the
structure of translation chains of statements, where the coherence between actants
(technical devices, statements and human beings) provides the meaning of statements
about the world.
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The unity of science

It is more common, both in the literature and in general public contexts, to speak of
science rather than sciences. S o m e theorists seek to discern a single, underlying, unitary
structure of science. There are two broad notions of the unity of science, both of which
are contested: that essentially the sciences are similar in their methods, or their results
(Sober 1995).
Methodological unity holds that thereasoningactivities of the various sciences are
simtiar across the sciences. Discussions of the scientific method in many general science
texts seem to m a k e this assumption, but the notion of methodological unity is strongly
criticised and rejected in m u c h of the post-positivist literature1. In any event there is no
clear notion of what a uniform method of reasoning refers to. There seem to be some
general notions of unity, but the nature of this unity is unclear. For example, Sober
(1995) has argued that while it is 'doubtless' that all sciences use the same technique of
reasoning (the structure if A, then B, or modus ponens), it is not clear that all sciences
use other techniques, either logical or practical, uniformly (Sober 1995, pp. 501-2). In a
similar way, Duschl (1994, p. 449) has noted some striking similarities between Kuhn's
notions of normal and revolutionary science, based on physics, and Schwab's notions of
stable and fluid science, based on biology. Like Sober, however, Duschl does not see
any structural unity beyond these general notions. The trend in much of post-positivist
metascience seems to be an increasing interest in differences between sciences. For
example, in their review of H P S , Boyd, Gasper and Trout include chapters on emerging
differences in the philosophies of different sciences; in their review of STS, Jasanoff et al
include chapters on different constructions of science, including different
characterisations (Cadon) and constructions of boundaries between science and nonscience (Gieryn).
Unity of scientific results is the view that the theories in one science can be
subsumed under, or reduced to, the confirmed theories in another science. Most
commonly this is taken to m e a n that sciences such as sociology and biology can be
reduced to theories in physics and mathematics. Reduction of theories is one of the tenets
of the positivist R V , and is one of thetenetson which the R V has been largelyrejectedin
metascience (Suppe 1979; Horgan 1995).
The idea of the unity of science n o w probably relies on the lingering influence of
positivism and the popular use of the term science. The present thesis refers mostiy to
1

See the discussion of the scientific method in Appendix B.5.
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science to be consistent with the c o m m o n use of the term science as the basis for the
curriculum subject, Science. In doing so, however, itrecognisesthat the post-positivist
literature gives grounds for caution, at least, in ignoring the variation that the singular
science can imply.
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4.3 The role of structure in characterising a western European scientific tradition
Various notions of structure have changed over time and characterise a historical
tradition. T h e present section w d l confine its scope to structures of knowledge. This is
useful because, as noted above, there are links between the structure of knowledge, a
c o m m o n and traditional category of characterisation, and the organisational structures of
science: study of one informs the other. Whether one is concerned initially with
intellectual or organisational structures, the history of science shows that (a) there is a
relationship between the two, evident in the university faculties and departments based on
scientific disciplines - biology (even zoology, botany and genetics), physics, chemistry
(again, even as organic, inorganic and physical) and so on - and (b) these structures were
not always so, and in m a n y instances are historicady recent.
Machlup (1982) has demonstrated some historical links between the knowledgestructure and institutional-structure of science using examples of attempts to map the
sciences (in Part O n e ) and to construct departments of erudition (Part T w o ) . The
historical summary of some of these structures, given in the present section and in Table
B.4.2, also relates to the discussions of knowledge concepts (Chapter 11 and Appendix
B.6), beliefs about the nature of reatity and the appropriate w a y to relate to reality
(chapter 7 and Appendix B.2), and context (Chapter 6 and Appendix B.l). This
illustrates both the interconnectedness of the dimensions and the value of structure, as a
distinct dimension of characterisation, in providing insights useful for understanding the
nature of science as characterised in the literature. T h e present section is based upon
Machlup's characterisation, using some of his examples and noting his acknowledged
limitations: he addresses intellectual, and not other kinds of knowledge, and he makes no
attempt to give an exhaustive account of knowledge structures in history. Likewise, the
present section and Table B.4.2 make no claim to being exhaustive, but instead attempt to
indicate a historical tradition using sufficient scope and depth to show h o w various
aspects of structures have changed w h d e others have been more enduring. While based
on Machlup's account, it is supplemented with detatis from other accounts. There is some
variation between accounts; an example is discussions of Aristode, where the detatis
given by Machlup, Irwin and Oldroyd vary, and in somerespectsthe accounts have litde
in c o m m o n , but this detail is beyond the scope of the present thesis.
Machlup is clear 'that classifications are m a d e for different purposes and by
different types of people' (1982, p. 19), a conclusion that applies equally to the present
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thesis. Accordingly, he distinguishes four basic types of approach to knowledge
classification, remembering that individual attempts m a y embody more than one of these:
[First are] the philosophers, whose only purpose is to facilitate orderly thinking,
systematic analysis of the universe; their chief concern is an overview of things
(chiefly abstract) and an understanding of their interrelationships. There are the
encyclopaedists, w h o want to present their work in a systematic but not
alphabetic order; they are concerned with orderly presentation of their material,
with oudining and organising the universe in a methodological w a y so that the
reader might comprehend where ad the things should be placed, and where he
[sic] should look for them if he wants to gain deeper insights. There are the
bibliographers, whose task is to help readers and researchers become aware of
ad, or of the most important publications in their special fields; complete listings
secure the cumulative character of knowledge formation, promote the generation
of n e w or amended knowledge, and can avoid loss of knowledge previously
created, duplication of research previously completed, and repetition of error
previously corrected. Finally, there are the librarians, concerned with orderly
listing of published titles in ad fields of knowledge, orderly stacking of
volumes, and orderly cataloguing, to help the user of books and journals find
what he wants to read or consult. (Machlup 1982, p. 19)
While w e w d l not concern ourselves with the detati of this argument, Table B.4.2 shows
a variety of approaches that are also noted in the fodowing historical sketch. T h e detatis
of category labels (but not always content) are given in Table B.4.2 because that
presentation conveys, better than paragraphs of text, the notion of structure. The
notations are not intended to be equivalent between examples, or to represent the original
notation of the authors in question; their purpose is to help make clear the structures.
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The arrangement of knowledge is structured, not given
The most significant point to note from a historical summary is not the value of any
particular structure, but that the structure and inter-relatedness of knowledge, familiar in
contemporary science, is a human construction; it is neither a 'given' nor self-evident
Historical examples show that knowledge has been analysed and ordered in a variety of
ways: some show direct influences on current structures while others were alternatives
that have been considered.
For example, Aristode (384-322 B C ) made numerous distinctions, m a n y of which
remain familiar today, although 'despite ad this classificatory work, Aristode was not
among those w h o presented a comprehensive system of all the sciences k n o w n at his
time' (Machlup 1982, p. 23). Porphyry (AD. 232-302) is usuady credited with the
metaphor of a tree of knowledge, whose branching symbolises the dichotomous
divisions by which w e commonly categorise or structure knowledge. S o m e later thinkers
re-named Porphyry's tree as Porphyry's ladder, to symbolise better starting at the 'top'
with undifferentiated knowledge, and the ability to m o v e 'up' and 'down' through the
analysis.
Perhaps the best known structuring of knowledge in classical and mediaeval times
was the division of the seven liberal arts into the Trivium and Quadrivium: studies were
arranged respectively into the artes (grammar, rhetoric, dialectic) and disciplinae
(arithmetic, geometry, music, astronomy). These arose from traditional lists of
disciplines, notably those compded from Aurelius Augustinus (Saint Augustine, 354430); early proponents included Capetia (before A D . 439) and Cassiodorus (before 550).
O n e of the most influential encyclopaedic efforts in the late Middle Ages was
Robert Grosseteste (c. 1175-1253), whose Compendium provided a classification ofthe
scientific knowledge available at thetime.Grosseteste strongly influenced later thinkers:
Albertus Magnus (1193/1206-1280), w h o exhaustively compiled Aristode's work and
sought to increase understanding of knowledge (phdosophy); Thomas Aquinas (Saint
Thomas, 1227-1274), divided science according to roles of the intellect; and Roger
Bacon (1214-1292/94), w h o sought to show that science has a unitary and interconnected
structure. Particular points to note are that Aquinas excluded history from science, unlike
many thinkers from the 16th to 19th centuries, and that Bacon combined mathematical
and experimental methods. R a m o n L u d (or R a y m o n d Lulle, 1234-1315) also used the
metaphor of the branching tree, but unlike Porphyry (and later, Francis Bacon), proposed
as m a n y as sixteen rather than a single tree. Machlup also describes an equivalent Arabic
tradition, with origins traced back to Aristode, that sometimes parallels, and sometimes
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predates, simtiar work by the western Europeans. For example, M u h a m m a d al-Farabi (d.
950) catalogued the k n o w n sciences, and Ibn Sina (Abu Ali, 980-1037) later extended
these. Machlup notes particularly the inclusion of dream interpretation and charms among
physics in the latter (1982, p. 30). Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406) sought to distinguish
science (knowing) from crafts (doing), although he notes that somefields,like medicine,
combine the two. Note also that he distinguishes the 'intedectual sciences', based on
reason, from the traditional or religious sciences, based on retigious authority. H e
includes the sciences of sorcery (magic) and talismans in the former, and refutes and
condemns philosophy and astrology.
Before continuing, w e should note that these classical and mediaeval synopses of
knowledge establish a tradition of interpreting the term science more broadly than just the
natural sciences or the empirical sciences. The broader tradition is more consistent with
the non-Anglo-American use of the term today, as given in summary statements 21 and
2 2 (both Machlup). This distinction can be seen starting in the Scientific Revolution, the
example here being Francis Bacon's work, from which time structures more closely
resemble contemporary arrangements.
The metaphor of a branching tree for the structure of knowledge, widely k n o w n in
recenttimes,stems mainly from its extensive characterisation by Francis Bacon (15611626):
Bacon's classification of learning - his partitiones scientarium - became the
model for almost all later taxonomic and encyclopaedic efforts regarding
intellectual knowledge ... Bacon's taxonomic zeal led him to enumerate,
explicate, and illustrate the 'divisions ofthe sciences' at great length.
(Machlup 1982, p. 35)
T h e structure of the tree was used effectively to convey the notion of relationships
between branches orfieldsof knowledge, especiady as they arise from the intellectual
activities that comprise Bacon's three main divisions. In particular, Bacon noted
relationships between physics, mathematics and logic, and the expected structural
changes as physics continued to develop. From other taxonomic efforts of the time,
Machlup also mentions that of Rene Descartes (1596-1650) as one of the m a n y that used
the tree metaphor, and of Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) as one that did not.
Between the seventeenth and twentieth centuries there was considerable work done
on the structure of knowledge, including the development of encyclopaedias, but w e wdl
confine our attention to a few accounts that influenced thinking about scientific
knowledge. Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), did not provide a classification of science, but
his writings, which dealt with epistemology and methodology, provided a structural basis
for later thinkers that was very influential:
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Kant's analyses of the distinctions between analytic and synthetic, phenomena
and noumena, intuition and perception, theoretical and practical, immanent and
transcendent, empirical and transcendental, and m a n y other contraries and
contradictories laid the groundwork for the reflections of generations of
classifiers and taxonomists ofthe branches of learning. (Machlup 1982, p. 60)
For example, Georg Hegel (1770-1831) w a s influenced by Kant's critique of the limits
of reason and subjective elements in knowledge. H e proposed a categorisation of
knowledge by consecutively dividing parts into three. Following the work of Fichte, this
fodows a formula of thesis-antithesis-synthesis, through a dialectic process of affirming
and negating. Although Machlup notes an ambivalence in the influence of Hegel's
approach, Westphal (1993) notes that 'Hegel w a s thefirstepistemologist torealisethat a
socially and historically based epistemology is consistent with realism' (Westphal 1993,
p. 168). Hegel's account of knowledge thus contains externalist elements and marks the
starting point of continental epistemology (Alcoff 1993). Andre Ampere (1775-1836),
better k n o w n for his work in electricity and magnetism, proposed a scheme in 1834 that,
although complex, has a structure that bears a closer resemblance than its predecessors to
contemporary arrangements, particularly in its clearer distinction between biology and
physics, and between physics and metaphysics. Auguste Comte (1798-1857) envisaged
knowledge of the world as developing through three stages; from the theological, through
the metaphysical, to the final positive stage. Since he thought that the sciences in his day
were at or approaching the third, positive, stage, he considered earlier attempts to
categorise scientific knowledge as failed, and the time ripe for his o w n categorisation.
Comte's categorisation shows clear links with current conceptions. This is due in part to
the categories themselves and the terminology used being so famdiar. The hierarchical
ordering is also familiar, beginning with mathematics, which he saw as starting with the
simplest and most general and proceeding to that which is the most complex and
concerned with the specific. This ordering continued into the twentieth century,
influenced by the positivist school of thought. Karl Pearson (1857-1936) proposed a
structure in 1892 that was very influential at the turn of the century and beyond; he
rejected Comte's reductionist approach, but still provided a scheme which separated
mathematics (abstract or conceptual sciences) from the 'perceptual' domain: his three
fundamental divisions were abstract, physical and biological sciences. His scheme
appealed to the prevading positivist view by allowing only a descriptive, and not
explanatory,rolefor scientific knowledge, and rejecting any notion of metaphysics as
scientific knowledge.
O f the accounts that arose in the twentieth century, w e wdl mention two accounts
that sought to show the interrelated structure of scientific knowledge. O n e is the positivist
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R V , identified in the work of Otto Neurath (1882-1945) and Rudolf C a m a p (18911970), that argued an interrelated structure through the notion of unified science. The
other is the fifteenth edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica (1974), under the chairship
of Mortimer Adler, that argued an interrelated structure through afreshconcept of a circle
of learning, whose 'centre' is the knowledge of knowledge. The circle structure is used
to represent a non-hierarchical and non-linear structure of knowledge. Finally, Table
B.4.2 includes the categories used in the Dissertation Abstracts International for science
and engineering. This structure is used not to demonstrate interrelatedness, but
comprehensiveness, because it seeks to include ad possible theses published in science
and engineering.
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Structures of knowledge

There is a sense of structure in science that relates, either direcdy or indirectiy, to
the ways in which w e order or arrange scientific knowledge. Science is c o m m o n l y
identified, both in scientific and public contexts, by terms such as laws, theories and
disciplines: the present section will argue that each of these relates to structures of
knowledge but imprecisely so. T o some minds it m a y seem odd that scientific laws,
theories and disciplines should be characterised as structures, albeit partly so: that surely
they are simply statements of knowledge. T h e present thesis argues in the companion
chapter on knowledge and Appendix B.6 that science knowledge is not as
straightforward as simplistic characterisations imply. T h e present chapter, especiady in
this section, draws attention to the ordered, structured or composed character of science
knowledge, and to differences in structures and their meanings. Science knowledge is not
expressed, for example, in free verse, musical notation, or narrative: it is expressed in
characteristic forms that w e identify as laws, theories, mathematical structures like
axioms, and so forth. Yet these are sometimes used imprecisely: while laws and theories
are frequentiy mentioned together, often they are not distinguished from each other.
Where they are distinguished the difference in their meanings is significant: they refer to
different structures. Put rather baldly, the ordering of sense data - the empirical
information - so that w e might m a k e sense (order) out of their complexity gives the
structures called scientific laws. Alternatively the w a y w e construct and arrange
propositions and other statements so that they form descriptions and/or explanations
gives structures called theories. O f course, notions such as laws and theories are a good
deal more complex than this, but the point here is that laws and theories are structures
used in science, and by which the literature partly characterises science. T h e notion of a
scientific discipline is also unclear, because disciplines as knowledge structures physics, geology and so on - are also the basis for organisational structures, such as
departments or faculties of physics and geology. This is especiady interesting w h e n new,
cross-disciplinaryfieldsemerge, such as geophysics, biophysics and biochemistry. The
remainder of this section outlines these and some other variants of structures relating to
knowledge.
a) Scientific laws as structures
A s with other aspects of metascience, there are various notions of laws, and indeed
interpretations of the term law.
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'Law' is ... used ambiguously to refer to both statements and what statements
designate (e.g. 'Ohm's L a w ' refers to a proposition and what the proposition
describes, viz. arelationbetween certain variables).
M a n y different kinds of statements, or phenomena, are caded 'laws'. They
include constitutive, dispositional, developmental, quasi-teleological, abstract
and idealised properties, processes and relations, ranging from observed
patterns through experimentady established invariances to the fundamental
theoretical principles (or quasi-analytic axioms) of whole branches of sciences;
law-statements m a y express numerical constants or qualitative attributes,
developmental sequences, identities or functional relations, statistical
correlations or universal features of types of thing. (Bhaskar 1983e, pp. 229230)
Within these uses w e can discern two senses of laws as essentially structures, that they
are meaningful because of structure. One is the sense, based in the long standing
tradition, which is still influential, that laws are statements of natural regularity or
propensity, and are therefore statements of Nature (ontology). The other, which in some
views overlaps with the first, is that scientific laws are statements of knowledge
(epistemology), and thus represent cognitive structures.
A scientific law is a rule or generalisation which describes specified natural
phenomena within the limits of experimental observation. A n apparent exception
to a law tests the validity of the law under the specified conditions. A true
scientific law admits of no exception. A law is of no scientific value unless it can
be related to other laws comprehending relevant phenomena. (Wordsworth
Dictionary of Science and Technology 1995, p. 510)
It is widely held by both scientists and phdosophers that our universe is
governed by scientific laws and that it is one of the primary aims of science to
discover these laws. Particular scientific subjects are often organised around
laws stated in the vocabulary of that subject. For example, Schrodinger's
equation is central to physics, the Hardy-Weinberg law to genetics, and
equdibrium laws to economics. It is also widely held that the concept of a
scientific law is intimately related to other important concepts including
causation, natural kind, explanation, confirmation, reduction, necessity and
probability. It is not surprising then that the task of elucidating the concept of a
scientific law figures prominently within contemporary metaphysics and
phdosophy of science. (Loewer 1995, p. 266)
First, there is a sense that laws are meaningful because of their structure; this applies
whether or not one agrees with Loewer. Thus a law that can be expressed mathematicady
derives its meaning from that particular structure and not some other arrangement For
example, Newton's Second Law of Motion:
The rate of change of linear momentum is proportional to the force applied, and
takes place in the straight line in which that force acts. This definition can be
regarded as formulating a suitable w a y by which forces m a y be measured, that
is, by the acceleration they produce,
F = d/dr. (mv)
i.e. F = ma + v. d/w/df

Appendix B.4: Structure

745

In the majority of non-relativistic cases, dm/dt = 0 (i.e. the mass remains
constant), and then
F = ma
(Pitt 1977, p. 258)
The meaning is dependent on the structure^. Verbally, is proportional to gives a different
meaning and predictive outcome to is inversely proportion to; algebraicady, F -ma

gives

a different meaning to F = m + a. Bronowski (1978) makes this point w h e n he rejects
Dionysius's betief in G o d as an explanation for gravity, on the basis that a belief in G o d
does not lead to the precise mathematical structure that accounts for attraction over a
distance:
Dionysius had an excellent idea - bodies attract one another - and he had a good
reason to think so. But it was not a reason which was going to tell him whether
the attraction fell off at the inverse distance or the inverse square. It was not a
reason with which you could do any kind of manipulation. It w a s not a coherent
reason, because it lent itself to a different kind of speculation. (Bronowski 1978,
p. 9)
The second sense of structure in laws arises in views that reject Loewer's (op. cit)
claims that our universe is governed by laws, and that scientists discover them. The view
that laws are ontological statements of patterns andregularitiesin Nature (as in empiricist
accounts), and therefore that laws are discovered, is but one of several notions of laws in
the literature. A second view is that laws are statements of the mental constructions by
which w e m a k e sense of seemingly disparate sense data (as in constructivist accounts),
and thus they are constructed, not discovered. This argument, found widely in postpositivist accounts, points to historical examples where laws have been revised. The
c o m m o n example is Newton's laws of motion, that once were believed to hold always
and everywhere, but now, since Einstein'srelativisticinterpretation, are believed to hold
as good approximations where the velocity is smad compared with that oftight.The
lesson drawn from this example is that laws in science are revisable or tentative in
principle, even though in scientific practice they m a y be used without question^: if they
are revisable in principle, they cannot be unchanging expressions of ontology, and must
be (best available) constructions by scientists. A third view (as in scientific reatism) is
that laws are statements of the natural mechanisms that can, but do not always, manifest
themselves as regular patterns of phenomena: they are real but our knowledge of them is
limited by what w e can construct. In this view, knowledge of the regularity is

2 The verbal expression of this law is given as a regularity, although its mathematical ex
taken sometimes as a definition. In any case, the meaning depends on the structure.
3
In Kuhn's well-known characterisation of science, laws and theories are accepted and refined in
normal science - within a paradigm - and seriously challenged only in revolutionary science, when
there is a paradigm shift
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constructed, and w e deduce this structure from empirical tests of possible explanations of
regularities (Bhaskar 1983e, p. 231). Each of these views provides it o w n insights, but
they are dealt with in section 3 of Chapter 9, because scientific laws are one of the clearer
examples of h o w science is characterised in multiple dimensions.
In brief, there are widely held post-positivist beliefs that laws are not immutable
verities but are changed and even rejected as w e develop better explanations. This is
supported by a notion structure: in this sense, this aim has changed, from discovering to
constructing, even though both can be interpreted in a broader sense of identifying such
regularities, whether by discovering, constructing or some other activity. In this way, w e
are able to account for h o w science is able to describe and/or explain economicady and
accurately a large amount of empirical data by means of a small number of general
statements, while at the same time berevisable,and therefore tentative, in principle. The
empirical data is structured as observation statements; general statements are structured as
law-like statements or mathematical axioms.
b) Scientific theories as structures
Theories are in some senses related to laws, and often weakly distinguished from
them in general characterisations of science:
Theory:
A general, systematic account of a subject matter. Theoriesfrequentlyposit the
existence of unobservable (or theoretical) entities and often have the status of
hypotheses, since by their nature they are harder to confirm than less general
claims.
Hypothesis:
The status of a scientific claim after it has been advanced but before there is
sufficient evidence to accept (or reject) it (Boyd, Gasper & Trout 1991, pp.
777, 781)
A s with other characteristics of science, there are varying accounts of what a scientific
theory is. Probably the definitive characterisation of scientific theory in the Received
View ( R V ) is Suppe (The Structure of Scientific Theories 1979). Briefly, Suppe traces in
considerable detati the background, initial formulation in the 1920s, and development of
the R V . T h efinal(1960s) version of the R V characterisation of a scientific theory is
complex and highly structured (see Suppe 1979, pp. 50-53) and is only paraphrased
here, as follows. Scientific theories have a canonical structure, being axioms formulated
in mathematical logic. This axiomatic language comprises three main elements: an
observation language, whose descriptive terms only c o m e from an observation
vocabulary, and which applies only to empirical phenomena; a theoretical language,
whose descriptive terms only c o m e from a theoretical (non-observation) vocabulary; and
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mixed sentences comprising both observational and theoretical terms. Observation and
theoretical terms are related by the partial interpretation of theoretical terms using the
theoretical language and correspondence rules using mixed sentences. T h e R V
characterises theories by these structures; analysis of theories according to these
structures is catied the rational reconstruction of theories.
Post-positivist approaches in metascience have provided various criticisms of, and
alternatives to, the R V characterisation of theories. Suppe (1979, pp. 62-118) discusses a
number of criticisms of the R V account of theories, which w e wtil only note here: not ad
scientific theories can be 'fruitfutiy axiomatised'; the distinction between observational
and theoretical terms cannot be sustained; the notion of partial interpretation of theoretical
terms is unclear and relies on the observational-theoretical distinction; some views (as
proposed by Campbed, Nagel and Hesse) require that models be constructed to m a k e
theories meaningful and, although they fail to show that the R V is inadequate, they do
show m u c h about the meaningful interpretation of theories; the R V account of
correspondence rules is unsatisfactory; and it is not clear that theories can be formalised
or axiomatised as required by the R V .
Sceptical descriptive views of scientific theories
There have been a number of alternative views of theory proposed in response to
the criticisms of the R V version (Suppe 1979, pp. 119-232). Since w e are concerned
here only with structure, w e will mention two groups ofthe alternative accounts. First are
the so-called sceptical descriptive accounts, which seek not to describe what scientific
theories should be like (as in the R V ) but to describe them as actuady used and then seek
c o m m o n structural features:
Central to many of the proposed alternatives to the Received V i e w is the idea that
an adequate analysis of theories wtil not be rational reconstruction. Rather than
presenting an analysis of h o w theories ideady should be formulated (an ideal that
theories in practice fail to meet), it is held that an adequate analysis of theories
should characterise theories as they actuady are employed in science. Thus the
analysis of theories should be descriptive of theories actuady employed in actual
scientific use. U p o n looking at the theories actuady employed in science, some
authors have been so impressed by the diversity of theories encountered and the
functions they perform that they despair of ever providing a comprehensive
analysis of theories which display deep properties c o m m o n to all theories.
(Suppe 1979, p. 120)
T h e example Suppe gives is Achinstein (1968), w h o despairs of finding any deep,
c o m m o n structure to scientific theories beyond the four ways he identifies that scientific
theories are presented: (i) by the main assumptions of the theory (which the present thesis
interprets as elements of the belief system); (ii) by the underlying motivation for the
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theory (which the present thesis interprets as purpose); (iii) by the development of the
theory (which the present thesis interprets as mainly activity and structure); or (iv) by
confirming instances of the theory (which the present thesis interprets as mainly activity
and belief system). Suppe points out that Achinstein's analysis does not preclude a
detaded, general analysis of theories, but his scepticism is supported by other attempts to
describe c o m m o n details of theoretical structures, such as that by Rappoport (1958):
That the entities commonly catied scientific theories evidence such diversity does
lend credence to the suggestion that there will not be any particularly deep or
revealing characteristics c o m m o n to all scientific theories other than what
Achinstein incorporates into his analysis ...
I conclude ... that an examination of the diversity of theories and their
intended functions does lend some support to the contention that not m u c h is
possible in the w a y of a general structural analysis of ad theories. However,
theories each fall into one of a small number of fairly homogeneous classes of
theories for which there is reason to suppose deep structural properties are
c o m m o n to all theories in a given class; and m u c h in the w a y of increased
understanding of the theories could be gained by investigating the structural
properties c o m m o n to theories of a given class. (Suppe 1979, pp. 124)
Thus according to sceptical descriptive analyses there are no grounds to support
c o m m o n , deep structures in scientific theories as they are practised.
Characterisations of theories as world views
The second group of views is the Weltanschauungen analyses, in which science is
characterised by a particular perspective or view-point. These approaches do not
emphasise structure as did the sceptical descriptive approaches, but structure is part of the
characterisation and varies between accounts. Thus, for Toulmin, theories comprise laws
and hypotheses (which the present thesis interprets as structures) and 'ideals of natural
order' (Suppe 1979, p. 130), which the present thesis interprets as elements of the betief
system. Codectively these entati structure in that they must be composed in some way to
m a k e a meaningful whole. For Kuhn, science as a whole is structured from episodes of
normal and revolutionary, or extraordinary, science. H e initially characterised normal
science as being done within a paradigm, which he defined as the 'accepted examples of
actual scientific practice - examples which include law, theory, application, and
instrumentation together - [which] provide models from which spring particular coherent
traditions of scientific research' (Kuhn 1962, p. 10, in Suppe 1979, p. 136). The present
thesis interprets the initial use of paradigm as characterising science by a combination of
structure, knowledge, belief system, context and activity. K u h n later came to characterise
normal science as done within the structure of a disciplinary matrix (Suppe 1979, pp.
139-43), where the disciplinary matrix and the range of exemplars

together are

clarifications of his initial use of the term paradigm. ( W e shall address disciplines as

Appendix B.4: Structure

749

organisational structures presently.) This clarification of paradigm was in response both
to criticism of its initial imprecise meaning, and its widespread and even more imprecise
use by others. Significandy, though, most uses of paradigm entati structure:
Masterman (1970) finds twenty-one different ways in which K u h n employs
'paradigm', not all of which are compatible with each other ... In a particularly
insightful review, Shapere (1964) observes that there is far more to the notion of
the paradigm...:
... The term 'paradigm' thus covers a range of factors in scientific
development including or somehow involving laws and theories, models,
standards, and methods (both theoretical and instrumental), vague intuitions,
explicit or implicit metaphysical beliefs (or prejudices). In short, anything that
adows science to accomplish anything can be a part of (or somehow involved
in) a paradigm.
(Suppe 1979, pp. 136-7)
That is, the term paradigm, at least as initially used by K u h n and widely used by others,
refers to various notions, m a n y of which are structures - composite bodies (structures) of
laws, theories and patterns of beliefs and activities - and is criticised because of its
inherendy vague structure. Kuhn's later formulation of paradigm was more explicit about
its structural characteristic.
A m o n g the Weltanschauungen

analyses, Hanson's approach has also been

influential in establishing the notion that observations are theory-laden. Hanson's account
characterises two distinguishing notions of structure. First, he argues that facts are stated
in, and thereforetiedto, language:
A s such, the ability to apprehend facts 'is of a piece with Tycho and Kepler
seeing different things at dawn', which is to say that using language with
different meanings results in their seeing different things and also determines
which facts they can easily apprehend.' (Suppe 1979, pp. 158-9)
Thus Hanson argues that meanings are dependent on the context of a conceptual pattern,
so a term can have a different meaning in a different conceptual pattern. The characteristic
structures of scientific language are discussed in section 4.5 below. Terms used in
explanations are context-dependent in this way, but not terms used for sense data. O n
Hanson's account, then, observations are theory-laden, not theory-independent; accounts
of theory-laden-ness, including Suppe, typically idustrate this with optical dlusions
where a single diagram can be interpreted in two or more ways. Thus scientific theories and in this sense laws also - are structured in the sense that they account for observations
as being structured: observations are sense data that are selected and arranged or
composed - structured - by the mind. The second notion of structure in Hanson's account
is his claim that, contrary to the R V rejection of discovery as a psychological or historical
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notion, there is a logic of discovery somewhat like Pierce's notion of abduction4. While
Suppe disputes that Hanson's retroductive reasoning is a logic, it is a pattern of thought
or argument that, tike induction and deduction, derives its meaning partly from its
particular structure. Hanson argues that the reasons for accepting a particular hypothesis,
which are reasons for thinking it true, are not the same thing as reasons for suggesting
one hypothesis rather than other hypotheses, which are reasons for thinking it to be
plausible. T h e order is to begin with some surprising phenomena, then to suggest that
such phenomena would not be surprising given an appropriate hypothesis: therefore there
is good reason to propose that hypothesis as an explanation for those phenomena. This
relies on the theory-laden nature of observation and facts, for both are shaped by the
conceptual organisation. Suppe, writing in 1977, sees this as a criticism of Hanson's
account, but the theory-laden-ness of observations is widely accepted as part of the range
of post-positivist accounts of observation in metascience (Boyd, Gasper & Trout 1991;
Cadon 1995).
Post-positivist concerns with theories
F r o m the extensive post-positivist literature on scientific theories, including
structures of theories, there are several other matters that show that theories remain
central to characterising science. O n e is the challenge to the notion that theories are
structures of objective knowledge. S o m e post-positivist characterisations of science argue
that scientific theories are purposive constructs that e m b o d y ideologies, and can and
should be analysed as such. They arise from several concerns: the actual rather than
idealised construction of theories; the theory-laden-ness of observations and selection of
facts from sense data; and broader notions of scientific purpose, as discussed in the
companion chapter on purpose. T h e present thesis interprets such characterisations as
combinations of dimensions, such as structure, betief system and purpose; examples of
such multidimensional characterisation are given in section 3 of the Chapter 9.
Under-determination of theories
Another is the notion of underdetermination of theories. According to m a n y popular
characterisations of science, including naive verificationism and falsificationism, a theory
is straightforwardly accepted or rejected according to whether it is verified or falsified by
experimental (empirical) evidence. However, according to what is sometimes k n o w n as
the Duhem-Quine thesis, scientific theories are not simply determined - accepted or

4

This is discussed in Appendix B.5 on activity.
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rejected - by experimental evidence^. Rather, the avadable evidence can typicady support
more than one theory, which leads to problems about deciding between more than one
theory claiming experimental support:
It is often our position that several theories are compatible with the available
evidence: w e then hope that m o r e evidence will resolve the matter. T h e
underdetermination of theory by evidence holds that logically incompatible
theories m a y fit all possible evidence. Alternatively, there m a y be pairs of
empirically equivalent theories which, while not contradicting each other, use
radically different theoretical notions. Examples of such underdetermination
have been proposed which embarrass empiricist phdosophers (Quine 1990) w h o
must either deny that such theories are in competition or find an empirical basis
for preferring one of the pair. (Hookway 1992, p. 517)
Not surprisingly, the responses to this issue have been significant in influencing

characterisations of science. One response has been to point out that this doctrine can lead
to a relativism that undermines the very authority of science. In his discussion of
pragmatism and science, Roger Trigg has commented that underdetermination of theory
can be argued towards an extreme relativism that opposes traditional notions of scientific
authority:
Without any metaphysical underpinning there is in fact nothing to agree about,
nothing to constrain and guide us in our pursuit of truth. It is no wonder that
practices are thought to shift arbitrarily. T h e very concept of truth becomes
problematic. It used to be widely accepted that any betief or statement must be
either true or false. This has become doubted, so that m a n y would reject this socalled law of the excluded middle. Joseph Margolis sees in this rejection one of
the main signs of relativism. H e suggests that 'any doctrine counts as a form of
relativism if it abandons the principle of excluded middle or bivalence ... or
restricts its use, so that, in particular sectors of inquiry, incongruent claims m a y
be validated (1991, p. 17). This is admittedly a w e a k form of relativism, but it
does have large implications. It suggests that there is nothing against which
different claims can be measured. In the case of science, it would suggest that
our theories are under-determined by the world, or, worse, there is n o sense in
conceiving of one world independentiy of our theories. It suggests that there is
no invariant order built into the structure of things. T h e world cannot be k n o w n
b y us, or, in Margolis' words, it is 'cognitively transparent'. This leads to the
view that conceptions ofrealstructures are at least as m u c h the product of our
society as of any world. This in turn should m a k e cultural diversity unsurprising
and leaves us with historical change as bmte fact. (Trigg 1993, pp. 54-5)
Of course, the present thesis has already mentioned a number of (particularly postpositivist) views that do argue against the 'excluded middle', that notions such as truth

5

This notion of under-determination is also called the Duhem-Quine principle. It asserts that no one
single factor is enough to explain the closure of a controversy or the certainty acquired by
scientists. This principle forms the philosophical basis of most social history of sociology of
science. (Latour 1987, p.260)
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can be contingent and not absolute. Thus another response has been to embrace the
implications of underdetermination of theories:
[T]he natural sciences ... are underdetermined by facts, since no theory can be
supported unequivocally by afinitecodection of experimentalresults.Therefore
if consensus is reached on a theory, it is not explained by facts alone but by the
social conventions and c o m m o n institutions shared by the members of scientific
community. (Lynch 1992, p. 223)
That is, theories are indeed underdetermined by experimental evidence, and a moderate
externalist response is that w e therefore need to account not only for experimental
evidence but also for other factors used in negotiating the outcome. Latour has been
influential in encouraging others to re-examine actual laboratory practices. A s discussed
in Appendix B.5, there is a substantial body of literature that argues that laboratory
activities are a good deal more complex than simply applying logical criteria to
experimental results. On the other hand, Ian Hacking has argued that the notion of
underdetermination of theories misses the point:
Duhem's doctrine [was] that a theory inconsistent with an observation can
always be saved by modifying an auxiliary hypothesis, typicady a hypothesis
about the working of an instrument such as thetelescope.His was a thesis about
thoughts; like most phdosophers of theory he did notreflecton h o w w e change
not only our ideas but also the world. His doctrine, especiady for those w h o
read Quine, is taken to imply the underdetermination of scientific knowledge.
W h e n properly extended, it has quite the opposite effect, of helping us to
understand h o w the world and our knowledge of it are so remarkably
determinate.
D u h e m said that theory and auxiliary hypotheses can be adjusted to each
other; he left out the whole teeming world of making instruments, remaking
them, making them work, and rethinking h o w they work. It is m y thesis that as
a laboratory science matures, it develops a body of types of theory and types of
apparatus and types of analysis that are mutually adjusted to each other. They
become what Heisenberg (e.g., 1948) notoriously said Newtonian mechanics
was, 'a closed system' that is essentially irrefutable. They are self-vindicating in
the sense that any test of theory is against apparatus that has evolved in
conjunction with it - and in conjunction with m o d e s of data analysis.
Conversely, the criteria for the working of the apparatus and for the correctness
of analysis is precisely thefitwith theory. (Hacking 1992, p. 30).
That is, Hacking argues that theories are considered to be underdetermined only if w e
restrict our characterisation to the cognitive context. If w e consider also the physical
context - the apparatus - and belief system, then w e find a mutually supporting set of

theories that accounts for all these characteristics. That is, theories, experimental resu
our beliefs about the phenomena and our beliefs about the working of the apparatus m a k e
sense when considered together, and fail to make sense when taken, artificially, in
isolation.
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Scientific disciplines as structures
W e mentioned at the beginning of this section (4.4) an incomplete overlap between

the two notions of scientific disciplines as structures of knowledge and organisations. W e
wdl mention here the notion of disciplines as knowledge structures, and defer discussion
of organisational structures and overlap between the two until section 4.5, below. A
historical notion of disciplines as structures of knowledge is given in Table B.4.2,
below. Needless to say, there is no single, accepted structure: some current disciplines
are historically recent, while m a n y knowledge structures that in the past were
characterised as science would not be seen so today. For example, w e have seen above
that there have been several attempts, but none successful, to discern a c o m m o n structure
for theories in different scientific disciplines. Likewise a physiologist, a biochemist and a
biophysicist could find themselves working together on, say, a project concerning
neurotransmitters. Thus it is at the same time a commonplace to list disciplines such as
physics, chemistry, biology and geology (frequentiy in that order) as traditional cognitive
fields or disciplines of science, and to recognise that during the twentieth century science
became characterised increasingly by blends of existing disciplines and the emergence of
n e w disciplines. Historicady, astrology is listed as a discipline alongside astronomy, for
example, but is no longer accepted as a science by the mainstream scientific community
today.
d) Other cognitive structures in science
Finally, w e w d l mention briefly that there are notions of knowledge structures
which, while not as widely used as law, theory or discipline, use the notion of structure
in other ways. For example, Shapere has argued that a useful construct is scientific
domains:
[A scientific domain is] a number of items of information or putative facts
(perhaps including accepted laws and theories) which c o m e to be associated
together as a body of information having the following characteristics: the
association is based on some well-grounded, significant, relationships between
the items of information which are suggestive of deeper unities among the items;
there is something problematic about the body so related; the problems are
important; and, usually, the science is 'ready' to deal with diem. A n d Shapere
and his associates have been able to demonstrate that for a wide variety of cases
... scientific domains d o pose problems in this way, and, possibly aided by a
certain amount of background information or knowledge, rationally suggest
certain types of theories as likely candidates for explaining the underlying unities
of the domain information ... Minimally, thesefindingsindicate that from its
most primitive to its most advanced stages, there is a rational basis for
theorising. Thus, contra Lakatos, there is a rationality to theorising even in the
primitive 'immature' stages of science. (Suppe 1979, p. 667)
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That is, Shapere claims that the very structural arrangement of items in a domain, together
perhaps with appropriate background information, 'rationady poses or raises problems'
(Suppe 1979, p. 686). O n Shapere's analysis, a domain is not the same as a scientific
field, which is a m u c h broader concept of cognitive structure. N o r is it the same as a
discipline, which is a broader term that can include organisational factors, as w e have
seen. T o put this in a broader perspective, Cation's (1995) meta-analysis shows that
attempts to delineate domains orfieldsvary according to the analytical approach taken;
further, since some of these argue that rationality is constructed and negotiated, they wdl
deny an underlying rationality as the basis for structures.
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4.5 Organisational structures
Having mentioned the overlap between disciplines as both structures of knowledge
and of organisations, w e turn n o w to organisational structures that characterise science.
Clearly, this overlap arises because teaching, research and learning in a discipline
requires the organisation of people and resources.
Historically, the overlap between knowledge and organisational structures arose
largely from the organisation of study in the early universities, noting that science as w e
now characterise it did not exist then. From the beginning the first universities were
organised around disciplines of study, and from which derives the very term university:
The first university (or quasi university), at Salerno (now Italy) in the ninth
century, was a school of medicine; and die second, at Bologna around A D . 100,
w a s chiefly a school of law (civil as w e d as canon law); they included secular as
well as ecclesiastic students. The transitions of schools to universities involves
the formation of a community or federation of teachers or students or both into a
'whole' (universus) body, a universitas magistrorum or a universitas scholariwn
or a universitas magistrorum et scholarium. These bodies had the character of
guilds, chartered by ecclesiastic and/or secular authorities, usually the pope, the
emperor, the king. The students' communities were often formed along national
lines, so-called 'nations', confederations of aliens on foreign soil, with
privileges granting them variousrights... (Machlup 1971, in Machlup 1982, p.
121)
B y the year 1200, there were six universities in Europe established without a papal bud
or imperial charter; by the fourteenth century the number had grown to fiftyfive.The
curriculum - meaning the knowledge structure - was reasonably c o m m o n across the
institutions, and the organisational structure reflected this:
Even if some of the mediaeval universities began as professional schools faculties of theology, law, or medicine - they usually added a fourth, a faculty of
phdosophy. All studies, professional or philosophical, were preceded by years
of study in the liberal arts, divided into two curricula, the trivium, consisting of
grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic (logic), and the quadrivium, consisting of
music, arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy. The professional schools
considered themselves the 'superior' faculties vis-a-vis the faculty of
phdosophy. Phdosophy, in its early scope, consisted of ethics, physics, and
metaphysics. S o m e universities actuady began as faculties of philosophy. The
first of these w a s the University of Paris, which emphasised from the start the
study of logic and philosophy, regarded as the 'science of the sciences'.
(Machlup 1982, pp. 122-3)
These examples are given not just to show that knowledge and organisational

structures have characterised science historicady, but to give some idea of the antiquity
some notions of structure in science. Machlup gives a good deal more historical detati
than is necessary here, but simply to emphasise the influence of these traditions of
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structure, w e should note that studies in Greek 'remained an entrance requirement at
Oxford and Cambridge until the 1920s, and Latin, until around I960' (Machlup 1982, p.

139). Of course, the traditional four faculties had long gone by that time, and in any eve
there was m u c h greater variation between university structures - meaning the number and
names of faculties and what they taught - from the nineteenth and into the twentieth
centuries, when compared with the mediaeval universities.
Organisational structures do not always overlap because, increasingly so in the
twentieth century, there is more than one way, and more than one reason, to deploy
resources for education and research. For example, Redner (1987) points to a number of

arguments in the literature - of both scientists and sociologists of science - that the n
hybrid disciplines reflect more their organisational basis as against the traditional,
cognitive basis of the pre-existing disciplines:
Thus in the social sciences as in the natural sciences, indeed the whole field of
knowledge (Wissenschaft), the tendency has been for changes in technique and
social organisation to exceed those in pure cognition.
Perhaps the single clearest statement summing up the nature of the multiple
changes in post-war science is one from Harvey Brooks:
The growth of science in the post-war era has been characterised by the
spectacular expansion of hybrid disciplines such as geophysics,
geochemistry, biochemistry, chemical physics, computer science and systems
analysis. Techniques such as radiocarbon dating, the use of radioactive
tracers, paper and gas chromatography, microwave and nuclear resonance
spectroscopy, and X-ray diffraction have spread rapidly. Interdisciplinary
subjects such as oceanography, atmospheric sciences, and space science
draw on all the more classical disciplines, and it is difficult to ted at what
point they do or should be considered disciplines in their o w n right. Whole
areas of research often m o v e from one discipline to another. For example,
atomic spectroscopy, which used to be a major branch of physics, has n o w
moved almost entirely into astronomy. Simdarly, molecular spectroscopy has
largely moved from physics into chemistry. The study of cosmic rays has
largely moved from physics into a branch of space science, the theory of low
energy nuclear reactions has become an important part of astrophysics. It
becomes increasingly difficult to define a discipline except by the
organisational framework within which it is pursued - for example, physics is
what is done currently in academic physics departments (Brooks 1968, p. 57)
Noteworthy in this account is the clear distinction between the classical
disciplines, or the idea of a discipline in Classical science, and disciplines in
contemporary science defined largely by their 'organisational framework'. The
extract clearly indicates that in post-war science a reorganisation has taken place:
specialities have m o v e d from one discipline to another or specialities from
different disciplines have fused to form a n e w hybrid. T h e spread of
instrumental techniques and the development of n e w machines and their shift
from one speciality to another have also been crucial for this reorganisation. The
prime importance of organisation is emphasised further w h e n Brooks proposes
criteria for the classification of research 'in terms of the primary purpose of the
institution in which it is conducted or of the institution's organisational
subdivision' (ibid. p. 59) (Redner 1987, pp. 18-19)
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This rather lengthy passage from Redner clearly characterises science by the organisation
of its disciplines. Redner does not deny that disciplines have a cognitive basis, but is
clear that, drawing on Brooks's argument, increasingly it is inadequate to account for
disciplines in post-war science. The present thesis interprets this characterisation as
concerning organisation, context and purpose,firstly,and secondarily knowledge. A s
another example of the interdependence of cognitive and organisational structures, in
1996 the University of Wollongong offered courses leading to a Bachelor of Science
degree in both the Faculty of Science and the Faculty of Health and Behavioural
Sciences, whereas the University of Western Sydney, Macarthur offered the Bachelor of
Science degree in the Faculty of Business and Technology, which also offered degrees in
business, commerce, technology management, and design and technology (UAC 1996
Guide). The contents of those science coursesreflectsthe orientations of the faculties that
offer them.
Despite the foregoing argument and the public visibility of disciplines, departments,
faculties and universities as organisational structures of science, a strong case can be
m a d e that from about the middle of the twentieth century the more significant notion of
structure is of science as institutions. Science as an institution embodies two senses of
structure: one is some sense of a largely internal structure, which is not just faculties but
the hierarchical relationships of power and influence,resourcingand so forth; the other is
in s o m e sense an external notion of structure, by which w e characterise the structural
relationships of science with governments, industries, the military, and other social
groups. Both of these notions are found in the summary statements:
[There are] three basic aspects of all scientific work: the organisational,
instrumental and cognitive - in short, people, machines and ideas. These can be
ranked in this order of importance because the changes that brought about the
contemporary epoch of science can be graded with this weighting scale. T h e
most crucial changes took place in the organisation of science, that is, in the
socio-political system and institutional arrangements under which science is
produced.
(Redner 1987, in summary statement 118)
The term 'science' [can be used] to indicate ... an institution or set of
organisational arrangements designed for educating and accrediting scientists,
approving or discrediting scientific conclusions, and for protecting die interests
of the scientific estate ... [and] an ideology, that is, an organised w a y of
thinking about reality which serves to maintain and perpetuate structures and
patterns of social domination and subordination.
(Kenny 1988, in summary statement 14)
[S]cience and technology [are] human, social, political institutions with
complicated histories and relations to therestof society.
(Schuster 1993, in summary statement 81)
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The development of science organisations is not a recent one. For example, the
Scientific Revolution is characterised partly by the emergence of scientific institutions like
the Royal Society:
[N]early all the main branches of m o d e m science were established in the
seventeenth century, and a great deal of fundamental work from this period has
survived, whereas by far the greater portion of earlier work has been quite
superseded. Moreover, the seventeenth century also saw the foundation of the
scientific movement as a social system, with a character that has, in some
measure, lasted tdl the present day. For example, s o m e of today's most
prestigious scientific societies and journals were established in the seventeenth
century. (Oldroyd 1989, p. 49)
Thus the Royal Society of London, founded in 1662, and the Acadimie des Sciences
(later the Institut de France), founded in 1666, became the model for m a n y later
academies across Britain, Europe and their colonies (Emerson 1990). It w a s the
academies, and later, other bodies, that gave a structural identity to science, thereby
pooling talents, marshalling and deploying resources and serving as a focus of identity
and articulation with other organisations in society, notably governments and industries.
M u c h of the literature addressing science in society is based on this institutional character
of science, because the traditional concern in philosophy with knowledge and a rational
understanding of (mental) scientific activities does not account for the greater part of
science-society interactions. M u c h of this literature emphasises context, because it
addresses the character of science as an institution in relation to other institutions in
society, but the structural nature of science - as an institution, in comparison with other
institutions, and as part of larger structural arrangements - is also characteristic. In their
review of the literature addressing science, government and the politics of knowledge essentiady a contextual issue - Cozzens and Woodhouse (1995) characterise this interplay
by structural arrangements, notably institutions, organisations, power relationships and
authority structures. They argue three positions from this field of research, namely
politics and the shaping of knowledge, scientific expertise and society, and science and
business:
[First is] the claim that research knowledge is a product of politics. T h e authority
structure of the funding system - w h o participates in it, in what network of
power relationships - is a dominating influence. Because most research is
supported with government funding, distributed through agencies established
and maintained through political negotiation, the balance of knowledge a m o n g
fields is a political product. Moreover, the assumptions and worldviews of
science are shaped by expectations conveyed through the funding system and by
the access it allows to various social groups. Industry, bureaucracy, and the
organised public ad playroles...
[Second is] another major facet of the structure of authority, that is, the role
of expertise in policymaking. In theory, there is no necessary contradiction
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between government's use of expertise and its responsiveness to public
concerns. In actuality, conflicts abound. Professional scientists and their allies
often win substantial autonomy to promote knowledge and resource claims in
ways that advantage them at the expense of other equady legitimate social
interests. A m o n g other issues considered in this section is the extent to which
environmental, consumer, and other public interest organisations serve as
countervading forces to the knowledge/power alliance.
[Third], science stands in special relationship to industry, which is itself a
source - perhaps the major source - of negotiating power in the m o d e m state.
[ W e witi attempt] to situate the actions of science elites, their aides, and their
potential or actual adversaries within the structural setting of market-oriented
societies. W h e n governments leave the development and distribution of
technologies to private corporations, publicly funded research serves primarily
as an inducement to the private sector to perform this function, and only
secondarily as a form of public choice of knowledge or technology. Given the
current structure of influence around science,researchis m u c h more likely to be
pulled in directions chosen by industry than to pushed toward democratically
chosen ends, no matter h o w open the priority-setting process of government
becomes. Thus democratic control of science depends ultimately on democratic
control of technology. (Cozzens & Woodhouse 1995, pp. 534-5)
That is, the organisation of science is a meaningful way of characterising science to
account for the successful negotiation of authority. First, this field characterises the
political nature of knowledge in terms of power and authority structures by which
resources are (politically) negotiated. Second, the public negotiation of scientific
authority, as in policy decisions and science-based public disputes, is characterised by
organisations (including organised science) acting politicady. Third, the need of business

for scientific knowledge and expertise as a resource is an established influence on science
against which the relative influences of government and citizen needs are weighed: it is
characterised by the relative influences of science, government, industry and citizen

groups as institutions. It is by this structural characteristic that we understand the rela
impotence of citizen groups when seeking to dispute scientific claims by organised
science groups within universities, government agencies or industry. True, lack of
knowledge (cognitive expertise) and skills (methodological expertise) are factors.
However, these critiques point to political reasons for this, such as the (lack of) access
citizen groups to the planning of studies, to the classified results of studies, and
sometimes contentious character of 'scientific' results once they have been opened to
scrutiny.
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Language structures

There is another sense in which we characterise science by the structured
arrangements of components, and that is that w e recognise science by characteristic
structures of language. There are weak and strong versions of this argument. T h e
weaker, or less demanding, argument is that to express the particular concepts,
relationships and precision of argument found in science, w e construct scientific language
in particular, or characteristic, ways. Better k n o w n examples of this are the use of
passive voice and the third person. The stronger argument is that science is not
represented merely by language as a technology, but that science is language. T h e strong
version holds that w e shape or construct our ideas with language, and that w e cannot
k n o w anything other than as expressed in language; w e therefore understand science only
to the extent w e understand these uses and structures of language. T h e two approaches
could be labelled as expressing meaning (weak) versus making

meaning (strong)

(Haltiday & Martin 1993, p. 23). W e will sketch both the weak and strong versions here.
The weaker argument is relatively uncontentious, and essentially describes the
characteristic structures and uses of scientific language. Haltiday and Martin (1993) have
argued that the language of science is characterised both by a technical vocabulary and the
wording, although both need not be present together in any particular example: the
present thesis interprets the vocabulary, and indeed all units of text or discourse, as
elements of a structure, and the wording is of course the arrangement or structure itself.
T h e technical vocabulary is self-evident: terms such as atom, chemical equilibrium and
Boltzman's constant characterise science just as anyfieldis characterised by its particular
vocabulary of jargon. Less evident to those not familiar with the linguistic analysis, and
indeed often simply assumed by those w h o are science-educated, is the wording of
science. T h e notion of structure can be shown easdy in examples that arefreeof jargon
words:
It is not difficult... tofindpassages of wording without m a n y technical terms
which are still very clear instances of scientific writing ... [TJhe following
extract from Scientific American contains hardly any technical terms:
O u r work on crack growth in other solids leads us to believe that the general
conclusions developed for silica can explain the strength behaviour of a wide
range of britde materials. The actual cracktipreactions appear to vary from
material to material and the chemistry of each solid must be considered o n a
case-by-case basis. (Michalske & Bunker 1987, p. 81)
O f course, technical terms are an essential part of scientific language; it would be
impossible to create a discourse of organised knowledge without diem. But they
are not the whole story. The distinctive quality of scientific language lies in the
lexicogrammar (the 'wording') as a whole, and any response it engenders in the
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reader is a response to the total patterns of the discourse. (Haltiday & Martin
1993, pp. 3-4)
The patterns or structures of scientific discourse are learned and used by those trained

science, even when they are not familiar with the grammatical labels for these structures;
the structures become famdiar and m a k e sense - they are meaningful - because of this
use. Scientific English is a variety of English - like scientific Chinese is a variety of
Chinese - that can be difficult to m a k e meaningful just as English can be difficult when
learned as a second language:
[Scientific English] is English with special probabilities attached: a form of
English in which certain words, and more significantly certain grammatical
constructions, stand out as more highly favoured, w h d e others correspondingly
recede and become less highly favoured, than in other varieties of the language.
This is not to imply that there is one uniform version of it, any more than when
w e talk of British English or Australian English w e are implying that there is one
uniform version of each of these dialects. A n y variety of a language, whether
functional or dialectal, occupies an extended space, a region whose boundaries
are fuzzy and within which there can be considerable internal variation. But it
can be defined, and recognised, by certain syndromes, patterns of co-occurrence
a m o n g features at one or another linguistic level - typically, features of the
expression in the case of a dialect, features of the content in the case of a
functional variety or 'register'. Such syndromes are what m a k e it plausible to
talk of 'the language of science'. (Haltiday & Martin 1993, p. 4)
These structures of scientific language began to emerge in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries and so are one criterion by which w e characterise the Scientific
Revolution. Thus, for example, Francis Bacon, T h o m a s Hobbes and John Locke
(following W d l i a m of O c k h a m ) reacted against the mediaeval tendency to ascribe
ontologicady real entities for the h u m a n categories represented by words. This is a betief
about the nature of scientific language that continues to characterise science, and is caded
nominalism:
[Nominalism is] a deep-seated current in western thought distrusting the
tendency of the names and classifications given to natural objects to acquire a life
of their o w n , occluding natural reality ... During the Scientific revolution,
nominalists such as H o b b e s denied the verbal categories of
Aristotelian/Scholastic science (such as 'essence' or 'quality') represented reality
in Nature, or had explanatory power ... Baconian nominalism also caded for a
philosophy of work not words, i.e. one dedicated to using Nature for human
benefit, not just understanding it. Seventeenth century science also fodowed a
nominalist tack in demanding a plain and unrhetorical language of science,
Nature as far as possible being translated into quantitative terms. Enlightenment
scientific nominalism ... crystallised in the positivist developmental theory of
scientific explanation, in which the age of empty verbal explanations
(metaphysics) had been superseded by that of positivist accounts (causal
explanations by law-likeregularities).(Porter 1983a, p. 300)
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That is, in the nominalist tradition the word or term is recognised as a label for an entity
and not as the entity itself: merely labelling something is not an explanation of it. Thus the
terms or units of text, being the components of the language structure, changed as some
entities were abandoned and other, new, ones were identified.
However, the structure or wording itself also changed. Haltiday and Martin (1993)
have argued that the Scientific Revolution is also characterised by changes in the
grammatical structure, and analyse a number of examples from Newton and others:
It is convenient to think of the new resources that came into scientific English
(and other languages: for example, the Italian of Gatileo) at this time as fading
under these two headings, the lexical and the grammatical. The 'lexical'
resources were highly visible, in the form of vast numbers of n e w technical
terms; what was significant, however, was not so m u c h the terms themselves as
the potential that lay behind them. O n the one hand ... they could be formed into
systematic taxonomic hierarchies; on the other hand, they could be added to ad
infinitum - today a bilingual dictionary of a single branch of a scientific
discipline m a y easily contain 50 000-100 000 entries. The 'grammatical'
resources was the constructions of nominal groups and clauses, deployed so that
they could be combined to construe a particular form of reasoned argument: a
rhetorical structure which soon developed as the prototypical discourse pattern
for experimental science. A n y passage of Newton's writings could be taken to
illustrate these resources, both the lexical and the grammatical ... (Martin &
Hadiday 1993, p. 7)
Several of these grammatical structures characterise scientific English, and they are
typicady interdependent; the fodowing account highlights some characteristic features
according to Martin and Haltiday's systemic functional linguistics (SFL) analysis
(Haltiday & Martin 1993, pp. 54-68). At the level of analysis with which w e are
concerned, there are two elements of interest: process (or verbal) elements, and naming
(noun or nominal) elements.
Nominalisation of verbal elements
First, scientific English is characterised by therestructuringof verbal elements in
non-scientific English into nominal (or noun) elements in scientific English. This can
happen in a single piece of text: Martin and Haltiday (p. 7-8) show examples, in a quote
from Newton (1704), of verbs or adjectives early in the passage being later reworded as
nouns or nominal elements:
(i) will not be refracted becomes for want of sufficient refraction
enough
(refracted)
(refraction)
(ii) paint ...a confused
becomes according to the indistinctness of this
picture
picture
(confused)
(indistinctness)
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(iii) those convex glasses

becomes

if the glass have a due degree of
convexity
(convex)
(convexity)
The initial version of each example presents the piece of discourse as n e w information; by
rewording as a nominal element it is not presented as new, and can be 're-used as a given
in the course of the succeeding argument' (Haltiday & Martin 1993, p. 8). In this way,
processes become technical terms - objects rather than processes - and thus an accepted
part of the technical vocabulary of the language. This process of nominalisation has been
progressing 'over the past four to six centuries' somewhat as fodows (Haltiday & Martin
1993, p. 66):
1. Externatiy (relating nominalised processes to each other)
from a happens; so x happens
because a happens, x happens
that a happens causes x to happen
happening a causes happening x
to happening a is the cause of happening x
2. Internally (relating nominalised processes to our interpretation of them)
from a happens; so w e k n o w x happens
because a happens, w e k n o w x happens
that a happens proves x to happen
happening a proves happening x
to
happening a is the proof of happening x
The latest of these steps, where the cause and the proof are nominalised, took place
in the twentieth century. Thus the experiential content of language is shifted into nominal
or n a m e groups: both elements are structured as nominals. That is, the language
structures of nominalisation tend to hide the assumptions in, and encourage the
acceptance of, scientific argument. This is not to argue that nominalisation is or was a
devious strategy necessarily. However, it is a rhetoric strategy of scientific and technical
languages which needs to be understood if w e are to understand scientific argument in ,
say, science journals. O n e reason is because nominalisation processes, such as those
above given by Haltiday and Martin, imply or assume that a causal relationship is
established, which goes to the heart of what scientists seek to argue or refute.
Another reason is that nominalisation confers authority onto arguments, and for this
reason it is also used in wider contexts, or more accurately, for wider audiences and
purposes than just the expert peers of the researcher. It needs to be understood for this
reason too. For example, Gieryn and Figert (1990) have shown that the N A S A and M T I
submissions to the commission investigating the 1986 explosion of the space shuttie
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Challenger were characterised by highly technical language, including m a n y acronyms
and jargon terms unfamiliar to 'lay' audiences including scientists not working in that
program. They argued that part of the reason for the space authorities using these
structures was to confer authority to their argument and dissuade objection. Conversely,
they argued, part of the reason w h y these opinions were rejected by the public, and some
experts, was that a contradictory argument was put clearly in language understood by
both expert and lay audiences.
Technical taxonomies
Second, the nominal elements form structures caded technical taxonomies, which
m a y be technological, methodological or theoretical categories:
In the natural sciences, technical concepts have litde value in themselves; they
derive their meaning from being organised into taxonomies. Such taxonomies
are not simply groups of related terms; they are highly ordered constructions in
which every term has a definite functional value. A s Wigneti, Martin and Eggins
point out ... a technical taxonomy is typically based on two fundamental
semantic relationships: 'a is a kind of x' (superordination) and 'b is a part of y'
(composition). Thus in their example of climate, climate is divided into certain
kinds, and is composed of certain parts ... [T]he first is an either/or relationship:
'every climate is either tropical or subtropical or...'; the second is a both + and
relationship: 'every climate is both temperature and solar radiation and...' ( W e
have to stretch the meaning of either and both here so that they are no longer
limited to just two.) (Hadiday & Martin 1993, p. 73)
Thus the nominal elements of scientific discourse derive m u c h of their meaning from
being structured as taxonomies of concepts. A related structural notion is that definitions
are c o m m o n l y constructed in an interlocking fashion, such that a single passage of text
wtil define several terms that depend on each other for their meaning:
A circle is a plane curve with the special property that every point on it is at the
same distance from a particular point caded the centre. This distance is caded the
radius of the circle. The diameter of the circle is twice the radius. The length of
the circle is called its circumference. (Example quoted by Haltiday & Martin
1993, p. 72)
In this example, circle, centre, radius, diameter and circumference are ad part of a series
of interlocking definitions: circle, centre and radius are mutually defining and assume the
prior definition of distance and plane curve; diameter and circumference are defined in
terms of the first three. These structures - technical taxonomies and interlocking
definitions - are typical of scientific discourse: that is, they are characteristic of it
Repackaging meaning
Third, the nominal elements summarise and package the representations of
processes. This is related to the process of nominalisation: the nominal elements become
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the units for the entire semantic content or meaning. Take the fodowing example, given
by Hadiday and Martin (1993, p. 62):
According to this theory, all the operations of electricity depend upon one
fluid sui generis ... dispersed through the pores of all bodies, by which the
particles of it are as strongly attracted, as they are repelled by one another.
When the equilibrium of thisfluidin any body is not disturbed; that is,
when there is in any body neither more nor less of it than its natural share, or
than that quantity which it is capable of retaining by its own attraction, it does
not discover itself to our sense by any effect...
The equilibrium being forcible disturbed, the mutual repulsion of the
particles of thefluidis necessarily extended to restore it.
Nominal elements can be a noun, as in equilibrium, or a noun group (nominal group), as
in the equilibrium of thisfluidin any body. Nominalisation produces three effects of
interest to the present argument First is backgrounding, where the nominalised processes
become the subject or theme of the sentence. Thus the abstract technical term equilibrium
becomes the head of the nominal group the equilibrium of this fluid in any body and is
established as a thing that can be changed and restored. Second is foregrounding, where
the verb is left 'to express the relationship between these nominalised processes'
(Haltiday & Martin 1993, p. 63). Thus, in the earlier construction, the news is that the
particles are repelled, and the theme is the particles. Once this is no longer news, it can be
assumed and the news becomes the restoring of the equilibrium. T h e only means to do
this is by nominalisation: are repelled by one another becomes mutual repulsion; the
verbal group is exerted 'simply teds us that it happens' (ibid.). Third, this leads to the use
of passive voice. In scientific English, the agent or actor of a process is not always the
subject or theme of the sentence, as w e have seen. W h e r e this is the case, the passive
voice is the appropriate construction, as Haltiday and Martin c o m m e n t in relation to a
passage from Newton:
Such descriptions often c o m e in the passive, as in the Sun's Beam which was
propagated ... Note that these have nothing to do with the suppressed person
passive favoured by m o d e m teachers and scientific editors, which c a m e into
fashion only late in the nineteenth century. They are simply the passive in its
typical function in English: that of achieving the balance of information the
speaker or writer intends - often describing theresultof an experimental step,
where the T h e m e is something other than the Actor in the process (the Ray ...is
shatter'd). If the discourse context requires Actor as theme Newton displays no
coyness about using /. (Haltiday & Martin 1993, p. 58)
This much, as w e have said, isrelativelystraightforward as an analysis of language being
used to express meaning, and an example of characterising science by structure.
The more contentious issue is whether the weak (expressing meaning) or strong
(making meaning) interpretation is made. A n example of the so-caded w e a k version
would be where an account speaks of the language of science: the language expresses
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meaning. Even though he treats language as part of a larger issue, Bronowski (1978) also
interprets language as essentiady expressing meaning - describing Nature - rather than the
language as the construction itself. He gives the example (pp. 42-3) of Mendeleev's idea
of the periodic table, w h o , by inductive reasoning, found regularities or patterns in
chemical elements if they were arranged in order of their atomic weight The importance

was that, aside from being confirmed, 'it turned out that this regularity meant something
It represented a real law of nature' concerning the structure of atoms. Induction 'in the
Baconian sense had only foreshadowed' a 'profound explanation, a law of nature'. The
simdarity, the induction, 'pointed to an explanation' (Bronowski 1978, p. 43):
(S)cience... organises these appearances, the messages that come to us through
the senses, and organises them in some w a y which gives them a structure. The
best analogy that can be made to that structure is to say that science is a language
which has these kinds of units in it. In The Identity of M a n (N.Y.,
Doubleday/Natural History M u s e u m , 1971, p. 42) I wrote:
Science is not so m u c h a model of nature as ativinglanguage for describing
her. It has the structure of a language, a vocabulary, a formal grammar, and a
dictionary for translation. T h e vocabulary of science consists of its concepts
all the w a y from universal gravity and the neutron to the neuron and the
unconscious. The rules of grammar ted us h o w to arrange the concepts in
sensible sentences - that atoms can capture neutrons, for example, and that
heavy atoms w h e n they split will release them. A n d the dictionary then
translates these abstract sentences into practical observations that w e can test
in the everyday world: for example, in the damage that neutrons do when
plutonium is split
It is m y view that w e analyse the world in exacdy the same w a y that science
does, and w e do that from the m o m e n t w e start being the h u m a n animal. W e
analyse our experience in that way. At thetimethat w e learn language, w e match
the analysis of experience with die analysis of what our parents say to us, and
finally w e analyse natural phenomena from which w e control the messages of
nature ... (Bronowski 1978, pp. 45-7)
Thus although Bronowski characterises science as language, he speaks of analysing our
experiences, and matching these analyses at the time that we learn our language. Contrast
this with the constructivist view in fodowing extracts:
Language is not a superstructure on a base; it is a product of the conscious and
the material impacting each on the other ... Hence language has the power to
shape our consciousness ... [S]ince language evolves out of the impact between
the material and the conscious modes of being, it follows that as material
conditions change the forms given by language to consciousness also change.
(Haltiday 1990, p. 11)
The whole [grammatical] configuration is an immensely powerful resource for
the semiotic construction of reatity. (Haltiday & Martin 1993, p. 64)

That is, it is the structural character of the grammar - through devices such as nominal
processes - that shapes our ability to construct our notions of reality. This is a contentious
point in the literature, as shown by constructivism being but one of several current views
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in metascience. For example, other arguments hold that not just material conditions but
consciousness also changes, that forms are not only given by language by an external
reality, and that forms are not only given by language but to language by perceptual
inputs. These matters are taken up in Appendix B.5 and the companion chapter on
activity, where they are discussed in relation to observation and language and which
comes first.
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Table B.4.1
Examples of characterisation of key metascientific viewpoints
by structure
Author

Viewpoint

Suppe 1973,
1979

Received View

sceptical
descriptive
i

Bhaskar 1983

Weltanschauungen
(world view)
semantic or
model-theory
historical
realism
empiricism

idealism

realism

Nussbaum 1989 rationalism
;

empiricism/
positivism
constructivism

Identified in the w o r k of
Examples of reference to
*•*
structure
Camap
Scientific theories are logical
structures of concepts and
propositions.
The is no underlying universal E Achinstein, Rapoport
structure of scientific theories;
different structures reflect
different purposes.
The structure cf theories arises Bohm, Feyerabend, Hanson,
fiom a Weltanschauungen.
Kuhn, Popper, Toulmin
| Beth, Suppe, Suppes, van
I Fraasen
I Lakatos, Shapere, Toulmin
Francis Bacon, Berkeley,
Hobbes, H u m e , Locke, M a c h
(positivism), Mill, Russell,
Vienna Circle (logical
empiricism)
Reality is structured or composed Berkeley, Fichte, Hegel, H u m e ,
according to the structure of
Kant Plato, Schelling
minds or ideas; reality exists
independentiy of us, but our
knowledge of it is structured by
,
the human mind (Kant)
Statements about reality (a)
Aristotle, Bachelard, Bhaskar,
cannot be tested in isolation
Duhem, Feyerabend, Hanson,
(Duhem), (b) are a network
Hane, Hesse, H u m e , Kant
whose attachment to reality is i Koyr6, Kuhn, Plato, Popper,
theory-dependent and mutable
Putnam, Quine
(Hesse)
Competing theories are
alternative descriptions of the
same worid
Proven or confirmed knowledge Descartes, Kant, Plato
is structured by the power of the
intellect
Proven or confirmed knowledge Bacon, Comte, Hempel, H u m e ,
is structured by the evidence of Locke
the senses
The best current knowledge is
(a) Popper, Lakatos, Toulmin,
structured according to (a) inner partly K u h n
disciplinary criteria (rational,
(b) Kuhn, Toulmin, partly
logical, empirical) (b) outer
Lakatos
disciplinary criteria (socialpsychological, historical)
j
Experiences analysed inductively
as laws; deductive hierarchy of
propositions based on inductive
facts
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Boyd,Gaspar
and Trout 1991

post-positivist
consensus
comprising (a)
post-positivist
empiricism, (b)
neo-Kantian
constructivism,
and (c) scientific
realism
Pickering 1992 scientific
knowledge as
objective
(logical
empiricism)
:
scientific
knowledge as
relative to
culture
!
* scientific
knowledge as
relative to
interests
(sociology of
scientific
knowledge SSK)
science as
Callon 1995
rational
knowledge

science as
competitive
enterprise

science as
sociocultural
practice

science as
extended
translation

J (a) Partly Popper
Scientific methodology and
(b) Hanson, K u h n
knowledge are theory-dependent
(c) Boyd, G o o d m a n , Kripke,
Putnam, Quine

Scientific practice is characterised i
by disciplinary structures and
boundaries.

Scientific
knowledge/institutional
structures model existing
structures.
Scientific structures are
negotiated by actors.

Kuhn, Feyerabend

Barnes, Bloor, Callon,
Cartwright Collins, Garfinkel,
Gilbert Knorr Cetina, Latour,
L a w , Lynch, Mulkay, Shapin,
Woolgar

Hesse, Holton, Popper
The cognitive or disciplinary
organisation of science arises
fiom scientific statements, and
constrains the social organisation
of science. Model 2 applies here.
The cognitive/disciplinary
Althusser, Ben-Cole, David,
Freudenthal, Hull, Merton,
organisation of science is
Popper
encouraged by the social
organisation of science
(internally); external boundaries
are clear, beyond which scientific
structures break down.
Organisational and institutional Bachelard, Barnes, Collins,
forms are only moderately
H e c k , Knorr-Cetina, K u h n ,
significant; more significant are Mulkay, Pinch, Ravetz,
social structures, such as master Rudwick, Schaffer, Wise,
- disciple relationships.
Wittgenstein
Boundaries are constructedhy
actors.
There are two perspectives on
A m a a n , Callon, Foucault Knorr
organisation: (1) the overall
Cetina, Latour, Pickering, Wise,
dynamics of networks of actants; Woolgar
(2) the internal management of
die elements of networks.
j
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Table B.4.2
Historical examples of knowledge structures
(from Machlup 1982, Oldroyd 1987, Irwin 1989 and Motiand 1990)
Name
Aristotle
(384-322 BC.)

Porphyry
(AD. 232-302)

Headings of main categories
knowledge
1. a prion
a posteriori
!
2.
! knowledge
1. discovering and learning
2. proving and demonstrating
i knowledge
1. theoretical
2. practical
3. productive
1 science
1. theoretical
1.1
speculative thinking (physics)
2. empirical
2.1
inductive generalisations (biology)
physics
causes
1.
material - as in, of what something is made
2.
formal - as in, h o w something was made
3.
efficient - as in, the plan or pattern of something
4.
final - as in, the intention of the maker
substances
1. first substances - as in Socrates
2.
universals - as in Socrates is a m a n
3.
coincidentals - as in quality, quantity, relative, etc
changes
1.
generation and destruction of substance
2.
motion - change of category of quality
3.
motion - increase or decrease of category of quality
4.
motion - locomotion in category of place
physics
motions
1.
natural
2.
violent
3.
voluntary
biology
taxonomy
1.
botany
2.
zoology
theoretical philosophies
physics
1.
mathematics
2.
theology
3.
mathematics
universal mathematics
1.
geometry and astronomy
2.
Substance as the most general category, divided dichotomously like branches
of a tree, until the unit is a single type. Units at any intermediate level can be
combined as genera, or divided as species.
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Aurelius
Variously between 5 and 8 of this list of disciplines:
Augustinus
1.
Grammar
(later the trivium)
I (Saint Augustine) - 2.
Dialectics
(later the trivium)
I (354-430)
3.
Rhetoric
(later the trivium)
(later the quadrivium)
4.
Arithmetic
5.
Music
(later the quadrivium)
(later the quadrivium)
6.
Geometry
7.
Astrology (or Astronomy)
(later the quadrivium)
8.
Philosophy
M u h a m m a d al1.
The linguistic sciences
Farabi
2.
Logic (Aristotle's Organon)
(d.950)
3.
Mathematics (arithmetic, geometry, optics, astronomy, music, statics,
mechanics)
4.
Physics (as structured by Aristotle)
5.
Metaphysics
6.
Politics
7.
Jurisprudence
• 8.
Theology
Ibn Sina (Abu Ali) Rational sciences
(980-1037)
1.
Speculative sciences (seeking truth)
1.1
Physics
1.1.1 Basic sciences (8 fiom Aristotle)
1.1.2 Derivative sciences
• medicine
• astrology
• physiognomy
• dream interpretation
• talismans
•charms
•alchemy
1.2
Mathematics
1.3
Music
2.
Practical sciences (seeking well-being)
2.1
Personal morality
2.2
Domestic morality
2.3
Politics
Prophetology
2.4
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Robert Grosseteste
(c.l 175-1253)

Albeitus Magnus
(1193/1206-1280)
Thomas Aquinas
(Saint Thomas)
(1227-1274)

772

Twenty departments of scientific knowledge known at the time, in the
Compendium Scientarium
The divisions of philosophy
1.
2.
A compendium of natural philosophy
3.
Mathematics
4.
Metaphysics
5.
Grammar
6.
Rhetoric
7.
Logic
8.
Medicine
9.
Arithmetic
10. Music
11. Geometry
12.
Astronomy
13. Optics
14. Astrology
15. Mechanics (astronomy)
16. Mathematical sciences in general
17. Politics
18. Economics
19. Ethics
20.
The
unity
and simplicity
of knowledge
1.
Natural
philosophy
(physics)
2.
Metaphysics, with theology
3.
Mathematics
1.
Natural philosophy (The intellect observes what is in Nature)
2.
Rational philosophy (The intellect mentally produces)
3.
Moral philosophy (The intellect generates through acts of will)
4.
Practical sciences (mechanical arts)
(The intellect generates activities that produce things
or change the external world)
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Roger Bacon
(1214-1292/94)

R a m o n Lull
1 (or R a y m o n d
Luile)
| (1234-1315)

i
i

i

Parts of Opus Majus
1.
Four causes of human ignorance and error
2.
Philosophy & theology
3.
Foreign languages
4.
Mathematical sciences
4.1
Astronomy
4.2
Optics
4.3
Theology
4.4
Chronology
4.5
Astrology
Correction of the calendar - geography
4.6
5.
Perspective or Optics
6.
Experimental science
7.
Moral philosophy
Extant parts of Scriptum Principale
1.
Comparative grammar and logic (the trivium)
2.
Mathematics (the quadrivium)
Natural science
3.
3.1
General principles
3.2
Perspective or optics
3.3
Astronomy (including geography and astrology)
3.4
Barology (science of weights)
3.5
Speculative alchemy
3.6
Agriculture
3.7
Medicine
3.8
Experimental science
4.
Metaphysics and morals
1.
Elementary
(concerned
likewith
partcosmogony)
7 of the Opus Majus)
4.1 tree
(probably
2.
Vegetal tree
3.
Sensuous tree
4.
Imaginal tree (concerned with mental impressions of elementary, vegetal
and sensuous things)
5.
Human tree (soul and body)
6.
Moral tree
7.
Imperial tree (politics)
8.
Apostolic tree (church hierarchy)
Celestial tree
9.
10. Angelic tree
11. Eternal tree (beatitude and damnation)
12. Maternal tree (devoted to Our Lady)
13. Tree of Jesus Christ
14. Divine tree
15. Tree of examples
16. Tree of questions
Experimental science (in other works):
1.
Astronomy
2.
Physics
3.
Chemistry
4.
Medicine
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IbnKhaldun
(1332-1406)

j 1.

2.

774

Traditional sciences - 'based on the authority of the given religious law'
1.1
Interpretation ofthe Qur'an
1.2 reading of the Qur'an
1.3 prophetic traditions
1.4 Principles of jurisprudence (controversial questions & dialectics)
Jurisprudence, including laws of inheritance
1.5
1.6 Speculative theology, including degrees of faith, anthropomorphism,
schools of theologians and philosophers
Sufism ( M o h a m m e d a n ascetic mysticism)
1.7
1.8
Dream interpretation
Philosophical sciences - 'natural to m a n [sic] and to which he is guided by
his [sic] o w n ability to think'
2.1
Logic - divided into the 8 books of Aristotle's Organon:
•
categories
•
hermeneutics
analytics
•
apodeictica
•
topics
•
sophistry
•
rhetoric
•
poetics
Physics, mainly medicine and agriculture
2.2
2.3
Metaphysics
•
sorcery (magic) (possibly in physics?)
•
talismans (possibly in physics?)
•
letter magic (possibly in physics?)
alchemy (possibly in physics?)
2.4
Mathematical sciences
geometrical sciences
•
numerical sciences
•
music
•
astronomy
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Francis Bacon
(1561-1626)

775

divisions of h u m a n learning...
History (from memory)
1.1
Natural history
1.1.1 for narration
1.1.2 for induction ' the nursing mother of philosophy'
1.2 Civil history
Poesy (from imagination)
2.1
Narrative
2.2
Dramatic or Representative
2.3
Parabolical
Philosophy (from reason)
3.1 Universal science (Philosophia Prima)
3.1.1 Sacred theology; from revelation
3.1.2 Philosophy
3.1.2.1 Concerning the Deity (Natural Theology or Divine
Philosophy); from contemplation
3.1.2.2 Concerning Nature (Natural Philosophy)
3.1.2.2.1
Inquisition of causes: Speculative
• physics
* principles of things
* fabric of things
* variety of things
- things concrete
- things abstract
- configurations of matter
- motions
- simple
- compound
• metaphysics
* final causes (from Aristotle)
* forms
- 'dense, rare, hot, cold, heavy,
light, tangible, pneumatic,
volatile, fixed, and the like'
* mathematics
pure
- mixed (explains some axioms
and natural philosophy)
3.1.2.2.2
Production of effects: Operative
• mechanics
• magic
* alchemy
* astrology
3.1.2.3 Concerning M a n [sic] (Moral Philosophy)
3.1.2.3.1
M a n segregate
• the human body
* medicine
* athletics
• the mind
* logic
* ethics
3.1.2.3.2
M a n in society
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ImmanuelKant
(1724-1804)

Georg Hegel
(1770-1831)

Andre Ampere
(1775-1836)

j Fundamental distinctions of knowledge, e.g.
1.
analytic and synthetic
2.
phenomena and noumena
3.
intuition and perception
4.
theoretical and practical
| 5.
immanent and transcendent
I 6.
empirical and transcendental
1.
Logic
1.1
Being
1.2 Essence
1.3 Notion (what most philosophers would regard as logic)
1.3.1 the subjective forms of conception,
judgement, syllogism
1.3.2 their realisation mechanically, chemically or
ideologically
1.3.3 the ideas of life, science, and the
interpenetration of thought and objectivity
2.
Nature
2.1
Mechanics
2.2 Physics
2.3 Organics (the three kingdoms of Nature)
2.3.1 Geology
2.3.2 Botany
2.3.3 Animal physiology
3.
Mind
3.1
The Subjective mind
3.1.1 Anthropology
3.1.2 Phenomenology (consciousness, selfconsciousness, reason)
3.1.3 Psychology (in the narrower sense)
3.2 The Objective mind
3.2.1 Philosophy of L a w
3.2.2 Moral Philosophy
3.2.3 Political Philosophy
3.3 The Absolute mind
3.3.1 Philosophy of Art
3.3.2 Philosophy of Religion
1.
Cosmological
sciencesof Philosophy (Philosophical Theory).
3.3.3 History
1.1 Mathematical sciences
1.1.1 arithmology
1.1.2 geometry
1.1.3 mechanics
1.1.4 uranology
1.2 Physical sciences
1.2.1 physics
1.2.2 chemistry
1.2.3 technology
1.2.4 geology
1.2.5 mineralogy
1.2.6 oryctotechnics (technology of extractive industries)
2.
Noological sciences
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August Comte
(1798-1857)

1.
2.

U....W

Practical Knowledge
Theoretical Knowledge
2.1 Mathematics
2.2
Astronomy
2.3
Physics
2.4
Chemistry
2.5 Physiology (Biology)
2.6
Social Science ('Social Physics')

Appendix B.4: Structure

Karl Pearson
(1857-1936)

778

~~i
Abstract sciences
1.1
kinematics
1.2
theory of strain
1.3 theory of observation and description (a part of logic)
1.4
trigonometry
1.5 descriptive geometry
1.6 theory of functions
1.7 calculus of fluxions and calculus of sums (differential and integral
calculus)
1.8 arithmetic
1.9 statistics
1.10 logic
1.11 orthology (a part of grammar)
1.12 methodology
Concrete sciences
2.1 Sciences dealing with inorganic phenomena
2.1.1 Exact or precise sciences: phenomena reduced to ideal motions
theories of light, heat, electricity, dispersion, absorption,
transmission, conduction and radiation
theoretical chemistry, spectrum analysis, solar and sidereal
physics
theories of elasticity, plasticity, cohesion, sound,
crystallography, hydromechanics, aeromechanics, the tides,
kinetic theory of gases
•
mechanics, planetary theory, lunar theory
2.1.2 Synoptic or descriptive physical sciences: not yet reduced to
ideal motions
nebular theories
evolution of planetary systems
geology
•
physical geography
•
meteorology
•
mineralogy
•
chemistry
2.2
Sciences dealing with organic phenomena
2.2.1 Sciences emphasising space or localisation
Chorology (geographical distribution of living forms)
Ecology (habits in relation to situation and climate)
•
Natural history
2.2.2 Sciences emphasising time, change or growth
2.2.2.1 Biology
• botany
• zoology, includes all sciences of man, except theories of sex
and heredity, and all of sociology
* functions and actions - psychology, physiology
* growth and reproduction- embryology, theories of sex and
heredity
* form and structure - morphology, histology, anatomy
2.2.2.2 History
• evolution of species, theories of natural and sexual selection
• anthropology, histories of language, science, philosophy, art,
etc., and social institutions such as archaeology, folklore,
histories of customs, marriage, ownership,religions,states,
laws, etc.
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OttoNeurath
(1882-1945) and
Rudolf C a m a p
(1891-1970)

! Britannica3,
Mortimer Adler
(1902-) and the
i Propaedia
i

1.
2.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

j

|

Dissertation
Abstracts
International
(March 1990)

1.

Formal science: 'analytical statements established by logic and
mathematics'
Empirical science: 'synthetic statements established in the different fields of
factual knowledge'
2.1 Physics (nonbiological field of science) (does not presuppose
biology)
2.1.1 Both systematic and historical investigations of the field
• chemistry
• mineralogy
• astronomy
• geology
• meteorology, etc.
2.2
Biology (presupposes physics)
2.2.1 Biology in the narrower sense
• general biology
• botany
• the greater part of zoology
2.2.2 N o n a m e in general use
• Dealing with individual organisms (perhaps psychology)
* psychology, parts of physiology and the humanities
• Dealing with groups of organisms (perhaps social science)
* social science, the greater part of humanities and history
Matter and energy
The Earth
Life on Earth
H u m a n life
H u m a n society

Art
Technology
Religion
The history of mankind
The branches of knowledge
10.1 Logic
10.2 Mathematics
10.3 Science
history and philosophy of science
the physical sciences
the earth sciences
the biological sciences
medicine and affiliated disciplines
•
the social sciences and psychology
•
the technological sciences
10.4 History and the humanities
10.5 Philosophy
Biological sciences
1.1
Agriculture
General
Agronomy
>
Animal culture and nutrition
Animal pathology
Food science and technology
Forestry and wildlife
Plant culture
Plant pathology
Plant physiology
Range management
W o o d technology
1.2
Anatomy
1.3
Biological oceanography
1.4
Biology
1.5 1biophysics
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4.

i
!
:

i
i

j

:

L

1

Physical sciences
4.1
Pure sciences
4.1.1 Chemistry
General
•
Agricultural
Analytical
•
Biochemistry
Inorganic
•
Nuclear
Organic
•
Pharmaceutical
•
Physical
•
Polymer
Radiation
4.1.2 Mathematics
4.1.3 Physics
General
Acoustics
•
Astronomy and astrophysics
•
Atmospheric science
Atomic
Electronics and electricity
Elementary particles and high energy
•
Fluid and plasma
»
Molecular
Nuclear
Optics
>
Radiation
Solid state
4.1.4 Statistics
4.2
Applied sciences
4.2.1 Applied mechanics
4.2.2 Computer science
4.2.3 Engineering
General
>
Aerospace
Agricultural
Automotive
Biomedical
Chemical
Civil
Electronics and electrical
Heat and thermodynamics
Hydraulic
Industrial
Marine
Materials science
Mechanical
Metallurgy
Mining
Nuclear
Petroleum
Sanitary and municipal
System science
4.2.4 Geotechnology
4.2.5 Operations research
4.2.6 Textile technology
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Psychology
5.1
Psychology
General
Clinical
Developmental
Experimental
Industrial
Personality
Physiological
Psychobiology
Psychometrics
Social
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B.5

Argument from the metascientific literature emphasising the dimension
activity
Debates in the metascientific literature address many aspects of scientific activity,
again supporting a broad interpretation of scientific activity. It is clear that the literature
draws upon a broader notion of activity than m a n y individual thinkers have proposed.
This breadth is interpreted both as a wider range of activities than m a n y individual
accounts recognise, and as different interpretations ofthe same activities. The variations,
implications and subtleties of the views in several of these debates are outlined here in
Appendix B.5, to indicate the scope of the ways in which science is characterised partly
by activity and some issues which are used in relation to this characteristic:
B. 5.1 Activity as observable and non-observable;
B.5.2

Activity as method and methodology;

B . 5.3

T h e characterisation of a Western European scientific tradition by activity;

B . 5.4

T h e problem of induction;

B . 5.5

T h e characterisation of key metascientific viewpoints by activity;

B . 5.6

T h e notion of a uniform method of science;

B.5.7

Interpretations of some characteristic scientific activities: experiment,
observation, explanation and prediction;

B . 5.8

Mathematical activities in science;

B . 5.9

Debate over discovery and verification;

B .5.10 Activity as more than method and methodology: internalist and externalist
perspectives on scientific activity.
5.1 Activity as observable and non-observable
Science is characterised most obviously by - and indeed is manifest in - observable
or motor activity. S o m e of the activities identified in the s u m m a r y statements are
observable

behaviours or form part of observable behaviours, such as delicate

manipulations. Clearly, these activities are a characteristic by which science is recognised
by the scientific community and general community alike. The image of a person (very
often a male and wearing a laboratory coat) manipulating intricate chemical glassware,
observing through a microscope, spectroscope or telescope, or taking a reading from a
thermometer, would be interpreted widely as someone 'doing' science.
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However, scientific activity is not always observable. M a n y of the activities
identified in the summary statements are non-observable, or mental, such as comparing,
controlling variables, evaluating, experimenting, explaining, predicting, etc.:

Science, as practiced, involves an ongoing process of observation, experiment,
recourse to prior theory, reliance on various metaphysical principles, and so on,
exploited via reason and argument to suggest hypotheses, evaluate their promise
for further development, debate their adequacy, develop them further, accept or
reject them as true or false, the point of the enterprise being to obtain systematic
knowledge that provides understanding of the world w e live in. Whether or not
its use of it is very good, far more of science is concerned with reasoning,
argument, and marshalling evidence than with manipulating nature in the
laboratory. In short, a central and characteristic activity of science is the use of
reason in the suggestion and development of hypotheses and theories and in
evaluating the knowledge claims made by those w h o advance such hypotheses
and theories. (Suppe 1979, p. 650)
Considerable significance is attached in the metascientific literature to these activitie
indicated by the volume and variety of work devoted to their explication and theoretical
interpretations. This significance does not arise from a debate about whether or not the
activity is observable or mental in itself, but from its contribution to achieving a particular
purpose or end. Here is a second account which makes a similar distinction to Suppe,
above, but with different terminology and slightly different argument:

All scientific methods may be divided basicady into two major categories: (1)
technical, and (2) logical. The technical aspects of science differentiate the
various sciences from each other - astronomy from chemistry, and chemistry
from social science. For the major difference between the particular sciences ties
in the type of measuring instruments or measuring methods used to gather data,
or the type of observation employed, or the specific natural phenomena
investigated. Competence in dealing with a cloud chamber or a stethoscope, or
with particulate matter or a sick patient alone distinguishes physicist from
physician. Both of them can be serious scientists or both of diem can be
dilettantes. In this paper w e cannot consider the logical approaches involved in
scientific methods, since they are all basically the same and fundamental to ad
scientific methods. Stated simply, the logical components of scientific methods
involve reasoning about the facts in order to understand them better and to
devise an orderly array between apparently disconnected facts. O n e thus
attempts to place as m a n y different lands of specific facts into more general
terms or laws. (Hodes 1974, pp. 355-6)
Our attention is drawn, therefore, not to the mental or non-observable state of certain
activities, but to a distinction between what Hodes calls technical and logical methods.
They are interpreted here to be, respectively, methods involving the collection of data a
the reasoning towards some understanding of that data. There is far more discussion on
logical than technical processes in the metascientific literature, from which we can infe
that greater significance is attached to debates about h o w experimental inquiries and
explanations should be constructed and justified, than to physical manipulations and
operations. Also, conceptions of scientific activity have undergone considerable changes
in their development, are still developing and do not yet enjoy consensus. Analysis,
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below, of examples from the literature indicates some strengths and difficulties associated
with Hodes' position in characterising science.
There is some commonsense support for Hodes' distinction. It is true that the text
units indicating process or activity in Tables A.4 and A.9 do include some commonly

taken to indicate mental or logical activities (such as hypothesising , deductions and

predicting), and some commonly taken to indicate technical or observable activities (s
as experimenting and delicate manipulations). This distinction can be supported also with
examples from histories of science. For example, characterisations of the Scientific
Revolution commonly n a m e the writings of Francis Bacon and Rene Descartes as
exemplifying the opposing views of scientific methods that arose then, respectively
inductive/empirical and deduetivelrationalistic. These m a y be interpreted to approximate
logical methods as proposed by Hodes. M o r e clearly, Galileo's astronomical
observations pioneering the use of the telescope, and Spadanzani's considerable corpus
of experimental biology are cited as exemplifying the developments in technical methods
seen as characterising the science of that time. W e recognise the writings of Bacon and
the observations of Gatileo as being scientific, or as characterising science at a point in its
historical development, at least partly in terms of logical and technical methods.
A specific example in which technical and logical methods can be identified in the
following two passages concerning the work of Robert Boyle (1627-91):
The air-pump of Guericke was considerably improved (1658-9) by Robert
H o o k e (1635-1703) working at Oxford for his employer Robert Boyle. Hooke
was one ofthe most skilful and ingenious of physical experimenters, Boyle one
of the ablest and most suggestive of scientific investigators. A large part of the
foundations of the m o d e m sciences of chemistry and physics in their various
departments was laid down by these two men.
B y means of the air-pump Boyle and Hooke examined the elasticity,
compressibility, and weight of die air (1660)...
Boyle's n a m e is familiarly recalled in 'Boyle's law' which states that the
volume of a gas varies inversely as the pressure upon it, provided the
temperature be constant Boyle took a U-shaped tube with a shorter closed and a
longer open limb. B y pouring mercury into it he cut off air in the short limb and,
by shaking, the mercury was brought to the same level in both limbs. The air in
the short limb was n o w under atmospheric pressure. Adding mercury to the
long limb he could increase the pressure continuously, thereby reducing die bulk
of contained air. Thus when the barometric pressure stood at 30 inches above
the level in the short limb, the pressure on the imprisoned air was doubled. The
bulk of that air was then found to be reduced to one half. Under three times the
atmospheric pressure it was reduced to a third, and so on. Moreover, he could
reverse the process. (Singer 1959, pp. 271-2)
Boyle's most important early experiments were based on the use of the air
p u m p . Having repeated ad the experiments of Guericke as described by Kaspar
Schott (1608-66) in his Mechanica Hydraulica-Pnewnatica (1657), he added
certain new ones of his o w n such as the fact that w a r m water boded under
reduced pressure. These experiments were gathered together in the New
Experiments Physico-Mechanicall (1660). In an appendix to a n e w edition of
this latter work, he published the famous law which goes by his name, though
this was, in fact, discovered by one of his assistants, R. Towneley. In his last
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work, the General History of the Air (published posthumously, 1692), he
returned to the same subject again, giving a very clear qualitative expression of
the notion of heat as due to an increase in the motion of the ultimate particles of a
gas.
... W h a t was original in Boyle was his enormous ingenuity in constructing
experiments in support of the atomistic hypothesis. Here his influence was
profound. Through his writings a betief in atomism in Europe w a s greatly
strengthened. H e was also very influential for the example he provided of the
prosecution of the experimental method in science in the manner of Gatileo and
his Florentine successors. (Herivel 1969, pp. 74-5)
The question to be asked is, W h a t is being done or is happening here?, or more direcdy,
W h a t activity is indicated here? Both excerpts mention observable, or technical, activity in
connection with an air p u m p and, in Singer's account, other artefacts also. However, the
use of particular artefacts in the activity appears to be deemed significant not so m u c h for
their o w n sake, but for the activities they enable. Artefacts are involved in carrying out
m a n y observable activities, methods or processes, as the examples above show. Artefacts
m a y be involved also in carrying out non-observable activities: the very same microscope
or test tube m a y be the means by which the scientist compares

p h e n o m e n a and

subsequendy makes conjectures, controls variables or replicates results.
Since scientific artefacts are associated with both observable and non-observable
activity, appeal to artefacts is not central to a distinction between them or to an argument
for their significance. M a n y references to scientific activity in the literature m a k e litde or
no mention of the artefacts involved. Science is not an artefact: it is not a microscope,
bunsen burner, test tube or spectroscope. Artefacts do, however, comprise part of the
contexts in which and through which particular activities are carried out. In both passages
the significance of Boyle's activity lies only partly with his careful manipulation of
equipment and measurement of the pressure and volume of gases. Greater significance is
attached to his repetition (specifically of Guericke's work and implicidy of his o w n
work), of his comparison of readings, and of his controlling variables (the temperature,
to avoid confusing his results, and the pressure, with which he compared

his

measurements of volume). B y implication the data was interpreted and the relationship
between the pressure and volume w a s tested after s o m e sort of hypothesising or
speculating, which Herivel points out was actually the w o r k of Towneley. These
activities are all mental or logical. Ingenuity is mentioned by Herivel, and is integral to his
characterisation, but is a capacity or disposition rather than an activity1.
Closer examination of the passage from Herivel, above, highlights further points
worthy of comment. T h e second sentence refers to Boyle adding certain new
[experiments] of his own, yet provides as an example, such as the fact that warm water
boiled under reduced pressure. This is not an experiment but a generalisation of
experimental results, which emphasises the point that observable/technical and

1

This is discussed in the companion chapter on belief system and Appendix B 2.
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reasoning/logical activities are not easdy distinguished, a point taken up shortly. Further
on w e read that Towneley discovered the law that w e k n o w as Boyle's; quite aside from
metascientific contention about the label laws, discussed in the companion chapter on
structure, the question of whether scientific relationships and 'facts' are discovered or
invented or constructed is also a topic of debate, and is discussed later in this chapter.
Less contentious but nonetheless worthy of mention is the close of thefirstparagraph,
giving a very clear qualitative expression ... , which the present thesis interprets as
explaining the concept heat in terms of the motion of the particles of gas. T h e point here
is that clearer identification of the activities mentioned clarifies the meaning of the larger
unit of text, and hence the characterisation of science.
The limitations of distinguishing technical and logical activities
T h e accounts of Boyle's work, above, illustrate an important and m o r e general
point of characterisation, that technical and logical activities are difficult to distinguish in
practice, even though they are conceptuady distinct. First, w e have noted that some terms
are not clearly distinguished as logical or technical, such as method, classifying,
procedures, research and solution of in Tables A.4 and A.9, examined in Singer, above,
and constructing experiments in Herivel, above. Searching for such a clear distinction has
the potential to lead prolonged linguistic analysis of peripheral use to the present paper. In
any event, it is clear from the examples above that the authors used the terms in a more
comprehensive sense that would be misrepresented if described is either technical or
logical.
Second is the difficulty of separating technical from logical in practice. Technical
activity that is consciously and purposefully performed must entati thinking processes,
and where it is performed without logical or reasoning activities its status as scientific
activity is questioned. T h e observable manifestations of experimenting, for example, are
merely mechanical behaviours without considering an associated logic, context, purpose
and rationale. T h e young child manipulating laboratory glassware is not doing science.
Often the technical processes that partly characterise science have been done by research
assistants for scientists, but the minutiae of laboratory activity is rarely mentioned in the
metascientific literature. (The recent metascientific interest in transcribing laboratory
activities is a significant exception and is addressed later in this chapter). O n the other
hand, the work of Galileo and Spadanzani, for example, is recorded in the history books
because their technical methods werefruitfudycombined with logical methods, by which
they controlled variables, m a d e predictions and deductions, and interpreted data in terms
of theories. Conversely, logical activities cannot be considered meaningfutiy without the
observable activities they entail. For example, it m a k e s n o sense to speak of
hypothesising or predicting without also considering their articulation, in both the sense
of clarifying them as part of scientific communication and of linking them meaningfidly to
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other activities. This is clear in m a n y historical examples, as in this case of the rapid
development of chemical analysis without commensurate development of classification
(and, in turn, interpretation):
The investigation of chemical processes in the seventeenth century had yielded,
by the d a w n of the eighteenth, a vast accumulation of facts for which no
satisfactory system of classification had been suggested. (Singer 1959, p. 333)
In these ways, what m a y be inferred as discrete activities because they are labeded by
single words, are clearly parts of larger 'webs' of activities for which the labelboundaries are unclear. However interpreted, the important point is that these activities
are c o m m o n means by which science is characterised.
In summary, while the popular image of scientists is partly characterised by
observable activities, m a n y activities - in m a n y ways the more significant ones - are not
observable. These activities are labeded variously, such as logical or reasoning for nonobservable activities, which indicates a difference in interpretive focus more than
fundamental difference. Whether or not particular reasoning/logical activities are
conceptuady distinct from mechanical/technical activities, they are less distinct in practice.
M o r e importandy here, they work together, and their significance is m a d e clearer when
interpreted together with the other dimensions of science.
5.2 Activity as method and methodology
Greater explanatory power is promised by attention to a distinction between
method, of whatever type, and methodology. Method

is taken to be 'a m o d e or

procedure, especially an orderly or systematic mode'. Methodology is taken to be 'the
science of method, especially a branch of logic dealing with the logical principles
underlying the organisation of the various special sciences, and the conduct of scientific
inquiry' (The Macquarie Dictionary), or 'the procedures and techniques governing
inquiry, or the study of such procedures and techniques' (Boyd, Gasper & Trout 1991,
p. 778). Thus methods, like collecting data or controlling variables, are interpreted in
terms of theoretical constructs or methodologies, like proving (a n o w discredited
methodology), verifying or falsifying.
The activities w e have been discussing have metascientific interest because of their
role in developing a claim to scientific knowledge. For example, Herivel's account of
Boyle's work, above, placed great significance on constructing experiments in support of
the atomistic hypothesis. Accordingly, our attention is drawn not simply to particular
methods, but to their use in making some argument, demonstration or proof and a
rationale for this deployment. This represents an 'interaction of evidence, argument, and
hypotheses', which w e understand by methodology:
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[Methodology is] the theory of method, of the rules and evaluations that should
govern (or do not govern) the interaction of evidence, argument, and
hypotheses, particularly in the empirical realm; sometimes, the system of rules
itself. Methodology is not the same as epistemology; epistemology says what
w e can know, methodology elucidates ways and means. The epistemology of
fallibilist justificationism - knowledge rests on positive, though inconclusive,
evidence - has inspired methodologies endorsing the quest for w e d confirmed
(sometimes, highly probable) hypotheses; all methodologies appealing to some
principle of induction appear here, as well as most contemporary schools of
statistics. T h e fadibdist but non-justificationist epistemology of conjectures and
refutations is pursued in falsificationism, which dictates that evidence operate
only negatively. Although methodologies differ widely, the methods
recommended are often similar. All, except the methodology of scientific
research programs, agree that adverse evidence cannot be disregarded; few
contest that ad hoc hypotheses must be used sparingly, if at ad; falsificationism
and Bayesian personalism alike esteem severity in tests. T h e task of a
methodology, however, includes making sense of the rules it advocates, and
showing h o w they contribute to the rationality of science. (Mtiler 1983, p. 267)
This conception of methodology is interpreted here as the dynamic and reciprocal
influence of interactions between three characteristics: evidence (data serving as criteria,
which arises from investigative or other activities), argument (a process of reasoning or
rhetoric) and hypotheses (statements of a certain form, arising from processes of
explanation and conjecture). Methodologies are different in different accounts of
epistemology.
There is considerable metascientific interest in methodology and method. The
mastery of particular methods seems often to be a technical matter, of refining technical
sktils; it is the understanding , contribution and deployment of methods that is subject to
the broader debates. Interest in method and methodology arises not just because of their
importance in understanding science, but because of lack of agreement about the nature
and role of particular methods in the face of scientific successes. There are different
interpretations within and between different metascientific traditions, such as H P S and
STS, each drawing upon historical examples. See the discussion of Table B.5.1, below.
Mismatches between methods and theories of why they are significant (methodologies)
Another point of metascientific interest in the distinction between method and
methodology is w h e n the two do not match. For example, with the flurry of experimental
successes in the Scientific Revolution, experimental techniques blossomed without an
agreed account of w h y they were successful. That is, the emerging methodologies did not
match the development and application of methods, a gap which fuels metascientific
interest d o w n to the present. Scientific activity developed at such a rate and in so m a n y
locations that at times large amounts of knowledge accumulated without adequate
theoretical frameworks for either the knowledge or the status of the knowledge (that is,
epistemological and methodological theories). T h e discrepancies between methods in
theory and methods in practice has not been resolved: w e have noted above that in the
latter half of the twentieth century there is no agreed, single, metascientific view, as the
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R V w a s for m u c h of the first half. Section 5.4, below, oudines a long-recognised
problem in metascience, that science activity is commonly characterised by induction even
though induction is logicady flawed. The attempt to understand experimental activity, and
scientific activity more generaUy, remains a current metascientific issue. Indeed, it is part
of the rationale of the present thesis.
There has been interest also in the differences between the written accounts of
science activity and the actual activities of scientists. For example, Francis Bacon is
characterised often as the paradigmatic empiricist: his account of inductive activity was
seminal and w a s written prescriptively. However, this is partly misleading in two
respects. First, Bacon w a s a metascientist, not a scientist, and the scientific processes
advocated in his writings were popularised by others, such as Hooke, w h o nonetheless
did not follow Bacon strictly in their o w n successful experimental work. Secondly, there
is also a deductive

or rationalist element in Bacon's writings that often is not

acknowledged in the literature. Conversely, Descartes' rationalistic writings d o not give
an account of his successful empirical activities. N e w t o n and Galtieo m a d e useful
contributions to the development of both technical and logical scientific processes, yet
examples are recorded where their writings differed from their practice. Although
Newton rejected the hypothesising characteristic of Descartes' approach, he nonetheless
made some assumptions, such as the existence of absolute space and time, and of the
uniformity of Nature. Also, 'interest in the concrete detatis of scientific progress soon
drew attention away from abstract issues of methodology' (Cohen 1983, p. 203). There
are m a n y current examples also, such as the persistent use of induction by scientists, in
which there is not yet an agreed metascientific account of the (fruitful) actual activities of
scientists. S o m e examples are discussed in section 5.7 below, such as interpretations of
experiment, including the emergingfieldof laboratory studies in S T S , and interpretations
of observations, explanations and predictions. These are all examples of interest in
characterising science by activity, where the analysis of activity utilises the concepts of
method and methodology. Issues arising from this interest form the basis of the
remainder of this section.
5.3 The characterisation of a history of a Western European scientific tradition by
activity
Histories of the western European scientific tradition routinely characterise science
by activity. This tradition was addressed generady in Appendix B.l on context, but the
present section wdl show h o w the literature characterises an historical tradition partly in
terms of historical developments of activity. T h e scope of the present section w d l be
confined to just a few parameters that indicate the role of activity in characterising an
historical tradition.
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5.3a. Historical confusion of terms
T h e historical development of terms concerning scientific activity partly
characterises the historical development of science and thinking about science. For
example, the historical uses of the terms induction and deduction, and related terms, is an
example of the, often confused, development of terms and the activities they represent.
They indicate a process in which successive, and sometimes, contemporaneous, thinkers
proposed, debated and refined notions of these activities. S o m e of the confusion arose
through contradictory usage, as with Newton and Hooke for example, who used the
terms analysis and synthesis in exacdy opposite ways (Oldroyd 1989, p. 81). Other
confusion arose from simdarities and differences in the use of different pairs of terms:
But, in the geometric example [of Pappus], it should be noted that the
procedures in the analytic and synthetic phases of the reasoning process were
both deductive; neither w a s inductive. So w e cannot ... directly identify
induction with analysis, and deduction with synthesis. Yet something like this
identification did occur in subsequent authors. There arose, therefore, a mighty
confusion in the terminology of metascience, which persisted well into the
nineteenth century. There were, in fact, no less than three traditions that became
conflated one with another, the geometrical analysis and synthesis that w e have
just considered; the methodological tradition of analysis and synthesis (induction
and deduction, or resolution and composition); and also the rhetorical
procedures of thinking up ideas and then presenting them to one's auditors in a
clear and logically coherent manner. For this last, the terms 'invention' and
'judgement' were c o m m o n l y employed. Discussion on 'method' commonly
treated rhetorical, scientific/empirical, and mathematical procedures together,
without clearly differentiating one from another ... Another possible source of
confusion lay in the titles of Aristotle's two main logical works. Roughly
speaking, one m a y associate the Prior Analytics with deductive logic and the
Posterior Analytics with induction and the discovery of definitions, essences,
first principles, and so on. (Oldroyd 1989, pp. 27-8)
This passage itself is an historical overview of considerable scope in which science is
partiy characterised by activity, although the particular interest is in induction and
deduction as logical activities.
5.3b. Characterisations of a history of western European scientific tradition by
observable, technical activities
Although w e have noted that technical and logical activities are difficult to separate
in practice, the western European scientific tradition is characterised partly by the

observable, technical activities. They attract comparatively less metascientific interest

reasoning/logical activities, probably due in part because their visibility makes them le
in need of explication, and in part because they are less significant interpretatively.
Nevertheless, Molland (1990) judges the work of Aristode to be more recognisably

scientific than that of Plato because for Aristotle, unlike Plato, the investigation of N
necessarily rested on observations or sense data, that is, the codection of empirical
information. The judgement that there was relatively little scientific progress in the Middle
Ages is made partly in terms of technical processes: instead of pursuing the empirical
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activities advocated by Aristode, the scholastics emphasised study and interpretation of
Biblical Scriptures and Aristotelian texts and commentaries. S o m e empirical work in the
Aristotelian tradition continued during that time, however, in Islamic countries. The
argument that there was some scientific work done in Europe, leading up to the Scientific
Revolution, is m a d e partly on the basis of technical processes. The alchemists, for
example, carried out a good deal of activity that is commonly identified as technical
scientific activity from a twentieth century perspective. The judgement that their work had
mediaeval characteristics is also m a d e partly on the basis of logical processes (that is,
mental activity) and partly on purposes and belief system (see Needham, summary
statement 72; Bronowski 1978). This is addressed in Appendices B.2, B.3 and B.5.
T h e period roughly 1450-1750 is characterised popularly as the Scientific
Revolution in part due to the flurry of experimental work and advances in experimental
techniques and apparatus. There were m a n y developments, in m a n y (frequentiy n e w )
areas. Contributions were made by m a n y people, w h o often experimented in more than
one field. Scientific activity in the period 1600-1850 included significant developments in
at least the fodowing areas, using the categories of that time rather than those used today:
acoustics and music theory; astronomy; plant and animal anatomy, morphology and
palaeontology; cell theory; chemistry; crystadography and geology; explanation in terms
of atomic and molecular theory; experimental logic; the distribution of living things;
electricity; elements; embryology; energy; gases; geology; geophysics; heat; hydrostatics;
tight; magnetism; measurement of the earth and cartography; mechanics; microscopy;
optics; physiology; reproduction; taxonomy; and the use of mathematics in science,
notably the development of the calculus. Other developments that facditated n e w
experimental activity included the developments of the air p u m p , microscope and
telescope; thefirststate observatory of m o d e m times; the first university laboratory; and
developments in the measurement of temperature and time. S o m e of the activities outlined
above represent significant developments of existing practice, such as n e w techniques,
and an unprecedented increase in quantity within existing fields, such as astronomy,
mechanics, chemistry, taxonomy and physiology. Others represent developments in n e w
areas of study, such as microscopy and ced theory. In m a n y of these fields, the
development of more accurate scientific instruments enabled the more precise
measurements that helped the mathematisation of physics from about 1770 (Feldman
1983, p. 251).
Simdarly, developments in twentieth century science have been characterised partly
in terms of the rapid developments in scientific technologies and associated techniques:
T h e term 'technification of the sciences' designates a process whereby
techniques -frequentiy,though not always involving technology - b e c o m e
preponderant over earlier, more traditional methods of the practice of research.
Thus, as a result of technification, theory construction has to some extent been
rendered redundant through the systematic application of techniques and
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technical procedures to the given materials of research; these might be
collections of data to be analysed, or problems to be solved, or given practical
results to be produced, or proof constructions to be formed, or whatever else
might be the set task to be achieved by technical elaboration. Thus, as the
physicist Ziman (1976) puts it, 'research itself - the tussle with a problem of
natural philosophy - has given w a y to professional expertise in a variety of
techniques.' O f course, techniques have also played a partial role in most
sciences in the past, and almost no science has been without technical features.
Under the general heading of tools, Ravetz establishes techniques as an inherent
feature of the methods of science. But, as I shad show, there is an enormous
disparity between the tools or techniques utilised in the traditional sciences
during die Classical era, the days of string-and-sealing-wax devices, and those
n o w employed. Most obviously, the nature and role of technological tools in
contemporary science are very different from those of the craft tools that were
available to m a n y sciences even late in the era of Classical science during the
early years of this century. The computer, for example, is no longer on the same
level as m a n y of the craft tools. The ready avadability of computers brings about
far-reaching changes in the practice of science, for utilising these tools in a
science restructures the whole process of research and alters the very meaning of
data and knowledge. Computerised knowledge is technified knowledge.
(Redner 1987, pp. 64-5)
That is, Redner asserts that science is n o w significandy different from science in the
Classical era, and attributes this at least in part to fundamental changes in scientific
activity. In claiming that the use of computers has altered fundamentally both research
and the 'very meaning of data and knowledge', Redner points to sciences where 'the
instrument itself is being explored and theories devised and objects found to satisfy the
results of that exploration' (Redner 1987, p. 65). M o r e is said on the effect of changes in
instruments in Appendix B.l, which includes the physical contexts of science. For the
present thesis, Redner's analysistilustratesthe use of technical activity in characterising
recent changes in science in an historical context
In summary, it is too simplistic to characterise the history of science as the history
of technical scientific activities, because this thesis argues for a more sophisticated

characterisation. However, it is clearly the case that even in general scientific histori
science is partly characterised by technical or mechanical activity.

5.3c. Characterisations of a western European scientific tradition by reasoning activitie
and methodologies
A western European scientific tradition is more c o m m o n l y characterised by the

development of reasoning activities and methodologies, rather than by technical activitie
Historical themes based on activity
There have been a n u m b e r of methodologies proposed, from the Greek

philosopher-scientists down to the present, that interpret scientific activity in terms o
variants of induction and deduction, and often in combination (see, for example, Singer
1959; Losee 1980; Bhaskar 1983b; Cohen 1983; Oldroyd 1989; Tarnas 1991). These

activities are used to characterise the historical developments of science, mostiy as the
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contributed to current conceptions of science. In a general or lay sense they also remain
part of public perceptions of science, and of thinking in school science and science
education. They are significant, therefore, because of their historical role in characterising
science as antecedent to current ideas, and because they remain part of the current lexicon
for some of the notional readership of theses such as the present one.
Induction and deduction are interpreted initially, here, in their general senses,
although w e wdl examine some detaded issues later
Induction:
a process of discovering explanations for a set of particular facts, by estimating
the weight of observational evidence in favour of a proposition which (usually)
asserts something about that entire class of facts.
Deduction:
the process of drawing a conclusion from something k n o w n or assumed, (both,
The Macquarie Dictionary)
Together they can be interpreted historically as a set of activities involving observing
particular phenomena in the cosmos, making generalisations or principles about patterns
or regularities of these particulars, and generating from these principles new particulars
capable of being tested. They are consistent with m a n y views of science in the summary
statements, such as forming conceptual generalisations from the many particulars of
empirical evidence (summary statement 11) and understanding expressed in laws or
principles of greatest generality and which are capable of experimental test (summary
statement 9). Their recurrent and varying use in characterisations of a western European
scientific tradition is a useful organising concept in identifying activity as a characteristic
of a scientific tradition.
A n example of a thematic interpretation of such a tradition is given by Oldroyd's
detaded history of the philosophy and methodology of science (Oldroyd 1989). That
account presents a 'venerable tradition' (p. 4) of a two-way set of logical processes:
... a model of the process of scientific inquiry which I have called the 'arch of
knowledge'. According to this model, by induction from the world of observed
'facts' (phenomena or data) onerisesto scientific 'principles'; and from these
principles deductions are m a d e to other 'facts', which can be tested
experimentally, so that the whole 'structure' achieves a certain strength and
security. This model, which might also be referred to as a hypothetico-deductive
description of science, has been remarkably resilient in the history of 'Western'
science, and in tracing its history and its numerous historical variants, w e have
been able to handle a good deal of the historical metascientific literature with
considerable economy of thought. (Oldroyd 1989, p. 363)
A few examples only will suffice to indicate the role of these reasoning activities in
characterising this tradition, in particular the periods of antiquity, the scientific revolution
and twentieth-century science commonly addressed in abbreviated histories. T h e
following have been selected because (1) they illustrate the use of activity in
characterising an historical tradition, (2) their c o m m o n reference in general accounts
indicates their significance as key indicators, and (3) they remain current in contemporary
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metascientific arguments, either directly or as historical antecedents necessary to
understanding the positions in current points of view.
The notion of a two-fold pathway of constructing general principles and reasoning
from them wasfirstm a d e by Plato (Oldroyd 1989, p. 25) and first set within a general
system of natural philosophy by Aristode. In this context the methodologies of Plato and
Aristode are portrayed commonly as the archetypical approaches emphasising reasoning
and sensing, respectively. At the time of the Scientific Revolution and subsequentiy,
these notions were developed by rationales for induction and deduction in the respective
methodologies of Francis Bacon and R e n e Descartes, in Newton's work, and in
developments of methodologies associated with empiricism, positivism, rationalism,
idealism and experiment. In the twentieth century, science has been characterised partly
by the revisionism from several quarters that has invigorated the competition between
different viewpoints that draw partly on this two-fold pathway. It is interpreted as a
tradition because these and other writers refer to the works of earlier thinkers in such a
w a y that the ideas became the subject of debate, that is, were accepted with the
understanding that they could be revised.
For Plato, the material world accessible to our senses is changing and therefore
unreliable. True knowledge is knowledge of the Ideas of Forms, the unchanging and
immaterial reality behind the material world, and this knowledge is gained by a reasoning
process of subjecting concepts to 'arigorousprocess of dialectical discussion' (Oldroyd
1989, p. 12). B y this process successively higher principles are each secured in m m by
argument, although exactiy h o w this is done is not clear, as the ongoing 'problem of
induction' attests (see section 5.4 below). Knowledge ofthe material world is gained by
a 'descending, deductive, explanatory procedure', in the manner of geometric proofs
(Oldroyd 1989, p. 14).
Aristode proposed a clearer and more coherent methodology for reasoning both
from particular instances to generalisations (induction) and from generalisations and
initial statements to particular statements (deduction). Contrary to Plato, Aristode believed
the real world to be that which is accessible to the senses. H e therefore proposed (in the
Posterior Analytics) that knowledge of Nature was to be gained by investigation based on
observations or sense data: that the mind can recognise similarities between different
objects and so progressively group them into classes, creating a scientific taxonomy. In
the Prior Analytics, Aristotle proposed his well-known syllogistic logic, in which a
conclusion is deduced from two assumed propositions or premises:
Form of syllogism: Example:
All A's are B
A U marsupials are m a m m a l s
C is A
WaUabies are marsupials
Therefore
Therefore
C is B
WaUabies are m a m m a l s
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This form of argument is logicaUy correct, whether or not the premises are correct or
even believed to be so, as in this example:
A d A's are B
All marsupials wear socks
C is A
Wadabies are marsupials
Therefore
Therefore
C is B
Wallabies wear socks
Conversely, the form or argument below is logicaUy incorrect, even when the premises
may be true:
S o m e A's are B
S o m e mammals are marsupials
A U C's are A
A U dogs are mammals
Therefore
Therefore
C is B
All dogs are marsupials
Thus this form of argument tests the validity of the argument but not the truth or
otherwise of its basic premises. Aristode was thus able to codify the valid and invalid
syllogistic inferences, a technique that has remained useful, if limited. Arguing as it does
from premises, deduction does not claim to generate new knowledge, but it does allow
some claims of truth to be demonstrated. Aristotelian natural phdosophy remained the
dominant methodology in Western Europe until about the seventeenth century, with
developments up to thattimelargely comprising adjustments to and commentaries upon
Aristode.
The Scientific Revolution is partly characterised as such in terms of the m a n y
developments in methods of inquiry. These include rudimentary developments of logics
of experiment by Francis Bacon (1561-1626), Isaac Newton (1642-1727), David H u m e
and John Herschel (1792-1871) (Bhaskar 1983c, p. 137), in addition to the technical
developments noted above and theoretical developments below. The works of Francis
Bacon, Rene Descartes (1596-1650) and Isaac Newton are sufficient to indicate the
development of these activities.
Bacon was strongly influential in establishing an empirical characteristic of science,
meaning that science relies on observation. His major work, the Novum Organum

(New

Organon, published in 1620) contained thefirstcomprehensive formulation of induction
as a methodology. Like Sextus Empiricus (c250AD) Bacon recognised that the
sytiogisms comprising Aristotle's deductive reasoning did not lead to new knowledge.
H e also recognised the limitations of induction by simple enumeration, that is,
generalising about a class based simply on collecting information about the individuals in
it (Oldroyd 1989, p. 60). Instead, he set out a more thoroughgoing process of induction
which incorporated a very wide basis of observations from which principles are
formulated inductively and tested regularly and securely:
But it w a s Francis Bacon w h o most elegantly called for the experimental
interrogation of Nature. In order to establish the 'inductive ascent' he envisaged,
Bacon realised the need to differentiate accidental from essential (or necessary)
correlations and to decide between alternative hypotheses for the data. T o these
ends, he recommended drawing up Tables of Presence, Absence and Degrees of
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factors, and listed various 'prerogative instances' - of which the most famous is
the 'Instance ofthe Fingerpost' or crucial experiment. (Bhaskar 1983c, p. 137)
In turn, these low level principles become the bases for further inductive inferences,
leading to higher-level principles of increasing generality. At every level, the principles so
formed are subject to deductive inferences, although Bacon paid less attention to this
process. Bacon's method offered no recipe for making a sure inductive ascent, nor h o w
any particular answer could be obtained uniquely2.
In contrast to Bacon's emphasis on induction are the metascientific writings of his
French contemporary, Rene" Descartes (1596-1650). Descartes (in his writings but not his
practice) begins with propositions which he believes to be certain, thus eliminating any
inductive ascent, and then reasons deductively. This represents an extreme rationalism.
Descartes' point of certainty was his certainty in his o w n existence (Cogito, ergo sum, 'I
think, therefore I am'). H e then argued that he could hold a similarly 'clear and distinct'
notion of G o d and, by analogy, other 'clear and distinct' ideas such as of substance and
space. F r o m such clear and distinct ideas other principles were then derived by deductive
argument.
Isaac Newton did not write expressly or extensively as a metascientist, but his
success as a scientist has caused considerable interest in his methodology. N e w t o n
proposed that scientific activity be a combination of inductive and deductive processes, in
a manner that Oldroyd (1989, pp. 79ff) has interpreted as the almost paradigmatic
example of his 'arch of knowledge'. This is set out in the 31st Query of the Opticks
(1704) as a two-way schema of activities. F r o m observations of and experiments with
compounds, motions and effects, generalisations or principles are formed of ingredients,
forces and causes, by the process of induction. Then from these principles, other
phenomena are explained and the explanations proved3, by the process of deduction. It is
put succincdy as one of the four 'Rules of Reasoning in Phdosophy' in the third edition
of the Principia in 1687:
In experimental phdosophy w e are to look upon propositions inferred by general
induction from phenomena as accurately or very nearly true, notwithstanding
any contrary hypotheses that m a y be imagined, till such time as other
phenomena occur, by which they m a y either be m a d e more accurate, or liable to
exceptions. (Isaac Newton, as quoted by Oldroyd 1989, p. 82).
This notion of the revisability of scientific claims seems to have been lost in m a n y of the
positivistic accounts of science popular in the twentieth century, even in the treatments of
Newtonian science given in school and undergraduate levels of science study. Yet here is
Newton arguing what post-positivist views of knowledge n o w claim!

2
3

The extent to which Bacon believed bis method generated sure knowledge has been the subject of
much metascientific debate. (Oldroyd 1987, pp. 65-6)
W e would now say tested, confirmed or something similar, because recent post positivist
metascience rejects the idea that something can be proven.
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Newton's significance in a western European scientific tradition is judged therefore
not just in terms of his experimental and theoretical activities, but also his contribution to
methodology:
Thus Bacon and Descartes - prophets of a scientific civilisation, rebels against
an ignorant past, and zealous students of nature - proclaimed the twin
epistemological bases of the modern [Western] mind. In their respective
manifestos of empiricism and rationalism, the long-growing significance of the
natural world and the h u m a n reason, initiated by the Greeks and recovered by
the Scholastics, achieved definitive modern expression. U p o n this dual
foundation, philosophy proceeded and science triumphed: It was not accidental
to Newton's accomplishment that he had systematicaUy employed a practical
synthesis of Bacon's inductive empiricism and Descarte's deductive
mathematical rationalism, thereby bringing tofruitionthe scientific method first
forged by Galdeo. (Tarnas 1991, p. 280)
These developments in method and methodology flourished as variants of the twofold pathway of reasoning, in a tradition of argument and speculation d o w n to the
twentieth century. Variants emphasising sensing or perception as the basis for scientific
knowledge, following Bacon, are generally interpreted as the development ofthe tradition
of empiricism, and especiady the logical empiricism and logical positivism that were very
influential in thefirsthalf of the twentieth century. Variants emphasising reason as the
basis for scientific knowledge, fodowing Descartes, are generally interpreted as the
development of the traditions of rationalism, or a priorism or idealism.
Indications of these two themes are given in the empiricism of David Hume (171176) and the idealism of Immanual Kant (1724-1804) although, as w e shad see, there is
some c o m m o n ground even here. Hume's contributions to empiricism are probably best
k n o w n for his emphasis on sense experience as the basis for knowledge, and the
rejection of induction as the basis for certain knowledge:
According to Hume sense impressions are the sole source of knowledge of
matters of fact. ( H u m e included a m o n g 'sense impressions' desires, volitions,
and feelings, as w e d as visual, auditory, tactile, and olfactory data). H e thus
echoed Aristode's dictum that there is nothing in the inteUect which was not first
in the senses. H u m e ' s version (1748) was that 'ad our ideas are nothing but
copies of our impressions, or, in other words, that it is impossible for us to
think of any thing, which w e have not antecedentiy felt, either by our external or
internal senses.' ...
Hume's analysis has been interpreted as reinforcing Baconian inductivism a
tradition that perhaps as m u c h to Hume's epistemological investigations as to the
counsel of Francis Bacon himself. Thus interpreted, H u m e has been held to
claim that science begins with sense impressions and can encompass only those
concepts which are 'constructed' s o m e h o w out of sense data. Such a view is
consistent with [Newton's inductive] Method of Analysis, but not with
Newton's axiomatic method. (Losee 1980, p. 104)
Note that Losee identifies even in H u m e some sort of activity in which knowledge is
constructed from sense data.
Kant, on the other hand, explicitly proposed that the activity of mind is to structure
and not simply receive sense data:
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For in Kant's view, the nature of the h u m a n mind is such that it does not
passively receive sense data. Rather, it actively digests and structures them, and
m a n [sic] therefore knows objective reatity precisely to the extent that reality
conforms to the fundamental structures of the mind. T h e world addressed by
science corresponds to principles in the mind because the only world avadable to
the mind is already organised in accordance with the mind's o w n processes. A U
h u m a n cognition is channeUed through the h u m a n mind's categories. The
necessity and certainty of scientific knowledge derive from the mind, and are
embedded in the mind's perception and understanding of the world. They do not
derive from nature independent of the mind, which in fact can never be k n o w n
in itself. W h a t m a n knows is a world permeated by his knowledge, and
causality and the necessary laws of science are built into the framework of his
cognition. Observations alone do not give m a n certain laws; rather, those laws
reflect the laws of man's mental organisation. In the act of h u m a n cognition, the
mind does not conform to things; rather, things conform to the mind...
Thus m a n does not receive all his knowledge from experience, but his
knowledge in a sense already introduces itself into his experience in the process
of cognition. Although Kant criticised Leibniz and the rationalists for believing
that reason alone widiout sense experience can calculate the universe (for, Kant
argued, knowledge requires acquaintance with particulars), he also criticised
Locke and the empiricists for believing that sense impressions alone, without a
priori concepts of the understanding, could ever lead to knowledge (for
particulars are meaningless without general concepts by which they are
interpreted). (Tarnas 1991, pp. 343-5)
Note that these accounts of H u m e and Kant indicate a more complex position than would
a simple label such as empiricist or rationalist, which in part is Oldroyd's theme in tracing
the subdeties of this complex tradition. Note also the references in each case to other
thinkers, indicating the place of these viewpoints as part of an historical tradition.
In 1830 John Herschel proposed a two-way methodology in his Preliminary
Discourse on Natural Philosophy, namely the distinction mentioned above between the
activities in contexts of discovery and justification:
One of Herschel's important contributions to the phdosophy of science was a
clear distinction between the 'context of discovery' and the 'context of
justification'. H e insisted that the procedure used to formulate a theory is stricdy
irrelevant to the question of its acceptability. A meticulous inductive ascent and a
wild guess are on the same footing if their deductive consequences are
confirmed by observation. (Losee 1980, pp. 115-6)
Herschel's account influenced a number of subsequent scientists and metascientists who
m a d e significant contributions to this scientific tradition, and w e will return to it in the
discussion ofthe contexts of discovery and justification, below.
This theme of a twofold pathway remains evident into the twentieth century, in the

early rise of positivism and variations and reactions to it as the century unfolded. Thu
Ernst Mach (1838-1916) also rejected the need to suppose an external reality, claiming
that scientific knowledge was empirical, relying on the sensations of the observer. The
peak influence of positivism came with the variants known as the RV (Suppe 1979). It
conflated sensationalism, as proposed by Mach, the correspondence of language
propositions with phenomena, as proposed by Bertrand Russell and Ludwig
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Wittgenstein, and the dichotomy between empirical and analytical troths4, as proposed by
Hume:
T h e Vienna Circle aggressively employed H u m e ' s rigid dichotomy between
analytical and empirical truths in the form of a criterion of meaningfulness,
which also served as a principle to demarcate scientific from non-scientific
discourse: the famous verifiabitity principle, initially stated by Schtick as 'the
meaning of a proposition is the method of its verification'. (Bhaskar 1983i, p.
334)
The R V dismissed the context of discovery as a concern of science, a position usuaUy
attributed to Hans Reichenbach (1938). Not aU methodologies of this time placed as great
an emphasis on induction. The view of Albert Einstein (1879-1955), for example, was
that axioms or principles are formed, from which theorems are deducted mathematicaUy
and then tested experimentally. While agreeing that the axioms should correspond to
empirical data, Einstein denied that they could be derived direcdy or logicatiy from it.
Instead, the axioms axe formed

creatively (Oldroyd 1989, pp. 273-5). Karl Popper

(1902-94) proposed a highly influential variant of this group of methodologies, in which,
again, the hypothesis is formed by conjecture, but is then tested experimentally to be
falsified (Oldroyd 1989, p. 301). The absence of induction in these accounts follows
from objections to induction, which is explored below in section 5.4 on the problems of
induction.
5.4 Problems with induction
We have noted that induction as variously interpreted has been an enduring concept
of scientific activity in a western European scientific tradition. Indeed, it remains a
plausible w a y to budd a commonsense view of the world: it seems quite reasonable to
expect that the sun will rise tomorrow, for example. W e have noted also, however, that
H u m e established an objection to induction. This difficulty is n o w part of a more
complex metascientific issue concerning the explanation and justification of induction
(Chalmers 1982), the main features of which are sketched here.
The first set of problems m a y be taken as arising from within the notion of
induction itself. Induction is taken generady as a process of reasoning by which general
statements or propositions are established from a number of particular instances (Cohen
1983, p. 203). A simple view of induction is summarised by the statement,
AllX's observed have the property Y, therefore allX's have the property Y.

4

The general distinction is that analytic statements are true because of the meanings of the words in
it, like All bachelors are unmarried, whereas synthetic statements are true because of the way
things arc in the world. Analytic statements are held by many to describe mathematical knowledge,
and synthetic statements to describe empiricist knowledge, although there are philosophical flaws
in this distinction (Bostock 1983, p. 16).
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Statements of this sort include,
All swans are white.
Acids turn litmus paper red.
A s Chalmers has pointed out, the reasoning that produces this sort of statement is
appealing in several respects:
[I]t gives a formalised account of s o m e of the popularly held impressions
concerning the character of science, its explanatory and predictive power, its
objectivity and its superior reliability compared with other forms of knowledge.
(Chalmers 1982, p. 10)
There are several objections to any claim that induction produces certain
knowledge, however. First, induction is not supported by an appeal to logic: the
premises m a y be true and the conclusion false without logical contradiction. T h e example
of the white swans is well k n o w n : on the basis of a very large number of observations
over a long time that swans are white, Europeans concluded that all swans are white,
only to find black swans in Australia. Secondly, induction is not supported by an appeal
to experience of successful inductions. T h e argument,
The principle of induction has worked successfully on a very large number of
occasions, therefore the principle of induction always works,
is a circular argument: it is an argument by induction. This is the problem of induction,
well k n o w n in philosophy and demonstrated by David H u m e (Chalmers 1982, pp. 13-5).
Thirdly, several paradoxes can be constructed within inductive logic, which indicate
difficulties with constructing hypotheses suitable for inductive evaluation. O n e example is
the paradox

of the ravens, by which H e m p e l showed that t w o logically equivalent

hypotheses based on the same empirical data, such as
All ravens are black
and
All non-black things are non-ravens
seem to lead to a non-black thing such as a white handkerchief confirming that ad ravens
are black! (Cohen 1983, p. 204) 5 . This represents a difficulty in confirming or

5

The ravens paradox arises by invoking three principles (Achinstein 1993). (1) O n Nicod's
Principle, for the hypothesis All ravens are black, instances of blackravensare confirming
evidence and instances of non-blackravensare disconfjuming. (2) O n the Equivalence Principle,
instances of blackravensare confirming evidence for the hypothesis All ravens are black, and they
are also confirming evidence for the logically equivalent hypothesis All non-black things are nonravens. (3) By a principle of deductive logic, the type of inference called modus tollens, the
statement If raven then black leads to the valid statement Tf not black then not raven (Walton
1993, p.214). If the observed non-black things are, for example, a white handkerchief and red
shoes, then by (1) they confirm All non-black things are non-ravens, which by (3) is logically
equivalent to All ravens are black, and therefore by (2) confirm All ravens are blackl The solution
is not agreed.
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supporting hypotheses, for which there is not yet a generaUy agreed answer (Achinstein
1993; Blackburn 1983c).
Another example is the new riddle of induction, proposed by G o o d m a n in 1954:
The classical problem of induction searches for ourrightto project from the
features w e have observed things to possess, when w e expect simtiar things to
exhibit similar features in cases outside our observation. The n e w riddle
concentrates rather on selection of certain features asfitfor projection. It adeges
w e can in principle classify things so that events would exhibit breakdown of
uniformity, instead of exhibiting the continuation of regularity. Thus both
change or uniformity can be s o m e h o w relative to a particular, optional,
conceptual scheme, or psychological or linguistic background. If so, the old
problem of induction becomes yet more intractable, since there could be no fl
priori reason for expecting the world to conform to one scheme of description
rather than another. Goodman's critics have tried to show the concept of a
change or a uniformity is not in this w a y subjective, since w e have no coherent
concept of what it would be to operate the adeged alternative schemes.
(Blackburn 1983b, p. 299)
That is, the classical criticism of induction relates to the conclusion containing more
information than the premises, and G o o d m a n has added the criticism that induction
appears to rely on h o w w e interpret the cosmos (which the present thesis interprets as
relying on a particular belief system).
A broader set of problems concerning induction applies to some other accounts of
methodology as well. Central to most of these is the view, n o w widely supported, that
observations are theory-laden or theory-soaked (Chalmers 1982, ch. 3). Methodologies
that strongly advocate induction, such as the positivist R V , hold that scientific activity
started with observations and that scientific observations were objective and value-free.
Post-positivist accounts, however, arguefirstlythat observations are not simple neural
receptions such as retinal images; they are shown easdy to be subject to interpretation, as
in optical dlusions. Secondly, the formulation of public observation statements from
internal subjective experiences of the observer, as required by the logical positivists,
means using a public language and conceptual scheme that belong to some theory. This
means that theory is prior to observation, the opposite of a strict approach to induction.
Thirdly, says Chalmers, observation and experiment are not unbiased, but are themselves
guided by theoretical assumptions. T h e present thesis interprets the priorroleof theory to
mean that observations are made so that they are consistent with the belief system of the
observer. In a looser sense, observations have been shown to be influenced by a wider
set of factors, including social, personal and other contexts, as discussed in Appendix
B. 1 on context. Fourthly, some alternative accounts do not employ induction at ad. The
best k n o w n of these is probably Popper's methodology, which says that scientists arrive
at hypotheses by conjecture, and then seek to refute or falsify them; it does not require
induction.
There are two other main possible responses to the problem of induction. O n e is to
reject the claim that methodologies are rational. The sceptical approach of H u m e is that if
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induction cannot be logically justified and science is inductive, then science is not
rational. H u m e ' s answer was to argue that what w e interpret as inductive theories are
instead habits of mind foUowing repeated experiences. Alternatively, the anarchical
approach of Feyerabend holds that no methodology proposed has explained scientific
activity, so scientists should not be concerned with methodologies; hence his wed-known
(and contested!) conclusion that 'anything goes.' Another response is to propose
alternative methodologies that do not rely on induction, which is the approach advocated
by Chalmers.
There are s o m e defences of induction. The objections above are not an absolute
refutation of induction (Chalmers 1982, p. 35). Other metascientific accounts also have
their difficulties and debate continues over the nature of scientific activity. S o m e would
argue that the theory-laden-ness of observations is not as significant as claimed by postpositivist metascientists. S o m e inductivist accounts lessen the requirement for the
generalisation to be true, requiring instead that it be probably true given a large enough
sample of observations. Although logical problems remain for probabilistic accounts, at
least s o m e sort of sophisticated induction retains some appeal. Significantly, induction is
nonetheless the means scientists and others use to collect and order empirical data:
But Popper's critics have pointed out that the rational exploitation of scientific
discoveries is impossible without some reliance on a method of grading the
support that evidence gives to theory. (Cohen 1983, p. 204)
A shift in interpretation of processes: inductivism to hypothetico-deductivism
T h e objections to induction account for some of the shifts noted in the two-fold
pathway described by Oldroyd, above. The two-fold reasoning exemplified perhaps by
Francis Bacon and N e w t o n is described in the literature as the methodology inductivism:
Inductivism is a point of view that emphasises the importance to science of
inductive arguments. In its most inclusive form, it is a thesis about both the
context of discovery and the context of justification. With respect to the context
of discovery, the inductivist position is that scientific inquiry is a matter of
inductive generalisation from the results of observations and experiments. With
respect to the context of justification, the inductivist position is that a scientific
law or theory is justified only if the evidence in its favour conforms to inductive
schema. (Losee 1980, p. 148)
Inductivism is one of the two main historical variants, or group of variants, of this
two-fold reasoning. T h e other term is hypothetico-deductivism which seems to have two
interpretations. In its narrower sense it rejects induction: a hypothesis is formed by
conjecture or guessing and followed by deductive reasoning. In its broader sense it
a d o w s the construction of the hypothesis by whatever means, induction or conjecture,
fodowed by deductive processes. The broader use can be seen in Oldroyd (1989), as in
the quotation from Oldroyd (1989, p. 363) above, and in an earlier footnote:
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... the formulation of hypotheses, the working out of the empirical implication
of these, and the testing by experiment and/or observation (Oldroyd 1989, p.
46, n.107)
and in Porter (1988):
Popular in the middle of this century w a s hypothetico-deductivism, the notion
that facts should lead to hypotheses which would guide further investigation
leading to further investigation leading to the testing of hypotheses, and so
forth, in a progressive manner. (Porter 1988, p. 760)
The narrower sense is m o r e specific about the initial or 'upward' pathway to the
hypotheses:
[Hypothetico-deductive method] ... is based on the idea that hypotheses cannot
be derived from observation, but once having been put forward (as a result of an
imaginative leap) m a y be tested against observation. (Richards 1983a, p. 196)
This approach describes the methodologies of Einstein and Popper, mentioned above in
Oldroyd's account. Whichever version is advocated, hypothetico-deductivismfitswithin
the broader tradition identified by Oldroyd as one of a range of attempts to discern some
underlying order in the m a n y observed particulars, and to use this perceived order as the
basis for extending our knowledge by testable predictions.
5.5 The characterisation of key metascientific viewpoints by activity
Reasoning activities and methodologies are part of the characterisation of
metascientific viewpoints. This was foreshadowed in the preceding historical discussion,
in which metascientific viewpoints such as rationalism/a priorism and empiricism were
partly characterised by their differing accounts of scientific activity. Activity as a
dimension of science is useful, therefore, in characterising metascientific viewpoints:
All of the stock appreciations of scientific knowledge - as objective (logical
empiricism), as relative to culture (Kuhn, Feyerabend), as relative to interests
(SSK) - can be translated into particular understandings of scientific practice.
W e can m o v e in the opposite direction too, and it is an interesting challenge to
read n e w understandings of practice back into the problematic of knowledge ...
Likewise w e can read studies of practice back into social theory and
historiography. (Pickering 1992c, p. 7)
Table B.5.1 sets out six metascientific analyses showing h o w different metascientific
approaches in the literature characterise science by activity. Each analysis categorises a
variety of viewpoints identified by the author, and the differences between them give
s o m e indication of the differences between metascientific views, at least as they
characterise science by activity.
The centrality of empirical activity
Before discussing differences of view, w e should note that there is general
recognition that experience is an essential characteristic of science, even though different
accounts focus on various other activities, and interpret empirical activity variously:
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Despite [other differences], few m o d e m philosophers would want to deny the
epistemic value of experience - the central insight of empiricism - or the ideas
that at least s o m e terms in a theory must be partially empirically defined or that
law-like statements are ultimately to be judged by their instances under
experimentaUy produced and controUed conditions. (Bhaskar 1983b, p. 121)
Metascientific characterisations by activity
T h e comparison of metascientific views fodows the format used in each ofthe six
c o m p a n i o n chapters6. Thus w e interpret three main positions in the post-positivist
consensus in H P S : constructivism, post-positivist empiricism and scientific realism, (a)
In constructivism or neo-Kantianism, the characteristic activity is taken as reasoning or
mental

construction. Weltanschauungen

analyses emphasise the need to consider

scientific activity from within its conceptual perspective. In (b) post-positivist
empiricism, the characteristic activity is taken as observation, but with less or modified
emphasis o n induction than positivism advocated. In terms of activity, Suppe (1979) sees
positivism as essentially concerned with induction as the means by which knowledge
claims are justified or confirmed, and the incorporation by reduction of 'older theories
into m o r e comprehensive theories' (Suppe 1979, p. 704). In (c) scientific reatism, the
characteristic activity is taken as description and explanation of an independentiy existing
cosmos. A s noted in earlier chapters, there are several variants of realism (Bhaskar
1983k, p. 363). Although reatism is based on betiefs about Nature rather than activity,
the variants of reatism are distinguished in part by the investigative activities of Nature.
Thus Platonic realism entatis reasoning to ascertain an abstract reality; Aristotelian realism
entails observation to ascertain a materialreality;perceptual realism entatis perception of a
material reality which is independent of perceptions; and scientific realism entails
perceptions and other activities (including social activities) of scientists, concerning the
objects of scientific inquiry.
In S T S , Cation's (1995) review of thefieldsuggests four perspectives. Each model
assumes the laboratory/experimental activities of scientists, but posits additional,
characterising, activities as necessary for understanding scientific development Thus, (a)
where science is characterised as rational knowledge, the characterising activities are the
production and clarification of scientific discourse, that is, 'statements that are the result
of a dialogue between m a n [sic] and nature' (Cadon 1995, p. 35). (b) W h e r e science is
characterised as a competitive enterprise, the characteristic activities are the production

6

It is worthwhileremindingthe reader here that the present thesis urges caution about charicaturing
differences between notional fields such as HPS and STS. For example, w e have noted the general
assent that empirical activity characterises science. Also, many views in STS and post-positivist
H P S accept that, at least to some extent, the individual constructs their personal knowledge, an
insight of constructivism or neo-Kantianism. These are labels for different interpretations or
characterisations of science, and serve to highlight perspectives and emphases.
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and competitive evaluation of scientific knowledge, (c) W h e r e science is characterised as
sociocultural practice, the characterising activities are the production of scientific
knowledge by socio-cultural as well as epistemic activities and norms, (d) W h e r e science
is characterised as extended translation, the characterising activities are the interactions of
humans, technical devices and phenomena.
5.6 The notion of a uniform method of science (the Scientific Method)

No discussion of the characterisation of science by activity would be complete
without mention of scientific method. It is often referred to as the scientific method,
sometimes capitalised, and is usually taken to indicate either explicitly or implicitly the
notion that there is a single, standardised method or algorithmic approach for carrying out
scientific investigations (see Messel 1964 in summary statement 95). T h e companion
chapter on structure, and Appendix B.4, noted the view of the unity of science was once
pervasive and stdl endures, but is n o w widely contested, at least in the metascientific
literature. What is of particular interest in the present thesis is that the notion of scientific
method m a y be a good indicator of a gap between conceptions of science held, on the one
hand, by the general community, school students of science, perhaps undergraduate
students of science, and others, and on the other hand recent conceptions of science held
by the metascientific communities. W e have noted the lack of a single, consensuady-held
metascientific view since the decline of the R V , but if there is something approaching
such a contemporary consensus it is the widespread view that there is not n o w and was
not in history a single, generic method of (investigative) scientific activity. This view is
given in s u m m a r y statement 103 (Holton & Roller 1958) and in m o r e recent
characterisations:
Pasteur w a s a great scientist but what he did boretitderesemblance to the ideal
set out in m o d e m texts of scientific method. It is hard to see h o w he would have
brought about the changes in our ideas of the nature of germs if he had been
constrained by the sterile model of behaviour which counts, for m a n y , as the
model of scientific method. (Collins & Pinch 1993, p. 90)
Yet the concept of the scientific method remains in use, sometimes within
metascientific writings, and certainly elsewhere. O f course use of the notion of scientific
method is a clear example of characterising science by activity, and this alone merits its
attention here. B e y o n d that, though, it serves to illustrate s o m e subtieties of
characterisations, which are mentioned below in no particular order.
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Scientific method and the unity of science
First, the very notion of a single method rests on an assumption about uniformity
of science1. The concept of methodological unity is put succincdy by Schuster, in his
discussion of differences between interpretations ofthe Scientific Revolution:
... the universal assumption that modem science has some simply graspable
defining feature which, turned into an historical category, invites explanation of
the Scientific Revolution through the search for general causes of the
appearance, sudden or otherwise, of that feature. (Schuster 1990, p. 221)
That is, it rests o n an essentialist view of science8. The assumption applies to any
interpretations of this type, including the interpretation of scientific activity in terms of a
single method: it implies an assumption that various activities in different times and in
different contexts can be reduced to a single method. The unity of science, including
methodological unity, is discredited in metascience though less so in other forums, as
discussed in Appendix B.4.
Scientific activity and the RV
Secondly, the emergence and dominance of the positivist R V early in the twentieth
century marked the dominance of a particular, narrowly defined view of methods in
science:

The standard, logical empiricist account of scientific method (particularly
confirmation theory and concept formation) is largely based o n three
distinctions...
1. T h e observational/theoretical term distinction (and the conceptual vacuum
analysis of theories to which it leads).
2.
T h e sharp distinction between context of discovery from context of
justification.
3.
T h e fact/value distinction, to put it crudely; m o r e accurately, the
theory/methodology distinction, which is m a d e to support two doctrines:
a. theory systems are value-neutral,
b. methodology is theory-neutral, that is, independent of theoretical
developments.
A prominent conclusion, or perhaps assumption, of the standard account is the
doctrine of the methodological unity of science, the view that ad sciences worthy
ofthe n a m e employ the same methods, logicaUy speaking, of concept formation
and theory testing and that theories (and explanations and predictions) have the
s a m e structure in ad scientific disciplines. Intimately related to the above
distinctions, the doctrine of unity of method nevertheless deserves special
emphasis... (Nickles 1979, p. 575)
This view allows only a narrow scope of possible activities which would be considered
'scientific', and ascribes certain criteria such as value-neutrality. Such a dominant view
sets the scope and criteria to which other accounts are pressured to meet if they claim to
be 'scientific'. When the dominant view is normative, setting out what science should be,

7
8

See Appendix B.4.
See the discussion on boundary work, in the companion chapter on context and Appendix B.l.

Appendix B.5: Activity

807

as the R V was, it avoids the need to provide a compelling description of actual activity, as
descriptive accounts seek to do. Thus the ongoing influence of the R V , discussed above,
has reinforced this notion of a uniform method in science.
The scientific method and legitimisation in the social sciences
Third is the ongoing recourse to the scientific method by some of the social
sciences and otherfieldsas a means of legitimising or conferring scientific authority (the
authority of the scientific method) upon their o w n endeavours. T o varying extents, this
m a y be interpreted as representing scientism, or the use of the image of science:
[S]cientism is present where people draw on widely shared images and notions
about the scientific community and its beliefs and practices in order to add
weight to arguments which they are advancing, or to practices which they are
promoting, or to values and policies whose adoption they are advocating.
(Cameron & Edge 1979, p. 3)
For example, Codins and Pinch (1993) have given as examples fields among the social
sciences and anti-science groups which, although their motivations m a y be different,
nonetheless show recourse to particular notions of scientific method in making their
respective cases:
... The impact of our redescriptions should be on the scientific method of those
disciplines which ape what they take to be therightw a y of going on in the highprestige natural sciences, and on those individuals and organisations w h o would
destroy fledgling sciences for their failure to live up to a misplaced ideal.
Notoriously, the social sciences suffer from thefirstmalaise - physics envy,
as it is k n o w n - with areas of experimental psychology and quantitative
sociology, all pedantically stated hypotheses, and endless statistical
manipulation of marginal data, being the most clear-cut examples of this kind of
'scientism'.
The second malaise is more worrisome. The favourable public reception of
unusual sciences such as parapsychology ... has givenriseto fears that fringe
sciences are taking over. A n anti-fringe science m o v e m e n t has been spawned
whose members take it on themselves to 'debunk' ad that is not within the
canon, in the name of proper scientific method. W h e r e this effort is aimed at
disabusing the public about unsupported claims, it is admirable, but the zeal of
these self-appointed vigilantes carries over into areas where they have no
business.
Recendy, on British television, the public at large was able to witness a stage
magician informing a prestigious scientist, head of a famous Paris institute, that
his ideas wereridiculous.The motive for this attack w a s not the professor's
methods but the topic he had chosen to research - homoeopathy; the instrument
of the attack was, nevertheless, an idealised version of what scientific method
ought to be. It is no coincidence that those w h o feel most certain of their grip on
scientific method have rarely worked on thefrontiersof science themselves.
(Collins & Pinch 1993, p. 143)
That is, the grounds for attacking the work of the scientist was a simplistic
characterisation of scientific activity, even though the subject of the attack w a s the topic
or cognitive content. This is an attempt to mark a boundary between science and nonscience, and is an example of arguments concerning boundary issues.
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W e could add educational research as a collection of fields that have drawn on the
scientific method also:
... Compared to other sources of knowledge, such as experience, authority,
inductive reasoning, and deductive reasoning, application of the scientific
method is undoubtedly the most efficient and reliable ... Although neither
[inductive nor deductive reasoning] is entirely satisfactory, when used together
as integral components ofthe scientific method, they are very effective ... The
scientific method is a very orderly process which entails a number of sequential
steps ... (Gay 1976, pp. 4-5).
Even in 1976, this characterisation was appealing to a view of science that in metascience
at least was declining and largely abandoned. There is less excuse in later examples,
w h e n the tenor of metascientific debate was not only to have rejected the scientific
method, but to have m o v e d on to n e w issues. For example, Haltiday and Martin (1993)
cited the same passage from Messed (1964) quoted in summary statement 95 as the
authority for discussion of method in school science texts, which undermines their
subsequent analysis of the linguistic features of science (Haltiday & Martin 1993, pp.
183ff). Even science texts are no guarantee of metascientific currency: Kormondy and
Essenfeld gave a step-wiserecipe-likeaccount of 'the scientific method, which is a
logical w a y of solving problems' in their senior secondary school science text Biology,
although they concluded with the unsupported disclaimer that 'scientists do not always
follow the scientific method exacdy, but they are guided by it' (Kormondy & Essenfeld
1984, pp. 96-7).
A weaker version of scientism is the passing or simplistic mention of scientific
method, thereby either inferring or endorsing the notion of a single, generic method. It is
surprising to find this type of mention in books, recent and widely regarded as
authoritative, written to popularise and demystify late-twentieth century science:
The success ofthe scientific enterprise can often blind us to the astonishing fact
that science works. Although most people take it for granted, it is both
incredibly fortunate and incredibly mysterious that w e are able to fathom the
workings of nature by use of the scientific method (Davies 1992, p. 148,
emphasis added; see also Davies in summary statement 120).
Historical references to multiple scientific methods
Fourthly, w e m a y add that there have been m a n y references historicaUy to the
diversity of approaches to scientific investigation; there is and has been no single and
universally endorsed authority of scientific method, despite the authoritative tone of
Francis Bacon's seminal writings on scientific inquiry. This is mentioned in general
histories of science that in otherrespectsare sometimes interpretively dated (Sarton 1936;
Singer 1959). Also, Holton and Roder (1958, pp. 248ff) have cited specific examples:
the identification of the role of chance by Joseph Priestley (1776) and W . I. B. Beveridge
(1951); the plurality of methods and approaches by P. W . Bridgman (1950); of method
as the extension of c o m m o n sense by M a x Planck and others; the appeal at some stage,
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but not always at the same stage, to experiment and observation, such as by Francis
Bacon and Galileo Galilei; and the appeal to creativity and intuition, rather than logic, as
found in Plato, Galileo and Einstein. Holton and Roller interpreted this m i x of
characteristics of method in terms of 'outiook' or 'orientation' or 'attitude' (1958, p.
252), which the present thesis interprets as elements of betief system. O n e might presume
that the rejection of this advice for m u c h of the twentieth century has been due to the
dominance and lingering influence of the positivist R V .
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5.7 Interpretations of some characteristic scientific activities
Another example of the metascientific variation in accounts of scientific activity is
that there are different accounts of any one activity. T h e present section discusses
experiment, observation, explanation and prediction as activities by which science is
c o m m o n l y characterised, but which themselves are characterised variously in the
literature.
5.7a. Experiment
Probably foremost in the public image of scientific activity, and even for many the
defining activity, is the experiment. In standard scientific texts experiment is defined in
terms of controlling the conditions under which observations are limited to particular
phenomena:
A n experiment usually consists in making an event occur under k n o w n
conditions where as m a n y extraneous influences as possible are eliminated and
close observation is possible so that relationships between phenomena can be
revealed. (Beveridge 1953, p. 13)
Typicady the experiment is represented in terms of its role among the other activities of a
research project, such as reviewing the literature, collecting data including field or
laboratory observations, organisation of the data collected and determination of the
problem and specific research questions, making informed guesses, forming and
considering hypotheses, and devising experiments 'to testfirstthe likeliest hypotheses
bearing on the most crucial questions' (Beveridge 1953, p. 12). In some accounts it is
not clear whether or not the term experiment is used to include some of these extra
activities, in the sense of being general investigative activity. In either case, experiment is
presented in these accounts as being relatively unproblematic except for methodological
issues: the chief concerns in experimenting are usually given as selecting and executing
the appropriate scope and sequence of activities.
Experiment is a significant element in characterisations of science in several
respects. First, it is significant historically. The experimental successes beginning from
about the seventeenth century were a marked improvement on Aristotelian methodology,
and an even greater contrast with the scholastics' neglect of Aristotle's emphasis on
observation:
The important point, of course, is that the n e w phdosophy claimed that n e w
knowledge was to be obtained by experimentation, not by analysis of language
or by establishing the correct definition of things. If you wanted to k n o w more
about the properties of gold than anyone had ever k n o w n before you would
need a chemical laboratory, not a dictionary! (Oldroyd 1989, pp. 91-2).
Secondly, the experiment not only remained current in science, but central to it:
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Here w e have again the persistent and striking leitmotif in science, the appeal to
observation and experiment as last authorities. (Holton & Roller 1958, p. 251;
emphasis in original)
Thirdly, the notion of the scientific experiment has passed into the public domain, where
experiment

has a quasi-scientific meaning as any 'test or trial' (The

Macquarie

Dictionary), and remains current among the general public as a characteristic activity of
scientists. Fourthly, it is a concept of continuing interest in metascientific debate, as the
following discussion shows.
Theory and experiment
There has been long-standing metascientific interest in the relationship between
experiment and theory (Bhaskar 1983c), of which Hacking (1983) is critical because of
the historical preference for examining theory. The popular characterisation of scientific
observation as being objective arises particularly from the R V of science, in which
observation is given as unbiased or free of theoretical influence; that is, experiment
precedes theory, where experiment is interpreted generady, as investigative activity. In
post-positivist metascience, there is considerable acceptance that observations are theoryloaded (the term being attributed to Hanson, 1958); that is, theory precedes experiment.
Hacking (1983, pp. 150ff) has given historical examples of two roles envisaged for
experiment, as defined by its relationship to theory. Thus in the essentially inductive view
given by the chemist Sir H u m p h r y Davy (1778-1829), experiment precedes theory: n e w
facts are discovered through experiment and analogies confirmed by it However, in the
essentially deductive view given by the chemist Justus von Liebig (1803-73), experiment
fodows theory: thoughts or theories aretestedby experiment.
Hacking (1983, pp. 152ff.) has cited a variety of historical examples that
demonstrate differentrelationshipsbetween observation, as a component of experiment,
and theory. Thus, for example, experimental results have been recorded, if not
independentiy of, then certainly in advance of explanatory theory, such as the work of E.
L. Malus (1775-1812) on polarisation by reflection, John Herschel (1792-1871) on
fluorescence, and the observation of potien movement in water by Robert B r o w n in
1827. Alternatively, experimental and theoretical work have c o m m e n c e d quite
independently and have been brought together to their mutual benefit, such as the
measurement of (unexplained) background radiation in space by Arno Penxias and R. W .
Wilson in 1965, and the contemporaneous theorising by a group at Princeton that a Big
B a n g origin of the universe should have resulted in measurable background radiation.
A n d theory has preceded experiment in newfieldsof science, such as the development of
the theory of electromagnetism by A. -M. A m p e r e (1775-1836). Codectively these
examples support the view that seeking to determine the order of the two m a y less
productive than pursuing other elements of characterisation.

Appendix B.5: Activity

812

Another difficulty with the notion of theory arising from or being tested by
experiment is that any one theory can be shown to be dependent on multiple auxiliary
theories. Auxiliary theories are used in the design and construction of the apparatus and
the experiment, and in the interpretation of the results and which in turn need explication
(Bhaskar 1983c, p. 138). This follows 'Duhem's doctrine that a theory inconsistent with
an observation can always be saved by modifying an auxiliary hypothesis, typicady an
hypothesis about the working of an instrument' (Hacking 1992, p. 30). For example, the
notion of replicating experiments, for the purposes of increasing accuracy or checking the
validity of claims, is widely held to be essential in science, yet assumptions about the
reproducibility of experimental conditions are problematic. Replication experiments often
differ minutely from the original to 'improve' results or reliability, and in any event it is
difficult to claim that the initial conditions were precisely reproduced. This is most
significant, and evident, when 'the very existence ofthe phenomenon is itself in doubt',
where the design of the experiment and even the apparatus depend on the very theoretical
assumptions being tested. This is notable in biology, psychology and parapsychology but
there are also examples in physics, such as the search for gravitation waves (Collins
1983, p. 372).
Some current issues concerning experiment
The current status of the experiment is the subject of interest from several quarters,
largely concerning the set of assumptions and beliefs underpinning the experiment
(Bhaskar 1983c; Shapere 1984; Knorr Cetina 1995). Thus the expertise, prior betiefs and
prior theories held by experimenters and observers are factors which influence
experiment, a conclusion rarely recognised by experimenters and observers. This has
meant identifying and questioning the betief system (assumptions and betiefs about the
cosmos and appropriate w a y s to gain knowledge of it), purposes, contexts
(psychological, socio-cultural and ontological) and procedures involved in experiments:
A n experiment, unlike an experience, is a designed practical intervention in
Nature: its upshot is a socially contrived set of observations, carried out under
artificially produced and deliberately controUed, reproducible conditions. At the
experiment's core is the notion that the conditions for producing a given effect
can be separated into independentiy variable factors, in such a w a y as to
demonstrate h o w the factors behave in their natural (ie. the non-experimental)
state. The crucial assumption is that the factors studied - and represented in
experimental design as independent and dependent variables - retain their
identities (and dispositional properties) whether or not other conditions are held
constant, as in the laboratory, orfreelyvary, as in extra-experimental reality.
(Bhaskar 1983c, p. 136)
This is a m u c h clearer distinction between the controlled intervention and other kinds of
data gathering or observational activities.
Secondly, there has been a re-evaluation of the role of experiment in science,
especially in the genre of laboratory studies within S T S . The traditional methodological
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account of experiments served to demonstrate validity and rationality of scientific activity
and the knowledge it produced:
[Experiments ... have until recently carried m u c h of the epistemological burden
in explaining the validity of scientific results and rational betief in science. They
provided the frameworks within which 'the scientific method' was deployed and
borefruitThey were the units in terms of which science proceeded empirically
step by step, the rungs in a ladder of theory testing and empirical verification.
Experiments were largely defined methodologicatiy in earlier studies; notions
like the testing of theories, experimental design, blind and double-blind
procedure, control group, factor isolation, and replication are ad linked to
experiments. T h e advantages attributed to experiments include the fact that they
disentangle variables and test each variable by itself, that they compare the
results with those of a control group, that they avoid experimenter bias and
subjective expectations, and that their results can be justified through
replications that 'anyone' can check or perform. With this methodological
definition of experiments in place, the real-time processes of experimentation in
different fields remained largely unexamined (Gooding, Pinch & Schaffer
1989). (Knorr Cetina 1995, pp. 142-3)
T h e shift in the laboratory studies has been to explicate ad the activities in the laboratory,
not just idealised experiments, with the result that these studies claim that scientific
knowledge is 'not only "technically manufactured" [by experiment] in laboratories but
also inextricably symbolically and politicady construed', by activities such as persuasive
techniques in scientific papers, forming alliances and mobilising resources (KnorT Cetina
1995, p. 143).
Thirdly, a feature of some of the laboratory studies in recent decades has been the
identification of factors involved in experimental work, often listed as typologies, that
indicate strongly that the outcomes of experiments can be affected by a range of factors.
Hacking (1992, p.29) has noted the extraordinary amount of empirical knowledge that
has accumulated since the seventeenth century, indicating that scientific knowledge and
practices seem remarkably resilient, 'modified but not refuted, reworked but persistent'.
His explanation is that w h e n the laboratory sciences are practicable, they tend to develop
a stable and self-vindicating structure: theories and equipment evolve together
symbolically, which is 'a contingent fact about people, our scientific organisations, and
nature' (Hacking 1992, p. 56). Nature does not actively cause the symbiosis; it is merely
the agency within which theory and equipment are successfully interdependent O f
course, laboratories are not experiments and experiments are not confined to laboratories.
Hacking (1992, pp. 32ff) has proposed a taxonomy of elements of experiment
from which the self-vindicating character of laboratory sciences arises, which
demonstrates the 'modey of experimental science', its potential for various outcomes
including 'successful' ones, and its 'human agency' - that it is done by people (1992, p.
32). It is this taxonomy in which w e are interested as a characterisation of experiment In
brief, Hacking says that experiments are characterised by three groups of elements: ideas,
things and marks.
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Ideas include both philosophical and pragmatic questions; background knowledge
(including beliefs, addressed in the present paper as part of belief systems); systematic
theory about the subject matter, and local, topical hypotheses that connect systematic
theory to phenomena; and modelling ofthe apparatus, which are the theories or lore about
the design and working ofthe equipment and instruments used.
The group things includes the target - the substance or population being studied,
and its preparation (as in microbiological staining) and modification (as in injecting the
prepared ced with a foreign substance); source of modification, usually the equipment
that interferes with the target; detectors that determine or measure the result of the
modification; tools, a category that overlaps with other categories, but includes the
multifarious and often mundane artefacts used in preparing, modifying, and other
experimental activities, such as microtomes, chemicals and off-the-shelf items; and data
generators, that generate marks and m a y be detectors, such as cameras, computer
scanners, automatic printouts, and people w h o are counting.
Marks includes data, meaning uninterpreted inscriptions, graphs, photographs,
tables or displays; data processing, which includes data assessment (calculation of
probable error and estimation of systematic error), data reduction of large amounts of
numerical data into manageable amounts or forms, data analysis in terms of specified
theories or hypotheses, and image enhancement as in microscopy and astronomy; and
finally interpretation of the data. Data assessment and data reduction are supposed, in
principle, to be theory-neutral applications of statistical methods, but Hacking argues that
often they are not. Data analysis has become more significant in recent decades and, in
introducing 'an echelon of workers or devices between the data and the principal
investigators' has transformed experimental science (Hacking 1992, p. 49).
Hacking's argument presents a strong case for the inter-connectedness of
experiment in science: interconnectedness within experimental elements (such as data
interpretations leading to new data reduction, analysis and assessment), with theory in
self-vindicating stable sciences, and, more significantly here, with other factors. Other
factors include the impact on other theories, foUowing 'Duhem's doctrine that a theory
inconsistent with an observation can always be saved by modifying an auxtiiary
hypothesis, typically an hypothesis about the working of an instrument' (Hacking 1992,
p. 30), and the researchers w h o attend to those. Quite clearly, the outcome of an
experiment can be affected by a change in any one or more of Hacking's elements, as the
genre of laboratory studies shows (Knorr-Cetina 1995).
Similar sorts of typologies for understanding experiment have been proposed,
which although different in approach and detati, identify a range of factors that, if varied,
affect the experimental outcome. Thus Gooding (1992, pp. 67-8) has identified (1) the
'interaction of hand, eye, and mind in the fine structure of observation'; (2) human
agency; (3) unexpected events; and (4) the 'absence of linear, logical structure'. Knorr-
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Cetina (1992) has identified a general approach in laboratory studies that redefines
traditional notions of self, others and things such that ad human and non-human agents of
activity are treated as ontologicaUy equal in order to trace activity thoroughly:
In relevant [laboratory] studies, the laboratory is the locus of mechanisms and
processes which can be taken to account for the success of science.
Characteristically, these mechanisms and processes are nonmethodological and
mundane. They appear to have nothing to do with a special scientific logic of
procedure, with rationality, or with what is generaUy meant by 'validation'. The
hallmark of these mechanisms and processes is that they imply, to use MerleauPonty's terminology, a reconfiguration of the system of 'self-others-things', of
the 'phenomenal field' in which experience is m a d e in science. A s a
consequence of these reconfigurations, die structure of symmetry relationships
which obtains between the social order and the natural order, between actors and
environments, is changed. T o be sure, it is changed only temporarily and within
the walls of the laboratory. But it appears to be changed in ways which yield
epistemic profit for science. (Knorr-Cetina 1992, p. 116, and Knorr-Cetina
1995, pp. 144-5)
Critics of laboratory studies object to the undervaluing or omission of criteria of
rationality in those studies (Bunge 1991; Bunge 1992; Slezak 1994a; Slezak 1994b) 9 .
T h e present thesis interprets this as failing to account for the belief system. Nonetheless,
the argument is compelling that if w e are concerned to explicate actual rather than
idealised activity in science, then the outcomes of experiments are subject to multiple
influences, however interpreted. T h e argument advanced in the present thesis is that a
complete characterisation of science would include criteria of rationality, beliefs, attitudes
and so forth, as elements of the belief system held by the investigators, as w e U as a
broader notion of laboratory activity than just idealised experiments.
5.7b. Observation

More so than for experiment observation is a term which is used non-scientificady
at large: to m e a n the activity of noting, perceiving or watching, but also 'the information
or record secured thereby [or] ... that which is learned by observing' (The

Macquarie

Dictionary). Observation in science is regarded popularly as similar to any observation,
but with particular attention to accuracy; this is developed by specialist training. W h d e a
reasonable characterisation at face value, observation is a good deal more problematic
than this in a n u m b e r of metascientific accounts. W e willrestrictthe scope here to two
issues particularly significant in characterisations using observation.
Observation and theory

9

There is, nonetheless, a healthy discussion between scientists and metascientists, as in an
exchange in the journal Social Studies of Science. See Labinger 1995a; Collins 1995; FuUer
1995; Jasanoff 1995; Hakken 1995; Keith 1995; Lynch 1995; Marks 1995; Pinch 1995; Stockdale
1995; Labinger 1995b
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First there are conflicting views of therelationshipbetween observation and theory
(Suppe 1979; Chalmers 1982; Callon 1995) 10 . O n the one hand experimental activity
produces statements, and on the other theories are expressed in statements:
According to the inductivist account of science, the secure basis on which the
laws and theories that constitute science are built is m a d e up of public
observation statements rather than the private, subjective experiences of
individual observers. Clearly, the observations m a d e by Darwin during his
voyage on the Beagle, for example, would have been inconsequential for
science had they remained Darwin's private experiences. They became relevant
for science only w h e n they were formulated and communicated as observation
statements capable of being utilised and criticised by other scientists. T h e
inductivist account requires the derivation of universal statements from singular
statements by induction. Inductive as w e d as deductive reasoning involves the
relationships between various sets of statements and not relationships between
statements on the one hand and perceptual experiences on the other. (Chalmers
1982, p. 28; emphasis in original)
However, high-level theories do not refer directiy to particular observations; the two
groups of statements use different vocabularies. The observational vocabulary, such as
red, touches, hot, longer than or cell nucleus, is distinct from the theoretical vocabulary,
such as electricfield,temperature, or mass. The former refer to directly observable
entities, and can be verified by direct observations; the latter do not and can not. S o m e
accounts of h o w these two languages are linked propose various kinds of intermediary
translation statements and distinctions between theoretical and observation statements.
O n e view is that theoretical statements are derived from observational statements, as in
positivism and logical empiricism. This is the basis for a criterion of validity, in
inductionist theory, or a criterion for demarcation between meaningful and meaningless
statements. Thus the R V entails 'objective' or theory-free observation in science. A
second view is that 'observational statements are shaped by theoretical considerations
without which they have no meaning' (Callon 1995, p. 32), by which account
observations are 'theory-laden'. A third view denies in thefirstinstance the implicit
hierarchy between observational and theoretical statements in thefirsttwo views, by
assuming that the different types of statements are more or less independent and simply
testing predictions from theory or judging the explanatory successes of competing
theories (Callon 1995, pp. 31-2).
For example, in the positivist R V , observations are taken to be (1) simple, direct
perceptual experiences with the aid of no or very simple instruments, and (2) objective in
the sense of being uninfluenced or free of theory. The R V regards the notion of being
directiy observable as 'nonproblematic and generally understood' (Suppe 1979, p. 46),
in which those looking at the same objects 'see the same things' (Suppe 1979, p. 153).
They see the scone things because these direct observations are expressed in a shared
language which is theory-neutral.
10 This is also discussed in section 5.7a, above, and in Appendix B.4.
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Critiques of this account of observation form part of the rebuttals of the R V , as
mentioned already. For example, the fact of optical illusions conflicts with the notion that
two observers looking at the same object and using the same observation language see the
same thing, as discussed in almost any undergraduate text dealing with h u m a n
perception. Neural or retinal activity is not the same as observing. Also, the observationtheory distinction is at least 'untenable' (Suppe 1979, p. 153) if notrefuted.Drawing on
arguments by Achinstein and Putnam, Suppe (1979, pp. 80ff) concluded that the
observation-theory distinction (1) fails to provide an empiricist methodology as sought by
the R V ; (2) has not been drawn successfutiy, nor can it be done plausibly in ordinary use
of natural scientific languages; (3) would not be significant philosophically or revealing
epistemically; (4) does not characterise ('capture what is distinctive' of) either the
language of theories or observation reports. Further, the account of observation in the R V
as being 'unproblematic' is inadequate, both because it fads to support the observationtheory distinction, and because it is less plausible than more detaded characterisations of
observation. For example:
Achinstein (1968) maintains, correcdy I think, that in the relevant scientific
sense observation involves attending to something in a w a y which (1) is
influenced by m y concerns and knowledge [by which I decide which aspects of
the object and h o w m a n y to attend to], (2) does notrequirerecognising what is
observed [because I m a y need only to attend to certain aspects of the object not
die whole], (3) allows one to observe what is hidden from view [in the sense
that a ranger observes a fire by seeing smoke], (4) m a y involve seeing an
intermediary image [in the sense of seeing myself in the minor], and (5) aUows
what I a m observing to be described correcdy in different ways [in the sense of
describing what I observe in the sky as a speck or an airplane]. (Suppe, 1979,
pp. 196-7)
Thus observation is not clearly separated from terms belonging to the paradigm or the
world view (Weltanschauungen)11. Finady, a significant component of arguments for the
theory-dependence of observation derives from the view that our language resources
influence or determine our observing and our theorising. This issue is discussed in more
detati below.
Observation and language
T h e second and perhaps more fundamental issue concerning observation is the
view that language plays a fundamental role in observation. The general matter of
language and science is addressed in the companion chapters on belief system and
structure12, covering viewpoints ranging from simply the formal constructs of scientific
language to the notion that language forms our knowledge of Nature. T h e debate
concerning the latter viewpoint matter is of interest here. The later work of Ludwig
Wittgenstein (1889-1951), particularly as adopted by Norwood Russed Hanson (192411 See chapter 6 and Appendix B. 1 on context
12
For extended discussion, see Appendices B.2 and B.4.
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1967), emphasised the role of language in determining perceptions (the 'conceptsinfluence-percepts' thesis):
Citing Wittgenstein extensively, Hanson produced a wealth of argument psychological, historical and philosophical - to convince readers that w e never
just 'see' the world, passively absorbing impressions and then interpreting
them, as the positivist sense-data theorist might lead one to believe.
Observation, Hanson argued, is always an active process that is shaped by
one's theoretical expectations, cultural assumptions, and linguistic background
and attributes (Oldroyd 1989, p. 230).
This is consistent with several current metascientific viewpoints, such as constructivism
or constructionism and Bhaskar's scientific realism (see Table B.5.1), and critiques of
induction, as given above.
In traditional accounts, including the RV, language is viewed in science as a tool,
and its relationship to observation as the means of inscribing and manipulating marks.

Alternative views, however, are that the language resources available are constituents o
observing and theorising, on some accounts by shaping or influencing and on others by
actuady determining.
Haltiday (1990, pp. 10-11) has proposed a similar typology of three broad views.
In thefirstview, the overad structure and content of the semantic system of the language
is essentially unchanged; n e w objects, institutions and abstractions are constantly being
created and being named, 'but naming n e w things (in this view) does not by itself perturb
the semantic environment - hence if new grammatical forms arise in the course of
technical development, they have been borrowed' (Haltiday 1990, p. 10).
In the second view, language is continuady evolving in response to changing
material and non-material conditions in a culture:
The language thus optimises itself in relation to its environment; new forms wtil
arise when called for - they do not need to be borrowed ...[T]his view would
hold that language reflects reatity through the intermediary of h u m a n cultures;
hence in the long m n the grammar changes in response to the patterns of cultural
change, even if the process is a very gradual and indirect one. (Haltiday 1990,

p. H)
The third view is that our language actively constitutes our perceptions of reality:
In this view language does not passively reflect reality; language actively creates
reality. It is the grammar - but n o w in die sense of lexicogrammar, the grammar
plus vocabulary, with no real distinction between the two - that shapes
experience and transforms our perceptions into meanings. The categories and
concepts of our material existence are not 'given' to us prior to their expression
in language. Rather, they are construed by language, at the intersection of the
material with the symbolic. Grammar, in the sense of the syntax and vocabulary
of a natural language, is thus a theory of human experience. It is also a principle
of social action. In both these functions, or metafunctions, grammar creates the
potential within which w e act and enact our cultural being. This potential is at
once both enabling and constraining: that is, grammar makes meaning possible
and also sets limits on what can be meant. (Haltiday 1990, p. 11)
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This view, which Haltiday endorses, draws on examples from various cultures
demonstrating a match between their particular conceptual frameworks and associated
linguistic features: 'this cultural reality is actively constructed by regular and systematic
features of the grammar of the languages concerned' (Haltiday 1990, p. 18).
Three criticisms of Haltiday's view will serve totilustratethe conflict between
characterisations here. First, w h d e the bulk of Haltiday's argument is a very plausible
account for linguistic construction of social realities, such as the public discourses
concerning podution or resource usage, comparatively little attention is given to the more
contentious question of an ontological reality. It does not seem as strong an argument for
constructionism as for social and personal realities:
Language is not a superstructure on a base; it is a product of the conscious and
the material impacting each on the other ... Hence language has the power to
shape our consciousness ... [S]ince language evolves out of the impact between
the material and the conscious m o d e s of being, it follows that as material
conditions change the forms given by language to consciousness also change.
(Haltiday 1990, p. 11)
This seems to a U o w for an ontology of an external, material reality, while arguing for our
understanding of it being shaped by our language; to this extent it seems consistent with
Bhaskar's realism, for example.
Secondly, Haltiday's discussion of the linguistic forms that developed during the
Scientific Revolution is not always clear as to whether the linguistic forms developed
before, during or after n e w scientific developments. From some sort of Kantian idealism
one could argue that the linguistic structures must precede the concepts, but from a nonidealist viewpoint it must surely be the case that the linguistic structures develop after, or
at best alongside, n e w scientific developments (Wilson 1994).
Thirdly, Halliday does not explain the actual role of language in this
ontological/epistemological 'impact'.
This complex characterisation of science from a linguistic viewpoint is m a d e
nevertheless in terms of activities:from,essentiaUy, reporting in Haltiday's first account,
to representing and reporting in the second, to constructing, representing and reporting in
the third. O n the constructionist view, as proposed by Halliday, the activity of
constructing reality is based on the avadable linguistic structures somehow 'impacting' on
the material world. O n Wdson's critique, however, these constructions of reality occur
before the linguistic structures themselves have been constructed. M a n y sophisticated
post-positivist accounts reconcile these viewpoints; in Bhaskar's scientific realism, for
example, their is an external reality with characteristic structures, but our knowledge of it
is constrained by being personally and socially constructed. Both of these accounts posit
observation as a complex interaction of several activities intervening on the simple activity
of sense perception.
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5.7c. Explanation

A third type of activity often featured in characterisations of science is explanation.
A s with experiment and observation, explanation is used widely in non-scientific
contexts:
Explanation:
to make plain or clean render intelligible (The Macquarie Dictionary)
and in more specialised contexts:
The process or account by which something is m a d e intedigible, where the
account is called the explanans, and the thing, which m a y be a statement, event,
state, process, law, theory, etc. is caUed the explanandum. (Bhaskar 1983d, p.
140).
In essence, this activity concerns the communication of meaning, and w h d e both public
and technical understandings of the term recognise the role of explaining in producing
knowledge, scientific explanation is restricted by what this meaning can refer to. Again, it
is subject to metascientific debate: what it means to explain depends on which theory of
explanation one uses, but as elsewhere the main current positions are realist empiricist
and contextualist or relativist (Bhaskar 1983d; Sloman 1988; Bakker & Clark 1989;
Gasper 1991; Salmon 1993). The public perception of, and response to, scientific
explanation is significant in considering the role of science and scientists in general
society, and points to a need to clarify these differences in interpretation of explanation.
A traditional account of explanation typicaUy foUows a progression from Aristotle's
four causes, to Hume's critique of causation, the positivist response to H u m e ' s
scepticism, Hempel's covering-law model, and to relativistic or contextualistic accounts
as in Scriven, the later Wittgenstein, feminist critiques, and others (Bakker & Clark
1989). Thus Aristode claimed that w e have understanding of the different kinds of things
w h e n w e can answer four types of questions of the type through what? or often why?
The answer to each can be thought of as because, hence they are k n o w n as Aristode's
four causes (Tiles & Tiles 1993, p. 96). That is, in the Aristotelian scheme, to explain X
is to answer one or more of these questions concerning X . However, because Aristotle
valued the causes that referred to ends (tele,finalcauses) as the most important, being
concerned with what is a 'good' outcome for X , this led to what w a s m u c h later
interpreted as a conflation of science and theology:
For phdosophers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, debate about what
is ... good would inevitably lead to debates into which theology had to enter.
(Tties & Tiles 1993, pp. 97-8)
H u m e , however, was sceptical of power or agency, and dismissed the notion of
cause as merely our being accustomed to regularities in sequences of sense impressions,
that is, as habits of mind (Tiles & Tiles 1993, p. 112). The response of positivists such
as M a c h was torejectexplanation as scientific and aUow only description and prediction.
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This addressed Hume's scepticism of causality and excluded metaphysical, theological or
anthropomorphic explanations from science. A s part ofthe R V the rejection of scientific
explanation was widely held for particularly thefirsthalf of the twentieth century.
The covering-law model of explanation
However, from the 1930s and especiaUy in the 1960s and 1970s, the R V rejection
of scientific explanation shifted to allow that a scientific explanation of a phenomenon is
possible by showing h o w the phenomenon is subsumed or covered by a law of Nature
(Salmon 1993, pp. 130-1). This is the deductive-nomological (D-N), covering-law or
Popper-Hempel theory of explanation. It is deductivist, because a statement or conclusion
is logicaUy deduced from a set of initial conditions and a set of laws, generalisations or
regularities:
Copper conducts electricity because {initial condition) copper is a metal and
{covering law) metals conduct electricity.
Its deductive argument means that the explanandum has to fotiow from the explanans;
this certainty is posited as a strength of the D - N model. Sometimes reference to a
covering-law is implied only:
Copper conducts electricity because {initial condition) copper is a metal
in which case it m a y be caded a causal explanation.
There are problems with deductivist explanations. For example, like any logical
deduction, the conclusion does not contain any more information than is given in the
premises, and so this type of explanation is technically only a redescription. Secondly,
any number of initial conditions can be made to entati an explanans, and so there is a need
for some requirement of truth or confirmation of the explanans. Thirdly, either the
deducibtiity or covering-lawrequirementscan be largely satisfied without the other.
In some variants of the R V , the explanation is also an argument from a
generalisation but is subsumed under statistical laws, where the argument is inductive.
Given the explanans, the explanandum is inductively probable or expected rather than
true or necessary. This is the inductive-statistical (I-S), inductive-probabilistic (I-P),
statistical or probabilistic explanation. Probabilistic explanations are c o m m o n in
psychology and the social sciences. H e m p e l proposed two criteria for judging the
adequacy of an explanation: that the explanation is (a) judged as relevant (meaning the
explanation is implied in D - N examples or highly probably in I-S examples), and is (b)
testable (van Fraassen 1991, p. 318).
The contextualist model of explanation
A n alternative to D - N and I-S accounts is the contextualist explanation, a social
exchange which has a simtiar structure to the D - N model but with broader parameters
such as semantics (familiarity, plausibility and coherence) and pragmatics (relevance).

Appendix B.5: Activity

822

T h u s an explanation occurs w h e n one's puzzlement is resolved, and m a y require
reference to matters already known. For example, van Fraassen (1991) has emphasised
the pragmatic nature of explanation:
Scientific inference is inference to the best explanation. That does not rule at ad
for the supremacy of explanation a m o n g the virtues of theories. For w e evaluate
h o w good an explanation is given by h o w good a theory is used to give it, h o w
close it fits to the empirical facts, h o w internally simple and coherent the
explanation. There is a further evaluation in terms of a prior judgement of which
kinds of factors are explanatorily relevant. If this further evaluation took
precedence, overriding other considerations, explanation would be the peculiar
virtue sought above all. But this is not so: instead, science schools our
imagination so as to revise just those prior judgements of what satisfies and
eliminates wonder, (van Fraassen 1991, p. 326)
Gutting (1984, p. 97) has set out two schemas for explanation, which appeal respectively
to the reasoning process and the circumstance:
[T]here are two different ways of explaining betiefs. The first, which I'll cad
T y p e I explanation, makes essential reference to the reasoning processes that
giveriseto a betief... Type I explanations have the foUowing form:
(i) S believes p'.
(ii) S reasons in manner R and believes the results of his [sic]
reasoning.
(id) Given p \ reasoning in manner R results in p.
(iv) Therefore, S believes p.
But, of course, there's another w a y of explaining betiefs: T y p e II explanations,
which refer only to circumstances that do not involve reasoning processes.
These have the general form:
(i) A n y o n e in circumstance C believes p.
(ti) S is in circumstance C.
(iii) Therefore, S believes p.
(C, of course, is a circumstance that does not involve S's employing any
reasoning processes). (Gutting 1984, p. 97)
B y m e a n s of a hypothetical exchange between a sociologist advocating the strong
program 1 3 and philosopher opposing it, Gutting set out opposing concerns about the
strong program's appeals to Type I and II explanations. Thus the phdosopher identifies
Type I explanations with the betiefs held by scientists and Type II with the strong
program. T h e sociologist replies that the strong program in principle accommodates both,
although sociologists have an interest in Type II explanations 'maybe because its those
that undermine the philosophers' paradigm of rationality' (Gutting 1984, p. 98). T h u s to
return to the copper example, a contextualist explanation could take the form:

13

Bloor (1976) has argued that all science is explained by a combination of epistemic and social
factors, as in contextualist models of explanation. Given this, he is critical of the tendency to
explain science and scientific successes by one set of criteria, such as rationality, and non-science
and scientific failures by other criteria such as sociological and psychological factors. H e argues in
the 'strong program' that explanations of science should be the same as explanations in science in
that they are symmetrical: there should be the same type of explanation for true or false beliefs.
(See the discussion of externalism and internalism in the companion chapter on context).
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Copper conducts electricity because it satisfies accepted behaviours of metals
subjected to a potential difference.
For Bhaskar (1983d), this model has difficulties demonstrating the necessary or
sufficient conditions in historical examples; it m a y also lead to confusion instead of
clarification.
Realist models of explanation
The third main alternative, m o d e m realist explanations, seeks to include the insights
of both deductivism - as a causal account - and contextuatism - as a 'socially produced
(and fadible)' account of phenomena (Bhaskar 1983d, p. 141). For scientific realists,
explanations are approximately true to the extent of their empirical support, rather than
empirically adequate as empiricists typically maintain (Boyd 1991, p. 372). In this
account there are two kinds of explanation. Theoretical explanations describe the law-like
behaviour, formulate possible explanations by retroduction, and empiricaUy identify the
responsible causal mechanism:
Electric current flows when electrons flow through a conductor. Electric current
as measured by an ammeter flows through copper w h e n a potential difference is
applied. Copper is an electric conductor.
Practical (applied) explanations resolve a complex event or situation into its components,
redescribe the components theoretically, formulate possible antecedents to the
components by retroduction, and eliminate possible alternative causes.
This provides a contrast with non-scientific explanations used by the general public:
From this perspective, scientific explanations differ from lay explanations not so
m u c h in their form, as in their conceptual content circumstances of production
and (empirical, logical and contextual) controls. (Bhaskar 1983d, p. 142)
The more sophisticated characterisation of a realist account of explanation such as this
informs discussion about differences between 'scientific' and 'lay' uses ofthe term.
Teleological explanations
FinaUy, as mentioned in Appendix B.2, one ofthe differences between Aristotelian
and Classical sciences is the general rejection of final causes, that is, teleological
explanations. Teleological explanations can include explanations of either function or
purpose, since these two are often indistinguishable. Explanation in terms of purpose 'are
c o m m o n in everyday life and law courts, but also in some of the social sciences and
psychology' (Sloman 1988, p. 300) and embryology. Apart from this, teleological
explanations are generally not used in science, either because mental functions are not
regarded as scientific, or because an explanation of an event by a tendency to that effect is
not regarded as an explanation.
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5.7d. Prediction
The fourth activity to be mentioned here is prediction, again a term used by both
scientific and lay communities, to m e a n 'to foretell the future' (The Macquarie
Dictionary). The notion of prediction in science is central to a number of metascientific
claims of reliable knowledge (on which predictions can be based), and the utility of
science (arising largely from its predictive ability):
Needless to say, the most impressive w a y of validating a scientific theory is to
confirm its predictions ... (T)he persuasive power of a successful prediction
arises from the fact that it could not have been deliberately contrived. (Ziman
1978, p. 31)
Ziman goes on to point out that this impressiveness is not logical, in that it does not
matter logicaUy whether a novel observation is m a d e before or after a theory is
formulated. It is, however, very persuasive psychologicaUy.
A s with other scientific activities, there are different accounts of prediction in the
metascientific literature. Bhaskar (1983j) has identified four classical conceptions ofthe
role of prediction within H P S but rejects these in favour of a fifth. Thus the positivist
view is that prediction serves for the control of Nature. The instrumentalist view is that
prediction and summary of phenomena arise from laws and theories, but understanding
does not. T h e deductivist view is that prediction and explanation are symmetrical, and
that explanation can become prediction. The inductivist and falsificationist view is that
prediction is the test of a theory. Bhaskar holds that each of these views is untenable
because it requires a closed system, which is 'not generady avadable'. That is, prediction
can never be certain because w e cannot in advance account for ad variables in real
systems. Instead, he posits a realist view:
Thus, laws and theories do not license deductively justified predictions in open
systems, but rather enable the analysis and retrodiction of phenomena; and the
chief aim of theoretical science becomes once more understanding rather than
controding Nature. (Bhaskar 1983j, pp. 336-7)
Gadon's (1995) overview of S T S accounts of scientific development incorporate
prediction into various schemas: making verifiable predictions is central in some views of
science-as-rational-knowledge; and prediction, manipulation and control are emphasised
where science is characterised as sociocultural practice.
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5.8 Mathematical activity in science
A significant aspect of scientific activity is mathematical, as both the direct and
indirect representation of Nature by mathematical processes. W e will mention four
indicators of this here: (a) the historical interplay of mathematics and science; the
mathematics of (b) algebra and (c) infinitesimals as powerful tools of analysis and
description; and (d) the marked developments of mathematics in twentieth century
science, especiaUy in physics.
5.8a The historical use of mathematical processes in science
Mathematical processes have been used in science from antiquity, notably by Plato,
the Pythagoreans, Archimedes, Euclid and Ptolemy. T h e role of mathematics in science
shifted particularly in the Scientific Revolution, as indicated in summary statement 7 2
(Needham 1969). Schuster has characterised the Scientific Revolution by conceptual
breakthroughs, two of which rest on developments in mathematics:
... Gatileo and Newton laid the foundations for classical mathematical physics
... and Descartes, Pierre Fermat, Newton and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz created
the first m o d e mfieldsof mathematics, coordinate geometry and differential and
integral calculus (Schuster 1990, p. 217).
Further, mathematics became part of the conceptual and methodological resources in the
emerging interest in h o w the n e w science actually worked, that is, in seeking more
reliable and precise methods for interrogating the cosmos. Therevivalof interest in Greek
geometrical analysis was associated with the 'broader and very fluid contemporary
interest in "method" as a tool of discovery, proof and teaching, on the part of humanists
and Aristotelians alike' (Schuster 1990, p. 233).
The precision of mathematical techniques also lent itself to characterisations of a
difference between mediaeval scholastic science and the classical science that emerged in
the Scientific Revolution, notably as a change from qualitative to quantitative approaches:
It is a current conception that one of the most characteristic differences between
scholastic and more recent physics is that the former was of an exclusively
qualitative nature, whereas in the latter the quantitative point of view
predominates. This characterisation is undoubtedly correct when it is intended to
convey that in peripatetic science the concept of quality took a m u c h more
important place than in classical science, in which every effort is m a d e to reduce
qualitative to quantitative differences; it would, however, be less correct, at aU
events with respect to the fourteenth century, if it implied that in Scholasticism
there w a s no tendency to treat qualities quantitatively, while fully preserving
their independent meaning. (Dijksterhuis 1986, p. 188)
The significant mathematical development at this time is attributed usually to Gatileo
Galilei. Galileo revived the experimental basis of Aristode, but proposed a different
cosmology to Aristode's, which (as with Plato's) could berepresentedmathematicaUy:
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In Aristotle's physics, motion was regarded as a quality: a body would be
moving or stationary according to whether it possessed the quality of motion.
But it was not possible to treat such an Aristotelian property satisfactorily in
terms of numbers, and hence examine the phenomena of motion in more than a
general manner. B y contrast, Gatileo's falling bodies were, so to speak,
'mathematical' entities, moving in 'mathematical' space. All their attributes
(such as colour, smell, weight, etc) were disregarded (for the purpose of the
experiment on falling bodies), and attention was focussed solely on position and
time. S o in a sense Gatileo was no longer dealing with real bodies moving in
real space, but with 'mathematicalfictions'.(Oldroyd 1989, p. 58)
However, Gatileo refrained from representing the cosmos in terms of mathematical
models without recourse to experiment, as a strict neo-Platonist would be content to d
John Hedbron (1983b) has made such a distinction between Galileo and his Mediaeval
predecessors in terms of these beliefs:

But these anticipators [such as Nicole Oresme (c 1320-1382) and Domingo de
Soto (c 1494-1560)] do not appear to have shared Galileo's approach: they
investigated laws of motion as mathematical possibilities, he as testable
descriptions of Nature. (Heilbron 1983b, p. 229)
The interplay between mathematics and science was strengthened by Rene
Descartes, whose Cartesian system justified a mathematical approach that is identified

down to the present day (Singer 1959; Dijksterhuis 1986). In idealist or constructivist
interpretations such as Descartes and Kant the products of mathematics and science res
from mental activity:

.. .Kepler and Galileo were deeply convinced that... the structure of the world
was essentiaUy mathematical in character and a natural harmony existed between
the universe and the mathematical thought ofthe human mind.
N o w the standpoint taken by Descartes cannot be better described than by
saying that by carrying this conception to its extreme he virtually identified
mathematics and natural science. Natural science is mathematical in character not
only in the wider sense that mathematics ministers to it... but also in the m u c h
stricter sense that the human mind produces the knowledge of nature by its o w n
efforts in the same way as it does mathematics. (Dijksterhuis 1986, p. 404)
The most comprehensive and successful expression of this interplay between
mathematics and science of that time is usually taken as the work of Isaac Newton. From
Newton's work, mathematics, including the mathematics of infinitesimals, became a
widely used tool for analysing physical change:
Newton (1642-1727) mathematised force, analysing the gravitational attraction
between gross bodies into contributions from their infinitesimal elements
(Principia, 1687)...
T h e subjects mathematised during or before the 17th century - astronomy,
geometrical optics, hydrostatics (hydrodynamics), and mechanics - were not
considered 'physics' by contemporaries. They were practical subjects,
belonging to applied mathematics. In the 18th century the calculus was applied
to these subjects, which were gready expanded, and also to branches of optics.
Electricity, magnetism, heat and physical optics belonged during the 18th
century to experimental physics, an empirical, non-mathematical discipline
before about 1770. T w o factors contributed to the mathematisation of
experimental physics. Improvements in scientific instruments permitted exact
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measurement of physical quantities. From these algebraic laws were derivable,
but neither measurements nor empirical laws can be called mathematical physics.
Exact measurements, however, encouraged the establishment of theories to
account for them. B y this time physicists were lessreluctantto ascribe distant
forces to imponderable fluids. (Feldman 1983, pp. 250-1)
Thus the history of science is characterised partly by the development and use of
mathematical activities, allowing greater precision, the measurement of phenomena
previously not subject to manipulation, and ultimately to shifts in scientific theorising,
concepts and knowledge because of mathematical activity. T w o particular examples algebra and calculus - and the accelerating use of mathematics in twentieth century science
are taken up further, below.
5.8b Algebra
A particular example of mathematical activity in science is the use of algebra,
interpreted here as the mathematical manipulation of symbols. Dijksterhuis (1986, p.
188) has noted that the term algebra 'in the sense of a system of letters symbolising all
existing magnitudes, no matter whether they are constants or variables, k n o w n or
unknown quantities' was not used until the seventeenth century. Prior to about 1800,
algebra was taken to concern numbers and number systems, such as the solution of
numerical or algebraic equations. S o m e historical indicators include Aristode's use of
letters torepresentvariable magnitudes, and the adoption in western Europe from c.1500
of standard algebraic symbolism and techniques, from the Arabic number system which
in turn had been adopted from the Indian or Hindu number system (Dijksterhuis 1986,
pp. 109-115). In the fourteenth century, a branch of Scholasticism caUed Calculations
(the 'Calculators'), used symbols as a means of language shorthand, then to denote
magnitudes of concepts such as motion, and even to concepts such as sin and grace
which are not regarded n o w as being appropriate for quantification. In the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries particularly, algebra flourished:
However, the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were to witness a
transformation of algebra and the flowering of algebraic analysis. Pierre de
Fermat (1601-65) and Rene Descartes (1596-1650) independentiy showed h o w
the algebraic notation of Francois Viete (1540-1603) could be applied to die
solution of geometrical problems. Their n e w analytical geometry was able to
generalise and extend the results of ancient Greek geometers ... (Kitcher 1990,
p. 679)
Developments in the nineteenth century included theories of groups,fields,higher order
equations and vectors. In the twentieth century algebraic structures have tended to be
regarded 'from an abstract and axiomatic point of view ... as a study of abstract
structures such as groups, rings, fields, lattices, and vector spaces' (Johnson 1983, p.
11).
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5.8c Mathematics of variability
The other mathematical activity to be considered here is the mathematics of
variability, in the general sense of techniques for representing continuous change. In
antiquity, Eudoxus (c400-347BC) proposed a method of exhaustion, which was
subsequently developed by Archimedes (c287-212BC) to determine the areas of
curvilinearfigures(Dauben 1983, p. 14), but the mature development ofthe mathematics
of variability w a s the period leading into and including the Scientific Revolution.
The ability to represent variabdity is fundamental to conceptualising motion, among
other things, and the first significant development in this respect was the graphical
representation introduced by Nicole Oresme (c 1320-82). In mechanics, for example, it
far easier to grasp intuitively the slope of a tangent of the curve, when distance s is
graphed against time t, than the limit of the quotient dsldt as the numerator and
denominator approach zero. Since both of these represent instantaneous velocity, it is
clear, then, that the development of graphical representation greatly assisted thinking in
thisfieldbefore the notion of a derivative matured. This contributed to the reassessment
of ontological beliefs, particularly the long-held belief in the perfection of circles and
spheres, and that the cosmos is so constructed as to exhibit invariant spherical and
circular forms:
The graphical representation thus created the possihtiity of illustrating the
concept of instantaneous velocity geometrically and of gaining, on the strength
of this, an insight into kinematic phenomena that was as yet unattainable by
analytical methods. This was of great importance especially at a time when
algebraic symbolism, which was indispensable to the evolution ofthe calculus,
was sttil in its infancy.
T h e gradual introduction of what m a y be caded the mathematics of variability
in the period beginning with Oresme and ending provisionady with Newton and
Leibniz implied the pursuit of a direction leading away inevitably from the
sphere of ancient mathematics. It was afirstsymptom, showing that the
guidance of antiquity, which had hitherto shielded mathematical thought from
m a n y dangers, was being gradually abandoned. T o therigorousmathematics of
the ancients, which was b o m of the spirit of Platonic philosophy and in which
true reality w a s characterised by invariability, any scientific treatment of
variability as such had been inconceivable. Once it had assimtiated the
mathematical knowledge of Antiquity, one of the great tasks before the
Renaissance mind was to break the barriers it had erected against the growth of
mathematics, and thus not only to raise this branch of science itself to an
unthought-of height but also to m a k e it subservient to natural science.
(Dijksterhuis 1986, p. 263)
These developments served to prepare an even more significant mathematical
development, the calculus of Newton and Leibniz. The calculus illustrates a recurrent
issue for interpretation in papers such as the present thesis, which is the role of individual
characteristics in the whole. There is no doubt that the calculus, as a set of mathematical
procedures, is a most useful mathematical tool for description and analysis. But there is
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also a sense in which the calculus is more than just a tool to help 'do' science and actuaUy
is constitutive of the science itself:
... Building on the work of Descartes, Fermat and other mathematicians, Isaac
N e w t o n (1642-1727) and Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716) independentiy
formulated the principles of the differential and integral calculus. Using the new
calculus, Newton and Leibniz computed the values of the areas under m a n y
curves, found the length of arcs, identified radii of curvature, constructed
tangents and normals and solved problems about the motions of ideal particles.
T h e Marquis Guillaume de l'Hopital (1661-1701), the author of the first
textbook on the Leibnizian calculus, claimed that the n e w methods enabled
mathematics to solve problems which 'nobody previously had dared to attempt'
(Kitcher 1990, p. 679)
Thus while electricity, magnetism, heat and physical optics were studied in an empirical
and non-mathematical w a y prior to about 1770, use of the calculus enabled accurate
descriptions of physical variability. F r o m its use were developed quantitative laws
describing fluids, electricity and magnetism by about 1 8 0 0 and optics and
electromagnetism in the early 1800s (Feldman 1983, p. 251). Kitcher's remarks clearly
characterise science partly by the method of calculus, although they are ambiguous
concerning the interpretive question of whether he considered the calculus w a s a tool in
this development or an integral part ofthe development itself. Redner (1987), however,
has argued explicidy that in the twentieth century, mathematical processes fundamentally
characterise scientific activity, as w e shall see in section 5.8d, below.
5.8d Mathematics in twentieth century physics
In the twentieth century, mathematics has had a remarkably influential role in
science, especially physics. That is, although mathematical processes have been used to
represent the cosmos scientifically especially since Galileo, Descartes and Newton,
mathematical activity characterises twentieth century science even more profoundly.
Twentieth century physics, notably quantum and relativity theories, has undergone
fundamental changes and n o w entails strikingly counter-intuitive views of the cosmos 14 .
It is a central theme in most accounts that twentieth century physics is characterised by a
fundamental interplay with complex mathematics that renders non-mathematical
understandings at best only approximations, and conceptually difficult approximations at
that
[S]ome of the n e w concepts [of physics] are fully meaningful only in
mathematical language. (Davies & Gribbin 1991, p. 3)
In the overthrow of the old world view - a paradigm shift that is dramatieaUy
transforming our understanding ofreatity- the chief casualty is c o m m o n sense.
14 There is also an argument that Newtonian science is counter-intuitive, when compared
Aristotelian science, for example; that Newtonian science is commonsensical to those of us who
have received a science, or at least a physics, education. Nonetheless, the counter-intuitive nature
of twentieth century physics arises largely from its mathematical character.
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Whereas in the Newtonian picture of reality h u m a n senses and intuition proved a
good guide, in the abstract wonderland of the n e w physics it seems that only
advanced mathematics can help us to m a k e sense of nature. (Davies & Gribbin
1991, p. 11)
Books of this type15 are an excedentfirststep in demystifying the n e w physics. However

their very existence points to the developments made with mathematics. It is no reflecti
on the clarity of writing that Hawking's (1988) A Brief History of Time is described on
the cover as 'the international number one best seder' yet has been jokinglyreferredto in
the media as 'the world's least-read coffee-table book'. The material dealt with in texts
such as these - quantum theory, relativity, singularities, the exclusion principle,
imaginary time, quarks, string theory, chaos theory, and so forth - are just as the authors
describe: sophisticated mathematical representations of the cosmos, that cannot be
understood without the mathematics. They can be described in general terms without the
mathematics, but the general descriptions have to be accepted on faith, and with so many
complex and counter-intuitive concepts, that is indeed a problem for the public
understanding of science. T h e mathematical representation of reality is central to
characterising twentieth century physics and many other sciences also.
A different perspective on the mathematisation of twentieth century science is given
by Redner (1987), w h o argues that twentieth-century World science is characterised by
technification, usuady accompanied by formalisation, abstraction and problem-solving:
These thematic categories are usuatiy linked by a mere general tendency towards
what Whitley (1977), following Georgescu-Roegen, has called
'arithmomorphism' or the 'arithmetic ideal'. The introduction of mathematical
techniques into science can take place for m a n yreasons.These can be technical
and practical - to facditate calculation, for example, and to make certain kinds of
problems solvable; or formal - to place the science on a more rigorous and so
scientistic footing, for example, by introducing quantification and exactitude in
definitions, relations and 'laws'; or institutional - to establish criteria of
professional expertise and technical competence, for instance; or phdosophical to permit a theoretical reduction of the objects of the science to those of a more
general science, and eventually of all sciences to physics. But no matter w h y
such techniques are included, their introduction will almost inevitably set up a
tendency towards formalisation, abstraction and problem-solving. Formalisation
occurs because once mathematical techniques operate to quantify relations and
'laws' there will be an irresistible intellectual pud to bring them together as a
systematic and fully formal theory, which in extreme cases wdl be 'closed' and
even axiomatised. Abstraction occurs because a mathematical description
governing a few exact parameters constitutes an abstractionfromreatity;it is
only applied to an ideal or abstract object selected from the multiplicity of actual
objects and their properties. A n d finally, a science operating with mathematical
formulae will invariably couch ad questions in the form of exact problems for
which there are presumed to be specific, if not unique, solutions,tikethose for a
set of solvable equations. A mathematical, 'closed' and axiomatic science
operating on highly abstract objects to solve intellectually constructed problems
wtil almost always need to be finalised as weU, since there wdl no longer be any
15

See also Davies (1980), Hawking (1988) and Davies (1992)
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'internal' direction for further research, the guidance of which wdl have come
from outside ends. (Redner 1987, p. 71)
Each of Redner's characteristics of twentieth century World science - formalisation,
abstraction and problem-solving - is in turn strongly characterised by mathematical
processes. M o r e than this, Redner's critique is that the increasingly mathematical
characteristic of twentieth century (World) science establishes particular kinds of
questions to be solved, which in turn lead to particular kinds of answers. Redner is less
clear about the extent to which his notion of World science applies to ad sciences, but to
the extent his argument applies it identifies an increasingly fundamental character of
mathematical activity in science. The outcomes of mathematisation Redner describes fit
exacdy the outcomes of, for example, Hawking (1988), w h o argued the apparent
tendency of the fundamental physics theories - that is, theories that are characteristicaUy
mathematical - to converge. H e speculated that such a convergence could in principle
answer h o w and w h y the universe started and runs as it does, interpreted in his n o w
well-known concluding paragraph:
However, if w e do discover a complete [unified] theory [of physics], it should
in time be understandable in broad principle by everyone, not just a few
scientists. Then w e shall aU, philosophers, scientists, and just ordinary people,
be able to take part in the discussion of the question of w h y it is that w e and the
universe exist. If w e find the answer to that, it would be the ultimate triumph of
reason - for then w e would k n o w the mind of God. (Hawking 1988, p. 185)
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Debate over discovery and justification

We have noted above an enduring historical theme of a twofold pathway of
reasoning, identified in the inductivism of Francis Bacon, for example, and in the
hypothetico-deductivism that displaced it. Part of that discussion concerned the
distinction between two contexts characterised respectively by the activities discovery and
justification. A s broadly understood n o w , this distinction w a s conceived by John
Herschel (1830). According to Herschel, the set of activities caded discovery included the
selection of relevant criteria from complex phenomena (a process for which there are no
rules), and from these the successive formulation of higher and higher principles,firstas
law-like regularities and eventually as theories, either by induction or the formulation of
hypotheses. F r o m there, in the context of the set of activities called justification, he
reasserted deductive reasoning as the path for prediction from these laws and theories.
Herschel's distinction can be viewed as the basis for a number of accounts that
either acknowledge discovery but dismiss it as beyond the province of metascientific
understanding, as in positivism, or focus on the metascientific neglect of discovery as a
significant gap in developing an understanding of what science is and h o w it works. In
thefirsthalf of the twentieth century particularly, the R V strongly characterised science
by the activities summarised as justification, and not discovery:
M u c h of traditional epistemology is devoted to the study of the justification or,
more generaUy, the evaluation of the betiefs w e have on the basis of some given
body of evidence. Recendy, belief revision has claimed its place as a further
chapter of epistemology. In contrast, relatively litde attention has been devoted
to the epistemology of knowledge acquisition. O n e (usuady tacit)reasonfor this
neglect is the belief that the most important types of knowledge acquisition, e.g.
the discovery of a n e w scientific theory, are not subject to rules, and hence
cannot be studied logically or epistemologicady. (Hintikka 1992, p. 241)
The second factor, the rejection of the activities of discovery, is of particular interest here.
This argument contributed to the positivists' rejection of activities that were not
demonstrably rational. A s a tenet of the R V , it remains current where derivatives of that
view are still influential, but is disputed by characterisations that contributed to, and
followed, the decline of the R V . It represents a touchstone for characterisations of
scientific activity, as indicated in the foUowing discussion.
The dismissal of a context of discovery is usuady attributed to Hans Reichenbach
(1891-1953):
The history of logical positivism on the discovery issue is also complex ... The
official, logical positivist position on discovery is usuady attributed to Hans
Reichenbach, who, in Experience and Prediction (1938) distinguished 'context
of discovery' from 'context of justification' and supposedly ruled context of
discovery out of bounds to epistemology. A careful reading of that work reveals
that Reichenbach[s distinction had a different purpose. Indeed, Reichenbach
himself believed in the existence of a sort of inductive-probabilistic logic of
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discovery, or rather, a logic of discoverability. It w a s primarily in
Reichenbach's and other positivists' later writings that the 'two context'
distinction became an invidious one. Ironicady, at die very time these writers
banished discovery as a legitimate methodological topic, s o m e of them were
contributing to the development of statistical inference and data reduction
methods, such as factor analysis, which amounted to logics of discovery.
T h e later positivists came to focus more and more on the logical structure of
the final products of research - theories, laws, explanations and empirical
testing. Having stripped the process of research of ad interesting cognitiveepistemic features, they assigned this topic to psychologists and historians!
(Nickles 1990, p. 158)
Despite such criticism, it should be noted that the distinction between discovery and
justification became more marked, not so much because of concern over weaknesses of
the former, but because of the strengths perceived in assuring truth through the latter:
One of the consequences of the Reichenbach doctrine is that it is held that,
whatever the origin of an idea, its truth can be determined independentiy of it
This is one of the main themes in Popper's Poverty of Historicism, w h e n he
takes great exception to the relationalism of M a n n h e i m and the sociology of
knowledge. T h e veracity of a theory is not justified by changing political and
cultural grounds. Hence the context of justification is apolitical. (Brannigan
1981, p. 42, emphases in original)
The position that science is only concerned with that which is logicaUy demonstrable is

central to the debates on the externalist/internalist distinction, discussed in the comp
chapter on context and Appendix B.l, and in the section below. Alternative views, that
discovery is not merely acknowledged but is significant to scientific activity, have
become more influential with the declining influence of the positivist RV.
The distorting effect of rejecting discovery as a characteristic activity
There are several implications of the discovery/justification debate for the
characterisation of science by activity. First is the criticism that omitting discovery

distorts descriptions or explications of science. An eloquent if stylisticaUy dated, acco

of scientific activity which puts this view is Singer (1959). This view is quoted at some
length not only because it puts a plausible account of scientific activity, but subsumes
Oldroyd's (1989) account of hypothetico-deductivism and roles in science for both

justification and discovery. Singer in fact uses the omission of discovery as the criter
forjudging Francis Bacon's account of scientific activity as fundamentally limited:
The scientific man [sic] in the prosecution of his art of discovery has to practise
three distinguishable mental processes. These m a y be considered asfirsdy,the
choosing of his facts; secondly, the formation of an hypothesis that links them
together, and thirdly, thetestingof the truth or falsehood of the hypothesis.
W h e n this hypothesis answers numerous and/or stringent tests, he has m a d e
what is usually caded a 'scientific discovery'. It is doubtiess true that the three
processes of choosing facts, drawing an hypothesis or conclusion, and testing
the conclusion, are often confused in his o w n thinking by the m a n of science.
Often, too, his demonstration of his discovery, that is the testing of his
hypothesis, helps him, more or less unconsciously, to n e w acts of judgement,
these to a n e w selection of facts, and so on in endless complexity. But
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essentiady the three processes are distinct, and one might be largely developed
while the others were in a state of relative arrest
In this matter scientific articles, and especially scientific text-books,
habitually give a false impression. These scientific works are composed to
demonstrate the truth of certain views. In doing so they must needs obscure the
process by which the investigator reached those views. That process consists, in
effect, of a series of improvised judgements, or 'working hypotheses',
interspersed with imperfect and merely provisional demonstrations. M a n y
hypotheses and m a n y demonstrations have had to be discarded w h e n submitted
to a further process of testing. Thus a scientific article or book which teUs
nothing of these side issues, blind adeys, and false starts tends, in some sort, to
conceal the tracks of the investigator. For this reason, among others, science can
never be learned from books, but only by contact with phenomena.
T h e distinction between the process of discovery and demonstration of
discovery w a s constantly missed during the Middle Ages. O n this point, in
which our thought is separated from that of the m e n of those times, Bacon
remained in darkness. H e succeeded, indeed, in emphasising the importance of
the operation of collection of facts. H e failed to perceive h o w deeply the act of
judgement must be in the effective cotiection of facts. (Singer 1959, pp. 265-6)
That is, discovery is a distinct process (or cotiection of processes) which is systematicatiy
omitted from scientific accounts (including textbooks) because those accounts seek to
show only the rationality of the reconstructed argument. Note that Singer makes a
distinction between discovery as a process, which includes the activity of judgement and
scientific discovery as a product Choosing facts, the first of Singer's three processes,
presumably includes identifying and collecting them and other subtiy different labels for

associated activities, but begs the question of the role of theory in this process. As we
have noted, m a n y characterisations of science argue that the judgement that only
particular 'facts' are useful presupposes a commitment to a particular theory or

hypothesis; the present thesis adds betiefs and assumptions (belief system) as influenci
the judgement of which data arerelevantand useful.
Psychological and social models of discovery
Second is the question, what is this process of discovery, and various answers
have been proposed. Brannigan (1981, pp. 13ff) has argued that there are two broad
types of accounts of discovery: psychological and social.
Discovery as a psychological activity
Psychological accounts are so-called because each is a 'mentalistic' explanation,
whether proposing genius, gestalt shift, recognition of anomalies or insight as the
controlling variable:
[A]U these accounts offer explanations of the occurrence of discoveries by
showing h o w , as aresultof interaction with the environment n e w ideas get into
the researcher's head. Hence these accounts are ad reductionistic. That is, they
reduce the problem of historical discoveries to the psychological level.
(Brannigan 1981, p. 33)
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This mentalistic or psychological characteristic is evident in m a n y accounts. For example,
for Hanson, discovery is a different Gestalt or interpretation of perceptions, and its logic
involves the reasons the scientist has for discriminating between different hypotheses.
W h d e this view accepts that some induction follows therecognitionof an anomaly, its
rejects simple enumerative induction. K u h n has provided an account both of h o w
individuals m a k e discoveries and of h o w communities accept or reject them. For Kuhn,
discoveries also start with the recognition of anomalies, but it is necessary also for the
individual to recognise the significance of the anomaly, and for there to be adequate
development of concepts and instruments. For Koestier, unlike Hanson and Kuhn,
gestalts m a y be present but are not necessary; the distinguishing characteristic of any
creation, inspiration or discovery, in science and in other contexts, is bisociation - 'the
synthesis of a single idea with two apparendy inconsistent contexts' (Brannigan 1981, p.
27). Thus, whether in science, literature or comedy, bisociation produces a cognitive
tension, as in the w e U known example of Archimedes in the bath:
The change in the water level produced by stepping into the gymnasium bath
was certainly something with which any experienced bather must have been
familiar. However, Archimedes bisociated his observation of the change in
water level with the question of the proportion of gold in Hiero's crown. In
other words, the commonplace displacement of bathwater became thematically
important for the solution of a problem in another context. However, the
inadvertent solution to the problem in the context of bathing constituted a
surprise, a disruption of the mundane course of bathing. This accounts for the
classical reports of Archimedes' distraction and exuberance. (Brannigan 1981,
p. 28)
Other examples given by Koesder include Gutenberg, w h o bisociated the action of the
wine press with imprinting an image, Darwin's bisociation of the immense diversity of
species with Malthus' notion of economic struggle, and Kepler's bisociation of physical
laws, which could account for eUiptical orbits, with astronomy, which had used the
metaphysical principle of the perfection of circles as the explanatory principle.
A n example of such an account of discovery is the work by Charles Pierce (18391914) to produce a 'logic of discovery'. H e began with the criticisms of induction, and
accounts that rely on some sort of induction. T w o of these failings, as w e have seen, are
the failure to account for (1) h o w a hypothesis is made or constructed, and (2) h o w a
decision is m a d e to test some of the possible hypotheses and not others. Pierce argued
that a logical account could be given of h o w one determines a hypothesis rationady:
Throughout his philosophical work, Pierce was greatly interested in logic, and it
was, therefore, within this general framework of interest that he sought to
construct a 'logic of discovery'. In 1878, for example, he sought to clarify the
distinctions between deduction, induction, and the process of hypothesis
formulation, by means of the following simple examples:
(i) Deduction:
Rule - A U the beans from this bag are white.
Case - These beans are from this bag.
Therefore
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Result - These beans are white.
(ii) Induction:
Case - These beans are from this bag.
Result - These beans are white.
Therefore
Rule - A U the beans from this bag are white.
(iii) Hypothesis:
Rule - A U the beans from this bag are white.
Result - These beans are white.
Therefore
Case - These beans are from this bag.
... The term that Pierce coined for the process which occurs when a hypothesis
is formulated, in order to explain some puzzling phenomenon, was abduction.
This m a y be represented by the following simple schema:
The surprising fact, C, is observed;
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course;
Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true.
(Oldroyd 1989, pp. 184-5)
The process of abduction is similar to the notion of retroduction in Hanson (1958) and
Bhaskar (1989): arguing 'backwards' from what is known or observed.
Pierce's argument is part of the pragmatist tradition of thinking that held that the
troth or meaning of an idea is given in its practical outcomes, also seen in the work of
Wiltiam James (1842-1910) and John Dewey (1859-1952). The proposal of a process of
abduction is made therefore to address different concerns, which the present thesis
identifies as purposes:
The logic of abduction thus investigates the norms employed in deciding
whether a hypothesis is worth testing at a given stage of inquiry, and the norms
influencing h o w w e should retain the key insights of rejected theories in
formulating their successors. (Hookway 1992a, p. 8)
In Pierce's account, logic is concerned not with how we think, but how we ought to
think, and he makes a connection between constructing hypotheses (abduction), the
practical consequences of the hypothesis (pragmatism), and ethical or moral
considerations:

So hypotheses should be formulated that could explain phenomena
satisfactorily, were capable of experimental testing (a point with which the
positivists would have agreed), and which could be investigated as economically
as possible. Here questions of both mental economy (as in the employment of
Ockham's razor) and economy in terms of materials, time and other costs were
relevant. Evidendy, Pierce was giving sanction to the significance of socioeconomic factors in the very cognitive structure of scientific knowledge, a
position which the positivists such as M a c h would have found quite
unacceptable. (Oldroyd 1989, pp. 184-5)
This account provides a mechanism forjudging, after the formation ofthe hypothesis, the
range of factors that contributed to its formation.
Reactions to Pierce's account tilustrate some of the tensions of making the case for
discovery as a scientific activity. Oldroyd, in the context of his historical theme of
hypothetico-deductivism, finds no sustainable logic of discovery in Pierce's argument,
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only reasons w h y one argument might be preferred to others, because it 'still seemed to
require flashes of insight, wit genius, or whatever' (Oldroyd 1989, p. 187). Critics of
abduction object that it is not true in the same sense as the deductive argument Pierce's
pragmatism w a s directly opposed by M o o r e and Russell, for example, w h o 'were
scandalised by what they took to be a crass identification of truth and utility' (Haack
1992, p. 354). T h e rebuttal of this criticism is that pragmatic truth is not equated with
trivial, short-term utilities or expediencies, but with the long-term utility:
Fallible and imperfect as scientific inquiry is, however, if this vast co-operative
enterprise were to continue long enough - Pierce is aware there is no guarantee
that it will - eventually afinal,stable opinion would be reached. (Haack 1992,
p. 353)
This does not, of course, m a k e a watertight account of discovery in science, but it does
show h o w such an activity can be construed by alternative characterisations of scientific
activity generaUy and ofthe nature of truth in science. In terms of activity, the example of
Pierce retains empiricist characteristics, but includes the combination of deduction,
induction and abduction in a longer-term context and applying to a different criterion of
troth.
A n alternative psychological account of the activity discovery is given by theories
of knowledge-seeking by questioning (Hintikka 1992, pp. 241ff). Hintikka has proposed
an interrogative model of inquiry, something like Socratic questioning, that can apply to
scientific and other inquiries such as legal procedures. In its simplest form it involves an
inquirer (such as a scientist or a group or community of scientists) and the source of
information, the oracle. A n oracle can be a person, as in a 'witness in a court of law or a
patient in a diagnostic interview, but it can also be Nature as a target of observations and
experiments' (Hintikka 1992, p. 242). At each stage the inquirer can m a k e either a logical
inference or interrogate the oracle. A m o n g Hintikka's conclusions from this activity, are:
(a) there can be a rational (logical) theory of discovery, as well as logical theories of
justification or evaluation, but that normally there are no mechanical (recursive) rules for
discovery; (b) the reliability of oracles can be judged, and therefore the process can give
insights into 'the self-correcting character of knowledge-seeking methods' (Hintikka
1992, p. 242); (c) an inquiry can serve to answer a question rather than prove a particular
conclusion; (d) differences between types of inquiry can be characterised; (e) the nature
of scientific inquiry can be clarified, notably by rejecting the belief that empirical scientific
inquiry is atomistic; (f) the nature of discovery can be clarified; and (g) differences
between kinds of knowledge can be characterised. The notion of an oracle implies that an
assumption is m a d e already about w h o 'knows' or might 'know'.
Discovery as a social activity
For Brannigan (1981, p. 70), the naturalistic question of what causes a discovery is
less productive than h o w they are identified as discoveries. H e accepts insights from
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psychological accounts, such as Gestalt shift or perception of anomaly, and the claim that
inferences of that type are necessary. However, he judges them as a group to be
insufficient in principle to account for discovery because ad inferences of that type suffer
the same limitation, that none is sufficient to distinguish discovery from mere learning.
They provide no explanation for the uniqueness ofthe discovery: the original discoverer
and the school student alike experience the Gestalt or flash of insight. Part of the
problem, in Brannigan's view, is that scientific discoveries are discoveries by definition w e are interested in them because they are recognised discoveries. Therefore they are post
hoc explanations. If w e seek a mentalistic explanation, its efficacy is assured since w e are
explaining a successful activity. The converse is not true generally: other sorts of
explanations are given of non-discoveries - what are subsequendy regarded as mistaken
thinking. Thus psychological or mentalistic accounts of 'discoveries' like the phlogiston
theory or the Piltdown M a n , whether they appeal to Gestalt shifts or perceptions of
anomalies, are inadequate: they fail to discriminate between scientific discoveries and
either learning or errors.
In answer to this critique, Brannigan suggests a different notion of discovery in
science:
[F]or Kuhn, discoveries are theoretical achievements which entail by definition a
reflective reconstruction of experience. Excluded by fiat are simple factual
discoveries. Hence the appearance of n e w elements would be simple novelties which do not produce 'discoveries' - for discoveries are by definition theoretical
breakthroughs and anomalies are those types of novelties which in the guise of
explaining discoveries, only define them. (Brannigan 1981, p. 37; emphases in
original).
It is reasonable to argue that scientific discoveries are marked by a change in theory, and
if so, then aside from mental activity like insight there must be mental activity like
theorising, and other activities such as explanation and defence of the theorising to the
scientific community so that it is agreed to be a discovery. Fodowing this argument and
consistent with his analysis of scientific 'discoveries' and 'non-discoveries', Brannigan
proposed four criteria by which the conditions of discoveries and fadures of candidates
for discovery are typically understood. These criteria are essentiaUy social rather than
psychological. They are that an announcement or achievement is accorded the status of a
discovery w h e n it is (a) judged to be a 'substantively relevant possibility'; (b) arises as
part of 'motivated scientific investigations or schemes of research' - even so-catied
accidental discoveries, while temporarily inadvertent arise precisely because they occur
within specific and planned research activities; (c) judged to be 'convincingly true or
valid' by scientific peers; and (d) judged by those peers to be unique, and therefore
unprecedented (Brannigan 1981, p. 77).
Unlike M a n n h e i m but following Barnes and Bloor, Brannigan argues that
discovery is methodologically relativistic, meaning scientific discovery is subject to the
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same scrutiny as any discovery. It holds that all knowledge, valid or invalid, is
determined or constructed, unlike the assumption by m a n y earlier sociologists that
scientific knowledge is objective and other knowledges are socially determined.
Therefore Brannigan's account does not give scientific activity any special status that
protects it from analysis. T o do so, says Brannigan, undermines the credibdity of
scientific knowledge. However, he argues that discovery is not ontologically relativistic,
meaning scientific discoveries do not arise in just any social context, but arise only as part
of certain activities and within certain contexts. This is important, given that in recent
metascience there is no agreed account of discovery, and views range from strongly
internalist (allowing a psychology but no logic of discovery) to strongly relativistic
(allowing that discovery in science is no different from any discovery). Accounts such as
Brannigan's attempt to address the criticisms from both camps, aUowing the construction
of knowledge (construction rather than discovery) w h d erecognisingthat in science this is
epistemologicatiy special because of the context and other factors. This is consistent with
views such as Bhaskar's scientific realism, and with the present thesis, which extends
Brannigan's special conditions. That is, the construction (discovery) of scientific
knowledge is epistemologicatiy special because it takes place in conjunction with
particular purposes, belief systems, (other) activities, contexts, knowledges and
structures.

840
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5.10 Activity as more than method and methodology:

internalist and externalist

perspectives on scientific activity
This final section addresses broader characterisations of scientific activity than just
experimental and other activities most typicady considered to characterise science. First,
m a n y accounts characterise the boundary between experimental and related activities to be
imprecise, if it exists, and therefore not a useful distinction. (For what is the status of
reading, for example, or becoming informed?) O n this argument, scientific activity is
difficult to define narrowly as merely experimental or laboratory activity. Secondly, other
accounts of scientific activity do not even begin with the minutiae of experimentation or
logical reasoning, which are assumed. These accounts are concerned with other activities
by which experimentations are established and their results accepted or rejected, and in
other ways manipulated. The following argument addresses both of these claims.
Broadening the characterisation of activity from experiment
Earlier in this chapter, w e noted that experimental activity not only characterises
science in the public mind, but is a leitmotif also in the metascientific literature. However,
it is a distortion of the metascientific literature to claim further that activity in science is
only experimental or that experiments can be understood by reference only to their logical
structure. M u c h of the literature concerned with experiment does not explicidy exclude
other activity, it just does not address it. Conversely, other views in the literature do not
deny the centrality of experiment and related activities, but attempt specificady to redress
this imbalance. (See Table B.5.1.) A s w e have seen, the selection of meanings from the
s u m m a r y statements indicates a broader interpretation of activity than methods, the
subject of the extract above from Hodes. For example, s o m e authorities identify
maintaining, perpetuating and communication as scientific activities. That is, these are
activities characteristic of science, although they also characterise other endeavours, and
need not be considered a method of science. It is contentious, therefore, to claim that
experiment is the only scientific activity, or that experiment can be understood without
understanding other activities. In dealing with the nature of activities loosely described as
discovery, the preceding section included the argument that a stricdy mentalistic or
psychological account of scientific activity is inadequate. This section (a) pursues that
critique to explicate ambiguities between experimental activity and related activities,
leading to broader characterisations of scientific activity; and (b) addresses insights from
viewpoints which do not begin from a concern with experiment
Experiment is less distinct as an activity than once thought
T h e first critique questions the notion that scientific activity is essentially
experimental activity, logically and in other ways separable from other activity. W e have
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mentioned above the changing interests, as part of post-positivist thinking, in the
experiment: in the influence of assumptions and betiefs underpinning the experiment, a
re-evaluation of the role of experiment in science, and attempts to detati and understand
the elements comprising experiments and laboratory activities more generally. Despite
individual differences a m o n g views entailed in these developments, an emerging
characterisation is that the experiment is more complex and subde than was previously
betieved. The implications of this view are that the experiment is subject to a far wider
range of influences that w a s previously thought, and that the experiment itself is not the
only activity that influences the production of scientific knowledge. A n indication of this
progression of characterisation can be found in Chalmer's (1982) widely-read
introduction to some of the major philosophical views of science, in which he addresses,
in order: inductivism, Popper's falsificationism, Lakatos's research programs, Kuhn's
paradigms, Feyerabend's anarchism and a variant of m o d e m scientific realism. The
sweep of this argument is sufficient to demonstrate the notion of this progression of
argument of characterisation, and is given here. T h e detad of the actual arguments is
omitted only to highlight a trend of thought, and the trend itself is not portrayed as a
simple linear progression; rather, the examples dlustrate ideas the indicate a change in
thinking.
Some responses to naive characterisations of experiment
W e have noted earlier in this chapter that inductivist characterisations of scientific
activity appeal because they fit c o m m o n sense notions of reliable knowledge,
observation, induction, objectivity, and so on. W e also noted, however, problems with
inductivist claims to sure knowledge, notably that inductive conclusions cannot be
logicaUy justified, and that observations are not 'objective' as once thought O n e
response to this dtiemma w a s Karl Popper's falsificationist methodology, in which both
the reliance on induction as the basis for hypotheses, and the theory-ladenness of
observations, are immaterial. Hypotheses m a y be freely conjectured; the significant
process is the rigorous testing by observation and experiment of the hypothesis. Those
that fail (are falsified) are rejected, and so to be subject to this test the critical
characteristic of scientific hypotheses is that they are in principle falsifiable. However,
even the more sophisticated versions of falsificationism have their o w n problems. For
example, observations are not secure enough to support clear falsifications, because the
same failings of observations in naive induction also apply here. Secondly, falsifications
are difficult in complex situations where individual factors m a y need to be isolated.
Thirdly, falsification poorly represents the historical record.
Imre Lakatos (1974) proposed an account of scientific activity that focuses on the
scientific research program rather than on individual experiments, where the research
program is the framework within which research is done. The basic assumptions and
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defining hypotheses of the program comprise the hard core, which cannot be falsified if
w o r k is to be done in that program, i.e., they are not to be modified or rejected. T h e
protection from falsification is provided by the initial conditions, auxiliary hypotheses,
and so on, that comprise the protective belt, which is subject to the testing. T h e program
is progressive if w o r k in the protective belt leads to the discovery of novel phenomena,
and degenerating if not A difficulty with Lakatos' research programs is judging the time
necessary to apply his analysis, for an apparently degenerating program might just
b e c o m e progressive if a single experiment provides the appropriate result tomorrow.
However, it provides a better account of the historical record than either inductivism or
falsificationism, as does T h o m a s K u h n ' s (1962) characterisation of science by
paradigms.
K u h n originady proposed the paradigm as the general set of assumptions, laws and
activities adopted by a community of scientists. H e later clarified the term as meaning the
disciplinary matrix and the exemplar. W o r k done within the paradigm is normal science,
which carries on until sufficient discrepancies or problems surmount, leading to a crisis
state. Crises are resolved w h e n sufficient scientists perceive a n e w paradigm to be better,
and w o r k in it instead, constituting a scientific revolution. K u h n therefore characterises
science as discontinuous, unlike the steady and incremental progress implied by
inductivist characterisations.
T h e detail of these accounts, and more, is grist for the m i d in most metascience
texts in recent decades, but the present discussion is included to show: (1) that wellk n o w n accountsfitwithin the schema of this thesis; (2) that in particular, this sweep of
thinking is partly characterised by activity; (3) that the different interpretations use
different activities; and (4) the limitations ofrestrictingattention to the application of
logic, and that m o r e powerful alternatives arose within the philosophy of science and
other traditions.
T h u s for example, despite its appeal for addressing s o m e shortcomings in
inductivism, falsificationism failed in practice to provide the m e a n s of distinguishing
science from non-science that Popper sought1**:
It must also be acknowledged that the much-vaunted distinction between science
and pseudo-science is n o w beginning to look somewhat tatty. O n e can accept
that a theory that is formaUy unfalsifiable cannot be scientific, but it is often the
case that a falsifiable theory is not falsified because its proponents choose not to
press h o m e the falsifying evidence - Popper's methodological rules against
conventionalist stratagems notwithstanding. T h e y prefer to invoke ad hoc
hypotheses, or to conventionalise the theory. But this has to do with aspects of
h u m a n behaviour, rather than s o m e logical feature of the structure of the theory 16

The discussion of boundary work, in the companion chapter cn context shows that essentialist
approaches to characterising science, such as Popper's, are all flawed. Scholarship within the field
of boundary work suggests that constructivist (descriptive) approaches are more meaningful,
although essentialist notions are still held strongly outside this field.
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its inherent unfalsifiability. S o whether or not theories are falsified on any given
occasion is as m u c h a social question as anything else. So, as I say, the
distinction between science and pseudo-science should be m a d e by examination
of social practices just as m u c h as by examination of the logical structures of
theories.
In fact Popper himself acknowledged this long ago w h e n he wrote:
Only with reference to the methods applied to a theoretical system
is it at all possible to ask whether w e are dealing with a
conventionalist or an empirical theory.
With hindsight, this can perhaps be seen to have been the thin end of the wedge
of the sociology of knowledge cutting into Popper's theory. Thus, if w e want to
k n o w whether a theory is or is not scientific, w e should look and see h o w it is
handled by people, rather than consider its logical structure. (Oldroyd 1989, p.
315; emphasis in original)
That is, comparison of the idealised method with actual practice meant that (a) the
confidence in the scientific results could not be guaranteed, and (b) the logical processes
alone are inadequate, and account needs to be taken of a wider context of activity17.
Hence the increased interest of post-positivist metascience in actual rather than idealised
scientific activity. W e will examine three characterisations of science as more than just
experimental activity, (a) Bhaskar (1975; 1989) is an example of a philosophical critique
that claims traditional H P S accounts are inadequate partly because they neglect social
characteristics of scientific activity, (b) Ravetz (1971) is an example of a sociological
perspective, that begins by acknowledging social activities of science, (c) Recent
Australian government policy is an example of an influential characterisation that is in the
public domain and simply presumes experimental, social and other characteristics of
scientific activity.
a) Bhaskar's characterisation of science by activity
Bhaskar has argued that traditional approaches in H P S to scientific activity have in
fact removed the intelligibility of activity in science, and that phdosophical analysis can
both reveal this flaw and show that scientific activity is more than experimentation. In his
view, classical empiricism (as in the tradition fodowing H u m e ) and transcendental
idealism (as in the tradition following Kant) are similarly flawed, for several reasons.
Both of these traditions, and hence most traditional H P S , seek to justify betief. In doing
so, they require that scientific knowledge has secure or certain foundations. This
establishes a sequence of requirements: certainty entails, in turn, individual experiences,
the events that are the ontological counterparts of these experiences, other events that are
their constant conjunctions, and closed systems within which these events occur. The
analysis of patterns of phenomena (laws) is therefore anthropocentric, the complement of

17

Here we might modify Oldroyd's suggestion that we look at the human context rather than the
logical structure, to suggest the logical structure can be looked at only within a wider context The
present thesis, again, argues that any particular characteristic of science should be analysed only
along with other dimensions, such as in this case structure and context.
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which 'is neglect of the conscious human activity required for our knowledge of them'
(Bhaskar 1989, p. 22). Thus, both empiricism and neo-Kantian idealism share betiefs
about the cosmos (that is, an ontology), which Bhaskar caUs empirical realism: the world
is human-dependent (empirical) and knowledge is activity-independent (asocial).
Against this, Bhaskar characterises science by a version of scientific realism,
meaning that it asserts that the objects of scientists' study are real18. It differs from
empirical realism in several respects. First it seeks to analyse the intelligible activities of
science - the activities that lead to knowledge about Nature - rather than justifying betief.
Secondly, according to Bhaskar, science is intelligible only if it is assumed that 'the order
discovered in nature exists independently of [people]' (Bhaskar 1975, p. 27). M o r e
specifically, experimental activity is only intelligible if the experimenter is a causal agent
of the events in an experiment (a closed system), but is not a causal agent of the tendency
to similar events in open systems outside the context of the experiment The statement of
tendency or way of acting of things is the causal law (Bhaskar 1975, p. 51), such as
Ohm's Law:
N o w an experiment is necessary precisely to the extent that the pattern of events
forthcoming under experimental conditions would not be forthcoming without
it. Thus in an experiment w e are a causal agent of the sequence of events, but
not of the causal law which the sequence of events, because it has been
produced under experimental conditions, enables us to identify.
T w o consequences flow from this. First, the real basis of causal laws cannot
be sequences of events; there must be an ontological distinction between them.
Secondly, experimental activity can only be given a satisfactory rationale if the
causal law it enables us to identify is held to prevad outside the contexts under
which the sequence of events is generated. (Bhaskar 1975, p. 33)
That is, there are ontological differences between causal laws, events and the experiences
of empirical activity, which indicate three domains of reality or ontology. For example,
copper has the tendency to conduct electricity, regardless of whether it is conducting at a
particular point in time and space, or whether it is observed doing this.
In Bhaskar's scientific realism, then, there is stiti a Nature even if there is no
science to investigate it:
For it is not the fact that science occurs that gives the world a structure that can
be k n o w n by [humans]. Rather, it is the fact that the world has such a structure
that makes science, whether or not it actuady occurs, possible. (Bhaskar 1975,
p. 30)
The significant difference from empiricalrealismis that scientific reatism suggests more
than one domain of reality.
Bhaskar in fact suggests that there are three domains ofreality,as foUows, and that
this belief has implications for our view of scientific activity. Firsdy, w e observe that in
Nature things have tendencies or ways of acting, which w e summarise as statements

18

Bhaskar classifies his version of scientific realism as transcendental realism or critical realism.
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called causal laws. For example, copper has the tendency or w a y of acting to conduct
electricity. The w a y of acting of a thing results from a generative mechanism or its being
as a structure (Bhaskar 1975, p. 51). This is the domain ofthe real.
However, although causal laws do not depend on h u m a n activity, the events by
which w e identify these laws in an experiment do depend partly on human activity. Thus,
while any number of school students or research assistants m a y upset the workings of an
experiment, this is not taken to show that a causal law has been overturned. Events, then,
are real but their ontology is different to that of causal laws. Thus mechanisms or
structures m a y be said to exist whether or not they generate events, and events are neither
experiences nor causal laws. Events m a y occur regardless of whether they are
experienced by scientists: they m a y be unperceived, or in the absence of scientists,
unperceivable. The experimental event of an electric current in a copper wire that is
subject to a potential difference is not the same as the tendency or way of acting of copper
to conduct electricity per se. The reality of events is the domains of the real and the actual.
Similarly, experiences are also real but they have a different ontology: the
mechanisms and structures that cause tendencies and events m a y occur regardless of
whether anyone is there to observe them:
Tendencies m a y be possessed unexercised, exercised unrealised, and realised
unperceived (or undetected) by [people]; they m a y also be transformed.
(Bhaskar 1975, p. 18).
The reality of experiences is the domains of the real, the actual and the empirical.
These domains of reality represent the core of a betief system that is significandy
different from that of empirical realism in several ways. First, these domains of reatity
m a y be disjunct from each other, implying an ontological difference. For example,
beyond the context of the experiment - in open rather than closed systems - copper has
the tendency or w a y of acting to conduct electricity.
Secondly, it is the distinction of these three domains of reality that makes the very
idea of experimentation meaningfrd. The intelligibility of experiments and the 'idea of the
universality of a k n o w n law' (Bhaskar 1975, p. 13) depend on the assumptions that
mechanisms are independent of the events they generate and continue to act outside the
closed conditions of the experiment (The present thesis interprets Bhaskar to be saying
that experiments are intelligible in terms of the betief system, elements of which are this
'idea' and these 'assumptions'.)
... It is only w h e n the distinctiveness of the domains is registered and the
possibility of their disjuncture thereby posed that w e can appreciate the
enormous effort - in experimental design and scientific education - required to
make h u m a n experience epistemicatiy significant in science... (Bhaskar 1989,
pp. 21-2)
That is, to generate knowledge (to k n o w ) from experimental and teaching activities,
requires enormous effort which can only be appreciated when disjunctures between these
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domains are addressed. Thus, neither performing experiments (in closed systems) nor
applying laws outside experimental conditions (in open systems) makes sense unless real
structures exist independently of the events they generate. Also, w e need to perform
experiments because real structures are often out of phase with events. Likewise, making
observations does not m a k e sense unless events occur independentiy of experiences.
Experiences are often out of phase with events, as in cases of mis-observation or
misidentification; hence the need for scientific training. Empiricalrealismis a flawed view
because (a) it assumes that the world is essentially experienciable, rather than that some
things happen to be experienciable and this is significant for science; (b) it uses the
category of experience (an epistemological concept) to define Nature (an ontological
function); and (c) it neglects 'the (socially produced) circumstances under which
experience is in fact epistemicatiy significant in science' (Bhaskar 1975, p. 28).
Thirdly, this views points to a broader range of scientific activities than only
experimentation in the production of scientific knowledge. Scientific realism, on the
contrary, proposes that 'science is not an epiphenomenon of nature, nor is nature a
product of m a n ' (Bhaskar 1975, p. 25). That is, scientific reatism seeks to reconcile the
social production of knowledge of an objective world (causal structures and things).
Conversely, neither empiricism nor neo-Kantian idealism 'can sustain the idea of the
independent existence and action of the causal structures and things investigated and
discovered by science' (Bhaskar 1975, pp. 27-8). It is critical because it precludes any
analysis that might iUuminate the significant activities in science:
... N o w this double reduction prevents the empirical realist from examining the
critical question of the conditions under which experience is in fact significant in
science...
It is evident that the critical omission from orthodox accounts of science is the
notion of scientific activity as work. Moreover, when, as in transcendental
idealism, work is recognised, it is treated only as intellectual, and not also as
practical labour, in causal exchange with nature. Accordingly, such accounts
cannot see knowledge, or at least the achievement of a closure, as a transient
social product Underlying the undifferentiated ontology of empirical realism is
thus an individualistic sociology, in which people are regarded as passively
sensing (or else, conventionally deciding upon) given facts and recording their
constant conjunctions, that is to say, as passive spectators of a given world,
rather than as active agents in a complex one. In the ensemble of conditions and
concerns that constitute empirical realism, it is this model of tacidy gendered
m a n that plays the dominant role. (Bhaskar 1989, pp. 21-22; emphases in
original)
That is, traditional empiricist and idealist accounts fail to identify just what and h o w
experimental activities lead to the production of knowledge about Nature. This arises
partly because, instead of analysing intedigible activities as Bhaskar and others seek to
do, traditional H P S accounts aim to justify betief.
In conclusion, Bhaskar's post-positivist philosophical analysis argues that
traditional philosophical analyses of science are inadequate both because they fad to show
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both w h y experimental activity in science is significant, and the significance and social
character of experimental activity as work. Traditional, empirical reatism, that assumes
the world is human-dependent (empirical) and knowledge is activity-independent
(asocial) is therefore unable to account for the significance of experimental activity.
Conversely, scientific realism, that assume the knowledge is human-dependent and the
world is human-independent (transcendentatiy real), makes clear the significance of the
experiment but also that it is not sufficient to account for science knowledge: social
activities have a necessary role. O n his analysis, therefore, it is a misrepresentation of
scientific activity to consider only experiment; other activities, such as negotiation,
training and organisation, are also significant in determining the knowledge outcomes of
science.
b) Ravetz's characterisation of science by activity
Another source of argument that scientific activity is more than just experimental is
the approach from the view of science as socio-cultural practice. Science as socio-cultural
practice is one of four models proposed by G a U o n (1995) as his typology of S T S models
for the dynamics of science, all of which characterise science partly by activity, but with
emphases on different sorts of activity (see Table B.5.1). A s with the discussion of
Bhaskar's scientific realist account, above, an outline of one account will be m a d e from
the m a n y available, to dlustrate the use of this activity in characterising science. The
particular example is Ravetz (1971), which has been an influential account and is sttil a
persuasive characterisation of science in terms of socio-cultural activity (GaUon 1995).
Ravetz's introduction provides a rationale thatfitsvery well with the rationale of this
thesis in the emerging complex of interactions with science by the general public. Ravetz
is in some ways interpretatively dated: m u c h work has been done since in S T S , for
example, in developing characterisations that no longer see science and culture as
separate, that speak more of sciences and less of science, and in elucidating the 'microactivities' in laboratories and consensus formation in scientific disciplines. Nonetheless
Ravetz has been influential in broadening the scope of the notion of scientific activity and
is a useful example of this characterisation of science for the present thesis.
Ravetz m a d e two main arguments. First he proposed that the 'deepest problems
[of science] have changed from the epistemological to the social' (Ravetz 1971, p. 10).
This arose from his concern that science has changed fundamentatiy in the twentieth
century, in particular its massively increased capacity to influence society (see summary
statement 110). Thus, like Bhaskar, he argued that science is not best understood by
focusing on truth-seeking:
T o achieve an understanding of the n e w social character and problems of
science, it is useful first to review the deficiencies of the various prevalent
c o m m o n sense and traditional images of science; and then to show by example
that the industrialised science of the present has social problems which arise
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from the technical and social conditions of its work. This discussion opens the
w a y to a n e w philosophy of science which, instead of asking 'What sort of truth
is embodied in perfected scientific knowledge?', proceeds by asking 'By what
activities and judgements, individual and social, can genuine scientific
knowledge c o m e to be?' (Ravetz 1971, p. 10)
Thus activity is fundamental to Ravetz's characterisation of science (work, activities and
judgements),

although his account starts with concerns characterised by context

(industrialised science of the present, social problems, technical and social conditions,
and individual and social) implicit elements of a belief system (criteria for judgements)
and knowledge. Again tike Bhaskar, Ravetz is concerned to resolve 'the paradox of the
radical difference between the subject intensely personal activity of creative science, and
the objective, impersonal knowledge which results from it', which had been 'ignored in
philosophical discussion' (Ravetz 1971, p. 75). However, his different question results
in a different answer that scientific activity has characteristics of craft activity that are
ignored in traditional characterisations. Thus science is characterised by 'a special sort of
craft w o r k operating on intellectually constructed objects' (Ravetz 1971, p. 146). The
craftswoman or craftsman (craft worker does not imply the same richness of expertise)
has a knowledge of his or her materials and tools that is often intimate, personal, tacit and
informal, combined with skills and attitudes refined through experience, and often
affected by personality, availability of particular resources, and so on. A sympathetic
characterisation of this interplay is given in Pirsig's more widely-known polemic, Zen
and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance (Pirsig 1984).
For Ravetz, craft activity is directed toward (or in the terminology of the present
thesis, has the purpose of) solving problems, and comprises an 'interplay of personal and
social aspects [that] begins with the birth of the problem itself and is continuous through
the inquiry' (Ravetz 1971, p. 76). Thus the cotiection and refinement of data,refineddata
being information, involves not just mechanical or technical activities but also making
judgements and the judicious application of craft skills. These activities are carried out
using tools, which include: the physical apparatus that produce the data; data-processing
tools such as statistical techniques or hardware that produces patterns; tools for
interpreting data, such as standard information; and tools such as calculus for
manipulating formal languages such as mathematics. Such tools require considerable
specialisation of expertise, which emphasises the social character of these activities:
Because so m a n y of the essential tools for any field of science are so highly
sophisticated, to achieve complete mastery in the use of some of them involves
becoming a specialist in the tool rather than in thefieldto which it is being
applied. There is thus a natural division of labour between tool-experts and their
clients; and the tools experts are not merely individuals serving as auxiliaries to
the clients in the work, but themselves can form a self-contained speciality, a
tool-providingfield.W h e n two craftsmen [sic] with different skids are involved
in the same project, they w d l inevitably see the work from different points of
view. T h e different approaches will be complementary, and can correct and
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enrich each other; but they can also be the occasion of conflict. (Ravetz 1971, p.
90)
The degree of specialisation is characterised by activities deploying tools: where the

specialisation is less marked, a preferable characterisation is to speak of tool-users ra
than tool-experts and clients.
Changes in fields or disciplines are characterised also by activities deploying tools:

We have already seen that in a general way the tools avadable define the range of
problems that can be studied. But the influence of tools on afieldcan be more
subde than a mere creation of possibilities. The extensive use of a tool involves
shaping the work around its distinctive strengths and limitations; one can rarely
apply a n e w tool to an existing stream of research without modifying the stream
strongly. Hence as n e w tools c o m e into being, and are judged appropriate and
valuable by the people in thefield,they alter die direction of work in the field
and the conception of thefielditself. The m e n of an older generation w h o cannot
master the n e w tools m a y grumble that thefieldhas been distorted or taken over
by outsiders. (Ravetz 1971, p. 93)
The characterisation of scientific activity as craft activity is made in other ways also:
notion of 'pitfalls' or 'concealed traps for the unwary' or un-initiated (Ravetz 1971, pp
94ff); the mastery of tools, which entati 'informal and largely tacit precepts' (p. 103);
the existence of individual style in setting and solving problems, writing up the work,

and in interpersonal and social relations.
Ravetz's notion of craft skills is less significant in itself than in its role in
identifying their decline in the increasingly industrialised character of science fotiowi

World War IL That is, it is partly by this characterisation in terms of activity that Rav
argues for a fundamental change in the nature of science itself. This is what Redner
(1987) referred to as the technification of science, mentioned above:

Technification in the natural sciences - despite its undoubted achievements - is
causing serious problems even in standard scientific work. Ravetz has explored
at length the problems of what he calls 'industrialised' science, which is very
largely technified science. The loss of skid and craft competence a m o n g the
general m n of research workers as a result of the over-utilisation of big
machines, methodical techniques and routines of organised research procedure
is graduallyrevealingad the symptoms of work in bureaucratised organisations.
There is a diminution of inventiveness, a lapse of personal responsibility, overauthoritativeness, and, eventuady, an absence of purpose. Such science cannot
even serve practical ends adequately, for as Ravetz points out there is a
'tendency for immediate technical problems to displace the initiating practical
problem in the execution of a project [which] becomes very marked as soon as a
stable organisation has been formed, and "welfare invention" has given w a y to
"welfare engineering'" (Ravetz 1971). (Redner 1987, pp. 70-1)
Thus the partly tacit and social character of scientific methods, identified as character
of craft activity, is particularly significant in this, the first argument of Ravetz's
characterisation of science. It illuminates some ofthe character of scientific activity a
as a result also some fundamental changes in scientific activity. Redner extends Ravetz's

argument to further claim that the progressive replacement of these craft activities, wit
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the accompanying loss of craft skids as scientists and technicians work as teams on 'big
machines', contributes to a fundamentally different character of science.
The second of Ravetz's arguments for the social character of scientific activity is
that scientific inquiry is 'a special sort of socially organised activity', arising from 'the
distinction between the collective goals of that work, and the private purposes of each of
the agents involved in it' (Ravetz 1971, p. 243). This is an example ofthe second critique
of scientific activity, to which w e n o w turn, that does not begin with experiment and does
not necessarily claim that scientific activity is to be understood only from within the
context of the practice of science. Appendix B.l on context mentions examples found
through historical studies of the influence of 'external' or socio-cultural factors, and goes
further to show that the notion of external versus internal factors is highly problematic.
Even more significantly here, there are abundant examples to show that science as
practiced in the latter half of the twentieth century is inextricably enmeshed in sociocultural, political, mtiitary, industrial and other factors.
This argument that the substantial portion of funding for science comes directiy
from large social institutions like governments and industrial corporations, gives a clear
picture of strong influences on scientific activity. F r o m this perspective there is only
secondary interest in the logical structure of experiments or the refinement of technique.
The primary interest is in directing scientific activity towards this problem and not that
one, on directing funding to this research project or team and not that one, and on
procuring this set of information or this product, under specified conditions such as time,
confidentiality or cost:
The success and vigour of scientific research, and the effectiveness of its
technological application, are generaUy accepted as indicators of the quality of a
nation's life. Science is so important, and expensive, that the major policy
decisions concerning its development are increasingly being taken by the State,
rather than being left to the judgement of the scientists and their private patrons.
Accordingly, the progress of science becomes a matter of politics; everyone in
the community is involved in the consequences of decisions on 'science policy',
and every citizen is responsible, however indirecdy, for the formation of those
decisions. This social involvement of science wtil necessarily increase over the
decades to come. A n increasing number of practical problems wtil need to be
solved through planned programs of scientific and technological research, and
therisingcost of the many-sided work of science wtil call for the most direct
involvement of the State in its planning. (Ravetz 1971, p. 11)
F r o m this perspective, other sorts of activities also characterise science. Ravetz
addresses four groups of such activities according to particular purposes needing to be
met: activities for protecting property, managing novelty, controlling quality and
(although not addressed explicitly in terms of activity, nonetheless entailing activities in)
maintaining ethical frameworks. These are described in Appendix B.3, but briefly here
they include the following.
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The generation of publications such as articles and research reports, itself a
cotiection of activities, constitutes the creation of a product which in turn needs to be
authenticated and protected, activities which by their very nature are social. The
generation of n e w or novel results in science is in somerespectslike any other creative
h u m a n activity, but there are issues concerning its management that science shares with
few other human activities:
But in science, the achievement and management of novelty do present problems
which are nearly unique. In other sorts of work, an organisation can be quite
successful even if it merely keeps pace with gradual changes in circumstances,
and does its old job well; but in science, afieldin that condition eventually
comes to be judged as stagnant Also, in science, the achievement of novelty of
any significant sort involves a chaUenge to some existing inteUectual property;
and the task of the management of novelty involves the orderly destruction of
personal property, for the fulfilment of the collective goals of the work. (Ravetz
1971, p. 260)
This characterisation has become strained somewhat in the quarter-century since it was
written. It seems reasonable to argue that at least since the mid-1980s, public and private
sector reforms in countries such as Australia have seen accelerating rates of change, such
that the keeping pace Ravetz describes would be judged as insufficient in m a n y more
activities now. In defence of his argument the pace-setters for change in industry largely
comprised those with strong research bases in science - electronics, biotechnologies and
materials sciences are obvious examples - for which keeping pace means a strong
commitment to research and development. The management of the change, though,
remains pertinent, because the creation of n e w knowledge very often entails the
discarding of the established knowledge, activities which by their nature w d l create
tensions. Histories of science are replete with accounts of these tensions and their
resolutions in scientific communities (and wider communities); again, both the intedectual
and the social character of these activities is fundamental.
Quality control has been less of an issue than have protecting property and
managing

novelty prior to the twentieth century, probably due in part to the 'idealist

propaganda of science' by which science was characterised as a largely self-regulating
activity (Ravetz 1971, p. 273). This view is no longer held as strongly, influenced no
doubt by post-positivist critiques of science, and the increasing industrialisation and
general public accountability of science. Thus the mechanisms and criteria for assessing
and maintaining quality are more widely k n o w n now, partly through increasingly public
scrutiny. Thus scientific activity is increasingly subject to public scrutiny, such as
through the competition for resources and funding, especially through application for
grants, and the action and intervention of other groups in society, such as animal welfare
groups. These activities affect not only h o w science is done, but what science is done.
While these social effects m a y have been present in the past but unrecognised, they are
n o w quite evident. Again, they constitute social activities of science.
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The matter of ethics in science, addressed by the present thesis in the companion
chapter on belief systems and Appendix B.2, is not addressed by Ravetz explicitly or
uniquely in terms of activity, but the activities involved in determining, exercising and
monitoring ethical principles and standards need to be acknowledged:
The specification and achievement of a set of personal purposes on a job is thus
a complex affair, which can itself be considered as a task. The different sorts of
activities and unit tasks associated with a job are evaluated by their function in
the achievement of the personal purposes, and individual unit tasks wtil be
specified by private goals, established in accordance with these private
functions, rather than being defined by those w h o direct and control the work.
(Ravetz 1971, pp. 292-3)
Once again, these activities are inherently social in character, since they apply standards
which are c o m m u n a U y and consensuaUy negotiated within a shared belief system.
c) The characterisation of science by activity in science policy
Finally is an example of characterising science by activities identified in public
policy. A n indication of the situation in Australia in the mid-1990s is given in the
publications, Australian Science and Innovation Resources Brief 1994 and Innovate
Australia: The Pace of Change (both Commonwealth of Australia 1994), and the Annual
Report 1994-95 of the Department of. Industry, Science and Technology (Commonwealth
of Australia 1995), henceforth respectively the Resources Brief 1994, Innovate Australia
and the Annual Report 1994-95. Reports such as these make it clear that the Australian
government as with governments elsewhere from about the 1980s, has taken increased
interest in h o w the m o n e y provided to support scientific activity is spent. This is
manifested as more specific and directed science policy, which directs science funding. It
applies to both direct funding, as with cash grants, and indirect funding, as with funding
of universities and creation of projects requiring research and development Thus science
funding has c o m e to be seen as a legitirnisation of government claims to be a stakeholder
in scientific activity, and therefore to have a legitimate say in what scientific activity takes
place, and to what purposes. In particular, the Australian government in the 1990s has
characterised scientific activity as a factor in the economic growth and wed-being of the
country:
The relationship between science and technology effort and economic growth
including the role of innovation in the growth process is important in national
policy considerations. Indicators based on R & D have m a d e an essential
contribution to assessment of the health of the national science and innovation
system and have helped guide the decisions of policy-makers. Surveys of
research and development ( R & D ) activities have provided the focus for the
evolution of science and technology indicators. (Resources Brief 1994, p. 1;
opening paragraph of chapter 1, National Overview).
It might be argued that research and development (henceforth R & D ) is a broader measure
of activity than just scientific activity, and these reports acknowledge distinctions between
science and technology. However, it remains that the funding for scientific activity, and
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the pressures associated with its dispersal, is part of this mix of money. Thus from this
perspective, w e do not look to the manipulation of apparatus or subtleties of reasoning to
indicate scientific activity, let alone the quality of such activity. Instead, government and
other agencies examine other 'indicators' of R & D activity, as given in the Resources
Brief 1994. See Figure Activity 1.
These data were collected by the Australian Bureau of Statistics ( A B S ) , whose
R & D surveys conform to standards formulated by the Organisation for Economic Cooperations and Development (OECD):
The O E C D defines Research and Experimental Development ( R & D ) as fodows:
Research and experimental development comprises creative work
undertaken on a systematic basis in order to increase the stock of
knowledge, including knowledge of m a n [sic], culture and society, and
the use of this stock of knowledge to devise n e w applications.
A n y activity classified as R & D is characterised by originality; it should have
investigation as a primary objective and should have the potential to produce
results that are sufficiently general for humanity's stock of knowledge
(theoretical and/or practical) to be recognisably increased. The outcome of R & D
activity is n e w knowledge, with or without a specific practical application or
n e w or improved materials, products, devises, processes or services.
(Resources Brief 1994, p. 69)
This definition clearly avoids the problems arising from a distinction between pure and
applied research or from boundary concerns - arguments about whether particular activity
is properly ascribed to science or technology or some other related enterprise. Simply, it
includes what would be agreed generatiy as scientific research.
This approach to scientific activity leads, in turn, to different complexities in
characterising science, particularly when compared to positivist accounts of experiment
and explanation. For example, the identification of scientific activity with economic
activity leads to the notion of science as intedectual property (Etzkowitz & Webster
1995). Thus the traditional scientific activity of contesting knowledge is carried out not
just for symbolic or epistemological reasons, but also for economic reasons. Knowledge,
therefore, is capitalised, which draws attention to the different sorts of activities that
comprise three stages of capitalisation.
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Figure 10.1
Indicators of R & D Activity, including scientific activity,
given in the Resources Brief 1994
•

consumption of money earmarked for research and development activities (SA2274 million
fiom the Commonwealth Government in 1990-91)

•

consumption of money for R & D according to 'socio-economic objectives' in all sectors
(defence, economic development national welfare and advancement of knowledge)

•

consumption of money for R & D according tofieldofresearchin non-business sectors (in two
groups, natural sciences/technologies/engineering, and social sciences/humanities)

•

human resources engaged in R & D (full-time equivalent total personnel and scientists/
engineers by sector, support staff per researcher, migration of engineers/ scientists/academics
to Australia)

*

comparisons of international rankings for gross expenditure on research and development as a
percentage of G D P

•

international comparisons of growth in R & D and patenting

•

expenditure by the business sector on R & D over time and as a percentage of G D P

•

expenditure by the government sector on R & D over time and as a percentage of G D P

•

flow of funding support for R & D , from appropriations and other legislation, to various
agencies (government semi-government and non-government) and ultimately to cooperative
research centres established through government initiatives

•

expenditure by the higher education sector on R & D over time and as a percentage of G D P

•

expenditure ('performance') by the higher education sector according to socio-economic
objectives and byfieldof research (categories as above)

•

measures of support for academic researchers and of postgraduate research students

•

measures of total expenditure, total human resource effort and human resource effort by type,
forfieldof research (where 'effort' is measured in person years)

•

measures of graduate completions of degrees (PhD, master and bachelor, over time and against
other countries)

•

expenditure and human resources in R & D in non business sectors by socio-economic
objective

* expenditure and human resources in R & D in business sectors by product field

The first stage is securing knowledge as private property, typicady by patents and
copyrights applying for specified periods:
Through these mechanisms, a particular technique for producing antibodies that
canfightcancer ceds can take on the status of 'property'. Intedectual property is
not only owned but, as such, carries all the exploitation rights ownership
normally confers: It can be invested; it can be exchanged wholly or partly for
other goods, services or money; and it can be used to prevent other, similar
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ideas from trespassing on its inteUectual domain, through being granted patent
protection. (Etzkowitz & Webster 1995, p. 483)
The marked increase in patenting activity in m a n y countries from the 1980s is well
documented (Etzkowitz & Webster 1995, pp. 483-4).
The second stage in the capitalisation of knowledge is accruing value from secured
knowledge, typically 'through marketing and licensing activities', notably with increasing
attention to strategic and applied research.
The third stage is renewing and increasing the value of the knowledge, not as
developed as thefirsttwo stages, but typicaUy 'involving coordination among industrial,
academic, and government actors' (Etzkowitz & Webster 1995, p. 484). Although
government coordination was typicady resisted by capitalist countries such as the U K and
U S A , it is increasingly identified 'worldwide' (Etzkowitz & Webster 1995, p. 485).
These activities lead, in turn, to other activities undertaken that enable scientific
success in terms of securing the research funding. Thus the traditional credit earned by
publication activity acquires added value in terms of accumulating the 'credit' necessary
to win competitive grants. This, and the increasing recognition of scientific work by
holding patents, encourages research by stable research groups rather than individuals:
W h a t is, however, perhaps most noteworthy about today's science is that m a n y
claims to 'credit' that previously would have been recognised only eponymously
- as in 'Boyle's L a w ' or 'Einstein's theory of relativity' - are recognised as
belonging to a certain scientist or team of scientists, because of the patent they
hold on it - such as the Cohen-Boyer patent on D N A cloning techniques.
Gaining 'credibility' in science is increasingly tied to the abdity to generate
exploitable knowledge, making scientists m o r e akin to 'economic'
entrepreneurs. (Etzkowitz & Webster 1995, p. 487)
The trends to characterise science increasingly in terms of inteUectual property and
commercial potential are widely discussed in the S T S literature, which suggests five
socio-economic activities as contributing (Etzkowitz & Webster 1995, pp. 494ff). First
m u c h n e w research is not well-characterised by a distinction between pure and applied,
and is increasingly underpinned by combined and generic scientific/technological
knowledge. Secondly, there are new divisions of labour, and distinctions between public
and private-sector research activity are increasingly blurred. Thirdly, production activity
in capitalist organisations is changing to a more flexible, post-Fordist (non production
line) character which suits closer ties between universities and industries. Fourthly,
research activity is increasingly competitive, with the decline of set grants and the
pressure for universities to seek external funding. Fifthly, universities have acted in some
places, notably in the U K and U S A in the 1980s but more widely since then, as regional
focuses for research in place of direct government intervention in research.
Etzkowitz and Webster concluded that this n e w conception of scientific activity is
displacing traditional notions of capital and labour, and the activities associated with the
generation of knowledge give rise to significant questions about the role, place and
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control of such knowledge in society. T h e 1990s, for example, has seen significant
public debate about the information society, the information superhighway and control of
telecommunications. W e have not seriously addressed other characterisations of scientific
activity in S T S accounts, but their diversity (see Gallon, above, and in Table B.5.1)
provides a range of insights into, and perspectives on, scientific activity beyond
experiment.
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Table B.5.1
Examples of characterisation of key metascientific viewpoints
by activity
Author

Viewpoint

Distinguishing

Suppe 1973,
1979

Received View
(RV)

induction, justifying,
Camap
confirming, reduction of
theories, as what should happen
various; actual rather than idealAchinstein, Rapoport
activities
Bohm, Feyerabend, Hanson,
various; scientific activity within
Kuhn, Popper, Toulmin
conceptual perspective

sceptical
descriptive
Weltanschauungen
(world view)
semantic or
model-theory
historical
realism
empiricism

activity

Identified in the w o r k of

various; description of indicative,
Beth, Suppe, Suppes, van
abstracted activities
Fraasen
actual practices, both historical
Lakatos, Shapere, Toulmin
and contemporary
Bhaskar 1983
observation
Francis Bacon, Berkeley,
Hobbes, H u m e , Locke, M a c h
(positivism), Mill, Russell,
Vienna Circle (logical
empiricism)
idealism
reasoning from mental constructs
Berkeley, Fichte, Hegel, H u m e ,
or ideas
Kant, Plato, Schelling,
reatism
reasoning
Aristotle, Bachelard, Bhaskar,
(Platonic realism)
Duhem, Feyerabend, Hanson,
observation
Harr6, Hesse, H u m e , Kant
(Aristotelian realism)
Koyr6, Kuhn, Plato, Popper,
perception (perceptual or
Putnam, Quine
empirical realism)
perceptions and other activities,
including social activities
(scientific realism)
....,.,.. „ , „....
reasoning
Nussbaum 1989
Descartes, Kant, Plato
rationalism
empiricism/
observation
Bacon, Comte, Hempel, H u m e ,
positivism
Locke
construction cf knowledge
constructivism
Kuhn, Lakatos, Popper,
Toulmin
Explain experimental data that
post-positivist
(a) Camap, Hempel, H u m e ,
Boyd,Gaspar
correspond with the facts or with Popper
and Trout 1991 consensus
reatity, while acknowledging the (b) Hanson, Kuhn
comprising (a)
theory-laden nature of
post-positivist
(c) Boyd, Goodman, Kripke,
empiricism (b) observations.
Putnam, Quine
neo-Kantian
constructivism
(c) scientific
realism
'appraisal of conceptual
Pickering 1992 scientific
knowledge claims against
knowledge as
observational knowledge...
objective
ideally governed by some logic
(logical
or method' (footnote, p. 3)
empiricism)
scientific
Kuhn, Feyerabend
knowledge as
relative to
culture
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Callon 1995

scientific
knowledge as
relative to
interests
(sociology of
scientific
knowledge SSK)
science as
rational
knowledge
science as
competitive
enterprise
science as
sociocultural
practice
science as
extended
translation

•••

•••**"

'•'

•••

Barnes, Bloor, Callon,
Cartwright, Collins, Garfinkel,
Gilbert, Knorr Cetina, Latour,
L a w , Lynch, Mulkay, Shapin,
Woolgar

production of statements from
the dialogue between humans and
Nature
production and competitive
evaluation of scientific
knowledge
production of knowledge by
socio-cultural and epistemic
activities
activities and interactions of all
participants ('actants')

Hesse, Holton, Popper

Althusser, Ben-Cole, David,
Freudenthal, Hull, Merton,
Popper
Bachelard, Barnes, Collins,
Fleck, Knorr, Kuhn, Mulkay,
Pinch, Ravetz, Rudwick,
Schaffer, Wise, Wittgenstein
A m a a n , Callon, Foucault, Knorr
Cetina, Latour, Pickering, Wise,
Woolgar
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Appendix B.6
Argument from the metascientific literature emphasising the dimension
knowledge
Appendix B.6 reviews and analyses some of the argument in the literature that
characterises science by knowledge. Although knowledge is one of the two dimensions
traditionally used to characterise science, this association did not m a k e the present
analysis necessarily easier: tradition is not sufficient reason to substantiate an analysis of
this type, and exactiy what w e m e a n by knowledge is rarely explained in general science
texts, other than to addressfieldsor disciplines of knowledge. W h e n w e turn to the
metascientific literatures, there are strong and diverse views about the nature of scientific
knowledge, whose complexity is compounded by views in other literatures, such as
psychology. In informal discussions with a number of scientists and science educators
during the writing of this thesis, most viewed scientific knowledge primarily as a list or
m a p of knowledge content, but this characterisation alone is unsatisfactory. With some
prompting, most agreed that science knowledge was more problematic than this, as
discussed in the metascientific literature, and in any event attempting to provide a
comprehensive m a p of such content could never be definitive. Related to its often
unspecified use, the term knowledge is used commonly in conjunction with one or
another of several other terms, for example belief, understanding and information, whose
meaning and relationship to knowledge are likewise often imprecise and interpreted
variously. Appendix B.6 delineates some of these uses and relationships in
characterisations of science, and is set out as fodows.
B . 6.1

Current metascientific views of knowledge

B.6.2

Dlustrating an historical tradition of science by knowledge

B . 6.3

Knowledge and belief
a)
standard definitions of knowledge

B . 6.4

Kinds of knowledge
a)
knowledge h o w and knowledge that
b)

internalist and externalist theories of knowledge

B.6.5

Knowledge and information

B.6.6

Knowledge and understanding

B . 6.7

Knowledge / understanding as concepts and propositions

B . 6.8

Knowledge and power

B . 6.9

Knowledge as a m a p of scientific content or topics
a)

current scientific conceptions

Appendix B.6: Knowledge

860

6.1 Current metascientific views of knowledge
There are various accounts of knowledge in the metascientific literature. Table
B.6.1 presents a summary of various analyses of metascientific viewpoints, to enable
some comparisons based on notions of knowledge. Each view addresses at least one
aspect of knowledge.
This thesis recognises three main positions in contemporary H P S : post-positivist
empiricism, idealism or neo-Kantianism, and scientific realism. In (a) empiricism w e gain
our knowledge of Nature from experience, emphasising the role of the senses in
codecting observational data. W e have noted in the companion chapter on activity that
most other accounts also hold experience to be an essential, even if not central, dimension
of science. In (b) idealism our knowledge is structured by the intedect, as in the theoryladen-ness of observations or the selection and interpretation of observations through a
world view or Weltanschauungen.
Finally, (c) scientific realism holds that the
possibilities of our knowledge are given in, or constrained by, an external reality, but our
knowledge of it is produced socially and psychologicady.
In contemporary S T S , Cation's (1995) summary of approaches in the field
suggests four categories. Thus, where science is characterised as (a) rational knowledge,
it concerns knowledge as structured in scientific statements. These statements are most
commonly classified as observation statements, that account for experiments and data
cotiection, and theoretical statements, that account for conjectures and generalisations.
Production of knowledge is thus production of these two kinds of statements, (b) W h e r e
science is characterised as a competitive enterprise, the emphasis is on particular activities
of knowledge development: both the production of knowledge as theoretical statements,
and the evaluation of this knowledge by a process of competition or struggle. This model
is not concerned with the content of the knowledge, which it assumes to be published and
judged by codeagues:
These publications are in principle intelligible to specialists in thefield.O n e can
make use of the notion of information to speak of their contents. This knowledge
or information is characterised by its novelty, its originality, or perhaps its
degree of generality. A n evaluation of its utility, as perceived by others scientists or nonscientists - is also possible. This model does not exclude the
existence of tacit skids, but this is aduded to without being turned into a specific
component. (Callon 1995, p. 36)
Where science is characterised as (c) sociocultural practice, the focus is on the production
of knowledge within a broader context than just the production of statements that can be
interpreted at face value. This model takes science to be a h u m a n activity alongside ad
other h u m a n activities: social factors 'are as important as the constraints that arise from
the order of discourse' (Callon 1995, p. 42). This model does not accept that science
knowledge is given completely in a body of theoretical statements: rather that the meaning
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of statements arises partly from their contexts, and that some science knowledge
comprises the k n o w - h o w of scientists. It argues that m u c h knowledge in science is
implicit and not codified, as in Polyani's theory of tacit knowledge:
Certain knowledge - for example, knowledge linked to the functioning of
instruments or the interpretation of data supplied by these instruments - cannot
be expressed in the form of explicit statements. In this view science is an
adventure that depends on local know-how, on specific tricks of the trade, and
on rules that cannot easily be transposed. Formal statements can only travel and
be understood in their instrumental environment and the knowledge incorporated
in h u m a n beings is the same. (Cation 1995, p. 42)
Where science is characterised as (d) extended translation, it concerns the production of
statements, as in model (a), but goes beyond the notion of codified knowledge, to
account for the 'nonpropositional elements' that link and stabilise statements, as in model
(c) (Callon 1995, p. 50). Thus it characterises scientific knowledge as networks of
statements about the world, that derive their meaning from the coherence between actants
(technical devices, statements and human beings).
Li c o m m o n with the approach taken in the other companion chapters, the remainder
of this chapter presents some of the ways in which the term knowledge is used when
characterising science, rather than arguing from philosophical or sociological
assumptions. That is, it seeks to show h o w different characterisations use knowledge to
mean different things.
6.2 The role of knowledge in characterising a western European scientific tradition
As explained in Appendix B.l on context most histories of science have been
straightforward internalist, W h i g histories. That is, they trace the historical development
of scientific ideas or knowledge, and tend to trace the successful ideas, meaning those
interpreted as precursors of later ideas. Thus these histories characterise the development
of scientific knowledge as the progressive march of history. Examples are given in the
historical section of Appendix B.l, and in Table B.6.2, which shows h o w a historical
sequence of ideas, structured as knowledge propositions, characterises a history of
science. The selection in Table B.6.2 is arbitrary: from the detati included it is clear that
any attempt to be comprehensive, even if that were possible, would be beyond the scope
of the present thesis. S o m e entries show a developmental sequence over time; others
represent ideas that were rejected after some time. S o m e historical figures and the
knowledge for which they wereresponsibleare very well known, such as Newton and
others from the Scientific Revolution, and laterfigures;others whose names are widely
known, such as Aristode, developed concepts that are not widely understood today
except by those w h o have studied them; and others are mostiy unknown except for those
w h o have m a d e explicit studies of their works. For these reasons, the scope of Table
B.6.2 covers that which is generally less w e d known, and extends from the Ionian

Appendix B.6: Knowledge

862

Thales, in antiquity, to the earlyfiguresof the Scientific Revolution. The last contribution
included is that of the great astronomer, Johannes Kepler, because of a particularly
insightful quote from Hanson (1958), that concerns the theory-laden-ness of
observations, and therefore of scientific knowledge. Hanson observed that Tycho Brahe
(1546-1601) and Kepler (1571-1630), representing successive generations of
astronomers, saw 'different things at dawn' (quoted in Suppe 1979, pp. 158-9), meaning
that the knowledge of one was framed essentiady within the Aristotelian/Ptolemaic
context and the other within a new paradigm. That is, the 'facts' of observation are stated
within a particular framework of concepts and theory, which illustrates a salient point
about the nature of scientific knowledge. Finishing with this example lends a nice
metaphor about the sun rising and the world turning in the history of science!
S o m e writers characterise science knowledge by a broader history than just the
western European tradition. For example, Ronan (1982) has argued that science exists in
every culture, and so it is unsurprising that he saw the beginning of science as long
before the Ionians. Significandy, he characterised this beginning by knowledge:
The flame of science, as w e have described it, first glimmered some ten
thousand or more years ago in the Middle East. It began w h e n m a n [sic] started
to gather knowledge, mainly but not only for day-to-daytiving.(Ronan 1982, p.
14)
This included descriptions and detatis of animals and plants, both domesticated and w d d ,
for reasons of their usefulness and sometimes for their intrinsic interest alone. Other
knowledge, on Ronan's account, accumulated concerning lifting and moving heavy
loads, tanning hides, weaving,firingand glazing pottery, smelting ores, deploying
pharmacological substances, and so on. This was very m u c h a practical, experiential
knowledge, and one could argue that by definition it has featured through the history of
Homo

sapiens. Others, like Wolpert (1992) reject broader characterisations such as

Ronan's. For Wolpert, the western European scientific tradition began with Thales of
Miletus, as w e have discussed in Appendix B.l on context. His reason is that Thales
sought to explain the material world in 'terms that might be subject to verification', for the
purpose offinding'a fundamental unity in Nature' (Wolpert 1992, p. 35).
T h e present thesis interprets differences such as these as competing attempts at
boundary work, that to be understood need to be analysed for the reasons behind these
claims. Ronan argued, in essence, that characteristics of what w e current understand as
science can be found in many cultures, including very ancient ones. Conversely, Wolpert
(p. 124) argued that science is exceptional, because it is counter-intuitive and therefore
different to other forms of knowledge, and because it provides our 'best' knowledge of
the world. Wolpert characterises the practical, experiential knowledge, mentioned by
Ronan, as technology, and technology as not-science. These are arguments best
understood by considering all the dimensions of the characterisations, such as the six
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proposed in the present thesis. W h e n analysed in this way, the different purposes of the
authors become clear as attempts to create different boundaries, for different reasons.
6.3 Knowledge and belief
Knowledge is used commonly in conjunction with belief or beliefs. Both
philosophical and general uses characterise belief at least partly as a disposition or
attitude, such as a conviction or confidence that something is the case, and knowledge as
a more certain state than belief. Beliefs are discussed in more detati elsewhere1, so w e
need only note here that belief m a y be thought of as a conviction or acceptance of a claim:
Belief:
1.
that which is believed; an accepted opinion.
2.
conviction of the truth or reality of a thing, based upon grounds
insufficient to afford positive knowledge: statements unworthy of belief.
3.
confidence; faith; trust: a child's belief in his [sic] parents.
4.
a religious tenet or tenets. (The Macquarie Dictionary; emphases in
original)
The concern here is the relationship between belief and knowledge, which although
c o m m o n enough in the literature, is m a d e clear rarely except in the literature expressly
dealing with knowledge (epistemology).
The classic relationship between knowledge and betief is attributed usually to Plato,
w h o argued 'that knowledge involves true belief but goes beyond it' (Quinton 1988b, p.
279). This relationship is given typically as a distinction between knowledge (episteme)
and mere belief (doxa) or true belief (orthe doxa): episteme is betief with reasons.
However, this is incomplete and misses some of the subtlety of Plato's argument (Tiles &
Tiles 1993, pp. 11-19). First, the term episteme as used by Plato does not mean simply
knowledge, as commonly translated into m o d e m English: rather, it draws on a notion of
know-how,

which w e will address in the discussion below of

knowledge-how.

Secondly, Plato often used episteme in conjunction with, and sometimes interchangeably
with techne, whose translation into m o d e m English as skill or craft again fads to convey
the richer meaning in the Greek:
[T]he exercise of a techne involves a process of thought which can generate an
account of what it offers, as well as explanations of its procedure based on the
nature of those objectives. It is know-how backed up by thought which is able to
articulate reasons. (Tiles & Tdes 1993, pp. 11-12)
(It w a s Plato's pupil, Aristotle, w h o later distinguished between techne, as exercising
discursive thought toward producing something like an artefact, and episteme, as
exercising discursive thought toward producing a rational discourse in the form of
demonstration; demonstration communicates episteme.) Essentiady, Plato viewed
knowledge as certain, infallible or more secure than a belief, even w h e n the belief is true:
1 See section 6.5, below, and the companion chapter on belief system.
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Plato [acknowledges] that for the purposes of succeeding at what one is doing,
a correct doxa m a y serve just as w e d as episteme, but the former is unstable,
liable to escape, unless tethered d o w n and turned into episteme by 'working out
the reasons' (Meno 98a). (Tiles & Tties 1993, p. 15)
That is, knowledge is a secure state because it is reasoned. This can also apply in the
sense of knowledge beingfirsthand experience, and belief being mere hearsay. For
example, if I give directions based on m y o w n experience, they are based on episteme,
whereas if I do not have the experience, they are based on doxa. If following the
directions is interpreted as a metaphor for the chain of reasoning that tethers the doxa and
converts it into episteme, then one can only have knowledge by basing it on reasoning,
and not on the authority of someone else. Simdarly, Plato distinguished between technai
of producing, such as bridle-making, and technai of using, such as horseriding. Thus
horseriders have episteme of bridles, whereas bridle-makers have only true doxa - relying
on theriders'knowledge - unless they stop making w h d e they gain theriders'expertise:
W h e n bridle-makers explain their procedures, and w h y they adopt the materials
and design which they do, they have to rely on principles which belong to this
other area of expertise. If they do not possess die horserider's expertise, they
must rely on the horserider's authority. In that case, w h e n they explain their
procedure, they are like the person w h o gives directions ... on the basis of
hearsay. (Tiles 8c Tdes 1993, p. 15)
Thus knowledge, which is reasoned, is more secure than betief, which is not. F r o m these
examples, knowledge is more secure also because it is based on personal experience
rather than relying on others' knowledge.
Another relationship between knowledge and betief is that beliefs, not being
reasoned like knowledge, are generady unstated and form part of the assumptions that
underpin scientific activity, knowledge and so forth2. Traditional positivist accounts
assumed a correspondence between scientific belief, knowledge and experimental activity
that is chadenged in post-positivist metascience:
T h e study of controversies became the methodological focus of a sociology of
scientific knowledge, which developed in the early 1970s and resulted in a
thoroughgoing sociological contextuatisation of science (see Bloor 1976); it
examined, for example, h o w internal scientific standards and experimental
evidence fail to provide for scientists' betiefs (e.g., Collins 1975 and 1981) and
h o w the beliefs and knowledge claims of scientists are influenced by their social
context (e.g., Barnes 1977; MacKenzie 1981; Pickering 1984). Unfinished
knowledge - the knowledge that is yet in the process of being constituted - on the
other hand, became the province of laboratory studies. (Knorr Cetina 1995, p.
141)
That is, the shift from normative to descriptive accounts of science has revealed that,
contrary to the positivist R V of science, scientists' betiefs and knowledge claims do not

2

Discussed also in the companion chapter on belief system and Appendix B.2.
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correspond with experimental results unswervingly, w h d e they are influenced by social
factors.
This relatedness and difference between knowledge and betief is identified in the
S T S literature as a resource in science-based disputes: betief is held to be less scientific,
even unscientific, w h e n compared with scientific knowledge. For the present thesis,
science is characterised c o m m o n l y by betief systems, albeit not as c o m m o n l y or explicidy
as by knowledge, and also by other dimensions. That is, knowledge and beliefs
characterise science in two senses: in the broader sense that knowledge and systems of
betief are two of several dimensions of characterisation, and in the narrower sense that
knowledge and belief arerelatedmental states. O n e does not cease to have betiefs w h e n
one has knowledge, nor are beliefs unscientific: indeed, the present thesis argues that
scholarly characterisations of science include, not preclude, scientists having belief
systems. Arguments about beliefs being 'scientific' or not (and the discussion in
Appendix B.l on context has s h o w n that agreement on this is difficult) are arguments
about the contents of the beliefs and other elements of the belief system like criteria.
Standard definitions of knowledge
This relationship between belief and knowledge w a s embodied in the definition of
knowledge that until recent times w a s almost universady agreed in phdosophy, that is, in
epistemology. T h e standard view w a s that knowledge, at least of propositions3, entatis
belief or belief-like attitudes such as psychological certainty, conviction or acceptance
(Luper-Foy 1992, p. 234). That is, to k n o w something is also to believe that it is so.
Thus, the so-called standard

analysis, or tripartite definition, of (propositional)

knowledge defines knowledge in terms of betief, following Plato, Kant and others:
The tripartite definition of knowledge states that propositional knowledge, i.e.
knowledge that p, has three individuaUy necessary and jointly sufficient
conditions: justification, truth and belief. In short, propositional knowledge is
justified true betief. T h e belief condition requires that anyone w h o knows that/?
believe that/?. T h e troth condition requires that any k n o w n proposition be true.
A n d the justification condition requires that any k n o w n proposition be
adequately justified, warranted or evidentially supported. (Moser 1992, p. 509)
That is, on the standard analysis, w e know a proposition w h e n w e have justified true
belief of it w h e n w e believe it w e are justified in believing it and the subject of the belief
is true^. This is consistent with the R V of science knowledge, that a scientific theory (that

3
4

Propositions are statements having the phrase that p, as in I know that p is the case. W e will
return to propositions in section 6.7, below.
The three conditions of knowledge are important (1) W e know something when we have a
conviction that it is true or believe it: it may well be true but if we don't believe it we do not have
knowledge of it (2) W e must have sound reasons or are justified in having the belief, such as
support of evidence: it is possible for us to believe, but have faulty reasons for doing so, and so
we do not have knowledge of it (3) The subject of the belief must be true: w e may well have
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is, its set of laws, axioms and correspondence rules) is empirically true if it truly
describes 'conditions obtaining in the world' (Suppe 1979, p. 94). That is, science
knowledge is true knowledge because it comprises true and justified beliefs. This
identification of science knowledge with truth partly explains the residual appeal of the
positivist R V :
Nature is assumed to hold a unique truth and the current state of scientific
knowledge is assumed to be the best avadable approximation to that truth. There
is no need to examine w h y scientists believe what they believe, because there are
assumed to be no social factors intervening between nature and scientific truth.
(Martin & Richards 1995, p. 510)
The positivist approach assumes there is an objective scientific truth that, sooner
or later, wid be revealed ... (Martin & Richards 1995, p. 520)
T h e epistemological specialness of science rests on the claim that science is a
search for truth. This 'truth' is believed to be public, testable, and universal
rather than merely particular or parochial in nature. Implicit in this conjunction of
truth and science is that science is good because the truth is good in its o w n
right. (Bimber & Guston 1995, p. 556)
However, the tripartite definition of knowledge is n o longer universally endorsed.
First it w a s subject to telling criticism. In 1963 E d m u n d Gettier published some counter
examples of having justified true beliefs that are not certain knowledge, and philosophy
has not agreed yet on a solution to what became k n o w n as the Gettier problem. Most
attempts to solve the Gettier problem have been to suggest a fourth condition (Podock
1986, p. 9). A n example of such a fourth condition is that w e should also require the
totality of truths that sustain the justified true belief. That is, there should be counter
propositions to restore the justification for believing all propositions weakened by Gettier
propositions (Moser 1993, p. 158-9). However, some accounts deny that knowledge
entails betief (Luper-Foy 1992, pp. 234-7).
Secondly, post-positivist accounts of science have questioned not only betief, but
the notions of objective truth and justification. T h e strong version of this view
emphasises the negotiated and contested character of science knowledge:
T h e old understanding assumed that good science produced truth and that truthproducers deserved a special role in politics. T h e n e w understanding treats
scientific knowledge as a negotiated product of h u m a n inquiry, formed not only
via interaction a m o n g scientists, but also by research patrons and regulatory
adversaries. If all scientific knowledge is negotiated, then its content depends in
crucial w a y s on h o w negotiating authority is distributed. (Cozzens &
W o o d h o u s e 1995, p534)
A weaker version of this view acknowledges the negotiation of knowledge, but also that
within the science community, empirical evidence is central to this negotiation. A main

justification in believing a proposition, but if it is false, we do not have knowledge of it (Moser
1993a, 1993b)
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difference between the two versions is whether or not 'research patrons and regulatory
adversaries' play a direct role in constituting science knowledge. The strong version
argues that they do; the w e a k version accepts that their role does affect science
knowledge, but only as external agents to the work of the scientists w h o m a k e science
knowledge. W e will return to these critiques later in this chapter. The significant point
here is that these views presume neither the existence nor the possibility of absolute truth
or justification: science knowledge is accepted as the best avadable and justifiedfitto
empirical results, and not as absolutely true. In this view, definitions of knowledge like
the tripartite definition are not relevant
6.4 Kinds of knowledge
In discussing kinds of knowledge, the present thesis concerns itself with how
knowledge is characterised in the metascientific literature, whether there is a characteristic
kind of scientific knowledge, and if so, the nature of this scientific knowledge. A s a first
approach, one could search for examples of knowledge caded science, and as w e shall
see, such examples can be found. However, the notion that there is a kind of knowledge
simply identified as science is opposed by m u c h of epistemology, the branch of
philosophy that addresses knowledge, and thefieldof S T S . Instead, the present thesis
argues that science is characterised by certain kinds of knowledge, but not simply so: (a)
not all kinds of knowledge characterise science; (b) the kinds of knowledge by which w e
characterise science are not unique to it and are found also in otherfields;and (c) science
is characterised by these kinds of knowledges in combination with certain structures,
contexts, purposes, belief systems and activities. W h e n w e examine the literature, w e
find discussions of several kinds or types of knowledge, and some of these are used to
characterise science.
Hirst's forms of knowledge
There are examples of characterising kinds of knowledge where one kind is labeded
science. A notable example in the phdosophy of education is Hirst's (1974) conception of
the school curriculum as seven forms of knowledge, of which science is one:
1.

mathematics and logic (deductive/analytical forms of knowing in which
relations are expressed symbolically)

2.

physical science (empirical forms of knowing in which troths are tested by
observation and experiment)

3.

history and the h u m a n sciences (forms involving propositions connected with
intentions)

4.

literature andfinearts (aesthetic forms)

5.

morals (rationady deduced form a broad base of other understandings)
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6. retigion
7. philosophy.
Hirst argued that these are logically separated, and non-overlapping, because they are
based on different conceptual frameworks and tests for truth. The present thesis interprets
this as a characterisation by knowledge in combination with structure (conceptual
framework), activity (testing) and belief system (criteria for truth).
However, there are strong arguments opposing any essentialist notion of
characteristic scientific knowledge such as Hirst's. First, Hirst's criteria appear arbitrary,
and so the character and number of his forms appear arbitrary (Evers & Walker 1983)
even though some commentators see them as useful nonetheless (Mackenzie 1985).
Secondly, the H P S and S T S literatures have pursued other questions and developed other
conceptions of knowledge that are significant, as shown below, yet seem ignored by
characterisations such as Hirst's. Thirdly, the present thesis argues that characterisations
of that type are inadequate compared to the post-positivist accounts in H P S and S T S
fields. Therefore Hirst's criteria for forms of knowledge appear arbitrary and weakly
defended for the present purpose.
Justification of knowledge in traditional epistemology
Pollock (1986, p. 10) has argued that the primary concern of epistemology has not
been knowledge itself, but instead 'deciding what to believe', or h o w w e justify
knowledge:
The theory of knowledge is an attempt to answer the question, ' H o w do you
know?', but this is a question about how one knows, and not about knowing per
se. In asking h o w a person knows something w e are typically asking for his
[sic] grounds for believing it W e want to k n o w what justifies him in holding his
betief. Thus epistemology has traditionally focussed on epistemic justification
more than on knowledge. Epistemology might better be caded 'doxastology' [or
the study of beliefs]. (Potiock 1986, p. 7; emphases in original)
Thus Pollock argues that epistemology is afieldof theories characterised by the solutions
they offer to general problems found in ad areas of knowledge; it does not suggest any
distinct form of knowledge called science in its o w n right, as Hirst had suggested.
Potiock argues that there are several problems: (i) the nature and legitimacy of reasoning
by which a proposition is justified by evidence; (ti) whether or not there are foundations
to knowledge (meaning whether knowledge beliefs are based on simple, basic beliefs that
require no justification themselves, such as betiefs about perceptions); and (iii) the source
of norms that govern our reasoning and by which w e justify our beliefs. W e w d l address
these matters presendy.
Rorty's rejection of any theory or analysis of knowledge
S o m e accounts reject the possibility of a theory of knowledge, and hence
epistemology and any independent philosophical analysis of knowledge. A notable
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instance is the notion of the death of epistemology, best k n o w n in the work of the
philosopher Richard Rorty, that an informative analysis of knowledge is not possible
(Williams 1993). This is a constructivist or neo-Kantian argument that theories of
knowledge, and indeed the very conception that there can be a theory of knowledge, are
constructed; and, therefore, what is constructed can be deconstructed. Theories of
knowledge, therefore, are neither significant nor perennial but instead arise from
historically and culturally contingent concepts such as rationality. Watson-Verran and
TurnbuU (1995), for example, have argued that critiques of this kind, that reject
objectivity, undermine both the claim of scientific objectivity, and its ideological use in
promoting the h e g e m o n y of Western culture. However, s o m e post-positivist
philosophers w h o also reject simplistic notions of objectivity argue that analysis of
knowledge should be continued and refined, not abandoned: it is both desirable and
useful (Potiock 1986; Bhaskar 1989; Tiles 8c Tdes 1993).
The present thesis suggests two conclusions that summarise this state of theorising
about knowledge, particularly as it applies to science knowledge. First, there is a range of
views about the nature of science knowledge, and the present thesis is concerned to
indicate and analyse this range, not to arguefromfirstprinciples towards a particular
view. This means that the present thesis accepts as one among many the view that there is
a characteristic science knowledge, that can be analysed; it does not presume an
identifiably distinct science knowledge and then seek to clarify it. Secondly, these views
differ in their account of h o w knowledge arises from particular activities, purposes,
contexts, structures and belief systems. For example, the belief system of positivist
approaches (as described by Martin and Richards 1993, p. 510) includes the assumption
or belief that Nature holds a unique truth and that 'scientific knowledge is assumed to be
the best available approximation to that truth'. In an extreme positivism, as in the R V , the
purpose of scientific activity is to develop true and objective knowledge; in either case the
underlying belief is that the troths of Nature are eternal and unchanging, as discussed in
Appendix B.2 on betief system. A n alternative view, more typical of the post-positivist
consensus, characterises science as seeking to develop the best available knowledge,
meaning to best approximate agreed criteria of objectivity.
Knowledge-how and knowledge-that
Different perspectives of knowledge are addressed elsewhere in the present thesis,
particularly by different internal structures and different activities in the companion
chapters on structure and activity, respectively. These include empirical knowledge, a
priori knowledge, and knowledge arising from deduction and induction. However,
discussions of characteristic structures or associated activities do not address the
characterisation of these forms as knowledge. There are different kinds or areas of
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knowledge proposed in the literature, based on the different ways in which w e k n o w or
claim to know, and there are problems with each area (Dancy 1985; Potiock 1986;
Quinton 1988b; Dancy & Sosa (eds) 1992). Most kinds are c o m m o n to most accounts of
knowledge: they include empirical/perceptual, a priori, moral, memory, inductive and
tacit knowledges. W e shall mention here two fairly standard characterisations of kinds of
knowledge.
O n e approach is a standard reference summary of senses of knowledge arising from
interpretations of knowing, namely that essentiady w e can have either knowledge-how or
knowledge-that:
O n e way of distinguishing kinds of knowledge is into practical knowledge-how,
propositional knowledge-that, and knowledge-of. However, the various sorts of
knowledge-of seem reducible to either to knowledge-how (e.g. knowing Italian)
or to knowing-that (e.g. knowing the date of the batde of Waterloo). Within
knowledge-that the prime concern of epistemologists, empirical and a priori
knowledge are distinguished and, within each of these realms, the basic or
intuitive items of knowledge are distinguished from the derived or inferred ones.
A priori knowledge is derived from its self-evident axiomatic bases by
deduction; empirical knowledge from uninferred observation-statements by
induction. The usuady acknowledged sources of empirical knowledge are senseperception and introspection, while a priori knowledge is said to c o m e from
reason. (Quinton 1988b, p. 279)
Thus what is usually characterised as the body of scientific knowledge, that is, its
framework of concepts and understandings, is knowledge-that. Note, though, that this
does not claim a distinct kind of knowledge called science; knowledge-that is not uniquely
identified as science, except in strong positivism. Knowledge-that is the subject of a
considerable literature, and is addressed in the present thesis across the companion
chapters and their respective appendices: the central empirical character of science in most
accounts; debates about the relative status of empirical (inductive) and a priori (deductive)
activities; and the commonsense appeal but logicaUy flawed nature of induction.
However, knowledge-how receives relatively scant attention in the literature. W e
have seen that Plato's conception of episteme was more like the present-day conception of
know-how than simply knowledge-that Probably the strongest current characterisations
of science by knowledge-how are strands of interest in s o m e of the (usually) S T S
literature that address science as work, and include a shift of interest from logical analyses
of experiment to analyses of the total interactions in laboratories. For example, Ravetz
(1971) has characterised science using craft as an analogy, pardy because of the
knowledge-how that is typicaUy tacit; the notion of tacit knowledge w a s introduced by
Polanyi (1958) 'to account for the transmission of noncodified information' (Callon
1995, p. 42). Thus although knowledge-how is usually ignored in the philosophy
literature, it features strongly in the characterisation of science as work, as influenced by
Ravetz:
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[W]ithout an appreciation of the craft character of scientific work there is no
possibility of resolving the paradox of the radical difference between the
subjective, intensely personal activity of creative science, and the objective,
impersonal knowledge which results from it. W h e n w e think of material objects
produced by handicraft rather than by mass-production, w e easdy appreciate the
distinctive features of this sort of work. The craftsman [sic] works with
particular objects; he must k n o w their properties in all their particularity; and his
knowledge of them cannot be specified in a formal account. Indeed, no explicit
description of a craftsman's techniques, and the objects on which he works, can
be more than the simplest elements of the subject They can be useful for the
beginner, but he must develop a personal, tacit knowledge of his objects and
what he can do with them, if he is to produce good work. Indeed, m u c h of his
technique m a y not even have the character of conscious knowledge; by
experience, his hands and eyes have taught themselves. It is this subtie
interaction of the craftsman with his material, producing slighdy different copies
of the same general model, which gives handicraft productions their special
charm. (Ravetz 1971, pp. 75-6)
Ravetz observed that notions of talent or personal (tacit) knowledge are hardly implied by
the impersonal (acontextual) writings of classical science. T o redress this, he gave a
detaded discussion of the m a n y individual judgements and expressions of tacit knowledge
- that is, examples of knowledge-how - in data collection, calibration and manipulation of
instruments, and so forth. Thus, as discussed in Appendix B.5 on activity, Ravetz (1971
p. 103) characterised scientific inquiry as 'a craft activity depending on a body of
knowledge which is informal and partly tacit', although he acknowledged that this is not
usuady interpreted as a characteristic of science:
We have already seen several ways in which the work of scientific inquiry
requires knowledge which is learned only through precept and experience in a
multitude of particular cases, and which is therefore not 'scientific' in character.
(Ravetz 1971, p. 101).
That is, he acknowledges that the normative R V of science allowed only knowledge-that
as scientific, whereas his o w n descriptive view also characterises science by the less
formal, less structured, knowledge-how.
The present thesis argues that in making this claim, Ravetz characterises science by
both types of knowledge: mainly knowledge-how in experimental activity, and mainly
knowledge-that as it is written up formally. Cation (1995) has shown how Ravetz's
characterisation has been extended in the S T S literature, to argue that knowledge-that
does not show how science is transmitted by enculturation:
For instance, in [Collins' 1974] study of the construction of the TEA laser, he
showed that the diffusion of knowledge could not be reduced to the mere
transmission of information: 'The major point is that the transmission of sktils is
not done through the medium of written words'. (Cadon 1995, p. 42)
While traditional epistemology was concerned mainly with propositional knowledge-that
newer accounts emerged within post-positivist metascience that argued more complex
characterisations. To overlook enculturation, as positivism had done, was to fail to
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account for the lengthy and demanding training that scientists undergo before they
practice science, and therefore to fad to account for knowledge-how.
A s an example of a second approach, Potiock (1986) has categorised knowledge as
based on either their source or their method of acquisition. Again, there is no area of
knowledge caUed science. There m a y be several sources of knowledge: sense perceptions
(as in perceptual knowledge); a possible intuitive faculty (as in a priori knowledge); a
possible moral intuition (as in moral knowledge); or memory. Knowledge from inductive
generalisations differs from the other areas by being distinguished by its method of
acquisition.
The source of perceptual knowledge is self-evidendy perceptions. Generally its
problem is formulated as 'explaining h o w w e can acquire justified betiefs about the
external world on the basis of the output of our sense organs', because, although 'we all
agree that sense perception can lead to justified betiefs about the world around us ... the
details remain obscure' (Potiock 1986, pp. 10-11). O n e possible criticism comes from
scepticism. M u c h has been written about perceptual knowledge, partly because more is
k n o w n about the psychology of perception. Appendix B.5 on activity addresses some of
the issues arising with perception.
A priori knowledge has a complex role in science. With a priori knowledge there
are several problems. First, there is no clear and agreed definition: two c o m m o n
definitions are that a priori knowledge is independent of experience, and based only on
reason, but for Pollock these are inadequate. Characteristic examples of a priori
knowledge are knowledge of mathematical and logical troths, yet to establish the class by
example rather than by definition is unsatisfactory. Secondly, although the claim for an a
priori intuitive faculty is psychological, the psychology of acquiring mathematical and
logical knowledge is not understood. Quite apart from the difficulties of mathematical
proof, there is the difficulty of establishing the basis of the premises on which
mathematical proofs are founded. The view that these premises are arbitrary axioms
established by convention - conventionalism - was held widely, but is no longer
considered plausible. This is partly because of GQdel's theorem:
Godel's theorem has been interpreted as showing that, for any system of
mathematical axioms, the mathematician can k n o w a mathematical truth that does
not follow from those axioms; realists argue that the only w a y this could be true
is by mathematical intuition. (Steiner 1993, p. 271)
That is, it appears that in a system of mathematical axioms, a mathematician can k n o w
more mathematical truths than what conventionady is agreed the axioms contain. Godel's
theorem formalises a long-recognised paradox in mathematical knowledge (Steiner 1993,
p. 271). The paradox arises because, on the one hand, mathematics is continuous with
physics, the paradigmatically empirical science, but on the other hand apparendy is
continuous also with metaphysics: it describes geometric figures like circles and spheres
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that are ideal, and numbers that are abstract and apparendy not the idealisation of actual
objects. M o r e than this, mathematical knowledge has a certainty 'that seems to set it apart
from empirical knowledge' (Steiner 1993, p. 270). This presents a problem for
naturalism, which supposes a causal interaction between the knower and Nature, because
mathematical entities are not part of this interaction; Plato and Kant recognised this.
Hence the paradox:
W e can, therefore, s u m up the paradox of mathematical knowledge as fodows:
without mathematical knowledge, there is no scientific knowledge - yet the
epistemology ('naturalism') suggested by scientific knowledge seems to make
mathematical knowledge impossible! (Steiner 1993, p. 271)
Steiner outlines various metascientific strategies for dealing with this. For realists,
Godel's theorem is true only if there is mathematical intuition. For Kantians,
mathematical knowledge is necessary for empirical knowledge. For empiricists such as
Mdl, mathematics is a branch not of logic but of physics, and derives its certainty from its
empirical confirmation; it is not metaphysical. For logicists, mathematics is again not
metaphysical, and hence is sympathetic to empiricism, but is a branch of logic; it is true
by definition. For pragmatists, mathematics is useful, indeed essential, for us to achieve
the goals of science and life, in the same boat as science. For instrumentalists,
mathematics is a tool for use in sciences and elsewhere, but is not a science in itself. For
conventionalists, mathematics is true by convention or agreement
For m u c h of science, notably experimental science, these variations in interpreting
mathematical knowledge and science are not central: they are understood as perceptual
knowledge or knowledge from inductive generalisations. However, in theoretical and
mathematical sciences, like cosmology and computer science, the interpretation ofthe role
of mathematics is central. Redner (1987) has argued that the increasingly mathematical
character of science in the twentieth century has contributed to fundamental changes in
science:
The changed character of science in the post-Second World W a r period entaded a
gradual departure from Rationalism and the emergence of a scientific approach
characterised by another form of rationality: Rationalisation, also called
instrumental reason, formal rationality, and Zweckrationatitat... Rationalisation
has as its basic defining principles standardisation and exact repetition for it is a
commutating and calculating form of rationality.
The rationalisation of the cognitive content of science is closely bound up
with the techniques of computation and calculation, above aU those involving
mathematics. This process takes the form of what Whitley, following
Georgescu-Roegen has called arithmomorphism: the tendency towards
mathematical formulation of adrelationsin a science and finady its formalisation
as a closed theory. (Redner 1987, pp. 56-7)
Thus in some sciences and mathematics, proof procedures are programmed, and are fully
automatic, formalised, processes; Redner argued that this constitutes a change in the
rationality or justification ofthe knowledge (Redner 1987, pp. 56-7). At the very least, it
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is clear that the character of knowledge in these sciences is linked fundamentady to the
character of mathematical knowledge.
Claims that w e can have moral knowledge are also problematic. First there is no
consensus that it exists: for example, Dancy (1985) does not include it Secondly, it is
only weakly supported by psychological explanations. In any event the role of any moral
knowledge in science has not gready exercised the minds of scientists and metascientists.
The role of memory in knowledge is also unclear. Quite clearly, 'much of what w e
k n o w , w e k n o w by remembering' (Pollock 1986, p. 13). The question is whether
memory is a source of knowledge (apparent memory), something like the role of sense
perception in perceptual knowledge, or whether m e m o r y is the calling to use of
knowledge already held and acquired by some other means. Again, there is no agreed
philosophical or psychological explanation. However, any reasonable epistemological
account of reasoning will have to account for the significant role m e m o r y plays in
reasoning:
[W]hen w e reason in accordance with any even slightly complicated argument
w e do not hold the entire argument in mind at the same time. W e attend to each
step individuady andrelyupon memory to ted us that w e got to that step in some
reasonable way. (Pollock 1986, p. 14)
Pollock characterises the remaining kind of knowledge, knowledge
of
generalisations from induction, by its method of acquisition rather than a source*.
Inductive generalisations are formed by inferring that a characteristic observed in a sample
of objects applies similarly to the wider population of such objects. Either w e infer that a
property observed in the sample is taken to apply to the whole population, by enumerative
induction, or w e infer by statistical induction that a property observed in a proportion a/b
rather than in all the sample is likely to be found in the same proportion in the wider
population. However, while this process seems generady plausible, there is no agreement
on a detaded description of h o w this should work, because 'the premises of an inductive
argument do not logically entail the conclusion' (Pollock 1986, p. 15). This lack of
agreement arises from two questions of continuing philosophical interest: h o w can
induction be justified (the traditional problem of induction, as described by David H u m e )
and h o w can the principles of induction be formulated (the n e w riddle of induction, as
described by Nelson Goodman). Because of these difficulties, induction is no longer
regarded as the means of generating certain knowledge. However, itretainssupport both
generally, as in the w a y w e generate commonsense knowledge, and in science as the
means of generating the best avadable knowledge given the set of observations.

5

The process of induction and its difficulties are discussed in the companion chapter on activity; the
present paragraph simply sketches some of the character of inductive knowledge.
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Internalist and externalist views of knowledge
There is considerable debate over internalist and externalist (e/i) characterisations of
science, discussed in Appendix B.l on context, and m u c h of it concerns the nature and
status of scientific knowledge, which w e wtil address here. The terms externalism and
internalism are used in three main ways (Bonjour 1993). O n e refers to theories of
justifying knowledge (epistemic justification); the second, closely related to the first,
refers directiy to theories of knowledge; the third refers to accounts of betief and thought
content. T h e sense described in Appendix B.l applies largely to the third interpretation,
although not clearly so: where internalism holds that the content of scientific knowledge is
determined only by the mind of the individual, and externalism holds that this knowledge
is influenced by external factors such as the physical and social environments (usuady
also by internal factors). The e/i distinction is rarely m a d e clearly by epistemologists
(Bonjour 1993, p. 132) or consistently in debates within and between groups of
philosophers and sociologists of science (Shapin 1992). In spite of these ambiguities, or
perhaps because of them, debate about the e/i character of science knowledge is one of the
more contentious in metascience. W e wid examine each of the three broad uses of these
terms here.
First is the e/i distinction w h e n justifying knowledge. Here, internalist justification
is where all the factors needed to justify a belief are 'cognitively accessible to that person,
internal to his [sic] cognitive perspective' (Bonjour 1993, p. 132). In the strong version,
the belief is justified only if the believer is aware of the justifying facts, and in the weak
version the belief is justified if the believer is capable of becoming aware. Pollock (1986,
p. 21) has argued that our grounds for reliably deciding what to believe as knowledge our justification - must rest at least partly on the existing beliefs w e hold. Until relatively
recently there was almost consensus a m o n g epistemologists that betiefs could be justified
only by the beliefs already held by the observer, this is a doxastic theory. This means that
if the s a m e beliefs are held in two circumstances, then those circumstances justify the
same beliefs, regardless of h o w other circumstances might change. In this approach, the
beliefs are justified either by appealing to basic or foundational beliefs that are privdeged
and need no justification (foundations theories), or to the w a y betiefs relate or cohere with
other beliefs (coherence theories). Both of these approaches are flawed: betiefs can be
held for bad reasons, so appealing to foundational beliefs fads, and it appears that some
beliefs rely not on beliefs but perceptions (as in perceptual beliefs) and memory. For
Pollock, w e do not have to have beliefs about perceptions and memories for them to
exist.
Externalist justification is where at least some of the justifying factors are 'external
to the believer's cognitive perspective, beyond his [sic] ken' (Bounjour 1993, p. 132);
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that is, that the beliefs are justified by more than the cognitive state of the believer, such
as its reliabdity. Thus, externalist theories typically acknowledge both internal and
external factors. Pollock rejects externalist justification of beliefs (1986, pp. 133ff.),
arguing that justification must be guided by reasons, which is done by appealing to
norms: reason-guiding norms cannot be formulated by externalist factors, as in
probabitism, and appeal toreliabilityis redundant because internalist norms are sufficient
The only alternative for Pollock is to justify knowledge with the internal states of the
believer (internalism) but not solely by existing betiefs (i.e. by non-doxastic factors).
Potiock classifies his theory as direct realism, which holds that perceptual judgements can
be m a d e about physical objects directiy from perceptual states without mediation by
betiefs.
T h e second e/i distinction concerns theories of knowledge, and is related to the
first. Here, an externalist account is given of knowledge, but not of justification; it is
possible to m a k e a weaker appeal to internalist justification. This account holds that
knowledge is true belief that is not justified but satisfies some externalist condition like
reliability (Bounjour 1993, p. 135). It allows that animals and children can have
knowledge, although the status of such a knowledge is uncertain.
T h e third e/i distinction is somewhat different to the first two, and concerns the
contents of betiefs and thoughts:
[According to an internalist view of content, the content of such intentional
states depends only on the non-relational, internal properties of the individual's
mind or brain, and not at ad on his [sic] physical and social environment while
according to an externalist view, content is significantly [but not exclusively]
affected by such factors. (Bonjour 1993, p. 136)
A s Bonjour points out, and has been noted previously, the traditional view of content,
and indeed knowledge and justification, has been internalist T h e main argument for
externalism is that w e seem to have betiefs about external states - for example, what is
being observed, or the points of view of others - that cannot be explained solely by what
is happening in one's brain. T h e main argument against strong externalism is that it does
not account for the content of beliefs or thoughts that emanate from within the brain, such
as in reflections or puzzlement Bonjour argues that an externalist justification is possible.
In the broader sense of externalism and internalism, externalists hold that social,
political and other factors (usually including internal factors) determine the content of
knowledge. Typically they dismiss the objection that external knowledge cannot be
justified rationally, for which there seem to be two main arguments. First, the failure to
rationally justify externalist knowledge is irrelevant because, contrary to traditional
internalist accounts, rationality is not absolute and unchanging: not only knowledge but
norms and concepts of rationality are constructed, and are historically and sociaUy
contingent. Secondly, internalist accounts fad to show h o w scientific knowledge comes
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to be, even though most accounts allow internalist (cognitive) factors as part of the
explanation. W e will sketch a few arguments from some externalist accounts here.
The sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) n o w comprises a body of discourse
and literature distinguishable within the S T S literature as a whole. T h e traditional
accounts of sociology of knowledge treated scientific knowledge as unique because it
deals with the objective truths of the natural world (Mulkay 1979); an example is
Merton's (1973) discussion of characteristic scientific norms (Cozzens & Gieryn 1990).
The newer alternatives treat 'the procedures and conclusions of science ... like all other
cultural products, [as] the contingent outcome of interpretive social acts' (Mulkay 1979,
p. 91). Examples are Edge and Mulkay's (1976) linking of small group structures with
scientific knowledge (theories), and Knorr-Cetina and Mulkay's (1983) argument that
scientific knowledge in laboratory activities and technical discourse have a social character
(both in Cozzens & Gieryn 1990). Hesse's (1984) review of approaches to socialising
epistemology concludes that both internal and external factors can be studied, because any
knowledge (cognitive) system, like any social system, is held together by 'socialrolesor
norms':
W h e r e a system of knowledge or cognitive belief is either accepted (as in our
o w n science) or claimed to be cognitive in other cultures or by subgroups in our
o w n culture, there can be internal epistemological study of therelationsclaimed
to hold between data, theory and conceptual frameworks, and external
explanations of the genesis of concepts and methods, and of the goals and
interests served by the cognitive system. (Hesse 1984, p. 24)
Longino (1990, p. 216) has argued that only a social account of objectivity can serve to
check the 'unbridled relativism' arising from 'an individualist conception of scientific
method and scientific knowledge'. It does this by minimising the influences of the
subjective preferences and background assumptions m a d e by multiple individual
scientists, which the present thesis interprets as the multiple belief systems of individual
scientists:
W h a t is called scientific knowledge, then, is produced by a community
(ultimately the community of ad scientific practitioners) and transcends the
contributions of any individual or even of any subcommunity within the larger
community. Once propositions, theses, and hypotheses are developed, what wtil
become scientific knowledge is produced collectively through the clashing and
meshing of a variety of points of view. (Longino 1990, p. 69; see also Longino
in summary statement 119)
Thus the very activities that produce scientific knowledge cannot be reduced to the
psychological activities of individuals because the characteristic qualities of scientific
knowledge arise from multiple critical perspectives that are tested in argument. This is
essentiady a social activity:
[C]riticism from alternative points of view is required for objectivity and ... the
subjection of hypotheses and evidential reasoning to critical scrutiny is what

Appendix B.6: Knowledge

878

limits the intrusion of individual subjective preference into scientific knowledge.
(Longino 1990, p. 76)
In summary, the most plausible view from the current literature seems to be some
sort of moderate externalist view of science knowledge, that recognises both the
internalist elements ofthe belief system, such as criteria for judgements, and externalist
elements such as the social role of criticism and negotiation. This avoids the logical
difficulties of traditional accounts of knowledge, on the one hand, and an unbridled
relativism on the other. However, to avoid the extremes, one must be aware of their
possibility.
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6.5 Knowledge and information
Other terms commonly used with knowledge and science, though not uniquely so,
are data, facts and information. These are not equivalent terms, although their meanings
are related:
Datum:
1. any proposition assumed or given, from which conclusions m a y be drawn.
2. any fact assumed to be a matter of direct observation.
Data:
1. plural of datum
2. figures, etc., k n o w n or available; information.
Fact:
1. what ready happened or is the case; troth; reality.
2. something k n o w n to have happened; a truth k n o w n by actual experience or
observation: scientists working with the facts.
3. something said to be true or supposed to have happened: the facts are as
follows.
Information:
1. knowledge communicated or received concerning some fact or circumstance;
news.
2. knowledge on various subjects, however acquired.
3. the act of informing.
4. the state of being informed.
5. (in communication theory) a quantitative measure of the contents of a
message.
(The Macquarie Dictionary, emphases in originals)
There are two senses in which data, facts and information characterise science: both as a
state of knowing and as that which is known. In the sense of a state of knowing, data,
facts and information are in a sense the 'raw materials', or elemental contents of
(scientific) knowledge. They are necessary for scientific knowledge, although in this
context they usuady mean a state of certainty less than understanding. Thus, one would
expect someone with scientific knowledge to be familiar with agreed propositions or
conclusions whose certainty is assured; that is, facts and data. These are units of
information that comprise (scientific) knowledge-that. However, they do not entail
reasoning or understanding. For example, it is possible that w e might reject a quiz
champion, w h o rapidly and correcdy recalls facts and data, as possessing scientific
knowledge. This is despite requiring the person with scientific knowledge to have
possession of the relevant data or facts.
In the sense of that which is known, or available to be known, data, facts and
information constitute a body of knowledge, or part of it that is external to the individual
knower. This body is available typically as written text, in books and articles that are
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developed and reviewed by scientists, and was mentioned above in some of the
approaches described by Callon (1995). This is what Popper called World 3 material:
[I]n scientific work w e do not even take our o w n observations as certain, indeed
w e do not even accept them as scientific observations, until w e have repeated
and tested them. In all these respects, then, [science] knowledge is objective. It
inhabits the public domain (World 3). It is not in the private states of mind of
individuals (World 2). (Magee 1973, p. 71)
That is, Popper m a k e s the distinction, mentioned at the beginning of this chapter,
between science knowledge as a state of knowing (World 2) and as the body of collected
information (World 3).
The rapid increase in science knowledge
Furthermore, data, facts and information are significant to characterising current
science because as the twentieth century progressed the amount of avadable knowledge
andfieldsof knowledge increased at an increasing rate. This phenomenon is widely
k n o w n by various terms, all of which relate to science but not uniquely or
comprehensively so. They represent attempts to summarise either therapidtransformation
(information

explosion, information

revolution, third industrial revolution,

communications revolution) or the resulting n e w social condition (electronic age, age of
information, age of cybernation, knowledge society, techtronic society, information
society, service society, post-industrial society); most of these terms date from the 1960s
(Marien 1983). T h e characteristic of science knowledge of concern here - its rapid
proliferation - is best described as an information explosion, even though this term
applies to more fields than just science.
There are m a n y lists in the literature giving examples of a striking proliferation of
knowledge. T h e message has remainedrelativelyconstant since the 1960s, although the
examples have become more remarkable as the rate of increase has itself increased:
(A)s far as m a n y statistical seriesrelatedto activities of mankind are concerned,
the date that divides h u m a n history into two equal parts is w e d within living
memory. For the volume and number of chemical publications, for instance, the
date is n o w [i.e., 1964] about 1950 ... Another startling fact is that about 2 5 %
of the h u m a n beings w h o have ever lived are n o w alive, and what is more
astonishing, something like 9 0 % of all the scientists w h o have ever lived are
n o w alive. (Boulding 1964, p. 7)
This is modest w h e n compared with data two decades later, such as the following quoted
by the former Australian Minister for Science, Barry Jones (1983, pp. 179-181) to
illustrate therateof increase of knowledge:
the s u m total of h u m a n knowledge is thought to have been doubling every
50 years by 1800, every 10 years by 1950, every 5 years by 1973;
•

all case studies of information increase show a geometric, not an
arithmetic, increase, with an exponential curve;
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about 200,000 n e w theorems were published each year in mathematical
journals during the mid 1970s, causing the mathematician Stanislaw to say
this was 'something to worry about... If the number of theorems is larger
than one can possible survey, w h o can be trusted to judge what is
"important"';

•

data was transmitted to earth from manned space flights at the rate of 52
kdobytes per second - the equivalent of the Encyclopaedia Britannica every
79 minutes;

•

PhD's in engineering have a 'half-life' of less than 10 years (i.e., only half
of the information generated by the research is current after less than 10
years).

Examples like these are significant in several senses. For example, the explosion of
information and data 'makes control and regulation of intellectual property more difficult'
(Etzkowitz & Webster 1995, p. 492). Also, following Stanislaw's concern about the
proliferation of mathematical theorems, above, it has implications for developing
scientific understanding, another use of knowledge in connection with science.
The rapid increase in avadable data is also related to the increasing availability and
power of computing technologies:
Computers are arguably among the half dozen most important post-World W a r II
technologies, in impressive list that might include television, jet aircraft,
satellites, missiles, atomic weapons, and genetic engineering. The proliferation
of cheap, powerful information processing and computerised control systems
has unquestionably altered - and in some cases deeply transformed - the nature
of warfare, communication, science, offices, factories, government, and certain
cultural forms. This point hardly requires substantiation; reportage on the
'informationrevolution'has become a virtual cottage industry. (Edwards 1995,
p. 257)
Edwards notes that strong claims have been made for the impact of computing technology
- revolutionary either for good (utopian) or evti (Orwellian) - which, although they reflect
real hopes and concerns, respectively, have been overstated often:
'[Revolutionary' effects ... have been substantially, even hystericaUy oversold.
This is especially true in the areas of office automation and computing in
government, where their effects on productivity and panoptic power have been
considerably less than m a n y imagine. (Edwards 1995, p. 285)
In science, however, even adowing for some hyperbole, the effect of increasingly
powerful computing technology has been a massive increase in the production of data, of
the sort mentioned above. S o m e commentators further claim that computing technologies
have changed the very nature of scientific research (Redner 1987) 6 . Such claims imply
that the nature of scientific knowledge has changed as a result: that scientific knowledge is

6

See the companion chapter on activity and Appendix B.5.
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increasingly interdependent with the technology used to generate it, and the theories and
assumptions built into the technology.
In any event, the explosion of scientific information clearly entails too great a
volume and diversity of data and information to understand it ad. W e shad n o w turn to
this sense of knowledge.
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Knowledge and understanding

Sometimes knowledge is used with understanding: in several themes within the
literature and in general use. Understanding usuady means knowledge of the underlying
argument or of the implications, and is therefore more complex:
When a person knows the answer to some question, but lacks the ability to
explain w h y that should be the right answer, w e c o m m o n l y say that such a
person knows the answer but does not understand it (Tties & Tdes 1993, p. 16;
emphasis in original)
This follows Plato's requirement that knowledge is based on reasoning, not authority.
Terms such as data and information are inadequate to convey this sense: no individual

hope to be familiar with their reasoned justification, and must accept their vast bulk
basis of authority alone. In contrast, understanding does entati reasoned knowledge:
Understanding:
1.
the act of one w h o understands; comprehension; personal interpretation.
2.
intelligence; wit
3.
superior intelligence; superior power of recognising the truth: men of
understanding.
4.
a mutual comprehension of each other's meaning, thoughts, etc.
5.
Philosophy: discursive knowledge based on premises and observations.
Understand:
1.
to perceive the meaning of; grasp the idea of; comprehend.
2.
to be thoroughly familiar with; apprehend clearly the character cc nature of.
3.
to comprehend by knowing the meaning of the words employed, as a
language;
4.
to interpret or assign a meaning to; take to mean;
5.
to grasp the significance, implications, or importance of.
11. to perceive what is meant
15. to be informed; believe.
Discursive:
2.
proceeding by reasoning or argument; not intuitive.
(The Macquarie Dictionary)
Scientific knowledge in the sense of the knowing individual clearly entails thorough

famtiiarity and comprehension, and not the simple recati of facts, information or data.

Understanding also has implications for scientific knowledge in the sense of an 'exter

body of knowledge given in texts, because quite clearly scientific texts have to provi
the argument to enable the personal understanding and comprehension. However, just as

clearly, the mere existence of texts does not entail an individual having that scienti
knowledge: simply, it is avadable.
The public understanding of science
Understanding and science are used together also in the sense of public

understanding of scientific issues. Wynne (1995) has reviewed the literature on the pu
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understanding of science, which became an identifiable field from the 1980s. This
literature tended to characterise scientific knowledges, practices and institutions as
relatively unproblematic, and identified the public understanding (or misunderstanding) of
this as the suitable problems to investigate:
In many dominant formulations (e.g. Royal Society 1985), public understanding
of science is automatically equated with public appreciation and support of
science, and with the public's 'correct' understanding and use of 'technical'
knowledge and advice. Thus, w h e n publics resist or ignore a program advanced
in the n a m e of science, the cause is assumed to be their misunderstanding of the
science. The public understanding of scienceresearchagenda is thus confined to
measuring, explaining, and finding remedies for apparent shortfalls of 'correct
understanding and use' as if this were free of framing commitments that have
social implications. T h e field of risk perception research, for example, was
defined by the assumption that the public opposed technologies like nuclear
power because they misunderstood the 'real' risks as k n o w n to science; this
view has resisted m a n y substantive critiques (Otway 1992; W y n n e 1992).
(Wynne 1995, pp. 362-3)
However, as the literature developed, it identified a number of confusions and

complications. For example, the term understanding in public understanding of science i
used variously: to refer both to science-in-general and science-in-particular, to mean the
effective use of technical knowledge, even though one may have understanding despite
being unable to use this knowledge; to mean understanding scientific methods but not
having specific knowledge content; and to m e a n understanding 'its institutional
characteristics, its forms of patronage and control, and its social implications' (Wynne
1995, p. 363). The present thesis interprets these various meanings as having
understanding of some dimensions - knowledge, activity, structure and context in these
examples - but not ad, and certainly not as they interrelate.
In recent times the focus of research in public understanding of science shifted from
public misunderstandings of unproblematic science to public perception and interaction
with constructed and negotiated science:

By contrast, critical research approaches informed by the sociology of scientific
knowledge ( S S K ) - what I call here the constructivist perspective - have
attempted to investigate h o w people experience and define 'science' in social life,
and h o w particular scientific constructions incorporate tacit, closed models of
social relationships that are or should be open to negotiation. In other words,
scientific knowledge is seen as encoding taken-for-granted norms,
commitments, and assumptions that w h e n deployed in public, inevitably take on
a social-prescriptive role. Thus dominant internal criteria of 'valid knowledge' or
'good science' m a y be legitimately open to question w h e n science is used in
public arenas. ( W y n n e 1995, p. 362)
Thus this critical perspective addresses problems with science as wed as with the publi
and allows for more diverse and richer interactions between the two. Clearly, this
perspective allows for, and encourages, richer characterisations of science such as
proposed by the present thesis.
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W y n n e (1995, pp. 364ff) has identified three main conceptions of public
understanding of science, arising from three main research approaches. Each approach
brings its o w n insights, some of which w e wid mention. Thefirstapproach addresses
public attitudes to science, scientific literacy and understanding of science, as measured
by large-scale quantitative surveys. W y n n e is critical of most of these surveys because
they tend to assume a particular, uncritical, characterisation of science and 'problematise'
the public:
[L]arge-scale surveys of public attitudes towards and understandings of science
inevitably build in certain normative assumptions about the public, about what is
meant by science and scientific knowledge, and about understanding. They m a y
often therefore reinforce the syndrome ... in which only the public, and not
science or scientific culture and institutions, are problematised in the public
understanding of science issue. Such surveys take the respondent out of social
context and are intrinsicady unable to examine or control analytically for the
potentially variable, socially rooted meanings that key terms have for social
actors. The survey method by its nature decontextualises knowledge and
understanding and imposes the assumption that their meaning exists
independentiy of h u m a n subjects interacting sociaUy. Evidence of internal
coherence among survey data is not itself evidence of wider validity - only of
internal consistency. T o o often the latter is mistaken for the former. ( W y n n e
1995, p. 370)
The second approach addresses 'mental models' of scientific processes, as
measured by cognitive psychology tests. This approach studies the models by which
people are thought to recognise patterns, m a k e inferences and predictions, and so forth.
Though not as clearly as for the large-scale surveys, this approach tends also to budd in
assumptions about ideal forms of reasoning and understanding. Models analysed in the
literature include navigation, evaporation, global warming and motion; lay models are
called naive theory in some studies, but others prefer folk theory as less prejudicial
(Wynne 1995, p. 371). Ethnographic studies (or ethnoscience research) argue that the
mental models in folk theories are 'more sociady derived and situational' rather than
universal ( W y n n e 1995, p. 374). Folk theories are problematic for interpreting public
understanding of science by traditional characterisations of science. Sometimes
respondents give conflicting folk theories as explanations, but the one agreeing most with
the accepted scientific explanation is not always the most useful. Also, traditional
(positivist) characterisations present science as universal or independent of context, yet
useful folk knowledge is frequentiy situational. Thus ethnoscience, which includes
feminist critiques of science, values the 'rationality of ambivalence' (Wynne 1995, pp.
374-5). This has strong implications for the science education of citizens, which w e will
pursue in chapter 12.
T h e third approach is to address the different experiences and constructions of
science by people in different contexts, as measured (described) by qualitative
anthropologicalfieldresearch:
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This area of research shares a commitment to avoiding a priori assumptions
about what 'proper' science is ... \T\t attempts to examine the influence of social
contexts and social relations upon people's renegotiation of the 'science' handed
d o w n from formal institutions as if already validated and closed. This general
approach immediately opens to question the very notion of what counts as a
scientific-technical issue or as scientific-technical knowledge. A c o m m o n thread
in all this research is the encounter of different cultures: on the one hand,
scientific culture, which tends to reduce issues to those of control and prediction
within the terms of the scientificfieldin play, and on the other hand, social
worlds that reflect fundamentaUy different models of agency, and also recognise
m a n y more crosscutting and open-ended agendas and interests beyond those
embedded in scientific discourse. (Wynne 1995, p. 375)
This approach includes research in severalfields,including: sociology of medicine and
public health; community responses to expert intervention, including technological
accidents and emergencies; reproductive technologies and other women's studies;
environmental controversies, campaigning and regulations; lay use of expertise, such as
toxic waste chemistry, and lay constructs of 'deviant knowledge such as UFOlogy'; and
anthropology of 'Third World' encounters with the culture of western European science
(Wynne 1995, p. 375). In m a n y of these studies, science as such m a y not be explicit but
becomes embedded in ordinary social and cultural practice. This general approach has
profound implications for the public understanding of science, because it does not accept
that scientific knowledge, as published in refereed scientific texts, is universal and
unchanging; scientific knowledge that simply is endorsed as part of government policy or
industry practice is even more contestable.
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6.7 Knowledge/understanding as concepts and propositions
We have described scientific knowledge that is reasoned, or argued, as
understanding. There are two further, related, senses of this understanding by which
s o m e of the literature characterises science. These are, first, the expression of
understandings as statements, as mentioned above by Cadon, and secondly, their
cognitive status as concepts.
First, understandings of knowledge are expressed usually as statements called
propositions:
Proposition:
4. a thing, matter, or person considered as something to be dealt with or
encountered.
5. anything stated or affirmed for discussion or illustration.
6. Logic: a statement in which something (a predicate) is affirmed or denied of a
subject, or in which membership of a class is affirmed or denied of
something, or in which a relation is affirmed or denied to hold between two or
more things. (The Macquarie Dictionary)
Thus the entries in Table B.6.2 are constructed as propositions or statements of
knowledge, as in this example:
Change in the cosmos has material, rather than supernatural, causes.
In phdosophy, propositional knowledge is given typicady as statements with the form
that p, where p is a predicate that affirms or denies a claim. Thus, for example, the
standard or tripartite definition of propositional knowledge, discussed above, holds that
w e have propositional knowledge when w e have justified, true, betief that p. However,
theories of propositional knowledge disagree whether a proposition picks out a
propositional attitude necessary for knowledge (as in being sure that p, or believing that
p), or whether a proposition that p only serves to label a specific ability, capacity or
power
For instance, White (1982) treats propositional knowledge as merely the ability
to provide a correct answer to a possible question. However, White m a y be
equating 'producing' knowledge in the sense of producing 'the correct answer to
a possible question' with 'displaying' knowledge in the sense of manifesting
knowledge. T h e latter can be done even by very young chtidren and some nonh u m a n animals independently of their being asked questions, understanding
questions, or recognising answers to questions. (Shope 1993, p. 400).
That is, simply displaying or manifesting knowledge, as young chtidren can do or indeed
as typical quiz answers require, fads short of knowledge as understanding. That is,
simply stating a single proposition, such as
Light bends as it passes from air through a glass prism
does not demonstrate understanding. Nevertheless, science knowledge-that is
propositional knowledge: it is structured as propositions.
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T h e second sense is knowledge as a notion or concept, where a concept is the
generalised term for a number of entities that are similar in some way:
Concept:
1. a thought, idea, or notion, often one deriving from a generalising mental
operation.
2.
a theoretical construct: a concept of the solar system.
3. an idea that includes all that is associated with a word or other symbol.
4.
an idea elaborated into a pattern or procedure: a new concept in roof
maintenance.
5. a design in which all aspects of the product are linked to a central idea,
function, theory, etc.
(The Macquarie Dictionary)
More particularly, a concept refers to knowledge content:
Mental states have contents: a belief m a y have the content that I w d l catch the
train, a hope m a y have the content that the prime minister wdlresign.A concept
is something which is capable of being a constituent of such contents. More
specifically, a concept is a way of thinking of something - a particular object or
property, or relation, or some other entity. (Peacocke 1993, p. 74)
Thus a concept concerns knowledge, and in phdosophy is described by epistemology; it
is not equivalent to its content, which in philosophy is described by metaphysics and
ontology. W e wtil return to knowledge content in section 6.10, below.
Peacocke (1993) makes some useful distinctions concerning concepts, which w e
shall mention here. First different concepts m a y be different ways of thinking about the
same object: for example, at the one time an adult person m a y be thought of as a citizen,
spouse, parent, worker and driver. Secondly, w h e n concepts are expressed in a
proposition thatp, 'they will be capable of being true or false, depending on the way the
world is' (Peacocke 1993, p. 74). Thirdly, concepts are not stereotypes: w e can believe
that Stephen Hawking falls under the concept scientist, for example, while disbelieving
he falls under the stereotype of the white-coated m a n tending elaborate chemical
glassware. Fourthly, the statement by which w e express the meaning (content) of a
concept is taken usually as the means by which w e differentiate concepts from each other.
Fifthly, the way w e m a k e meaning of concepts can be complex. Our mastery of a concept
is helped w h e n w e find it compeding to use that concept, an insight of the later
Wittgenstein. Related to this, w e sometimes determine the meanings of groups or clusters
of concepts simultaneously: for example belief and desire can identify a combined mental
state. Sixthly, some accounts emphasise 'the links between a concept and the thinker's
perceptual experience' (Peacocke 1993, p. 75); concepts m a y thus vary with different
environmental circumstances. S o m e accounts extend this to argue that the conceptual
content of one's mental state varies with variation in the social environment, especiaUy
with linguistic relations. For example, Knorr Cetina (1995, p. 141) has cited several
studies that show 'how the betiefs and knowledge claims of scientists are influenced by
their social context'.
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S o m e accounts link concepts, understandings and propositions, on the basis that
the expression of the conceptual content as a statement expresses an understanding that is
propositional knowledge. This view emphasises knowledge as a condition ofthe knower,
and is evident particularly in the psychology of learning (Gagne 1970; Gagne & Driscoll
1988; White & Gunstone 1992). For example, Gagne and Driscoll (1988, pp. 47ff) have
argued that an important category of learning outcomes is intellectual skills, which are a
type of knowing how, rather than information or knowledge-that. Concept-formation is
the construction of categories that free the learner from learning multiple individual
instances:
It would not be possible to leam ad these things as verbal information, or as
facts, because too m a n y individual instances exist. The intedectual sktil you leam
enable you to respond adequately to entire classes (that is, groups or categories)
of interactions with the environment through symbols, such as letters, numbers,
words, or diagrams. (Gagne & Driscoll 1988, p. 47)
G a g n e and Driscoll rank these skills in a hierarchy, from simple types of learning, to
discriminations, concrete concepts, defined concepts, rules and higher-order rules. The
higher, m o r e complex types require the prior learning of the simpler ones. Thus
discriminations, which entad telling the difference between stimuli, are necessary to
cluster or group features, objects or events that are similar: that is, to form concrete
concepts. Concrete concepts m a y be: objects, such as tree, dog or rock; the qualities of
objects, such as colour, pointed or smooth; or relations, such as up, down, higher or
near. Concepts m a y also be defined rather than concrete, such as obstacle, uncle or
buyer. There is a sense in which both of Gagne and DriscolTs conceptual categories,
concrete and defined, are both defined, since the meanings of terms in both groups are
agreed or defined by convention. It would seem that the category concrete refers to
concepts with observable characteristics, and defined refers to those without observable
characteristics. Both types of concept m a y apply to the one word: for example/tower in
poetry remains a concrete concept, but in science it is by definition an organ of a plant
associated with sexual reproduction.
Part of the precision of science knowledge arises from this type of concept that
defines classes of entities. Concepts are used in rules for activities, such as,
Classify examples of flowers.
In turn simple rules are used in higher-order rules such as,
Generate a scheme for classifying flowers.
The conceptual complexity of recent and current science
A final point in this section is that science knowledge is conceptuaUy complex, and
has become increasingly so during the twentieth century. There are m a n y w e U k n o w n
examples, and in m a n yfields,such as physics (quantum mechanics andrelativitytheory),
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chemistry (developments of n e w materials such as ceramics, plastics and futierenes) and
biology (the human genome project). Wolpert (1992) has argued that science knowledge
is counter-intuitive, in part due to its conceptual complexity:
The central theme presented in this book is that many of the misunderstandings
about the nature of science might be corrected once it is realised just h o w
'unnatural' science is. I wdl argue that science involves a special m o d e of
thought and is unnatural for two main reasons ... Firsdy, the world is not
constructed on a common-sensical basis. This means that 'natural' thinking ordinary, day-to-day c o m m o n sense - will never give an understanding about die
nature of science. Scientific ideas are, with rare exceptions, counter-intuitive:
they cannot be acquired by simple inspection of phenomena and are often outside
everyday experience. Secondly, doing science requires a conscious awareness of
the pitfalls of 'natural' thinking. For c o m m o n sense is prone to error w h e n
applied to problems requiringrigorousand quantitative thinking; lay theories are
highly unreliable. (Wolpert 1992, pp. xi-xii)
Wolpert's analysis makes a valid point that scientific knowledge is complex and

increasingly difficult particularly for lay audiences. However, it seems remarkably na

it uncritically presents views that have been subject to telling criticism in both pos
positivist HPS and STS. Also, its basic premise overlooks the fundamental point that

much of science is commonsensical, as claimed in summary statements 17 and 49; rather,

the success of science has been to enable us to develop counter-intuitive understandin

as wed. That is, science knowledge is not limited to the common-sensical, and as scien
knowledge has become increasingly complex and abstract, it moves beyond what is
common-sensical to lay audiences.
6.8 Knowledge and power
This section addresses several ways in which scientific knowledge is characterised
by power and usefulness, usually as its ability to predict. T h e companion chapter on
context mentions the historical association, usually dating from Francis Bacon, between
knowledge and power 7 . This association is the basis for two commonly held assumptions
about scientific knowledge, namely that western European science is the paradigm of
rational knowledge, and that this accounts for the power of western societies:
By and large, past cross-cultural work has taken Western 'rationality' and
'scientificity' as the bench mark criteria by which other cultures' knowledges
should be evaluated. So-caded traditional knowledge systems of indigenous
peoples have frequentiy been portrayed as closed, pragmatic, utilitarian, value
laden, indexical, context dependent, and so on, implying that they cannot have
the same authority and credibility as science because their localness restricts them
to the social and cultural circumstances of the production. These were accounts
of dichotomy where the great divide between societies that are powerful and
those that are not. Here was a satisfying explanation of the relation between
knowledge and power. (Watson-Verran & TurnbuU 1995, pp. 115-6)

7

See also Appendices B.l and B.3.
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A s argued in Appendix B.l on context, this view dominated until the second half of the
twentieth century because of the positivist R V , which allowed only empirical and
rationally reconstructed knowledge-that as the scientific norm. In this view, the power of
scientific knowledge is self-evident in its successful technological application, arising
from its empirical andrationalcharacter.
However, in post-positivist studies of science, the association between knowledge
and power is not so clear, and there is a tension between competing views (WatsonVerran & TurnbuU 1995). O n the one hand (western European) science knowledge is
undoubtedly successful in sustaining predictions. O n the other there is no agreed account
of w h y this knowledge should be so powerful, especially if only the cognitive context is
considered; further, attempts to portray western European science as the standard for
rationality ignore the predictive successes (power) of some other knowledge systems8.
This opposition of views is significant, and relates a number of issues raised in
other companion chapters. First, the R V does not hold up to telling criticisms. For
example, as argued in the companion chapter on activity and Appendix B.5, the
normative R V does not account for the actual activities of scientists; therefore, it does not
account for the successes of science. Further, particular activities such as observation,
induction, verification and falsification d o not withstand the rational reconstruction
required by the R V . Secondly, the R V denies the demonstrable power and authority of
other knowledge systems. For example, some indigenous knowledge systems have
enabled remarkable feats of navigation, construction and transformation of materials, yet
they are tacit and localised, and not rationallyreconstructed.Thirdly, western European
science has undoubted successes and strengths, that a strongrelativismfails to identify.
Despite the absence of an agreed, rational explanation of scientific activities, such as
induction or indeed of agreed criteria of rationality, scientists collect observational data
inductively because it continues to be a source of successful predictions. In this w a y a
body of knowledge develops that is powerful because it sustains predictions. Thus the
link between science knowledge and power is qualified.
Post-positivist accounts tend to imply a m o r e complex association between
knowledge and power than the positivist R V adowed. These views n o longer see the
power or utility of scientific knowledge arising uniquely from its cognitive character. T h e
present thesis interprets this as the effect of multiple dimensions in combination: scientific
knowledge develops according to particular betiefs, purposes, contexts and so on. This
implies decisions leading to and arising from scientific knowledge:
W e have unparalleled knowledge and power over nature, yet this faces us with
moral dilemmas and responsibilities for which w e aretil-prepared.W e can if w e
choose keep alive the victims of brain damage, or croeUy deformed children w h o

8 This is discussed at greater length in Appendices B.l and B.2 on context and belief s
respectively.
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once would have died: reason and humanity are both confused by such choices,
and the exercise of the power w e have attained, in either direction, leaves us
tainted. Our technology has made it easy for us to b u m up in a few decades the
od produced in many millions of years, or to destroy the last forests, or drive to
extinction an increasing range oftivingcreatures ...
In many ways w e have the feeling oftivingat the end of an era, rather than
the beginning of a n e w one. Both those w h o are optimistic about the future and
those w h o are pessimistic agree in predicting rapid change. F e w believe that the
world in 20 years' time will be very similar to the world as it is today, yet the
feeling is of moving away from what w e have, rather than moving toward a
welcoming future.
The Victorian [era response to the Industrial Revolution] led toward the
danger of complacency. O u r o w n offers a choice of two: o n the one hand,
despondency, and on the other, a millennial optimism, both of which can be
seen at the present time. (Rosenbrock et al [sic] 1981)
While all but an extreme externalism claim at least a partly cognitive (internal) character
for scientific knowledge, notions like power cannot be strictly internalist Thus the
equation between knowledge and power is characterised by knowledge and other
dimensions, such as context, purpose and belief system. For example, there is an
increasing tendency for scientific knowledge to be expressed in patents, and to be
considered as intedectual property that can be bartered. Thus knowledge becomes a kind
of currency that cannot be described adequately by its cognitive characteristics alone.
Rosenbrock makes a strong appeal to values and other elements of belief system that
strongly challenges the notion of science knowledge as value-neutral.
6.9 Knowledge as a map of scientific content; current scientific knowledge
Scientific knowledge in the twentieth century has increased and diversified rapidly:
the notion ofthe information explosion summarises this characteristic of current scientific
knowledge wed. A s a consequence, mapping the current state of scientific knowledge
content is difficult, especiady infieldsat the vanguard such as microbiology or genetic
engineering. A n y attempt to list the content of science knowledge would be implausible
and, even is possible, too big to suit the purpose of the present thesis. T h e detail of
current knowledge in particular fields is in any case the main content of science text
books. Instead, our purpose here is to show h o w knowledge content partly characterises
science.
The content of scientific knowledge is taken to be the semantic content - the
meaning - of knowledge propositions in science, and the framework of concepts they
embody. Thus Hedbron (1983c) has characterised the development of twentieth century
physics by changes in the concepts that were fundamental at the turn of the century. H e
characterises physics circa 1900 by the major concepts electricity and magnetism, heat
and thermodynamics, hydrodynamics and hydrostatics, light and mechanics. H e gives the
major concepts of 20th century physics as atomic structure, elementary particle, nucleus,
quantum,

radioactivity and relativity. In discussing the new physics, Heilbron
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distinguishes between concepts that are not carried forward because they have been
superseded or are n o longer central, and those that are not carried forward because they
remain current but no longer excite attention.
The character of science knowledge content depends on the perspective taken for
analysis. O n e perspective is that the content of science knowledge characteristically
concerns the material world or the cosmos: animals, plants, forces, chemicals, planets,
and so forth. They arerecognisablyscientific concepts,ratherthan economic, aesthetic or
historical ones, for example. However, this distinction leads to problems; it is simplistic
and does not address other distinctions. O n e example is the distinction between the
natural and m a d e worlds, which arises from a narrower characterisation of science as
concerning Nature only: at what point does the content of chemistry or genetics cease to
be Nature and instead becomes the product of earlier science? This distinction does not
arise in broader characterisations of science. Another is the distinction between science
and non-science: astronomy and astrology, for example, or evolution and Creation
Science. (These are examples of boundary work, as discussed in the companion chapter
on context and Appendix B.l.) Each of these choices shares some concepts that most
commentators would agree are characteristically scientific: celestial phenomena in
astronomy and astrology, and variation intivingthings in evolution and Creation Science.
However, their status as science is different, and science knowledge alone does not
account for this. T h e present thesis argues that knowledge content alone, while a
necessary dimension, is insufficient, and these difficulties can be addressed by
recognising that scientific knowledge is characterised also by its particular contextual
influences, structures, purposes, activities and particular betiefs and value preferences, as
argued in the companion chapters as a set. The present section focuses on the knowledge
itself.
Another characterisation of science knowledge content is byfields,domains or
disciplines of science in the sense of intellectual or cognitive structures: the n a m e of the
field is the overarching concept that is central to a framework of interrelated concepts.
General dictionaries of science provide a summary of such concepts. For example, the
entries in The Macmillan Dictionary of the History of Science (Bynum, Browne and
Porter (eds) 1983) are listed alphabetically by concept but also near thefrontas lists by
field: Astronomy, Biology (with a note to see H u m a n Sciences and Medicine),
Chemistry, Earth Sciences, Historiography and Sociology of Science, H u m a n Sciences,
Mathematics, Medicine (with a note to see also H u m a n Sciences, Biology and
Chemistry), Miscellaneous, Philosophy of Science, and Physics (with a note to see also
Astronomy, Chemistry, Mathematics and Phdosophy).
A third characterisation of science knowledge content, particularly its currency, is
by its published source. Changes in science knowledge are more pronounced at the level
of particular understandings; the more general the knowledge proposition or concept, the
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less subject it is to change. This is reflected in the publication of scientific knowledge.
Typically the current state of knowledge is to be found in journals. M a n y of these are
very specialised and are difficult to understand for a lay audience, which increasingly
includes scientists from other specialisations. In at least some rapidly developingfieldsit
is not even the journals that contain the latest developments, but informal networks of
scientists: to be up to date requires being part of the right networks. Text books on
specific topics are generally not as current as journal articles, and general science texts
cover well-established, and therefore older, content again. Currency of ideas is traded
against some measure of the significance and place of knowledge; as a rule, the more
general thetext,the more general, established and enduring, but less current its content
Consequendy, the current state of scientific knowledge is difficult to summarise
meaningfully. There are so m a n y developments, in so m a n y scientificfields,that it is
difficult to keep track of them ad, and impossible to develop a reasoned understanding of
them ad. W e have also mentioned that scientific concepts are increasingly complex. In
any event the very nature of science knowledge means that the mere announcement of a
breakthrough is not sufficient, and w e need to await replications of experiments and
theoretical critiques to avoid placing too m u c h credence on fresh claims. This makes it
very difficult to characterise the current state of science knowledge, except perhaps in
general terms.
O n e indication is the Dissertation Abstracts International, given in Table B.4.2.
Another is to review science journals, or journals that review science journals. In a
publication sense, journals and abstracts remain current only for the period of publication,
usually a week, month or quarter, whether the content of older publications is still current
has to be judged by those w h o are regular readers and would k n o w if content has been
updated later. A s an example of recent coverage of science knowledge content, Table
B.6.4 sets out the cover page by-lines for Nature and New Scientist, for the month June
1996. These journals were selected simply because they are authoritative, widely k n o w n
and avadable journals that review science developments generally; that is, they are not
restricted to particular science subjects, like, say, a physics journal. Additionally, New
Scientist includes a segment each week, called Science, that reviews n e w scientific
developments and claims; Table B.6.4 includes the by-lines for these entries also. The
wording in Table B.6.4 is not always verbatim, to compensate for the creativity of the
sub-editors: the intention is to indicate the range of topics contained in these updates.
Note that only some developments are reported by both journals.
In summary, the content of science knowledge is characterised by an astounding
diversity and growth. At the level of particular propositions of knowledge-that science
knowledge is tentative, but only in the sense that it is in principle revisable or contestable.
M o s t metascientific accounts, and indeed most public characterisations of science, d o not
regard science knowledge as tentative in the sense of ephemeral or transient. T h e present
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thesis argues that the literature m a k e s this distinction b y characterising science knowledge
partly by particular activities, purposes, contexts, structures and betief systems, including
criteria for making judgements. K n o w l e d g e content is less subject to change at the level
of concepts, which are generalising cognitive terms.
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Table B.6.1
Examples of characterisation of key metascientific viewpoints
by knowledge
Author

Viewpoint

Suppe 1973,
1979

Received View

sceptical
descriptive
Weltanschauungen
(world view)
semantic or
model-theory
historical
realism

Bhaskar 1983

empiricism

idealism
realism

Nussbaum 1989 rationalism

empiricism/
positivism
constructivism

Boyd,Gaspar
and Trout 1991

post-positivist
consensus
comprising (a)
post-positivist
empiricism, (b)
neo-Kantian
constructivism
and (c) scientific
realism

Examples of reference to
knowledge
Knowledge can berepresentedas
a logical, related, system of
theoretical concepts and
conclusions
Theories are systems of
propositions, but have no other
generalised characteristics.
Scientific knowledge is not
acontextual, but instead is
meaningful only within a
Weltanschauungen.
Scientific knowledge is given in
the language of theories.
Scientific knowledge arises from
the reasoning by which theories
are developed as well as from
experimental data.
Knowledge is given in
experience.

Knowledge is what w e make or
construct
Knowledge is constructed but
given in an external reality.

Proven or confirmed knowledge
is primarily acquired by the
power of the intellect.
Proven or confirmed knowledge
is primarily acquired by the
evidence of the senses.
The best current knowledge is
acquired according to (a) inner
disciplinary criteria (rational,
logical, empirical) (b) outer
disciplinary criteria (socialpsychological, historical).
The definitions of scientific
concepts and terms are theorydependent.

Identified in the w o r k of
Camap; the Vienna Circle

Achinstein, Rapoport

B o h m , Feyerabend, Hanson,
Kuhn, Popper, Toulmin

Beth, Suppe, Suppes, van
Fraasen
Lakatos, Shapere, Toulmin

Francis Bacon, Berkeley,
Hobbes, H u m e , Locke, M a c h
(positivism), Mill, Russell,
Vienna Circle (logical
empiricism)
Berkeley, Fichte, Hegel, H u m e ,
Kant, Plato? Schelling
Aristotle, Bachelard, Bhaskar,
Duhem, Feyerabend, Hanson,
Harre, Hesse, H u m e , K a n t
Koyr6, Kuhn, Plato, Popper,
Putnam, Quine
Descartes, Kant Plato

Bacon, Comte, Hempel, H u m e ,
Locke
(a) Popper, Lakatos, Toulmin,
partly K u h n
(b) Kuhn, Toulmin, partly
Lakatos

(a) Partly Popper
(b) Hanson, K u h n
(c) Boyd, Goodman, Kripke,
Putnam, Quine
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Pickering 1992

Callon 1995

scientific
knowledge as
objective
(logical
empiricism)
scientific
knowledge as
relative to
culture
scientific
knowledge as
relative to
interests
(sociology of
scientific
knowledge SSK)
science as
rational
knowledge

science as
competitive
enterprise
science as
sociocultural
practice

.—.r.,.,w..,,»»».»»..

science as
extended
translation

Science knowledge arises
objectively from empirical
inquiry.

A s given by Suppe

Scientific knowledge arises
Kuhn, Feyerabend
within various cultural contexts.

Scientific concepts at different
levels of abstraction are linked
together by generalisations and
to the natural world by instances
grouped under observation terms.
'New scientific knowledge
entails seeing n e w situations as
being relevantly like old ones.'
(P. 4)
Science knowledge is given in
statements, usually distinguished
as observational / empirical (of
experiments and data collection)
and theoretical statements (of
conjectures and generalisations.
Model 2 applies here.
Science knowledge is given as
theoretical statements that are
evaluated by a competitive
process.
Statements are meaningless
without context; science
knowledge is partly
nonpropositional (tacit
knowledge).
Knowledge is produced by
temporarily stabilised networks
of actants.

Barnes, Bloor, Callon,
Cartwright Collins, Garfinkel,
Gilbert Knorr Cetina, Latour,
Law, Lynch, Mulkay, Shapin,
Woolgar

Hesse, Holton, Popper

Althusser, Ben-Cole, David,
Freudenthal, Hull, Merton,
Popper
Bachelard, Barnes, Collins,
Fleck, Knorr, Kuhn, Mulkay,
Pinch, Ravetz, Rudwick,
Schaffer, Wise, Wittgenstein
Amaan, Callon, Foucault, Knorr
Cetina, Latour, Pickering, Wise,
Woolgar
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Table B.6.2
A Chronology of Contributions to Science Knowledge Propositions
(from Bynum, Browne & Porter 1983)
Nationality Contribution
of Greek
Change in the cosmos has material, rather than
supernatural, causes.
Water is the basic element from which all parts of the
cosmos are made.
Nature is made more comprehensible by the reduction of
theories into fewer, simpler and m o r e powerful
frameworks.
c 552-479 B C Confucius and Chinese
ThefivePhases or Elements are Metal, W o o d , Water, Fire
and following
followers of his
and Earth.
philosophy
Natural numbers (2,3,5,6,8,12...) have hidden meanings
(such as yin/yang pairs, eg, maleness and femaleness).
c 560-c 480 B C Pythagoras
Greek
Strings vibrating in octaves, fifths and fourths have
lengths in numerical ratios.
Natural numbers (1*2,3...) have hidden meanings (such as
maleness and femaleness).
The fundamental types of knowledge are geometry,
arithmetic and music.
Greek
540-475 B C
Heraclitus
The cosmos is in a state of constant change from the
interplay of opposites.
Greek
c 5 1 5 - c 4 5 0 B C Parmenides
The cosmos is essentially unchangeable, not in a state of
constant change.
A l c m a e o n of Italian-C
flc500BC
Dissection is a means of demonstrating structure and
Crotona
function, eg, dissection of the eye shows the channels
linking the eye and brain
Greek
c 5 0 0 - c 4 2 8 B C Anaxagoras
Substances are continuous (ie, can be divided infinitely).
Sicilian
Empedocles
c 492-432 B C
Fire, earth, air (or pneuma or spirit) and water are the four
elements from which the world is made, and each tends to
its natural place.
Gredc
ZenoofElea
c 490-430 B C
Heat results from the presence offirein a substance.
A technique for refuting hypotheses is to draw
unacceptable conclusions from m e m , such as paradoxes,
Gredc
Socrates
c 470-399 B C
as in dialectic technique.
The method ofrefutingthe hypothesis of an opponent by
drawing unacceptable conclusions is called a dialectic.
Such argument is for the purpose of the disinterested
Greek
Democritus
c 460-371 B C
pursuit of truth, not victory in debate.
Substances cannot be divided infinitely (ie, matter is not
continuous) because matter is made fiom homogeneous entities
(called "atoms") that are eternal, unchanging and indivisible.
Atoms are identical in their makeup but differ in their
c 4 5 0 - c 3 7 0 B C Hippocrates of
geometrical and mechanical properties.
Cos
Greek
The patient is an individual with his/her o w n disease.
Disease is caused by an imbalance of humours, not by magic
or gods.
Diagnosis should consider the whole person and precede
by logically dividing the possibilities.
Dates
c 624-546 B C

Name
Thales
Miletus
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5th-4th cent. B C Followers of
Hippocrates

427-347 B C

Plato

c 400-347 B C

Eudoxus
Cnidus

Greek

of Greek

Inflammation and other conditions which result fiom an
excess of the humour blood should be treated by blood
letting.
Epilepsy is an ordinary disease, of the brain, and therefore
to be treated by diet and drugs, not prayers and
incantations.
The role of the doctor is to help rather than confront
Nature, because the body has inherent, natural, powers for
restoring its health.
Disease in general is not distinct from the person afflicted
with the disease
There is a continuum between health and disease.
Disease is a disturbance from a healthy balance.
The healthy balance is restored by using remedies which
oppose the disease, eg., cold against hot ie., treatment is
by opposites.
Moderation is therefore the key to health.
Prevention is preferred to cure.
Medicine is generally concerned with the health of the
individual rather than with public health.
"All possible kinds of things exist"
The changing world apparent to our senses is made from
more permanent and simpler forms called "elements".
Knowledge is different from mere belief.
Reason, not observation or experience, is the source of
true knowledge.
Physics is better understood through geometry and
contemplation of the ideal.
Atoms do not exist because there cannot be a vacuum or
self-moving bodies.
The humours influence psychological behaviour.
Rules of conduct can affect individual health (hygiene).
The observable particulars of the world are copies of forms
or Ideas which are not material but are also not mental,
ie., reality is ideas, not objects.
The soul comprises three parts (reason, spirit and
appetite), is immortal and can remember its previous
existence. Thought comes from the part of the soul in the
head. Sensations c o m e the rational soul in the chest
Desires c o m e from the appetitive soul in the liver.
Madness is a mental disorder.
Just as humans have a soul, so must the world. Just as
humans are physically dependent on the world, so must
they be spiritually dependent
Curved geometrical shapes can be analysed using the
method of exhaustion
The motion of the planets is accounted for mathematically
by the motion of four concentric spheres.
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384-322 B C

Aristotle

Gredc

c 371-287 B C
341-270 B C

Theophrastus
Epicurus

Gredc
Greek

A320BC

Meno

Gredc

T h e three fundamental types of knowledge are the
theoretical sciences (physics, philosophy), the practical
sciences (ethics, politics) and the poetic sciences
(aesthetics).
There is no infinity (infinitely large, small or numerous),
merely a potential for infinity.
Light passes from observed to observer.
Colour arises from the darkening of light by bodies in the
medium.
T h e sublunary region is imperfect and is m a d e of the four
Elements, earth,fire,air and water.
The Elements can be changed into each other by exchange
of their qualities (dry-cold, hot-dry, moist-hot cold-moist
respectively).
T h e qualities of the elements are the irreducible features of
the appearance or behaviour of the elements.
Hotness, dryness, coldness and moistness define the four
elements and, because they are manifest to the senses, are
called the 'manifest' qualities.
Other qualities, like gravity, levity are hidden to the
senses, and are called the 'occult' qualities.
The manifest and occult qualities are both accessible by
reason, and are agents of motion.
Minerals and metals are formed deep in the Earth by the
mingling of the dry and moist qualities of the Elements.
The earthly elements m o v e in a linear, discontinuous
manner.
T h e heavenly bodies m o v e in a circular, continuous
manner.
The celestial region includes afifthelement the aether.
T h e source of all motion in the Universe is the prime
mover, which moves die heavenly bodies, like humans are
m o v e d by the Good. In turn, the heavenly bodies are the
source of movement in the sublunary region.
The eternal, most good mover is God.
T h e observed diumal and independent motion of the
planets is accounted for by a system of fifty five
homocentric spheres.
Gravity is an occult quality located in the gravitating
body, which tend towards the centre of the Universe.
Gravity is only found in substances below the sphere of
the m o o n , and even then not in all, eg, fire, which
levitates.
B y means of dissection, it is possible to arrange animals
hierarchically and to observe similarities between species.
Only the male parent determines the form of the offspring.
Atoms do not exist because there cannot be a vacuum or
self-moving bodies.
There is wide diversity and complexity of plants.
Matter is ultimately composed of discrete particles, atoms,
which can sometimes swerve from no external cause. This
helps to explainfreewill in humans.
B o d y and soul differ in the combination of the same
atomic units, not in substance.
Sense perceptions are reliable, contrary to Plato's claim,
in that the eye takes in minute copies of objects radiated
by them.
Hippocratic diagnosis can be used to good effect
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Alexandrian Dissection and vivisection are methods of inquiry suitable
for determining anatomy, including that of humans.
The blood vessels comprise arteries and veins. The heart
comprises a series of chambers and valves. Blood carries
nourishment from the liver. The left ventricle and arteries
carry only pneuma, holding blood only when the artery is
cut because Nature abhors a vacuum.
Nerves are confirmed by dissection as channels between
the brain and sense organs.
fl c 280 B C
Erasistratus
Greek
A s for Herophilus.
Digestion is a mechanical process, not the conversion by
heat into chyle, then the humours.
Euclid
Gredc
The known geometry can be organised as axioms (used in
both Greek and Islamic science traditions).
Light travels in straight lines, which can be described
geometrically.
There is an infinite amount of prime numbers.
Vision works by the eye sending out invisible rays
(pneuma) to form an impression of objects.
d. after 127 B C Hipparchus
Gredc
Calibrated sighting instruments, such the astrolabe,
quadrant and armillary sphere enable measured
astronomical observations.
The positions of the equinoxes m o v erelativeto the fixed
stars.
Roman
fl 1st cent B C Vitruvius
S o u n d comprises vibrations or compressions.
Roman
Reverberation and interference can arise in auditoria.
c 95-55 B C
Lucretius
M a n is subject to the same natural law as the rest of
Nature.
Alexandrian Matter is composed of discrete particles, or atoms.
20BC-AD50
Philo Judaeus
M a n and the cosmos are equally m a d e of a mixture of the
four elements.
There are some numerological correspondences between
Pliny the Elder R o m a n
c 23-79 A D
man and the cosmos, such as the stars.
Components of tar can be separated by distillation.
flc62AD
o f Alexandrian Volcanoes can be better understood through observation.
Hero
Alexandria
Sound comprises vibrations or compressions.
Egyptian
Ptolemy, C.
c 100-170 A D
The Egyptian calendar of 1 year=365 days is useful in
making astronomical calculations.
Aristotelian physics shows that the Earth is at rest
Geometry shows that the Earth is the centre of the
Universe and that the stars m o v e together as a sphere.
Aristotelian physics shows that celestial motion, which is
regular, is circular.
Astronomical calculations must conform to mathematics
rather than observations.
The behaviour of light rays can be described
geometrically.
The planets orbit the Earth in a series of epicycles.
The angle of light reflection equals its angle of incidence.
Experiment shows a relationship between the angle of
refraction and the medium of refraction.
Light passes from observer to observed.
Navigational position can be defined using a system of
coordinates comprising parallels and meridians.
The zero symbol can be used in expressing sexagesimal
fractions.
Calibrated sighting instruments, such the astrolabe,
quadrant and armillary sphere enable measured
astronomical observations.
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of GraecoRoman

c 200
965-c 1040

Al-Haytham
(Alhazen)

Egyptian

980-1037

Avicenna

Persian

The practical medicine of the Hippocratics (4th-5th cent
B C ) can be combined with Plato's idealist philosophy by
means of Aristotle's logic.
Anatomy can be integrated with Hippocratic theories of
humours.
There are structural similarities between humans and other
animals.
The cranial nerves can be classified.
The control of food and drink affects health and the control
of disease.
Disease is mainly the result of imbalance between the four
humours, bile, phlegm, blood and black bile or
"melancholy".
A s advocated by the Hippocratics, and contrary to
Erasistratus, food is converted by heat into chyle, then
into the four humours, then into the body.
Dissection is a useful technique, despite being illegal.
Medical knowledge is advanced by experiment
Bodily organs require a combination of humours (factors)
to work normally and without which their working is
impaired.
The three main faculties are genesis, growth and nutrition.
Purpose is reflected in function, ie., form or structure is
related to physiological function.
The three main organs are the heart brain and the liver.
The body is kept alive by the heart
The heat is nourished by the blood and ventilated by the
lungs.
The innate heat in the heart promotes coction in the
stomach, whereby food is converted into chyle.
G o o d health is always susceptible to changes from the
non-naturals.
There are six necessary causes of health and disease: the
air; food and drink; inanition;repletion;motion and rest
sleep and waking.
Disease can be treated by diet and drugs.
Drug mixtures are calibrated with the disease.
The crystalline humour is the sensitive part of the eye.
Magnetic compasses used in China 1000
years before Europe.
Intromission (the movement of light from observed to
observer, favoured by Aristotle) is a superior explanation
to extromission (the movement of light from observer to
observed, favoured by Euclid and Ptolemy).
Reflection from a curved surface can be calculated.
Refraction can be estimated.
The camera obscura and formation of images through pin
holes can be explained.
The physics of light is related to the brain.
Sensation (of the image) is separate from perception (the
interpretation by the brain).
Binocular fusion occurs in the c o m m o n nerve (optic
chiasma).
The image is inverted by the lens yet is perceived as
upright
The image corresponds to the object
The dry and moist exhalations identified by Aristotle as
the basis for minerals and metals are the Principles of
Sulfur and Mercury, ie., all the k n o w n metals are m a d e
from these two Principles.
Nest building by birds differs from h u m a n behaviour
because it is invariable.
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c1250-1310

Theodoric, D.

c 1266-1308
flcl269

Scotus, J. British
Duns
Peregrinus, P. French

c 1285-1349

Ockham,W.of

English

1423-1461

Peurbach, G.

Austrian

1436-1476

German

1452-1519

Regiomontanus, J.
da Vinci, L.

1462-1525

Pomponazzi

Italian

1473-1543

Copernicus, N.

Polish

German

Italian

Light and colour can be better understood through
experiment
Knowledge of the material world can be gained by the
method of experimental agreement
The magnetic compass is influenced by the celestial pole.
The magnetic poles of the earth can be demonstrated
experimentally by means of a model earth fashioned from
magnetite.
T w o magnets can be formed by breaking a magnet
The poles of a magnet have attractive and repulsive
properties.
Knowledge of the material world can be gained by the
method of experimental difference.
The names of categories are not real in themselves
(Nominalism), specifically finite categories like
'perfection' and 'order* cannot equate with Divine Freedom.
Knowledge is gained by observation of phenomena.
The hypothesis to choose is the simplest one thatfitsthe
facts.
Ptolemy's theory does not account for the variations in the
apparent diameter of the moon.
Ptolemy's theory inadequately describes planetary motion.
It is possible to transpose Ptolemy's system such that the
planetary eccentric orbs centre around the sun, which
travels on its sphere around the Earth.
A s for Peurbach.
The human body is a suitable subject for anatomy.
The heart works by valves.
Machines can be geometrically analysed.
Nature can be controlled or revealed by the use of natural
magic, where a wise and religious 'Magus' is inspired to
be receptive to the occult correspondences of Nature.
The Egyptian calendar of 1 year=365 days is useful in
making astronomical calculations.
The observed motions of the stars and planetsresultsfrom
their movement on spheres which are mathematical
models and probably real.
The Universe appears stable, regular and subject to
mathematical law, not in steady decay as widely interpreted
from the Bible.
The Earth is curved.
Each type of matter, whether on earth, the m o o n or
another planet has its o w n 'gravity' that attracts it to the
centre of its planet.
The Aristotelian concept of levity no longer applies.
The heliocentric model of the solar system is true, ie., the
universe so described is real, unlike Ptolemaic astronomy,
which was a useful calculational model but did not make
truth claims.
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c 1493-1541

Paracelsus, T.

Swiss

1498-1552

Osiander, A .

1514-1564

Vesalius, A .

Flemish

1535-1615

Porta, G. della

Italian

15*14 1603

Gilbert, W .

English

T h e temporal existence of parts of the universe is
imperfect, from which they can be transmuted by
alchemy.
The elements can be understood through the study of
alchemy.
The basic power that gives life to humans, other animals,
stones and spirits, is the archeus.
The archeus is stimulated in therapy to oppose poisons
that cause illness.
Bloodletting is an outmoded practice.
Chemical analysis of urine is a useful adduct to
observation in medical diagnosis.
Salt is the third Principle, of Solidity, besides the two
identified by Aristotle, Sulfur and Mercury.
The properties of substances arise from the properties of
the Principles from which they are made.
Disease is treated by ingestion of mineral drugs which
restore the correct mix of the Principles, Mercury, Sulfur
and Saltratherthan the practices of the Hippocratics and
Galenists w h o used mainly plant derivatives.
Disease results from the action of a morbid archeus in
opposition to the patient's archeus.
Disease is therefore qualitatively different from health, not
in a continuum as claimed by the Hippocratics.
Diseases can therefore be classified and treated by specifics
(remedies specific to a disease),ratherthan treating the
symptoms in the individual patient.
Diseases are also therefore distinct from the afflicted
person, contrary to the notion of the Hippocratics.
Mental diseases have some humoral (physiological) and
some psychological bases.
There are similarities between humans and the Universe,
ie., the microcosm of m a nreflectsthe macrocosm of the
Universe, eg., epilepsy, which is like a thunderstorm, the
curative power of yellow flowers for jaundice, and
"microcosmic salt", a salt extracted from human urine.
S o m e diseases correlate to particular occupations, which is
a key to their prevention.
The discovery of the N e w World indicates diverse human
origins.
Copernicus' theory is useful but since w e cannot
demonstrate its truth cannot be claimed to be true
H u m a n anatomy extends medical knowledge and is a
means for testing existing theories.
Surgery, vivisection and anatomy show that Galen's
physiology is incorrect
The heart appears to comprises two distinct halves.
The supposed site for the residue of vital spirit or air or
pneuma, one of the four elements, does not exist
There are animistic powers in Nature which are k n o w n by
the wise, and by which Nature can be manipulated.
Magnetic declination is an example of an Aristotelian
occult quality.
Magnetic attraction is accounted for by a sticky, elastic
vapour called effluvium.
Magnetite and amber attract differendy.
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1546-1601

Brahe, T.

Danish

1548-1600
1561-1626

Bruno, G.
Bacon, F.

Italian
British

1564-1642

Galilei, G.

Italian

1571-1630

Kepler, J.

German

Accurate and systematic observations of the sky are
necessary to advance astronomy.
The accuracy of observations is improved by building
larger instruments, such as sextants and quadrants, with
improved sights and refined calibrations.
Celestial spheres are an inadequate description of the
heavens, since the comet of 1577 travelled through where
they are supposed to be.
T h e movement of the Earth around the sun, as proposed
by Copernicus, appears to contradict Scripture, physics
and astronomy.
It is more likely that the Earth isfixed,circled by the sun
with the planets orbiting the sun.
Astronomical calculations can be simplified by expressing
products as the sums and differences of trigonometric
entities.
The bright light in the sky in 1572 is a n e w star, not
atmospheric disturbance.
Infinity
O n e crucial test will indicate which of several competing
theories is true.
The pitch of sound isrelatedto the frequency of vibration.
The 'force of vacuum' can only support a limited height of
water in a p u m p
Copernicus' theory is a true picture of the solar system.
A s suggested by Democritus, physics is concerned with the
qualities inherent in bodies (size, shape, location in space
and time, motion) and not in the observer, or produced by
the bodies (colour, heat sound, taste).
The physical qualities of objects can be quantified and
manipulated mathematically.
The speed of light isfinite,contrary to Aristotle's claim.
The speed of light is infinite.
The orbits of planets result from a balance between central
and tangential forces from the Sun.
The orbits of the planets are ellipses, each with the Sun as
a focus. (First L a w )
A s a planet orbits the sun, it sweeps equal areas in equal
times. (Second L a w )
The square of the time (period) for an orbit of the Sun by
a planet is proportional to the cube of the m e a n distance
from the Sun. (Third L a w )
These laws are better descriptors of planetary positions
than the models of Ptolemy.
The image in the eye is not received in the lens, but
upside down on the retina.
Planetary motion is better explained by the notion that the
resistance to m o v e from rest is proportional to the density
of a body, rather than the scholastic (Aristotelian) notion
of tendency to m o v e to its natural place.
A s with Copernicus and Galileo, but contrary to Clavius
and Ptolemy, the descriptions of planetary motion are true
or realistic views.
Also as with Galileo and Plato, mathematics can be
applied to actual or real events.
Telescope lenses can be described mathematically.

Table B.6.2 is a rough chronology of ideas in the development of science. These ideas
include scientific (content) knowledge, ideas about how to 'do' science (scientific p
and ideas about science (metascience). They are presented as simple statements or

propositions which summarise the principle idea involved. They do not include comment
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on the statement or any other background information, so that as a set they are intended to
convey a progression of knowledge propositions; no comments are given about theoretical
developments, which are discontinuous and sometimes concurrent T h e set, therefore,
includes ideas that have been falsified or discarded. Because the set has a chronological,
rather than thematic, format, it is possible to see the concurrent development of different
areas.
The chronology is 'rough' in four senses. Firstly, the dates are not given for the
publication of ideas, but rather the life-dates of the person. This avoids the complications of
not knowing exactly when some ideas were m a d e public, and leaves aside discussion of h o w
long an idea m a y have taken to b e c o m e generally accepted. (Some ideas, are not yet
universally accepted; in any case, scientific ideas are always open to revue, and there is no
absolute measure of acceptance.) Such discussion is beyond the purpose of this chronology.
Secondly, there are m a n y ideas (and their proponents) which have not found their w a y
into this chronology, but could have been included. Related to the second point is the third
point, that a few inclusions might be argued not to be as significant as some omissions. This
essentially reflects editorial judgement in attempting to balance the competing goals of detati
against overview, to convey a sense of history and to itiustrate the development of major
ideas. For example, some have been included because their names have become associated
with a structure or law and are therefore k n o w n to us, whereas others w h o m a y also have
contributed to that same discovery have been omitted.
Fourthly, the statements under contribution are couched as summary statements so that
as a set, they read as a type of cumulative summary of knowledge. They are not intended to
be comprehensive, either in the sense of all the contributions of each person, or as definitive
statements of the ideas included, or of external factors in the production of this knowledge.
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Table B.6.3
Pollock's (1986) Categorisation of Theories of Knowledge
• "

DOXASTIC
N O N - D O X A S T I C theories hold
theories hold that our beliefs are that our beliefs are partly justified
justified exclusively in terms of the in terms of the beliefs w e already
beliefs w e already hold - our doxastichold but also in terms of other
state.
nondoxastic considerations.
;

I N T E R N A L I S T theories
hold that beliefs are
justified in terms of the
internal states of the
believer.

Beliefs can only be justified by Direct realism, for example, holds
appeal either to basic, self-justifying that beliefs are justified at least
beliefs, such as simple beliefs about partly in terms of perceptual states
sense perceptions, (foundations themselves, and not just in terms of
theories), or to the general coherencebeliefs about the perceptual states.
of epistemologicatiy equal beliefs
(coherence theories).
•

E X T E R N A L I S T theories None; logically excluded
hold that beliefs are
justified in terms of more
than the internal states of
the believer.

There are various theories fitting
this category. For example,
according to reliabilism beliefs are
justified to the extent they are
produced by reliable cognitive
processes, while according to
probabilism they are justified to the
extent of their probably being true.
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Table B.6.4
Developments in science knowledge
reported in June 1996 in two journals,
as given in headlines/story by-lines
New Scientist (Australasian edition)
Stories on front cover
Issue
Stories in science update section
Tumour origins
1 June 1996 Reinventing the city
Squatters take control
Friendly toxin
Vol. 150
Symbiotic factories
Tadpole galaxies (Discrepancy between cosmological theory
No. 2032
and test results)
Playing with chaos
Treadmill illusion
Useful noise
Freshwater whales (Whale evolution)
| Sleeping echidnas
Quantum cation
Weird matter (New state of matter pictured at last)
Breast cancer setback (Not guilty verdict on cancer gene)
n,. ,
| Male infertility
8 June 1996 ..v
W h y you could catch a
Sociable shrimps
Vol. 150
heart attack
Cosmicfireballs(Strange matter of the early Universe)
No. 2033
Tiny black holes
i Sailing goes quantum (Explanation of sailing lore by
Fire engines in the sky
quantum physics)
Plant power (Renewable energy)
'Junk' D N A (New interpretation of repeated D N A sequences)
Comets' origins
Editing enzyme corrects faulty genes
15 June 1996 Alien Earth - the seven
Lunar power sends ripple round Earth
new worlds
Vol. 150
Fruit without fertilisation (A gene that makes males
Real-time evolution
No. 2034
redundant?)
Rongorongo wrangle
Maths of birds' and bees' flight
Automated Singapore
Chromosome swapping in primitive microorganisms
Enzyme that likes it hot
N e w theory of m a g m a under volcanoes
Secret of the young Sun (Comet clues to missing neutrinos)
22 June 1996 Life at two hundred - will Genes mend bones (Broken bones heal better with D N A )
HTV receptor
w e always grow old?
Vol. 150
Cloudy future (Solar system moving into cloudy space)
Seeing through the sea
No. 2035
The secret of life in the Dead Sea
W h o owns the dead?
Diary of a mathematician Cloud of gas and dust in the Milky W a y contains vinegar
Giant lake beneath Antarctica's ice
Enzyme pushes cell's self-destruct button
Embryos under stress (Why stressful lives begin before birth)
29 June 1996 Machines that dance on a Evolution as it happens (Identification of key steps in
evolution as 'jerks')
pinhead
Vol. 150
High and dry in Columbia Tornado chasers see into the eye of a storm
No. 2036
H o w mammals swam to south America
Deep-sea salvage
D o w n with state funding Primitive grazing animals wiped out early algae and bacteria
Lake life once thrived at the South Pole
(for science)
Climate change m a y induce volcanic activity
N e w jelly that changes with its environment
Similarities between changes in exchange rates and fluid flow
Star observed emitting soot (cloud of carbon)
•
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Nature
Issue

Story on front cover

6 June 1996 The Universe observed
Vol. 381
Pyroclasticflowsreconsidered
No. 6582
Directing m R N A splicing
A sociable shrimp
13 June 1996 Neurons get their timing right
Vol. 381
TGF-6 signalling goes Mad
No. 6583
The anelastic Earth
A galaxy too old
20 June 1996 Giant lake beneath Antarctic ice
Vol. 381
Neurobiology of sign language
No. 6584
Stiffness of nanotunes
HTV co-receptor
27 June 1996 A matter of taste
Genetics of male infertility
Vol. 381
Aurorae shun the light
No. 6585
Financial turbulence

r
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APPENDIX C
Summary statements of technology

Figure Cl;
A collection of s u m m a r y statements of technology f r o m the literature
T.l '[Technology is]
1. the branch of knowledge that deals with science and engineering, or its practice, as applied to
industry; applied science;
2. the terminology of an art science, etc.; technical nomenclature.'
The Macquarie Dictionary 1985

T.2 '(Technology is) the results of man's [sic] equally natural desire to find ever new and b
satisfying his needs, of achieving his goals, of doing the job he wants done.'
Foecke 1984, p.2

T.3 The purpose behind a technological activity is to facilitate human aspiration: to solve s
practical problems; to put knowledge to good use; to extend the boundaries of existing
possibilities.'
Foecke 1984, p.2

T.4 Technology is the application of science and other forms of organised knowledge towards a
specific practical outcome.'
Lowe 1987b, p.l17

T.5 Technology is a perishable resource comprising knowledge, skills and the means of using an
controlling factors of production for the purpose of producing, delivering to users, and maintaining
goods and services for which there is an economic and/or social demand.'
Definition from the U.S. National Academy of Science, adopted by the Commonwealth
Department of Science and Technology and accepted by the Senior Secondary Assessment Board of
South Australian for their Year 12 Technology Studies Syllabus, cl989

T.6 Technology is a process whereby techniques of researching, designing and making are appli
and through human, material and energy resourcestomake and control end products which will
satisfy needs.'
Gilbert 1988, pJ

T.7 Technology is a disciplined process using resources of materials, energy and natural pheno
achieve human purposes.'
Black & Harrison 1985
T.8 Technology is the application of scientific, material and human resources to the solution
human needs.'
Williams & Jinks 1985, p. 50

T.9 Technology is the construction of useful objects and materials, and the organisation of hu
activity to meet ends."
McKenzie 1987, p. 170

T. 10 '(Technology is) the study of the application of science and scientific knowledge, espec
industry.'
Heinemann Australian Dictionary, 2nd Ed.
T. 11 Technology is defined as the systematic process of designing, improving, producing and
maintaining artefacts - and the artefacts themselves.'
Genoni, cl984, quoted in NSW Department of Education 1988

T. 12 While the term "science" can claim some degree of clarity and precision, no such claim c
made for "technology". The term is used to designate a wide variety of tools, systems, products,
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complexes of activities and so on. Lewis Mumford and other historians and philosophers of
technology have attempted to introduce a more precise and discriminating vocabulary to distinguish
among a wide variety of quite distinct phenomena, but the term is still popularly used in a w a y
which confuses rather than clarifies issues.
The most commonly accepted precise definition of technology is the deployment of matter,
energy and information for human purposes. In this definition, technology is considerably more
than, and qualitatively different from, "applied science", even though it is science-based, and is at
least potentially, fundamentally different from "technocracy". Technocracy is what Jacques Ellul
has described as the triumph of the kingdom of means. It is the design and deployment of technical
systems and skills divorced from a serious consideration of human purposes.
Technology, in its popular sense, can also be considered and analysed as process, product,
institution, myth and ideology. Its technocratic manifestation, especially, has the character of
ideology in that technical skills and systems, often claimed to be value-neutral, are, nevertheless,
designed, developed, and deployed within a well-defined structure of economic and political
relationships and a deeply established set of social priorities. T h e design imperatives are so totally
taken for granted that the values inherent in them and socio-economic biases they embody are not
even recognised as such.'
Kenny 1988, p 24
T. 13 Technology is often thought of as the practical developments and applications of Science. It might
more suitably be considered as the purposeful use of human knowledge of materials, sources of
energy and natural phenomena In many cases technological applications have been developed from
scientific knowledge, but also many scientific advances have followed on after the Technology.
The development of metals for various uses, for example, and the knowledge of the chemistry of
metals grew uptogether.Recently the word Technology has taken on n e w meanings with the
development and use of computers and other new technologies associated with such areas as genetic
engineering and electronic devices.
The ideas and methods of Science and those of Technology clearly have a great deal in
common. A n d it is over simplistic to think of Science as theoretical and Technology as practical;
both have theoretical and practical aspects. For thesereasonsit is appropriate to think of Science
and Technology as one area... It is the attitudes, skills and methods of Science and Technology
which set it apart from other areasratherthan the particular content studied.
A.C.T. Schools Authority 1984, p.2
T. 14 Technology ... is a perishable resource comprising knowledge, skills and the means of using and
controlling factors of production. The application of this knowledge results in the production,
delivery and maintenance of goods and services for which there is an economic and/or social
demand.'
Education Commission ofN.S.W. cl987, p. 2
T. 15 'As long as there have been people, there has been technology. Indeed, the techniques of shaping
tools are taken as the chief evidence of the beginning of h u m a n culture. O n the whole, technology
has been a powerful force in the development of civilisation, all the more so as its link with
science has been forged. Technology - like language,ritual,values, commerce and the arts - is an
intrinsic part of a cultural system and it both shapes andreflectsthe system's values. In today's
world, technology is a complex social enterprise that includes not onlyresearch,design, and crafts,
but alsofinance,manufacturing, management labour, marketing, and maintenance.
In its broadest sense, technology extends our abilities to change the world: to cut shape, or
put together materials;tom o v e things from one place to another; to reach further with our hands,
voices, and senses. W e use technology to try to change the world to suit us better. The changes
m a y relate to survival needs such as food, shelter, or defence, or they m a yrelateto human
aspirations such as knowledge, art, or control But the results of changing the world are often
complicated and unpredictable. They can include unexpected benefits, unexpected costs, and
unexpectedrisks- any of which m a y fall on different social groups at different times. Anticipating
the effects of technology is therefore as important as advancing its capabilities.'
Project 2061, AAAS 1993, p.41
T. 16 'Technology is an overworked term. It once meant knowing how to do things - the practical arts or
the study of the practical arts. But it has also c o m e to mean innovations such as pencils,
television, aspirin, microscopes, etc., that people use for specific purposes, and itrefersto h u m a n
activities such as agriculture or manufacturing and even to processes such as animal breeding or
voting or war that change certain aspects of the world. Further, technology sometimes refers to the
industrial and military institutions dedicated to producing and using inventions and know-how. In
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any of these senses, technology has economic, social, ethical, and aestheticramificationsthat
depend on where it is used and on people's attitudes toward its use.'
Project 2061, AAAS 1993, p.43
T. 17 'Technology is even older than mathematics and science. Indeed, the latter may both have
developed atfirstin response to the need to build things and solve practical problems, although
discoveries in science and mathematics today often precede practical uses. In any case, although
technology still has a life of its own, it is becoming m u c h more closelytiedtomathematics and
science and hence is an essential part of the scientific enterprise. Understanding technology and its
connections to science and mathematics is therefore necessary for science literacy.'
Project 2061, AAAS 1993, p.323
T.18 'Following a concert given by Fritz Kreisler, a woman came up to him and said, "Maestro, your
violin makes such beautiful music.'' Kreisler held his violin up to his ear and responded, "I don't
hear any music coming out of it" Melvin Kranzberg, in presenting this story, then observes,
"when m e n [sic] and machine work together, they can m a k e some beautiful music." In this
context Kranzberg is viewing machines, tools,technicalartefacts and technique as one, a
conflation that I will show later is misleading. Each of these manifestations is however a member
of the general species, "technology".
The story and Kranzberg's observation directly align with the original Greek conception of
what technique and knowledge were, the two Greek epistemic roots from which the modern-day
meaning of "technology" was derived. The ancient Greeks had a world view that asserted human
engagement with the natural world. This world view is quite different to the contemporary world
view of industrialised society which places science on a pedestal as an independent arbiter of what
is valid in h u m a n experience and constructions of meaning. Science, for the Greek philosopher
Pythagoras, involved "the study of the comely and harmonious order of the world." Greek science
was more to do with the h u m a n engagement in the aesthetic of the "Kosmos" (or "comely order"
of things), as in Pythagorean geometry, than it was to do with the separation fostered within postBaconian science between an eternal reality and its human observation. Similarly, the Greek root
for "technology", techne, is to do with not only the activities and skills of the craftsman, but also
comprises the arts of the mind, and thefinearts. Techne, like science, involves an aesthetic, or as
Heidegger describes it a "bringing forth to poiesis", or the human construction of poetic meaning
withintechnique.For the ancient Greeks,
Beauty lay in the potential for meaning whichrealisedthe object an object
simultaneously useful, integrated and integral, or rather, both the product and
production of nature prescribed by a unifying vision of the world, gathering
about it and in it the milieu from which it took root
T h e "ology" part of the word "techne-ology"referstoknowledge about techne, literally, "words of
knowledge". Thus, the cultural roots from which the word "technology" has been derived are deeply
planted in h u m a n engagement in a world that the people are crafting, transforming and gaining
knowledge about as a harmonious and poetic synthesis constituted within therelationshipbetween
humans and nature. This perfectly expressed therelationshipbetween Fritz Kreisler and his violin.
However, by the time "technology" came to be defined by the American Webster's dictionary,
its meaning had fundamentally shifted to "the application of science to industrial use". Within this
definition, "technology" still concerns a m o d e ofrevealingtohuman consciousness, as Heidegger
would claim. However, what is 'revealed' is only that which can appear through the filter of
rationality and the application of rationality within industrialism. A s opposed to the holistic view
of the ancient Greeks, contemporary "technology" is seen more as associated with a means to an
end than it is with h u m a n activity and construction of meanings. Within the m o d e m experience of
technology, the person is a component in a collective enterprise that connectstechnicalmeans
with productive ends. Thus, the end that Kreisler could accomplish as a virtuoso violinist m a y
express h u m a n harmony. But the experience that people have of technology generally is very
different indeed.'
Hill 1988, pp. 37-8 (emphases in original)
T. 19 'Consequently, whilst the definition of "technology" has been derived from ancient Greek cultural
roots, the aesthetic order that houses human experience, and the meaning of "technology", is n o w
fundamentally different A s far as the Greeks were concerned, the aesthetic was one of harmony
derived from h u m a n engagement A s far as m o d e m society is concerned, the aesthetic is one of
harmony between smoothly integratedtechnicalsystems, a harmony that mirrors the assertion of
"instrumental" over "communicative" action. The m o d e m technological aesthetic has as its
fundamental dimension externally-mediated power and control over both the use of nature and
humanity's definition of it Thus, whilst " m e n and machines working together can m a k e some

Figure C.1: Summary statements of technology
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beautiful music" in any culture, for the Greeks the harmony is the music of human engagement
and for the modern world, the harmony is the music of smoothly meshed, quietly humming
technical systems.'
Hill 1988, p.39

T.20 ' [W]hat determines the level of opacity or transparency of the artefact text is the level of alignment
between the stock of knowledge that w e have access to within our life-world experience, and the
stock of knowledge that is hidden within the artefact Thus, returning to the original definition of
the word, "technology", the "species" is defined in terms of knowledge rather than mere physical
object but within the species, the distinction between the separate identities of tool and machine as far as life-world experience and mediation of relationships is concerned - is a distinction between
the level of knowledge embodied, and the accessibility of this knowledge to life-world experience
and construction.'
Hill 1988, p.43 (emphasis in original)
T.21 'Technology is the practical method which has enabled us to raise ourselves above the animals and
to create not only our habitats, our food supply, our comfort and our means of health, travel and
communication, but also our arts - painting, sculpture, music and literature. These are the results
of human capability for action ...
Technology is a disciplined process usingresourcesof materials, energy and natural
phenomena to achive human purposes.'
Black & Harrison 1985, p. 3
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